Abu Qatada and Palestine

416 P. Nesser / Welt des Islams 53 (2013) 416-448

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15685152-5334P0005

Welt des Islams 53-3-4 (2013) 416-448

ISSN 0043-2539 (print version)ISSN 1570-0607 (online version) WDI

* I would like to thank Hugo Lewi at the Center for Research on Communication, Educa--tion and Culture at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Science (HiOA), for invaluable assistance in the completion of the article. Lewi has provided quantitative analy-ses of text materials in Abū Qatāda’s file on the Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād website (MTJ website). I would also like to thank Thomas Hegghammer and Joas Wagemakers for guid-ance and comments on drafts. Most primary sources cited in this article are available on my Academia.edu profile page (http://ffi.academia.edu/PetterNesser).

Abū Qatāda and Palestine

Petter NesserNorwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

Abstract

Abū Qatāda “The Palestinian” is among the most influential ideologues of the salafi-jihadi movement. Born in Palestine, Abū Qatāda grew up in the Jordanian capital Amman, spent time among jihadi guerrillas in Pakistan, and ended up a militant preacher in London. Over the last decade, while going in and out of prison accused of aiding international terrorism, Abū Qatāda has worked to define the theological basis of al-Qaida and likeminded movements. This article explores the Palestinian preacher’s background, activism and ideological communication, focusing on the relationship with his land of origin. It finds that the jihadi thinker seems largely to have ignored his country of origin in both word and deed. This is counter-intuitive given that Abū Qatāda represents a movement presenting the liberation of Palestine as the heart of a worldwide armed holy struggle. However, jihadi ideologues tread a fine line between nationalism and worldliness on one hand, and transnational religious purism on the other.

Keywords

Palestine, Israel, Afghanistan, Ḥamās, jihad, tawḥīd, Islamism, transnationalism, nationalism

417P. Nesser / Welt des Islams 53 (2013) 416-448

Introduction

In spite of his Palestinian background, the salafi-jihadi ideologue Abū Qatāda has concentrated on supporting armed jihad in parts of the world other than his original homeland.1

Since the 1980s Abū Qatāda has fiercely advocated the violent over-throw of authoritarian Arab regimes. In the early 1990s he spent time among Arab jihadis in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 1993 he gained asylum in Britain and began acting as a spiritual guide for jihadi guer-rillas in North Africa and in the Caucasus. Ever since 2002 Abū Qatāda has been in and out of British prisons accused of providing religious justification for al-Qaida’s global jihadism. Seen as a spiritual leader for al-Qaida associated networks across the globe, Abū Qatāda never emerged as a figurehead for Palestinian jihadism.

Given his nickname “The Palestinian”, and the fact that al-Qaida leaders have placed the liberation of Palestine at the heart of its global war against the West, one would expect Abū Qatāda to pay more atten-tion to the Palestinian cause. This article takes a closer look at Abū Qatāda’s personal background and activism, his ideological writings and the interviews he has given to journalists and Islamic activists. It aims to find out more about Abū Qatāda’s views regarding Palestine. Does his focus on global jihadism imply that he does not care much about the Palestinian resistance, has he given upon the idea of igniting jihad in Palestine, or are there other personal or ideological reasons why he became a theologian for transnational jihadis rather than Palestinian militancy?

I will argue that Abū Qatāda’s emotional attachment to Palestine seems stronger than expected and his hatred towards Israel paramount.

1) In this article salafi-jihadism refers to the ideology of al-Qaida and likeminded move-ments, mixing Wahhabi-inspired Sunni fundamentalism (Salafism) with a revolutionary program of overthrowing unjust and un-Islamic regimes in the Muslim world, as well as irredentism aiming at expelling non-Muslim military presence and influences from Muslim lands. The essence of Salafism is absolute monotheism (tawḥīd), adherence to the original sources of Islam, the Quʾrān and the Prophetic Traditions (sunna). For in-depth reviews of principles and practices of Salafism, consult Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideol-ogy and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 2ff.; Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2009).


At the same time his role as a theologian and religious purist has forbid-den him from involving with Palestinian Islamists and nationalists.

Abū Qatāda’s relationship to Palestine thus appears highly ambigu-ous. While acknowledging the suffering of the Palestinian people and eulogizing its martyrs, he despises the Palestinian leadership, including that of Ḥamās. His disappointment with Palestinian militants’ political pragmatism—which in his view constitutes the sin of putting worldly self-interests before religion—appears to have kept Abū Qatāda in the more intransigent salafi-jihadi camp. He appears to have effectively given up on the idea that Palestine can be liberated from within.

As shown by Thomas Hegghammer’s and Joas Wagemakers’ articles in this issue, it is not uncommon for Palestinian jihadis to focus their attention elsewhere than their country of origin. There are of course many reasons why jihadism never gained a foothold in Palestine, some of which have to do with the geo-politics of the conflict area: the military superiority of Israel, security regimes in Israel’s neighbouring states mak-ing it difficult for jihadis to move around and operate in the region, and so forth. However, this article will not focus on such factors, but con-centrate on the ideological barriers jihadis face in terms of relating to the struggle for Palestine.

Al-Qaida and the global jihadi movement consist of both pragmatists and dogmatists. Organizational leaders and strategists such as Usāma bin Lādin and Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī belong to the former camp and keep the door open to cooperate with all non-jihadi Sunni Muslims or even Shias under given circumstances. Theologians such as Abū Qatāda be-long to the latter camp and do not approve of cooperation with non-jihadis. The dogmatists are often seen as the glue that keeps jihadi movements together, securing ideological cohesion through religious purism and solidifying enemy perceptions.

At the same time, such ideologues’ lack of pragmatism may prevent the jihadis from successfully joining or co-opting armed struggles which are pre-dominantly nationalist or political in nature. Both in Iraq, and nowadays in Syria, al-Qaida associated armed groups have been caught up in confrontations with competing nationalist insurgents. In both countries al-Qaida has sought to ignite sectarian conflict along the Sun-ni-Shia divide to provide a common enemy and gather insurgents under the jihadi banner. In Palestine al-Qaida cannot pursue a similar strategy


and would have to cooperate with Islamists and nationalists in a prag-matic manner, something Abū Qatāda could never be part of.

After a section on sources and method, the first part of this article presents what we know about Abū Qatāda’s personal background. The second part takes a closer look at his general ideological worldview.2 The third part examines selected text materials and interviews pertaining to Palestine. The article employs mainly qualitative methods, but includes some quantitative content analysis.

Sources and Methods

To reconstruct Abū Qatāda’s biography, I began by collecting informa-tion from secondary literature, press sources, and web forums, before gathering primary sources such as eyewitness accounts, judicial docu-ments, and expert interviews. It turns out that there are very few aca-demic studies of Abū Qatāda. Besides Arab and international press, the most complete biographical information can be found in a book by the French academic Dominique Thomas.3 His background in Jordan is covered in works by the Jordanian Islamism experts Muḥammad Abū Rummān and Ḥasan Abū Haniyya, whereas Abū Qatāda’s time in the U.K. is best documented in a book by British journalists Sean O’Neill, and Daniel McGrory.4 Other informative sources regarding the preach-er’s U.K. activities include a judgement against Abū Qatāda handed down by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), a court

2) “Ideology” is defined here as “systematic, normative thinking about how to change soci-eties”. Ideologies typically contain descriptions of societal problems, specifying their causes (diagnosis); the reasons why the problems should be solved; who should solve them (ratio-nale); as well as prescriptions on how to solve the problems and the consequences of solving them (prognosis). John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973).3) Dominique Thomas, Le Londonistan, La Voix Du Djihad (Paris: Editions Michalon, 2003).4) Muḥammad Abū Rummān and Ḥasan Abū Haniyya, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi: Identity, Leadership Crisis and Obscured Vision (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009); Muḥammad Abū Rummān, “Abū Qatāda al-Filasṭīnī, Faylusūf Tanẓimāt al-ʿUnf”, Al-Ghad.com, 29 March 2005, http://www.alghad.com/?news=15108 (accessed 14 June 2013); Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006).


handling cases involving immigrants and matters of national security, and the autobiography of an ex-jihadi who came to work as an infor-mant for Algerian and European security services.5

Having pieced together key events in Abū Qatāda’s personal history I turned to his ideological production, focusing on written materials.6 I found well-informed analyses of his ideological standpoints in Abū Rummān and Ḥasan Abū Haniyya’s book on Jordanian salafi-jihadism.7 The U.S. think tank Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) has also pro-vided quantitative indicators on Abū Qatāda’s standing among other jihadi ideologues.8 Furthermore, there are insights to be gained from literature that criticizes the Palestinian’s thinking from a normative-theological angle, accusing him of exploiting Islam for violent purposes.9

Analyses of Qatāda’s ideology benefit from the jihadi tradition of self-documentation. Followers of another highly influential Palestinian salafi-jihadi ideologue discussed here, ʿIṣām Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Barqāwī (Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdīsī), maintain a comprehensive li-brary of jihadi literature online called Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād (The Platform for Monotheism and Jihad, hereafter “MTJ”). On this website Abū Qatāda has been granted a “special file”.10

5) Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), “Omar Othman (aka Abu Qatada) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, SC/15/2005” (2007), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/SIAC/2007/15_2005.html (accessed 18 June 2013); Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda (New York: Basic Books, 2006).6) Abū Qatāda’s ideological communication also includes audiotapes and videos. For ex-ample, his file on the website Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād contains some 150 audio-tapes and one video. Moreover, an unknown number of videos are available via YouTube and other outlets, but these are not considered here because their systematic processing is pro-hibitively labor-intensive. I am assuming that the views found in his texts are representative of his general views, i.e., that there is no systematic difference, as far as content is concerned, between what he writes and what he says. 7) Muḥammad Abū Rummān and Ḥasan Abū Haniyya, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi.8) William McCants (ed.), “Militant Ideology Atlas, Executive Report” (West Point: Com-bating Terrorism Center (CTC), 2006); William McCants (ed.), “Militant Ideology Atlas, Research Compendium (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), 2006).9) Shaykh AbdulMalik ibn Ahmad ibn Mubaraak ar-Ramadaanee al-Jazaa’iree, “The Savage Barbarism of Aboo Qataadah”, SalafiManhaj (2007), http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhajQataadah.pdf (accessed March 2012).10) Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād, “Milaff Abī Qatāda al-Filasṭīnī” [The File of Abū Qatāda the Palestinian], http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed March 2012).


