A21 #3-2010

r s e n a l3(8), 2010

for p

artners a

broad

a magazine ofthe russian defence

industry complex

tHe lada leaVesBeHind itsforeiGn-MadeanaloGs page 10

nuclear sHield:proJect667 Bd, Bdr, BdrM page 16

role of HYdrofoilsin deVelopMentof russianeconoMY page 38

strateGic aViation of cHina:past and present page 52

eacH stateHas tHe riGHtto independence page 62

enGineer aMMunition:todaY’s situationand prospectsfordeVelopMentpage 66

elektropriBor-MadeinstruMent sYsteMsfor tHe suBMarine ladapaGe 30

elektropriBor-MadeinstruMent sYsteMsfor tHe suBMarine ladapaGe 30

Main suBJect of issue: suBMarine doMinance

in tHe naVY

Main suBJect of issue: suBMarine doMinance

in tHe naVY

tHe lada leaVesBeHind itsforeiGn-MadeanaloGs page 10

nuclear sHield:proJect667 Bd, Bdr, BdrM page 16

role of HYdrofoilsin deVelopMentof russianeconoMY page 38

strateGic aViation of cHina:past and present page 52

eacH stateHas tHe riGHtto independence page 62

enGineer aMMunition:todaY’s situationand prospectsfordeVelopMentpage 66

MODULAR MISSILE SYSTEMClub-U

CONTAINER MISSILE SYSTEMClub-K

EACH STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE

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-2

01

1

Geopolitics & resources

Navy,the key to North’s wealth ......................................................................................... 2

suBMariNe DoMiNaNce iN the Navy

the laDa leaves BehiND its foreiGN-MaDe aNaloGs .........................................................10

Nuclear shielD: proJect 667 BD, BDr, BDrM ..........................................................................................16

elektropriBor-MaDe iNstruMeNt systeMs for the New GeNeratioN suBMariNe laDa ........................................................30

GooD luck,severoDviNsk! .................................................................................................................34

hiGh techNoloGy

role of hyDrofoils iN DevelopMeNt of russiaN ecoNoMy ................................................................38

“techNoloGical roulette” oN BoarD the GeralD forD .......................................................................................42

Military aviatioN

raptor as it is seeN By BeiJiNG ..................................................................................................48

strateGic aviatioN of chiNa: past aND preseNt ............................................................................................................52

Navy

katraN Missile Boat ......................................................................................................................58

weapoNs

each state has the riGhtto iNDepeNDeNce ...........................................................................................................62

eNGiNeer aMMuNitioN: toDay’s situatioN aND prospects for DevelopMeNt ................................... 66

history

GraNit-elektroN:the BeGiNNiNG of history .........................................................................................70

issued by informvs printing house

GeNeral Directoralexander chernov

1st Deputy GeNeral DirectorNina Molokanova

eDitor-iN-chiefvladimir ilyin

couNselorsoleg kustovvladimir karnozov

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eDitor of eNGlish issueoleg Molokanov

DesiGN & MakeupGreentowers creative Bureau

photos & artwork:alexander Beljaev, vladimir karnozov, victor Drushliakov, alexander chernov, ress-offices: cDB Me rubin, cMDB almaz, spMDB Malakhite, concern Granit-elektron, concern Morinformsystem-agat, concern csri elektropribor, Niii, avic

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© arseNal 21st centurya magazineof the russian defenceindustry complex

contents

3 , 2 0 1 0F O R P A R T N E R S A B R O A D

2 • Geopolitics and resources • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

With new Russian presidential elections due in early 2012, various political groups are trying to exploit the “great nation” spirits for

their purposes. Also present is a long-term interest that may unite this nation. This interest is to strength-en Russia’s control over a great part of Earth’s na-tional resources by every means at hand. So doing would require not only maintaining Russian armed forces in a potent condition, but also building a new navy and merchant fleet. These are necessary tools to extend the Russian sovereignty to the shelf territo-ries in the North Atlantic, rich with oil and natural gas. And it is all about the big politics.

This explains why the Kremlin is paying so much at-tention to restructuring transforming its aged collection of shipbuilding enterprises. Moscow wants to turn them into a modern industry able to construct a required number of surface combatants, submarines and mer-chant vessels. Restructuring commenced in 2007.

Perhaps the largest challenge before modern Russia arises from the fact that the Kremlin wants control over the Arctic Shelf, and its part adja-cent to the Russian northern coasts in particular. It is a huge territory measuring about a million square kilometers. The Shelf is believed to contain one-fourth of the planet’s oil and natural gas resources. Without potent navy and purposely built merchant ships for operations in the cold and icy northern wa-ters Russia may prove not up to the challenge.

More than 250 thousand people are employed by Russian shipyards, and up to 700 thousand in the whole of shipbuilding industry, including vendors. Counting in all people involved in sea trade and sea port activities, the figure rises to several millions. Se-curing jobs for so many people is also a major consid-eration for Moscow politicians.

At the end of the communist era, the Soviet Union had the capacity to manufacture warships with total displacement of 200 thousand tons a year, and mer-chant vessels with deadweight of 700-900 thousand tons. Soviet strategists believed this capacity would keep the Soviet navy at 4 million tons, similar to USN, and the merchant fleet at 24 million ton deadweight, close to that of the United States.

Following demise of the Soviet Union, this indus-try was neglected for some fifteen years. Shipbuild-ing, navy and merchant fleet degraded. Can they get their past glory back? the light of hope is shining from the office of Igor Sechin, deputy head of the Russian government. He is sometimes referred in the media as the leader of the powerful “siloviki” group (made up by army, navy and order reinforcement officers). In May 2008 Igor Sechin became chairman of the United Ship-building Corporation (Russian acronym OSK). In May 2009 Roman Trotsenko, was appointed OSK president.

Several months after this appointment, Trotsenko reported about his first achievements to the Russian media. He said the Russian shipbuilding industry

attained a 62% rise in 2009, as it delivered “many new large ships” to domestic and international cus-tomers. Its order book rose to 118 large vessels, with foreign orders exceeding 7.5 billion dollars.

Kremlin’s strategic goals seem the following.First is to ensure long-term control over vast

natural resources up north. Oil and gas fields of the Arctic shelf adjacent to the north of the Russian mainland promise to keep Russia world’s largest producer of fossil fuels. The Kremlin wants this situ-ation to last long. Today, Russia is number one by the volumes of natural resources. Their value is esti-mated at 140 trillion US dollars. World’s GDP is 55 trillion, Russia’s own 40 trillion rubles. This country controls 23% of all known oil fields, 33% of natural gas, 50% of coal. It also has huge reserves of Iron, Cuprum, Aluminum, Nickel, Titanium, precious met-als and diamonds. Besides, Russia leads in timber, with 23%. Sales of these goods generate the lion’s share of hard currency income.

Second is to ensure Russian control over the Far East territories in the view of Japan renew-ing its once-lost interest in regaining control over dis-puted islands. They include the Kuril chain and other lands washed by the northern pacific waters.

Third is the demonstration of the flag in remote parts of the globe, especially where the Kremlin’s strategic allies ask for guarantees in case of possible aggression to prevent Iraqi and Kosovo scenarios.

Navy, the key to North’s Wealth

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • Geopolitics and resources • 3

Fourth. The Kremlin needs a potent expedition-ary force for participation in international peace keeping operations and local wars. The August 2008 conflict with Georgia sets an example.

Finally, the Kremlin has a duty to maintain the nation’s nuclear deterrent component that in-cludes nuclear powered submarines armed with bal-listic and cruise missiles, and keep some strength in conventional naval forces.

Arms export is also a consideration, both politi-cal and financial, but its scale fades in comparison with Russia’s oil income. Let us illustrate it. Accord-ing to official statistics from Russia’s Federal Cus-toms Service, the export in the first half of 2010 came to 188.8 billion dollars, including 26.6 bil-lion to CIS countries and 162.2 to the rest of the world. The lion’s share of Russian export is taken by fossil fuels, at 71.9% (with that specifically to CIS at 50.2%). Using these statistics, one can calculate that Russia has sold fuels for about 130 billion dollars.

According to state weapons vendor Rosobo-ronexport, Russia’s arms trade amounted to 6.46 billion dollars in 2006, rising to 7.55 billion in 2007 and then stabilizing at 8.35 – 8.5 billion dollars in 2008 – 2009. Equipment for navies accounts for roughly one-fourth of the grand total, meaning sales of 1.5 to 2 billion annually. Rosoboronexport

says its backlog for that sort of wares stands at 5 billion dollars.

Kremlin’s petrodollar income is the main source for funding revival of the in-house shipbuilding ca-pability, construction of new navy and merchant fleet. This expense is seen as a necessary one, some sort of “tax” payable to ensure that would-be outside pretenders for the wealth of the north keep their hands off it. As for the Arctic, there is a need in the navy and merchant fleet to support a huge multi-tier effort the Kremlin is planning on explora-tion of the shelf.

Meantime, the once grandeur Soviet navy and the merchant fleet have downsized. They are not capable of handling the challenges. Meantime, Ja-pan and China, who used to be way down the league in the naval power, now can send more warships, and often more modern ones, into the northern waters than Russia’s Pacific Fleet. The Japan’s Self-Defense Force commissioned the DDH 181 Hyuga destroyer with a flight deck, and looks to commissioning of her sister ship DDH 182. Two more such ships are under construction. China is about to complete the Shi Lang, formerly Varyag. Laid down in Nikolaev, the Ukraine, as a Project 1143.6 aircraft carrying cruiser, it was sold to China in a 70% state of readi-ness, towed first to Macao and then over to Dailyan for completion. A pair of “Improved Varyag” vessels

is under construction. Meantime, the Pacific Fleet lost its carrier component in 1993, when the Project 1143 sister ships, the Kiev and Minsk, were decom-missioned.

The Russian navy has many times asked the gov-ernment for funds on new aircraft carriers. Plans call for launching a head ship of a next-generation series sometime in 2012-2014 in Severodvinsk. by that time the local enterprise Sevmash shall have its dock free after delivering the Vikramaditya to the In-dian Navy. The respective efforts call for rebuilding the Admiral Gorshkov, ex-Soviet navy aircraft carry-ing cruiser of the Project 1143.5 into Project 1143.0 aircraft carrier of STOBAR concept, for Short Takeoff but Arrested Recovery. It will see MiG-29K/KUB fight-ers taking off from a sky ramp and landing with help by arrestor hook.

The Vikramaditya took first lines in the news on 2 July 2009, when Russia’s president Dmitry Medvedev visited Sevmash (Northern Machinery-building Enter-prise) in Severodvinsk. Official presidential site www.kremlin.ru informs: “The contract for cruiser modern-ization was signed with India in 2004. The ship was scheduled to be delivered in 2008, but because of the increased amount of work its delivery was postponed to 2012-2013”. It further informs that “Medvedev questioned the management team in detail about the status of the project and insisted that they com-

Russian President D. Medvedev and USC President R. Trotsenko


plete the modernization of the cruiser in the specified time frame and according to the conditions agreed.”

When the contract was signed five years ago, it amounted to 617 million dollars. After a series of re-estimates, India agreed on 1.5 billion. More re-cently, in early 2010, the sides accepted “final price”, reportedly at $2.5billion. Talking to Medvedev on 2 July, Sevmash CEO Nikolai Kalistratov confessed that his enterprise “miscalculated” the costs, but stated the Indians initially asked for modest performance of the ship, and now “demand for much more”. Med-vedev replied: We must complete the work and de-liver the rebuilt ship to our partners, otherwise heavy consequences will occur”.

Chairing a Russian government meeting in Severodvinsk, Medvedev said that the Vikramadiya contract is “one of the key orders for our shipbuilding industry and a key element of our international coop-eration. It is unique by both its volume and complex-ity, and uses decisions never tried before, including in transformation of original design. Such a contract is something we do for the first time. Certainly, it en-tails a large number of problems. Production prepa-rations on the ship commenced in the late 1980s, and now this ship is being rebuilt into a fully-capable aircraft carrier”. He further said that he had “nego-tiations” with his Indian colleagues and that “there were some discussable moments”. “These disputes

need to be closed, the issues remaining on the base-line parameters of the cooperation resolved, and the work completed. This matter is that of our pres-tige”, he concluded.

While in Severodvinsk, Medvedev also inspect-ed the Yuri Dolgoruky ICBM-carrying submarine. A head vessel in the series of Russia’s new genera-tion nuclear strike assets, the submarine carries 12 Bulava ballistic missiles. By that time Sevmash had completed 45 surface warships and 163 subma-rines including 128 nuclear-powered. “The way we manage this and other enterprises of our shipbuild-ing industry shall determine whether we succeed in one of the key challenges before our nation, that

Project 1144.2 Piotr Veliki heavy nuclear missile cruiser

Frigate Yaroslav Mudry (Project 11540)


on completion by 2020 of a new core of the Russian navy’s sea-going assets”, Medvedev said. He added that the government “has got the will to do it”. New-ly built ships “must be armed with most advanced weapons, and must be competitive, and, most im-portantly, must correspond or exceed their foreign analogues”. Rather than finishing work on previ-ous generation ships laid down in the 1980s and 1990s, Russia shall concentrate its resources on new designs. “Today, our goal is to launch new designs of warships into series production”, Medve-dev concluded.

At IDMS’2007 the Russian cabinet members said the importance of the carrier program for the na-tion is so great, and also so much expensive, that it should be given status of a special federal program, and run independently of the Armament Program. In 2005 the Russian navy spokesman said the ser-vice wants 2-3 new carriers. Two years after the figure rose to six, to be built “in the next 20-30 years”. Re-alistically, Russian industry can produce one or two ships by 2020, of a refined Project 1143.7 with full displacement between 65 and 75 thousand tons. The Shipbuilding program 2005 calls for construction of 30 corvettes, 20 frigates, 6 destroyers along with smaller combat and auxiliary ships for the Russian navy. This program alone requires rebuilding of the aged shipyards.

But there is more they have to build: hundreds of special-design tankers, container carriers, ice-breakers, various floatable drilling platforms and pumping stations – all this for exploration of oil and natural gas fields in the Arctic shelf and the northern pacific. Besides, there is a new word in the power generation business, floatable nuclear power sta-tions. First such station, Project 20870, is already being built, for completion in 2012. A total of eight such stations shall be constructed to serve remote regions of Russia where natural resources need to be exploited. There is a separate program for five nucle-ar powered ice-breakers.

Plans are grand. Will they materialize? Today, Russia is almost absent from the global market for large displacement ships. Roughly, it makes one large merchant ship (displacement over 30,000t) per three hundred built in the Republic of Korea. Report-edly, a ton of ship’s structural weight is three to four times more expensive to build in Russia than Repub-lic of Korea.

Situation with naval assets is not much better. Russia has not launched even a single first-class sur-face ship (destroyers and larger) since demise of the Soviet Union. Even the two Project 956E and two Project 956ME destroyers delivered to the navy of the People’s Liberation Army were laid down in the Soviet times. The Jaroslav the Wise frigate (Yaroslav Mudry), a second ship of the Project 11540, which was commissioned earlier this year and demonstrated

at IDMS’2009, had her hull launched back in 1991. Russia’s only aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the only operational nuclear-powered surface com-batant Peter the Great missile carrying cruiser were launched in 1988 and 1989, respectively.

The fact that Russia did not produce any ocean-worthy surface combatant in the past 15 years makes it all the more difficult for the shipbuild-ers to manage restructuring of their vast Soviet legacy into a modern industry. President Medvedev said this about the situation: “We lost a lot in the 1990s. Sadly, we built very few ships since then. We need to make a move now, that to re-establish the very base for building aircraft carrying cruis-ers, and the navy as a whole. We need to reinstall the carrier component since without it our subma-rine force cannot fulfill all tasks that it must fulfill. Therefore, I think, we will put together a program on reinstallation of the carrier component and de-termine places where to build the new ships”.

The Kremlin gave start to the restructuring campaign on 21 October 2007, when it declared the very intent to establish the United Shipbuild-ing Corporation (USC, Russian acronym OSK). Aleksandr Burutin, an army general who acted Putin’s military advisor before this appointment, formulated the strategy of the merger, but failed to attain mutual understanding with key industrial-ists. Yuri Yarov, then-Director of Severnoye Design Bureau, became OSK head in late 2007. He tried to find compromise solutions taking into account interests of various financial and industrial group-ings, while strictly observing the state interests. He was superseded by deputy head of Rosoboronex-port state arms vendor Vladimir Pakhomov, who remained in that position until October 2009. Then Roman Trotsenko came.

OSK was first declared “up and running” at IDMS’2009, “in strict accordance with the time-frame set in the respective presidential decree”.

Corvette Stereguschi (Project 20380)


IMDS’09 was the first maritime show where OSK was exhibiting in full power, as a merger of 31 en-terprises including nine design houses and ten large shipyards. The corporation’s workforce is 80 thousand people. Engineering arm of nine design houses (including Rubin, Severnoye, Almaz) employs 6 thousand engineers, including 4.5 thousand ship developers. Share of military orders take 85% of the corporation’s order book.

During the show, OSK leaders announced that the corporation will soon expand. “Nearly twenty” more enterprises situated in Central and South-ern parts of Russia, as well Privolzhie region (along Volga river), shall be added to the corporate struc-

ture by another presidential degree being prepared. When asked for details, OSK leaders said that out of their wish-list of twenty enterprises, 13 have been tentatively approved by the Russian government for inclusion into the corporation and three more are be-ing considered. Some of these were actually added to the OSK member lists in 2009-2010.

Today, OSK’s share in the industry is impressive. By the corporation’s own estimates, it holds two-thirds of the nation’s capacity in ship development and half that in ship building. According to the presi-dential decrees, OSK production facilities are being structured into three regional units: the Western, Far Eastern and Northern centers of shipbuilding. OSK

head office in Moscow is trying to distribute workload between shipyards in a way it eliminates “unhealthy internal competition” and to specialize enterprises on making particular products or components.

OSK faces many challenges. There is a press-ing need to free space in the precious territory of St. Petersburg. The city expands rapidly forcing heavy industry out. Every fourth vessel built in the Soviet Union was built in St. Petersburg, and some half of first- class surface combatants (destroyers and larger) were launched here. The Admiralty Shipyards and the Baltic Plant are “first candidates” for being expelled from the city. Their total removal is sched-uled for between 2015 and 2025, but not (as of yet) supported by firm plans on erection of new shipyards in a new place, where they could continue operating.

Generations after generations of St. Petersburg citizens worked in the shipbuilding industry since Peter the Great built shipyards in the mouth of the Neva in the early 1700s. Many still have jobs in sea trade. This prompts decision makers to look for new location of the shipyards – off the city fence but still within easy rich for St. Petersburg residents.

Creation of a new design house, of civilian ship-building is dictated by large losses in skillful develop-ers specializing in merchant ships. In the view of most scientific and higher education establishments in the maritime trade situated in St. Petersburg, there is no alternative for geographic location of such a design house. In the Soviet Union all major design houses

Building process of Prirazlomnoye platform at Sevmash

Small landing ship Zubr (Project 12322)


developing surface combatants had civilian branch-es. In the past fifteen years the workforce tended to dwindle and it remains centering on more lucrative military projects. OSK is considering moving skillful engineers with experience in merchant ships into this new design house so as to prevent the situation in which the nation may one day find itself unable to produce a competitive merchant ship.

OSK says that creation of the civilian design house shall make the first step into reviving of a truly com-petitive shipbuilding industry in Russia. Next step will be erection of new shipyards that would specialize in modern merchant ships. But this issue has to be thought out well before practical steps are made. Some experts urge not to separate completely mili-

tary and civilian directions, and, rather, develop new shipyards as double-purpose, able to build military and civilian vessels cost-efficiently. They argue that Russia’s workforce and intellectual resources are not large enough to be spread over too many enterprises.

Another challenge is shortage of specialists aged between 30-50 years, as thus aged left the Russian shipbuilding industry in the past 15 years, when workload there was low. Some left for work in Norway, Korea and UK. OSK does not see fit in having them back in home, instead preferring to hire younger uni-versity graduates.

