A330 HKG Fuel Contamination

A330/Trent700 – Fuel Contamination, Dual Eng Loss of Thrust Control

Presented byChristopher McGregor , Head of Accident/Incident Investigation

© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Rome, 21-24 March 201117th Flight Safety Conference

• Event description

• Technical description

• Certification and Fuel Quality

• Operational aspects

• Conclusion

Content

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Event Summary

• A330-300, Trent 772• Scheduled flight from Surabaya (Indonesia) to Hong Kong, 13/04/2010 • During descent, approach and landing the aircraft encountered a loss

of thrust control event affecting both engines• Engine 1 remained at 70% N1, Engine 2, sub-idle• An emergency landing was made at HKG, • Aircraft landed at a ground speed of approx 240 knots, conf 1. • On landing (bounce), the lower cowling of No. 1engine contacted the

runway surface.• The aircraft stopped 3,300m beyond threshold, on the runway. • During the emergency evacuation there was one serious injury.• Subject to a formal investigation led by the Hong Kong CAD


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Event Summary – climb, cruise, top of descent

Rome, 21-24 March 2011

EPR Fluctuations observed by the flight crew during climb

01:20

ENG 2 CTL SYS FAULTENG SLOW RESPONSE

01:58

FL340

ENG 2 CTL SYS FAULTAVOID RAPID THR CHANGES

ENG2 STALLENG 1 CTL SYS FAULT

05:19 05:30

8000ft

ENG 1 STALL, ENG 2 dropped to sub-idle and remained sub-idle for remainder of flight

CAS starts to decrease below target 300kts

A/THR disconnected

TRA2 & TRA1 advanced but no thrust increase TRA1 set to climb notch, N1 increased from 35 to 45% but no decrease when TRA1 was set back to idle

17th Flight Safety Conference

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ALT

UTC UTC


Descent

5500ft

05:36

TRA1 briefly set to MCT, EPR actual increases to 1.30 (N1 75%) and remains stuck at this level.

CAS increases above 200kts

05:40

ENG2 re-start attempt but remains sub-idle

CONF 1 selectedCAS 212 knts

TRA1 set to idleCAS stabilises at 220ktsSignificant sideslipENG1 multiple stalls

Airbrakes fully extended

Landing gears extended at 233ktsSide-stick nose down inputsCAS 236kts


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ALT

UTC


Touch down


05:40

CONF 2 selected at 234kts but only CONF 1 reached

VFE warning triggered till touchdown

Above ILS beamCAS 230 kts-1600ft/minPitch zeroAutobrake armed (low mode)Ground spoilers armed

05:42

500 ftPassing 80ftCAS 241kts (VFE + 35)-1000ft/min

800 ft

RH crosswind 20kts Touch down 1,350m from threshold with 5° of right drift angleNLG and RH MLG bounce Nz +0.30g / +1.80g.

Max manual brakingFull reverse were applied

Reverse #1 deployedReverse #2 remained stowed.

The aircraft stopped 3,300m beyond threshold, on the runway.

3300 m


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ALT

UTC

GPWS triggered‘TOO LOW TERRAIN’







• Conclusion

Content

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Fuel

FILTERHMU

HP PUMP

FOHELP PUMP FILTER HP PUMP

FOHELP PUMP

Fuel from aircraft fuel tank

To engine combustor

FMGEC (Autothrust)

Throttle Lever Angle

FADEC

Thrust demand

Aircraft airspeed Flight mode

Main metering valve

A330/Trent 700 Fuel Control

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Contaminants ranged from 5 to 40 microns

Typical clearance 7 microns

Main metering valve - contaminatedRome, 21-24 March 201117th Flight Safety Conference

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Microspheres composition

• Microsphere composed of salt, water and Super Absorbent Polymer.

• Presence of Salt is Critical• The presence of salt has resulted in a more dense and stable SAP

structure in comparison to ‘known’ SAP migration

Dried microsphere with salt on surface

Effect of absorbing water


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• Failure to stop refuelling on delta pressure rise:Monitor elements damagedTraining procedures not appliedRefuelling continued after pressure rise

• Failure to follow Hydrant re-commissioning procs.• Hydrant lines not flushed through fully• Salt water contamination left in system


Fuel Quality Assurance Failures

WATER SALT

• No system for continuing analysis/surveillance• No continuous analysis • No inspection program• No notification of system coming back on line

• Oversized Hydrant Dispenser Filter MonitorsSystem optimised for 4 to 8 times typical refuel rates

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HK CAD Recommendations

7.1 Recommendation 2010-1The Juanda Surabaya Airport Development Taskforce) should, ......conduct an extensive review of the re-commissioning procedures of hydrant refuel system in accordance with the best practice in aviation fuel industry.