Abū Qatāda’s file systematizes his ideological production into: “books and research”, “conversations”, “articles and essays”, “fatwas and an-swers”, “novels and poems”, “audios”, “videos”, “statements” and “brochures”.11 Publications appear to have been added chronologically under each category and the administrators of the website update the file when new materials become available.12 As of March 2013, 185 entries contained text materials. Most of the texts date back to the 1990s and early 2000s, before Abū Qatāda was arrested.13 However, he has also authored texts and given interviews while incarcerated, which have been made available via the MTJ website.14

I first skimmed the text materials familiarizing with the broader ide-ological framework. Zooming in on the preacher’s views on Palestine, texts containing references to Palestine in their titles were singled out. Next I received assistance from Hugo Lewi at Oslo and Akershus Uni-versity College of Applied Science (HiOA), who extracted all texts in Abū Qatāda’s MTJ-file and identified overall and text-specific frequen-cies of words relating to Palestine. The search terms were: “Filasṭīn” (Palestine), “yahūd” (Jews), “ʿIsrāʾīl” (Israel), “al-dawla al-yahūdiyya” (the Jewish state), “Ghazza” (Gaza), “Ḥamās”, and “Aḥmad Yāsīn” (Ḥamās’s deceased spiritual leader).

We also compared frequencies of Palestine-related words with fre-quencies of a number of other geographical names and topics Abū Qatāda has shown an interest in, including: “al-Shishān” (Chechnya), “al-Qawqāz” (Caucasus), “al-Jazāʾir” (Algeria), “al-Urdunn” (Jordan), “jihād” (Holy War), “al-gharb” (the West), “tawḥīd” (God’s oneness), “kufr” (disbelief ), “murtadd” (apostate), “takfīr” (excommunication), “qitāl” (armed struggle), etc.

11) Ibid.12) The MTJ website also has an English section. Many of the translations posted there stem from the jihadi translation bureau At-Tibyan Publications, http://www.tibyan.co.cc/ (accessed March 2012).13) Few of the texts are dated, but several dates are known from other publications in which they have appeared, e.g. GIA’s al-Anṣār magazine. Some of the texts also contain references to current affairs and thus indicate the approximate time of publication.14) See e.g. Raffaello Pantucci, “British Hostage Threatened with Death Unless Abu Qatada is Released from British Prison”, Terrorism Monitor, 7 (13) (2009).


To provide an additional indicator on the relative importance of Pal-estine in this corpus, we measured the density of Palestine-related words in text or text passages, and conducted so-called cluster analyses that compared combinations of words related to Palestine with combinations of words representing other topics.

Through this combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, we identified 10 texts on the MTJ website that were deemed particu-larly relevant for the study of Abū Qatāda’s relationship with Palestine.15 These texts were subjected to further qualitative analysis. As will become evident, very few of Abū Qatāda’s texts deal with Palestine issues per se, and the most informative source regarding the subject matter is in fact an interview with Abū Qatāda in which the preacher was asked directly about how he relates to his homeland.

Abū Qatāda’s Background and Activism

Abū Qatāda is the alias or “kunya” of a Jordanian-Palestinian named ʿUmar b. Maḥmūd Abū ʿUmar.16 His family originally hails from the village of Dayr al-Shaykh between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and ended up living in the Jordanian capital Amman. According to different sources Abū Qatāda was born in 1960 or 1961 in Bethlehem. There is

15) The sample included the following texts, which will be addressed in the following anal-yses: 1) “Qirāʾa fī l-Nabawāt” [Readings in Prophecies]; 2) “Al-Ruʾya al-Sharʿiyya li-Aḥdāth Amrīkā” [The Legality of the Events in America (9/11)]; 3) “Tilka Ummat Muḥammad Ṣallā Allāh ʿalayhi wa-Sallam wa-lan Tamūta” [Such is the Umma of Prophet Muḥammed (pbuh) that Will Not Die]; 4) “Ḥasan Ḥanafī—Zandaqat al-Yasār al-Dīnī” [Ḥasan Ḥanafī, the Heresy of the Religious Left]; 5) “Al-Islām wa-Amrīkā–ʿAlāqa Sayf Yaṣnaʿhua” [Islam and America–A Relationship Made Out for the Sword]; 6) “Al-Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād” [Jihad and Interpretation]; 7) “Bayān Nuṣra wa-Taʾyīd ilā l-Mujāhidīn wa-l-Ahl fī Ghazza al-Ṣābira al-Mujāhida” [Statement of Support and Aid to the Mujahidin and the People in Struggling and Patient Gaza]; 8) “Bayān ilā l-Muslimīn min al-Shaykh Abī Qatāda al-Filasṭīnī” [Ad-dress to the Muslims from Abū Qatāda The Palestinian]; 9) “Juʾnat al-Muṭayyibīn” [The Bowl of Perfume for the People of Odor] 10) “Ḥiwār maʿa l-Shaykh Abī Qatāda min Dākhil al-Sujūn al-Brīṭāniyya” [Conversation with the Shaykh Abū Qatāda inside the British Pris-ons], http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 14 June 2013).16) The alias probably refers to one of Prophet Muḥammad’s companions and a narrator of Prophetic Traditions (aḥādīth), known as Abū Qatāda al-Anṣārī al-Silmī, http://library.is lamweb.net/newlibrary/showalam.php?ids=60 (accessed 14 June 2013).


very little information in media sources and academic works regarding exactly when, why and how the family moved to Amman. However, a 2012 article by the British tabloid The Sun, which presumably is based on an interview with the preacher’s brother, appears to shed some new light on the matter.17 According to the article the family was forced to leave Deir al-Sheikh for a refugee camp situated in Bethlehem during the Israeli occupation in 1948. Reportedly, the loss of the home-village to the Israelis left the whole family with a “burning” sense of injustice and an urge to retrieve the occupied land. However, for unknown rea-sons they moved from Bethlehem to Amman at some point during the 1960s. It is probably safe to assume that this happened during the tur-moil of the next Arab-Israeli war in 1967, but I found no sources con-firming this. Apparently, Abū Qatāda was thus born into a displaced refugee family carrying a strong Palestinian identity and anti-Israeli sen-timent.

Several and seemingly well-informed sources claim that in Amman, Abū Qatāda’s family settled in the poor district called Raʾs al-ʿAyn, where his father set up a small butchery and food stall.18 To people from the area the young Abū Qatāda was known as a pious and studious man involved in social and religious activism including the setting up of a local mosque named The Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-khulafāʾ al-rāshidūn), in which he also functioned as imam from time to time.19As a youth he reportedly spent much time studying religious texts togeth-er with one of his friends.20

17) “Room with Abu”, The Sun, 15 April 2012, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/fea tures/4257599/Qatadas-rundown-Jordan-flat-awaits-lets-put-him-in-it.html (accessed 23 June 2013). The Sun is usually not regarded as a reliable source in academic work, but the context of the article and the purported sources provide exclusive information which is by no means improbable or contradicting information retrieved from other sources. 18) “Shaqīq ‘Muftī’ al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya ʾItahamma wa-Barāʾ fī Qaḍiyyat Bīʿat al-Imām” [Brother of the Scholar of The Islamic Groups Accused and Exonerated in the bayʿat al-imām Case] , al-Ḥayāt, 18 February 1996.19) “Taqrīr ḥawla Nashʾat al-Shaykh Abū Qatāda fī l-Urdunn”, [Report on Shaykh Abū Qatāda’s Childhood in Jordan] Al-Jazeera documentary (2005), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIPisvVpqHg (accessed 14 June 2013).20) Ibid. Taḥqīq means verification of aḥādīth (Prophetic traditions) by tracing the chain (isnād) of narrators back to a credible reliable source among the first Muslims. By way of taḥqīq, Islamic scholars classify aḥādīth as “ṣaḥīḥ” (true), “ḥasan” (good/acceptable) and


Strongly religious, but apparently not extreme in a political sense, Abū Qatāda joined the Tabligh movement as a student and obtained a Bachelors Degree in Islamic jurisprudence at the Faculty of Law at the University of Jordan in 1984, after which he enrolled in higher studies.