The aircraft carrier program, if launched, might develop in conditions of financial limitations neces-sitating wider use of civilian technologies for lower

costs. Furthermore, “merchant” ships are seen by some people in the Kremlin as instruments in the larger system that would explore the Arctic shelf, other northern and the Far East regions. The requi-site “merchant” ships shall have respective design features to enable operations in the harsh environ-ments of the cold waters and icing. Even though these may prove less cost-effective to operate than their close analogues built in Korea or China, they would be strongly built – this and more to be able to fulfill Kremlin’s strategic tasks to do with explo-ration of Russia’s natural resources that sell well in the global marketplace. From this viewpoint, hav-ing a capable, purposely-built merchant fleet is the issue of same importance as having a strong navy.

Three plans for new “super shipyards” are being considered, in Kronshtadt (island of Kotlin), Primorsk (between Vyborg and St. Petersburg), both on the Baltic Sea coast, and one near Vladivostok (town of Bolshoi Kamen, or the Big Stone) on the Pacific coast. A top manager with OSK source told us: “There are plans for Far East, Baltic and North. Each has its strong and weak points. I fear the costs of laying new highways and at-tracting sufficient number of workers in the remote re-gions of the north may appear too high to bear. These issues are easier if the place is on the Baltic coast”.

Kronshtadt is close enough to St. Petersburg for its citizens to consider having a job there. The plan for a super shipyard there has attracted attention of Rus-sia’s large banks, most notably VneshTorgBank (VTB) and VneshEconomBank (VEB). OSK source contin-ued: “There are two projects in the Baltic, of which OSK favors one in Kronshtadt. When we launch it de-pends on terms and sources of outside investments available to us and the sort of support we can get

Aleksandr G. Burutin

Yuri F. Yarov

Vladimir A. Pakhomov


Igor I. Sechin


from the government. When clear answers to these questions are received, we can estimate how much it would cost us to build the shipyard”.

He further said that, as of this time, there is no understanding whether this new shipyard will be completely devoted to civilian ships. “Creation of a new large shipyard is a costly, complex issue, re-quiring understanding of the fact that, businesswise, building military and civilian ships differ in technolo-gies and economics. When starting a new shipyard, we need to have a clear understanding what is it for, whether it be completely civilian or not. It may hap-pen that the new shipyard will not replace, but rater supplement, the existing facilities”.

Since VTB and VEB are firmly under Kremlin’s control, the costs of financial credits are not at issue, the source insisted. “OSK believes Kronshtadt proj-ect is a good one. The main challenge is to get neces-sary funding sooner, so as to ensure smooth moving of the Admiralty Shipyards into this new site. With that, the future of St. Petersburg shipbuilding school will be secured”.

Some more light came on 17 July 2010, when the Administration of St. Petersburg and OSK signed a document calling for moving the Admiralty Ship-yards manufacturing facilities out of the city. It says they will settle in the island of Kotlin, where OSK “is purchasing” a patch of land measuring 100 hectares. The cost of moving was estimated at ruble 20 billion.

This announcement was preceded by an impor-tant meeting in Barvikha, a residence of the Russian president. On 1 October 2009 Dmitry Medvedev invit-ed Igor Sechin to discuss restructuring of the Russian shipbuilding. His guest reported that a total of 37 en-terprises had been integrated into OSK structure with three shipbuilding centers at its core. Sechin further said that the governmental team regained control over “previously lost” stake of 26% in Dalzavod en-terprise in the Far East, and that OSK council of direc-tors validated a program for development of the Far East assets that calls for construction of new modern shipyards with foreign assistance.

Today, the Admiralty Shipyards employ 7 thou-sand, an average monthly salary at one thousand US dollars. Compared to China with a standard of 200 dollar monthly salary and better operating conditions for industrial enterprises, the Russian shipbuilders will have problems competing against the Chinese for orders of ordinary vessels. Management of the Admiralty Shipyards says to stay in the business they try to keep Russian navy orders (for Lada-series sub-marines), orders of foreign navies (Project 636 and 877EKM submarines) and civilian orders roughly equal, one-third each.

Russia’s largest privately controlled shipbuilding group, the United Industrial Company (OPK), also fac-es the challenges of contracting its presence on the lands of St. Petersburg. Founded in 2004, it has as-

sets estimated at 11.5 billion dollars. OPK controls Northern Shipyard, Baltic Plant and Aisberg design house along with smaller shipbuilding companies. Since foundation, it completed naval ships for 3.2 bil-lion dollars. Rather than moving out of the city, OPK plans a more effective use of the territory occupied by the Northern Shipyard.

Andrei Fomichev, who acts general director of two enterprises, Northern Shipyards and Baltic Plant, told the media that the world-wide economic crisis “has had no effect” on OPK plans on rebuilding the North-ern Shipyards for the purpose of creating, within the existing land site, a much more effective produc-tion facility that would have a larger capacity than both enterprises now possess. This shall allow to free the land (650 thousand sq. m in the Vasilievsky is-land) currently occupied by the Baltic Plant and hand it over to the city authorities and developers for con-struction of dwelling blocks and offices.

OPK has been successful in winning Russian navy tenders for construction of new generation sur-face ships. In 2001 it won contract for Steregushchy corvette, head ship of the Project 20380. Four more are under construction. In February 2006 the North-ern Shipyard laid down head ship of the Project

22350, the Admiral Gorshkov frigate. With displace-ment of 4500t, this frigate is, as of today, the largest surface ship of the new generation ordered by the Russian navy in the past 15 years. OPK believes that the existing Baltic Plant docks, capable of making ships with displacement of up to 100,000 tons, give it a chance to compete for an order for aircraft carri-ers. The new dry dock, sized 400m x 70m, planned for construction at the Northern Shipyard, will also be employed in the interests of the carrier project.

The world-wide economic downturn produced an effect on OPK to such an extent that its owners opened negotiations with Roman Trotsenko about selling it to OSK or the Russian government. Talks were still on as we went to press, with the sides hav-ing not yet settled about the final price. Meantime, Russia has received an offer from Ukraine, on sale of certain enterprises located on the Black Sea coast. The biggest of them are shipyards in Nikolaev (where all Soviet navy aircraft cruisers were built) and the na-val turbine maker Zorya-Mashproekt. Negotiations on them are also going on with no certain date when a decision can be made.

Vladimir Karnozov

Kronstadt Navy Cathedral

10 • suBMarine doMinance in tHe naVY • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

Extracts from interview with Igor Vilnit, First deputy General director – Chief enegineer of the central design bureau for marine engineering “Rubin” (first published in our #2 (7) 2010).

Mr. Vilnit, some time ago the ceremony of making colours on board the new generation Lada-type submarine took place. What is your opinion on prospects for these vessels?

Speaking about the new generation forerun-ner Lada submarine, the point of principle impor-tance is the following – this vessel incorporates lots

of brand new design and technical decisions which will remain basic for other submarines for a long time, including nuclear-powered ones.

Does the point you have mentioned really make it possible to call the Lada a new genera-tion submarine?

Yes, it does. It is important to stress that our specialists took into account the big experience we have got in design of conventional submarines of previous generations. Lada’s predecessors, the Varshavyanka submarines (Kilo-class in ex-

ported version), are world famous; they possess brilliant characteristics, and hence their big suc-cess in our Navy and foreign navies who buy them in terms of military-technical cooperation contracts. Our new vessel has got much better technical and combat equipment, and it is several steps ahead. Those problems which were solved at the design and manufacture phases allow to call the Lada a new generation submarine.

From time to time Russian and foreign press discuss the point that a new generation non-nu-clear submarine differs from predecessors by hav-ing an air-independent propulsion unit on board. Lada does not have it, and in spite of that it is able to win a duel with its foreign-made analogs. To my mind, all these talks about air-independent propul-sion are a PR campaign, planned and coordinated by our competitors. They simply want to get some advantages in the international market. Are you of the same opinion?

Sea endurance including submerged endurance as well is a question of big importance for non-nuclear submarines. However, it is not quite right to speak about new generation submarines using air-independent propulsion as a trump. A new gen-eration vessel differs from others by total number of characteristics and parameters; and its main advantage is combat efficiency. It is an integral in-dex. It includes – together with other ones – such factor as time spent under water without contact

the ladaleaves behiNd its foreigN-made aNalogs

The famous Varshavyanka, Lada’s predecessor

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • suBMarine doMinance in tHe naVY • 11

with the atmosphere. But this factor is not of cru-cial importance if we look at today’s problems in the Navy. As it was mentioned above, a new generation submarine must efficiently execute all the needed missions and win duels – and the success in these situations is achieved due to its stealthiness and quality of weapons.

Besides, if we touch the aspect of power supply we must not forget about new generation batteries – whose possibilities have grown – and about other versions of power units. This aspect needs to be pro-foundly studied; it is a very important state task and

impetus for development. In the last issue of your magazine various means of air-independent propul-sion were described. I do not want to analyse the con-clusions; all I want to say is the following: soon our design bureau will present the results of its work, and these results will be of great interest.

There are some efficient ways of sea endur-ance increase, and they should be well studied and tested. Today these small vessels are very important to our country. With the lack of nuclear submarines, on one hand, and with high weapons efficiency – which is still growing –, on the other, conventional

submarines turn to be very efficient even in mis-sions executed not so far from coast. They can meet strategic challenges too. In comparison with other vessels, the role of this submarine class will con-stantly grow. We can create various types of such non-nuclear submarines able to execute this or that mission both for our Navy and foreign navies. And we work on that today.

Yes, it is natural process. But skeptics often raise the question of Lada’s big dimensions. Can you make objection?

Igor Vilnit, First deputy General director – Chief enegineerof the Central design bureau for marine engineering “Rubin”

St. Petersburg submarine is ready for flag-raising ceremony


Well, it is substantially smaller than Kilo subma-rines – and the latter are still in demand and success-fully sold today. First of all, people in the Navy take into account the whole number of tasks for this or that submarine. Sure, we can manufacture very small ves-sels – 200-300 tons – with one gun and one torpedo launcher, but these so-called ‘submarines’ will only be able to execute a limited number of missions.

Analysing modern combat vessels – non-nuclear submarines in our case –, we must reasonably look at the tasks for each of them. The tendency for smaller dimensions is evident and objective, and not only Rubin is facing it – the Lada’s displacement is less than 2,000 tons –, it is faced worldwide. The main thing here

is avoid slipping past the ‘optimal point’; if it happens, smaller displacement leads to combat potential fall.

Germans have already had negative experi-ence with their Type 212 submarine; after that they quickly enhanced displacement…

Yes, this fact is quite illustrative. To add, their foreign customers – German designers created for them the 214-type – ordered significantly improved parameters. So we can not speak about displacement putting apart operational peculiarities. If we need to guard littoral zone – bases, coastal sectors, sker-ries – we will be satisfied with a 500-700t displace-ment submarine. If we see our tasks wider – having

in mind Russia’s vast naval theatre and the fact that nuclear submarines can not be present in some zones due to conventional reasons –, we have to admit that the 1,000-2,000t displacement is optimal. The ma-jority of our traditional partners in military-technical cooperation think the same. The need precisely such submarines for they have got access to open ocean. There is substantial difference between small and La-da-class submarines in terms of weapons, operational range, noisiness, means of detection, communication, etc. For this reason the 1,000-2,000t displacement is in high demand nowadays.

Today the submarine is passing reliability field testing. What are the reasons? Design faults? In-adequate level of crew training?

Reliability field testing is a very important thing. Many people do not understand the difference, and in press there are lots of opinions which have nothing to do with reality. St. Petersburg is a new generation forerunner submarine with enormous number of in-novations, brand new technical equipment and auto-matics. They all need new operational skills. They all have peculiarities; some improvements in hardware still need to be done, as well as additional calcula-tions. All the forerunners belonging to previous gen-erations passed reliability field testing – it is right and normal. This period not only gives working experience with equipment but as well makes it possible to ana-lyse its functioning and improve its characteristics. Now I speak not only about the today’s submarine but about the ones we will get in future, too. This pe-

Vladimir Aleksandrov, General director of the Admiralteiskie Shipyards,

greets meeting participants

Yuri Kormilitsin, General designer of the Lada (3rd from the left),

among the solemn ceremony participants


Officers of the Lada crew

St. Petersburg took part in the paradeon the Neva on the Russian Navy day


riod is important for the Navy, for the designers and for the manufacturers.

Mr. Vilnit, what can you say about the SED-1 problem in serially built submarines? Are there ways of its solution?

We do not have problems with the main propulsion motor. Of course, there are small questions, but as well there are ways of decision. During the period of inte-grated training we had no problems with the SED-1. But we want to improve it, anyway, for we see its potential is higher. We are sure we will climb to success with that.

Are you sure the submarine will be a success after its serial production starts? Skeptics still claim the opposite.

Soon everyone will see that the new submarine leaves foreign analogs far behind. We know what we say, and it is not mere dreams. The parameters it shows prove that we speak about something brand new, about a very promising submarine.

Is it true that the ideas it embodies will hold good during the next 50 years?

Soon we all will see. What I can say now is that its general designer Yuri N. Kormilitsin made in due time a number of bold and wise decisions. Today he works in the State Marine Technical University of St. Petersburg, but in fact our contacts are still very close. He has not abandoned his ‘child’, and it stands to reason. We are thankful for his recom-mendations, and we are sure his scientific knowledge and talent will stand us in good stead.

Does it seem fantastic to manufacture La-das with nuclear reactor? if it happens, we could get a cheap serially produced nuclear submarine.

You see, for today we do not set such a task, but maybe some day we use your advice!

Thank you very much! (Both laugh.) by the way, when the Lada starts to be serially built, do you see the plant in Nizhny Novgorod as promising

premises for manufacture? I was born in this city, and I want to know if my fellow countrymen are able to take part in the process.

Well, Krasnoe Sormovo is a powerful enterprise – why not? But today, unfortunately, we still have not got orders for wide serial manufacture. If we get them, we will quickly choose right shipyards; fur-thermore, the submarine is very promising in terms of export.

Yes, I know that. At exhibitions I talked to spe-cialists and navy people from India, Vietnam, In-donesia, and North Korea. They were all asking for the Project 677’s operational results in the Rus-sian Navy. And I think they all will visit you soon.

Our partners’ interest is always visible. The same can be said about our competitors in the market of conventional submarines – the St. Petersburg causes their concern. And we understand why. Nev-ertheless, our first client is our Navy, and we want to commence serial production as soon as possible.

Thank you for your interview. Let me wish Rubin and you personally new achievements which will make our country’s defence capacity stronger!

Thank you. For my part, let me wish you well: I warmly welcome people from press who truly speak about problems of our defence industry.

Prepared by Alexander Chernov

St. Petersburg sails into the Gulf of Finland



manufacturing capabilities enabled the North-ern machine-building plant (“Sevmash”) to increase the body length of the 667 sub-

marine family. As a result there appeared an idea, to increase a bit, using the available building technol-ogy and minimal structural alternations to the project 667 B, the body length of the submarines being built and increase their missile load, improving thus “ef-fectiveness to cost” feature of the weapon system.

In June 1972 CKB MT “Rubin” received the tech-nical development plan for engineering an updated modification of the 667 B submarine able to carry 16 R-29D missiles instead of 12. New nuclear subma-rine received “667BD” project number and “Murena-M” code. S.N. Kovalev guided the engineering pro-cess in the CKB MT “Rubin”.

Modernized ships were to be built according to the work cycle of the previous project keeping

the same equipment, as the Northern machine-build-ing plant had great reserve for manufacturing 667 B submarines. This allowed little structural changes in new project.

To place extra missiles in the submarine body there was a decision to “add” a 16 meter long section into the 4-5 transverse frame body zone leaving the rest ship design without changes. As a result the number of the inner hull watertight compartments increased from 10 to 11 (There appeared an extra 5-bis compartment). The dis-placement increased by 1500 tons, the speed de-creased by 1 knot.

As mentioned before a number of mechanisms and equipment units particularly high-pressure ste-ampipes valves circulation pumps etc. were “inher-ited” from previous project being the reason of es-sential acoustic noise.

Taking this into account a number of measures was taken to decrease the noise level of the sub-marine and also reduce interference in the work of own hydroacoustic means. To be more precise, the steam-turbine plant mechanisms were mounted on special vibration-absorbing basements equipped by two-stage buffer system. There were used new noise absorbing and vibration-buffering covering.

667BD SSBN PERFoRMANCE

Biggest length, m 155,0

Biggest width, m 11,7

Mean draft, m 8,6

Displacement, m3:

normal 10500

full 15750

Operating depth, m 320

Diving limit, m 400

Full underwater speed, knots 25

Surface speed, knots 15

Crew, men 135

Crew endurance, days 80

ProJeCt 667

NUClear shield

bdbdrbdrm

110th aNNiversary of rUbiN!


The pipelines and hydraulic units were detached from the ship body by vibration isolation. The outer hull re-ceived updated antisonar coating.

The submarine received an automated all-ship TV-optical complex providing subglacial and inter-compartment monitoring, rendering of the ship at-titude position and displaying on the monitors, in-stalled in the main control room, close surface and air picture on the periscope data.

The BO-120 series monitors for the complex were designed and manufactured at the radio manufactur-ing plant in Aleksandrov, the manufacturer of famous in the country “Record” TV-sets. Today this famous plant doesn’t exist any more. It was destroyed dur-ing the “wild privatization” period because of N.V. Vinogradov’s, the governor of Vladimir region, con-nivance.

Instead of action-information system “Almaz-B” there was installed an updated “Almaz-BD” system.

Project 667BD submarine was the first to use the air electrochemical regeneration system operat-ing the electrolytic process (to get oxygen) and revers-ible solid absorbent to absorb carbon dioxide. There was installed advanced equipment to provide fixed habitability standard on board.

The submarine propulsion plant power was in-creased from 52000 till 55000 hp.

On the 667BD submarines the D-9D missile complex with R-29D missiles (fielded in 1978, western designation SS-N-8 Mod 2 Sawfly) having advanced range (9100 km) and accuracy (CEP – 900 m) came instead of D-9. Missile launch range rise caused shift of the SSBN military patrol zone to arctic region.

As the fire direction system stayed in reality with-out changes, the 667BD SSBN could fire its load in two salvo fires – the main one (12 missiles) and an extra one (four missiles), which enhanced subma-rine fragility through displaying its location to the en-emy after the first firing.

A set of four ships was decided to be built in Severodvinsk (worth mentioning that after project 667BD all native SSBNs were manufactured only at the Northern machine-building plant). In the pro-cess of building the set at the “Sevmash” there was widely integrated a modular unit design method and a method of mounting ship hardware, mechanisms and equipment. The method developed later in build-ing third generation nuclear powered submarines. Specialists from “Rubin”, CNIITS, Academician Krylov CNII and other plants and research centers made great contribution in the process of underwater ship-building.

Building of the first ship, K-187, began in 1973. That year another ship from the set, K-92, was start-ed. In 1974 two another cruisers, K-193 and K-421 were started. The submarines came into commis-sion September, 30, December, 17 and December,

bdbdrbdrm

Sergei Kovalev, Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering “Rubin”

General designer, Hero of Socialist Labour, RAS academician

Project 667BD submarine in sea


30 (two SSBNs at the same time), 1975 respectively. All they came to service to the third flotilla of subma-rines, deployed in the Olenya bay (Olenya Guba), and starting from 1981 they were located in the Yagel-naya bay. Under NATO classifying project 667BD sub-marines received code Delta-2.

Appearing of SSBNs with integrated D-9D com-plex made it possible to “tighten” their patrolling zones closer to the state coastline, thus increasing combat stability of the naval part of the nuclear stra-tegic forces.

In 1980 K-193 submarine under command of captain I rank V.I. Pepelyaev executed a special campaign aimed at testing American SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) capability. Despite gradual fi-nancial and material expenses it was deployed by the Americans at three antisubmarine barriers at the same time. Theoretically they controlled the main routs of SSBN development into the combat deploy-ment zones and were placed in:

North Cape – Bear Island;Greenland – Island – the Faeroes – Great Britain

(exact name – Faeroes-Island barrier);In the North-Western and Central parts of the Pa-

cific Ocean. It should be admitted the SOSUS system turned

out to be very effective in detecting 1st and 2nd generation USSR Navy submarines, having become strong “headache” of the Soviet nuclear powered underwater fleet. That is why starting from project 667BD Soviet scientists and engineers began from one modification to another to gradually reduce the noise produced by the 667s, which respectively decreased the length of their acoustic detection.

