Mar 10, 2016
9
Barcelona Institute of Architecture
History, Theory, and Criticism Department
Labor, City, Form: Towards a Common Architectural Language
Seminar paper
Book review: The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt, The University of Chicago Press, 2007
Student: Andjelka Badnjar
Prof. Pier Vittorio Aureli
Fall term 2010-2011. Barcelona
This paper will try to follow the relationship between politics and
labor as deployed in Carl Schmitt’s book The Concept of the Political. The
paper follows two constitutive arguments: The first part introduces elements
that are hypothetically analogue to the what later Hannah Arendt described
as the primary human condition1 . The second part instead is devoted to the
influence of liberalism that would be argued as deductive line within the
concept. In the cohesion between these two lines (human condition and
liberalism), the concepts of the political and labor appear as questionable.
1 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958
10
Carl Schmitt does not provide any definition of the political. He
deals with its nature.2 In order to determinate the very essence of the
concept he starts with defining “political categories”3, a term that almost
does not repeat again any more. Namely, further discussion on the political
is based on terms of criterion.
For Schmitt, the consideration of the political is autonomous from other realms of human thought and action, such as moral, aesthetic,
religious, economic, etc. These realms are just relatively independent, since
all other actions could be traced through the criteria of the political.4 At the
moment they start to be decisive, they are becoming political and with no
connection within previous human realm. Therefore, they cannot be
evaluated by the criteria of its original category, which is the principal for
creating a fundamental base to serve the distinction between state and
society.
In order to potentially determinate the political, for anything from
totality of human actions, it is necessary to have the ability for causing the
ultimate distinction that political must rest on: the one between friendship
and enmity.5This distinction is parallels common antitheses existing in other
realms such as the distinction between good and evil in morality, beautiful
and ugly in aesthetics, or profitable and unprofitable in economics. But even
though Schmitt derives this assumption from mentioned categories6, “” he
further insists that this new distinction “can speak clearly for itself” and
“cannot be directly reduced to the others.”7
This is final line up to where Schmitt goes in defining the political.
All other connotations are just potential scenarios of its essence, and all of
2 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 19. 3 Id., p. 25.
4 Id., pp. 25, 26.
5 For distinction between terms “enemy” and “foe” relevant for Schmitt’s concept
of the political see: Schwab, G., Introduction of The Concept of the Political, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 10. 6 the question there is whether there is also a special distinction which can serve as a
simple criterion of the political, [Where] 7 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 26.
them could be reduced on “distinction between friend and enemy [that]
denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation.”8
Moreover, the split “provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative on substantial
content.”9 It is not the content that could be defined, since content might be
anything, but the character of the category determined by intensity of an
association or dissociation of human beings. This potential association is
sovereign, not in the totalitarian meaning, but “in the sense that the decision
about the critical situation, [war], must always necessarily reside there.”10
The decision whether there is going to be war or not could be
brought only by the actual participants. “Only the actual participants can
correctly recognize…”11
There is no norm or law but only one who
participates is able to experience and consequently know how to act. The
decision is strictly subjective, since it is primary condition of the group.
“Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary
intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed
in order to preserve one’s own form of existence.”12 Therefore, the reason of
grouping is not any reason, it is the form of existence. Moreover, when
talking about pacified globe, Schmitt refers that “there would not be a
meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life,
authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings.”13
Schmitt suggests
that in pacified globe, politics is [apparently] impossible, since there is no
primary condition of the political: grouping strong enough that establishes
choice between life and death. “From this most extreme possibility human
life derives its specifically political tension.”14
There is no other justification
except for the political condition that could explain “man killing each
other”15
, and this principle does not derive its argument from any moral
8 Id., p. 26.
9 Ibid.
10 Id., p. 27. 11
Ibid. 12
Id., p. 25. 13
Id., p. 35. 14
Ibid. 15
Id., p. 49.
11
norm or nihilist tendency, since it is not a claim for justice nor call for war,
but the very basic nature of human existence.