During his early adulthood in Jordan Abū Qatāda was supposedly influenced by salafi scholars and opposition figures in Saudi Arabia, such as Safar al-Hawālī and Salmān al-ʿAwda, and, according to Dominique Thomas, he travelled to the Kingdom to attend their lectures. He would later criticize the same scholars for having become co-opted by the Sau-di regime.21

During four-year mandatory military service, Abū Qatāda was report-edly assigned to the post of a low-ranking warrant officer inside military jails where he made contacts among people belonging to different Is-lamist trends. Towards the end of the 1980s Abū Qatāda had embraced salafism and together with some friends he attempted to mobilize the first Jordanian salafi organization, dubbed “The Sunnis” (ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa). However, this project failed to attract substantial numbers of members.22

When Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Abū Qatāda gained some notoriety and became highly unpopular on the Jordanian street because he publicly criticized the Iraqi president, who was considered a hero by many Jordanians and Palestinian refugees in the country.23 Apparently, he also criticized the Jordanian government for supporting Saddam Hussein, and, according to his application for asylum in the U.K., this got him into trouble with the Jordanian secu-rity services.24

“ḍaʿīf ” (weak). Two aḥādīth collections, Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, dating back to 800 AD, claim to contain only true aḥādīth. Consult e.g. ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Fadli, Introduction to Hadith (London: ICAS Press, 2002), pp. 25ff.21) E-Mail correspondence with Dominique Thomas, March 2008.22) Muḥammad Abū Rummān, “Abū Qatāda al-Filasṭīnī, Faylasūf Tanẓīmāt al-ʿUnf” [Abū Qatāda The Palestinian, Philosopher of the Organizations of Violence], Al-Ghad.com 29 March 2005, http://alghad.com/index.php/article/13197.html (accessed 14 June 2013).23) ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm (Abū Muṣʿab al-Sūrī), “Mukhtaṣar Shahādatī ʿalā l-Jihād fī l-Jazāʾir” [A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria], http://www.fsboa.com/vw/index.php (accessed 6 September 2005), p. 29.24) Ibid., p. 29 and SIAC (2007), p. 3.


In 1991, after experiencing problems with the Jordanian authorities, he travelled to Malaysia, where he stayed for a short while before going to Peshawar, Pakistan. At Peshawar University he continued his religious studies and completed an M.A. in Islamic jurisprudence. He then began to work as a lecturer at the open Islamic University set up for the reli-gious education of so-called “Arab Afghans” (Arabs who volunteered to fight against Communists in Afghanistan).25 Peshawar was the rear base for the Afghan Mujahidin and their international supporters in the 1980s, and has been a hub for jihadi networks ever since.

According to Dominique Thomas, who interviewed Abū Qatāda in person, the latter obtained a position as lecturer in Peshawar through people linked to the Kuwait-based Palestinian ʿIṣām Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Barqāwī (Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdīsī), who was already a prominent figure in international salafi-jihadi circles.26 According to Mary Anne Weaver, Abū Qatāda and Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdīsī are close friends who spent time together in Kuwait, in the Jordanian city of Zarqa, and in Afghanistan.27 Moreover, several media sources indicate that Abū Qatāda spent time in Kuwait before he travelled to Pakistan.28 How-ever, apart from Weaver’s account, I have not been able to locate sourc-es confirming meetings and interactions between Abū Qatāda and al-Maqdīsī. Moreover, it appears as if their time in Peshawar did not overlap (al-Maqdīsī stayed in the city during the late 1980s, but appar-ently returned to Kuwait shortly before Abū Qatāda arrived in 1991).29

Whatever the nature of their interpersonal connections, documenta-tion from international terrorism investigations suggests that Abū Qatāda, al-Maqdīsī and the late Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī collaborated on the setting up of a Jordan-based jihadi terrorist outfit during the late

25) E-Mail correspondence with Dominique Thomas, March 2008.26) Ibid.27) Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”, The Atlantic, July/August issue (2006), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/?single_page=true (accessed 14 June 2013).28) “Abū Qatāda–Min Sijn ilā Sijn” [Abū Qatāda–From Prison to Prison], al-jazeera.net, 19 April 2012, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/2eed98d2-c9f1-4dd4-b483-c48ee3a01222 (accessed 14 June 2013). The two ideologues may also have encountered each other in Saudi Arabia.29) Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, p. 202; E-mail correspondence with Joas Wagemakers 15 May 2013.


1990s. This group involved several persons that later would set up a training camp on the border between Afghanistan and Iran and came to play a role in establishing al-Qaida’s Iraq branch after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

On 16 September 1993 Abū Qatāda arrived in the U.K. carrying a fake United Arab Emirates passport. He applied for asylum for himself and his family, and started to preach at the Four Feathers Club (also known as Baker Street Mosque) and at his residence in Acton, West London. Addressing an audience that included a growing number of Arab Afghanistan veterans, he rallied support for Islamist rebels in Al-geria, Chechnya, Bosnia and the Middle East, and became heavily in-volved in jihadi media production.30

Under the pseudonym “Abū Qatāda al-Filasṭīnī” he wrote numerous articles, commentaries, analyses and legal opinions in GIA’s al-Ansār magazine. Most importantly, an essay series dubbed “Between the Two Methods” (“Bayna l-Manhajayn”), which was later published as a book-let entitled “Jihad and Interpretation” (“Al-Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād”).31 In March 1995 he issued a famous fatwa legitimizing the killing of the offspring and wives of Algerian soldiers and policemen as a means to “ward off the exposure and killing of the Brothers” in Algeria (“brothers” referring to GIA’s jihadis).32 This fatwa has been much criticized, even by likeminded militants such as Abū Qatāda’s pupil, the Egyptian Abū Ḥamza al-Miṣrī (see below).33

30) See Abū Qatāda’s profile on the MTJ website which claims he contributed to several jihadi magazines, including Nidāʾ al-Islām, LIFGs publication al-Fajr and others, http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 21 June 2013). 31) Abū Qatāda, Al-Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād: Taʾammulāt fī l-Manhaj (ʿAmmān: Dār al-Bayāriq, 1999). For practical reasons in the article I refer to an online, searchable word version of the book, available at abokatada.110mb.com/kotob/aljihad.doc (accessed 14 June 2013).32) Abū Qatāda defended this fatwa in a televised debate in November 2000 and in an in-terview with CNN in November 2001: consult SIAC (2007), p. 7. See also the original fatwa in Majallat al-Anṣār, no. 90, 30 March 1995 entitled “Jawāz Qatl al-Dhiriyya wa-l-Niswān Darʿan li-Khaṭar Hatk al-ʿIraḍ wa-Qatl al-Ikhwān” [Permission to Kill the Children and Women In Order To Ward Off the Danger of Tearing Apart of the Land and Killing of the Brothers] (on file with author) and “Q&A with Muslim cleric Abu Qatada”, CNN, 29 November 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/27/gen.qatada.tran script.cnna/ (accessed 19 June 2013).33) “Abū Ḥamza Yaṭlubu al-Uṣūlī al-Urdunnī ‘Abū Qatāda’ bi-l-Tawba ʿan ‘Fatwāhu’ bi-Qatl Nisāʾ wa-Aṭfāl Rijāl al-Shurṭa wa-l-Jaysh al-ʿArab” [Abū Ḥamza Demands That the


In mid-1996 Abū Qatāda was forced to withdraw his support for the GIA after other leading figures in London’s jihadi community conclud-ed that the GIA had violated Islamic law by murdering leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as well as emissaries of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).34 After being compelled to denounce the GIA, the main focus of Abū Qatāda’s support activism was the Islamist insur-gency in Chechnya. In a 2002 interview with CBC Abū Qatāda admit-ted funding Chechen mujahidin.35 When Abū Qatāda was arrested for the first time in 2001 on suspicion of links to an Algerian terrorist cell plotting attacks in Europe, he possessed large amounts of cash, some of which had supposedly been earmarked for Chechen rebels.36

Abū Qatāda was one of three jihadi preachers who played a key role in mobilizing jihadi networks in the U.K. and other parts of Europe in the late 1990s; the other two being the Egyptian Abū Ḥamza al-Miṣrī and the Syrian ʿUmar Bakrī Muḥammad. The three mixed with one another, but catered for slightly different constituencies; Abū Qatāda for veteran jihadi fighters with ties to armed groups, and Abū Ḥamza al-Miṣrī and ʿUmar Bakrī for new recruits, often second generation im-migrants.37

Jordanian Fundamentalist “Abū Qatāda” Repents his Fatwa Permitting the Killing of Women and Children of Arab Men in the Military and Police], al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 20 June 2001, http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=43746&issueno=8240 (accessed 14 June 2013).34) Camille al-Tawil, Al-Qāʿida wa-Akhawātuhā, Qiṣṣat al-Jihādiyyīn al-ʿArab [Al-Qāʿida and its Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadis] (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008).35) Terence McKenna, “The Recruiters”, CBC Newsworld, 16 June 2002, www.cbc.ca/na tional/news/recruiters/hassaine.html (accessed 2003).36) SIAC (2007), p. 13.37) ʿUmar Bakrī and ʿ Abū Ḥamza belong to the same ideological camp as Abū Qatāda. Abū Ḥamza was one of The Palestinian’s students, who spent some time among mujahidin in Afghanistan and Bosnia. ʿUmar Bakrī is a former member of the political Islamist Ḥizb al-Taḥrir (HUT) movement. After abandoning HUT he founded his own organization called al-Muhājirūn in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, and re-established the group in the U.K. during the 1990s. Before he left the U.K. for Lebanon following the London attacks on 7 July 2005, he had gathered a substantial following among young Britons of Pakistani and Bengali backgrounds, which he continues to guide from Lebanon via Internet chat rooms. As for Abū Ḥamza, he took over as a religious guide for the GIA after Abū Qatāda de-nounced the group in mid-1996. Ḥamza remained a supporter of the GIA until 1998/99, when it became clear that the leader of the group was behind a 1997 fatwa declaring the whole Algerian people as unbelievers. After he cut ties with the GIA organization, he con-


There is much circumstantial evidence pointing to an association between Abū Qatāda and al-Qaida, and the preacher never made a secret of supporting the organization’s aims. However, at the same time, I did not find any sources indicating formal ties between Abū Qatāda and al-Qaida, or that he ever was directly implicated in al-Qaida affiliated terrorism.

