abd raziq

al-Islām wa Usūl al-Hukm

A Historical Justification of Egyptian Nationalism

Abstract

In Islam and the Sources of Authority, Shaykh ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq put forward one of the earliest Islamic defenses of secular governments. The work is well-known today, but there is still significant disagreement about the sources of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reasoning. His work, for example, includes radical revisionist narratives of the caliphate’s origins. Some authors have suggested that these narratives were “drawn more from non-Muslim writers on Islam,” while others have insisted that they were “not at all rooted in Western thought, but rather, sit firmly within the dictates of Islam’s sacred texts.” This paper examines two of the institutions that shaped ‘Abd al-Raziq’s historical reasoning, namely, Egyptian nationalist parties and the Egyptian University. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s aim in writing Islam and the Sources of Authority, this paper argues, was to defend the secular brand of nationalism promoted by Egypt’s Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Writing at a time when high religious sentiment challenged the propriety of secular nationalism, ‘Abd al-Raziq chose to engage these religious sentiments with religious arguments, buttressed by what he called “scientific research.” This paper demonstrates that ‘Abd al-Raziq understood his historical arguments as scientific, insofar as they employed methods of European historical research. These were methods that ‘Abd al-Raziq first learned while studying the history of Arabic literature under Carlo Nallino at the Egyptian University. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s historical narratives were, in fact, drawn from Islamic sources, and did not rely on the findings of European researchers. This paper argues, however, that his method of critically examining and assessing these sources was broadly, and self-consciously, shaped by European traditions of historical scholarship.

1. Introduction

In May of 1925, Shaykh ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq published his notorious contribution to Islamic

political thought, Islam and the Sources of Authority. A promising young scholar with an

‘alamiyya degree from Cairo’s al-Azhar madrasa, Shaykh ‘Ali rejected the traditional Sunni belief

that the caliphate institution was an integral part of Islam. His work drew intense criticism. For

months Egyptians could read scathing reviews of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work in the papers. Numerous

books were written to refute him. ‘Abd al-Raziq did find some defenders, but they acted in

defense of Egyptians’ freedom of expression. No one defended his position on religious grounds.1

‘Abd al-Raziq’s colleagues at al-Azhar famously denounced his work. In a high profile court

1 Meir Hatina. “The Call to Separate Religion and State in Modern Egypt.” Middle Eastern Studies 36.1: 39.

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hearing, al-Azhar’s High Council of ‘Ulema decided that he had departed from basic theological

creeds that no Islamic scholar could rightfully give to doubt. They revoked his ‘alamiyya degree

on August 12, 1925, ending his tenure as a shari'a court judge.2

Since the publication of Islam and the Sources of Authority, numerous scholars have

suggested that the controversy it provoked was partly caused by the unorthodox research methods

that ‘Abd al-Raziq applied to the question of the caliphate. Henri Lammens, the first orientalist to

examine ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work, asserted that “with Sheikh ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book, historical

criticism burst into the conservative circles of Islam.”3 Jacques Berque claimed that ‘Abd al-

Raziq’s “method of exposition,”4 betrayed “a change in the realm of al-Azhar.”5 ‘Abd al-Raziq’s

critics, Berque alleged, were “the enemies of secular history.”6 Most recently, John Kelsay has

suggested that one reason for the ‘Abd al-Raziq controversy was that “‘Abd al-Raziq’s exploration

of the sources went further than the al-Azhar scholars were prepared to go.”7 Each of these

statements suggest that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work drew criticism not just for the conclusions it reached,

but also for the way in which ‘Abd al-Raziq justified them—specifically the way he read and

assessed classical sources of the Islamic tradition. Lammens and Berque propose that his reasoning

was informed by the European discipline of historical criticism.

Following this suggestion, this paper examines ‘Abd al-Raziq’s historical reasoning in Islam

and the Sources of Authority. It demonstrates that ‘Abd al-Raziq used European methods of

historical research, which he described as “scientific.” ‘Abd al-Raziq received training in European

historical scholarship while attending Carlo Nallino’s lectures on the history of Arabic literature at

the Egyptian university in 1910. There, he learned that literary history was a great service to the

2 For al-Azhar’s decision, see Reply of the High Council of Ulema to the book Islam and the Sources of Authority. 3 Henri Lammens. Islam: Beliefs and Institutions, 223. Indeed, citing the publication of Taha Husayn’s Fi al-shi‘r al-Jahili in 1926, Lammens opined that “the condemnation of the al-Azhar tribunal seems unlikely to stop the march of ideas advanced by the Egyptian ‘alim [‘Abd al-Raziq]” (223). 4 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 360. 5 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 359. 6 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 360. 7 John Kelsay. See his Arguing the Just War in Islam, 85.

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nation, as the preservation of a “national” literature strengthened the nation’s unity. He was also

shown a historical-critical approach to literature, which took literary works as products and

producers of an underlying historical reality. ‘Abd al-Raziq used his historical training to challenge

popular narratives of the caliphate’s origins, and to put forward a counter-narrative reinforced by

the authority of science. His aim in this effort was to justify the secular concept of national unity

promoted by Egypt’s Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Islam and the Sources of Authority, this paper

suggests, is a predecessor to works of the 1930’s, like Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s Hayāt

Muh ammad and Taha Husayn’s �Alā Hāmish al-Sīra, which attempted to promote the values of

Egypt’s liberal intellectuals through the medium of Islamic literature.

2. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s “Scientific Research” in Islam and the Sources of Authority

Arguing that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reasoning was informed by European scholarship may seem to

merely repeat and reinforce previous interpretations of Islam and the Sources of Authority. This

interpretation was largely based on the heated responses of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s critics. For example, in

his review of Islam and the Sources of Authority, Rashid Rida ranked ‘Abd al-Raziq among the

“Europeanized apostates,” who “eagerly attend to making the government of Egypt an irreligious

government like the government of Ankara.”8 Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit, likewise, faulted ‘Abd

al-Raziq for citing orientalists like T.W. Arnold in his work. “The consensus of Muslims,” he

argued, “is that the claim of a non-Muslim, about matters pertaining to the religion of Islam, is

unacceptable—especially when pertaining to the caliphate.”9 In a similarly disapproving tone,

Shaykh Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn suggested that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reliance upon scholars who

lack training in the shari‘a sciences “is nothing but an obstacle in the path of research that distracts

the naïve and leads them to hesitation and suspicion.”10

8 Rashid Rida, al-Manār, 26:101. 9 Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit, H aqīqat al-Islām wa-usūl al-h ukm, 43. 10 Quoted in Souad T. Ali, A Religion, Not a State, 106.

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Given the criticisms of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s contemporaries, Albert Hourani inferred that his

work provoked intense controversy mainly because it proposed a revisionist historical theory that

“was drawn more from non-Muslim writers on Islam.”11 Recently, Souad T. Ali has correctly

argued that this is an inaccurate description of Islam and the Sources of Authority.12 In fact ‘Abd

al-Raziq cited only a few European authors in his work, and these sparse citations played no

significant role in his arguments.13 For example, after arguing that the Qur’an offers no clear

endorsement of the caliphate, ‘Abd al-Raziq cited T. W. Arnold, writing, “if the reader desires to

study this subject further, he should consult The Caliphate, by Sir Thomas Arnold, the well-known

authority.”14 Clearly, ‘Abd al-Raziq approved of Arnold’s scholarship, yet this reference held little

weight in his argument. Indeed, prior to this citation, ‘Abd al-Raziq had explained that Islamic

scholars already concur that the Qur’an does not provide evidence for the purported duty to

establish a Caliph.

The impartial ‘ulema, as well as the bureaucratic ones, have been unable to find in the Qur’an any argument for their view. So they have abandoned it in favor of what we have seen, claiming consensus [إجماع], and resorting to analogical syllogisms and the postulates of reason.15

‘Abd al-Raziq supported this claim by citing scholars like ‘Adud al-Din al-Idji (680/1281-

756/1355), who asserted that the consensus judgment of scholars regarding the necessity of

establishing a caliph rested upon no further authority. In other words, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s claim that

11 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 189. 12 Souad T. Ali, A Religion, Not a State, 106. 13 In all, Abd al-Raziq cited 3 non-Muslim works: 1) Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student’s History of Philosophy (11); Thomas Arnold’s, The Caliphate (15, 30); and The Gospel of Matthew, (49). Arnold’s work was cited twice. The second citation was given as further reading to substantiate ‘Abd al-Raziq’s claim that, during the Ottoman caliphate, jealousy and love of power led to much unnecessary bloodshed between Muslims (30). Beyond these citations, ‘Abd al-Raziq, referred to the findings of “political scientists,” at a few points in his work, although he never cited these claims. It appears that ‘Abd al-Raziq referred to British political scientists in these passages, since at one point, he uses English to mention their key concepts (70). 14 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 15. ). ‘Abd al-Raziq may have been introduced to Arnold at some point. At the very least, his admiration for Arnold’s work ran deep, as ‘Abd al-Raziq sent him a copy of Islam and the Sources of Authority upon its publication. (see Anita Burdett. “Letter from T.W. Arnold to Wakely,” in volume II of Islamic Movements in the Arab World 1913-1966, 35-36). 15 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 14. For the most part, I follow C. C. Adams’ translation of Islam and the Sources of Authority, although I have modified it in places. For this translation, see C. C. Adams 1928.

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the caliphate lacked clear Qur’anic support was not new, nor was it an idea imported from

European scholarship. Citing T. W. Arnold’s work may have raised eyebrows, but it did not

support any innovative or controversial claims that could not find support within classic works of

Islamic scholarship.