The results of the “cat and mouse” game of K-193 and NATO “antisubmariners” gave the mili-tary authorities and SSBN designers advanced “infor-mation for thinking”. As a result the operational sites for this type submarines began to be placed mainly in the polar regions.

In 1982 K-92 SSBN (commander – captain 1 rank V.V. Patrushev) successfully fulfilled a special task: using live torpedos to make an ice-hole in the pack ice he floated and launched missiles. According to the SALT agreements between Russia and the USA first project 667BD SSBN was put out of commission in 1996. By 1999 all ships this project were outcom-missioned and sent to the Sayda Bay (Gadjievo) for storage. By now their recycling has almost been ac-complished.

PRoJECT 667BDR In February 1973 in the Miass design bureau

there began designing works to create a new R-29R (3М40, RSM-50, SS-N-18) two-stage liquid-powered ballistic missile being further development of the R-29D. Its main difference from previous navy bal-listic missiles was multiple warhead with individu-ally controlled warheads allowing to multiply increase the amount of targets hit by one launch.

By the beginning of works to create the multiple warhead there had been discussions among Navy specialists on the purposefulness of this step. Some Navy men thought that such warheads were neces-sary only in case of preventive disarming strike, when it hits first of all well-protected pinpoints (launching silo, command centers etc.), located on quite wide surface in the “dot-way”. At the same time in case of response (based on the naval part of the strategic nuclear forces) these targets won’t be of first priority any more. But later it was proved that in case of responsive strike multiple warheads will be more effective than single warheads.

More advanced inertial guidance system with full stellar monitoring used in R-29R provided new mis-sile with better accuracy. In the process of further up-dating the complex its accuracy became better, get-ting in practice as good as strategic bomber nuclear strikes accuracy. This let underwater cruisers hit not only undefended area targets (as Americans say “soft targets”) but also well-defended pinpoints (“hard”), in particular land based ICBM launching silos, de-fended command centers, munitions depots etc.

R-29R was notably bigger then its predecessor R-29D (1,2 metres longer and 2 tons heavier). That is why “Murena-M” was unsuitable for mounting new D-9R launch complex with 16 such missiles. Under designer S.N. Kovalev’s guidance in CKB MT “Ru-bin” there began engineering of an updated project 667BDR SSBN (“Kalmar” code), which like “Murena-M” was to be equipped with 16 missile silos.

Engineering order for a new missile carrier was posed in 1972. The submarine became further evolu-tionary development of project 667BD. From the out-side in comparison to its predecessor new ship had higher missile silos cover bench (which “grew” almost up to the level of the sword-arm deck-house cover), and for that these submarines were gently called “humpbacked” by navy men.

Project 667BD submarine,element of the Russian Navy

Sergei Kovalyov on board the strategic submarine cruiser


In designing new SSBN special attention was paid firstly to updating fire-direction system (un-like in project 667BD here all missile load must be launched in one shot, intervals between launches were reduced) and secondly to better, compared to the previous mode, acoustic hiding.

Inner hull of the ship was divided into 11 water-tight compartments. At that 1st, 2nd and 11th ones were escape compartments (their bulkheads were designed to withstand the pressure equal to the wa-ter pressure at the submarine diving limit).

There were taken extra measures to better fire safety through installing a new chemical fire-smoth-ering system with Freon use (full name VCF sys-tem – submarine volume chemical fire-resistance). The urge for its development was a fire accident at K-19 SSBN.

In project 667BDR crew life support means were further developed. Particularly on board there ap-peared a solarium, a swimming pool and also fixed gym. In comparison at the American missile cruis-ers having more ascetic interior, an inconstant gym (using pneumatic system) was placed in torpedo compartment, and such “luxury” like swimming pool doesn’t exist there at all.

The main powerplant with output of 60000 hp in-cluded two VM-4S reactors and two steam turbines. On the submarine there were used new noiseless five

Project 667BDR: nose diving planes ready for under-ice emersion

Project 667BDR: nose part


blade true screw with advanced hydroacoustic per-formance. There were two TG-3000 turbine-type gen-erators (2 by 3000 kW), two standby diesel-powered generators (2 by 460 kW), accumulator plant with lead/acid accumulator batteries.

Underwater cruiser received new hydroacoustic complex “Rubicon” (MGK-400), worked out under chief designer S.M. Shelekhov’s guidance, able to work in the subsonic range and having automated target classification system. Maximum detection range in sound location mode under favourable hy-drology reached 200 km.

More accurate navigation complex “Tobol-M-1” (on chips built later “Tobol-M-2”) had retention time for navigation parameters between two observations exceeding two days which raised hiding of underwater cruiser. The complex included also “Shmel” navigation hydroacoustic station making it possible to detect ship location through hydroacoustic responder beacons. There was radar facility “Kaskad” (MRK-50) with addi-tional unit “Korma” (MRK-57), radar signals detecting system “Zaliv-P” (MRP-21A), TV complex MT-70.

On board of the submarine there was mounted telecommunication complex “Molniya-M”, which in-cluded space telecommunication system “Tsunami”, ejecting floating antenna-buoy “Paravan” or (instead of “Paravan”) ejecting trailed antenna device “Last-ochka”. action-information system “Almaz-BDR” was an “integrating part” for all the board systems.

The D-9R missile complex included 16 R-29R missiles (RSM-50). Missile length – 13,635 m, diam-eter – 1,8 m, launch weight – 36,3 tons. The inertial celestial guidance system with complex (direction and range) stellar monitoring provided CEP of about 900 m (later this figure was bettered).

The feature of the complex was availability of three replaceable warhead unit modifications dif-

Project 667BDR nuclear-powered BM submarine,element of the Russian Navy Pacific Fleet

Project 667BDR nuclear-powered BM submarine,front view


fered in the number and explosive capacity of war-heads. Initial R-29R missile carried multiple warhead with three warheads with capacity of 0,2 Mt each and maximum range 6500 km. The R-29RL was equipped with single warhead with capacity of 0,45 Mt and coul hit targets at range of about 9000 km. The R-29RK provided delivery of seven warheads (0,1 Mt each) at range up to 6500 km.

For the submarine there was worked out dynamic error compensation system, measuring ship rocking data to send it to the missile complex computer.

The R-29R missile testing began in November 1976 and finished in 1978. K-441 SSBN executed al-together 22 missile launches in the White and Barents sea (four missiles were launched in single warhead, six in three warheads, twelve in seven warheads modi-fication). Missiles with one and three warheads be-came standard armament for the underwater cruiser as later the seven warheads modification was refused, mainly because of acquisition detecting system defec-tiveness. The R-29R SLBM was fielded in 1979.

If “Navagas” undermined absolute superiority of the USA in the naval part of the nuclear force, “Murenas” had consolidated nuclear balance of the superpowers by the mid-1970s, including naval component. Home and American historians almost unanimously state that that was exact time when subject talks between the USSR and the USA on strategic arms limitation be-came possible. According to the SNF-1 all R-29R mis-siles are considered as carrying four warheads.

Submarine torpedo battery included four 533-mm torpedo-launching tubes in the foreship. There was a torpedo tube preparation system “Kalmar”. The standard torpedo load made 16 SET-65, SAET-60 and 56-65K torpedoes.

Submarines were built at the Northern machine-building enterprise (Severodvinsk). The leading ship, K-441, was begun in 1975 and came into service in 1976. Its first commander was captain 1 rank B.P. Zhukov. After K-441 there came K-449 (1977), K-455, K-490, K-487 (1987), K-44, K-496, K-506 (1979), K-211, K-223, K-180 (1980), K-433, K-129 (1981).

During the performance trials the K-441 subma-rine hit over the rocky bottom at high speed at big depth. The ship got damages in the foreship, but for the skilled work of the crew it managed to escape a disaster and went up.

Most 667BDR submarines designated in the West as Delta III, Were in service at the Far East, Ka-mchatka (Rybachi base). At this starting from1980 there were executed seven individual voyages of 667BDR SSBNs under arctic pack (the first one was done by the submarine under D.N. Novikov’s command)

The submarines participating in the interfleet voy-ages had greatest difficulties (especially in going up from under the ice). As a rule during this period all the crew members were constantly at their positions

for two or three days. The depth was often not more than 50 m. The greatest danger was caused by trav-eling shallows with great glaciers setting on them.

Above the ships there was ice with thickness up to 11-15 m. At this the space between the ice cover and submarine decreased to 3-4 m with under-keel clearance of only 4-5 m. Under such conditions the automated control system was switched off and the submarine was manually operated. Mental and physical tension of the crew was extreme. The com-manders bore especially great responsibility.

Despite the difficulty and extreme risk, the sub-glacial voyages from one theatre of operation to an-other were very attractive because of their fastness and location of march lines in the zone joining Rus-sian territorial waters.

Two submarines K-455 and K-490 moved to the Pacific Fleet in February-March 1979 by the Southern way through the Drake straight. In par-ticular space navigation system effectiveness was checked during the voyage.

The Northern Fleet received five project 667BDR underwater cruisers, out of which there was formed a strategic submarine division deployed in the Yagel-naya bay of the Sayda bay (three SSBNs), and in Ole-nya bay (two submarines. In the early 1990-s all ships were moved to the Yagelnaya.

The North Fleet ships actively served executing patrol duties in the North Atlantics and in the waters of the Arctic Ocean.

In 1982 first under polar night conditions K-211 (commander captain 2 rank A.A. Beresin, senior offi-cer of the march – captain 1 rank V.M. Busirev) made a voyage along the perimeter of the Arctic Ocean. Worth mentioning also unique underwater voyage of K-524 (commander – captain 1 rank V.V. Proto-popov, senior officer on board – captain 1 rank A.I. Shevtchenko), made in the end of 1985. The march to the Baffin Sea going through a number of arctic straights took 80 days, 54 of which the ship spent under ice cover at depths of more than 150 m.

One can say project 667BDR submarines were lucky: most of them had undergone plant repairing and modernization before 1991, when homeland defense complex began to fall apart very fast. Rest nuclear powered submarines this type also managed to go through the dockyard. That is why by the begin-ning of the XXI century the ships retained high com-bat effectiveness. Modernization of the D-9R com-plex was also in process (successive modifications of the R-29R missile were fielded in 1987 and 1990).

Nevertheless in the end 1990s there began gradual writing off of the “BDRs” which was caused not so much technically as by the necessity to obey

PRoJECT 667BDR SSBN PERFoRMANCE

Biggest length, m 155,0

Biggest width, m 11,7

Mean draft, m 8,7

Displacement, m3:

normal 10600

full 15950

Operating depth, m 320

Diving limit, m 400

Full underwater speed, knots 24

Surface speed, knots 14

Crew, men 130

Crew endurance, days 80

Missile-carrying submarine in the Arctic Region


Russian-American agreements on strategic arms. In May 1994 K-129 being at the machine build-

ing plant “Zvezdochka” at the intermediate overhaul was withdrawn from navy strategic nuclear forces and by December, 23, 2002 (date of signing its ac-ceptance certificate) had been reconfigured accord-ing to project 09786 (worked out in CKB MT “Rubin”) into capsule submarine carrier. K-424 and K-441 went after in 1996.

By now K-44 “Ryasan” and K-496 “Borisog-lebsk” continue service at the North Fleet and K-211 “Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski”, K-223 “Podolsk” and K-433 “Saint George the Victorious” serve at the Pa-cific Fleet.

Within the scopes of the “Station” program, im-plemented by FGUP “GRC “academician V.P.Makeev KB” (chief designer – V.G. Degtyar), academician N.A. Semikhvatov automatics NPO (general director – L.N. Shalimov), academician E.I. Zababahin technical physics VNII (head of research – E.N. Avrorin, direc-tor – G.N. Rykovanov), it was possible to provide ex-tended time of service of project 667BDR submarines.

Today 667BDR ships remained in effectiveness combat strength of the fleet are in quite good tech-nical condition. K-506 “Zelenograd” is put into inter-mediate overhaul at the “Zvezda” dockyard (Bolshoy Kamen settlement).

During the October, 1-2, 1999 exercise two SSBNs from the North and Pacific Fleets executed on the whole three R-29R missile launches from

the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk waters and hit simulated targets at Kura training range (Kam-chatka) and Kanin Nos. At this the missile launch was executed within a few minutes after the order. Ac-cording to Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief admi-ral Vladimir Kuroedov, these launches were consid-ered as drilling possible steps of Russia to respond the USA breaking missile defense system treaty dat-ing back to 1972 and their further deployment of the national missile defense system.

667BDR SSBNs were the first in the world under-water missile carriers used for peaceful purposes. “Makeev” cooperation firms created the “Volna” car-rier rocket on the basis of the RSM-50 combat missile.

The beginning of commercial use of the SSBNs one can consider the “Volna” rocket carrier from K-44 submarine in May 1995. Pocket payload for this international experiment was thermoconvection module from Bremen University (Germany), launched within the scopes of international program Elrabeck.

Recoverable vehicle “Volan” is used at “Volna” rocket carrier launches. It’s designed to execute sci-entific applied researches in the conditions of zero-gravity through launches along suborbital trajectories. Inside the “Volan” body there is researching equip-ment, parachute compartment, electric energy source, control unit and telemetric measurement system and also real-time search system after landing.

During the flight the vehicle broadcasts telemet-ric information on the controlled parameters. At the final part of the flight the vehicle executes ballistic de-scend and before landing it activates the two-stage parachute rescue system. After “soft” landing the ve-hicle is real-time detected and evacuated.

For launches of research equipment of bigger weight (up to 400 kg) there is an updated mode of the “Volan-M” rescued flying vehicke. Despite the size and weight this modification differs with its unique aerodynamic design.

Despite scientific equipment with weight up to 105 kg, the rescued vehicle has spaceborne in-strument. It provides controlling of the experiment and flight parameters. The “Volan” is equipped with a three-stage parachute landing system and real-time searching equipment after landing (working not ,ore than 2 hours). To reduce the cost and develop-ment time there were used units and equipment from series produced missile complexes.

In the process of the launch made in 1995 the microgravity level equaled 10-4-10-5 g with the time of zero-gravity 20,5 minutes. There began investigations showing principal possibility to create rescued flying vehicle with science equipment weight up to 300 kg, launched by the “Volna” rocket-carrier along the trajectory with the zero-gravity time of 30 minutes at the microgravitation level of 10-5-10-6 g.

The “Volna” can be used for launches to the sub-orbital trajectories of the equipment for researching

geophysical processes in the upper atmosphere and near-to-earth space, Earth surface monitoring, ex-ecuting various, also active, experiments. The rocket-carrier provides raising of 600-700 kg disposable load to the trajectories 1200-1300 km max high and 100 kg – up to 3000 km high. There is an opportu-nity to mount some elements of disposable load with their gradual separation.

July, 20, 2001 K-496 “Borisoglebsk” launched the “Volna” with the “Kosmos-1” satellite. But the satellite equipped with a ”solar sail” didn’t separate from the carrier and burned in the atmo-sphere. October, 7, 2005 “Borisoglebsk” within the “Demonstrator” program (cargo delivery from the orbit to the Earth) executed a successful “Volna” launch again. By this time “makeev’s” commercial rocket-carrier “Shtil-1” came instead of the “Volna”. It was created on the basis of the R-29 RM SLBM – the main weapon of “kovalev’s strategian” last modi-fication – project 667BDRM SSBN.

PRoJECT 667BDRMProject 667BDRM submarines (code: Delfin)

were the latest 2G underwater nuclear-powered missile carriers of the Soviet period. Their time of turning into 3G submarines passed rather smoothly and without whoop-de-do. As its prede-cessors, this project was created by Rubin design bureau under academician and general designer S. Kovalyov’s guidance. A governmental decree issued on September 10, 1975 stipulated for development of a new nuclear submarine able to work in pair with the famous Taifun.

The new project was one more stage in develop-ment of well-known Soviet nuclear submarines; it in-corporated the latest know-how in missiles and tor-pedoes, firing control systems, radio and engineering equipment and hydro-acoustic stealthiness.

In 1970-1975 the leading Soviet scientific cen-tres ran a number of wide-scale

R & D projects focused on stealthiness increase. This work covered such equipment as absorbers and anti-hunt devices, vibration- and noise-isolating coat-ings. Principles of hull and engine noise emission and communication were carefully studied and then used in creation of a new missile-carrying submarine able to help Project 941 in its missions (the latter was more expensive and, as a result, manufactured in small quantities).

In 1974 the USSR adopted new and very strict requirements – VAKh-74 – concerning vibration characteristics of submarine equipment. By that time our country already had rich experience in submarine acoustic tests. Their results made it possible to equip supplier plants with acoustic stands and laboratories and send qualified and trained specialists there. All that strongly helped to increase the level of subma-rines’ stealthiness.

Loading of the Volna boosterwith a commercial satellite

on board the Borisoglebsk submarine(Project 667BDR)


The new missile system D-9RM was planned to become the main Project 667BDRM’s weapon: it consisted of 16 intercontinental liquid-fuelled mis-siles R-29RM (RSM-54, SS-N-24) with increased range, accuracy, and spread range of warheads.

This system started to be developed in 1979. Its designers were oriented to achievement of maxi-mum technical possibilities and operational charac-teristics with limited changes in project. All the tasks were successfully solved due to original layout: com-bined tanks of main and combat stages, engines with maximum permissible characteristics, new engineer-ing materials, improved production technologies, and bigger missiles dimensions (at the same time the di-mensions of the launcher became smaller).

In terms of combat potential the new missiles left behind all the US-made

modifications for the Trident, being at the same time lighter and smaller. A light ICBM’s range ex-ceeded 10,000km, and this fact enabled destruc-tion of enemy forces without leaving own territory controlled by air defence and antisubmarine defence or even directly from naval bases.

Notably, the R-29RM was the last missile de-signed under V. Makeev’s direction and the last liquid-fuelled ICBM made in the Soviet Union. All the next ballistic missiles were solid-fuelled.

The new submarine was a continuation of the 667 family in terms of engineering. Due to bigger size of missiles and new design decisions in stealthi-

ness the submarine’s launching silos became higher. Its fore and rear ends became longer and its main hull bigger in diameter. The outer hull’s zone of 1st and 3rd compartments also turned a bit bigger.

In manufacture of the main hull and bulkheads a new sort of steel was used – it was produced with the help of remelted slag and had high plasticity in-dexes.

The improved submarine’s noisiness was a result of many innovations, and its hydro-acoustic equipment started to work with higher efficiency. Mechanisms and units were situated near each other, and their mount-ing frames were well amortised. It had sound absorbers near all the power compartments and its hull coatings turned much better in terms of acoustics.

As a result, Project 667BDRM got nearly the same characteristics as the US-made fleet ballistic missile submarine Ohio of the 3rd generation, which was for a long time considered #1 in the world in terms of stealthiness.

The main powerplant of Project 667BDRM includes 2 water-moderated water-cooled reac-tors VM-4SG (90MW each) and 2 steam turbines OK-700A. The main powerplant’s rated power is 60,000hp; besides, the vessel has got two turbo generators TG-3,000 (2x3,000kW), two diesel gen-erators DG-460 (2x460kW), and two electric cruise engines (225hp each).

The submarine’s water propellers are low-noise and five-bladed. To make them more efficient, a spe-

Mission is over.Project 667BDRM submarine ready for mooring

Above: SS-N-24 missile,main weapon of Project 667BDRM submarines, in launching tube


cial hydrodynamic unit is mounted on the outer hull – it levels down water flows. Upgraded submarines are equipped with crescent-shaped seven-bladed propellers.

Project 667BDRM’s crew has got convenient con-ditions on board: a solarium, a sauna with swimming pool, a gym, etc. The upgraded air regeneration sys-tem provides oxygen percentage of 25%, and carbon dioxide of 0.8%.

To control all the combat operations, the sub-marine has got the Omnibus-BDRM information and control system responsible for information gathering and processing, tactical maneuvering and use of tor-pedoes and missiles.

