Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Malaysia’s Neo-Conservative Intellectuals

© Pacific Affairs: Volume 86, No. 1 March 2013 73

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Malaysia's Neo-Conservative

Intellectuals Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail and

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid*

Abstract

This article discusses the role played by neo-conservative intellectuals during the tenure of Malaysia’s fifth prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009). Abdullah’s leadership was distinguished by two qualities which arguably qualify it as “neo-conservative,” in terms of revival of policies from a bygone era and the launching of political reforms within the framework of a conservative regime led by the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party. Using the theoretical experiences of dominant conservative regimes in the Soviet Union, Japan, China and Taiwan, the present authors are of the view that the policies and approach undertaken by Abdullah constitute a sharp departure from those of his predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, for twenty-two years (1981-2003). Particularly eliciting controversy was the trust Abdullah put into a team of young advisors led by his son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin. In this article, we look at how these young neo-conservative intellectuals, together with several identifiable individuals, brought about reforms in Abdullah’s leadership and impacted on UMNO politics. We discover that, notwithstanding their enthusiasm for progressive reforms, these intellectuals had underestimated the strength of reactionary and conservative elements existing within an UMNO-based interlocking system, hence reducing them to an anomaly amongst these forces. The perception deficit befalling these reformists was aggravated by their encroachment into the political economy of the UMNO rentiers and prevailing weaknesses in Abdullah’s support system. The article seeks to contribute to the discourse on intra-elite conflicts in dominant conservatives regimes, such as have taken place in dominant parties like the UMNO.

Keywords: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, UMNO, Khairy Jamaluddin, Mahathir Mohamad, dominant party system

doI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2013861073

* Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail wishes to thank the UKM and the Sumitomo Foundation, Japan for sponsoring his visiting research fellowships at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-Jetro), Japan. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid is grateful to the USM and the Sumitomo Foundation, Japan, for providing grants which facilitated research for this article. Both authors would like to express their gratitude to two anonymous reviewers whose comments have proven useful towards improving this article.

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Pacific Affairs: Volume 86, No. 1 – March 2013

The passing of Malaysia’s leadership baton from the fourth prime minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), to his handpicked successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, spelled out significant changes

for the country’s political trajectory. The changeover enabled Abdullah to embark on a slew of ambitious political reforms in what some observers have arbitrarily termed a de-Mahathirization process.1 This article does not seek to discuss the nature and implications of all the changes, but merely broaches one controversial issue which is believed to have undergirded most of the attempted reforms of Abdullah’s era (2003-09), in terms of his reliance on a team of relatively young advisors and a few other individuals we identify as neo-conservative intellectuals. Different from journalistic analyses, which tend to be pejorative, the present authors see these advisors as the intellectual forces behind Abdullah’s reform endeavour, undertaken within the constraints of the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO)’s conservative regime.

For further discussion, this article is organized into four sections. First, we explore the position of the UMNO as a dominant conservative regime by focusing on its interconnected internal structure and deeply factionalized character. Second, we develop a theoretical understanding of neo-conservative leadership in the context of Malaysia by applying it to Abdullah’s leadership. Third, we look at the support system behind Abdullah’s leadership and discuss the roles played by these neo-conservative intellectuals as embodied by a few primary personalities, namely Abdullah’s son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin, and his young cohorts; the New Straits Times editor-in-chief, Kalimullah Hassan; and former minister in the prime minister’s department in charge of legal affairs, Zaid Ibrahim. Finally, we argue that not only did reforms pursued by Abdullah receive stiff opposition from and were effectively diluted by UMNO conservatives, but they were also at the same time emasculated by the reformers’ inability to move parallel alongside the UMNO’s mainstream and by Abdullah’s feeble support system. Apart from utilizing secondary sources, data for this article is strengthened through direct interviews with four members of Abdullah’s cabinet, including Abdullah himself, authoritative scholars and a few close companions of Abdullah.

The UMNo as a dominant Conservative regime

In the literature on dominant party systems, one can find various typologies which are suitable for parties like the UMNO. Some examples are “dominant party regimes,”2 “competitive authoritarianism,”3 “authoritarian dominant

1 Khoo Boo Teik, “De-Mahathirising Malaysia,” Aliran Monthly 23, no. 8 (2003): 2, 4-6.2 Ora John Reuter and Thomas F. Remington, “Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment

Problem: The Case of United Russia,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 4 (2009): 501-526.3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold

War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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Abdullah Badawi and Neo-conservative Intellectuals

party”4 and “electoral one-party state.”5 In our present contribution, we do not wish to proffer yet another typology that could be appropriate for the UMNO. Following Pempel,6 we are comfortable with using the term “dominant conservative regime” to portray a party which has been at the heights of power and decision making for a protracted duration. We perceive “regime” not in its pejorative connotation but as “a national political leadership,” as understood by Barraclough.7 Having been ensconced in the corridoors of power for a long time, the UMNO was not exceptional in institutionalizing conservatism as a practical ideology; the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan is another example.8 In parts of this article, we are inclined to compare the UMNO and LDP regimes, which share significant historical and structural similarities.9

A major similarity between the UMNO and the LDP lies in both parties’ patronage of interlocking systems. The LDP’s protracted hold on Japanese politics has rendered virtually inextricable the prevailing power nexuses entangling politicians, bureaucrats and business groups.10 Hence, since the defeat of the LDP in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has been unable to unwind those intertwining connections. As compared with the LDP-based system, the UMNO-based interlocking system has a more nebulous distinction between party and state, although the relations may not be as firm as China’s conservative regimes, which are propped up by single-party administrations. Still, despite differences in matters of relations between party and state, some observers have designated the LDP and the UMNO as members of the established party-state models in Asia, other than the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan and the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. In Malaysia, such intimate relations between party and state prevailed to a greater extent under Mahathir, whose strongman rule served to minimize the concept of separation of powers, expand the UMNO’s

4 Kenneth F. Greene, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 7 (2010): 807-834.

5 Wong Chin-Huat, James Chin and Norani Othman, “Malaysia–towards a typology of an electoral one-party state,” Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 920-949.

6 T.J. Pempel, “Learning to lose is for losers: The Japanese LDP’s reform struggle,” in Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose, eds. Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong (London: Routledge, 2008), 111.

7 Simon Barraclough, “Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia: A Regime Perspective,” Asian Survey 23, no. 8 (1983), 958.

8 Jose Antonio Crespo, “The Liberal Democrat Party in Japan: Conservative Domination,” International Political Science Review 16, no. 2 (1995): 109-209; T.J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of The Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).

9 William Case, “Umno Paramountcy: A Report on Single-Party Dominance in Malaysia,” Party Politics 2, no. 1 (1996), 116; interview with Chandra Muzaffar, Nordin Sopiee Professorial Chair of Global Studies at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) and prominent social activist, Petaling Jaya, 29 December 2009.

10 Richard Colignon and Chikako Usui, “The Resilience of Japan’s Iron Triangle,” Asian Survey 41, no. 5 (2001), 865-895.

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influence in the corporate world and curtail the powers of Malay rulers.11 State institutions then enjoyed a strongly symbiotic relationship with the UMNO, while the Malay elite dominated the civil service, the armed forces, the judiciary and the police.12 Control over such state resources, as manifested via approaches such as patron-client relationships, economic patronage, legal coercion and monitoring of the flow of information, helped the UMNO to perpetuate its power.