Precisely, the existential attribute of the political is why Schmitt does not define it. It cannot be defined since defining it would entail
defining human nature. The concept of the political melts within the totality
of human affairs, driven by simple criterion as to make significant
distinctions. Its ultimate condition is the survival instinct. Therefore, the
concept of the political is not anything alien to human nature but its supreme
ruling condition, provoked by simple and intense potential decision between
life and death. As existentially decisive it is a primary human necessity,”,
and therefore, potentially analogue to the concept of labor.16
But if human labor is the potential base for experiencing and for
establishing political as the concept, then why humanity as entity is not
supposed to involve or decide within the politics? When Schmitt express
that the pair friend / enemy should be understood in its concrete, not
metaphoric sense, he also stresses that “least all [it is not to be understood]
in a private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private
emotions and tendencies.”17
Clearly enough, enemy is public, not private.
But unlike Marx’s primacy of the social aspects of man above his
individuality18, Schmitt refuses the initially individuality, precisely in order
not to become social. “No form of order, nor reasonable legitimacy or
legality can exist without protection and obedience.”19
By tracing German
political science, Schmitt refers to the state as “qualitatively distinct from
society and higher than it.”20
So, although the concept of the political is
based on existential human condition, the same politics, within the
instrumentalization of the concept, is de-familiarized from the same labor.
16
“To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity, and this enslavement was inherent in
the condition of human life.” Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998, pp.
83, 84. 17 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 28. 18
Marx, K., Grundrisse, Penguin Group, England, 1993, pp. 83, 84. 19
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 52. 20
Id., p. 24.
Because “human nature as well as divine right demands its inviolable
observation”21
, Schmitt pulls away concept of the political from its origin,
from the fundaments on what is based, from the sphere of nature to the
sphere of order, arguing for a distrust in man.
“The problematic or unproblematic conception of man is decisive
for the presupposition of every further political consideration.”22
After
following traces from animal fables and Machiavelli’s passions of all kinds
consisting inclination toward evil if not checked, Schmitt arrives to the
interpretation of Plessner that concept of political cannot be neutralized
against irrational life decisions. Finally, he concludes that dominant
philosophical thought, including Hegel and Nietzsche, also belong to the
side of evil.23
And yet, it is the case and consequence order that occasionally
appears as unclear. Is it so because in man’s nature, criterion of friend and
enemy is entailed?, or is it because the necessity of friend and enemy
division in [Schmitt’s] concept of the political illustrates the problematic
nature of man most adequately?
Later on, Schmitt writes: “Because the sphere of the political is in
the final analysis determined by the real possibility of enmity, political
conceptions and ideas cannot very well start with an anthropological
optimism. This would dissolve the possibility of enmity and, thereby, every
specific political consequence.”24
Oscillating in the dualistic connotations of cause and consequence,
Schmitt, predominantly, refers to Hobbes. His state of nature as “a condition
of war of every one against every one”25
, where everyone can use anything
in preserving life against enemy, is recalled in Schmitt’s statement as the
basis for protection and obedience. As Strauss noticed in his Notes on The
21
Id., p. 52. 22
Id., p. 58. 23 Id., pp. 59, 60. 24
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic
Thought, ch. XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their
Felicity and Misery, p. 80. 25
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 19.
12
Concept of the Political, Hobbes attempts to overcome state of the nature26,
namely human liberty27
within the position of civilization, i.e. with the
negation of state of the nature. For Hobbes within this condition where
“every man has a right to everything, even to one another’s body” there can
be no security to any man. And consequently “it is a precept, or general rule
of reason: that every man ought to endeavor peace, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.”28
Unlike Schmitt, political concept for Hobbes is abstraction more than
negation of the state of nature. It is right of the nature that is abstracted: by
all means we are allowed to defend ourselves. Within the political, it is the
law of nature that it is left: seek peace and follow it. In the condition where
there is no politics, there is no law.