The Skat-BDRM, submarine’s hydro-acoustic system, ranges with its American analogs by charac-teristics. Its antenna’s diameter is 8.1m, and the an-tenna is 4.5m high. The antenna’s blister is made of fiberglass (for the first time in national shipbuild-

ing). Besides, the vessel has got a trailed hydro-acoustic antenna which can be put into the hull in non-working mode.

The submarine’s navigation system Tobol-M pro-vides missile fire accuracy. Stellar correction is provid-ed by one-time emersion at periscope depth each 48h.

The submarine’s radio communication is pro-vided by the Molnia-LM1 or Molnia-MS2 system; be-sides, it has got the satellite communication system Tsunami-BM and two ascending antennas Zalom for radio communication and navigation.

The missile system D-9RM was fielded in 1986, already after the death of its designer Viktor P. Ma-keev. It is a D-9R upgraded version. It consists of 16 three-stage liquid-fuelled missiles R-29RM (3M37, RSM-54) with maximum range of more than 10,000km.

Even today the R-29RM remains perfect in terms of balance between energy and weight. It is 14.8m

long and 1.9m in diameter; its all-up weight is 40.3t and throw-weight – 2.8t (the latter is the same as the solid-fuelled Trident II D5’s, which has more or less the same range).

The R-29RM’s warhead splits into 4 or 10 self-homing combat units (with a power of 250kt or 100kt, correspondingly); both accuracy and split-ting range are high. Today all the submarine’s missile warheads have got 4 combat units.

The missile’s high accuracy – practically equal to the one of the Trident II D5 (CEP of 250m against the Trident’s 170-250m) – gives the opportunity to destroy small and well-protected targets (ICBM si-los, command posts, etc.).

All the missiles can be salvo fired. The maximum depth for firing is 55m, with no weather constrains.

Project 667BDRM has got a new torpedo-mis-sile system – TRV-671RTM – consisting of four 533-mm torpedo launchers with a system of quick


loading – thus it can use practically all types of modern torpedoes, anti-submarine underwater missiles and equipment for sonar countermea-sures. As a rule, it has on board eighteen SAET-60, 56-65K torpedoes or Vodopad anti-submarine guided missiles.

The building phase of Project 667BDRM started since 1981 in Severodvinsk.

In total, the navy got 7 nuclear submarines of this type. The first vessel – K-51 – was commanded by commodore Y. Rusakov.

Today’s Project 667BDRMs (western designa-tion: Delta IV) belong to the naval sector of Russia’s nuclear triad potential. All these submarines are part of the 3rd Strategic Submarine Flotilla of the North Fleet and are based in Yagelnaya bay. They are guard-ed in special underground nuclear-proof shelters with no foreign analog; there they can be repaired and recharged.

Project 667BDRM submarines are practically invulnerable in zones of operation. During patrol missions in Arctic zones not far from the Rus-sian coast (including under-ice) they can only be detected by the cutting-edge American multirole Improved Los Angeles-type submarines at a dis-tance less than 30km (given the fact that the lat-ter work in most favourable conditions: dead calm, which is registered in the Barents Sea only in 8% of cases). In the rest 92% of cases (waves and wind blowing at a speed of more than 10-15m/sec.) enemy submarines are either unable to detect them or they can be detected by BQQ-5-type sonar stations (which the Los Angeles have on board) at a distance of less than 10km – but in this case it is very risky to go on with tracing for the ‘hunt-er’ and the ‘victim’ may crash one into the other. Furthermore, polar seas have vast shallow zones where it is practically impossible to detect a Project

667BDRM (range of probable detection: less than 10km).

Speaking about combat missions of Project 667BDRMs we should stress that these subma-rines operate, in fact, in Russia’s inner water zones which are well protected by air defence and naval aviation and air force. Thus NATO submarines kill-ers and other anti-submarine weapons turn to be far less efficient.

Project 667BDRM submarines are used not only in combat missions. Their civilian branch of activity is putting satellites – including commercial – into low orbit. For instance, for the first time in the world – July 1998 – the booster Shtil-1 put into orbit the Tubsat-N satellite developed in Germany (underwater launch). The booster was created on the combat missile RSM-54 platform and it was launched from a Proj-ect 667BDRM submarine. Specialists plan to make the Shtil more powerful (new version is designated

Karelia and Verkhoturie in the base

Shtil-2), with weight-lifting capability of 350kg (for the Shtil-1: 100kg).

Specialists expect that both Project 667BDRM and Trident II will remain operational till the end of the 2010s. In order to properly maintain the for-mer’s combat potential the Military-Industrial Com-mission – under the chairmanship of Vladimir Putin, in September 1999 – decided to restart manufacture of the RM-54-type missiles. Cooperation with Ma-keev State Missile Centre was charged to machine-building plants from Miass and Zlatoust, as well as to a number of enterprises from Krasnoyarsk.

Vladimir Degtyar, general designer of Makeev De-sign Bureau, was appointed director of the project – and as a result, in the early 2000s Russian 3G sub-marines got a brand new missile. It was designated R-29RMU2 Sineva, and it is a radically upgraded ver-sion of the RSM-54.

On June 29, 2004, at 10:25 a.m., the submarine Ekaterinburg commanded by commodore Serguei Rachuk successfully launched the new ballistic mis-sile Sineva – this launch symbolised end of the state tests. Soon serial production of these missiles – fielded in 2008 – started, and this new weapon is planned to use for re-equipment of six Delfin-type submarines. After factory overhaul the latter will re-main operational at least until 2020.

The Sineva has got a big range: for this reason it can be used directly from basing sites and/or from high-latitude Arctic zones. For the first time a ballistic missile fired from sea has shown the same accuracy as its analog fired from land.

The upgraded missile uses stellar correction on the GLONASS platform. Its warheads are indi-vidually homed (spreading on random-formed and random-sized zones). Low-trajectory firing with small impact point time can also be executed.

Taking into account the US efforts in creation of a new strategic system of antimissile defence it is worth mentioning that the Sineva has advanced resistance to adverse factors of nuclear explosion.

The Sineva differs from its predecessors by stag-es dimensions, increased number of combat units, improved electromagnetic interference immunity and existence of penetration aids.

The Sineva has got an outstanding satellite navi-gation system and a calculation system – initially both were planned to be installed in the new gen-eration system Bark. The missile is manufactured at Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant. Specialists say that the upgraded D-9RM is better than its Amer-ican analog Trident II D5 in terms of accuracy and penetration aids.

Notably, the Sineva’s potential for upgrading is high enough to maintain it competitive during the first 25 years of the 21st century. After the USA withdrew from the ABM treaty of 1972, Russia found itself independent in choosing adequate measures for keeping strategic balance with the Americans.

One of these measures, the ‘asymmetrical response’, implied return to a bigger number of combat units with individual homing in a R-29RM’s warhead.

In 2003 the design scheme of the Sineva-2 was scrupulously studied and specialists decided that the R-29RMU2 could get eight small-sized combat units or four medium-sized – both types well protect-ed from enemy air defence. To their opinion, the D-9RMU2’s combat launchers and other systems can remain operational up to 36 years and can be effi-ciently used in case with the new missiles.

All this work was a part of the above mentioned ‘asymmetrical response’, on one hand, and helped to increase (up to maximum, according to Russo-American agreements) the strategic nuclear potential of Russia in conditions of technical, economic and political uncertainty, on the other.

The first stage of antimissile defence means de-ployment (non-nuclear measures without use of space equipment) is maximum efficient with 8 non-controlled small combat units with penetration aids.

Countermeasures against space weapons incor-porate individually spread (spread in parallel) units and missile’s range reduce (active trajectory). For the R-29RMU2 with its long active flight trajectory some intervals in cruise engines’ work can be pro-vided (0-30 sec. between the 1st and the 2nd stage). This sort of re-equipment can be made at naval mis-sile bases. Submarines will use missiles with various complete sets in various combinations.

After factory overhaul a Project 667BDRM sub-marine remains operational for 10 years. At the same time the new missiles are intended to be in service for 18-20 years (this service period was shown by previous models). Both the D-9RMU2 system and the R-29RMU2 missile can use various complete sets in order to adequately respond to military and political situation in the world. Some specialists think it is logical to use the R-29RMU2 missiles dur-ing their whole operating life. They say it is possible due to submarines’ second factory overhauls: thus

PRoJECT 667BDRM ChARACTERISTICS

Maximum length, m 167.0

Maximum width, m 11.7

Mean draft, m 8.8

Displacement, m3:

normal 11740

total 18200

Maximum diving depth, m 650

Operational diving depth, m 400

Maximum underwater speed, knots 24

Speed on water surface, knots 14

Crew, men 135

Endurance, days 80Missile loading on board

a Project 667BDRM submarine

Officers pictured here makeus understand how big

the submarine is


the Delfins’ service life will last 36 years. It is quite real if we remember that the American Ohio-type sub-marines are intended to remain operational for 44 years, and some national Project 667A submarines were on-stream during 32-34 years.

Taking these facts into account, some specialists in the field of nuclear deterrence think that first of all it is necessary to prolong the Project 667BDRM sub-marines’ service life up to 30 years and even more. After that, they say, R & D work must be done for the R-29RMU2’s re-equipment (small combat units and improved penetration aids – Sineva-2) and ad-ditional upgrading.

If this work ends successfully, the number of war-heads in our strategic navy will increase to 400-600 items from 2015 to 2024, thus compensating by one third the number of warheads withdrawn from operational use in 2011-2020 after the service life of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and inter-continental ballistic missiles is over. Such measures will help to lessen the rate of deployment of new stra-tegic carriers and give an adequate answer to the US development of its ballistic missile defence system in 2015-2025.

If necessary, a part of these missiles can be equipped with a powerful single-block high-explosive warhead (weight: more than 2,000kg). Such missiles can be used in non-nuclear conflicts and destroy im-portant stationary targets. However, their use must meet international agreements and be well con-trolled by other nuclear powers – otherwise a launch of ballistic missile with intercontinental range can cause unpredictable consequences.

In theory, Russia can use new nuclear low-yield warheads (TNT equivalent: 5-50t). In critical cases

such weapons can serve as means of final warn-ing to the aggressor. They have high accuracy and destroy with 100% guarantee enemy headquarters, governmental institutions, R & D and weapon produc-tion centres and other objects of the kind. With that, civilian population remains practically untouched.

Thus we see that Project 667BDRM submarines can efficiently turn from means of nuclear deterrence into multirole combat systems able to efficiently and quickly execute whatever combat missions.

The period of evolution of the national strate-gic submarines (1960-1990) ended with creation

of Project 667BDRM. In these 30 years very much was done in order to improve their technical level and combat efficiency: the missiles’ range became 10-15 times as long; the number of warheads car-ried on board a submarine grew from 3 to 160-200; the accuracy turned to be much more efficient; the in-dex of in situ navigation parameters precision grew tenfold, and the one of course parameters, fivefold. Energetic potential of hydro-acoustic equipment grew threefold and made it possible to detect low-noise nuclear submarines at far distance. The underwater noisiness of the submarine itself lessened 30 times.

Combat mission is over

Bryansk in Zviozdochka workshop


The depth of receiving control signals increased from periscope to 250m.

As for the conditions of combat duty and habit-ability, they were substantially improved. The sub-marine’s equipment passed to be remotely and au-tomatically controlled – hence less men on board and better accommodation facilities (living space for a crew member grew from 0.75m² to 4.90m²). Sanitary norms in terms of radiation grew 7 times more rigid, and in terms of carbon dioxide percent-age 3-4 times. Equipment life became 4.5 times longer.

Today six Project 667BDRM submarines remain in good technical condition being combat elements of the North Fleet.

K-51 (designation since June 11, 1992: 26th Congress of CPSU; since February 2, 1999: Verkho-turie) was the first among Project 667BDRM subma-rines to cross the Arctic and come to the surface near the North Pole (July 1987). In 1995-1999 it passed intermediate overhaul at Zviozdochka Machine-Building Enterprise, Severodvinsk.

K-84 (designation since February 2, 1999: Ekat-erinburg) was the first among Project 667BDRM sub-

marines to commence operational service. Before its intermediate overhaul it made 8 independent sailings. In 1989, in terms of the Begemot project, it was the first in the world to practice underwater fir-ing with the whole ammunition load. Due to technical problems the second missile’s launch was stopped. In December 1996 the K-84 was put out of service and sent to Zviozdochka for intermediate overhaul and radio and engineering systems upgrading – this work ended in December 2003.

K-114 (designation since August 21, 1997: Tula) got intermediate overhaul and radio and engineer-ing systems upgrading at Zviozdochka in December 2004.

K-117 (designation since January 29, 1998: Bry-ansk) was sent to Zviozdochka for intermediate over-haul in July 2002. 83 innovations were made in order to improve the submarine’s tactical and technical characteristics: its noisiness was reduced and ene-my submarine detection possibilities, endurance and nuclear safety increased. The overhaul was made with participation of NIPB Omega designers and spe-cialists from other R & D centres and enterprises, such as Bius, SPO Arktika (Severodvinsk), NPO Av-tomatika (Ekaterinburg), Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant, Miass Machine-Building Plant, etc.

On October 10, 2006 the upgraded Bryansk left Zviozdochka having become the 1,000th submarine to pass overhaul at this famous enterprise directed by Nikolai Kalistratov. A. Ryabukhin, commodore and commander of the 31th submarine division (who ear-lier commanded the K-117), delivered a speech: “Our submarines are back to the Arctic Region! Successful

Project 667BDR submarine leaves overhaul workshop

Bryansk submarine (Project 667BDM) leaves overhaul workshop


polar missions of the Ekaterinburg and Verkhoturie and perfect results of firings confirm high profession-al skills of Zviozdochka specialists”, he said.

K-18 (designation since September 18, 1996: Karelia) successfully executed its mission – together with Project 671RTMK B-414 Daniil Moskovsky – in the Arctic Region and came to the surface near the North Pole in Summer 1994. In 2007 the subma-rine started to pass overhaul and upgrading at Zvioz-dochka, after the Bryansk left this enterprise.

K-407 (designation since June 14, 1997: Novo-moskovsk) for the first time in the world made suc-cessful underwater salvo firing in terms of the Be-gemot project. On March 20, 1993 during training mission in Kildinsky Plios zone it came in collision with the US submarine Grayling and suffered light damage. On July 7, 1998 the Novomoskovsk suc-cessfully put into orbit the German commercial sat-ellite Tubsat-N. It was the first underwater satellite launch in history. The Novomoskovsk passed over-haul at Zviozdochka from 1998 to 2003.

K-64 was put out of service (reserve of 2nd cat-egory) in June 1999 and sent to Zviozdochka for intermediate overhaul and upgrading. Initially spe-cialists planned to take medium compartments and special equipment from the special-purpose sub-marine KS-411 and mount them on the K-64, but financial problems made the process stop. Today the K-64 – with removed missile compartments – is waiting for overhaul continuation on Zviozdochka premises.

Vladimir Ilyin


Interview with Vladimir G. Peshekhonov, Con-cern CSRI Elektropribor, JSC General Director

Mr. Peshekhonov, we congratulate you on the St. Petersburg conventional submarine’s (new generation forerunner, Project 677, “Lada” code) passing into service in the Russian Navy. We have been all waiting for this big event. Who do you personally want to congratulate?

Thank you. It is really an outstanding day for all those who took part in its creation. Thousands of specialists made their best, and all of them come in for congratulations and words of gratitude.

Speaking about the most merited persons, we must mention Igor Spassky – who foresaw many problems and took right decisions –, Vladimir Ale-ksandrov – who was responsible for building process with minimum state support –, and Yuri Kormilitsin, general designer of the project. Without these people we would not have been able to solve the problem.

What is your opinion about differences, in principle, between the new subma-rine and the Varshavyanka? Can the submarine, its equip-ment and armaments be improved in future, when it starts to be serially manufactured?

elektroPribor-made iNstrUmeNt systems for the NeW geNeratioN sUbmariNe lada

Flag of ship in the commander’s hands. In a couple of minutes the St.Petersburg submarine will officially become operational


I want to stress that the Varshavyanka is a very good submarine, and it is highly demanded today. From the very start it incorporated progressive deci-sions, and further it was deeply modernized: some of its systems were substituted for those which are used on board the Lada. If we use aviation terminol-ogy, the modernized Varshavyanka belongs to 3+ class, and the Lada, to 4.

Not all the Lada’s advantages are clearly seen to-day. It was tested in rather limited Baltic water zones, and not everything could be efficiently checked – what we are waiting for now are ocean tests. Besides, the experience of previous generation vessels shows that all forerunner’s potential is clearly seen after several operational years in the Navy.

Speaking about radical changes for the serially produced vessels, I say for sure that in some years we will get a 4+ class submarine, for our navy and industry people always forge ahead.

Could you please let our readers remember which systems Elektropribor de-veloped for this submarine, and by what they differ from the ones of previous gener-ations. Are they all tradi-tional for Elektropribor? Which ones – besides the Lira – were developed for the first time? how was your work estimated by the Navy?

Elektropribor has developed and installed in the submarine 3 instrument systems: the Apassionata, which is the first national inertial small-sized naviga-tion complex for conventional submarines; the Parus,

Vladimir Peshekhonov, general director of Concern CSRI Elektropribor and RAS academician

St.Petersburg sails in the Gulf of Finland


first national periscope complex with photonics mast, and the Distantsia, automated radio communication complex with antennas. These three systems are also used on board the modernized Varshavyanka; and as for the Parus, it found application at atomic submarines as well.

We did not face serious difficulties in design and manufacture. Elektropribor has been specializing in navigation systems for more than 50 years, and the Apassionata is a logical step in our development.

Earlier we did not deal with periscope systems, but we have got experience in near-by systems – in terms of design –, and this fact helped us a lot. Our concern began to deal with radio communications af-ter Svyazmorproekt design bureau became our part-ner – with its own outstanding experience in creation

of vessel antennas. Thus radio communication sys-tems also became part of our activity.

The hydro-acoustic system Lira is a special point. We had nothing to show in sub-marine acoustics before they asked us to finish the Lira. Lira design team came to us; all together we remade the soft-ware, made some changes in equipment and pro-vided the experimental model’s operation on board the vessel.

In general, our four systems’ work was estimat-ed as positive by the Navy. There were some points of criticism, and we eliminated all of them. We partici-pate in all the de-bugging on board. Unfortunately, to-day we still do not have stands imitating on-board op-eration; the same can be said about mathematical models taking into account each and every influence.

What were the most serious problems you faced working on the St. Peters-burg? human fac-tor, disbelief in team, unfair competition?

Human factor is always with us, and it is nor-mal. As for the Lira project, we really had a hard pe-riod – especially at the start –, when not everyone could understand and ac-cept that we needed time to get the things settled. Luckily for us, the Ministry of Industry and Trade’s top managers and Navy com-manders looked at the situation in the proper way, and they were not mistaken.

All the difficulties ended when the systems’ de-bugging was over. The Lira was put into stable op-eration – with good results –, and gossips about our mistakes and profes-sional incompetence vanished in the air.

St. Petersburg submarine: flag-raising ceremony


Do you still have problems with the vessel, having in mind that it is planned to be serially produced? If yes, what are the best ways for their solution?

We will have one big problem at the stage of trans-fer to serial production. The fact is that the main tech-nical decisions were made about 15 years ago, and since that time many things have changed.

First, hardware components today have com-pletely changed (Moore’s law is still in force), and there are some instruments which need to be com-pletely modernized. If we do this work rationally, it will coincide with the terms of building of the first serial submarine, and will not require big money.

In the same terms we need to put into serial pro-duction those systems whose tests and adjustment delayed on board the St. Petersburg.

Second, we have got new technologies which make submarines more combat effi-cient. In terms of power we speak about anaerobic plants; in terms of submarine acoustics, about coating on-board antennas and fibre-optic trailed antennas; in terms of instrument equipment, about integrated com-bat control systems. It is not real to do all this work in terms of building of the first serial submarine. Here we should move step by step – prepare some things for the first serial vessel, and prepare the rest for other ones.

Elekropribor has already finished preliminary en-gineering works, and we are ready to start full-scale work in this field.