Another important similarity between both the LDP-based and the UMNO-based systems is their deeply factionalized character. It is from this prism of intra-elite conflict within dominant regimes such as the UMNO that this article finds contextual significance. Factionalism within the UMNO may be regarded as fulfilling the “degenerative faces of factionalism” category as oulined by Boucek, encompassing competition which is excessive, damaging and prone to instability.13 In Japan, similar factionalism contributed significantly to the LDP’s defeat in 2009.14 In the case of the UMNO, factionalism became a chronic malaise, as factional leaders persistently competed for the space to bolster their power and advance in the party hierarchy. By the mid-1980s, such power brokering was stimulated by the UMNO’s increasing involvement in business, making it a virtual hub for accumulating economic resources, and as manifested in the internecine conflict between Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in 1987. Further encouraging factionalism was the political nepotism engulfing politicians encumbered with the burden of preserving their family legacies, such as Najib Razak, Hishamuddin Hussein, Mukhriz Mahathir and Khairy Jamaluddin.15

Factional intensity among UMNO leaders can be understood from the standpoint of the scramble for the spoils of power. Intense competition between Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh in 1987 led to the eventual court declaration of the UMNO as an illegal entity in 1988. Jostling for influence between Mahathir and Anwar since the mid-1990s culminated in the former’s sacking of the latter in 1998 and the exit of Anwar’s supporters en masse from the UMNO. Under Mahathir’s prolonged rule of twenty-two years, power was concentrated in the hands of the executive, especially after the constitutional crises of 1983 and 1992 involving the monarchy, and the

11 Maznah Mohamad, Review of Barry Wain “Malaysia. Malaysian maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in turbulent times,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 42, no. 2 (2011): 361.

12 Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 131.

13 Françoise Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism,” Party Politics 14, no. 4 (2009): 16.

14 Ellis Kraus and Robert Pekkanen, “The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” The Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 1 (2010): 5-15.

15 Edmund Terence Gomez, “The Perils of Pro-Malay Policies,” Far Eastern Economic Review 169 (2005): 9; Diane K. Mauzy and Shane J. Barter, “Learning to lose? Not if UMNO can help it,” in Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems, eds. Friedman and Wong (London: Routledge, 2008), 223-224.

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judicial crisis of 1988, which witnessed the unprecedented removal of a sitting chief justice, Salleh Abas.16 Unsurprisingly, the power accumulation so characteristic of Mahathir lent his era an image of unresponsiveness to change; this can be seen as a reflection of the idea of conservatism as expressed in his Asian Values discourse.17 As we shall further show, the reforms which Abdullah attempted upon assuming power from Mahathir in 2003 are essentially contextual reactions to Mahathir’s past administration.

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as a Neo-Conservative

We argue that Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s leadership (2003-2009) has been the best reflection so far of neo-conservatism within the context of the UMNO as a dominant conservative regime. By “neo-conservatism,” the present authors mean a significant departure from the framework of a previously dominant conservative regime. Nonetheless, neo-conservatism has various dimensions and must therefore be employed within the context of a particular country. Our research has come up with at least five categories in which the term neo-conservatism can be conceptually applied. First, in its most general context, neo-conservatism is represented by a vigorous re-emphasis on past values, as championed for instance by former US President Ronald Reagan (1981-1988) and his counterpart, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990). Enjoying a “special partnership” during their days in power, both leaders introduced neo-liberal economics as a central agenda of their respective administrations.18 Secondly, in perhaps its most popular application during the past decade, neo-conservatism denotes an aggressive foreign policy stream practiced by former US President George W. Bush (2001-2008), under whose directives the superpower invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 on the pretext of combating terrorism and destroying weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).19 Third, as exemplified by Michael Minkenberg’s work on Germany, neo-conservatism can be conceived as the restructuring of the political spectrum.20 Fourth, neo-conservatism has also been employed to describe the rightist stream of political thought

16 Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents (London: Zed Books,

2003), 18.17 See for example two important works which establish a relationship between conservatism

and Asian Values, viz. Garry Rodan, “The Internationalization of Ideological Conflict: Asia’s New Significance,” The Pacific Review 9, no. 3 (1996): 328-351; Richard Robison, “The politics of ‘Asian Values’,” The Pacific Review 9, no. 3 (1996): 309-327.

18 Anthony Mughan and Roger M. Scully, “The Triumph of Conservatism in the West,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 3, no. 1 (1996): 229-235; Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization,” Political Theory 34, no. 6 (2006): 690-714.

19 Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

20 Michael Minkenberg, “The New Right in Germany: The transformation of conservatism and the extreme right,” European Journal of Political Research 22, no. 1 (1992): 55-81.

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embraced by intellectuals in Germany’s Weimar Republic (1919-1933), who professed no loyalty to any political party.21 Finally, within the context of Islamic legislative framework and democracy, neo-conservatism has also been described as one of the major strands of political thought.22

Following such a wide diversity of opinion, caution is advised for any random usage of the term neo-conservatism when applied to the context of Malaysia. In search of an operational framework through which we can meaningfully conceptualize neo-conservatism, we have adopted a discourse which develops the concept based on political developments in dominant conservative regimes in the Soviet Union,23 China,24 Japan25 and Taiwan.26 Studies conducted on these nation states have variously looked at the dynamics governing the multiple relationships involving conservatives and neo-conservative reformists in their reactions and responses to political changes and reforms.

Two cardinal components of the departure or break are the revival of past policies and, more importantly, the launching of political reformation. Generally speaking, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi fulfilled both components.

21 Walter Struve, “Hans Zehrer as a Neoconservative Elite Theorist,” The American Historical Review 70, no. 4 (1965): 1035-1057; Werner E. Braatz, “Two Neo-Conservative Myths in Germany 1919-1932: The ‘Third Reich’ and the ‘New State’,” Journal of the History of Ideas 32, no. 4 (1971): 569-584.

22 Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Muslim Perspectives on Global Ethics,” in The Globalization of Ethics: Religious and Secular Perspectives, eds. William M. Sullivan and Will Kymlicka (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 104-108.

23 For the case of the Soviet Union, see Stephen F. Cohen, “The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 38, no. 2 (1979): 187-202; David Nordlander, “Khrushchev’s Image in the Light of Glasnost and Perestroika,” Russian Review 52, no. 2 (1993): 248-264; W.J. Tompson, “Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison,” British Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1 (1993): 77-105.

24 For the case of China, see Joseph Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era,” Asian Survey 35, no. 7 (1995): 635-651; Feng Chan, “Order and Stability in Social Transition: Neoconservative Political Thought in Post-1989 China,” The China Quarterly 151 (1997): 593-613; David Rolls, “The Emergence of The ‘Jiang Zemin Era’: Legitimacy and the Development of the Political Theory of ‘Neo-Conservatism’ - 1989-1995,” Ph.D. dissertation (University Of Southern Queensland, Australia, 2004).

25 For the case of Japan, see Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era , second edition (Washington: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992), 71-74; Eisuke Sakakibara, Structural Reform in Japan – Breaking The Iron Triangle (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2003), xi-xiii; Jim Frederick, “Standing Their Ground,” TIME, 2 May 2005; Patrick Kőllner, “The Liberal Democratic Party at 50: Sources of Dominance and Changes in the Koizumi Era,” Social Science Japan Journal 9, no. 2 (2006): 249-254; LI Xiushi, “Japanese Neo-Conservative Foreign Strategy,” Global Review (Winter 2007): 166-182; Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel, “How Junichiro Koizumi seized the leadership of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (2007): 95-114.