For Hobbes, politics should exist because of such nature of man. For
Schmitt, such nature of man is the content of politics War and not peace is
the political ultimate condition. Hobbes’s antithesis that man is evil and
peace is political order is actually a deduction in Schmitt’s case: man is
dangerous and a possibility of war is the political concept. Unlike Hobbes’s
negation of the state of nature, Schmitt does not renounce to it; moreover he
adopts, civilizes and transforms it toward establishing order within it. Such
nature of men is ever present condition, always on the same level and it is
only how it is cultivated that is distinctive. It is a feature that the content
itself does not change, making therefore Schmitt’s thought to seem
ultimately unprogressive. Apart from most of modern theories having in
common the concept of the process29
, he rejects the possibility that man,
26
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 108. 27
Liberty: “the absence of external impediments may take away part of man’s to do
what he would”,
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic
Thought, c. XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity
and Misery, p. 80. 28
Ibid. 29
“The coincidence of Marx’s labor philosophy with evolution and development
theories of the nineteenth century…and the historical development of a life process
of mankind as a whole-was early observed by Engels, who called Marx “the Darwin of history”…what all these theories have in common is the concept of process,
although assumed as dangerous in his origin, could evolve within the
politics. Furthermore, by acknowledging Nietzsche30
Schmitt was,
doubtless, very well aware of possibility that it might not be even the issue if
man is good or evil. If we speculate with the possibility of these choices all
together within Schmitt’s own oscillating view between cause and
consequence, then we might think that it is not only that he doesn’t believe man to be unproblematic, but more of that, Schmitt chooses to believe that
man is problematic.
Acknowledging that his distinction between labor and politics, based
on the nature of man, is actually based on his choice of man as problematic,
it is easy to turn to the direction of potential bellicose and imperialistic
nature of his thought that Strauss slightly attached to Schmitt, noticing that
“Schmitt speaks with an unmistakable sympathy of the “evil”, which is
“nothing other than admiration of animal power.”31
Based on the content of
The Concept of the Political it is not the line that is considered relevant to be
followed, nor the very reason of Schmitt’s choice. Namely, two parallel
departure points could be traced as relevant for Schmitt’s formation of the
concept of the political. Apart from Schmitt’s consideration on politics
based on human condition discussed up until now, the other constitutive line
is the experience of liberalism. This experience will be argued as potential
reason for Schmitt to choose man to be problematic.
Schmitt traces the foundation of liberalism through historical stages
of the last four centuries. He names them “central domains”. For Strauss,
Schmitt wants to return particularly to Hobbes in order to “strike at the root
of liberalism.”32
Although Strauss sees Hobbes as “author of the ideal of
civilization” and consequently the very “founder of liberalism”33, it is
Hobbes who uses the term awe when describing common power that men
which was virtually unknown prior to the modern age.” Arendt, H., The Human
Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998, p. 116. 30
Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, Vintage Books, 1989 31 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, pp. 113, 115. 32
Id., p. 108. 33
Id., p. 107.
13
need to be kept in, in order to avoid a condition of war. 34 Furthermore, he
points to a kind of masochistic nature of human where “men have no
pleasure … in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe
them all.”35
Therefore, labor, that hypothetically has the highest level of
freedom within the state of nature, needs to be controlled by authority. For
Hobbes, this situation does not necessary exclude the right to labor to be involved within the process. When he argues that desires and passions of
men need to know the law that forbids them, he also underscores that no law
can be made “till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.”36
It is
not men that decide about law, but they decide about the person who shall
make it. Being aware of historical situation that Hobbes worked in, his
consideration of involvement of labor within the politics is on a potentially
higher level than in Schmitt’s concept.
Further on, Schmitt pursues the distinction between labor and
politics from another angle: the manifestation of liberalism causes de-
polarization and neutralization. Ultimately, it is the plurality that is “denying
the sovereignty of the political entity.”37 There is no possibility for having
strong divisions if each one has its own individual and what is more crucial -
different from each other- endeavors. The more the number rise, the more
the political gets weaker. Paradoxically, for Schmitt freedom of labor is
becoming the antithesis of the concept of the political. At least, ruled labor
apparently excludes the concept of the political. Eventually, the issue is not
what labor is, but the numerosity of its condition. For Schmitt it is nothing
more than mass culture based on bourgeois society.
Tracing stages in which “intellectual life has had four different
centers”38, Schmitt follows the rise of bourgeoisie through the development
of liberal society. “There are four great, simple, secular stages…proceeding
to the theological to the metaphysical domain, from there to the
34
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic
Thought, c. XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity
and Misery, p. 77. 35
Ibid. 36
Id., p. 78. 37
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 41. 38
Id., p. 81., The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929)
humanitarian-moral, and, finally, to the economic domain.”39 Schmitt
stresses the word simple as they cannot be misunderstood, interpreted in
various meanings. He uses simple almost as negation in advance to a
condition of a relativity that liberalism could contain. Furthermore, an
unprogressive character of his thought appears also relevant in the sequence
he provides. So, the shift is not meant as a theory of cultural, neither as law. It is not rhythm, nor continuous line of progress.40 It is only, a center that
had changed, and consequently, the condition how political thought has been
shaped. The main sources from which the political emerged had shifted, but
the concept of the political, itself, remains a constant and ever-present fact.