They say that in spite of the fact the St. Pe-tersburg has been accepted still ex-ist influential skeptics – even opponents – of the new subma-rine. They consider that instead of quickening Lada serial building it is more useful either to buy German conventional submarines or… keep on building the Varshavyankas. What is your opin-ion on that?

Today we have got real conditions for Lada se-rial building, and other variants, to my mind, are not promising. The same can be said about acquiring conventional submarines abroad. Relations between Russia and NATO do not give reasons for modern submarines trading. I think all the customers per-fectly understand that; they use this trick to make ship-builders work faster.

Varshavyanka is another thing. If people in the Navy consider they urgently need more conven-tional submarines to operate in sea, the Varshavy-ankas are able to solve this tactical problem. But as for the strategic task given by Russia’s leaders, e.g. putting into service new generation equip-ment, these submarines are useless. This task is for the La-da.

Copy by Aleksandr Chernov

Consecration of the colours of the new submarine


Interview with Vladimir Pialov, General direc-tor, General designer of the St.Petersburg Marine Design Bureau “Malachite”.

Vladimir Nikolayevich! First, let me congratu-late you on a great event for our Navy and indus-try – launching the Severodvinsk multipurpose nuclear submarine, a leading new-generation ship designed by your team.

Thank you, indeed, it is a great and outstanding event for all of us. It is this date, June 23, 2010, when the ship has been set afloat. At present, it is a usual thing in Severodvinsk to accompany the ceremony of ‘dry’ launching with a bottle of champagne thrown

at the board, prayer service and high-ranking guests. The enterprise can allow this ceremony. We are ship-builders and designers of previous generation, and setting a ship afloat has always been an important date for us. (Smiles.) so thank you for congratula-tions, and do not forget naval traditions.

I was appointed chief designer, but this ship was built by all the country! Many enterprises took part in this project. It is vital now that celebration ceremo-nies should not blank out the importance of problems we faced creating this ship. It was a long-term proj-ect. There certainly were obvious problems of federal scale. But the fact itself proves that the path from the draft to setting afloat was very difficult. Unfor-

tunately, year after year this process is becoming increasingly complicated as Russia still has no laws obliging stock companies to fulfill state orders.

Today all the businessmen are looking for profit. Directors of stock companies think that it is better to manufacture toilets and vodka and lease their premises for garage and office building, the more so, as requirements for management and chief design-ers have been stiffened. Meanwhile we, main design-ers, are now responsible for everybody and every-thing. Now we are still doing well, perhaps the United Shipbuilding Corporation will help us. Nevertheless, I think that it is more and more difficult to carry out cooperation without legislative measures.

good lUCk, severodviNsk!


In foreign countries, for example, the US, state order is a privilege and companies struggle for it. Even if there are no other orders, the state ones always remain. Our ‘market-oriented’ directors are still unaware of it.

But they are managers of new generation, ‘ef-ficient owners’ of the 1990s…

In Russia manager is a seller. It is the person who has all the rights. Despite other words and names, managers think only about profit. They do not think about equipment, which is sphere of other people’s interests, and often they do not have any rights.

There are opinions that a general designer should play the leading role in high-tech defense enterprises creating new-generation equip-ment…

Of course! a leader with management skills is very suitable in a shop or a car service as he will increase sales and help create new products. And we are designing new military equipment which requires enthusiasm, soul and new ideas. Of course, econo-my is important and should be taken into account by an experienced general director who should not design ‘holes in the budget’. Moreover, the state sim-ply will not allow that. As regards the aircraft industry, it is general designer, but not a plant director and top manager, who creates planes.

Thus, now, to sell is still the most important thing instead of to design and manufacture. Managers are needed in selling ready products, but not in creating something new, where they are useless and designers and needed. That is why I am deeply convinced that it is a wrong position, a misbalance. We surely need to revise this question. Life itself will make us do it.

Do you remember academician Peshek-honov’s idea to create a council of general de-signers? Was it implemented?

This idea still exists. And perhaps it will be real-ized. But the council of general designers should have certain powers, which means the right to con-trol financial flows.

Perhaps financial problems were the main ones when you worked on the ship – is that so?

It happened already in the time of ‘new Russia’. We were short of money but had to build the ship. We had only tax remission tickets and no salary. What is 500 rubles for a family? Who will work for this money? Everyone wants to eat. So the ship re-mained unfinished for a very long time. When we re-ceived the money, it was quickly over. Everybody was interested in creating this submarine. And those tax remissions were useless, of course. I will not mention those dabblers – authors of this idea.

Shipbuilding requires not only attention, but finan-cial support as well. In Severodvinsk people worked for

food coupons. Who will dare to accuse them of such a long building period? at present we still have forces, capabilities and plant that can do something. But we can lose this all. Trust me, everything is very fragile. So the state should take care of this sector every day.

Could you please tell our readers about the new nuclear submarine.

What for? Project 885 submarine has been al-ready described in detail, so I cannot add anything to this information without disclosing secrets. A lot of information was given about it. US, British, French and Russian newspapers wrote about it. The Internet provided respective coverage, too. But we securely closed some subjects, and it proves that even in the era of globalization and information technologies both our specialists and security officers can keep state secrets. There is no other way.

Then let us speak about the history if you don’t mind. What is the principal difference of Proj-ect 855 from vessels of previous generations? I mean Bars submarines. What are the main ideas implemented in the Severodvinsk?

Project 971 Bars are still excellent vessels. And they will even serve for some more time. But the Severodvinsk is not their further evolution. This is a submarine of completely different purpose and class. It is a multifunctional vessel with numerous specific tasks that the Bars was unable to solve. Plants and institutes were not ready to solve such problems. It is a big and completely different sub-marine. Of course, it fulfills all the tasks solved by the Bars, but it can carry out more important mis-sions. The vessel differs from previous-generation subs in almost everything – new weapons, power-plant, etc. It features lower noisiness, better arma-ment and new capabilities.

And how many submarines of this class will be put into service with the Russian Navy?

According to Russia’s president, such subs will be put into serial production. As you know, the sec-ond ship dubbed Kazan is under construction now. In 2011, the third one is scheduled for keel-laying. Then – another series of ships. Time will show how many we shall build. It depends on many factors in-cluding foreign policy ones.

Vladimir Pialov, General director, General designer of the St.Petersburg Marine Design Bureau “Malachite”


has the ship been named yet? Will it be a ‘town name’, too?

This question is still open. This ship will probably have some other name. This issue is being settled now by the Navy and the government.

Vladimir Nikolayevich, one of the project’s specific points is vertically-launched cruise mis-siles. Mass media say they can solve strategic tasks, too. Is that true?

I did not tell you about that! (Smiles.)

Is placing cruise missiles into vertical silos a right solution? in case with Project 949 Antei ships, they were located in other manner.

Such missiles did not exist at that time. The Kursk was build 30 years ago when missiles were differ-ent. That is why we have another approach to this type of weapons. That is why we have twice altered the drafts… There was poor funding, too, but in the end they realized that multipurpose submarines are vital. That main thing is that it took us 4.5-5 years to build the submarine when everything had been settled. There was only an empty hull standing on the slipway – the only thing Sevmash could do itself. But after certain government decisions the needed parts arrived – thanks God, their suppliers did not let us down.

of course, retaining the cooperation was a headache for you… You were not the only enter-prise that had difficult times, were you?

The situation was very difficult, especially in coop-eration. It was extremely difficult to keep it working. We managed to find money to support it and search for new suppliers instead of ‘dead’ ones. Thanks God, the state realized this task and we even managed to re-equip some plants. Our cooperation was unpre-pared for such sharp market changes. Cutting defense order and breaking ties among ex-Soviet countries hampered it much. Just look, our former partners in Ukraine have no good plant remained. Moldavia and Kazakhstan still have some. That is why we mainly co-operate with our national enterprises. It was a difficult task but we managed to solve it. The submarine has been set afloat ahead of plant and state tests. You see that it is a very important period.

Do you really feel the support of the president and government?

No doubt. The president personally told me about it and everybody present heard it. Also all the respec-tive papers needed for the construction of such ships have been signed.

Some experts think that two types of nuclear submarines – a multifunctional submarine and a missile-carrying strategic submarine cruiser – may converge. Is it true? What do you think?


These two types of vessels are created for differ-ent missions, they are separately used and designed. It is impossible to combine them mechanically. The same as a fighter-bomber cannot be combined with a strategic bomber. These are different concepts and approaches. Their designers think in different ways and create different schools – Tupolev and Suk-hoi. It has always been this way. The only thing that should be unified is equipment.

Let us say, the level of unification should in-crease.

Yes, of course. The same thing is in the shipbuild-ing sphere. If there is something useful, it should be used not only in submarines but in surface ships as well. In this case the equipment will not be de-signed anew and will be improved, simplified, be-come more reliable and, thus, cheap. In due time we had two turbines made by the Perm and Kaluga plants. Now we have only one.

Is Kaluga still all right?It works. It is all right. Such large structures

should be unified. And now we are trying to do it. As for sonar systems, they are different for missile carriers and multifunctional submarines designed to attack convoys, striking groups and submarines. A missile carrier will not hunt a convoy! Nobody will send a missile-carrying submarine worth billions

of dollars for search of combat ships. This should be done by proper types of subs using different ap-proaches. And as for various units and ship systems, they should be unified as they are very similar.

Torpedo systems, missile-torpedo systems…Of course. Such systems will slightly differ but

they will be similar in principle. Powerplants are simi-lar, too. This is the task designers are facing today. But I repeat, each one should do its own business. Pogosyan should not make strategic bombers or ci-vilian aircraft. His designers can create fighters. And Tupolev experts will not be able to make a good fight-er as they create world-best bombers!

That is right. That is why Sukhoi has recently failed with its notorious Superjet, for civilian air-craft radically differ from military ones.

You are absolutely right. They have another task. They should only fly back and forth two times every day. So the tasks are completely different. And when it comes all together, we see that a lot of money had been spent and the result is very bad.

Another 30 billion were allocated ten days ago.Yes. And where is their serial aircraft? They have

only five test planes that can hardly fly. The tests reveal a lot of defects. And we can not make five experimental submarines, we can not build even

two or one. But that is aviation. Submarine building plants and enterprises work in a completely different way. We start the battle at once. A forerunner subma-rine is a real combat ship.

And the level of responsibility for taken deci-sions is different.

Certainly. You take a decision and it must work. It must work trouble-free straight away. We have two weeks for painting and then the crew will get aboard and sail off. We do not break submarines during static tests. Aircraft are broken, then they undergo wind tunnels, then they are readjusted… Nobody will allow us to do this. However, you see that modern aircraft are as expensive as ships. I can not help mentioning the new PAK FA fighter! And the US B-2 strategic bomber costs as much as a cruiser.

Vladimir Nikolayevich, when will you make us happy with your new vessel? Do you work at the next generation of submarines?

The Russian authorities are likely to continue their policy in this sphere. We shall work and face new problems to solve. Presently Malakhit is engaged with launching the first ship, then come the second and the third… Project 885 is not the only vessel we are creating. Also we are working on the Piranya and other projects.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the ceremony of taking the nuclear submarine cruiser Severodvinsk from building slip

38 • HiGH tecHnoloGY • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

russia’s state programme focused on intensive economic development underlines, above all, main economic problems and ways of their so-

lution. Its basic orientation is to create a well-thought innovation system able to incorporate progressive ideas in new products, technologies and services in all spheres of life. The programme realisation is kept under Russian president’s control.

The strategy of the programme depends on sci-entific and innovation policy conducted by our state. Such aspects as legislative environment, direct and indirect state control, scientific and technical condi-tions, national product and labour market, historical

and cultural traditions play an important role in de-velopment of the adopted programme.

All the taken initiatives are annually discussed and corrected by Russia’s government. There are 5 priority orientations of national economic moderni-sation, and high-speed and high-efficient transport is one of them.

Russia is motherland of many scientific discov-eries and engineering achievements, and among them stand high-speed sea means of transport. Hy-drofoils enter this list first and foremost. For many years Russian hydrofoils were considered the best in the world and they proved their effectiveness both

in civilian and military spheres. Russia can not afford losing its achievements. At the stage of high-speed fleet development we can not forget about hydrofoils. Unfortunately, we did not manage to save our great achievements in high-speed maritime transport: in the 1990s, period of crisis, Russia lost too much; on September 12, 2006 Sergey Ivanov, speaking at a conference held by the governmental Maritime Board, characterised as ‘critical’ the today’s state of national high-speed water transport and added that ‘earlier it was the best in the world’.

Differently from Russia, other developed countries at that time period paid special attention to this ques-

ProsPeCts for CreatioN of high-effiCieNt traNsPort iN rUssia’s loNg-term iNNovatioN Programme

role of hydrofoils iN develoPmeNt of rUssiaN eCoNomy

Combat hydrofoil Lun

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • HiGH tecHnoloGY • 39

tion. Today’s interest to hydrofoils is enormous in the whole world – in the nearest decade these vehicles will become an important part of the international transport structure. Commercial hydrofoils are already in demand in many countries. Can Russia return to its positions with the potential it has managed to keep?

A modern hydrofoil is a sophisticated innova-tion project incorporating such aspects as building materials, energetic and hydro-dynamic and aero-dynamic qualities. All these problems can be solved with the help of cutting-edge technologies including nanotechnology. Hydrofoils can be successfully used both with military and civilian purposes. As for na-tional economy, they can become a universal means of transport.

Whatever kind of transport is estimated in terms of its speed, range, carrying capacity, mooring place and weather. Hydrofoils inherited from ships big car-rying capacity and comfort; from aircraft they inherited speed, range and small crew. Today the quickest sea vessels move at a speed of 55-65km/h, and hydro-foils at 200-300km/h and even more. In comparison with economy aircraft the transporting efficiency of hy-drofoils is higher by one third or nearly twice as large, e.g. about 30-35%; for promising models it may reach more than 50% of hydrofoil’s total weight.

Hydrofoils, if compared with other high-speed ves-sels (skimming boats, air-cushion vehicles, hovercraft) in terms of technical parameters and economy, are quite competitive (analysing direct operational expens-es and service life). Their higher speed (200-300km/h against 65-85km/h for competitor vessels) lessens 2.6-3.3 times their carrying capacity, on one hand, but on the other they save much time and provide maxi-mum range per daylight. If hydrofoils get special equip-ment (GLONASS-provided navigation, radar, optic and electronic and mode ‘B’) they will become operational 24h a day and in whatever weather conditions.

In addition to their advantages it is worth say-ing that hydrofoils do not need well-equipped moor-ings and aerodromes; they nearly do not depend on weather and suffer just a little from roll and pitch in comparison with ships, and for this reason they are attractive to be used in zones with numerous islands with no moorings and/or aerodromes. First of all we speak about the Asian-Pacific Region which today needs more and more transport. Hydrofoils with their impeccable amphibious parameters can provide non-stop all-year navigation and make closer to us the most distant points of our planet. Specialists say that in the two nearest decades hydrofoils will put serious competitive pressure on sea means of trans-port and airplanes, in particular on transcontinental cargo routes. This business can bring significant profit to any state.

Today it is logical to start our national transport programme from northern regions. These zones will stop to be problematic if heavy class ‘A’ and ‘B’ –

and ‘C’ in more distant future – hydrofoils become operational there. Severe conditions of Siberia and the Far East will not be a problem for transportation anymore. The transport system for ‘difficult’ zones is expected to provide:

• all-year transportation independently of weath-er and climate;

• high operational speed;• access to most distant points;• low cost of use, and not demand expensive

capital facilities.It is obvious that only promising hydrofoils are able

to solve the transportation problems mentioned above. Creation of such vehicles stands among the most im-portant tasks of the federal programme ‘Development of Civilian Sea Equipment’ (2009-2016).

Low level of transport infrastructure development checks economic growth of hard-access zones of Si-beria and Far East and Arctic regions – all of them

need concentrated pump priming. In this sense the new means of transport – hydrofoils – will help to reduce the expenditures.

Today we register the following tendency: passen-gers pay less attention to water transport if they need to make a 300-500km trip. The first reason for that is growth of railway transport speed (300-500km/h in France, Germany and Japan) and airplane speed (900-950km/h). Water transport still remains effi-cient only for cargo carrying and leisure time activities. It is possible to increase its speed and sailing qualities if we use water surface for creation of aerodynamic rising force – and only hydrofoils can help us do that.

Economists have already determined the niche for hydrofoils: it is sea voyages, urgent cargo trans-portation and transport connection between islands in archipelagoes and between continents and is-lands. Hydrofoils need no moorings or aerodromes – it is not profitable to build these structures if you have

role of hydrofoils iN develoPmeNt of rUssiaN eCoNomy

Leonid Strugov, Director of the Ship-building Industry and Naval Equipment

Dept. of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade


no intensive passenger or cargo traffic (which is typi-cal for Arctic regions, Siberia and Far East).

There are many ways of use of hydrofoils in civil-ian needs. For example, they can take working teams to sea oil platforms and be used in whatever rescue missions. They can take on board hospitals with re-suscitation and operating theatre equipment, band-aging rooms, etc. A hydrofoil needs only 15 minutes to be prepared for whatever mission – the above facts are favourable to make this means of transport basic in the worldwide sea rescue system.

The military role of hydrofoils is also important. They may be used first of all in fast moving amphibi-ous assault missions both in own-controlled zones and in zones of probable countermeasures of enemy navy. In Russia these zones are Sakhalin, Kamchat-ka, and Kuril Islands.

Second, hydrofoils are efficient in anti-submarine struggle for they are extremely difficult to detect and can carry the whole variety of weapons.

Third, hydrofoils can be used as supply vehicles since they need very short time to take from a logistic base whatever materials and equipment and deliver them to a surface ship.

There are other spheres of combat use of hydro-foils: border control, for instance – and in this sense everything depends on specified task.

Today such countries as the U.S. and China are most active in development of hydrofoils. The Ameri-cans work on their Pelican project: this vehicle takes on board up to 1,300t of cargo (for example, 12 Abrams tanks) and covers, with this load, a distance of 12,000km at a speed of about 460km/h. The Peli-can is 122m long; its wingspan is 152m, and maxi-mum takeoff weight – 2.7 thousand tons.

As for China, in 2017 it plans to possess not less than 200 hydrofoils able to execute various missions. It manufactured first experimental hydrofoils in the late 1980s. After they appeared, all the work got se-curity classification.

Today Russia takes measures to restore its poten-tial. A working group controlled by Russia’s deputy min-ister of industry and trade has been already formed; besides, a number of commercial firms have founded the Ekranoplan Association. All these steps are aimed to solve the whole spectrum of problems dealing with hydrofoils, and a very important impulse here is that the our border service, EMERCOM, ministry of trans-portation and federal space agency, as well as many foreign firms are interested in their acquisition.

The programme of development of civilian sea equipment started in 2009 and it is focused on crea-tion of a new platform for calculation and preliminary and experimental works. Our promising hydrofoils are planned to have a 5-50t displacement and possess very good operational characteristics both for seas and rivers. Hydrofoils for passengers will start to be developed in 2012 (they will take on board from 20

Aquaglide hydrofoil (ATTK company)

Building process of the Spasatel hydrofoil

Hydrofoil EK-12P


to 200 persons). Besides, in 2012 a hydrofoil with 300t displacement will be designed.

All the above work is carried out by the Investment and Industrial Finance Group (in cooperation with Krylov R & D Institute) in terms of contracts with the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade. Both contractors have got big experience in development of modern hydro-foils – their vehicles successfully passed tests in Mos-cow Region, Siberia, Baikal and Ladoga lakes, Cas-pian and Baltic seas and were highly estimated at the Shanghai Shipbuilding International Exposition (2002); 54th Brussels Eureka world show of innovations, sci-entific research projects and new technologies (2006); 21st Century High Technologies international show in Moscow (2007); MAKS’2007 airshow (Zhukovsky), and Moscow Integrated Safety and Security state expo-sition (2010) – the latter awarded gold medal to the In-vestment and Industrial Finance Group. Today a new hydrofoil manufactured by order of the Russian Border Service is passing operational tests – this model will serve as a platform for further projects run in Russia.

Time has come to attribute national status to this subject, for today it still remains under the Ministry of Industry and Trade’s control (Department of Ship-building Industry and Sea Equipment). It must be-come an independent federal programme – simply said, a state order.