26 For the case of Taiwan, see Ping-hui Liao, “Rewriting Taiwanese National History: The February 28 Incident as Spectacle,” Public Culture 5, no. 2 (1993): 281-196; Michael Ying-mao Kau, “The Power Structure in Taiwan’s Political Economy,” Asian Survey 36, no. 3 (1996): 287-305; Anthony Milner, “What Happened to ‘Asian Values,’” in Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia, eds. Gerald Segal and David S.G. Goodman (London: Routledge, 1999): 56-68; Ching-fen Hu, “Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5, no. 1 (2005): 26-44; Joseph Wong, “Maintaining KMT dominance: party adaptation in authoritarian and democratic Taiwan,” in Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems, eds. Friedman and Wong, 57-74.

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Under Abdullah, the agendas of poverty eradication, agriculture and rural development—policies very much identified with Abdullah’s political godfather and second prime minister, Abdul Razak Hussein (1970-1976)—were re-invigorated. In the ethno-religious field, he adopted a more Malaysian-oriented spectrum in his discourse, relegating Malay-Muslim ethnocentrism to the periphery, an approach reminiscent of that of the first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970). In the context of political reform, Abdullah stressed integrity and the fight against corruption, opening up channels of expression and improving his government’s democratic credentials. It is within this context that we examine the role played by the neo-conservative intellectuals, who were primarily responsible for helping Abdullah realize his significant departure away from the framework of the previous conservative regime. Since the concept of neo-conservatism has been used, especially in British and American political discourse, we proffer here an extension of its application to encompass intra-elite conflicts in such dominant conservative regimes as the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Taiwan. It is from this vantage point that we build the central question of our article, by looking at intra-elite conflicts within the post-Mahathir UMNO, with a focus on the clash between the neo-conservative-reformist and the conservative streams during Abdullah’s era.

enter the Neo-Conservatives

In general, a prime minister’s support structure may be divided into a formal and an informal segment. The formal structure refers to members of the cabinet, the UMNO and Barisan Nasional (BN) component parties. The informal structure revolves around a prime minister’s inner circle, individuals who may or may not play an official part in his administration. Our focus in this article is on Abdullah Badawi’s informal support structure.

Abdullah Badawi was not the first Malaysian leader to employ a team of trusted advisors. Previous prime ministers, like Abdul Razak Hussein and Mahathir, also had an inner circle, though they differed in extent and approach. Abdul Razak’s informal think-tank, assembled to implement his economic development program, was known to have been composed of socialist-oriented advisors and academics such as James Puthucheary, Abdul Samad Ismail, Abdullah Ahmad, Abdullah Majid, Agos Salim, Khalil Akashah, Ghafar Baba and Ungku Omar.27 During Mahathir’s premiership, his earliest deputy, Musa Hitam, fell out of favour with his boss for criticizing Mahathir’s penchant for preferring advice from his “kitchen cabinet” which consisted of, among others, Daim Zainuddin, Anwar Ibrahim and Sanusi Junid.28

27 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 55-56; Dominic Puthucheary, “James Puthucheary: His Friends and His Times,” in James Puthucheary: No Cowardly Past, eds. Dominic Puthucheary and Jomo K.S. (Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 1998), 1-37.

28 Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, 175.

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However, the technique of employing advisors was perhaps most masterfully executed by Anwar Ibrahim, even in his capacity as the deputy prime minister (1993-98). In an effort to bolster his network, Anwar made sure his emissaries systematically prevailed in all influential sectors of society: the media, the corporate world, academia and civil society.29

Therefore, grumblings that later arose out of dissatisfaction with Abdullah Badawi’s method of entrusting policy making to the hands of trusted advisors are not unusual, for it is not without precedent. What is of concern to us here is the critical role the neo-conservative intellectuals played as architects of the political transformations which Abdullah endeavoured to bring about. In line with Gramsci’s theory of ideological hegemony, we understand intellectuals as those who relate with society organically, functioning as organizer and theoretical think-tank in co-ordinating consciousness, uniformity and conceptualization of a particular policy and accompanying needs.30

Abdullah Badawi’s lengthy tenure in government service, as a bureaucrat and later as a politician, endeared to him many colleagues from motley layers of Malaysia’s social hierarchy. He enjoyed fruitful and long-lasting relationships with bodies such as the Peninsular Malays’ Union of Students (GPMS: Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung) and the highly nationalist National Civics Bureau (BTN: Biro Tatanegara), which also formed his earliest inner circle. Later, as prime minister, Abdullah continued to trust his circle of GPMS and BTN friends by handing them positions of authority in state establishments and departments. They were Annuar Zaini, former chairman of the national news agency Berita Nasional Malaysia (BERNAMA) (2004-2010); Firdaus Abdullah, former Universiti Malaya (UM) professor who became director of the National Language and Literary Institute (DBP: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka) (2005-2008); Nordin Kardi, former BTN director (1999-2005) who rose to become vice chancellor of Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) (2005-2010); Shagul Hamid Abdullah, also an ex-BTN director (2006-2011); and Kamarulzaman Zainal, Abdullah’s long-time press secretary who from 2003 onward served as director of news and current affairs of the UMNO-controlled broadcasting station, TV3. The majority of Abdullah’s inner circle, even if they were not UMNO members, fit into the category of hard-line Malay nationalists. Another of his long-standing compatriots, Kalimullah Hassan, was catapulted into the role of New Straits Times (NST) editor-in-chief after helming BERNAMA during Abdullah’s tenure as deputy prime minister.

The second core group of Abdullah’s inner circle comprised politicians who had remained loyal to him in his steady rise to power. They include

29 Edmund Terence Gomez, “Factionalism and Money Politics in UMNO,” Aliran Monthly 13, no. 9 (1993): 35-39.

30 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 258, 274, 403; Joseph Femia, “Hegemony and Consciousness in the thought of Antonio Gramsci,” Political Studies 23, no. 1 (1975), 38.

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Musa Hitam, Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, Shahrir Samad, Aziz Shamsuddin, Syed Hamid Albar, Azmi Khalid and Idris Jusoh—most of whom had been part of the Team B who rebelled against Mahathir during the hard-fought UMNO elections of 1987. Except for Musa, the others had at one time or another figured in Abdullah’s larger support system as cabinet members. Finally, the third echelon of Abdullah’s informal structure comprised individuals who dealt with Abdullah on a daily basis in their capacities as private secretaries, press secretaries, political secretaries and a host of personal assistants. It is this third layer that became a cause célèbre with regard to the flow of decision making in Abdullah’s administration.

