EN BANC ABAKADA GURO PARTY G.R. No. 166715 LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, Petitioners, Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, - v e r s u s - CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR. NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and BRION, JJ. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, Respondents. Promulgated: August 14, 2008
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a. Scrutiny Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention
to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of
the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at
the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more
intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx c. Legislative supervision The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. Supervision connotes a continuing
and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional
supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations
to Congress, which retains a right to approve or disapprove any regulation before
it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if
Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if
Congress affirmatively approves it. Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government
as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They
contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One
proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is
too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual
or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general
statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an
executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their
implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not have
participated in or agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently,
absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme
could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard,
of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing
law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the
executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies
have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether
legislative intervention is appropriate. Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-
enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that
legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto
authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches
of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of
powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from
accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements and
congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the
exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review
executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity
for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative
veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval
of subordinate law or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto is a
necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside
its chambers. In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto is
the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme
Court resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from
the order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant
to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of
Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2)
authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of
the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement
the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed the aliens appeal, holding that it had no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth
Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to order the aliens
deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of
powers. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2)
unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of separation of
powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and
bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose
and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the
Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment
to the President. x x x x x x x x x Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum
decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated
statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions
required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism
requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.[35](emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of
congressional oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional
body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional
Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the
IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these
functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the Commission on
Elections.[36]
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers. [1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [2] An Act to Improve Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) Through the Creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and of a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board and for Other Purposes. [3] Section 2, RA 9335. [4] Section 3, id. [5] Section 4, id. [6] Section 6, id. [7] Section 7, id. [8] Section 11, id. [9] Section 12, id. [10] Cruz, Isagani, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1995 edition, p. 23. [11] Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY, 1996 edition, pp. 848-849. [12] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion) [13] See La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 01 December 2004, 445 SCRA 1. [14] Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997). [15] Section 2, id. [16] Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, 15 December 2004,
446 SCRA 299. [17] 173 U.S. 381 (1899). [18] 74 U.S. 166 (1868). [19] BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, SPECIAL DE LUXE 5th Edition, West, p. 481. [20] 158 Phil. 60 (1974). [21] Id. Citations omitted. [22] Ambros v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159700, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 572. [23] Section 2, RA 9335. [24] Section 18, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987. [25] Section 23, id. [26] Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965). [27] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 533.