Today the working group directed by Russia’s deputy minister of industry and trade is busy with this precise problem. In the near future it must prepare a concept project of development of hydrofoils – it in-corporates such aspects as special engines for hy-drofoils, adaptation to salt fogs, all kinds of on-board equipment, new building materials and technologies, training systems, mooring and technical and engi-neering maintenance, and legal framework.

Russia will keep its leading positions in this sphere – for hydrofoils are expected to be in great demand in the 21st century – in case it successfully combines efforts of all the interested parts – minis-tries, institutions and stock and private companies.

Leonid Strugov

Hydrofoil Volga-2

Hydrofoil A-30, design concept

Hydrofoil Orion-20A, project


last year was plenty of events in American ship-building industry: the U.S. Navy received its last Nimitz-family aircraft carrier – the CVN-77

George Bush – and the CVN-21 Gerald Ford, the so-called “21st century aircraft carrier” started to be built. Among the new generation aircraft carriers – the whole class is named CVN-X – it has got CVN-78 designation. In early 2009 the ceremony of its first steel slab cutting-out took place at a Northrop Grum-man shipyard. The initial cost of the project was $8.3 billion, and the budget for 2009 (FY 2009) agreed by a special committee of the Congress has already declared another sum – $11 billion. But as problems with manufacture process show, even the increased amount will not be enough: specialists say it will be raised up to $14 billion. In parallel with financial prob-lems which the Congress tries to solve, the first 21st century aircraft carrier project faces both technical failures and achievements. The most serious problems

are the electro-hydraulic aircraft arresting gear (AAG) and the multi-purpose two-band search radar (planned to be made only in 2013). The Governmental Audit Of-fice (GAO) in its report dated Mar. 30, 2009 claimed the EMALS to be among “the most risky technologies in terms of cost and manufacture of the vessel”. Fur-ther it was said that “if EMALS turns the Gerald Ford into metal scrap, shipbuilders will get the right to apply old steam technologies”. The same subject was harsh-ly criticized by vice-admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, NAVAIR commander (on Feb. 20, 2009): “It will be a big prob-lem – if not a disaster – to re-equip the aircraft car-rier, if EMALS proves to be useless”. (Installation of old steam catapults with extra weight of more than 2,000 tons under the flight deck will cause problems with metacentric height and stability.) Scott Fomey, repre-sentative of General Atomics, main designer of EMALS and AAG, also sees negativity: “With no doubt I support the idea of coming back to the steam catapult”.

The EMALS subsystems tests and their results – together with successful assembly of all the systems at Lakehurst, N.J. test site and at JB MDL joint base – give certain optimism which is expressed by high-ranking officials in navy and industry. The PMA-251 (Programme of Maintenance of Aircraft) director Randy Mahr, U.S. Navy post captain, in his interview on Jul. 3, 2009 said: “The navy’s aim is to take steam catapults away from aircraft carriers. We have used them for 50 years; it is high time to make a new step”. In response to specialists’ doubts about EMI (electromagnetic leakage) influence on electronic systems of the on-board aircraft and the vessel itself, Randy Mahr said “it is not a problem for us; basing on gathered data we can state that the magnetic field is dispersed at a 1-cm height over the flight deck and its magnitude is too small to influence on instru-ments and computers”. In order to start using elec-tromagnetic catapult pilots and deck technicians

“Technological rouleTTe”

on board The gerald Ford


must pass special training, but with all that takeoff procedures will remain the same, “pilots and deck team will not see any difference, since takeoff con-trol systems and hand signals have not changed”. According to Mahr, the main EMALS and its systems tests will be run at Lakehurst and Tupelo sites, “to let us in the end substitute steam catapults on our promising aircraft carriers; but it will only happen not earlier than in 2017”. At the end of June General Atomics, EMALS prime contractor, got a $573-million contract on catapult manufacture for the CVN-78, planned to be fulfilled in September 2015. The Con-gress came to this decision due to the company’s success in assembly and quality preparation for EM-ALS complex tests at Lakehurst test site.

After passing the input transformer the on-board energy enters the 3-phase electric engine equipped with an impulse generator and accumulating wheel (motional energy; weight: more than 3t). At flight preparation phase and during flight itself the engine consumes stable power (up to 1.35MW) and does not create problems (non-stationary loading) for the on-board net. While an aircraft takes off the generator starts to work in impulse excitation mode (2.5-3 seconds) and transforms its motional energy into a 1,700V voltage (frequency: about 2,000Hz). Then the energy is transformed as the regulations for linear engines prescribe. One of big EMALS advan-tages is absence of braking system for the shuttle shifting gear, as well as its return to initial position. When the voltage loader gathers the needed speed, the shuttle shifting gear stops to move, and due to change of phases this device returns to initial posi-tion. The linear engine differs from the steam cata-pult – with its hydraulic brake and winding engine for shuttle and piston block, which need additional sub-systems and technicians – by the fact that it com-bines all these functions, and the control process is programmed and does not need operators.

Lakehurst: bird view

EMALS technologies are developedunder rigid control of US officials

Gerald Ford aircraft carrier: project image


The full-scale EMALS model (Lakehurst, N.J.) has got an open magnetic gap; its active rotor section parts are turned inside, thus forming a 50-mm thick magnetic field in the gap. The above mentioned in-novation decisions were put aside due to problems of electric power loss and unsatisfactory linear en-gine thrust. The “old new” stator part gives better specific indices in terms of energy generation. EMI influence still exists – as it was in projects developed in the 1970s –, but in terms of design and opera-tional mode the problem has been solved (both for the shifting gear’s rotor bearing part and the so-called “travelling wave” section of the stator frame).

As GAO concluded, the AAG (according to its de-signer Carmelo Rodriguez, the term sounds as “tur-bo-electric braking gear”; U.S. patent application: Jun. 6, 2006) also belongs to the “risky technologies” category. Our photos show the systems which are AAG elements (Lakehurst test site).

When an aircraft starts braking, damping devic-es smooth the applied shock at the moment when the hook engages the intake sling (transfer pro-cess); in the stationary braking mode the engine-generator (EG) and the hydraulic turbine (HT) are used. Thus the braking energy is neutralized both by EG (35%) and HT (65%). Besides, HT works with the help of heat transfer from the turbine. At the same time EG, passing into generating braking mode, provides energy recovery (up to 10%) for the primary feeder line. Such a small percentage is obtained because of impulse braking (2.5-3.0 seconds) and impossibility to accumulate enough energy between landings.

The AAG has been developed since 2003 by Gen-eral Atomics, in cooperation with Curtiss-Wright. The new aircraft arresting gear will substitute the Mark 7, polyspast-hydraulic arresting gear used today on board the Nimitz-family aircraft carriers.

The first vessel planned for modernization is the CVN-68 (its life cycle comes to the end in 2020).

The new AAGs are intended to meet all the require-ments on safety: their error-free running time (configu-ration: 3+1 sling) must not be less than 16,500 cycles (in practice, up to 29,500). One cycle consists of such phases as landing with the help of sling, sling return, and readiness for further work. The above mentioned AAG designed by General Atomics meets all the need-ed requirements; this fact, however, must be proved during complex tests at Lakehurst, which will pass with deadloads and used aircraft. According to the NA-VAIR press release dated Jul. 30, 2009, these tests should start in 2010 and the system mounted on the CVN-78 in 2015. The latter term gives all the reasons to think that the CVN-78 will not be put into service in 2015, as it is planned.

Time displacement related to making opera-tional the first three CVN-X family aircraft carriers (one by one each five years) and, as a consequence, to withdrawal the Enterprise (CVN-65), George Ken-nedy (CVN-67), Nimitz-family aircraft carriers from operational status is seriously controlled by the Congress and principal officers of the U.S Navy. Mr. McKenzie, leading Heritage analyst, called this pro-cess “a risky game played by the U.S Navy and Con-gress”. The agreed, by both parties, number of op-erational aircraft carriers – 11 vessels – may lessen, since the CVN-65 will be pensioned off in 2012 and the CVN-78, planned for its substitution, is expected to become operational after 2015. Such “unexpected losses” also take place due to overhauls and nuclear reactor recharges of Nimitz-family aircraft carriers. Lack of aircraft carries will be seriously felt in 2012; in this situation financial support does not play any role in making the work on the Gerald Ford faster if we keep in mind the above “risky technologies”. Ex-perts see the solution in modernization of operation-al aircraft carriers – but it will not only impede saving money from the budget but as well lead to leakage of allocated funds for building new aircraft carriers. All that can fairly be called a catch-22 situation. Ac-cording to foreign media, the pre-schedule commis-sion of the CVN-78 turns real in case it gets the 5G fighters F-35B (if EMALS-dealing problems are not solved in time in Lakehurst). Such a decision will lead to decrease – in number – of on-board aircraft and to absolute absence of radar surveillance aircraft, which are nothing else but indispensable. Negative developments of the CVN-78 project will certainly postpone putting into service two more aircraft car-ries of the series, and lack of aircraft carriers will be very clearly seen. Lawmakers and navy command-ers, understanding that, are in constant contact and study all the changes in order costs and working schedules. On Jul. 16, 2009 the Congress’s subcom-mittee for naval and expedition forces held loud de-bates concerning the EMALS project. Catapult’s bed in the phase of manufacture


Gene Taylor, chairman and R-representative, pointed that “if EMALS demonstrates all the prom-ised advantages, the Ford-class aircraft carriers will get a catapult system leaving far behind the steam one used on board the Nimitz-family vessels. Takeoff possibilities – both for heavy and light aircraft – will widen, the system’s weight will lessen, the number of mechanic units and devices will decrease, the ex-penditures on maintenance and the number of tech-nicians will diminish. But we all worry about schedule delay; this fact may postpone the date of EMALS in-stallation on board the CVN-78”. According to Taylor, tests of pilot prototype were planned for 2007; their results will show (in two years) what changes in the system must be made. At the moment of discussion (July 2009) the full-scale model was in the phase of assembly in Lakehurst. With the existing schedule for the CVN-78 nothing remains for specialists but build the vessel in parallel with testing the EMALS complex – which still does not show the needed pa-rameters. It was said that some systems, such as the ESS, for example (system of energy accumulation and conservation), have already passed the cycle of full-scale loading simulation. At the discussion meeting Gene Taylor asked the participants with concern: “What shall we do if this important system, which took billions of dollars from our taxpayers, does not work?” David Architzel in his report showed video materials and explicative diagrams dealing with the EMALS tests. The things people saw caused turbulent debates; the most active was R-N.Y. Eric Massa, ex-navy commander. His questions bewil-dered the spokesman:

E.M. “What happens if the system does not work?”

D.A. “Today this technology is the most important for the aircraft carrier”.

E.M. “I say it again: what happens if it does not work?”

D.A. “We have all the reasons to say it will work”.E.M. “Will all due respect, sir: what happens if it

does not work?”D.A. “Being honest I tell you: if the system does

not work… well, we must be convinced it will”.Massa told Architzel – who sat near him – some

more: “I say it officially that I was against changes in this Ford-class vessel manufacture and choice of such a technologically isolated system. Your dis-ability to answer my simple question causes big anxiety”. In the end Massa said: “In reality we have bought the biggest in the world rotorcraft carrier”. People in the Congress officially expressed their concern on May 15, 2009. At that time Gene Taylor, chairman of the subcommittee for naval and expe-dition forces, said during the discussion dedicated to 2010 financial year (FY10): “I am concerned about the EMALS programme for our next aircraft carrier. Some time ago I visited the building site. Everything

is O.K., but if the EMAILS fails we will get at our dis-posal the world’s biggest helicopter carrier”. In July, when discussions around the EMAILS appeared in media, Gene Taylor said: “We had bad news about the EMALS in February 2009 and till today we do not know any details, for they do not inform us about the problem”. He added that “the world’s biggest helicopter carrier is not just a phrase pronounced by Eric Massa, today it is a slogan… and that is not good at all”. Eric Massa, in his turn, whilst speaking with journalists expressed self-criticism: “We keep in mind not only the EMALS but many other problems. Sitting in the library of the Ministry of Defence we agreed to jump into 2G and 3G technologies without any foundation. It is much more than EMALS – now we speak about our aircraft carriers’ striking poten-tial which is very important for the nation. The main reason of the delay is the takeoff electromagnetic system”. He aphoristically added that “the decision we took makes us go to Las Vegas and put our navy’s future on the green cloth; in other words, play techno-logical roulette”.

The final decision on the PMA-251 project and terms of making the CVN-78 G. Ford operational will be made and discussed in Lakehurst – in December 2010 the full-scale EMALS model will be tested there (deadload launches). On September 30, 2009 there was an optimistic event in Lakehurst. In terms of the Ministry of Defence’s programme (DoD), aiming uni-fication and move of military bases (the so-called BRAC 2005 programme), the opening ceremony of unified military base with nearby DoD infrastruc-ture took place. McGuire (air force base), Fort-Dix, and NAES (Lakehurst) have turned to be its elements. The joint base got JB MDL designation, and air force coronel Gina Grossa was appointed its commander. Everybody present at the ceremony said they were sure the creation of the new base would significantly reduce expenditures.

The event at the Northrop Grumman shipyard or-ganized on November 14, 2009 can also be called important. Congress members, high officials and ship-builders took part in the G. Ford keel-laying ceremony; in the grave dock #12 a frame crane put on the build-ing slip a 25x29m ship section weighing more than 900t. Susan Ford Bales, daughter of the 38th U.S. president, was present at the ceremony as a honour-able project supervisor. She stated that “the keel has been laid, and it has been laid properly!”

At the end of 2009 the working process showed that everything can be finished in due time. On No-vember 12, 2009 (Lakehurst centre) high officials from NAVAIR took part in the ceremony of EMALS sys-tem opening – with red band scissoring – which sym-bolized the end of linear engine and deadload launch system assembly; the complex was absolutely ready for tests. The guests participated in the first shoot-ing of the EMALS electromagnetic catapult. Randy

Mahr, post captain of the U.S. Navy and EMALS proj-ect director, said that “the tests and Lakehurst-based systems maintenance guarantee a non-stop 50-year work at the site”. Kathy Donnelly, takeoff and land-ing systems project director added that “since 1950 the steam catapult had been used more than 5 mil-lion times, and today the era of electromagnetic cata-pults has come. The latter ones use a linear engine instead of steam-driven pistons”. Congress member Christopher H. Smith, lobbying for his voting district’s interests – where JB MDL is situated – pathetically said the ceremony symbolized the beginning of a new era for the U.S Navy and local community and added: “EMALS can be compared with the wheel inven-

EMALS mounting


tion”. Notably, in 2002 Smith managed to convince the budget subcommittee of the House of Represen-tatives in the necessity of EMALS financial support ($20.6 million) and thus to save Lakehurst base from DoD – BRAC 2005 plan recommendations. He stated that “the EMALS project was one of the main rea-sons for keeping Lakehurst in function”. According to Smith, both the EMALS and AAG guarantee work for NAVAIR specialists at Lakehurst during the next 50 years, e.g. new aircraft carriers’ life cycle. He also mentioned that “this day is historical for our new generation aircraft carriers which we use to call heart of the U.S. Navy”. Demonstrating his support of the existing naval doctrine Christopher H. Smith stressed that “aircraft carriers stay among the most efficient means of our influence and are key to resolute ac-tions in whatever crisis or conflict”.

A number of technical problems revealed in 2008 by designers and manufacturers of EMALS system

for the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier – when the tests of a 12-m model led to refusal of using a linear catapult engine with shielded stator part – ended with manufacture and tests of a new linear engine EMALS in the second half of 2008. It passed tests in Tupelo, Ms. (this site is owned by General Atom-ics). Its operational principles were described in Ar-senal 21st Century #1, 2010. In spite of positive results of the tests – a new linear engine received green light at Lakehurst, united base of JBM DL, NJ. – by early 2009 the project of EMALS tests found itself 4 months behind schedule.

This fact caused concern among politicians and navy commanders; debates about the CVN-78 build-ing took place in the budget committee of US Con-gress; the whole project was criticised by the audit chamber (GAO), and the PMA-251 by vice-admiral and NAVAIR commander T.J. Kilcline. The so-called Plan B, e.g. return to steam catapult on board

the CVN-78, was still having right to life, as EMALS designer General Atomics declared, – but in spite of that US Congress devoted more funds in order to develop this project in 2009: on June 30, $573 million for manufacture and mounting of electro-magnetic catapult on board the CVN-78; on August 17, $24 million for RDT&E programme – investiga-tions, design, tests and estimation of results; on No-vember 9, $102.2 million for EMALS modification and manufacture of first turbo-electric aircraft arrest-ing gear (AAG).

All that made it possible to speed up the work on new EMALS at Lakehurst, and organise the cer-emony of EMALS initial run on November 12, 2009. Further it was planned to run idle startup tests, maximum speed tests and deadload tests – all that in December 2009. The second phase of tests – with F-18 aircraft participation – was postponed for June-July 2010. The PMA-251 programme was described in detail in press by leading General Atomics design-ers, but all these publications stopped after EMALS initial run on November 12, 2009. Publications reap-peared only on May 5, 2010, when the situation with the PMA-251 became more or less clear.

The materials about EMALS published on May 11, 2010 in Defense Industry Daily (media.defenseindus-trydaily.com) show that the PMA-251 programme had faced more financial and technical problems. Both designers and customers express their concern with sea climate’s and salty water’s influence on EMALS elements and with the catapult’s structural stability too. On March 25, 2010 NAVAIR commanders issued a tender on investigations in this field – simulation of influence on catapult’s bed tray – in order to avoid additional expenditures on changes in insecure units. McGee Industries was announced the main applicant as soon as it had the richest experience and techni-cal base for such sort of investigations.

US GAO published after financial audit its 8th annual report – on March 30, 2010 – where it un-derlined problems with growing expenses and risks of failure to meet the terms of new systems tests and their delivery on board the CVN-78. In spite of that, programme directors are optimistic about the sys-tem’s units readiness and terms of their delivery. GAO’s report as well mentions terms of the second phase of EMALS tests with participation of aircraft – it is summer’10 (everything shows that this schedule needs to be once again revised). GAO may simply have not been informed about the events at EMALS tests in January 2010.

In the previous report – year of 2009 – AAG was once again mentioned as technologically risky proj-ect. Being a sophisticated system – it includes 7 sub-systems – AAG still has not proved its operational safety; the state some of its subsystems are in also leaves a lot to be desired. AAG control system’s soft-ware still has not passed tests (!); they are planned

EMALS mounting is nearly over

EMALS ready for testing


only for 2012 (you can read about AAG subsystems interface in braking mode of aircraft in our maga-zine #2/2009). The braking process lasts 2.5-3.0 seconds and consists of fast operational changing of subsystems. To make it work properly, you need to possess high dynamic potential and use exclu-sively digital technologies and controllers on their platform. It is hard to overestimate the software sub-system’s role in the PMA-251.

Pentagon’s report dated April 1, 2010 and dedicated to weapons acquirement also express-es concern about growing expenditures on EM-ALS and the CVN-78 (the latter amount showed a growth of $1.3 billion). The report states that the expenditures on the PMA-251 have gained more than 15 percent – $5.426 million – which is caused by difficulties in working schedule and transfer to 5-year cycle of putting into operation CVN-X aircraft carriers.

Technical problems with EMALS became clearer due to materials published by Defense Industry Daily on May 11, 2010 (with reference to Newport News Daily Press reports). At the first stage of control soft-ware tests and idle startup tests, planned for De-cember 2009, some works were postponed because of problems with software – specialists spent nearly a month to solve them all.

In the beginning of January 2010 the first at-tempt of idle startup test had dramatic consequenc-es – an error in software made the catapult’s linear engine work in reverse mode; after that the shuttle rotor changed its direction and crashed into the rear part of linear engine stator. Both the stator and the shuttle rotor were destroyed – damage estimated in $52,000 – and the first tests schedule kept back for 3 months. Work on mistakes in control software brought promising results at the first stage of the pro-gramme – more than 750 successful idle startups were made in the whole spectrum of set speeds (250 startups showed a maximum speed of 300km/h). Given the fact that there are no publications about deadload launches, we suppose that this stage of tests has been once again postponed. Officially published information about postponed tests with the written-off F-18s – for seven months – proves this assumption.