At the outset of his assumption of power, Abdullah Badawi combined old and new faces in his third echelon of administrative officials. They could be divided into four categories.31 The first category was comprised of state bureaucrats who were part of Abdullah’s “old management circle” who had served him for a long time and had gained his utmost trust. They were Thajudeen Abdul Wahab (chief private secretary who had served Abdullah since 1991), Ahmad Nazri Yusof (first deputy private secretary), Ho May Yong (special functions officer), Ahmad Yaacob (main private secretary) and Aminuddin Md Yassin (first private secretary). The second category consisted of old faces who were assigned “specific advisory” roles in their areas of expertise. A significant number of them were UMNO members and had previously served Mahathir. They were Nor Mohamed Yakcob (finance), Ali Abul Hassan Sulaiman (economics), Abdul Kadir Mohamad (foreign policy), Ahmad Zaharuddin Idrus (science) and Abdul Hamid Othman (religion). Third, there was a group of “political secretaries” who were tasked with assisting Abdullah in a wide range of portfolios. A mixture of veterans and newcomers, they were Johari Baharum, later appointed as deputy home minister; Mahadzir Khalid, later appointed as chief minister of Kedah; Md. Alwi Che Ahmad, state legislative assembly member for Kok Lanas, Kelantan; and Othman Desa and Hasbullah Lebai Isa, both losers of the Twelfth General Elections (GE). New faces included Reezal Merican Naina Merican (finance), Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh (home affairs) and Vincent Lim Kian Tick (political secretary for ethnic Chinese affairs), the only non-UMNO member of the coterie.

The fourth category of officials consisted of around a dozen or so young novices who attracted a lot of speculative attention. They earned the sobriquet “Fourth Floor boys,” in conjunction with the location of their offices at the Prime Minister’s Department (JPM: Jabatan Perdana Menteri). This fourth category made up the Management and Policy Unit. Until May 2004, Khairy Jamaluddin, Abdullah’s son-in-law, led this group. Assisting him were two

31 Information on all individuals mentioned in these four categories was confirmed by Abdullah’s press secretary Wan Esuriyanti Wan Ahmad (interview, 22 November 2011).

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upstarts who had been inducted earlier as Abdullah’s special officers during his term as deputy prime minister (1999-2003), viz. Kamal Khalid, head of the Communications Unit, and Ahmad Zaki Zahid, head of the Policy Unit. It is this fourth category of officials, plus Vincent Lim, who was Khairy’s colleague at Oxford University, whom we refer to as the neo-conservative intellectuals. Khairy and Ahmad Zaki were UMNO members and had been involved in assisting UMNO Youth Chief Hishamuddin Hussein since 1999. Besides them, the other fourth-category officials were originally non-partisan professionals—young outsiders—recruited from such diverse sectors as the media, private consultancies and the academia. Abdullah’s support structure can be more profoundly gleaned from chart 1.

What factors lay behind Abdullah’s faith in such a youthful team of advisors, most of whom were in their early thirties? First, and most obviously, Abdullah Badawi was not known to have fostered his own intellectual think-tank. He was therefore in great need of a team which could gain public confidence on economic matters. Since economic performance had been established as the yardstick by which regime legitimacy of an administration is measured, the perception deficit which had put Abdullah at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Mahathir, renowned for his intellectual prowess, had to be addressed.32 Second, Abdullah also required a team that was able to generate innovative ideas along the lines of politically fashionable concepts such as openness, justice, freedom and democracy, all of which had struck chords among the Malaysian electorate since the Tenth GE of 1999. Such ideas were admittedly close to the worldview and hearts of the intellectual network associated with Khairy Jamaluddin, cultivated particularly during his undergraduate days at Oxford.33 Finally, Abdullah harboured a personal fondness for the Khairy-linked group of young intellectuals. It was during his tenure as minister of Education in the mid-1980s that the government launched the Joint-Secretariat on Scholarships Abroad program to encourage specially selected Malay students to apply to Oxbridge and Ivy League universities.34 In a sense, he was reaping handsome rewards in terms of human capital. Five members of his young team were Oxford and Cambridge graduates, while the others were alumni of reputable universities and had research and consultancy experiences with various international firms.

Khairy Jamaluddin and the “young Turks”

Khairy Jamaluddin, the son a former diplomat, is married to Nori, Abdullah

32 Interview with Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, Professor of Social Anthropology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, 12 March 2010.

33 Interview with Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, 12 March 2010.34 Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas and Ng Tieh Chuan, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Revivalist Of An Intellectual

Tradition (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2005), 13-14.

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Badawi’s only daughter. Once dubbed a “very intelligent individual,”35 Khairy, then only twenty-eight years old, was recruited as Abdullah’s speech writer. His outstanding academic credentials—a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) from Oxford and a Masters degree in Political and Legal Theory from University College, London—led political scientist Rustam Sani to quip, “never before had a young UMNO politician emerged with such strong intellectual credentials.”36

In spite of all the negative attention poured on him by the likes of iconic blogger Raja Petra Kamaruddin’s The Khairy Chronicles, serialized in his anti-establishment Malaysia Today website, Khairy and his cohorts gradually raised their legitimacy by quickly establishing themselves as the intellectual engine driving Abdullah Badawi’s leadership. For instance, innovative methods adopted by the BN in the hustings of the 2004 general election, which it won overwhelmingly, were atrributed to the presence of new blood in the nation’s administration.37 A content analysis of Abdullah’s speeches betrays a powerful intellectual dimension, no doubt influenced by neo-conservative speech writers. Facilitating the spread and conceptualization of neo-conservatism in the Malaysian context, Abdullah’s speeches unabashedly promoted ideas of “new politics.” For example, he exhorted party elites to embrace political openness and sow healthy linkages with civil society, including independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hitherto critical of the government. The Bar Council and women’s groups, amongst others, received Abdullah’s flattering attention.

The neo-conservative theoretical dimension is also reflected in Abdullah Badawi’s ambitious scheme of progressive Islam, eventually christened as Islam Hadhari. During Abdullah’s tenure as deputy prime minister, Khairy Jamaluddin had already internationally published an article, “Model Nation,” which showcased his devotion to the concepts of justice, freedom and religious tolerance—themes well taken up later by Abdullah as premier.38 Blending Islamic modernism with women’s rights, Abdullah, as deputy premier, openly supported his wife Endon Mahmood’s (d. 2005) patronage of the Coalition on Women’s Rights in Islam,39 which campaigned, inter alia, for monogamy as the ideal form of Islamic marriage. In outlining ten fundamental precepts of Islam Hadhari, Abdullah listed “protection of the

35 Chandra Muzaffar, “The Emerging Scenario Under Abdullah Badawi,” in Trends in Southeast Asia Series 15 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 13.

36 Rustam Sani, “Khairy Jamaluddin: Pemimpin rempit berkelulusan Oxford” [Khairy Jamaluddin: Whipping leader with an Oxford qualification], Siasah, 9 May 2007.

37 Wong Kok Keong, “The Pak Lah Factor,” Aliran Monthly 24, no. 3 (2004): 36, 40; Francis Loh Kok Wah, “The March 2004 General Elections in Malaysia: Looking Beyond the “Pak Lah” Factor,” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 20, no. 1 (2005) 14.

38 Khairy Jamaluddin, “Model Nation,” TIME, 10 March 2003.39 Helen Ting, “Gender discourse in Malay Politics,” in Politics in Malaysia: The Malay Dimension,

ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (New York: Routledge, 2007), 95.