More importantly, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s historical narrative of the caliphate’s origins showed little

similarity to Arnold’s. Arnold, with some reservations, endorsed traditional Sunni narratives,

according to which the first four Caliphs of Islam inherited the Prophet’s political office by means

of election. Following these narratives, Arnold also believed that the Umayyads departed from the

principle of election, and introduced the unsanctioned principle of hereditary succession.16 ‘Abd

al-Raziq, as we will see, argued that the Prophet Muhammad never held political authority, and

that there was, therefore, no political office for the first caliph to inherit. Furthermore, he argued

that each caliph gained his position purely by means of “force and the sword,”17 not by election.

Given the wide discrepancy between Arnold and ‘Abd al-Raziq’s historical narratives, it can

hardly be argued that the latter was drawn from the former. Beyond Arnold, there are very few

citations of European works in Islam and the Sources of Authority. While ‘Abd al-Raziq’s

reasoning is innovative in important ways, to be discussed below, he never relied upon explicit

findings of European scholarship to justify his innovations.

Given the paucity of references to European authorities in ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work, we can see

why Hamid Enayat, despite the testimony of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s critics, claimed that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s

“strong point” was that his work “did not indicate much absorption of Western thought.”18 More

recently, and more resolutely, Souad T. Ali has asserted that his arguments are “not at all rooted in

Western thought, but rather, sit firmly within the dictates of Islam’s sacred texts.”19 These

descriptions of Islam and the Sources of Authority are partly true, but largely misleading. Can we

16 T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, 22. 17 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92. 18 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, 62. 19 Souad T. Ali, A Religion, Not a State, 70.

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really imagine that an “Islamic justification of political secularism,”20 put forward in the Cairene

milieu of 1925, was not at all rooted in Western thought? This would mean that ‘Abd al-Raziq just

happened to independently arrive at political conclusions that had been endorsed by Western

European intellectuals since the 17th century. While theoretically possible, this scenario is highly

improbable. In ‘Abd al-Raziq’s time, Egyptian society itself was rooted in Western thought, in the

form of the British occupation. Ali overlooks this obvious environmental influence, I believe,

because she aims to prove that Muslims should endorse ‘Abd al-Raziq’s conclusions. That is why

she asserts that his arguments “sit firmly within the dictates of Islam’s sacred texts.” Setting the

propriety of her theological judgments aside, it is important to note that Ali’s defense of ‘Abd al-

Raziq assumes the same false dichotomy put forward by ‘Abd al-Raziq’s critics: namely, that

beliefs and practices must be either Western or Islamic. More importantly, she makes the false

assumption that the sacred texts of Islam contain dictates. Texts, of course, do not make dictates or

claims; people do. It is the reader who takes a text to make a certain claim, which she may then

accept or reject. By asserting that ‘Abd al-Raziq merely expressed the claims made in sacred texts,

Ali buries the question of how ‘Abd al-Raziq read these texts, and why he took them to make

certain claims. Sections 3 and 4 take up these questions, and argue that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s read

Islam’s classic sources by the lights of Egyptian nationalism and European historicism.

The most important reason for examining ‘Abd al-Raziq’s method of reading Islam’s sacred

texts is that he was explicit about the novelty of his approach. Indeed, ‘Abd al-Raziq asserted that a

certain section of his book should not be taken as a traditional work of Islamic scholarship:

This is an investigation that lies outside of the field of religious creeds [ دائرة that the ‘ulema are accustomed to investigating, and concerning [العقائدwhich they have arrived at a settled opinion; it pertains more strictly to the department of scientific research [باب البحث العلمي] than it does to the department of religion [ باب الدين 21.[

20 This is the subtitle of Ali’s book-- A Religion, Not a State: ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s Islamic justification of Political Secularism. 21 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 49.

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By labeling his research as “scientific” rather than “religious,” ‘Abd al-Raziq suggested that he

was following a method of research distinct from the ones used in the theological investigations of

the ‘ulema. Unfortunately, ‘Abd al-Raziq never made his research methodology explicit. It is

significant, however, that ‘Abd al-Raziq did not claim that his entire work was scientific. The

above-cited passage appears in the second section of his three-part work, where ‘Abd al-Raziq

begins his historical examination of the origins of the caliphate institution. This tells us that ‘Abd

al-Raziq believed his historical inquiry constituted scientific research, and was a departure from

Islamic traditions of scholarship. Section 5 will examine ‘Abd al-Raziq’s historical argument in

detail. This argument is central to Islam and the Sources of Authority. Indeed, it comprises two

thirds of the work.

Islam and the Sources of Authority is a short work—103 pages—subdivided into three

sections. In the first section, The Caliphate and Islam, ‘Abd al-Raziq demonstrated that the

caliphate finds support neither in the sources of the shari‘a, nor the claim of reason. In the

following section, Government and Islam, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that the Prophet never held

political authority over the umma. This argument discredited the traditional claim that the caliph

succeeded the Prophet in political leadership. It was followed by the concluding section, The

Caliphate and Government in History, where ‘Abd al-Raziq proposed that Abu Bakr’s authority

rested upon military force, rather than the consensual endorsement of Muslims.22 Abu Bakr used

his armies to consolidate the first state in Islamic civilization—an institution that was created,

rather than inherited, and departed from the Prophet’s example in important ways.

Although ‘Abd al-Raziq divided his work into three parts, he believed himself to be making

two arguments.23 The first argument, contained in section I, concluded that the caliphate

22 Abu Bakr was the first caliph, or successor, to the Prophet Muhammad. According to the standard histories of early Islam, Abu Bakr inherited Muhammad’s responsibilities of state, but not his prophetic mission. 23 Perhaps this claim is controversial. In her recent treatment of Islam and the Sources of Authority, Souad T. Ali describes the work’s three sections, without mentioning a special relationship between sections two and three (Ali, 70-90). I claim that these sections are linked based on ‘Abd al-Raziq’s language in the paragraph concluding section I.

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institution was illegitimate. This argument, made by way of shari‘a reasoning,24 had its merits, but

the history of Islam provided reasons to doubt it. The caliphate was an institution founded by the

Prophet’s most revered companions, and later maintained by eminent Muslim scholars throughout

the history of Islamic civilization. Anyone challenging the legitimacy of the caliphate office

would have to explain why it had gained the widespread endorsement of learned, exemplary

Muslims over many centuries. This prompted ‘Abd al-Raziq’s second argument, in which he

attempted to “set forth” his “personal opinion concerning the caliphate and concerning its

origin.”25 ‘Abd al-Raziq’s aim was to challenge standard historical narratives describing the

origins of the caliphate institution, and provide his readers with an alternative account. He made

this historical argument in sections II and III. As we have seen, this is the portion of Islam and the

Sources of Authority that ‘Abd al-Raziq considered scientific.

In short, the arguments made in sections II and III were meant to provide historical reasons

for endorsing the shari‘a-based arguments in section I. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s hope was to show his

readers that their reverence for the caliphate was based on unpersuasive shari‘a reasoning (section

I), and a misunderstanding of Islamic history (sections II and III). This brief overview of the

structure of Islam and the Sources of Authority demonstrates the hybridized nature of ‘Abd al-

Raziq’s reasoning. ‘Abd al-Raziq put forward religious arguments from the shari‘a, and

“scientific” arguments from history, that he intended to be mutually reinforcing. As we take a

Having established that the caliphate “is not something that arose upon foundations of the true religion nor yet to sound reason,” ‘Abd al-Raziq turned to section II, writing:

Perchance the reader may, at this point, claim the right of asking what is our personal opinion concerning the caliphate and concerning its origin. It is our duty then to attempt to set this forth, seeking from God—may He be exalted—His gracious help and guidance and succour in so doing (‘Abd al-Raziq, 38).

In this paragraph, we see ‘Abd al-Raziq turning from his shari‘a-argument against the caliphate, to a historical argument concerning the true origin of the caliphate. This latter argument is the subject of the remainder of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work—sections II and III. For this reason, I believe, ‘Abd al-Raziq constructed his work as a case laid out in two interrelated arguments. This is the framework I use to discuss ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reasoning throughout this chapter. 24 By “shari‘a reasoning,” I mean the traditional pattern of reasoning used by Islamic scholars, according to which arguments are justified by the Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, the Consensus of previous scholars, and analogical reasoning. The term ‘shari‘a reasoning’ is taken from John Kelsay. See his Arguing the Just War in Islam. 25 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 38.

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closer look at ‘Abd al-Raziq’s argument from history, we will see that certain steps within this

argument rely upon theological reasoning. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s blend of religious and scientific

reasoning, therefore, is not simply segmented into two different portions of his book. It also occurs

within each section.26 Ultimately, this makes ‘Abd al-Raziq’s distinction between scientific and

religious inquiry difficult to maintain.