According to Fawaz Gerges, computers confiscated from jihadi train-ing camps in Afghanistan contained evidence of extensive contacts be-tween the London-based preacher and al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan.38 An additional indication appeared in the biography of a Moroccan infiltrator of European jihadi networks in the mid-1990s. The infiltrator, going by the pseudonym Omar Nasiri, claims he was asked to deliver a message from the supervisor of one al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan, Abu Zubaydah, to a Palestinian in London known as Abū Walīd, who is known to have acted as Abū Qatāda ’s deputy at that time.39

Moreover, Abū Qatāda has on several occasions expressed admiration for al-Qaida’s top leaders. For example, in a 2002 interview with the U.K.-based Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, Abū Qatāda was confronted with claims that he had been mentioned in a poem retrieved from the Egyptian al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī’s personal computer in Afghanistan. The preacher replied that he did not believe in these rumours, but added that if they were true, he would have been truly flattered.40 Al-Ẓawāhirī appears to be one of a small number of peo-

tinued to entertain a following dominated by young people of North African and Pakistani origins, which was oriented towards al-Qaida and global jihad. The relationship between the leading jihadi preachers in London varied between cooperation and competition, or even conflicts over resources and recruits. Abū Qatāda stood out as the main theologian, ʿUmar Bakrī earned a reputation as a skilled organizer, whereas Abū Ḥamza was a reputed agitator. Consult Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (2006), and Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe–Patterns in Islamist Terrorist Cell Formation and Behavior, 1995-2010 (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2012, doctoral thesis).38) Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 223. 39) Nasiri, Inside the Jihad, p. 281.40) Abū Qatāda, “Ḥiwār Abī Qatāda maʿa Jarīdat al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ” [Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ Newspaper in Conversation with Abū Qatāda] (2009), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=xysrye62


ple Abū Qatāda looks up to, and he has authored a tribute to the Egyp-tian.41

In addition to presumed contacts with al-Qaida’s central organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan, investigations of al-Qaida-affiliated terror-ist cells in Muslim and Western countries have indicated that many terrorist operatives were familiar with Abū Qatāda’s preaching and rec-ognized him as a religious authority. For example, during the investiga-tion of the 9/11 attacks numerous videotapes of Abū Qatāda’s religious sermons were retrieved from Hamburg apartments used by the suicide-pilots while preparing the attacks.42

Moreover, according to Spanish indictments, Abū Qatāda was in fre-quent contact with an al-Qaida financing cell in Madrid which was headed by Imad Eddine Barakat Yarkas (Abu Dahdah), linked to the 9/11 network, and disrupted during the late fall of 2001.43 The same year Abū Qatāda’s name came up in connection with the investigation of a terrorist network linked to Algerian jihadi groups and al-Qaida and plotting attacks on U.S. targets in European countries. Witnesses told interrogators that Abū Qatāda supplied the plotters with money, but these claims are difficult to verify, and the witnesses did not specify whether or not the money in question was meant for terrorist-related activities.44

In 2002 Abū Qatāda’s name also surfaced in a 2002 German investi-gation into an al-Qaida affiliated terrorist organization called al-Tawḥīd (the forerunner of al-Qaida in Iraq), which ran a training camp on Af-ghanistan’s border with Iran and terrorist networks in the Middle East and Europe. A terrorist cell operating on behalf of al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād plotted attacks against Jewish targets in Germany during 2002, but was

(accessed via MTJ website March 2012). Abū Qatāda is listed as the author on MTJ, but the interview is conducted by the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ.41) Ibid., and Abū Qatāda, “Ḥākim al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya: Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī” [Leader of the Islamic Movement: Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī], http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=dh5yj8ss (accessed March 2013).42) SIAC (2007), p. 7.43) Ministracion de Justicia, “Juzgado Central de Instruccion no. 005, Madrid, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035 /2001 E” (2003) [Indictment of the Abu Dahdah Network] (on file with author).44) Confidential source.


disrupted during the planning stages.45 The terrorists in this case took direct orders from the infamous Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī, who was the operational leader of al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād and later emerged as the leader of al-Qaida’s Iraqi branch. One of the cell members explained to interrogators that al-Zarqāwī needed theological approval from Abū Qatāda (who was referred to as al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād’s religious guide) before ordering a terrorist attack.46 Furthermore, the investigations into the 2004 Madrid bombings (M-11) revealed that several people associ-ated with the terrorist cell had travelled to London to meet with Abū Qatāda.47 Also, computers confiscated by Spanish police in the M-11 investigations contained numerous videos, audio files and texts attrib-uted to the Palestinian preacher.48

In a 2009 statement smuggled out from Long Lartin prison, Abū Qatāda suggested he may have inspired people involved in failed at-tempts to bomb a nightclub in London and Glasgow international air-port during 2007. The terrorist plot involved an Iraqi medical doctor and engineer of Pakistani descent.49 Abū Qatāda explained how he met a Saudi man inside prison who was charged, but later acquitted, of aid-ing the terrorist plotters. In the statement Abū Qatāda bragged about the fact that this man told him he was influenced by his audiotapes.50

Finally, there is extensive anecdotal evidence that jihadi communities in diverse countries consider Abū Qatāda a real scholar and authority,

45) Ibid.46) Interrogations of Shadi Abdullah (May–October 2002) (translated by Steven Arons, courtesy Peter Bergen). It should be noted that psychiatric reports questioned Abdullah’s reliability, but that his testimony was still deemed sufficiently reliable to be used as evidence in the trial against the al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād cell in Germany, consult Nesser, Jihad in Eu-rope. 47) Two of the ideological mentors of the cell, Moutaz and Mouhannad spent much time with Qatāda in London, see “Juzgado Central De Instruccion N 6 Audiencia Nacional Madrid Sumario 20/2004” [Indictment of the Madrid Bombers], pp. 1143, 1223, 1355 (translated excerpts on file with author).48) For example, one of the al-Mallah brothers possessed a box containing 117 videos of Abū Qatāda, “Juzgado Central De Instruccion N 6 Audiencia Nacional Madrid Sumario 20/2004”, p. 1236.49) Woolwich Crown Court, “The Queen v Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla and Moham-med Jamil Abdelqader Asha, Opening note” (2008) (on file with author).50) Abū Qatāda, “An Address to the Muslims from Abû Qatâdah, ‘Umar ibn Mahmûd Abû ‘Umar”, At-Tibyan 2 September (2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20120206180315/http://www.tibyan.co.cc/2009/09/address-to-muslims-from-abu-qatadah.html (accessed March 2012).


and been influenced by him. For example, Italian press reported from Muslim communities in Italy that extremists had obtained fatwas on the telephone from Abū Qatāda, and used them to threaten, intimidate and excommunicate mainstream Muslims.51 Also, the Danish-Moroccan jihadi propagandist Said Mansour who has been associated with mem-bers of several terrorist cells uncovered in Denmark, was frequently in phone contact with Abū Qatāda, presumably to ask for advice.52

In spite of his presumed support for and contacts with al-Qaida, the extent to which Abū Qatāda supports global jihad remains unclear. As we shall see, his ideological writings focus primarily on the struggle against authoritarian Muslim regimes, and anecdotal evidence from a trial against the Iraqi Bisher al-Rawi, who was a friend and assistant of Abū Qatāda in London, indicates that the preacher considered 9/11 counterproductive for the “Islamic community”.53

Ideological Production and Doctrine

Abū Qatāda has written some 200 different texts, including Quran com-mentary (tafsīr), verification of religious sources (taḥqīq), religious-po-litical analyses or commentaries, legal opinions (fatāwā), as well as poetry. In terms of content, the texts cover a range of topics ranging from religious justification for excommunicating Arab governments,54 declaring jihad against apostates and unbelievers,55 justification for sui-cide attacks,56 and questions of more mundane character. For example, he addresses whether or not women should cover their hands during

51) “Italy: Pro-Bin Ladin Muslims Said Seeking To Gain Control of Mosques in Italy”, La Republica, 9 July 2002.52) Michael Taarnby, “Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in Denmark 1990–2006” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs, 2006).53) United States District Court of Colombia, “Jamil El-Banna et al. vs. George W. Bush President of the United States et al” (2004), http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/get/2041/66559/02741 display.pdf (accessed 18 June 2013) pp. 9ff. Al-Rawi argued that Abū Qatāda told him the attacks would cause problems for everyone, “alienate us”, and that “If I was asked about 11 September, shall we do it or not, I would have said no” pp. 9, 24.54) Abū Qatāda, “Al-Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād” [Jihad and Interpretation] (1999), http://www.abokatada.110mb.com/kotob/aljihad.doc (accessed March 2013). 55) Abū Qatāda, “Li-mādhā l-Jihād?” [Why Jihad?] (unknown date), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=yrvjtyr8 (accessed March 2013).56) Abū Qatāda, “Jawāz al-ʿAmaliyyāt al-Istishhādiyya wa-annaha laysat bi-Qatl al-Nafs”


prayer,57 and whether or not it is permitted to arrange religious sermons in private homes.58

However, in terms of conveying religious-political worldview and enemy perception, certain texts could be regarded as more important than others. Dominique Thomas, who interviewed Abū Qatāda between 2000 and 2002, highlights the text “Jihad and Interpretation” (“Al-Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād”), which may be seen as a broader religious explanation for why Muslims should excommunicate their rulers if the latter neglect Islamic Law (sharīʿa).59 “Jihad and Interpretation” is based on an article series that was published under the name “Between the Two Methods” (“Bayna l-Manhajayn”) in the al-Ansār magazine during the 1990s. The original articles are available individually on the MTJ website numbered one through 98.