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rights of minority groups and women” as the seventh pillar.40 Endon and daughter Nori served as Abdullah’s ears and tentacles in expressing concern for gender equality for Muslim women without necessarily discarding their domestic roles. Through Nori, Abdullah toyed with feminist discourses of the liberal-minded non-governmental organization Sisters in Islam (SIS), much to the chagrin of mainstream Islamists, whether in the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the UMNO or independent Islamic groups.41

In spite of the vicissitudes of Abdullah Badawi’s lengthy political career before his ascendancy to the position of prime minister, including being consigned to the political wilderness for being on the opposite side from Mahathir between 1987 and 1991, he failed to mature with the quality required of a party warlord in facing the rough-and-tumble of UMNO realpolitik. Like Hussein Onn, prime minister between 1976 and 1981, Abdullah was deprived of strong grassroots support as he was seen as lacking the capacity to shower patronage and economic benefits to followers. As leader, he was never able to close the gap that had grown between him and Malaysia’s economic elites, whose importance to the nation’s political economy had increased manifold throughout Abdullah’s protracted years in the Foreign Ministry (1991-99). While he did liaise with them, the business community was never his favourite audience, especially given its unholy reputation of indulging in crony capitalistic practices.42 Upon taking over the national leadership, he asserted his preference to not manage the economy in the same way,43 in an obvious allusion to the economic developmentalism which had been Mahathir’s main legacy.44 His decision to trust Khairy Jamaluddin and his team of young intellectuals with the economic realm reflected badly on local business elites, many of whom had risen through state patronage.45 Amidst rumors that Khairy was poised to assume control of Malaysia’s biggest investment agency, Khazanah Holdings, dissatisfaction was openly expressed. Khairy’s inexperience and family

40 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Menuju kecemerlangan” [Heading towards excellence], keynote address at the 55th UMNO General Assembly, Utusan Malaysia, 24 September 2004.

41 “Islamists” here refer to proponents of “Islamization” or “political Islam”—understood as organized political action designed to establish a political and social order which installs Islam as the highest system. See Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Politically Engaged Muslims in Malaysia in the Era of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009),” Asian Journal of Political Science 18, no. 2 (2009): 170.

42 Chandra Muzaffar, “Malaysian Politics: The Emerging Scenario Under Abdullah Badawi,” 5; Edmund Terence Gomez, “The 2004 Malaysian General Elections: Economic Development, Electoral Trends, and the Decline of the Opposition,” in Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges, eds. Saw Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 79.

43 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Kata dikota, janji dilaksana - Ucapan Dasar Presiden UMNO, pada Perhimpunan Agung UMNO Ke-57’ [Undertakings accomplished, promises fulfilled – Keynote presidential address at the 57th UMNO General Assembly], Utusan Malaysia, 16 November 2006.

44 Francis Loh Kok Wah, “Developmentalism and the Limits of Democratic Discourse,” in Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices, eds. Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002).

45 William Case, “How’s my driving: Abdullah Badawi’s first year as Malaysian PM,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2005): 148.

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connections were the strong points used against him. Such scepticism seemed to be corroborated following Khairy’s purchase of RM9.2 million worth of shares from an investment company, ECM Libra, whose chairman was the NST editor-in-chief, Kalimullah Hassan. The ensuing merger between ECM Libra Capital and Avenue Capital Resources, a government-linked company, raised doubts over the transparency of the transaction. Its timing, the sequence of events leading to it and the actors involved led one to speculate whether Khairy did have insider information of the impending merger.

When Khairy’s economic exploits eventually became a national issue, Abdullah Badawi was disappointingly evasive. His testimony that he lacked knowledge of the ECM Libra Capital-Avenue Capital Resources merger dented his legitimacy by drawing into question his sincerity and exposing his ineptness.46 In a commissioned investigation, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that in principle there was a conflict of interest between Abdullah as minister of Finance and Khairy, although evidence of direct bribery was lacking.47 Following the abandonment of the “Crooked Bridge” project between Malaysia and Singapore, Mahathir’s faction publicly rebuked Abdullah’s young team and individuals such as Kalimullah, blaming them for allegedly masterminding all decision making in the government’s economic liberalization program.48 When the public spat between Mahathir and Abdullah appeared to reach a tipping point in August 2006, Khairy was forced by circumstances to sell all his shares in ECM Libra lest his father-in-law’s reputation became further tarnished. Until the end of 2007, Khairy unabashedly stressed that he would continue to manipulate the “protection” he gained from his relationship with Abdullah in order to prod for better changes for the UMNO without interference from reactionary elements within the party.49

The lurking presence of such reactionary elements explains why Abdullah’s leadership had to rely on two figures outside the UMNO’s mainstream to firmly install internal reforms on the party agenda. They were the aforementioned Kalimullah Hassan and Zaid Ibrahim, a former member of Parliament (MP) who, following the Twelfth GE, was appointed a senator in order to enable him to become de facto minister of Law.

46 “More heats on Khairy’s RM9.2m, shares purchase,” Malaysiakini, 29 December 2005, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/45087; “Merger talks: PM claims to be in the dark,” Malaysiakini, 20 January 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/46048, both accessed 23 February 2009.

47 Interview with Shahrir Samad, member of Parliament for Johor Baharu and PAC chairman, 15 December 2009. After the 12th general election of 2008, Shahrir was appointed a minister in Abdullah Badawi’s cabinet.

48 See for example “Opening Up,” Malaysian Business, 16 March 2004; Izmas, “Benarkah mereka di tingkat empat yang buat keputusan?” [Do the fourth floor boys make decisions?], Siasah, 4 August 2006; A. Kadir Jasin, “Political Pressures Frustrates Utusan-NSTP Merger,” Malaysian Business, 1 February 2007; Izmas, “WPI untuk siapa?” [WPI for whom?], Siasah, 30 May 2007; Feriz Omar, “Wawancara: Jangan sampai orang Johor jadi macam Palestin” [Interview: Avoid Johoreans becoming like Palestinians], Siasah, 9 September 2007; Ruhanie Ahmad, “Wawancara: UMNO tidak peka dominasi kuasa asing” [Interview: UMNO insensitive to foreign domination], Siasah, 2 November 2008.

49 “Khairy: I want to use protection to change things,” The Star, 2 November 2007.

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Kalimullah Hassan and the NsT

As the oldest mainstream English-language newspaper in Malaysia, the NST was an important ideological instrument for the UMNO, targeting readers among the rising Malay middle class. Prior to the arrival of Kalimullah Hassan as editor-in-chief, the role was played by Abdullah Ahmad, a former parliamentarian from Kelantan known to harbour close relations with Mahathir and previously with Abdul Razak Hussein. Abdullah Ahmad’s “unbridled independence” led to his dismissal from the NST, supposedly for criticizing the Saudi Arabian royal family in an editorial. Many speculated, though, that Abdullah Ahmad was given the boot by his namesake (with the additional “Badawi”) for going overboard in openly proposing Najib Razak, son of Abdul Razak Hussein and touted to be Mahathir’s preferred choice as deputy prime minister.50

It was not long before Kalimullah earned the wrath of diehard conservatives within the UMNO. Unease spread among the UMNO old guard once Kalimullah launched a policy of disseminating cues about Abdullah’s neo-conservative agenda, opening the way for another progressive newspaper, The Sun, to follow suit.51 From a positive standpoint, the newly carved niche of the mainstream English-language press in exposing corruption, highlighting integrity cases and putting forward a Malaysian-centric discourse was a fresh transformation. Nevertheless, the NST was seen to have over-capitalized on its special relationship with the prime minister’s office, to the extent of pre-empting the government several times and willingly serving as a platform to defend Khairy.52 The NST’s new orientation under Kalimullah was not received well by UMNO conservatives, who regarded the newspaper as having steered away from its course of being a loyal pro-UMNO organ. Its criticism of the quality of parliamentary debates and disclosure of details of internal UMNO meetings incurred the displeasure of UMNO members.53 Not only did it commit a public relations blunder by publishing a religious caricature bordering on blasphemy and advertizing liquor, but it also defended the actions, such that Abdullah had to caution the NST himself.54

50 Leslie Lopez, “He’s No Mahathir, and that’s OK,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 2003.

51 Wong Kok Keong, “Freer media under PM Abdullah?,” Aliran Monthly 26, no. 5 (2006): 37-38; interview with Ahiruddin Atan, 4 November 2009.