As is well known, ‘Abd al-Raziq had immediate political reasons for writing Islam and the

Sources of Authority. After Ataturk’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924, a coalition of Azhari

‘ulema, in cooperation with the Egyptian palace, began organizing a caliphate congress to be held

in Cairo.27 Members of Egypt’s liberal political parties—the Wafd and the Liberal

Constitutionalists—believed that the Azharis intended to name Egypt’s King Fu‘ad as the caliph of

Islam. They feared that the caliphate title would strengthen Fu‘ad’s hand in Egyptian affairs,

allowing him to manipulate the religious sentiments of the Egyptian populace, and weaken the

authority of Egypt’s newly-formed parliamentary institutions. Because ‘Abd al-Raziq was a

committed member of the liberal constitutional party, many commentators have rightly argued that

Islam and the Sources of Authority was put foreword as challenge to Fu‘ad’s candidacy. Rather

than arguing that Fu‘ad was unqualified to act as caliph, however, ‘Abd al-Raziq made the more

radical argument that no one should act as caliph, because the caliphate office had no basis in

Islam. This immediate context is important, and has been well-described in numerous works.28 In

order to fully grasp the significance that Islam and the Sources of Authority held for ‘Abd al-

Raziq’s contemporaries, however, it is important to take a longer view of Egyptian history, and

26 Indeed, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s argument from the shari‘a also relies, at points, upon his revisionist history. ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that the caliphate institution cannot be justified by appeals to ijma’ (consensus), because throughout Islam’s long history, scholars have always been compelled by force to endorse the caliph. Their consensus endorsement, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued, holds no more weight than the Iraqi’s endorsement of King Faisal. See ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 32. 27 For an account of this congress, see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled, 86-105. For the Egyptian palace’s role in organizing the conference, see Kramer, 89; Elie Kedourie, “Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-52,” 185. 28 Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled, 86-105; Elie Kedourie, “Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-52,” 177-212; Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 86-87; Maurius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt, 137; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 60-63; Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 358-60; P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 303-05.

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describe the ‘Abd al-Raziq family’s participation in Egyptian political movements stemming back

to the late nineteenth century.

3. The ‘Abd al-Raziq Family: A Pillar of Egyptian Secular Nationalism

The ‘Abd al-Raziq family was a landowning family of rural notables from Egypt’s Minya

province, which possessed a long line of religious scholars. ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s grandfather,

Ahmad Effendi ‘Abd al-Raziq (?-c. 1860) was a qadi, as was his father before him.29 Ahmad

Effendi’s son, Hasan ‘Abd al-Raziq (1844-1907), was Ali’s father. Like his father, Hasan was well

educated in the religious sciences; he attended al-Azhar for eight years, although he had to

abandon his schooling in order to take over the family’s affairs when his father died around

1863.30 Under Hasan’s leadership, the ‘Abd al-Raziq family’s landholdings, wealth, social status,

and political influence greatly increased.31 Hasan was elected to the newly-established Assembly

of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwwab) in 1877.32 The Assembly was later abolished by the British in

1883, and replaced with the Legislative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura), to which Hasan was also

elected and remained a member for more than eighteen years.33 Hasan was also a close friend and

29 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthār Mus tafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 7. According to ‘Ali, this qadi post was inherited within the ‘Abd al-Raziq family for many generations. He could trace the post back to his great, great grandfather, but there may have been ‘Abd al-Raziqs holding the post prior to him. See Ibid. 5-6. 30 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthār Mus tafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 10. Hasan’s older brother Ahmad Effendi al-Saghir, took over the family’s affairs prior to Hasan. But he died shortly after his father. 31 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthār Mus tafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 11. 32 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthar Mustafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 11.When Hasan ‘Abd al-Raziq first joined the Assembly, it was known as the Consultative Assembly of Deputies (majlis shura al-nuwwab). This body was first formed by Isma‘il in 1866 in order to strengthen his credit with foreign lenders by persuading them that his regime had popular support. Nonetheless, some argue the Consultative Assembly did challenge Isma‘il’s fiscal policies See Jacob M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt; Davis, Challenging Colonialism, 26). Others challenge this view, arguing that the Assembly’s purported powers to challenge Isma‘il’s authority are “not based on documentary evidence but on wishful thinking.” See A. Schloch, “Constitutional Development in Nineteenth Century Egypt—A Reconsideration,” Middle Eastern Studies 10.1: 7; see also F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives, 216-26. In 1879, with the Assembly playing a more prominent role in Egyptian politics, the deputies demanded new laws for the assembly, making ministers responsible to the assembly. It was at this point that the assembly became known as the Assembly of Deputies. See Abdelslam M. Maghraoui, Liberalism without Democracy, 122-23. For a good overview of the historiographical debate surrounding the assembly’s alleged powers, and the crucial year of 1979, see AbdelAziz EzzelArab, “The Experiment of Sharif Pasha’s Cabinet (1879): An Inquiry into the Historiography of Egypt’s Elite Movement,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36.4: 561-589. 33 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthar Mustafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 11.

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supporter of the Muslim reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh.34 In the 1870’s, as the Egyptian

government went dangerously far into European debt, ‘Abduh and his followers—many of them

large landowners like Hasan—became increasingly critical of Khedive Isma‘il. They advocated

greater legislative powers for the Assembly of Deputies. This advisory body largely dominated by

rural notables, like themselves, who they believed could better administer Egyptian affairs. The

‘Abd al-Raziq home in Cairo became an important intellectual salon, where ‘Abduh’s supporters

would meet and “policies against the Khedive and his court could crystallize.”35 Hasan’s role in

organizing petitions against the Khedive was recognized; Isma‘il banished him to the Sudan, but

was persuaded to rescind his order just before Hasan departed.36

Therefore, by the British occupation of 1882, the ‘Abd al-Raziq family was already

recognized as one of a number of politically-engaged, prominent landholding families who were

critical of the Khedive’s rule and affiliated with the Islamic reform movement led by Muhammad

‘Abduh. Many in this ‘Abduh’s circle earned European-style educations, either through Egyptian

state schools or degree programs in European universities. They believed Islamic law had to be

reformed with the aim of creating a new, dynamic Islamic framework that could provide the basis

for modern civilization in the Muslim world. This required a return to the forgotten teachings of

Islam’s pious forbearers, and an incorporation of the fruits of European learning.37 In the last

decade of the nineteenth century, however, some leading members of ‘Abduh’s circle, including

Qasim Amin, Mahmud Sulayman Pasha, ‘Ali Pasha Sha‘rawi, Hasan ‘Abd al-Raziq, Ahmad Lutfi

al-Sayyid, and Sad Zaghlul began to slowly secularize their Islam-based approach to social

reform.38 This group eventually coalesced into the Umma Party in 1907.39 Increasingly, their

34 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthār Mus tafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 12-13. 35 Eric Davis, Challenging Colonialism, 40. 36 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, Min āthār Mus tafá �Abd al-Rāziq, 12. 37 For an overview of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s teachings, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 130-60. 38 For an account of this shift among ‘Abduh’s followers, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,161-92; Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 22-31. Walid Kazziha, “The Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics.” 39 For the creation of the Umma Party, see Walid Kazziha, “The Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics.”

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arguments for the reform of Egyptian customs and institutions were couched in the language of

European science and rationalism, rather than Islamic terms. This departure was largely a reaction

to the nationalist agitations of Mustafa Kamil and his Watani party beginning in the last decade of

the nineteenth century.

In their study of Egyptian nationalist trends from 1900-1930, Israel Gershoni and James P.

Jankowski explain that the turn of the twentieth century in Egypt saw the birth of two rival

nationalist ideologies. On the one hand, there was “the Ottoman-Islamic orientation” promoted by

Mustafa Kamil and the Watani party. This was the dominant trend in Egyptian nationalist

reasoning from the 1890’s to the Allies’ defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War. On the

other hand, there was the anti-Ottoman, secular nationalism promoted by Muhammad ‘Abduh’s

disciples in the Umma Party. 40 Advocates of both parties assumed a kind of Egyptian territorial

nationalism, which held that Egyptians were united “as part of a geographically distinct,

historically unique Egyptian nation rooted in the Valley of the Nile.”41 Both parties also assumed

that the strengthening and maintenance of national unity was essential to Egypt’s progressive

development. According to Mustafa Kamil, for example, strong national unity was one of the keys

to Europe’s advancement:

Everything that exists in those regions, by way of justice, order, freedom, and independence, great prosperity and great possessions, is undoubtedly the product of this noble feeling which spurs the members of the nation in their entirety to strive for a common purpose and a single goal.42

The Watani and Umma parties disagreed, however, about the bases of Egyptian national unity, and

the loyalties it ought to inspire. This disagreement was largely shaped by the parties’ conflicting

positions concerning the British administration. The Watanis insisted on immediate evacuation of

40 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 4-15. 41 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 11. 42 Quoted in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 206.

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the British without conditions.43 The Umma Party, however, believed the wisest political strategy

was to work with the British administration to help modernize the Egyptian state until Egyptians

were ready to govern themselves. Disagreement about the legitimacy of the British administration

led to rival nationalist ideologies that were put forward via different styles of argumentation.

Mustafa Kamil attempted, quite successfully, to arouse anti-British sentiment by appealing to

pan-Islamic solidarity. “For every living nation there are two great obligations,” he claimed, “the

obligation toward its religion and its creed, and its obligation towards its watan and the land of its

fathers.”44 Kamil stressed that Egyptian loyalty to the Ottoman Caliph was a religious obligation.

This pro-Ottoman loyalty did not conflict with loyalty to the Egyptian nation, Kamil believed,

because Ottomans and Egyptians shared an interest in expelling the British. The Ottomans were

one of the few powers capable of helping Egypt to tear off the British yoke.

The Umma Party strongly opposed efforts to reestablish the Khedive’s former powers, or to

strengthen ties with the Ottoman state. Under the British administration, Egypt’s large landowners

had been able to hold an increasing number of administrative posts. As more of their sons received

European-style educations and attained government positions, the landholding classes imagined

that they were in position to eventually take the reigns of the Egyptian state, once the British

relinquished them.45 A return to Khedival or Ottoman rule would only subject them to an

administration they had less power to control. Therefore, as Kamil began appealing to pan-Islamic

sentiments in order to intensify Egyptian displeasure with British rule, landholders like Hasan

‘Abd al-Raziq took his agitations as a threat to their own well-being, and the possibility of an

independent Egyptian nation. In turn, they used the Umma Party, and its official newspaper, al-

Jarida, to articulate a secular nationalist ideology that could win Egyptians away from the policies

of the Watanis.