[28] Cruz, Isagani, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 1991 edition, p. 97. [29] Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), (Cardozo, J., dissenting). [30] Section 5, Rule II, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9335. [31] De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 70 (2000). [32] See Section 46(b)(8), Chapter 6, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987. [33] Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 152214, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA
295. [34] 453 Phil. 586 (2003). Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Punos separate opinion was adopted as part of the ponencia in
this case insofar as it related to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee. [35] Id. (italics in the original) [36] Id. [37] Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991). [38] Id. [39] Id. [40] See Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Punos separate opinion in Macalintal. [41] E.g., by requiring the regular submission of reports. [42] See Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Punos separate opinion in Macalintal. [43] See Tribe, Lawrence, I American Constitutional Law 131 (2000). [44] Id. [45] Id. at 141. [46] Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, supra. [47] Edu v. Ericta, 146 Phil. 469 (1970). [48] Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY, 2003 edition, p. 664 citing Wayman v. Southward, 10 Wheat 1 (1852) and The Brig
Aurora, 7 Cr. 382 (1813)). [49] Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, 01 September 1994, 236 SCRA 161; Sierra Madre Trust v.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 206 Phil. 310 (1983). [50] People v. Maceren, 169 Phil. 437 (1977). [51] See Eslao v. Commission on Audit, supra. [52] It is also for these reasons that the United States Supreme Court struck down legislative vetoes as unconstitutional
in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (462 U.S. 919 [1983]). [53] Nachura, Antonio B., OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW, 2006 edition, p. 236. [54] Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. [55] See Bernas, supra note 48, p. 762. [56] PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2002 edition, Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 152-153. [57] THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION FOR LADIES, GENTLEMEN AND OTHERS, 2007 edition, Rex
Bookstore, Inc., pp. 118-119. [58] The conference committee consists of members nominated by both Houses. The task of the conference committee,
however, is not strictly limited to reconciling differences. Jurisprudence also allows the committee to insert
new provision[s] not found in either original provided these are germane to the subject of the bill. Next, the
reconciled version must be presented to both Houses for ratification. (Id.) [59] Supra note 56. [60] Supra note 57. [61] See Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. In Taada v. Tuvera (230 Phil. 528), the Court also cited Section 6,
Article III which recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. [62] As much is recognized in Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Taada recognized that unless it is otherwise
provided referred to the date of effectivity. Simply put, a law which is silent as to its effectivity date takes
effect fifteen days following publication, though there is no impediment for Congress to provide for a
different effectivity date. [63] It has been suggested by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio that Section 12 of RA 9335 is likewise unconstitutional
because it violates the principle of separation of powers, particularly with respect to the executive and the
legislative branches. Implicit in this claim is the proposition that the ability of the President to promulgate
implementing rules to legislation is inherent in the executive branch. There has long been a trend towards the delegation of powers, especially of legislative powers, even
if not expressly permitted by the Constitution. (I. Cortes, Administrative Law, at 12-13.) Delegation of
legislative powers is permissible unless the delegation amounts to a surrender or abdication of powers. (Id.)
Recent instances of delegated legislative powers upheld by the Court include the power of the Departments
of Justice and Health to promulgate rules and regulations on lethal injection (Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 358 Phil. 410 [1998]); the power of the Secretary of Health to phase out blood banks (Beltran v.
Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, 133661, & 139147, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA 168); and the
power of the Departments of Finance and Labor to promulgate Implementing Rules to the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act. (Equi-Asia Placement v.DFA, G.R. No. 152214, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA
295.) The delegation to the executive branch of the power to formulate and enact implementing rules falls
within the class of permissible delegation of legislative powers. Most recently, in Executive Secretary v.
Southwing Heavy Industries (G.R. Nos. 164171, 164172 &168741, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 673), we
characterized such delegation as confer[ring] upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules
and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. (Id., at 686,
citing Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, 2003 Edition, at 24.) Law book authors are likewise virtually
unanimous that the power of the executive branch to promulgate implementing rules arises from legislative
delegation. Justice Nachura defines the nature of the rule-making power of administrative bodies in the
executive branch as the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what the law
shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the
law itself. (A.E. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law [2000 ed.], at 272.) He further explains that
rules and regulations that fix the details in the execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the law are
called supplementary or detailed legislation. (Id., at 273.) Other commentators such as Fr. Bernas (Bernas,
supra note 48, at 611), De Leon and De Leon (H. De Leon & H. De Leon, Jr., Administrative Law: Text and
Cases (1998 ed), at 79-80; citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d 891) and Carlos Cruz (C. Cruz, Philippine Administrative
Law (1998 ed), at 19-20, 22, 23) have similar views. The Congress may delegate the power to craft implementing rules to the President in his capacity
as the head of the executive branch, which is tasked under the Constitution to execute the law. In effecting