52 Charles Raj, “When a scoop is not a scoop,” Malaysian Business, 1 December 2004; Kalimullah Hassan, “Untouchable we’re not but we stand firm,” New Straits Times, 27 April 2005; A. Kadir Jasin, “ You are what you write”, Agenda Daily , 22 May 2005, http://www.agendadaily.com/A-Kadir-Jasin-Other-Thots/you-are-what-you-write.html, accessed 4 November 2012.

53 Kalimullah Hassan, “Getting the right player for a winning team,” New Straits Times, 16 February 2006; “Zam: Saya tidak layan perkara remeh-temeh” [Zam: I don’t indulge in trivialities], Malaysiakini, 20 February 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/47170, accessed 4 December 2012.

54 “PM: NST tidak patut siar iklan minuman keras” [PM: NST should not have published liquor advertisement], Malaysiakini, 28 May 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/51694, accessed 25 December 2010.

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Lamenting the changed character of the NST, Information Minister Zainuddin Maidin, himself former editor-in-chief of the staunchly pro-UMNO Utusan Malaysia, accused the NST of being manipulated to serve as a mouthpiece of the “Malaysian Malaysia” agenda championed by the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP).55 In 2006, as the war of words between Abdullah and Mahathir steadily exacerbated, seriously dividing the UMNO into two opposing camps, the NST blatantly supported Abdullah, thus unwisely alienating Mahathir and his faction.56 UMNO chauvinists unreservedly poured disdain on Kalimullah’s Indian Muslim pedigree, observing how the NST was being arrogantly led by a non-Malay more than willing to scoff at the venerable Mahathir.57 Small wonder, when Abdullah toyed with the idea of merging the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) with Utusan Melayu Berhad at the end of 2006, it encountered stout opposition from UMNO conservatives.58

Utusan Malaysia soon emerged as the primary platform for the conservatives to counterbalance what they saw as the rising tendency to marginalize issues of Malay and Islamic interests. Buoyed by Zainuddin Maidin, Utusan’s pro-Mahathir editorial board displayed peculiar recalcitrance in refusing to toe the line pursued by Abdullah’s administration.59 The source of Utusan’s simmering discontent, as voice in its reporters’ personal blogs, appears to be the brazenness of Abdullah’s advisors in issuing untoward directives to Utusan.60 Utusan’s rebuke of neo-conservative

55 “Zam dakwa NST siar rencana hapus identiti Melayu di M’sia” [Zam claims NST published article on destroying Malay identity in Malaysia], Malaysiakini, 31 March 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/49149, accessed 25 December 2010.

56 Members of Mahathir’s faction who were involved in open conflict with Abdullah’s leadership team included Mahathir’s ertswhile political secretary Matthias Chang, former NST editor-in-chief Abdullah Ahmad, independent member of Parliament for Pasir Mas Ibrahim Ali, veteran UMNO leaders Sanusi Junid and Megat Junid and owner of the political tabloid Era Baru, Idris Tulis. While cabinet ministers generally sided with Abdullah, two of them openly adopted more neutral stances which sometimes veered towards support for Mahathir, namely Aziz Shamsuddin and Zainuddin Maidin. Mahathir also received overwhelming backing from pro-government bloggers dissatisfied with Abdullah, for instance Ahiruddin Atan, A. Kadir Jasin, Nuraina Samad—all three were former NST journalists, Ruhanie Ahmad, Zakhir Mohamed, and those operating by the pseudonyms Jebat Must Die and Another Brick in the Wall.

57 See, for example, Laporan Dewan Negara, Eleventh Parliament, Third Term, First Meeting, no. 1, 8 May 2006, www.parlimen.gov.my/hindex/pdf/DN-08052006.pdf, accessed 15 January 2010, 70-71; Ruhanie Ahmad, “Perlu bertindak bijaksana ke atas ‘Keranis’” [Need to act intelligently on the ‘Clerks’], Siasah, 2 June 2006; Brendan Pereira, “Arrest and jail me if you dare,” New Straits Times, 18 September 2006; “Brendan Pereira Menghina Melayu” [Brendan Pereira Abuses Malays], Era Baru, 13 October 2006.

58 “Penggabungan Utusan dan NSTP terus dibantah” [Utusan--NSTP merger continuously opposed], Malaysiakini, 12 December 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/60864, accessed 23 July 2009; “Dayus jika biar Utusan Melayu dikawal pihak lain” [Coward if control of Utusan Melayu is left in other hands], Utusan Malaysia, 20 December 2006.

59 Interview with Ahiruddin Atan, pro-Mahathir blogger, Petaling Jaya, 4 November 2009; interview with Wan Esuriyanti, 22 November 2011.

60 See for example the personal expressions of dissatisfaction by Utusan journalists: Syahril Kadir, “Apa yang Pak Lah rasakan sekarang agaknya eh...” [What is Pak Lah feeling now eh...], 2 April 2008, http://syahrilkadir.wordpress.com/2008/04/02/apa-yang-pak-lah-rasakan-sekarang-agaknya-eh and

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intellectuals such as Khairy and Kalimullah persisted into Najib Razak’s era as prime minister.

Apart from the NST, another UMNO-affiliated media outlet which became the target of conservatives’ tongue-lashing was the broadcasting station TV3.61 Under the stewardship of Abdullah’s long-time staff Kamarulzaman Zainal, TV3 acted alongside the NST in upholding openness in news reporting. Its investigative segments, marshalled by award-winning reporter Karam Singh Walia, and exposés of poverty through its program Bersamamu, caused widespread dismay among UMNO and government members, many of whom were beginning to favour stricter controls over the NST and TV3.62

Zaid Ibrahim and Judicial reform

Improvements towards restoring the independence of the judiciary had been one of Abdullah Badawi’s priorities from the outset of his premiership. Having a constructive view of judicial independence, Abdullah invited the Bar Council to become a member of government committees such as the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC). In the aftermath of the overturning of convictions against Anwar Ibrahim and his release from prison in September 2004, Abdullah’s administration was showered with praise for returning to the judiciary the freedom it deserved. Undeniably, public confidence in the judiciary had sunk to abysmally low levels since Mahathir engineered the sacking of Salleh Abas from the position of Lord Chief Justice in 1988. In the midst of the altercation between Abdullah and Mahathir reaching a climax in 2006, neo-conservative-linked newspapers such as the NST and The Sun harped on the issue of Mahathir’s victimization of the judiciary during his era.63 This nicely dovetailed with Anwar Ibrahim’s revelation in September 2007, via a secret video clip, that a major judge of Mahathir’s era was involved in the brokering of appointments for minor judges. The alleged broker, V.K. Lingam, was a lawyer who had represented Mahathir.