43 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 203; Arthur Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892 - 1919.". 44 Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 7. 45 Walid Kazziha, “the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics,” 378-380

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Albert Hourani explains that the Umma Party “dissolved the relationship established by

‘Abduh between Islam and civilization.”46 This shift was partly based on their disapproval of

Mustafa Kamil’s abuse of pan-Islamic sentiments. But it was also due to the fact that some of

them, Qasim Amin and Lutfi al-Sayyid for example, were strongly influenced by works of

European intellectuals, like Comte, Renan, Mill, and Spencer.47 Amin and Lutfi took their works

to describe universal laws of social progress that governed all societies, thereby charting the path

of modernization for the Egyptian nation. Endorsing these theories, they began openly promoting

European values as true in themselves, independent of an Islamic framework. Western-educated

Umma Party members who followed this line imagined themselves as Egypt’s intellectual elite; 48

they were responsible for guiding the evolution of Egypt’s customs and institutions by teaching

their countrymen of the benefits of the European sciences, and the virtues of European society.

Reflecting on this responsibility, Lutfi claimed the best leaders are those “who, though of the elite,

can descend to the level of the masses and share their crude sentiments in order to gain their

confidence and lead them unawares in the direction of their real interests.”49 As the editor of al-

Jarida, Lutfi attempted to engage and massage these “crude sentiments” by promoting a secular

sense of Egyptian identity.

Lutfi argued that strong, flourishing nations cannot be built upon religious solidarity.

Religious solidarity “is incompatible with the sacred Egyptian slogan ‘Egypt for the Egyptians,’”50

insofar as it promotes divisions between Egypt’s Christians and Muslims. The nation, for Lutfi, is

a natural association of people that has no basis in religion. “The umma,” he wrote, “is that civic

association which is a product of nature and one of its creations. It has the right to life and

46 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 169. 47 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 167, 173; Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 24, 25, 27, 28. 48 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 6-8, 19-25, 27, 30, 31, 35, 37, 38; Jamal Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, 91; Walid Kazziha, “the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics,” 382-83. 49 Jamal Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, 91. Cited in Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 203 n.62. 50 Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 8.

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freedom, just as every individual possesses these natural rights.”51 “Fanatical” pan-Islamic

sentiments threaten this natural association, as does the “imperialist principle” of allegiance to the

Ottoman caliph. Lutfi demanded that Egyptians identify themselves as “Egyptians before anything

else.”52 Cultivating a sense of exclusive loyalty to the nation was essential to Egypt’s progress.

The pan-Islamic, pro-Ottoman sentiments expressed by Mustafa Kamil, as Lutfi had it, encouraged

the continuation of outdated government institutions that prevent Egypt from realizing its national

potential and entering into more advanced stages of social evolution.

Critics charged that the Umma Party was elitist, “being representative of the ‘ayan (rural

notables) and not the umma (nation).”53 The party conceded but qualified this accusation. The

‘ayan, Lutfi claimed, were “the representatives of those who have real interest in the country.”

While the Watani party was created by “a few educated Egyptians,” he argued, the Umma Party

“included among its members the majority of the heads of prominent families, who represented the

interests of the whole nation, a claim which no other party in Egypt could make.”54 Despite Lutfi’s

claim that the Umma Party, through its notable leadership, represented the interests of the entire

nation, its secular variety of Egyptian nationalism clearly lacked the popular support of the Watani

party. 55 A clear example of the unpopularity of their position came during the Italian-Ottoman war

of 1911-12. While the Watanis encouraged Egyptians to support their Ottoman sultan in the battle

against Italy, Lutfi argued that Egypt had no interest in this war and called for Egyptian neutrality.

This recommendation provoked an intense public response so negative that the Umma Party forced

Lutfi to temporarily step down as al-Jarida’s editor.56

51 Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 13. 52 Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 14. 53 Quoted in Walid Kazziha, “the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics,” 382. 54 Quoted in Walid Kazziha, “the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics,” 382. 55 Walid Kazziha, “the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics,” 382. See also Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 28-29. This perception of the Umma circle continued in the 1920’s, when its leaders formed the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Wafdist newspapers referred to the Liberal Constitutionalists as the “party of aristocrats.” Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 66. 56 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 10.

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As we have seen, the ‘Abd al-Raziq family was a prominent supporter of the secular

nationalist movement in Egypt from the very beginning. Hasan ‘Abd al-Raziq was the Umma

Party’s first vice-president, although he died shortly after its formation in 1907. His sons followed

in their father’s footsteps. They were also prominent Umma Party members, often frequenting the

offices of al-Jarida.57 They maintained an intellectual salon in their father’s Cairo home. When al-

Jarida ceased publication in 1915, Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq, ‘Ali’s brother, helped to found the

journal, al-Sufur, which promoted the policies of the former Umma Party.58 When the leadership

of the Umma circle created the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, in 1922, Hasan’s sons became

members. The ‘Abd al-Raziq family funded the party’s official newspaper, al-Siyasa.59 With the

family’s long, high-profile involvement in Egypt’s secular political parties, it is little wonder that

‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s contemporaries read Islam and the Sources of Authority as a politically-

motivated work written by a “Europeanized apostate.” It was clearly in line with the secular

nationalist platform advocated by the Umma Party circle since 1906, reasserting their long-held

opposition to the Egyptian monarchy and the Ottoman caliphate.

Islam and the Sources of Authority was also a departure, however, from the Umma circle’s

political strategy of nearly two decades. Rather than insisting upon the supremacy of secular

nationalism, or discounting religious commitments from the lofty perch of scientific rationalism,

‘Abd al-Raziq chose to engage the heated issue of the caliphate in religious terms. This strategy of

social reform was a throwback to Islam-based reform promoted by Muhammad ‘Abduh. ‘Ali ‘Abd

al-Raziq, with his ‘alamiyya degree from al-Azhar, and his ten-year tenure as a shari‘a-court judge,

was uniquely qualified to defend the Liberal Constitutionalist’s position with religious arguments.

57 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 30. In the al-Jarida office, lectures were given often by Lutfi al-Sayyid and other prominent lawyers. Young members of the Umma circle, like the ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, would meet with Lutfi and read books like Mill’s On Liberty, Spencer’s Justice, and Carlyle’s Heroes and Hero Worship and The French Revolution (see Ibid., 38). 58 ‘Ali’s brother, Mustafa, who later went on to become the Shaykh al-Azhar helped found al-Sufur in 1915. Al-Sufur was an avant-garde journal of modern literature and social criticism, which was published until 1918. ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq also contributed articles to al-Sufur. See Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 53; Elisabeth Kendall, Literature, Journalism and the Avant-Garde, 34-37. 59 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 78.

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But, as ‘Abd al-Raziq insisted, his book is not a standard theological work. Rather, it is a

hybridized work that combines methods of shari‘a reasoning with European historical criticism.

‘Abd al-Raziq’s choice to confront religious teachings with historical criticism reflects his learning

outside of al-Azhar. Simply growing up in his father’s household and frequenting the offices of al-

Jarida would have given ‘Abd al-Raziq exposure to the works of European scholarship most

discussed among Egypt’s leading intellectuals.60 Souad T. Ali overlooks this influence when she

claims that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reasoning has no roots in Western thought. More importantly, she

neglects the formative importance of Abd al-Raziq’s period of study at the Egyptian University.

There, ‘Abd al-Raziq attended Carlo Nallino’s lectures on the history of Arabic literature.61

Through Nallino, ‘Abd al-Raziq learned European methods of historical research that he would

later apply in Islam and the Sources of Authority.62

4. Historicism in Modern Egypt

Carlo Nallino (1872-1938) was part of a small group of Italian orientalists hired by King

Fu‘ad to teach at the Egyptian University upon its opening in 1910.63 His courses influenced a

number of students who went on to become leading Egyptian intellectuals—among them, ‘Ali

‘Abd al-Raziq, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Amin, and Mansur Fahmi.64 Judging by his students’

accounts, Nallino’s lectures had a profound impact upon them. According to Taha Husayn, one of

‘Abd al-Raziq’s classmates and another influential member of the Umma circle, Nallino’s lectures

were “a turning point in the history of Modern Egyptian thought and culture.”65 In his opening

lecture on the history of Arabic literature, Nallino explained his overriding responsibility to his

60 See note 57. 61 C. C. Adams, The Modern Reform Movement in Egypt and the Caliphate, 348. 62 Nallino also wrote a work on the Caliphate, which like Arnold’s book, focused on debunking Ottoman claims to the caliphate. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s arguments show no direct borrowings from this work. See Carlo Nallino, Notes on the nature of the "caliphate" in general and on the alleged "Ottoman Caliphate." 63 Donald Malcom Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt, 39. 64 Donald Malcom Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt, 153. 65 Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husain’s Education, 52. Ahmad Amin similarly claimed that he learned “the methodology of research” from reading Nallino’s History of Astronomy among the Arabs (Reid, 153).

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students: “Nothing is requested from me but to apply methods of historical research upon Arab

history that have become customary in the history of our European literature, with great utility.”66

He could not have imparted this knowledge at a more opportune moment, as historical narratives

had become a favored weapon in Egypt’s nationalist culture wars.