Dominique Thomas also considers the articles “Why Jihad” (“Li-mādhā l-Jihād”) and “Globalization and the Troops of Jihad” (“Al-‘Awlama wa-Sarāyā al-Jihād”) influential texts.60 “Globalization and the Troops of Jihad” is an anti-imperialist justification for jihad against Western Crusaders and Muslim puppet regimes, and the text includes tributes to the Taliban and al-Qaida. “Why Jihad” is an exposition of the duty of armed struggle against Islam’s enemies and has been trans-lated into English by the jihadi translation service At-Tibyan, which is an indication of its popularity. “Why Jihad” also appeared on a list of recommended readings issued by the more recent, Algeria-based group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).61Analyzing Abū Qatāda’s ideas, Muḥammad Abū Rummān and Ḥasan Abū Haniyya refer exten-sively to “Jihad and Interpretation” and a booklet entitled “Character-

[Permission to Conduct Martyrdom Operations and That They Not are Suicide] (unknown date), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=d3dgishf (accessed March 2013).57) Abū Qatāda, “Hal Yajibu ʿalā l-Marʾa Taghṭiya Yadayhā fī l-Ṣalāt?” [Must a Woman Cover her Hands during Prayer?] (unknown date), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=fgyfe8my ( accessed March 2013). 58) Abū Qatāda, “The Abandonment of Masajid Adh-Dhirar”, At-Tibyan (unknown date), http://www.archive.org/download/guidebooks/masaajid_dhiraar.pdf (accessed 14 June 2013).59) Email correspondence with Dominique Thomas, March 2008.60) Ibid.61) “Al Qa’ida in Lands of Islamic Maghreb Posts Articles about Jihad, Algerian Regime”, OSC (Open Source Center) Summary of content on radical websites, dated 22 October 2007, via OSC, https://www.opensource.gov/public/content/login/login.fcc (accessed March 2013).


istics of the Victorious Party” (“Maʿālim al-Ṭāʿifa al-Manṣūra”). This text aims to strengthen internal cohesion and identity among groups within the jihad movement.62

Metrics from MTJ confirm that “Jihad and Interpretation”, “Char-acteristics of the Victorious Party” and “Why Jihad” enjoy popularity among the website’s visitors.63 However, it should be noted that while the above-mentioned texts seem popular, several other texts are viewed or downloaded to roughly the same extent. For example, several publi-cations presented as academic research seem to enjoy considerable pop-ularity. They include Abū Qatāda’s harsh critique of one takfīrī author declaring the Taliban and other Islamist movements as apostates,64 a denunciation of the 19th century Shaykh of al-Azhar Ibrāhīm al-Bayjūrī as an innovator,65 and a presentation of 40 Prophetic Traditions, which according to Abū Qatāda justify and call for jihad.66 Other frequently accessed texts include “The Legality of Martyrdom Operations and Why They Should Not Be Considered Suicide”,67 “God’s Verdict Against the

62) Muḥammad Abū Rummān and Ḥasan Abū Haniyya, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi.63) By 22 June 2013, “Characteristics of the Victorious Party” had been downloaded 26,142 times and read 127,676 times; “Why Jihad” downloaded 14,929 times and read 88,916 times. Moreover, the statistics show that each of the 98 texts entitled “Between the Two Methods”, which together make up the booklet “Jihad and Interpretation” had been viewed between 11,042 and 25,294 times (download statistics do “appear not to” function). It should be noted that MTJ website statistics must be viewed with sound scepticism. Numbers may be manipulated. It is impossible to say exactly who hides behind the numbers (jihadis, curious members of the public, researchers, security officials, etc.). Moreover, some texts need to be downloaded so as to see content whereas others can be viewed directly on the website, something that affects the numbers (a frequently downloaded text does thus not have to be popular, but rather many people had to download it because of the setup of the website).64) Abū Qatāda, “Juʾnat al-Muṭayyibīn” [The Bowl of Perfume for the People of Odor] (text has been downloaded 18,370 times by 22 June 2013), http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 14 June 2013).65) Abū Qatāda, “Al-Radd al-Atharī al-Mufīd ʿalā ‘l-Bayjūrī’ fī ‘Jawharat al-Tawḥīd’” [The Useful Atharī Response to “al-Bayjūrī” Concerning “the Jewel of Tawḥīd] (downloaded 20,028 times), http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 22 June 2013). 66) Abū Qatāda “Al-Arbaʿun al-Jiyād li-Ahl al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād” [Forty Good Ones for the People of Tawḥīd and Jihad] (downloaded 22,675 times), http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 22 June 2013).67) Abū Qatāda, “Al-Ruʿya al-Sharʿiyya li-Aḥdāth Amrīkā” [The Legality of the Events in


Rulers Who Trade Away the sharīʿa of the Merciful”,68 or “Islam and America, a Relationship Founded upon the Sword”.69

While a number of texts are frequently viewed or downloaded via MTJ, “Jihad and Interpretation” and “Characteristics of the Victorious Party” also appear to be the texts most often referred to, recommended and discussed among jihadi sympathizers online.70 Both texts are also highlighted by the MTJ administrator in the introduction to Abū Qatāda’s file on the website.71 Moreover, according to Spanish judicial documents, the terrorists behind the 2004 Madrid bombings also down-loaded several articles from “Between the Two Methods”.72

Neither “Jihad and Interpretation” nor “Characteristics of the Victo-rious Party” focuses specifically on Palestine, or on other conflict theatres for that matter. Rather, the texts address general questions such as: What is the “salafi mujahid movement”? What are the problems they face? Who are their enemies? Why should they fight? How should they fight?

Abū Qatāda’s authorship is clearly inspired by the medieval salafi thinker Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya and the 20th century Egyptian ideo-logue Sayyid Quṭb. He also seems to draw considerable inspiration from Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the 18th century founder of the Wah-habi movement. In the text material available on MTJ, Ibn Taymiyya is mentioned specifically 218 times, Quṭb 56 times, and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 43 times. For comparison, Usama bin Laden is mentioned 19

America (9/11)] (downloaded 15,964 time and viewed 5,040 times), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3bcecisk (accessed 22 June 2013). 68) Abū Qatāda, “Ḥukm Allāh Taʿāla fī l-Ḥukkām al-Mubaddilīn li-Sharīʿat al-Raḥmān” [God’s Verdict against the Rulers Who Trade Away the Sharia of the Merciful] (viewed 19,038 time and downloaded 5,484 times), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=bukjq8uf (accessed 22 June 2013).69) Abū Qatāda, “Al-Islām wa-Amrīkā – ʿAlāqa Sayf Yaṣnaʿuhā” [Islam and America, a Relationship Founded upon the Sword] (viewed 12,325 time and downloaded 5,859 times), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=rpsqsfza (accessed 22 June 2013).70) For example, on a discussion thread called “this book changed my life”, members of an Islamist forum dubbed Islamic Networking highlighted these two texts and the article series Between the Two Methods (2004), http://talk.islamicnetwork.com/showthread.php?t=1559 (accessed March 2012).71) MTJ website “Baʿḍ min Intāj al-Shaykh al-ʿIlmī” [Some of the Academic Production of the Shaykh] http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed March 2013).72) Juzgado Central De Instruccion N 6 Audiencia Nacional Madrid Sumario 20/2004, pp. 403ff.


times, Taliban leader Mullah Omar 13 times, Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī 10 times, and ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām 9 times.

Abū Qatāda is favourably inclined towards all these figures as well as today’s main jihadi leaders, such as Mullah Omar and the al-Qaida leadership. For example, Abū Qatāda has authored a warm tribute to the current al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī. Abū Qatāda also rec-ognizes some Islamist militants beyond the jihadi domain. For example he has dedicated a poem to Ḥamās’s late spiritual guide Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn despite the fact that he is highly critical of the movement more generally (see below).

In order to obtain a sense of Abū Qatāda’s views regarding Palestine, it is necessary to take a closer look at the broader themes in his writings. Just like other salafi thinkers Abū Qatāda underscores the “oneness of divine governance” (tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya) in his writings (i.e. that all mankind should obey only the commands of God as stipulated in Is-lamic Law (sharīʿa)). Building on this concept, he divides the world into two spheres, the land of Islam (dār al-islām) and the land of war (dār al-ḥarb), where the former is governed by God’s law and the latter by man-made law. He further argues that nowadays the distinction between the two spheres is blurred because many Muslims live in a state of igno-rance, being governed by man-made laws and pursuing worldly self-interest. When there are no genuine Islamic states there is constant conflict between true and purified believers of Islam representing the truth (ḥaqq), various ignorant, misguided Muslims who engage in in-novation (bid‘a) or unbelief (kufr), and the original unbelievers (i.e. non-Muslims) who all represent falsehood (bāṭil). As a consequence of his absolute adherence to divine governance, Abū Qatāda considers de-mocracy as a blasphemous mortal sin, because it contradicts the superi-ority of God’s law and embodies the tyranny of the masses.