The number of idle startup tests – 750 – gives the reason to conclude that checkout of control soft-ware took the main part of time; it lasted till every-thing turned settled.

Our national experience with steam catapult shows that the same stage took only 30-40 idle startup tests, – though it is not quite right to compare these two projects.

The tests that were organised allowed solution of the following problems:

• calibration test of linear engine working in idle startup mode;

• law of time control on the whole catapult track;• shuttle rotor’s braking and return to normal

position;• calculation of minimum time for shuttle

return – this interval determines EMALS’s operational cyclicity.

Nevertheless, the next stage of tests may bring new problems to specialists.

The thing is that according to conceptual founda-tion the electro-magnetic launch of flying vehicles is used for a big spectrum of weights – from 6-t UAVs to 40-t aircraft.

At the very first stage of EMALS passive loaders launch it will be necessary to confirm maximum pa-rameters for trucks with no thrust, having in mind that an aircraft – when it uses catapult – takes off with maximum thrust. At this stage linear engine’s thrust must be calibrated in the whole weight and maximum speed spectrum. With that, all the EM-ALS subsystems must provide maximum set thrust of linear engine; as for control software, it must prove the advantage of digital technologies working in the mode of flexible interface. It is logical to expect that these programmes will be substantially changed in terms of start and speedup parameters.

The problem of electro-magnetic interference (EMI effect, e.g. dispersion of strong pulsating mag-netic field) will certainly need solution, since we speak about a linear engine with open operating clearance. First results are expected after launch of trucks with mounted and potentially vulnerable electronic units – with their help initial conditions will be created for transfer to electro-magnetic air-

craft start (cost of electronics comes up to 75% of aircraft cost).

Randy Mahr, post captain and PMA-251 direc-tor – and at the same time EMALS ‘godfather’ – con-tinues to support electro-magnetic start technolo-gies; he is sure that “in spite of problems with control software the George Ford will become operational in due time – in 2015. NAVAIR commanders and General Atomics planned to run aircraft tests on land this summer, but agreed it is better to do that in late 2010. The software will pass final checking after it is installed in the vessel”.

Newport News Daily Press Reports says that to-day first EMALS subsystems which passed tests ear-lier are being delivered to the shipyard and planned to be installed in May and June 2011. Experts say that the Plan B already does not exist and steam catapults will be inevitably changed for electro-magnetic.

Evgeniy Sholkov

EMALS team salute the first idle launch

Lakehurst: panoramic view

48 • MilitarY aViation • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

Everyone acquainted with Internet sites devoted to aviation for sure paid attention to numerous ‘non-official’ sources who inform about China-run work on creation of a ‘nearly invisible and extremely maneuverable’ 5G fighter (according to Chinese classification norms it can be named a 4G aircraft). This fighter (or fighters) is not going to stay behind such famous aircraft as the US-made F-22 and Russian T-50. Information of the kind is often accompanied with pompous pictures – at first sight, convincing – of this combat aircraft with exotic shape. Looking at them one is ready to believe that Chinese specialists run a very intensive work on new generation aviation complexes and that soon fighters in the whole world will bear exclusively Chinese trade marks. however, after a more careful look at these pictures you understand that

all of them are photoshopped, and the written information is simply unbelievable.

Meanwhile, specialists who study the Chinese aviation industry know perfectly well that China really has been trying to create a new generation aircraft at least since the late 1980s – early 1990s. There are objective reasons for that, on one hand, and there is information received directly from the People’s Liberation Army of China and scientific and industrial sources, on the other. All we have to do is try to understand the real state of things…

In reminiscences of an ex-employee from the Chi-nese R & D Institute 611 – specialising in aircraft manufacture – recently published in the West it is said that China began to study the concept of cre-ation of a new generation aircraft in distant 1989;

the new vehicle was intended to substitute the J-10 and J-11 (Su-27). The project – code: ‘2-03’ – went on with the Institute 611’s (situated in Chengdu) and Institute 601’s (situated in Shenyang) partici-pation. The author adds that specialists from TsAGI and Mikoyan also took part in this project in 1993 because of difficult financial situation in Russia in whole. Besides, among the Institute 611’s part-ners were advisors from SibNIA, Novosibirsk, who, in particular, helped China with development of the J-10 fighter.

To know more about modern composite materi-als – without them it is impossible to build a 5G fight-er – in the late 1980s a group of the Institute 611’s specialists was sent to Stanford University (USA); as far as additional information in this field is con-cerned, it was got during realisation of some civilian projects run by China and Boeing/China and Airbus. Besides, some time ago the Ukrainian firm Antonov helped China to modernise its transport planes and military cargo aircraft. All this knowledge helped China to create technological base for its 5G project.

Today enterprises in Chengdu and Shenyang are supposed to run long-term works on a new genera-tion fighter with 2 engines – the Chinese want it to compete with the F-22 and the T-50. Some sources report – and maybe it is true – that the Chinese Air Force has chosen a project presented by the Institute 611; and as for the Institute 601, it will play the role of subcontracting firm. But the problem they need to solve is extremely difficult – till today China has not created a single combat aviation complex by own means. All that it possesses now are vehicles made in cooperation with foreign partners, and an aircraft created by China from ‘A’ to ‘Z’ is unlikely to become operational earlier than in the 2020s.

raPtor as it is seeN by beiJiNg

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • MilitarY aViation • 49

More intensive work is run on a ‘medium-weight’ fighter (average takeoff weight: less than 20t); China expects to finish it in the near future. In November 2002 at Zhuhai air show the Institute 611 presented a booklet with computer-made layouts of a two-en-gine medium-weight fighter (canard) looking more or less like the Russian experimental aircraft ‘1.44’, prototype of the heavy fighter ‘1.42’ (MFI): in Russia this project was in the end closed. Foreign analysts adopt the possibility of transfer, from Russia to China, of some technical documents of the ‘1.44’ aircraft. Neither Russia nor China gives comments on this information.

In early 2005 a source in Chinese defence indus-try informed that the Institute 611 works on a new generation single-engine aircraft – the shape of the US-made Lockheed Martin F-35 (JSF) was chosen as platform.

In November 2006 – one more air show in Zhu-hai – the Institute 601 showed layouts of an axial triplane aircraft (this shape was used in creation of the Russian Su-30MKI, Su-33, and Su-34). Such an aircraft can have several modifications, including the one with short take-off and vertical landing.

All the above makes us think that the presented projects remain ink on paper. More probable is that China will decide to deeply upgrade its J-10 and turn it into a ‘new generation stealth fighter’. China’s design bureaus have limited potential; besides, they cooper-ate intensely with foreign partners – for this reason the idea to upgrade the successful J-10 (better weapon system, stealthiness and aerodynamics and a TVC en-gine on board) is seen as the most real. This can be an evolutionary process, with moderate expenditures and all the latest achievements in aircraft manufacture integrated (modern building and radar absorbing ma-terials, new generation automatic control system, on-board radar with antenna with phased array, integrated on-board equipment system, etc.). As for the airframe, its serial manufacture has been already approved. No-tably, designers of such aircraft as F/A-18E/F, F-16E/F, F-15S, MiG-35, Su-35 and other – known today as gen-eration ‘4++’ chose precisely this way.

Propagandistic aspect is also very important. Russia’s T-50 maiden flight, for example, got wide public response. China can do the same as well, if it is able to – maybe in some years and on the existent aircraft’s platform.

The above supposition is confirmed by the latest media information. In January 2009 media reported that in the near future China plans to create an up-graded version of its J-10, non-officially designated as Super-10 or J-12 (there were other designations: J-14 and J-20), with a more powerful TVC engine, reinforced airframe and on-board radar with active phased-array antenna.

In early 2010 Xinhua informed about success-ful results of China’s 5G fighter design project. One

This picture, as well as the ones above and on previous page, gives hypothetic image of the Chinesenew generation twin-engine fighter


of project top managers, 1st vice-general designer Zhan Tsi Kao, said that the maiden flight will ‘take place very soon’. Other sources in China report that the design process will take 5 years. All this makes us think that the first Chinese 5G fighter (more probably, ‘4++’) will get off the ground not later than in 2015.

As Chinese media inform, in terms of its basic characteristics – including radar stealthiness and ra-dio and electronic system potential – the new aircraft will keep pace with such fighters as the F-22 and T-50. Though this statement is propagandistic, the fact of appearance of such an aircraft in China – with near-ly the same characteristic as the US and Russian 5G fighters have – in the second half of the 2010s can be a great achievement which will certainly put this coun-try in the list of top leaders in world aircraft building.

What was the reaction of the USA, main potential opponent of China? American military and govern-mental officials are less optimistic in this field though US media – with reference to intelligence informa-tion – state serious progress achieved since sum-mer’09 in creation of the promising fighter. ‘China will manufacture a new generation fighter able to op-pose something to the F-22 only in eight years’, said Wayne Ulman, director of the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, in his report presented to the US Congress. Robert Gates, US minister of defence, says that according to American specialists’ forecasts China ‘is only able to design a fighter more or less close to 5G before 2020, and by 2025 it will have only a handful of such vehicles’.

Ulman added that there is lack of information concerning the Chinese aircraft, but he supposed that its parameters ‘will be quite close to the ones of the F-22’. As for the 4G group of Chinese aircraft – about 500 vehicles (J-10 and J-11/Su27/S-30) –, it has its ‘place in the line’ with the same generation of US aircraft – F-15, F-16, and F/A-18.

At the same time Robert Gates thinks his state’s unilateral advantage in fighters, combat vessels and other expensive branches of armed forces is ‘too big in the conditions of serious economic problems faced

today by the U.S.’. On May 8, 2010 he said he does not see ‘big problems in new 320 F-35 fighters de-lay having in mind that the US armed forces possess 3,200 tactical combat aircraft. Is it a serious threat for America that by 2020 we will have 20 times more stealth fighters than China?’

China’s attempts to create a 5G fighter are well seen if we look at its avionics-aimed projects. West-ern media report that China makes a lot of attempts to develop a new on-board radar with phased-array antenna – this element is ‘obligatory’ for promising aircraft (for example, India considers this point in-dispensable for its air force – in particular medium multirole fighter). Such antennas have very big pros-pects for the future: specialists say that other radar systems are not fit to hold a candle to them.

Chinese designers had a number of consultations with their Russian colleagues in the 1990-2000s concerning own manufacture of a passive phased ar-ray: they planned to install it in their new fighter. They had certain success in this work, as well as in some other projects run – not always legally – with the U.S. and other western countries.

Non-official sources inform that in 2008 the R & D Institute 607 (specialised in radar and other radio and electronic systems) created an experimental X-band on-board radar with phased-array antenna. Being Chinese-made, this radar works with the help of Russian and Israeli technologies. With that, nobody knows if the antenna modules are Chinese or they were bought abroad (notably, the first French system of the kind had US-made receive/transmit modules).

In 2008 in Zhuhai China demonstrated a big-format multi-purpose liquid-crystal screen display. It was said in annotation that the LCD was intended for a new fighter. Its shape resembled a lot the one used on board the US fighter F-35 (this is the only air-craft in the world equipped with such system; such fighters as F-22A, Su-35 and T-50 have two or more displays with smaller size).

Creation of a 5G combat aircraft is impossible without a quality powerplant (in particular, the en-

gine’s specific thrust in maximum afterburner mode must be 10-11kgf/kg – such engines as 117S, 117, AL31-FM-2, AL31-FM-3, F119-PW-100, and F-135-PW-100 meet these requirements). This precise problem had been always China’s weak point. Today all the Chinese combat aircraft – including last gen-eration ones – use either foreign-made or licensed engines. Today China has no success in creation of own gas-turbine engines with 4G characteristics.

China will do its best to make the Voshan-10A engine operational and then upgrade it according to ‘4++’ requirements (thrust: 14,000-15,000kgf, and substantially increased endurance). Though the prob-lem with this engine has been remaining unsolved for more than 10 years, sooner or later China will solve it. But when it happens it can bee too late to equip the promising fighter with ‘new’ engine. As a result, China again will use foreign-made engines, in particu-lar Russian ones – AL-31FM-2, AL-31FM-3 or 117S – which completely meet ‘4++’ requirements.

Speaking about the ‘medium’ stealth fighter, it can be created in 2015, and China itself sets these terms. For example, the work on the US ‘4++’ fighter F-16E/F Block 60 (it differs from the F-16C/D Block 50 by the same characteristics as the Super-10 from the serial J-10A) started in 1998, maiden flight took place in 2003 and serial manufacture – for UAE Air Force – began in 2005.

At the same time China develops one more new engine, the WS-12 Tanggula, with a thrust of 13,000kgf, but some sources inform that this programme had been stopped in 1999 and today there is another engine in development – it is based on the Russian R-79-300 (designed in the 1980s for the Yak-141) and it is expected to have a 15,000kgf thrust. Such an engine can be used for new J-10 ver-sions (including the ‘medium’ new generation air-craft), the promising vehicle with short take-off and vertical landing and a 5G heavy fighter which can ap-pear not earlier than in the 2020s.

Today it is possible to understand how the Chinese ‘4++’ fighter (as G. Djanjgava, director of Ramenskoe

J-10B ready for test flight


Design Bureau, joked, we speak about a ‘5-‘ aircraft) will look like. This vehicle is planned to become operational in the Chinese Air Force in the late 2010s or early 2020s (optimists say it will happen in the late 2010s). It will be a deeply upgraded J-10 version (some elements are al-ready being tested on board the J-10B), with maximum takeoff weight of 20,000-22,000kg and regular takeoff weight of 16,000-17,000kg. The Chinese fighter will keep its component layout untouched (one powerful en-gine, delta wing, belly intake, vertical single-fin tail unit) and be significantly upgraded in terms of stealthiness. The upgrading process will first of all touch the air intake DSI-type unit mounted today on the J-10B, ventral fins (to be removed), antennas, vertical fin, shape of half-doors and hatches, etc. Also new antiradar materials and coatings will be widely used. It is probable that the aircraft’s RCS in microwave band will be decreased and become the same as for the EF2000 Typhoon, Ra-fale, and Su-35 and close to the one for the exported version of the F-35.

The Chinese fighter’s maximum speed will be M=1.8-2.0, but minimum ‘non-afterburning’ M value will equal 1.1-1.2 (it corresponds to indexes of Typhoon, Gripen NG and Su-35. It can be achieved due to in-creased thrust-to-weight ratio which will exceed ‘1’ even in takeoff mode. A 14,500-15,000kgf engine with TVC (117S or AL-31FM-3, for example) provides, in theory, the same maneuvering parameters as the F-22A, Su-35, MiG-35 and promising EF2000 with TVC have.

It is quite possible that China will use on board its fighter flush fuel tanks mounted on both sides of the airframe (in press there were some pictures of that design version). The tank capacity of about 2,000l will increase (with a bit lessened speed and maneuvering parameters) the fighter’s range from 1,850km up to the one of the F-22A (2,200-2,300km).

The new fighter will be most probably equipped with an on-board radar with phased-array antenna whose characteristics are more or less the same as the ones of MiG-35-type aircraft, JAS 39NG or up-graded Rafale. Limited antenna aperture and TRP value (not more than 700-1,000 units) will hardly provide a range of enemy fighter detection of more than 140-160km.

At the same time the fighter’s radar should help to use the vehicle not only against air targets but against small land-based targets as well (including moving ones). Probably the on-board radar will get the mode of aperture synthesizing.

The optical and electronic equipment of the J-10B makes us suppose that the new fighter will use a system more or less alike with the MiG-29’s one and maybe the MiG-35’s. Thus the Chinese vehicle can tactically beat the F-15, F-16, F/A-18 and F-22 since they do not have such equipment on board (for the latter ones built-in optical and electronic systems are only planned).

As for weapons, they will be more or less the same as on board the J-10. Combat potential of the aircraft can increase due to the upgraded missile PL-12 with active homing radar system and ducted engine. This missile is the European-made Meteor analog – it destroys air tar-gets at distances exceeding 100km and, besides, it can efficiently coexist with the on-board radar with phased-array antenna (its target detection range is 140-160km).

Probably, in order to destroy targets on land the fight-er will have on board cluster bombs with a system of self-homing at final stage and homing GPS receivers. It can also get tactical cruise missiles with a range of 100-300km. Fighters for navy will have guided anti-ship mis-siles on board. As it will be a multirole fighter, it should carry nuclear tactical weapons (maybe ballistic bombs or ASMP-, SRAM- and X-15-type missiles).

Time will show if all these forecasts are true for the Chinese stealth fighter which are intended to come on stage in the late 2010s – early 2020s.

Vladimir Ilyin

Computer graphics or real layoutof a new generation fighter?(see picture above as well)


China is the third – after Russia and U.S. – coun-try in the world possessing strategic aviation. Its history starts from 1953, when China got 25

Tu-4 bombers (with four piston engines each, similar to the American Boeing B-29 in terms of character-istics). Those vehicles – made by the Plant No.22 (Kazan) and the Plant No.1 (Kuibyshev) – were able to drop bombs on targets in Taiwan, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines, e.g. places where numerous American military bases were situated. Though Chi-na did not have at its disposal aircraft able to carry nuclear bombs – eighteen Tu-4 nuclear-bomb car-rying vehicles existed in the USSR – in theory, af-ter certain modernization, Chinese bombers could take on board such weapons. The USSR and China agreed in principle that the latter would have got nu-clear weapons during Mao Tse-Tung’s historical visit to Moscow in December 1949.

Notably, Stalin was always trying to raise China’s scientific, technical, economic and military poten-tial in order to make cooperation between the two countries as close as possible. The alliance between Beijing and Moscow was able to solve whatever

problems from the East China Sea to the Elba, from the Arctic Region to Indo-Chinese jungle – it could be really very strong.

When Khrushchev substituted Stalin at the post of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary – in his struggle with members of the Political Bureau in 1953-1955 – he also tried to get Mao Tse-Tung’s support, since the Chinese leader was a power broker in the international communist movement. To gain such a support, Khrushchev increased his military-technical help (including the one in aviation) to China.

The USSR stopped manufacturing the Tu-4 bomb-ers in 1952, having produced in total 847 aircraft. No good vehicles for export were produced in the coun-try at that time: the manufacture of the serial Tu-16 started only at the end of 1953. So getting the Tu-4 Chinese pilots realy could say they had at their dis-posal a quality aircraft with strong strike potential.

Right after the aircraft shipment to China – and before Chinese pilots received proper training – the Tu-4s participated in the undeclared war against Taiwan, destroying military objects. At that time all the crews were headed by experienced Soviet pilots.

China was grateful for the Soviet pilots’ help: for example, A. Balenko, who headed a group of Chinese pilots training on board the Tu-4, got a personal car, and when he returned home in 1954 – the Order of Red Banner (he made not less than four combat flights to Taiwan).

Initially the Tu-4s were seen as temporary means to satisfy China’s needs in long-range bombers – till a new good bomber production would have started. For such plans were several times postponed, China had to start modernization of what they had – the Tu-4s. In the 1960s their bombers got the interrogator-

responder system Chrome Nickel (copy of Soviet-made system), the Sirena-2 threat alert system and other modern equipment.

The greatest difficulty was to get from the USSR the abandoned Ash-73TK piston engines (2,000/2,400hp). The decision was found in full re-motorisation of the Tu-4: in the mid-1970s fifteen operational bombers got the Y-8’s powerplant (this aircraft was manufactured by the same principle as the Soviet An-12BK, having on board four AI-20M engines (4,250hp each).

It is well known that the vehicle’s striking po-tential was rather low in spite of modernization, for the Tu-4 was created in the 1940s. For that reason the Chinese Tu-4s were reoriented in use and started to execute long-range sea reconnaissance flights and military transportation missions. In 1978 several Tu-4s were re-equipped for aerial launching of the WZ 5 pilotless target aircraft, and one (serial production number: 2806501) turned to be used with the aim to improve the Chinese system of long-range radar detection. The Chinese Air Force stopped to use the Tu-4s only in the late 1990s.