In his recent study of history writing in twentieth-century Egypt, Yoav Di-Capua explains

that “the modern idea of history is a form of thought and a habit of mind that arrived in Egypt in

the late nineteenth century, bringing with them specific institutions and modes of reasoning.”67 Di-

Capua refers to this modern idea of history as “historicism,” a European intellectual import that

“more than anything else . . . sought to understand the past from the point of view of the final

outcome of progress.”68 History writing became “a tool for uncovering the laws of progress.”69

This made historical narrative a powerful way of rejecting or endorsing contemporary institutions

and customs. Nationalists of all political persuasions upheld historical knowledge as essential to

the strengthening of the Egyptian nation. As Mustafa Kamil put it:

What is the lethal drug that the nation has taken with such pleasure? What is the disastrous misfortune of the country that befell its inhabitants while they (passively) continue to gaze at it? How come this beloved nation forgot that it was she who conquered, subjugated, stroked, and emerged triumphant . . .? Obviously, the reason for this disastrous state of affairs is the neglect of civil education [tarbiyya wataniyya] and the erasure of instructive history to the mind and spirit. . . . History, History! This is the common school for all classes of the nation. This is the instructor that will acculturate the glorious prince, the celebrated minister, the erudite scholar, the student, and the ordinary poor man.70

We see here that Kamil believed that Egyptian society had fallen into decay partly because

Egyptians had forgotten their history.71 The point of studying Egyptian history anew was to

66 Carlo Nallino, Tārīkh al-ādāb al-�Arabīyah min al-jāhilīyah h attá �asr banī Ammayah, nuss al-muh ādarāt allatī alqāhā bi-al-jāmi�ah al-Mis rīyah fī sanat 1910-1911, 57. 67 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 11. 68 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 29. 69 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 46. 70 Quoted in Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 52. 71 Similarly, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that Muslims have endorsed the caliphate, thereby hastening the decline of Islamic civilization, because they have failed to understand their own history. See page 8 above.

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revivify the nation’s spirit—to teach Egyptians to identify themselves with great heroes and

conquerors of old. This was a point that all nationalists took for granted. There was heated

disagreement, however, about the ways in which Egyptians ought to become “acculturated.” This

led to historiographical conflicts, as conflicting narratives were put forward to justify rival

nationalist trends.72 For example, orientalist research into ancient Egypt provided scientific

evidence of the greatness of Egypt’s past. Yet it could be used in controversial ways. During the

1920’s Muhammad Husayn Haykal73 wrote numerous articles celebrating Egypt’s pharaonic past

with the aim of excavating “Egypt’s true, unIslamic nature.”74 While he believed his findings to be

the fruits of research conducted “with scientific precision and all the freedom of thought

possible,”75 it is no coincidence that they justified a sense of Egyptian identity that gave legitimacy

to the Liberal Constitutionalist’s secular nationalism.

Islam and the Sources of Authority is another work that uses the science of history to

legitimate a secular nationalist Egyptian identity, although it uses Islamic rather than pharaonic

materials to make its case. This description of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work might make it seem a

polemical abuse of history, rather than a respectable historical work, but in ‘Abd al-Raziq’s

context this distinction is difficult to make.76 Take Nallino’s lectures, for example. Nallino

professed the intention to simply pass European research methods on to his students. But he, like

Kamil and Haykal, also recognized a moral purpose for studying history. “[T]he literature of your

noble language and its history is not only a scientific problem,” Nallino told his students, “but a

glorious service to your nation whose undertaking is obligatory for all of you.” He went on:

72 See, for example, the debate between Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad ‘Abduh concerning whether or not Mehmet Ali ought to be considered the founder of modern Egypt. See Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 31-35. 73 Muhammad Husayn Haykal was a member of the Umma circle who later became the editor of the Liberal Constitutionalist’s newspaper, al-Siyasa. For an excellent biography of Haykal, see Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt. 74 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 50. 75 Quoted in Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 43. 76 Martin Kramer makes this suggestion. See his “Review of Modern Islamic Politcal Thought by Hamid Enayat,” 239.

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Surely, what defines and preserves the unity of the nation is especially the unity of language, literature, customs, tastes, and inherited ideas from ancient times, with no break or interruption. If its preservation is neglected, then the nation will decline into the dilemma of its decay—rather, the frustration of its unity. If you review books of Western history, you will find that some of the European nations have endured civil strife, wars, tribulations, corruption, and subjugation and forced servitude to its enemy. Yet it was saved from the complete annihilation of its unity by the preservation of the literature of its language, and concern for the perpetual remembrance of its glorious ancient works of science and literature. Many a nation that has been flung into the flux of affairs and adversities of the greatest political decline has begun to reform its servile condition and return to its original state in terms of prosperity, political reform, and independence, when its devoted scholars began their efforts in penetrating research into its history, the conditions of its forbearers, and the restoration of the literature of its language. . . as if they, in their work, have thrust the spirit of life into the exhausted, near-dead body of the nation. Woe to every nation overcome by slackness in preserving its literary treasures and continuing the memory of its works.77

With the authority of a European university professor, Nallino projected the nation’s identity

into the past, as if it were a pre-existent entity, waiting to be discovered in literary artifacts. For

Nallino, nations existed from “ancient times, with no break or interruption.” Nations that shirk the

responsibility of history are sure to weaken and be threatened with disintegration. Many European

scholars of Nallino’s time would have concurred with these sentiments. Just as European

researchers studied Beowulf, Chanson de Roland, the Divine Comedy, El Cid, or The Song of the

Nibelungs to justify conceptions of British, French, Italian, Spanish, and German identity,

Egyptian intellectuals, following their lead, set about using literary artifacts to support concepts of

Egyptian identity.78 Since the formation of political parties in 1907, however, these concepts had

been in sharp dispute. ‘Abd al-Raziq turned to classic sources of the Islamic tradition—including

the Qur’an, hadith collections, theological treatises, and historical annals—in order to justify the

Liberal Constitutionalists’ promotion of a secular Egyptian identity, based on ties of geography,

custom, and language. For example, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that the Prophet Muhammad allowed

77 Carlo Nallino, Tārīkh al-ādāb al-�Arabīyah min al-jāhilīyah h attá �asr banī Ammayah, nuss al-muh ādarāt allatī alqāhā bi-al-jāmi�ah al-Mis rīyah fī sanat 1910-1911, 18. 78 For a description of this kind of engaged nationalist philology in nineteenth-century European scholarship see, Karla Mallette, European Modernity and the Arab Mediterranean, 6-19.

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the Arabian tribes to manage their own political, economic, and social affairs—as if they were

autonomous states.79 This was clearly an attempt to legitimate contemporary concepts of nation by

projecting them into the past. Islam and the Sources of Authority was written, therefore, with the

aim of fulfilling a responsibility to nation, as well as religion. Scientific history would demonstrate

that Islam endorsed states administered by “the most recent conclusions arrived at by the minds of

men, and the most assured results that the experience of nations have indicated to be the best

principles of government.”80

While many Egyptian nationalists used historical narratives to support their nationalist

commitments, most, like Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Husayn Haykal, were not professional

historians. Still, they used the veneer of science and rationalism to give their narratives persuasive

force. ‘Abd al-Raziq was no exception in this regard, although his coursework with Nallino did

provide him with more training in European historical research methods than most. Nallino taught

his students that among the Arabs, the state of historical science was undeveloped. Even the best

Arab historians have “confined themselves to detailing the memory of events and occurrences year

by year, without research into [their] causes, social circumstances, the connection between events,

their effects, and without extending their aim to anything more than a genuine memory of the

apparent contingencies that befall the nation”81 This critical observation about the deficiencies of

Arab history reveals the virtues of European historical research that Nallino intended to pass on to

his students. History, for Nallino, is a causal narrative that explains the rise and fall of

civilizations. The problem with Arab chronicles is that their chronological framework simply listed

events, without paying any attention to the connections between them. This made the fates of

nations appear to be random “contingencies,” rather than the rational outcome of causal

79 See page 29 below. 80 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 103. 81 Carlo Nallino, Tārīkh al-ādāb al-�Arabīyah min al-jāhilīyah h attá �asr banī Ammayah, nuss al-muh ādarāt allatī alqāhā bi-al-jāmi�ah al-Mis rīyah fī sanat 1910-1911, 56. Cf. Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husain’s Education, 54.

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sequences.82 Therefore, Nallino explained, even the best Arab historians “didn’t examine carefully

the progression of works in the development of civilization, or its decline.”83 Understanding the

progress or decline of a civilization requires historians to assume normative standards of social

development, by which they may measure the civilizations they study. For ‘Abd al-Raziq, these

standards were expressed in “the most recent conclusions arrived at by the minds of men.” Judging

by these European standards of progress, he considered the political institutions of the Muslim

world as “backwards.”84 In Islam and the Sources of Authority, as we will see, ‘Abd al-Raziq

attempts to account for this backwards state of affairs by examining the conditions that led to the

feeble condition of political philosophy in Islamic scholarship.

Following Nallino, ‘Abd al-Raziq proposed to chart the decline of Islamic civilization

through its works of political literature. Nallino taught his students to track the development of

literary traditions by reading historical sources contextually. That is, researchers had to account for

the social, economic, and political circumstances that stimulated a literary work, as well as the

effects it helped create. This historical approach to literature, Nallino explained, allows researchers

to account for “the origin of each class of the literary arts. . , the path of its growth or decay. . , the

influence of authors upon each other, and the reasons for changes of taste and custom.” These

topics of research were precluded by Arab scholars’ historical methods. Nallino demonstrated the

benefit of his method by applying it to ghazal love poetry. The ghazal poet’s social milieu had a

distinct impact upon his writings. In the Hijazi cities, one notices the development of a more

sensual style, while in the Arabian deserts, authors tended toward a chaste form of expression.85

Examining the social reality underlying literary artifacts also provided the historian with critical

leverage against traditional accounts of their formation. In his lectures, for example, Nallino

82 This is a standard observation made of Arab/Islamic historical works, as distinguished from modern, European works of history. See, Jack A. Crabbs, The Writing of History in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, 13-26; Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 36-46. 83 Carlo Nallino, Tārīkh al-ādāb al-�Arabīyah min al-jāhilīyah h attá �asr banī Ammayah, nuss al-muh ādarāt allatī alqāhā bi-al-jāmi�ah al-Mis rīyah fī sanat 1910-1911, 56-57. 84 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 31. 85 Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husain’s Education, 53.