And as such the concept of the political is present even today41, but
formed worst than ever. “Economization of intellectual life”42
have
happened to an active elite, “the clerc of the nineteenth century, (first and
foremost Karl Marx), became economic expert.”43
It is significant to notice
here that Schmitt refers to Marx as an economic expert. Comparing the
structure of their concepts, Marx, also, introduced a similar division to
stages in all forms of society where “there is one specific kind of production
which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and
influence to the others.”44
Surely that Schmitt was aware that, for Marx, a
production was more than one discipline term. As a constitutive part of unity
containing humanity as a subject and nature as an object it is an essential
condition of Hegelian whole. Economic categories were, precisely, what
determined politics through whole history of humanity and that finally
arrived to the point where their relationships within “modern bourgeois
society, [are] precisely the opposite of that which seems to be the natural
order or which corresponds to historical development.”45
On the other hand,
something as political economy is not considerable at all within Schmitt’s
narrative, since as far as anything comes near to politics, it is no longer
economy but the politics itself. Eventually, Schmitt, unlike Marx, has not
39
Id., p. 82., The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929) 40
Ibid. 41 1932. 42
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 84. 43
Id., p. 87. 44
Marx, K., Grundrisse, Penguin Group, England, 1993, p. 107. 45
Ibid.
14
considered what qualitative character of political formation is, but how
strong its constitution is. Schmitt stresses economics, not because he is
concerned with any constitutive element, but precisely because he blames it
as the central domain of economy [and Marx within it, although on the
opposite side] that served as a final mediation toward the fact that the
concept of the political, finally, lost its clerc.46
It is not because of the appropriation of instruments for production
or labor power that Schmitt refers to bourgeois society, but because his
dialectical and apt need between flexibility and order. The bourgeois, “an
individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private
sphere”47, is not the one who could be compelled to fight against his will in
the name of state, or any higher order but his own private interest.48
Consequently, the bourgeoisie’s primary interest within the realm of
politics is that it should be flexible enough in order to be hindered and
controlled, but also planned in providing government for “securing the
conditions for liberty and eliminating infringements on freedom.”49
Precisely comfort and dialectic are excluding decisive character of the
concept of the political.
Within the final mediation of liberal society - combination of an
economy and rising technology - struggle turns into procedure, the will into
tendency or calculation, politically united people50
into partially industrial
concern, partially a mass of consumers, and very core of human existence in
production and consumption.51 But general tendency of neutrality of intellect
is just an illusion. Since politics is congenitally state of the human “even
anti-political system serves existing or newly emerging friend-and-enemy
groupings and cannot escape the logic of political”52
Moreover, liberalism
46
For notion of term clerc within Schmitt’s concept see: Schmitt, C., The Concept
of the Political, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 86. 47
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 62. 48 Id., p. 71. 49
Id., p. 70, 71. 50
Schmitt never uses term society within describing who constitutes groups 51
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2007, p. 72, 84. 52
Id., p. 79.
has a specific political meaning that uses humanity as ideological
instrument. And - as Schmitt remarkably traces - within the oscillating poles
of ethics and economics, and development of technology with the image of
equality, liberalism evades visibility of its political condition.53
Technology
- which precisely because it serves all, it is not neutral -is used as a mean in
order to keep humanity unaware of this fact, and thus, apparently, neutral and non-political. Man appears as oscillating between labor and
playfulness54 and finally ambivalent and politically uninterested.
The present experience of liberalism is a constitutive vector in
Schmitt’s concept of the political and derives from population. Another one
is superimposed to the concept of population and derives from the human
condition. Within these two elements there exists a potential contradiction
following Schmitt’s thought. Consequences that political concept of liberal
society is followed with, present as condition without elite, struggle, will
and intensity, is the reason why Schmitt chooses man to be dangerous in
order to finally de-familiarize labor from the political. The concept of the
political is endangered by such essence of labor and because of that it exists
Schmitt’s deep entrust in the potential of population for the decisive
moment. It is order that is Schmitt’s ultimately concern, since order defines
quality. Although the concept of the political is the existential element
within the human condition, it is not given to human not to jeopardize
human order.