The consequence for true believers is that they have a duty to remain loyal to divine governance and disavow or fight those who are not loyal. This is the principle of “loyalty and disavowal” (al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ). The objective of loyalty and disavowal is to purify the movement, limit it to true monotheists (muwaḥḥidūn), and strengthen intra-movement cohe-sion and identity.

Identity building may very well be Abū Qatāda’s most important contribution to the salafi-jihadi movements, and presumably the main


purpose of one of his most popular texts, “Characteristics of the Victo-rious Party”. While several jihadi ideologues have addressed the idea of a “victorious party” (which seems to be an important element in jihadi self-perception), Abū Qatāda appears to be a main reference.73 In the book he explains how the Prophet talked about a “Victorious Party” (al-ṭāʾifa al-manṣūra) that fights in the way of God to establish His reli-gion upon earth and will enter the highest levels of Paradise.

He further illuminates the characteristics of this group based on how it has been described by the Prophet and recognized ḥadīth narrators. He concludes that the group is an ever-existing, truthful and manifest entity within the Muslim community (umma), which has been estab-lished upon the command of God. The group fights against Islam’s in-ternal and external enemies and displays readiness to become martyred. Members of the Victorious Party face many challenges, being “expelled into every area” facing enmity and siege, but carrying on until the Day of Resurrection.74 Furthermore, they are “People of Hadith” (ahl al-ḥadīth) who follow the example of the Prophet Muḥammad and the Victorious Party is composed mostly of people from the land of al-Shām (Greater Syria), by definition linked to Jerusalem and the surrounding areas.75

The Victorious Party faces many enemies, both within and outside the boundaries of Islam, notably the polytheists (mushrikūn), the hypo-crites (munāfiqūn), the apostates (murtaddūn), and the original unbe-lievers (kuffār aṣliyyūn). According to Abū Qatāda, the Qurʾān and the Sunna command jihad against all enemies of Islam, but he argues that the struggle against apostates takes precedence over jihad against original unbelievers.76

73) See for example ʿ Umar Bakrī Muḥammad, “The World is Divided into Two Camps …” (London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004), http://www.1ummah.dk/uploads/8/0/7/8/8078830/the_world_is_divided_into_two_camps-sheikh_omar_bakri_muhammad-www.islamchest.com.pdf (accessed 14 June 2013), pp. 61, 178. See also Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī, “Ṣifat al-Ṭāʾifa al-Manṣūra Alatī Yajibu Takthīr Suwādihā” [Characteristics of the Victorious Party Which Needs to Grow in Numbers [sic]], http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=d8if330p (accessed 14 June 2013). The latter is also a booklet, but less known than Abū Qatāda’s work on the topic and not translated into English for wider distribution as is Abū Qatāda’s book.74) “Characteristics of the Victorious Party”, At-Tibyan (English translation), pp. 19ff.75) Ibid.76) Abū Qatāda, “Li-mādhā l-Jihād?” [Why Jihad], sub-section “Wujūb qitālihim” [The


In “Jihad and Interpretation” Abū Qatāda describes the adversaries of the Victorious Party within Islam in more detail. The polytheists and the hypocrites include “innovators”, such as Sufis and Shiites, and the “misguided”, such as the political Islamist Muslim Brothers who submit to man-made laws by allowing themselves to become co-opted by cor-rupt rulers or taking part in democratic processes. The third category, the “apostates”, primarily refers to the Tyrants (ṭawāghīt), the Muslim governments which have traded away Islamic Law for secular laws.77 While the polytheists and hypocrites are condemned to different desti-nies in this world and the hereafter, according to the graveness of their sins and reasons for committing them, the apostates who wilfully re-jected Islam should be fought in this world and end up in hellfire.78 Abū Qatāda’s main writings express particular disdain for Muslim regimes that strike deals with the West and introduce secularist political systems in Muslim countries. He often reiterates that it is the duty of every able-bodied Muslim to fight such regimes and substitute them with genuine Islamic states.79

While the core texts concentrate on identity building and the ques-tion of why purified Muslims should distance themselves from un-Is-lamic influences and fight Islam’s enemies, other texts on MTJ explain how to do it. For example, the text called “The Abandonment of Harm-ful Mosques” warns the believers to stay away from or even destroy mosques run by misguided Imams.80 “Permission to Conduct Martyr-

Duty of Fighting Them], translation of relevant paragraph “he (Ibn Taymiyya) also said it has been affirmed by the Sunnah from a number of angles that the punishment for an apostate is greater than for an original unbeliever.”, http://www.tawhed.ws/r1?i=6439&x= yrvjtyr8 (accessed March 2013). 77) Unbelief is called kufr in Arabic, and the process of denouncing Muslims as infidels is called takfīr (often translated excommunication). A person found guilty of unbelief is called a kāfir (pl. kuffār). Takfīr is a highly controversial topic in Islam, and Muslims can only be denounced as kuffār after a careful application of Islamic Jurisprudence based on carefully reviewed evidence (ḥujja). 78) Abū Qatāda distinguishes between sins out of ignorance or rejection (major and minor sins), a topic far too extensive to cover here.79) Abū Qatāda, “Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād” [Jihad and Interpretation], translated excerpt, “it is the duty of all Muslims, a duty of defensive jihad, to fight these sects (of innovation and disbelief), and the verdict is one of defensive battle, and thus an individual duty (farḍ ʿayn) for everyone who is able … and if he is unable there is a duty of preparing …”, p. 42.80) Abū Qatāda, “The Abandonment of Masajid Adh-Dhirar” [harmful mosques], At-


dom Operations and Why They Are Not Suicide” offers religious justi-fication for suicide attacks by drawing parallels to the warfare of the first Muslims, when they charged enemy lines into certain death.81

While “Jihad and Interpretation” and “Characteristics of the Victori-ous Party” do not deal specifically with Palestine, the loss of Palestine to the “Jewish state” is portrayed as a consequence of ignorance and depar-ture from “oneness of divine governance”, which empowered the Jews. Moreover, the texts geographically situate the Victorious Party—the most important factor in reinstating divine governance—in an area en-compassing Palestine. However, Abū Qatāda’s absolute rejection of politics constitutes a dilemma with regards to his stance on the Islamist struggle in Palestine, simply because the Palestinian movements are in reality left with few options but negotiation and political process facing a superior enemy.

Positions on Palestine

As noted, very few of Abū Qatāda’s texts specifically address Palestine. This is surprising, considering that he was born there, that the Arab-Israeli conflict looms so large in Arab politics, and that liberation of Jerusalem is a commonly stated end goal by jihadi groups.

Only three texts on the MTJ website have titles referring to Palestine. They include the “Statement of Support and Aid to the Mujahidin and the People in Struggling and Patient Gaza”, a poem entitled “In Com-miseration of Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn”, and a legal opinion titled “How Do You Read the Decision of Ḥamās Not To Regard Gaza as an Is-lamic Emirate?” The latter is an excerpt from an interview conducted with the preacher inside jail dated 2009.

Quantitative analysis of text materials in Abū Qatāda’s MTJ file shows that words relating to geo-politics occur far less frequently than words

Tibyan (unknown date), http://www.tibyan.co.cc/search/label/Ab%C5%AB%20Qat%C4%81 dah%20Al-Filist%C4%ABn%C4%AB, full text PDF, URL: http://www.archive.org/down load/guidebooks/masaajid_dhiraar.pdf (accessed March 2013).81) Abū Qatāda, “Jawāz al-ʿAmaliyyāt al-Istishhādiyya wa-annaha laysat bi-Qatl al-Nafs” [Permission to Conduct Martyrdom Operations and That They Not Are Suicide] (unknown date), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=d3dgishf (accessed March 2013).


relating to theology. The same pattern is seen in analyses of central texts such as “Jihad and Interpretation”, “Characteristics of the Victorious Party” and “Why Jihad”. At the same time, words relating to Palestine occur more frequently than words signifying other conflict theatres and agendas in which Abū Qatāda has shown an interest, such as Jordan, Chechnya/Caucasus, Algeria and Bosnia. Words relating to Jews and Israel occur frequently overall and in central texts. However, qualitative analysis reveals that most references to Jews and Israel occur not in pas-sages on Palestine specifically, but in general passages on Western impe-rialism and the conspiracy against Islam and Muslims.

Palestine is thus not a major preoccupation of Abū Qatāda’s. But when he does speak about Palestine, what does he say? A reading of the relevant texts reveals four recurrent messages.

First: The Struggle for Palestine Is Religious in Nature

While Abū Qatāda does not address Palestine much in his writings, when he does it becomes clear that he strongly dislikes the way the liberation struggle has been dominated by nationalists, secularists and political forces. The jihadi preacher wants to redefine struggle for Pales-tine as a religious holy war, more than anything else.