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questioned the authenticity of some Pre-Islamic poems, since they contained styles of language

and Islamic concepts that were not present in the Pre-Islamic milieu.86 ‘Abd al-Raziq, as we will

see, also used a contextual historical approach to literary sources in order to explain the meager

development of Islamic political writings. He argued that the weakness of the Islamic political

sciences reflects their development under harsh conditions of repression inherent in the caliphate

system. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Raziq turned to the social milieu of Muhammad and his companions in

order to demonstrate that they could never have endorsed contemporary doctrines of the caliphate.

These doctrines, in their claim to trace back to the Prophet’s time, were every bit as forged as

certain works of Pre-Islamic poetry.

5. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s Historical Argument

Nallino’s historical approach to reading literary works contextually, within the framework of

social development, can be seen in ‘Abd al-Raziq’s account of the origins of the caliphate. In this

account, ‘Abd al-Raziq assumed, and attempted to explain, “the backward state of politics” [ انحطاط

among Muslims.87 He believed the primitive condition of the political sciences in [شأن السياسة

Islamic learning was indicative of this state of affairs:

It is a fact readily observable in the history of intellectual activity among Muslims, that the lot of political sciences among them, as compared with other sciences, has been unfortunate in the extreme, and that it has led in their midst a most precarious existence. We do not know of a single author among them in political science, nor a translator. Nor do we know a single study on any part of the laws of government or of the principles of politics, except, possibly an inconsiderable amount which is of no weight whatever in comparison with their intellectual activity in other sciences than that of politics.88

Why, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s asked, had Islamic scholars written so little on political science? Surely they

had reasons to study the subject. On the one hand, given the frequent political disputes that raged

86 Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husain’s Education, 56-57. This was the thesis Taha Husayn later took up in Fi al-Shi‘r al-Jahili. 87 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 31. 88 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 22.

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throughout the history of Islamic civilization, it is hard to believe that few scholars would have

thought to study the principles of political authority. On the other, many Muslim scholars were

devoted students of the Greeks. Given their reverence for Plato and Aristotle it is unlikely that

they would have taken little interest in works like the Republic and Aristotle’s Politics. What, then,

are the circumstances that produced “the weak condition of . . . political sciences among

Muslims”?89 In this set of questions, we see ‘Abd al-Raziq framing his historical argument with

the kinds of questions that Nallino asked. ‘Abd al-Raziq aims to explain the “unfortunate” state of

Islamic political literature. This account, he believes, will provide insight into the current

weakened state of Islamic civilization. It must be arrived at, moreover, by an examination of the

social reality that influenced the underdeveloped state of Islamic political writings.

The dearth and feebleness of Islamic political works is best explained, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued,

by political censorship that necessarily followed from the establishment of the caliphate institution.

As he had it, the caliphate office left human beings’ insatiable lust for power unchecked. The

office was based purely upon military power, which the caliph would naturally use to eliminate all

forms of dissent:

[T]he caliphate in Islam has never rested upon anything except the foundation of awe-inspiring, intimidating force, and. . . . this force, except in rare cases, has been material armed force.90

That the caliphate is established upon subjugation and compulsion means nothing more than this: 1) that these two [i.e. subjugation and compulsion] are kept on the lookout for anyone who might make a rebellious attack upon the position of the caliphate, or show hostility to it; and 2) that the sword is held in readiness for those who touch that throne with evil design or work for the shaking of its support.91

This account of the sources of the caliph’s authority was hardly a sympathetic description of

the institution. Moreover, as ‘Abd al-Raziq noted, it challenged the “fundamental principle . . . of

the caliphate according to Muslim thought”: namely, that the caliph’s authority should “be derived

89 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 24; 30. 90 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-us ūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 27; cf. 25. 91 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 28.

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from the choice of the men of influence.”92 This principle, ‘Abd al-Raziq explained, assumes that

the caliphate “rests upon the good will and pleasure of the men of influence among Muslims.”93

‘Abd al-Raziq conceded that “theoretically,” it is “within reason that there should exist . . . a

caliphate of the description given by advocates of the caliphate.”94 He turned to history, however,

to demonstrate that this theory has never been instantiated in practice.

History does not mention any caliph who is not associated in our minds with that armed dread that surrounds him, that constraining power that overshadows him, and those unsheathed swords that defend him.95

What ‘Abd al-Raziq is attempting, here, is to debunk traditional narratives of Islam’s

glorious caliphate. He chose to do this by turning to the origins of the caliphate, and critically

revising narratives of Islam’s most cherished, and unquestionably legitimate, period of caliphal

rule—the Rightly-Guided Caliphate. In this argument from history, ‘Abd al-Raziq challenged two

basic assumptions in traditional narratives of Abu Bakr’s ascension as Islam’s first caliph. First,

‘Abd al-Raziq argued that Abu Bakr did not inherit this office from the Prophet Muhammad. The

Prophet Muhammad, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued, never held political authority, nor did he ever head a

state. Therefore, the caliphate office was created by Abu Bakr and his supporters. It was an

innovation that finds no basis in the Prophet’s practice. Secondly, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that Abu

Bakr’s leadership was never sanctioned by the consensus of the Prophet’s companions. Indeed,

Abu Bakr consolidated his position by fighting the ridda wars, which means that his authority, like

that of all caliphs, was based “upon the foundations of force and the sword,”96 rather than the

choice of men of influence.

‘Abd al-Raziq’s prose indicates that he was well aware that his revisionist narrative was

likely to provoke a hostile response. “[P]lunging into the investigation of this subject,” he wrote,

92 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 24-25. Quoted from Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah. 93 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25. 94 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25. 95 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25-26. 96 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92.

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“may become that starting point of an attack, the fires of which they will kindle—those who do not

know religion except as a hard and fast form, which [allegedly] should not be pursued by the mind

nor approached by speculation.”97 As discussed above, ‘Abd al-Raziq claimed to be conducting

“scientific research,” in order to forestall such attacks. He was subjecting Islamic historical

narratives to rational criticism, which implied that his research was not governed by the same

standards of judgment as madrasa scholarship. Unlike theological inquiry, ‘Abd al-Raziq insisted,

his research “does not, in reality, touch [upon] anything of essential import in religion nor any

pillar of Islam.”98 Still, ‘Abd al-Raziq believed that emotional attachments to traditional narratives

of the caliphate’s origins would make his readers reluctant to endorse his arguments. “We have

some fear,” he wrote, “that the affecting picture that the historians try to paint of this era may

deceive you. Know, then, first of all: that in the science of history there are many mistakes. How

often is history at fault! And how often it may be grievously in error!”99 The claim that the

Prophet Muhammad established a government, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued, was one of these mistakes.

5.1 Muhammad: prophet, not statesman

If the Prophet founded the Islamic state, ‘Abd al-Raziq inquired, why is it that the historical

record gives so few details about the system of government he put in place?100 There is no

evidence suggesting that “essential” government offices—like the ministry of finance or of

justice—existed.101 There are stories of the Prophet appointing certain persons as qadis or

governors. But upon closer inspection, these accounts are often contradictory, and the

responsibilities attached to these posts are never clearly described. Some accounts, for example,

claim that ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib was sent to the Yemen as a qadi. But others claim he was sent to

97 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 47. 98 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 48-49. 99 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85. 100 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 39-45; 57; 85. 101 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 45.

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collect the Prophet’s khums (tribute), or to command of an army to subjugate the Hamdan tribe.102

If the Prophet did appoint believers to certain positions of government, it seems he did not do so

“in accordance with a fixed rule.” The historical records indicate that Muhammad made such

appointments “casually, for a limited time only.”103 A government, ‘Abd al-Raziq suggested,

could not function on such an ad hoc basis. Even the Prophet’s own administrational procedures

are unclear. For example, the sources claim that that he acted as a judge, but do not describe his

procedure for making judgments:

When we wish to elicit anything concerning his procedure in passing judgment, we find that to elicit anything from these cases is not easy, in fact, it is impossible. The reason is that what has been handed down to us in the way of traditions concerning the Prophet’s judicial action is not sufficient to give us a clear picture of such action, nor of what procedure it may have followed; if, indeed, it followed any fixed procedure.104

Given these ambiguities in the historical record, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that “an impartial

investigator may very well arrive at the opinion that the Prophet did not assign governors . . . in the

countries that God granted him victory, for the direction of their affairs, the management of their

circumstances, and the preservation of order within them.”105 A scientific researcher, therefore,

was entitled to question “whether the Messenger of God was or was not a king.”106 In other

words, did the Prophet even possess political authority? To answer this question, ‘Abd al-Raziq

turned from traditional works of history to the Qur’an. God, ‘Abd al-Raziq explained, repeatedly

states that Muhammad’s office is simply to “preach” to others and “warn” them of God’s

judgment:

102 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 41-42. 103 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 45. 104 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 40. 105 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 45. 106 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 48.