In response to incessant calls for a revamp of Malaysia’s “rotten” judicial system, Abdullah Badawi appointed the unelected Zaid Ibrahim as a senator and de facto law minister following the shocking 2008 general election results. As the founder and former proprietor of Malaysia’s biggest law firm, Zaid Ibrahim & Co., Zaid’s liberal disposition rendered his views peripheral within

Ku Seman Ku Hussein, “Ambil endah syor Dr Mahathir” [Take note of Dr Mahathir’s suggestion], 29 March 2012, http://kayangdailypost.blogspot.com/2012_03_01_archive.html, both accessed 17 May 2012.

61 Zainuddin Maidin, “Khairy Can Become PM In His Old Days,” 13 June 2012, http://zamkata.blogspot.com/2012/06/khairy-can-become-pm-in-his-old-days.html , accessed 22 June 2012.

62 Interview with Wan Esuriyanti Wan Ahmad, 22 November 2011.63 Syed Ahmad Idid, “Interview: I became the invisible man,” New Sunday Times, 11 June 2006;

“Dr M told me to resign,” New Straits Times, 27 September 2006; Azmi Kamaruddin, “Conversations: Review will reveal the truth,” The Sun, 21 September 2006.

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the framework of UMNO mainstream politics. Even before the Lingam video clip episode became public knowledge, Zaid had already mooted the idea of establishing an independent judicial commission during a Bar Council-organized debate in April 2007. Then de facto Law Minister Nazri Aziz, a fellow panelist at the forum, however, disagreed with the proposal.64 One would hence have expected Nazri, who had steadfastly defended Abdullah in his spat with Mahathir, to harbour dissatisfaction to a certain degree when Zaid was appointed to succeed him. External factors may account for the choice of Zaid to spearhead judicial reform. Nazri Aziz claimed that Zaid’s acquaintance with Abdullah’s son Kamaluddin was a decisive factor.65 From a different angle, Shamsul Amri perceived Zaid’s appointment as an emblematic reflection of hitherto submerged liberal voices, as represented previously by Khairy.66 A stern critic of Abdullah, former NST editor-in-chief A. Kadir Jasin also suspected Abdullah’s inner circle of having lobbied for the ascendancy of Zaid.67

Shortly after his appointment, the government declared that it would pay hefty sums as compensation for the judges unfairly dismissed during the “government versus judiciary” crisis of 1988. However, Zaid yielded to other cabinet members’ opposition to offering an apology.68 Mahathir and his supporters lamented the decision as too apologetic and intended to appease the Bar Council.69 Zaid invited further scepticism from conservatives as soon as he focused his efforts, allegedly by-passing the cabinet, on establishing a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC).70 Assisting Zaid in drafting an outline of the JAC were Khairy Jamaluddin and Ahmad Zaki Zahid, much to the consternation of conservatives who disputed their standing as outsiders to the cabinet.71 Among other things, the JAC draft controversially proposed that the prime minister be made to provide justification for any disagreement he had with the JAC. In opposing such a proposal, a number of UMNO MPs

64 ‘“I can be convinced, but I want to do it in the proper way,’ says Nazri,” 27 April 2007, http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/bar_news/berita_badan_peguam/_i_can_be_convinced_but_i_want_to_do_it_in_the_proper_way_says_nazri.html , accessed 24 September 2011.

65 Interview with Nazri Aziz, minister in Abdullah Badawi’s and Najib Razak’s cabinets, Kuala Lumpur, 15 April 2010.

66 Interview with Shamsul Amri, 12 March 2010.67 A. Kadir Jasin, “Tajuddin Lwn Zaid: Lagi Manifestasi Kemelut Umno” [Tajuddin versus Zaid:

Yet Another Manifestation of UMNO’s Flux], 29 May 2008, http://kadirjasin.blogspot.com/2008/05/tajuddin-lwn-zaid-lagi-manifestasi.html, accessed 4 July 2012.

68 Interview with Zaid Ibrahim, minister in Abdullah Badawi’s cabinet, Kuala Lumpur, 2 April 2010.

69 Mahathir Mohamad, “The Ex-Gratia Payment,” 9 May 2008, chedet.blogspot.com/2008/05/ex-gratia-payment.html, accessed 4 December 2012; Izmas, “Bayaran ex-gratia: Jumlahnya terlalu tinggi” [Ex-gratia payment: Sum is too high], Siasah, 16 November 2008.

70 Mahathir Mohamad, “Zaid Ibrahim The De Facto Minister Of Justice,” 8 October 2008, http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=18727, accessed 4 December 2012.

71 Interview with Nazri Aziz, 15 April 2010.

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accused Zaid of acting as the voice of the opposition.72 In its final form, the JAC retained a huge chunk of prime ministerial powers, in particular his control over the appointment and dismissal of its members. The premier also had absolute say over the names of candidates to be forwarded to the Yang DiPertuan Agong (King) for endorsement. Encountering inertia from within the UMNO, Zaid’s reforms floundered, and he snatched the opportunity of ending his persona nan grata status in the UMNO-dominated set-up when he resigned in protest against a spate of arrests under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in September 2008.

Neo-Conservatives and the Power Problem

On the whole, a large portion of reforms planned by Abdullah failed at the level of implementation, eventually coming about in only diluted form. In the face of opposition from the police and the UMNO, Abdullah’s most important piece of institutional reform, the IPCMC, was also implemented only in its watered-down version. Other than the JAC, the reconstituted Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) was also launched in attenuated form after overcoming resistance from UMNO warlords, who also gave a cold reception to Abdullah’s agenda of combating corruption and money politics.

A close examination, however, reveals that the difficulties which Abdullah’s neo-conservative leadership faced in pulling through his reform agenda was also accentuated by the UMNO’s internal structure and power distribution. First, most of the neo-conservative intellectuals involved were either outsiders to the UMNO or those who had been relegated to the periphery of the UMNO-based interlocking system. Such lack of connectivity brought about friction with party conservatives and other constituents of Abdullah’s informal support structure. For instance, long-time friends from among Abdullah’s old circle expressed discomfort at the excessive role played by Khairy and his young cohorts in pushing through the reforms. These veteran loyalists were quickly alienated by Abdullah’s over-reliance on this team of relatively inexperienced advisors. The high-profile role played by the fledgling group drove its members into inevitable conflict with their boss’ old management circle led by Thajudeen Abdul Wahab.73 The cases of Kalimullah Hassan and

72 “Mukhriz accuses Zaid of working for Pakatan,” Malaysiakini, 22 May 2008, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/83297; “Zaid ticked off over ‘false allegations,’” Malaysiakini, 27 May 2008, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/83518; “Zaid grilled over judicial matters,” Malaysiakini, 15 July 2008, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/86161, all accessed 26 December 2010.

73 Interview with “Anonymous,” a former high-ranking civil servant and member of Abdullah’s old circle, Petaling Jaya, 13 December 2009. It should be noted that input from this interview confirms reports of ongoing intra-elite contestation amongst Abdullah’s management team, as raised for instance by an influential independent journalist, the late MGG Pillai. See “The Ninjas and Scholars scramble for Pak Lah’s ear,” 26 December 2003, http://www.tranungkite.net/lama/c12/pillai523.htm, accessed 5 July 2012.