53
Id., p. 88. 54
“The same trend to level down all serious activities to the status of making a
living is manifest in present day labor theories, which almost unanimously define
labor as the opposite of play. As a result, all serious activities, irrespective of their
fruits, are called labor, and every activity which is not necessary either for the life of
the individual or for the life process of society is subsumed under playfulness.”,
Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998,
p. 127.
15
Bibliography:
1. Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1998
2. Hobbes, T., Leviathan, McMaster University Archive of the
History of Economic Thought
3. Marx, K., Grundrisse, Penguin Group, England, 1993
4. Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, Vintage Books, 1989
5. Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007
34
part 2/ collective structures. form: legibility of collective structure’s formation. urban cluster. Josep Anton Acebillo
45
Portfolio: text
In order to explain the influences that have affected this material
several points from academic year are worth mentioning.
First of all investigation on how things get relevant: the question that
Chus Martínez addressed in lecture on 15th of November titled as: ART,
CULTURE AND THE NEED TO STOP MAKING SENSE. How does relevant meaning create space of importance appears as questionable apart
from the subject of relevance. However, process of creation is precisely where
anomaly happens. Namely, the culture becomes overly obsessed with the
meaning, so it emerges as too fixed and inelastic.
Consequently, by excess of “meaning” what is relevant is becoming
unclear. One of the proposals on how culture might react toward the excess is
referential to Wittgenstein renouncement of dialectic: of what is true and
false. To think in simple and direct relationships is the argument Chus
Martínez addresses as compatible with process of unlearning. Unlearning
appears as a method how to reverse the way we organize knowledge from
producing to articulating it.
Speaking about articulation of knowledge, clarity of terms and their
application emerge as essential. Arguing for the essence of term of
interdisciplinary - so referential to the contemporary cultural production -
Isabel Valverde referred on Ronald Barthes’s observation that real
consequence of interdisciplinary approach is not meeting point of disciplines,
but creation of new object.
New object understood within discipline of architecture imposes
following question: what the new object is? What it is relevant for? Does it
need to be alien or could it be historically recognizable?
Within the seminar that Pier Vittorio Aureli gave on: LABOR,
CITY, FORM - Towards a Common Architectural Language - the form is
addressed as the dialectical relationship between two categories: the concept of the political and the concept of the labor. Argument is oscillating between
two images: one of Greek polis and another one of Archizoom’s Stop City. In
between these two historical moments architectural form has been developing
not as consequential toward politics, but as crucial tool used for organization
of labor. However, if form had had such a crucial role, than could it be
possible that same form might be used in more or less favor of labor?
Following the argument of the seminar, the seminar paper – book
review of “The Concept of the Political”- tried to understand form by
understanding basic of the concept of the political itself.
It is important to understand political not through one-discipline
isolated term, but as supreme, decisive and as such essential condition of
human nature. Main contradiction of Carl Schmitt’s concept of political
appears precisely in relationship between his attempts to define political as
such human condition, and at the same time as a concept that is working
almost as an antithesis of political experience of liberal society: one oscillating between poles of economics and aesthetics. As a consequence of
too many particularities and private interest domains emerging from
liberalism, political perception - that is basic human feature- becomes inert,
passive, de-familiarized from the human nature and consequently from the
culture.
As questionable appears what is influence and level of perception,
but also what is level of control, of one entity formation within liberal
society? And how it may or may not bring – collective project?
Collective [mega] structures
The object of interest of this material is: collective structure.
Historically, similar term was introduced by Fumiho Maki in his “Investigations in Collective Form”. According to Maki the megastructure
appears as one possibility of collective form.
“The megastructure is a large frame in which all the functions of a
city or part of a city are housed […] It is like the great hill on which Italian
towns were built.”[Investigations in Collective Form, p.47]
It is important here to note the issue of size as predominant
characteristic. This is logical if the megastructure is understood as an
adequate answer for resolving the issue of sprawl and growth. At the same
time it reduces possibilities for these structures to be applied in more common
use. Moreover, it tends to overcome the issue - what is the content for
structuring - as far as if it is big enough.