In a text called “Readings in Prophecies” Abū Qatāda focuses on re-ligious innovations, false prophecies within Shia Islam and Judaism. However, the text also emphasizes the religious nature of the state of Israel in Palestine. It characterizes Israel as a religious nation pursuing religious interests and mocks claims by Palestinians that the “war be-tween us and the Jews is not a religious war, but a war in its own right”.82 In “The Legality of the Events in America” Abū Qatāda addresses the nature of the enmity between the Jewish-American alliance and the Islamic Nation. “Is it a religious war?” he asks. “Yes and a thousand times yes!”83

In “Such is the Umma of Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) that Never Dies”, Abū Qatāda describes the loss of Palestine in 1948 (nakba) as the

82) Abū Qatāda, “Qirāʾa fī l-Nubūʾāt” [Readings in Prophecies] (unknown date), http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed March 2013), p. 2.83) Abū Qatāda, “Al-Ruʾyā al-Sharʿiyya li-Aḥdāth Amrīkā” [The Legality of the Events in America (9/11)] (2001–2002), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3bcecisk (accessed March 2013).


starting point for the spread of atheism among Muslim youth, and “the intrusion of Western concepts and ideologies on us”. So, here we have Communism, then there is Baʿthism, nationalism, and here are right- ist and leftist ideas, and so on, this is a loss in the present and the afterlife”.84

In the text “Ḥasan Ḥanafī, the Heresy of the Religious Left”, Abū Qatāda blasts the semi-Islamist Egyptian intellectual Ḥasan Ḥanafī for rationalizing away the true aim of the Palestinian struggle by arguing “if you want to liberate Palestine in the name of God, do as you please, in the name of liberalism (do as you please) in the name of nationalism, the international proletariat etc., do as you please”.85 In Abū Qatāda’s view, this is a mortal sin and one of the crimes conducted by misguided groups such as the Muslim Brotherhoods in Arab countries. According to Abū Qatāda, this approach contradicts Islamic Law, which puts the interests of Islam before worldly interests.86

The text “Islam and America, a Relationship Founded upon the Sword” elaborates on the Jewish-American conspiratorial alliance and its religious war in Palestine. He argues that Jews control the American state and its policies towards Muslims. He also writes that most U.S. presidents and foreign secretaries (Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, and Reagan, etc.) have been religiously driven Jews or Christians who believed in an end struggle against Muslims in Palestine, culminating with Armaged-don and the return of Messiah.87

Second: Palestinians Are Sinners Yet Martyrs

Abū Qatāda often comes across as having highly ambivalent feelings and attitudes towards the Palestinian people. On the one hand, keeping a cool distance as purist jihadi ideologue he condemns Palestinians for

84) Abū Qatāda, “Tilka Ummat Muḥammad Ṣallā Allāh ʿ alayhi wa-Sallam wa-lan Tamūta” [Such is the Umma of Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) that Will Not Die], http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3esy6dze (accessed March 2013).85) Abū Qatāda, “Ḥasan Ḥanafī—Zandaqat al-Yasār al-Dīnī” [Ḥasan Ḥanafī, the Heresy of the Religious Left], http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=fx45g5f5 (accessed March 2013).86) Ibid.87) Abū Qatāda, “Al-Islām wa-Amrīkā–ʿAlāqa Sayf Yaṣnaʿuhā” [Islam and America, a Re-lationship Founded upon the Sword], http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=rpsqsfza (accessed March 2013).


committing sins by supporting ignorant rulers, playing political games and failing to support the establishment of an Islamic emirate (imāra) in Gaza. On the other hand, perhaps speaking primarily as a Palestinian refugee dispelled from his country of origin, he acknowledges the Pal-estinians’ many sacrifices, and portrays them as martyrs, victims of su-perior aggressors, and persecuted wherever they go, even in the West.

In “Jihad and Interpretation”, Abū Qatāda mentions some of the reasons why he holds the Palestinian cause at arm’s length. In several passages he rages over Palestinian support for the Baʿthist regime of Sad-dam Hussein in the wars on Iran and Kuwait. With contempt he reiter-ates how many Palestinians celebrated Saddam as a “saviour” and contemporary Salahuddin, a view that Abū Qatāda found completely misguided.88

Then, in “the Mujahidin and the People in Struggling and Patient Gaza”, dated 15 February 2009, he offers what appears to be an emo-tional reaction to the December 2008 Israeli offensive in Gaza.89 The text praises the Palestinians for their sacrifices in times when the Jews, apostates and crusaders ally against them: “tanks and airplanes were poured against you and you offered martyrs and the pure blood of chil-dren, women, shaykhs and youths”.90

However, at the same time, Abū Qatāda uses the opportunity to discredit Palestinian efforts to form a unified national government in the wake of the attacks, adding: “this is not what the believers hoped for and it is not the path to grace, which is the way of religion. It is your right, believers and martyrs, before all of the world’s Muslims to declare an Islamic Emirate in Gaza.”91

In “Address to the Muslims from Abū Qatāda” from 2009, the preach-er describes his time in British prisons and reflects on his relationship

88) Abū Qatāda,“Jihād wa-l-Ijtihād” [Jihad and Interpretation], pp. 48f. and p. 143.89) The Gaza war started in December 2008 and the Israelis claimed the aim was to stop the firing of Qassam missiles into Israeli territories. The attacks were massive and were condemned by the international community as an overreaction. It resulted in the deaths of nearly 1400 Palestinians, one third of them women and children.90) Abū Qatāda, “Bayān Nuṣra wa-Taʾyīd ilā l-Mujāhidīn wa-l-Ahl fī Ghazza al-Ṣābira al-Mujāhida” [Statement of Support and Aid to the Mujāhidīn and the People in Struggling and Patient Gaza] (2009), http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=16011017 (accessed 18 June 2013).91) Ibid.


with the U.K. government. He comes close to casting himself as a Pal-estinian martyr when he attributes his own imprisonment to the British government’s “hatred” towards Muslims in general and toward Palestin-ians in particular. He also accuses U.K. authorities of prosecuting a man for presumed involvement in attempted attacks against a London night-club and Glasgow international airport just for being of Palestinian origin, and alleges that this was sufficient to conclude his guilt.92

Just as Abū Qatāda’s stance on Palestine as a whole seems two-sided, the same goes for his views on the Islamic Resistance Movement, Ḥamās.

Third: Ḥamās Could Be the Solution but Became an Obstacle

In an interview with Abū Qatāda conducted by the Egyptian Islamist activist ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Mujīd inside a U.K. prison, the preacher is ex-plicit about harbouring mixed feelings concerning The Islamic Resis-tance Movement, Ḥamās, which gained political power in the Gaza Strip through democratic elections in 2006.

For Abū Qatāda, Ḥamās represents a lost opportunity and a major disappointment. In his view the movement had both the momentum and capability to establish an Islamic emirate and introduce sharīʿa in Gaza, and to make the territory a starting point for jihad against the Jews. He explains how the Islamic community initially came to love Ḥamās for making a pre-dominantly secularist and nationalist struggle for Palestine more religious. However, when push came to shove, the movement failed to deliver and joined the political Muslim Brotherhood tendency in the “apostate democratic game”.93 For Abū Qatāda democ-racy is an innovation and a “religion apart from Islam”, and he regards every true democrat an unbeliever. However, and importantly with re-gards to his stance on Ḥamās, he qualifies this by saying that a Muslim

92) According to “An Address to the Muslims from Abû Qatâdah, ‘Umar ibn Mahmûd Abû‘Umar”, At-Tibyan, 2 September 2009, via https://web.archive.org/web/20120206180315/http://www.tibyan.co.cc/2009/09/address-to-muslims-from-abu-qatadah.html (accessed No-vember 2013).93) Abū Qatāda, “Ḥiwār maʿa l-Shaykh Abī Qatāda min Dākhil al-Sujūn al-Brīṭāniyya” [Conversation with the Shaykh Abū Qatāda inside the British Prisons] (2009), http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 14 June 2013). Abū Qatāda is listed as author on MTJ, but the interview is undertaken by an Egyptian Islamist activist named ʿ Ādil ʿ Abd al-Mujīd.


who uses democracy as a means (wasīla) to gain power cannot be called an unbeliever. Still, he is most definitely and innovator and wrongdoer.94

In order to symbolize the significance of Ḥamās’s failure and lost potential, he draws parallels to how the Prophet and his Companions declared the first Muslim state during exile in Medina, adding (for un-known reasons) that Gaza is an even bigger area than Medina.95 He also contradicts Ḥamās’s actions to the exemplary behaviour of the Afghan Taliban, which chose to pursue an Islamic emirate no matter what the consequences.

However, although Abū Qatāda considers Ḥamās’s actions strongly misguided, he by no means proposes to excommunicate the movement the way he does with the Middle Eastern Muslim regimes he despises so much. On the contrary, he authored a strong religious defence on behalf of the Taliban, Ḥamās and other political Islamist movements when they were accused of apostasy by other extreme salafis.

In the text “The Bowl of Perfume for the People of Odor”96 Abū Qatāda criticizes a text entitled “Exposure of Doubts Concerning Those Who Fight” attributed to a certain ʿAbdallāh Muwaḥḥid and dated 5 May 2000.97

94) Abū Qatāda, “Juʾnat al-Muṭayyibīn” [The Bowl of Perfume for the People of Odor], http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 20 June 2013), p 48.95) I am not sure why he raises this as I never came across jihadi discourse indicating that the size of a territory matters in decisions on whether or not to declare an emirate. Jihadis have declared emirates in small or large areas, or just within a social group for that matter. The main function of an emirate is to introduce Islamic Law, and should in principle be possible wherever you have a group of people and a recognized religious authority qualified to practice Islamic Jurisprudence. 96) The title refers to a 7th century treaty between tribes on the Arabian Peninsula, regulat-ing commerce among Muslims as well as with non-Muslims. The pact was called ḥilf al-fuḍūl (Alliance of Exellence) or ḥilf al-muṭayyibīn (Alliance of the People of Odor). At the initia-tion of the treaty one of the tribes (banū ʿabd al-dār) dipped their hands into a bowl of perfume and wiped them dry onto the Kaʿba, see e.g. Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych, The Mute Immortals Speak: Pre-Islamic Poetry and the Poetics of Ritual (New York: Cornell Uni-versity Press, 1993). The meaning in this context is probably that because the Prophet and the first Muslims made deals with and cooperated with non-Muslims, the threshold for excommunicating Muslims (in this case the Taliban) should be considered very high.97) ʿAbdallāh Muwaḥḥid, “Kashf Shubuhāt al-Muqātilīn” [Exposure of Doubts Concerning Those Who Fight] (2000), on file with author. Consult discussions about the text on the website Anā Muslim li-l-Ḥiwār al-Islāmī, http://www.muslm.net/vb/archive/index.