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Warn then, for you are a warner. You have no authority over them. But if one turns away and rejects God, God will punish him with a mighty Punishment.107

For you are nothing but a warner. Verily, we have sent you with the truth; as a bearer of good tidings and a warner. There has never been an umma without a warner having lived among them.108

Obey God then, and obey the Messenger. But if you turn away, our Messenger is charged with plain preaching.109

But if they turn aside from you, we have not sent you to be their guardian. Your duty is to preach.110

In all, ‘Abd al-Raziq cited 37 verses summoning Muhammad to preach and to warn. It is in

these verses, he argued, that God explains “the meaning of the Messenger’s mission” [الرسالة].111

The Prophet was not sent to establish a government over people. God clearly commanded that

“there be no compulsion in religion.”112 If people “turn away” from Muhammad, or disbelieve his

message, he cannot force them to become believers. As God put it:

But if the Lord had pleased, surely all who are in the earth would have believed together. What! Will you compel men to become believers?113

‘Abd al-Raziq emphasized God’s repeated claims that Muhammad is not the “keeper” of men, that

he is not “in charge” of them, and that he is not their “guardian.” These assertions, as he had it,

reiterated Muhammad’s status as purely that of a preacher and warner:

Follow what your Lord has reveled to you. There is no God but He! And turn away from the polytheists. Had God pleased, they would not have

107 Qur’an 88:21-24. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 53; 72. Qur’an translations are, although I have consulted C. C. Adams’ translations in his translation of Islam and the Sources of Authority, as well as Yusuf ‘Ali’s translation of the Qur’an. 108 Qur’an 35:23-24. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 75. 109 Qur’an 64:12. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 75. 110 Qur’an 42:48. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 72. 111 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 65-69. 112 Qur’an 2:256. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 53. 113 Qur’an 10:99. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 53; 71.

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joined other gods with Him. And we have not made you a keeper over them, nor are you a guardian over them.114

But your people reject it [God’s signs], while it is the truth. Say, I am not in charge of you. For every prophecy is its set time, eventually you will know it.115

Assuredly we have revealed the Book to you for people in truth. Whosoever is rightly guided, it is for his benefit. And whosoever has strayed, on the contrary, commits error. But you are not their guardian.116

If God declared that Muhammad was not “in charge” of people, he could hardly have been

a king. The Qur’an, therefore, clearly states that political authority is incompatible with the

mission of a Messenger. The Sunna, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued, concurs. It is reported that when a

certain man visited the Prophet and appeared anxious in his presence, the Prophet said “make

yourself at ease, for I am not a king nor a tyrant, but I am only the son of a woman of the Quraysh

who used to eat dried meat in Mecca.”117 By the Prophet Muhammad’s own account, then, he was

not a king. This is further verified by a report in which the angel Gabriel gives Muhammad the

choice of becoming either a king or a servant. Muhammad chose the latter, declaring that “a

prophet is a servant.”118

It is important to note that while ‘Abd al-Raziq used the Qur’an as an authoritative source

in his historical argument, he did not treat it as an ordinary literary source that was produced by the

economic, political, and social conditions of human communities. Rather, like his colleagues at al-

Azhar, ‘Abd al-Raziq treated the Qur’an as the word of God. His argument from history, therefore,

is itself a hybridized combination of historical and theological reasoning. In this specific piece of

his narrative, he used source criticism—his assessment of the vague and contradictory information

in sources describing Muhammad’s alleged state—to support his reading of the Qur’an. His

114 Qur’an 6:106-07. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 71. 115 Qur’an 6:66-67. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 71. 116 Qur’an 39:41. Quoted in ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 72. 117 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 76. Quoted from Ahmad ibn Zaini Dahlan (d. 1304/1887) Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah. 118 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 76.

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reading of the Qur’an, in turn, complimented his source criticism, indicating the reason why

sources describing the Prophet’s government are so obscure. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s hybridized reasoning

shows that his distinction between scientific and religious reasoning is not clearly drawn within his

work. Jacques Berque was not quite right, therefore, to identify ‘Abd al-Raziq’s critics as the

“enemies of secular history.”119 European-style historical research led Abd al-Raziq to challenge

his critics’ proprieties. But his historical arguments relied upon theological judgments. They

rejected these judgments as much, if not more, than his research methods.120

Since Muhammad was a warner, but not a guardian, he never created a state apparatus

overseeing the affairs of the Arab tribes. Muhammad did unify the tribes, but “the unity of the

Arabs that existed in the time of the Prophet was not a political unity from any point of view.”

“The sovereignty of the messenger [والية الرسول] over his people,” Abd al-Raziq explained, “is

spiritual sovereignty; it’s source is faith of the heart and its sincere and complete submission,

which is followed by submission of the body.” On the other hand, “the sovereignty of a civil ruler

is a material sovereignty, depending upon submission of the body and not having any [والية الحاآم]

connection with hearts.”121 Muhammad’s followers obeyed him out of belief in his mission and a

willing submission to it. Their unity, therefore, was “a unity of faith and of religious belief, not a

unity of empire nor of monarchical tendencies.”122 The Prophet did lay down Islamic codes that

regulated “beliefs . . , private relations, manners and customs, and punishments.”123 But these

regulations constitute a “religious code only, entirely concerned with the service of God and the

religious welfare of mankind, nothing else.”124 As Abd al-Raziq had it, a territorial map of the

119 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 360. 120 Had ‘Abd al-Raziq used “secular history” to support his colleagues’ endorsement of the caliphate, rather than challenge it, they would most likely have embraced his work as a major scientific contribution. This was the response to Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s Hayat Muhammad, published in 1933, which also claimed to adhere to “Western scientific methods” and listed Thomas Carlyle in its bibliography. See Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 113-30. 121 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 69. 122 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 83. 123 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85. 124 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85.

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Arabian peninsula in the Prophet’s time would have resembled the fractured checkerboard of states

seen on maps of the Middle East after World War I:

The Arabs, although the Divine Law of Islam did unite them, continued in those days in that condition of differentiation in regard to politics . . . and in regard to other manifestations of civil, social, and economic life. That is equivalent to saying that they constituted numerous states, to the degree in which the life of the Arabs at that time may be designated as a state or government. This was the state of the Arabs at the time when Muhammad departed to meet his exalted Friend.”125

State boundaries posed no threat to the religious unity established by the Prophet Muhammad. Nor

did a Muslim people’s decision to administer there own political, economic, or social affairs. The

Liberal Constitutionalists, in their promotion of a secular nationalist identity, followed in the

footsteps of the Prophet.

5.2 Abu Bakr: Islam’s first king

‘Abd al-Raziq concluded that “Muhammad was but a messenger sent on behalf of a

religious summons,” who “possessed neither kingly rule nor government, and . . . was not charged

with the task of founding a kingdom in the political sense.126 This judgment undercut the

traditional belief that the caliphate office had been inherited by from the Prophet Muhammad.

Since Muhammad wielded no political authority, no one could have succeeded him in political

leadership. Yet Muslims did refer to Abu Bakr as “caliph” (successor) of the Prophet of God.

Why would they have done so, if they didn’t conceive him as succeeding the Prophet in his

political leadership? ‘Abd al-Raziq had to explain this. He did so by following the procedure

recommended by Nallino, and examining the historical milieu in which Abu Bakr’s caliphate took

shape.

125 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85. 126 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 64-65.

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‘Abd al-Raziq argued that the language of the Arabs in Abu Bakr’s context undermined the

traditional understanding of his succession. The Prophet “throughout his whole life, did not refer to

anything that might be called an Islamic state or an Arab state.”127 Indeed, as ‘Abd al-Raziq had

already argued, the Prophet Muhammad never founded a state. Abu Bakr’s contemporaries,

therefore, could never have imagined that he was assuming the Prophet’s role as head of state. In

what sense, then, did they refer to Abu Bakr as Muhammad’s successor? ‘Abd al-Raziq reminded

his readers that ‘caliph,’ in Abu Bakr’s context, was a novel title used to describe his newfound

status as the leader of the umma. As such, there was no clear concept or doctrine behind the term.

According to ‘Abd al-Raziq, the term ‘caliph’ was originally a poetic way of acknowledging Abu

Bakr’s legitimacy. The Arabs called Abu Bakr Muhammad’s successor, “metaphorically,” with

the sense that he succeeded the Prophet in maintaining Arab unity. This unity was not based,

however, upon the Prophet’s spiritual authority, for Abu Bakr’s contemporaries believed that

Muhammad was the seal of the Prophets. Nor was it based upon a pre-existent state office, since

Abu Bakr’s contemporaries had never encountered an “Islamic state.” Rather, it was based upon a

new type of authority, that is, political authority constituted by military force. With Abu Bakr’s

institution of the caliphate office, Muslims, for the first time, were governed by a political

authority. In ‘Abd al-Raziq’s words:

There is no doubt that the Messenger of God was a leader of the Arabs and the rallying point of their unity, in the sense which we have previously explained. When, therefore, Abu Bakr became a king over the Arabs and gathered them into a unity, in the newly-originated political sense, it is proper, in the [linguistic] usage of the Arabs, to say that he was, in this regard, the caliph of the Messenger of God.128

It was the creation of a new institution, not the inheritance of an old one, that made Abu

Bakr the successor to the Prophet. ‘Abd al-Raziq also asserted that it made Abu Bakr “the first

127 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 87. 128 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 95.