7.2 Recommendation 2010-2The Juanda Surabaya Airport Development Taskforce should ensure the re-commissioning procedures are completed before resuming the hydrant refuelling operation for Stands No. 1 to 10 at WARR.


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• Conclusion

Content

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Engine certification JAR-E E670

• Industry standard MIL-E-5007 debris• Largely hard particulates• Majority 0-5micron

• Deliberately biased to cover debris size likely to be generated (a/c, pipelines etc)

• Engine cert defines quantity and size of contaminant to be tested.


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Engine certification• Requirements (filtered)

• 500 hours at 0.5gm/4500lt= 196gm total debris

• Requirement (unfiltered)• Must be able to complete half the longest flight at a rate of

4.5gm/4500lt after filter blockage warning= 31.5gm total debris

Nominal engine filter capability 40 microns – max capability 10 microns.The filters (engine 1 and 2 did not go into bypass) hence no filter clog indication.


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Fuel Quality Control

• Industry standards and guidelines exist, SIL28-094, (ASTM D 1655, DEF STAN 91-91)

• Aviation Fuel Quality Requirements for Jointly Operated Systems (AFQRJOS)

• International Fuel Quality Pool (IFQP) Standard, Joint Inspection Group (JIG)

• SAE 6401 Storage, Handling and Distribution of Jet Fuels at Airports (issue imminent), ...etc


• EASA: Part M, subpart C, AMC M.A.301-1c“....consumable fluids, gases, etc. uplifted prior to flight are of the correct specification, free from contamination and correctly recorded.”

Globally, self regulation has assured fuel quality and development of harmonised international standards


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Available technology to improve jet fuel quality


• Pressure sensingIn line, real time, automatic operation

• Particle counters In-line full flow designNo sampling errorsNear-real time informationDistinguishes/quantifies both solid particles and free water Automatic operation


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Way Forward

• Following Airbus and Operator request, IATA have agreed to take the lead and develop an oversite proposal to ICAO:

• Workgroups:• Supply group: (All aspects from Refinery to Airport Storage) • Storage group: (Airport Storage and Hydrant Systems) • Provision group: (Vehicles, Pressure control and Into-plane)

• Proposals to be submitted mid 2011.

• Engine manufacturers requested to review FMU designs.• Airbus have commissioned a laboratory to reproduce microsphere

contamination to ensure effective testing of future FMU designs.


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• Conclusion

Content

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Operational considerations – new development


ENG 1(2) CTL SYS FAULTAVOID RAPID THRUST CHANGE Or ENG 1(2) SLOW RESPONSE

With rapid and continuous EPR fluctuation indications on BOTH ENG

Apply the following paper procedure:

- A/THR.............................................................................OFF

• If EPR fluctuations on both engines stop:- ECAM PROC..................................................... APPLY- A/THR..........................................................KEEP OFF

• If EPR fluctuations on both engines continue:- FUEL CONTAMINATION PROC.......................APPLY

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ENG 1 CTL SYS FAULTENG 2 CTL SYS FAULT

AVOID RAPID THRUST CHANGE Or ENG 1(2) SLOW RESPONSE

Apply the following paper procedure:

- A/THR.............................................................................OFF- FUEL CONTAMINATION PROC...............................APPLY

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FUEL Contamination procedure (under review)

• A fuel contamination may result, in the worst case, in a loss of engine thrust control.

• Aim: Maintaining the thrust on one engine and Minimizing the thrust changes on the other, in order to prevent contaminant from blocking the mechanical devices of engine thrust regulation.

LAND ASAPA/THR..................................................................KEEP OFFMAN THR............................................. SET and MAINTAIN

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• Conclusion

Content

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Conclusions

• Fuel contamination traced to refuel dispenser• On-ground technology available to improve level of protection at point

of refuel.

• IATA Fuel Working Groups formed. Oversight recommendations to ICAO, mid 2011

• Manufacturers engaged in further research and development,

• New operational guidance to assist flight crews


Continue to enforce established fuel quality procedures

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by thedelivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not beused for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supportinggrounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.

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A330 HKG Fuel Contamination

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