this delegation, and as with any other delegation of legislative powers, Congress may impose conditions or
limitations which the executive branch is bound to observe. A usual example is the designation by Congress
of which particular members of the executive branch should participate in the drafting of the implementing
rules. This set-up does not offend the separation of powers between the branches as it is sanctioned by the
delegation principle. Apart from whatever rule-making power that Congress may delegate to the President, the latter has
inherent ordinance powers covering the executive branch as part of the power of executive control (The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices Section 17, Article VII,
Constitution.). By its nature, this ordinance power does not require or entail delegation from Congress. Such
faculty must be distinguished from the authority to issue implementing rules to legislation which does not
inhere in the presidency but instead, as explained earlier, is delegated by Congress. The marked distinction between the Presidents power to issue intrabranch orders and instructions or
internal rules for the executive branch, on one hand, and the Presidents authority by virtue of legislative
delegation to issue implementing rules to legislation, on the other, is embodied in the rules on publication, as
explained in Taada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446). The Court held
therein that internal regulations applicable to members of the executive branch, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Id., at 454) The
dispensation with publication in such instances is rooted in the very nature of the issuances, i.e., they are not
binding on the public. They neither create rights nor impose obligations which are enforceable in court. Since
they are issued pursuant to the power of executive control, and are directed only at members of the executive
branch, there is no constitutional need for their publication. However, when the presidential issuance does create rights and obligations affecting the public at
large, as implementing rules certainly do, then publication is mandatory. In explaining why this is so, the
Court went as far as to note that such rules and regulations are designed to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. (Id., at 254.) The Court would not have spoken of valid delegation
if indeed the power to issue such rules was inherent in the presidency. Moreover, the creation of legal
rights and obligations is legislative in character, and the President in whom legislative power does not reside
cannot confer legal rights or impose obligations on the people absent the proper empowering statute. Thus,
any presidential issuance which purports to bear such legal effect on the public, such as implementing rules
to legislation, can only emanate from a legislative delegation to the President. The prevalent practice in the Office of the President is to issue orders or instructions to officials of
the executive branch regarding the enforcement or carrying out of the law. This practice is valid conformably
with the Presidents power of executive control. The faculty to issue such orders or instructions is distinct
from the power to promulgate implementing rules to legislation. The latter originates from a different legal
foundation the delegation of legislative power to the President. Justice Carpio cites an unconventional interpretation of the ordinance power of the President,
particularly the power to issue executive orders, as set forth in the Administrative Code of 1987. Yet, by
practice, implementing rules are never contained in executive orders. They are, instead, contained in a
segregate promulgation, usually entitled Implementing Rules and Regulations, which derives not from the
Administrative Code, but rather from the specific grants in the legislation itself sought to be implemented. His position does not find textual support in the Administrative Code itself. Section 2, Chapter 2,
Title 1, Book III of the Code, which defines Executive orders as [a]cts of the President providing for rules of
a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers. Executive orders are not the vehicles for rules of a general or permanent character in
the implementation or execution of laws. They are the vehicle for rules of a general or permanent character
in the implementation or execution of the constitutional or statutory powers of the President himself.
Since by definition, the statutory powers of the President consist of a specific delegation by Congress, it
necessarily follows that the faculty to issue executive orders to implement such delegated authority emanates
not from any inherent executive power but from the authority delegated by Congress. It is not correct, as Justice Carpio posits, that without implementing rules, legislation cannot be
faithfully executed by the executive branch. Many of our key laws, including the Civil Code, the Revised
Penal Code, the Corporation Code, the Land Registration Act and the Property Registration Decree, do not
have Implementing Rules. It has never been suggested that the enforcement of these laws is unavailing, or
that the absence of implementing rules to these laws indicates insufficient statutory details that should
preclude their enforcement. (See DBM v.Kolonwel Trading, G.R. Nos. 175608, 175616 & 175659, 8 June
2007, 524 SCRA 591, 603.) In rejecting the theory that the power to craft implementing rules is executive in character and
reaffirming instead that such power arises from a legislative grant, the Court asserts that Congress retains the
power to impose statutory conditions in the drafting of implementing rules, provided that such conditions do
not take on the character of a legislative veto. Congress can designate which officers or entities should
participate in the drafting of implementing rules. It may impose statutory restraints on the participants in the
drafting of implementing rules, and the President is obliged to observe such restraints on the executive
officials, even if he thinks they are unnecessary or foolhardy. The unconstitutional nature of the legislative
veto does not however bar Congress from imposing conditions which the President must comply with in the
execution of the law. After all, the President has the constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. [64] This stance is called for by judicial restraint as well as the presumption of constitutionality accorded to laws enacted
by Congress, a co-equal branch. It is also finds support in Pelaez v. Auditor General (122 Phil. 965 [1965]). [65] 346 Phil. 321 (1997). Emphasis in the original. [66] In particular, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard. [67] Section 36, IRR of RA 9335.