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king in Islam.”129 This was a scandalously impertinent claim. Traditional Sunni narratives cast

Abu Bakr as the first of four “rightly-guided caliphs.” These were the caliphs who presided over a

golden age of Islam—a time when the umma was ruled in accordance with Islamic customs and

institutions. After the rightly-guided caliphate, the caliph’s throne was usurped by the powerful

Umayyad clan, based in Damascus. They made the caliphate a hereditary office, thereby

transforming the caliph into a king. From this period onward, the umma was governed by the same

mundane, monarchical institutions that ruled over other communities—not the system of

governance proper to Islam. By calling Abu Bakr Islam’s first king, ‘Abd al-Raziq knowingly

dissolved the assumed periodization of Islamic history, according to which the golden age of the

rightly-guided caliphs was followed by the decline into monarchical rule under the Umayyads. He

argued, instead, that the period of monarchy began with the death of the Prophet. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s

intention, however, was not to claim that Abu Bakr’s moral status was equal to that of the reviled

Umayyads. Rather, the point was that there is no real distinction between caliph and king. Both

terms name “a ruler over a nation possessing political and civil unity.”130 Whether one calls this

ruler “caliph” or “king,” his authority is political, resting upon purely upon “awe-inspiring and

intimidating force.”131 Abu Bakr was no exception:

If you have noticed how the taking of the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr was accomplished and his authority established, it will have become plain to you that it was an oath taking of a political, kingly sort, having all the characteristics of a newly constituted state, and that it came to be only as governments come to be, upon the foundations of force and the sword.132

‘Abd al-Raziq explained that Abu Bakr rose above many other contenders to fill the power

vacuum left after the Prophet’s death. Traditional narratives tend to focus on the oath of allegiance

pledged to Abu Bakr, suggesting that he became caliph with the umma’s full support, and did not

need to resort to force. Once again, ‘Abd al-Raziq used source criticism to debunk this narrative.

129 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92. 130 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 70. 131 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25. 132 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92.

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The classical sources of Islamic history, he explained, reveal that there was no consensus about

how the umma should be governed upon the Prophet’s death. Most Arab tribes rejected the need

to maintain the tribal unity Muhammad had forged.133 Even the leadership at Medina raised

similar doubts. When the Ansar and the Muhajirun disputed about which group had the right to

lead, a member of the Ansar proposed that the umma be split in two. Both parties ultimately

rejected this proposal, but the fact that it was raised shows that maintaining the unity of the umma

was not a foregone conclusion. Abu Bakr did, eventually, receive the oath of allegiance from the

people of Medina. But even some Medinans, like ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib and Sa‘d ibn Ubadah,

refused to make the oath.134 Clearly, then, Abu Bakr’s support was not universal—even in the city

of Medina.

‘Ali and Sa‘d’s withholding of the oath of fealty to Abu Bakr was regarded as unimportant,

‘Abd al-Raziq argued, because no one considered the caliphate a religious office. The Medinans

understood themselves to be setting up a secular, worldly government:

Abu Bakr did not claim, nor did any others of the important men of the people, that the command over Muslims was a religious office, or that rebellion of it was rebellion against religion.135

It was known to Muslims at that time that they were proceeding to set up a secular worldly government [ دنيوية مدنيةكومة ح ], nothing more. For this reason, they considered rebellion against it, and opposition to it, lawful. They knew that they were but differing in regard to on of the concerns of this life, not in a matter of religion, and that they were disputing only concerning a political matter that did not affect their religion or disturb their faith.136

This is why the classical sources do not describe ‘Ali or Sa‘d, as apostates. Had allegiance to the

caliphate been considered a religious obligation, ‘Ali and Sa‘d would have committed apostasy.

Other rebels against Abu Bakr, however, are considered apostates in the classical sources. These

rebels were members of the tribes outside of Medina. They are described as “apostates” [مرتدون],

133 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 86. 134 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 93. 135 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 94. 136 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 93-94.

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or renouncers of Islam. Abu Bakr, we are told, as the authorized successor to the Prophet

Muhammad, was compelled to wage a series of wars against these tribes. These are the famous

ridda wars—the wars of apostasy. Ultimately, Abu Bakr emerged the victor, thereby saving the

unity of the Arabs and the predominance of Islam. Once again, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that these

stories neglect historical evidence to the contrary. The historical sources indicate that “not all of

these rebels were in reality apostates, turning infidels [آفروا] against God and His Messenger.”137

These indications are subtle; in order to recognize them, a researcher must read these sources

against the grain of popular assumptions. ‘Abd al-Raziq referred to these counter-narrative

deposits within the classical sources as “firebrands,” or “glowing embers” [ قبس :138[

How much we are conscious of the obscurity of history and its wrongdoing, as we attempt search diligently into what history has related of those men who rebelled against Abu Bakr and were styled “apostates,” and of those wars of theirs that were styled “the wars of apostasy.”

However, an occasional firebrand [قبس] from the light of truth is ever tossed forth into the dark recesses of history; some day the ‘ulema will turn towards this glowing ember [ ]. And let us hope that in the light of this fire they will find guidance.139 قبس

‘Abd al-Raziq cited the case of Malik ibn Nuwairah as one of these “glowing embers.” He is

typically regarded as an apostate. Despite his labeling, classical sources show that “Malik

announces, with complete explicitness . . . that he still continues in Islam, but that he will not pay

the zakat to the master of Khalid (Abu Bakr).”140 Would an apostate insist that he was still a

Muslim? Many historical commentaries explain that the rebels apostatized by refusing to pay

zakat—one of the acknowledged “pillars” of Islam. Once again, ‘Abd al-Raziq turned to Abu

Bakr’s social environment to challenge this thesis. He conceded that zakat is an essential duty that

all Muslims must perform, but argued that not all of Abu Bakr’s opponents withheld zakat with the

137 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 97. 138 I translate ‘qabas’ [قبس] as both ‘firebrand, and ‘glowing ember,’ in the passage cited below, only for the sake of rendering better English style. Hans Wehr gives ‘firebrand,’ and ‘live coal,’ as possible meanings. The idea is that these muted themes in historical sources are remnants of the “light of truth,” ready to ignite more material and provide more light. 139 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 97-98. 140 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 98.

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intention of neglecting their religious duties. Indeed, Malik insisted that he refused to pay zakat to

Abu Bakr. Contemporary Arabian tribal custom make this qualification significant. According to

these customs, weak tribes would acknowledge the authority of dominant tribes by paying them

tribute. Hence, Malik refused to pay Abu Bakr the zakat, not because he shirked the religion of

Islam—indeed, he explicitly insisted the contrary—but because he refused to acknowledge Abu

Bakr’s leadership over his tribe. It is not the case, therefore, that all of Abu Bakr’s wars against the

tribes were wars against apostasy. Many of these wars were fought between Muslims, in a contest

for political authority.

That affair was, then, a contest which was other than religious: it was a contest between Malik, the Muslim who remained firm in his religion, but who was from the Tribe of Tamim, and between Abu Bakr, the Qurayshi, who was setting up an Arab state, the leaders of which were from the Quraysh. It was a dispute concerning the kingship of a king, not concerning rules of religion nor principles of faith.141

Moreover, in Abu Bakr’s milieu, the doctrine of zakat being an essential pillar of Islam had

not acquired the weight of centuries of tradition that it has today. Muslims were in the earliest

stages of determining the meaning of Islamic identity. Accordingly, ‘Umar was unsure of Abu

Bakr’s decision to fight the recalcitrant tribes, and asked him “How can you fight against these

men, since the Messenger of God said, ‘I was commanded to fight against men until they say,

There is no God but God.’”142 This question reveals that the essential features of Muslim identity

were still up for grabs as Abu Bakr embarked upon the Ridda wars. With the hindsight of well-

established theological doctrine, it makes sense to say that Abu Bakr chose to confront Muslims

who had abandoned their basic religious duties. In Abu Bakr’s time, however, the propriety of his

decision was ambiguous, and its correctness could have been reasonably challenged on religious

grounds. Indeed, given ‘Abd al-Raziq’s belief that the Prophet Muhammad allowed the tribes

141 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 98. 142 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 99.

36

under the Islamic fold to govern themselves, one could argue that “apostates” like Malik ibn

Nuwairah actually adhered to the Islamic tradition, as the caliph chose to reject it.

6. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to improve upon the previous descriptions of the arguments put

forward in ‘Abd al-Raziq’s Islam and the Sources of Authority. Previous studies have mentioned

‘Abd al-Raziq’s upbringing in a prominent political family, and the fact that he attended the

Egyptian University, but have failed to describe the ways in which ‘Abd al-Raziq’s writing

reflected his life. This paper has argued that the ends and means of persuasion, in Islam and the

Sources of Authority, were determined by ‘Abd al-Raziq’s involvement in the Liberal

Constitutionalist Party and the Egyptian University. A close reading of Islam and the Sources of

Authority shows that he referred little to European authors, but it also reveals that his arguments

were broadly shaped by European patterns of reasoning. For example, ‘Abd al-Raziq assumed a

progressive view of the history of civilization. This enabled him to judge Islamic political

institutions as “backwards,”143 and since they are not based on “the most recent conclusions

arrived at by the minds of men.”144 Moreover, ‘Abd al-Raziq revered scientific inquiry as the most

reliable means of arriving at knowledge that can be used to reform and develop society. Following

other European scholars, he classified history as scientific discipline, and believed that it had the

potential to recover a nation’s authentic identity from literary sources of the past.

Though Islam and the Sources of Authority is thoroughly shaped by European patterns of

reasoning, it is an original work that attempts to synthesize them with Islamic styles of

argumentation. ‘Abd al-Raziq reached singular conclusions, which he arrived at by his unique,

hybridized style of reasoning. He did not simply repeat the theses of European scholars. This

brings us back to the observations of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s critics, who loudly protested to his citations

143 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 31. 144 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa-usūl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 103.

37

of T. W. Arnold. In one sense, they blew two references to a non-Muslim work way out of

proportion. In another, however, their observations hit the mark. The point of highlighting the

Arnold citations was not to argue that ‘Abd al-Raziq’s work was derivative. Rather, the point was

that it was innovative—that something new was happening in his work. By the standards of ‘Abd

al-Raziq’s critics, his path-breaking investigations were confusing and condemnable. Others might

disagree with their condemnation, but it must be admitted that they were right to suggest that ‘Abd

al-Raziq’s innovative reasoning stemmed from his engagement with European scholarship.

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