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Zaid Ibrahim were somewhat similar; both were found wanting in team camaraderie and hence often went overboard in their zeal for reform. Khairy Jamaluddin admitted that Zaid Ibrahim, who ended up being sacked from the UMNO for participating in the opposition People’s Justice Party (PKR: Parti Keadilan Rakyat) function after his resignation as minister, had “rubbed a lot of people the wrong way within Umno.”74 Failure to ease out differences among members of Abdullah’s team proved costly in terms of group cohesiveness, thus making it difficult for them to counter the conservatives.

Second, the post-Mahathir scenario of redistribution of power had in actual fact ensnared the neo-conservative intellectuals. Although their reform-orientedness was on the right track, they got trapped in the game of power accumulation institutionalized by Mahathir for twenty-two years. Having “consolidated too much power within themselves,” they were the unwitting beneficiary of the largesse of power inherited by Abdullah.75 Little did Abdullah realize that over-dependence on this group would drive a wedge between his leadership and his mass support base in UMNO. According to Shahrir Samad, a vocal UMNO politician who remained sceptical of the approach pursued by the neo-conservative intellectuals:

When Abdullah became President [of UMNO], he dismantled the structure and [support] system because he regarded himself as “the Prime Minister and [UMNO] President of all Malaysians.” While [having such a belief] may be true conceptually, he would still have required a system of feedback which ran as usual… That was a mistake; it weakened him. Mahathir in early stages of his presidency also lacked a strong support structure as [Abdullah]. But he gradually bolstered support and ultimately became powerful by banking on the systemic network of Chief Ministers and [state UMNO] information bodies. [Abdullah], on the contrary, dismantled the support mechanism after only a year of becoming Prime Minister… The support he received was limited to office level, without extending to the wider grassroots channels at divisional, branch and network levels [of UMNO]. Isolated at the top of party hierarchy, [Abdullah] failed to emerge powerful. When the people surrounding him were attacked, it’s difficult [to defend them]. 76

This is where we need to return to the elaboration of the UMNO-based interlocking system perfected by Mahathir for twenty-two years. Although officially out of power, Mahathir managed to mobilize his loyalists not only within the party leadership but also in the media, amongst UMNO grassroots and in the bureaucracy. For example, certain elite bureaucrats felt neglected and they reacted by acting as a source of information on the internal workings

74 Khairy Jamaluddin, “Interview: Time for a makeover,” Off The Edge, January 2009, 48. 75 Interview with Edmund Terence Gomez, Professor of Political Economy, Universiti Malaya,

Kuala Lumpur, 26 March 2010.76 Interview with Shahrir Samad, former Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs minister, Kuala

Lumpur, 15 December 2009.

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of Abdullah’s administration, as so consistently demonstrated by the Malaysia Today portal coordinated by Raja Petra.77 Thus, after the shock of the 12th general election results, Mahathir more easily gained grassroots UMNO support and successfully influenced UMNO Vice-President Muhyiddin Yassin to openly call for Abdullah’s resignation and an orderly transfer of power to Najib through internal UMNO mechanisms.

Conditions worsened when Abdullah declined to fill his cabinet with reformists following his massive triumph in the 11th general election. Research has suggested that in the event that reforms would threaten entrenched interests, the hope of seeing such reforms being carried out successfully rests on the willingness to bring in reform-oriented “new players” into the system.78 Although Mahathir’s loyalists continued to be elected in the UMNO elections of 2004,79 Abdullah had discretionary power in selecting cabinet members. Unfortunately, he retained quite a few ministers from Mahathir’s order, including those whose credibility had been questioned due to allegations of corruption, such as Samy Vellu, Lim Kheng Yaik, Rafidah Aziz and Nazri Aziz. His cabinet reshuffle in early 2006 did little to ameliorate the situation. Considering that Abdullah had admitted in mid-2005 that his reforms were meeting with inertia, he could have early on acted to incorporate progressive politicians such as Shahrir Samad, Zaid Ibrahim, Ahmad Shabery and Saifuddin Abdullah—all of whom ended up being accepted by Abdullah only after the 12th general election debacle. His inclusion instead of figures like the confrontational Zainuddin Maidin and his retention of the embattled Rafidah Aziz, ever beleaguered by graft-related controversies, were ill-advised actions. To Abdullah, the blunder was a case of “miscalculation.”80 Later, he openly confessed that he should have been more forceful in expediting changes during his era.81

Conclusion

This article has attempted to analyze the role played by neo-conservative intellectuals during the premiership of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. We have characterized Abdullah’s leadership as neo-conservative based on past applications of the concept by preceding dominant conservative regimes. In the present discussion, the most important criterion of neo-conservatism is the sustained endeavour at political reformation within the framework of the UMNO’s dominant conservative regime. We then proceed to contextualize

77 Interview with Shamsul Amri, 12 March 2010; interview with Edmund Terence Gomez, 26 March 2010.

78 Tompson, “Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison,” 80.79 Diane K. Mauzy and Shane J. Barter, “Learning to lose? Not if UMNO can help it,” 223.80 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 18 March 2010.81 “Pak Lah admits should have been forceful with reforms,” The Malaysian Insider, 21 September

2011, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pak-lah-admits-should-have-been-forceful-with-reforms, accessed 22 September 2012.

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the role of neo-conservative intellectuals by providing a theoretical framework in which their reformist undertaking can be comprehended. Based on the premise that dominant conservative regimes operate in interlocking systems and are deeply factionalized, conflicts that took place during Abdullah’s administration were mostly intra-elite in nature. They were characterized by feuds between neo-conservative-reformist and conservative streams in relation to the political reforms attempted by Abdullah.

Unlike the success of the Japanese LDP’s neo-conservative leadership under Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), who unflinchingly carried through reforms such as the privatization of the Japan Postal System in the face of inexorable pressure from conservatives, to take just one comparative example, Abdullah Badawi’s neo-conservative leadership failed to institute reforms in the face of widespread opposition from UMNO conservatives. The presumptuous roles played by such neo-conservative intellectuals as Khairy Jamaluddin and his coterie of Young Turks, Kalimullah Hassan, who helmed NST, Kamarulzaman Zainal of TV3 and liberal-minded politician Zaid Ibrahim, were especially frowned upon by the conservatives. Although these neo-conservative intellectuals seemed to harbour the reasonable goal of freeing Abdullah’s administration from vestiges of Mahathirism, they found themselves embroiled in a larger system which had its peculiar political culture and dynamics. In addition, most of them operated outside the regime’s interlocking system, and were therefore inclined to under-estimate the extent to which conservative elements had been institutionalized. In placing excessive faith in the neo-conservative intellectuals, Abdullah rocked the distribution of power between the UMNO and the government and within the UMNO itself, thus destabilizing his own equilibrium of support.

In the final analysis, Abdullah and the neo-conservative intellectuals still deserve credit for purveying the message of change amidst all the complexities of the party-government relationship. At present, surviving neo-conservatives such as Khairy Jamaluddin, Saifuddin Abdullah and Nur Jazlan Mohamad have continued efforts to bring about reform in Najib Razak’s administration. It is interesting to observe their progress, which can be regarded as a yardstick of whether the UMNO is reformable at all, particularly within the trajectory of Najib Razak’s leadership becoming seemingly more conservative.

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia, October 2012

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Malaysia’s Neo-Conservative Intellectuals

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