Still, the megastructure might be understood within wider typology.
It might belong to the family of collective structures that could be mega, but
also really small objects. By being extra large, they adopt one level more of
complexity, but the stay primarily defined by collection of particular
structural element they are built of. The main feature of collective structures is
their structural element and in that sense they are modular objects. This
46
structural element defines character of collective structure, not only in terms
how to make its size to stand, but trough the question what the structure is
made off; what is the qualitative definition of structural element?
Consequently, this module is not primarily tool for largeness, but generator of
qualitative character of structure itself.
Collection of what structural element defines ultimate character of
collective formation? What structural element is relevant for it?
Collective structures tend to be defined through next topics:
- qualitative character of structural element they are
made off
- bidirectional relationship with programmatic
organizational pattern they are applied to
- form: legibility of collective structure’s formation
Qualitative character of structural elements is predominantly
defined by issues of: environment and production of energy, urban
mobility and ecology.
Bidirectional relationship with programmatic organizational
pattern they are applied to
There is one primary collective structure that is formed objectively,
based on scientific research on relevant issue: in particular case on circulation of water within building. This structure is primary influence.
It is alien and as such it is applied on space and program as first
influence on organization.
On the other hand this structure is modified by the structure of
programmatic organizational pattern itself. This reversal modification is
possible by the secondary element of the structure.
Namely, collective structure is divided to primary and secondary
element. Primary element originally organizes the space. Secondary element
that is fulfillment is the structure to be modified by the organizational pattern.
Comparing to characteristics of the megastructure emerged in 1960s with
“plugged in” modules, here the secondary element works not as addition, but as part of the collective structure itself.
Structure becomes consequence of dialectics between influence on
organization and being influenced by organization. As such, generic structural
system is becoming hybrid and particular object.
Although the space is manly resolved by dialectic between
organization and structure, collective structures do not tend to completely
resolve the space. They act as predominant.
This direct application of programmatic organization on structures
does not have tendency to make organizational pattern transparent, tough -
apart from resolving it functionally – it has tendency to stress its appearance.
Namely, the public space works in collective structures as follows:
- Through tectonic of primary structure: it follows
structure and, at the same time, it starts to appear within the program.
- through perception and functional organization of
secondary structure
Form: legibility of collective structure formation
Comparing to megastructures emerged in 1960s, collective structures
are just theoretically capable for infinite growth. Although their structural
modulation gives them such possibility, their formal articulation reduces level
of gentrification within them. So geometry of their formation is additional
component that influences collective structure.
Regarding the relationship to the ground the collective structures are
developing predominantly vertically. Namely, the reason if collective
structure needs to emerge could be mainly identified with issue of footprint. In general, occupation of footprint does not work coherently with any of the
issues of: growth, ecology, environment and energy.
If collective structures are sized as megastructures, and if they are
predominantly vertical then issue of mobility within verticality becomes
prevalent. In same way as the energy transmission mobility becomes the main
qualitative feature of structural element.
Each of the modules contains point of connection [“vertical plaza”]
by which it is connected with main system of mobility that develops in
parallel through the height, addressing different systems of transportation
such as: highway, rail, hectometric and pedestrian.
The position of connection point in structural element and its proximity to the main system of transportation is what makes the elements
differentiating between each other. By different displacement of mobility
pattern influenced by application of program, the collective structure becomes
distorted from the inside. Namely, complexity of collective structures emerges
by distortion within it;
47
Working in symbiosis with generic element that is applied and
afterwards distorted by programmatic organization, collective structures
behave in between generic grid and particular object.
Within the scope architectural design deals with them, they are
“unfinished”, supportative, but recognizable.
Level of recognition they achieve by their formal determination is
relevant only to what they do. If in the future these structures might be applied
also as generators of new ecologies - with all controversy it brings - then they
might connect two ecologically disturbed zones. They are formally determined as connector of two points, but at the same time they are leading
to formal dissolution of their inner design.
Their secondary structure is self designed, letting them oscillate in
between rigid and spontaneous formation. By choosing to deal with
architecture in more apparently “constructional” sense, collective structures
tend to skip devotion toward excess of architectural design and to move center
of attention from the agglomeration of methods to the precise point of
content: what do they perform for.