This text, which has sparked some controversy among jihadis, pro-vided religious arguments for the excommunication of movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Ḥamās in Palestine, the Muslim Brother-hood (specifying its Syrian branch), and the Islamic Movement of Kurd-istan. While Abū Qatāda’s critique concentrates on defending the Taliban, by analogy it shows that Abū Qatāda does not consider par-ticipating in democratic politics (in the way Ḥamās has done) an unfor-givable sin.

ʿAbdallāh Muwaḥḥid declared the Taliban apostates because the movement follows Deobandi Islam, because its followers worship graves, and because the Taliban leadership sought membership of the UN. As for the other movements mentioned—such as Ḥamās and the Kurdish Islamist separatists—the author declared them unbelievers for pursuing nationalist and democratic causes instead of Islam.

Abū Qatāda takes the author to task, describing him as “ignorant” and “deviant” for not applying appropriate principles of Islamic juris-prudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Abū Qatāda further criticizes him for failing to confer sources and scholars properly, and for not understanding the dif-ferent levels (marātib) of Islamic jurisprudence, the reality or the stan-dards of evidence (dalāʾil) and the evidence (ḥujja) needed do declare excommunication of Muslims.

As highlighted by one forum member on the Anā Muslim web portal, Abū Qatāda’s defence underscores that “takfīr is not issued without a specified Islamic contract, only after verification and strong opinion, especially when it concerns sects working for the realization of Islam on earth, so the issuing of takfīr against such sects without the opinion of the scholars is not the way of the believers”.98

In the text Abū Qatāda states that there is no legal precedent for ex-communicating the Taliban merely for being Deobandi (quoting mul-

php/t-390234.html. The pseudonym ʿAbdallāh al-Muwaḥḥid presumably signifies several authors. For an account of the text’s origin, consult http://www.metransparent.com/old/texts/peshawar_group_letter_abdul_hamid_al_suri.pdf (accessed March 2013).98) “Ju’nat al-Muṭayyibīn” as quoted in the discussion thread entitled “Ḥamās Talʿabu Dawr Fatḥ fī Ghazza” [Ḥamās Plays the Role of Fatḥa in Gaza] which appeared on the “I am Muslim Network” (Shabakat Anā Muslim) in November 2006, http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=412543 (accessed March 2013).


tiple salafi scholars, primarily Ibn Taymiyya). He further confirms that the worship of graves (practiced by some Afghanis) is indeed to be con-sidered innovation or polytheism, but explains that there is no legal precedence for excommunication of the Taliban on this basis (quoting among others Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb). As for Taliban’s relations with the UN, Abū Qatāda agrees with ʿAbdallāh Muwaḥḥid’s claims that it would be a major sin and reason for takfīr if the movement submitted to the man-made laws the UN represents. However, he claims to have discussed the matter with Taliban representatives who told him that the movement set as conditions for joining the UN that they would not compromise on matters relating to Islamic law, and that such condi-tions absolve the movement from heresy. Abū Qatāda seems to agree, leaving some room for excusing Ḥamās’s pragmatic behaviour in Gaza.

Fourth: Palestine Can Only Be Liberated from Abroad

The aforementioned interview conducted by ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Mujīd is the text on MTJ that provides the richest and most concrete insights of Abū Qatāda’s views on Palestine. The conversation indicates a tension be-tween, on the one hand, the preacher’s emotional connection to the country of origin and, on the other hand, his ideological puritanism which transcends state boundaries and nationalist ideas, focusing on divine governance and internal cohesion among true believers of Islam.

Asked about the future of Palestine, Abū Qatāda does in fact place the occupation of Palestine at the centre of the global struggle, as a driver for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and as an eternal “factor in instigation and awakening the Islamic community from discouragement all over the world”.99 However, at the same time he makes it very clear that the root cause of all problems of Muslims, including the occupation of Palestine, is the apostasy of Muslim regimes.

First and foremost he blames the consolidation of the Jewish- Crusader alliance in Palestine on the “apostate traitor client system” spearheaded by the Hashemite Kings of Jordan who sided with the

99) Abū Qatāda, “Ḥiwār maʿa l-Shaykh Abī Qatāda min Dākhil al-Sujūn al-Brīṭāniyya” [Conversation with the Shaykh Abū Qatāda inside the British Prisons] (2009), http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=aheed274 (accessed 14 June 2013).


enemy against the Muslims. However, while liberating Palestine is a stated goal, Abū Qatāda also says “it is not possible to solve the issue without the fall of the apostate regimes and formation of an Islamic state around Palestine”.100 Thus, instead of a successful liberation struggle from within the territories, he foresees a consolidation of Islamic states and armies in the area, which will then re-conquer the Holy Land:

I believe, my dear brother, that the Palestine issue will never be solved absent an Islamic Army, entering from abroad. However, the main factor in achieving victory is the persistence of the Palestinian people and their determination with regards to the principles that Palestine as a whole is Islamic land, that no-one has the right to intrude on this land, and that the treaties [international treaties regarding Palestine’s status] are not worth the ink with which they were written. The solution I imagine [an Islamic conquest], implies the fall of the apostate system and the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine’s surrounding area [Syria, Jordan, Egypt, etc.]. Verily, it will be an Egyptian Army and a Shāmī [Greater Syrian] Army that will realize the divine promise [liberation of Palestine], and there is no doubt about it. This is not a question of waiting, but about preparation and work. The jihadi movements are approaching [liberation of Palestine], and what is happening in Iraq is a precursor.101

It therefore seems that Abū Qatāda has largely given up on the idea that Palestine could be liberated from within. The main reason for this ap-pears to be his disappointment with Ḥamās, which he accuses of having “connected with an un-Islamic force [political Muslim Brotherhood tendency] and joined the game of interest in the area”.102 By participat-ing in elections the movement “failed and betrayed the religion and Law” and “wasted the blood of the martyrs”.103 However, Abū Qatāda’s criticisms of Ḥamās seem directed primarily at the leadership, which he claims has “entered the way of the enemies”.104 This could refer to the movement’s forceful crackdowns of the competing salafi-jihadi groups that started to emerge in Gaza in the early 2000s and increased in num-

100) Ibid.101) Ibid. 102) Ibid.103) Ibid.104) Ibid.


ber and strength after Ḥamās decided to curb rocket attacks on Israel after seizing power in Gaza in 2006.105

These groups have been composed primarily of former members of Ḥamās and Islamic Jihad or other Palestinian resistance groups that opposed the decision to form a democratically elected government and halt operations against Israel. However, I did not come across specific statements indicating that Abū Qatāda sees in these new groups poten-tial for a successful Palestinian jihad. Rather, somewhat curiously, he expresses that he wants Ḥamās to remain in leadership, and appeals to the “righteous” among the movement to return to the “principles … jihad and martyrdom, as in the beginning”.106

Conclusion

This inquiry into Abū Qatāda’s background and writings highlights sev-eral paradoxes. The man who is seen as one of al-Qaida’s main ideologues does not actually care so much for global jihad. He is mainly concerned with jihad against Muslim regimes in the Middle East, and above all the Jordanian regime, which he holds responsible for the loss of Palestine and other injustices against Muslims.

Furthermore, whereas Abū Qatāda is commonly portrayed as a takfīrī who excommunicates Muslims who do not follow his purist salafi code of conduct, his willingness to defend the Taliban and Ḥamās against accusations of apostasy indicates that he may be somewhat more restric-tive in the area of takfīr than has been assumed.

His relationship with Palestine, which is our main concern here, seems complicated to say the least. Abū Qatāda grew up in a family displaced during the 1948 Israeli occupation and longed to return. Born in the then Jordanian-controlled West Bank town of Bethlehem, he gained Jordanian citizenship, grew up mostly outside the Palestinian territories and seemingly never developed close relations with resistance

105) International Crisis Group (ICG), “Radical Islam in Gaza”, Middle East Report no. 104 (2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.ashx (accessed 21 June 2013).106) Ibid.


movements inside the Palestinian areas. Abū Qatāda became furious when many Palestinians expressed support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. He became further estranged from the Palestinian cause when the dominant Islamist faction Ḥamās—which Abū Qatāda ini-tially saw as the only hope for igniting a viable jihad against Israel from the Palestinian territories—went against all he stands for ideologically by pursuing a relatively pragmatic political strategy.

Although Abū Qatāda clearly despises Israel and justifies every effort to harm its interests, he prioritizes the struggle against Islam’s internal enemies, especially those that dabble in democracy. His obsession with divine governance makes it close to impossible for him to play any role in Palestine where the jihadis are cornered and achieve nothing without political compromise.

While Abū Qatāda appears to harbour emotional connections to his homeland, he has given up, ideologically and intellectually, on the local struggle and calls for its re-conquest from abroad. Seemingly in order to emphasize his contempt for nationalism and total adherence to pan-Islamic transnationalism, he concludes the 2009 prison interview by saying: “As for me returning to Palestine I hope to die in exile even if Palestine was returned. Palestine will be returned not only to its people but all Muslims.”

Abu Qatada and Palestine

Documents