In the beginning of 1956 the USSR and China signed an intergovernmental agreement on the Sovi-et help in building, in China, a modern bomber manu-facturing plant. The bombers should have been able to carry nuclear weapons on board. In 1957 China got the Soviet licence for the Tu-16 manufacture; this long-range bomber had perfect characteristics and became operational in the USSR in 1953-1954.

In terms of the agreement China got two vehicles, an assembly for building one more bomber on the Chinese territory and technical and technological documentation.

STraTegic aviaTion oF china: paST and preSenT

Tu-4


It was decided to organize serial manufacture at two new plants in Harbin and Xian. In May 1959 the Harbin Aviation Plant started to manufacture the Tu-16 using Soviet assembly (from the Plant No.22). For technical help 200 specialists from the Shenyang Aviation Plant arrived in Harbin; those people had experience in the J-5 (MiG-17) fighter pro-duction with the help of Soviet technologies. The new vehicle had its first flight on September 27, 1959, and in December of the same year one bomber be-came operational (it got H-6 designation – Hongzha-ji-6, which means “bomber aircraft 6”).

The plant in Xian also got new specialists – 1,040 engineers and technicians, and 1,697 workers. In 1961 this plant got the right to produce all the H-6 vehicles.

It was hard for China to start serial production of the Tu-16: there were no experienced special-ists, the cooperation between related enterprises left a lot to be desired, inconsiderate decisions were sometimes taken. Besides, the relations between China and the Soviet Union suddenly changed for the worse, and the political and economic situation when the “cultural revolution” began played a nega-tive role in the production of such a sophisticated and labour-intensive aircraft. The H-6 was ready for serial production only in 1964. The first airframe for tests was manufactured in 1966, and the maiden flight took place on December 24, 1968 (Chinese-made, with the Chinese engines Wopen-8 – licenced Soviet RD-3M-500 version).

In 1963, before the production of the H-6 start-ed, the Xian plant commenced re-equipment of this type of aircraft – manufactured in Harbin – in or-der to make it able to carry a bombs (with the same characteristics which the Soviet Tu-16A had). There were some improvements in the cargo compartment, the system of bomb dropping control, the system of weapons refrigeration, the crew biological pro-tection system, the nuclear test control system and in the measuring equipment. The bomber’s upgrading was over in 1964; on May 14, 1965 the vehicle with H-6A designation successfully dropped an a bomb (35kt) in a desert (western China). On May 9, 1966 the aircraft dropped its new nuclear bomb (250kt), and on June 17, 1967 – it dropped the first China-made 3.3 megatons bomb. With that, China declared itself as a nuclear-weapon state with the possibility to transfer its weapons to whatever point of the globe (the first nuclear explosion was made in 1962).

China, in parallel with the H-6A manufacture – with special equipment for nuclear weapons – , be-gan to produce the non-nuclear H-6C aircraft, the re-connaissance aircraft H-6B (analog of the Soviet Tu-16R) and a jammer (analog of the Soviet Tu-16P) with the SPS-1 and SPS-2 systems.

In 1959, when the Tu-16 started to be serially pro-duced in China, it was one of the most powerful bomb-ers in the world. The USSR went on with manufacture

of this vehicle in series up to late 1963. The Tu-16, after having its maiden flight on April 27, 1952, had

maximum speed of 992km/h (this parameter made it practically invulnerable for the US-made fighters and its inter-allied F-86. The bomber’s range was 5,640km; it could carry on board bombs weigh-ing about 9,000kg and 7 aircraft guns with radar homing (23-mm).

In the late 1960s, however, when the first Chi-na-made H-6As and H-6Cs became operational in the Chinese Air Force, the situation substantially changed; the USSR and the USA passed to superson-ic bombers, the Tu-22 and the B-58, correspondingly,

with much higher striking potential. As for the 1G subsonic bombers – Tu-16 in the USSR and Vulcan and Victor in England – equipped with guided mis-siles able to destroy targets without entering air de-fence area of coverage, as well as the US-made B-47 and the English-made Valient –, all of them were either removed from the inventory or converted for tanker aircraft. However, the main source of China’s concern was that its potential enemies’ supersonic fighters (first of all the new F-104s and F-5s) gave the Tu-16/H-6 low chances for survival at medium heights. Moreover, there were fielded medium- and low-height air defence systems like the Hawk, which

Tu-4 as a “flying radar”

Tu-16


proved to be very efficient in the war in the Middle East. So, just when the H-6 serial production started it was decided to upgrade this aircraft.

The only possible thing in such a situation was to start using the H-6 at lower heights. To solve this problem it was necessary to modernize all the navi-gation equipment (produced for using the bomber at medium and big heights). The work on creation of such equipment together with the one designed for bomb dropping, with better automatic performance, commenced in 1970. It was planned to have on board a navigation calculator, an avigragh, a Doppler radar system, a modernized autopilot system and a radar sight for bomb dropping. It was said in mass media that China used some western technologies whilst it worked on its new equipment. The flight tests of the upgraded vehicle began in 1975 and lasted six years; serial production started in 1982.

China’s long coastal borders together with con-stant threat from the Taiwanese and American navies, as well as weakness of its own navy, called for creation of a powerful anti-ship aircraft grouping, able to control low- and medium-range ocean zones. China – as well the Soviet Union at that time – chose the H-6/Tu-16 as carrier of guided anti-ship missiles. The H-6D de-sign project – the new vehicle was planned to be used in such combat missions – commenced in the Xian R & D Bureau in 1975. Specialists chose the S-601 (YJ-6) anti-ship missile to be carried by the new aircraft. The missile was created on the HY-2 platform; the lat-ter weapon is licenced version of the Soviet-made P-15 carried by torpedo boats. The aircraft version

differs by absence of solid-fuel launching booster. The speed of the new liquid-fuel booster was M=0.9, and its maximum range – 95-100km. It made homing with own active self-homing radar.

Two heavy missiles (launching weight: 2,440kg, warhead weight: 513kg) were mounted on suspen-sion units under the wings. The aircraft had its own launch control system, automated navigation and sighting system and new on-board radar with bigger antenna, situated in the nose cowl. The H-6D had its first flight on August 29, 1981; and on December 6 of the same year made the first test missile launch (S-601 missile). The launch tests ended in late 1983, and in December 1985 the aviation complex H-6D/S-601 became operational in the Chinese Navy. Further some aircraft of this family were delivered to Egypt and Iraq (for needs of their own air forces).

A better version – S-611 – was created a bit later on the S-601/YJ-6 platform. The new missile got a modernized high-energy fuel engine thus having increased its maximum range up to 180-200km.

In the 1990s all the U-6Ds got new anti-ship mis-siles – the solid-fuel S-801Ks (lower in dimensions; weight: 820kg; with active radar self-homing head; range: 50km; speed: M=0.8), first weapon in its class developed exclusively by China. Each aircraft could take on board four missiles.

At the same period the operational bombers H-6A and H-6C were upgraded and got H-6F classification level: they got new on-board radars, Doppler drift ve-locity detectors and GPS receivers.

Up to mid-2008 fourteen H-6D still belonging to the Chinese Navy turned into the H-6U tanker air-craft (those aircraft could also have H-6J and HU-6 designations). Under their wings they got the RDC-1 “hose-cone” refueling systems. Some aircraft have standard cockpits for flight navigators (vitrified), and some of them – modernized ones, without glass in the front part. These tanker aircraft are used for refueling of the J-8II and Su-30MK (J-13) naval fight-ers, as well as for the JH-7 tactical bombers with refueling hose. The H-6DUs – air force-owned – and the H-6E/F bombers are also going to become tanker aircraft.

Since the 1990s in foreign media there had been a lot of information concerning the end of serial pro-duction of the H-6-type aircraft; in spite of that they are still manufactured, though in small quantity and with intervals; they substitute older vehicles with 1:1 ratio.

The H-6H bomber-GM carrier – serially produced by Xian Aircraft Industry Company and used by the Chinese Air Force – takes on board the JH-63 (KD-63) high-accuracy missiles: two missiles of this type are suspended under wings. At the same time the air-craft has got a compartment for air bombs.

The first flight of the H-6H took place in Decem-ber 1998, and it made its first JH-63 missile launch in November 2002. Under its nose part it has a trans-

parent radome with bigger dimensions in comparison with previous modifications. Guns the aircraft was earlier equipped with for self-defence needs today do not exist (but it still possesses an airtight cabin in its rear part).

The subsonic missile JH-63 with the turbojet FW41B engine can destroy land targets at a range of up to 200km (with known coordinates). The missile has got a combined homing system (MFA+GLONASS/GPS at midcourse phase and a television system at end phase, controlled by operator). The missile’s CEP is about 10m, and its warhead’s weight – 500kg.

In 2008 the H-6M bomber-GM carrier started to be produced for the needs of navy (its develop-ment passed in 2001-2004). The vehicle is the next version of the H-6H. It has got no bomb com-partment (there is an additional fuel tank instead). Under its wings it carries four suspension units for the new anti-ship low-altitude missiles S-802K and/or S-803K with turbojet engines (the two missiles are new modifications of the S-801K). The S-802K’s range is 120km and speed – M=0.9; the S-803K’s – 180km (there is also information that its range has increased up to 260km) and M=1.2-1.3 at the end stage of trajectory.

The newest Hongzhaji-6 version for today is the H-6K; it differs from the previous ones – H-6H and H-6M – by the fact that it has six suspension units for cruise missiles – CJ-10 (DH-10) – and a new powerplant. Besides, its airframe has a bit changed: the navigator’s cabin has no glass, it is completely coated by transparent radome.

H-6D

H-6Cassemblyline


The aircraft has also got a new radar sighting system with increased antenna (most probably with mechanic scanning mode). It has got the GLONASS/GPS system of thermal imaging navigation and sight-ing, and probably a system of terrain countour match-ing (since such systems were used before on board the H-6).

In order to transmit quality visual information to the pilots the H-6K is equipped with six multifunc-tional LCDs (this parameter enters the list of require-ments for 4+G aircraft).

The crew has decreased to three men sitting in new 0-0 class catapult seats. Like in case with the H-6M, it has no defence air guns. The crew en-ters the cockpit through a special door in the airframe (differently from the Tu-16, with its front landing gear compartment access).

It is supposed that the H-6K’s main weapons will be 6 cruise missiles DH-10 used for destruction of land targets. This missile – today passing the last phase of tests – was created with use of technolo-gies embodied in the Russian-made Kh-55; its range is 2,000-2,500km (in the late 1990s China got – with the aim of copying – several Kh-55s from Ukraine). As a result, the operational range of the H-6K/DH-10 complex (without refueling and taking into account high economic feasibility of aircraft engines) is ex-pected to be 4,500-5,000km, with the possibility to destroy targets on the U.S. territory.

It can be said with high probability that the H-6K uses the Russian-made D-30P2 bypass engines installed in the Il-76-type military transport aircraft

bought by China in Russia (for instance, in 2006-2007 China acquired a batch of 64 bypass engines D-30KP2).

The case with the Tu-16 and H-6 remotorisa-tion is particularly interesting. This project com-menced in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. In 1956 the Tu-16B was created (the vehicle was powered by two RD-16-15s whose takeoff thrust achieved 11,000kgf). Specialists got the opportunity to in-crease takeoff weight and operational range, the lat-ter up to 7,200-7,500km (the same as the Vulcan

B Mk.2 had). In the 1950s-1960s these engines were mounted on the Tu-104E test-bed aircraft and some naval missile carriers Tu-16K-10. Sud-denly the work was interrupted, and the RD-16-15 never was serially produced. In the mid-1960s a new project started – the Tu-16 was supposed to get either NK-8-2 or NK-8-4 bypass engines; and in the 1970s there was an attempt to substitute the RD-3M-500 for the D-30KP bypass engine. All the above projects were not supported by the USSR Air Force commanders for two reasons. The first one

H-6U


was that mass remotorising of all the Tu-16 was too expensive: all the bombers’ engine compart-ments had to be re-manufactured. The second was the fact that in the early 1960s Soviet decision mak-ers considered the Tu-16 to be off-market vehicle; it needed to be changed for the supersonic Tu-22 and Tu-22M. In such conditions it was decided not to spend so much money on design changes in the old model’s airframe.

Nevertheless, China decided to take part in this “relay race” project. In the 1970s it manufactured the experimental aircraft H-61 equipped with the li-cenced Rolls Royce Spay Mk.512 bypass engines (4 items) instead of two W-8 engines used before. As a re-sult, its ferry range grew up to 8,060km, and near-land climbing ability – up to 29.7m/sec. But this project was also closed due to financial and technical reasons.

Some measures will be taken in order to make the H-6K less vulnerable for enemy radars. In case with the Tu-16 with its big dimensions, it has RCS of only 19m² in cm-operating range. Modern anti-radar coatings and some other technical improve-ments – which are rather cheap – enable to lessen this parameter to several square metres, which is the same as 3G and 4G fighters have got. Thus, the bomber gets a number of technical advantages against enemy fighters without losses in terms of other characteristics.

In late 2009 there was information about inten-tions to equip the H-6M aircraft with strategic cruise missiles.

Today the Chinese Air Force possesses 120 H-6-family aircraft. Besides, the naval aviation uses about 30. Some dozens of vehicles (H-6C and H-6D modifi-

cations) were shipped to Egypt, Iraq, and Libya in the 1970s-1980s.

Anyway, everything is best when it is ended – be it the Tu-16’s big potential for modernization or what-ever. China decided to change the Tu-16, designed in the distant 1950s, for more modern aircraft in the late 1980s – early 1990s. In 1993, as national and foreign media reported, the Chinese government asked Russia for a new contract – purchase of the Tu-22M3 with tactical and SRBM missiles on board (at the same time Iran was also planning to acquire these vehicles). In its exported version the Tu-22M3 was demonstrated at Farnborough, but no contracts on delivery were signed – political and military rea-sons showed to be stronger than economic.

Nevertheless, China did not stop searching for new variants of its H-6 substitution. At the end of 2007 China and Antonov (Ukraine) signed a con-tract on joint design of a new military transport air-craft; this vehicle, being an upgraded version of the An-70, has got higher cargo capacity (60 tons) and a better powerplant with 4 bypass engines. Besides, the parties agreed to create a new tanker aircraft, a radar warning aircraft and a civilian one. The pro-jected military transport may serve as a platform for creation of a new carrier of the DH-10 strategic mis-siles and even new generation cruise missiles with nuclear or conventional warhead. A project of the kind (in terms of FOAS) was also studied in England some time ago. In the mid-2000s U.S. studied its own prospects for creation of a new generation strategic complex (the C-130J Hercules II and the Globemas-ter III were suggested as missile carriers). Antonov also has experience – taking into account its Soviet period – in development of cruise missile carrying aircraft on military transport platform.

The new Chinese complex, which, as it is esti-mated, will be created in the early 2020s, will be able to destroy – by high-accuracy missiles with lowered radar-location signature – targets situ-ated in the west coastal zone of the U.S.A. Speaking about its possibilities to attack groups of air carri-ers in the Pacific, we should mention that in spite of big operational range and powerful on-board radar it is difficult to imagine it would be efficient, since all the military transport aircraft have big di-mensions and hence their unsatisfactory signature parameters.

Looking into the future, we can imagine that China will plan to create its own advanced long-range aircraft system or a NGB-type system. But having in mind the fact that it has no experience in creation of heavy aircraft by own means – putting apart much more sophisticated heavy combat com-plexes – it is hardly possible such a project could be a success.

Vladimir Ilyin

This picture, and above H-6U in details


58 • naVY • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

in the latest decades naval experts have repeat-edly said that the era of missile boats that were made in big quantity in the 1960-90s – and

were the basis of naval striking forces of third-world countries – is over. Such premature con-clusions were voiced after the US Navy destroyed Iraqi boats in 1991. The main conclusion is that a missile boat is helpless against aircraft that will sink it before it can use its weapons. That is why, it makes no sense to build small missile boats (with a displacement of up to 350t) and only large boats with a displacement of over 500t armed with efficient air defense and electronic warfare sys-tems are worth building.

If comprehensively analyzed, such conclusions turn out to be disputable.

Above:B.A. Leikis, Chief designerOJSC Central Marine Design Bureau Almazwith Kazakhstan’s officials

katraN missile boatSoviet-made Project 205 missile boat

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • naVY • 59

First, it is incorrect to evaluate the efficiency of missile boats by the well-planned offensive op-eration of the US armed forces, including air carrier grouping against single and sporadically-operating Iraqi boats. Nobody doubted dominating posi-tions aircraft have gained on sea after WWII. Mis-sile boats can efficiently fight against large surface ships only in case of certain target acquisition and support by coastal aviation and ECM systems, i.e. In case of favoured treatment by own armed forces and due to surprise factor.

Second, boats designed in the 1960s and built in the following decades did not meet the require-ments neither for their main missile weapons, nor for target acquisition and detection systems, defense capabilities and technical conditions.

In fact, premature ‘burials’ of missile boats can be explained by two main factors. First, it is great geopolitical changes in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw pact. On one hand, it made almost the whole world change priorities in armed forces development and made difficult the acquisition and maintenance of Soviet-made military hardware. On the other, the world got too many cheap armaments. There was no need to make up for decreasing fleets of third countries in the conditions of military-political uncertainty.

Further events showed that missile boats were far from losing their importance. Following expert conclusions, the wish of poor countries – tradition-ally buying missile boats – to get more efficient ves-sels resulted in creation of such ships as Victory and Super Vita. Richer countries got interested in cor-vettes. Thus, wanting to raise combat performance of their boats, customers often faced the problem of unaffordable prices. Even Germany who decided to replace its missile boats with K130 Project cor-vettes faced this problem – this replacement does not seem reasonable despite changing tasks. On the other hand, some countries that had not paid inter-

K130 Project corvette

Super Vita class ship

PKX class corvette

60 • naVY • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

est to missile boats before, for example South Korea, acquired them.

At present fleets of eight countries have over 70 Soviet-made Project 205 missile boats. It is a po-tential market for new-generation missile boats de-signed by St. Petersburg-based Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau and meeting the requirements of nu-merous foreign clients.

Project 20970 Katran can be called a reincarna-tion of Project 205 not only because Almaz – that had its 60th anniversary last year – used its rich experience in creation of this vessel and because it carries cutting-edge Russian weapons, but also because its propulsion unit employs products of well-known foreign compa-nies. It will allow the customer to avoid possible prob-lems with M503 diesel engines that are out of date now.

The boat is designed for destroying surface ships and combat boats and for patrol operations in open littoral zones of seas and oceans and internal waters.

Independently or as part of striking groups and in cooperation with other naval forces, the boat can fulfill the following missions:

• engaging enemy surface ships and combat boats, amphibian and transport vehicles;

• supporting coastal defense units in border pro-tection;

• supporting sea landing operations;• tactical reconnaissance;• patrol missions in territorial waters and sea

economic zones.The boat’s hull is firm enough to swim in open-pack

ice with a thickness of up to 0.4m. Its seagoing perfor-

mance allows its operation at sea state of up to 7 and efficient weapons employment at sea state of 5 without restrictions by course and speed. The boat keeps afloat even if its any two adjacent compartments are flooded.

The main powerplant is a two-shaft water jet-driv-en 6,790-kW diesel engine.

The boat has well-balanced armament which guarantees high striking performance and efficient self-protection from surface and aerial objects.

The Uran-E anti-ship missile system includes:• eight 3M-24E (Kh-35E) cruise missiles in 3S-

34E transport-launcher container;• two 3S-24E launchers;• 3R-60UE1 shipboard weapons control system.The maximum range of fire is 130km (minimal –

3-5km).

Project 20970 Katran

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • naVY • 61

The boat’s artillery armament consists of the 57-mm A-220M universal automatic mount and two 30-mm AK-630M six-barrel mounts with the Bagira digital fire control system. It is supplemented by two 12.7-m machine guns.

The air defense armament is the 3M-47 Gibka system which provides guidance and automated

launch of Igla-M air defense missile from shipborne turret launcher.

The boat’s ECM protection is provided by the PK-10 short-range passive jamming system.

The Pozitiv-ME 1.2 active three-dimensional radar executes target acquisition and distribution. The boat can be optionally equipped with the Ana-

pa-ME dipping sonar designed to detect combat divers and DP-64 antisaboteur grenade launcher.

The automated control system includes an in-tegrated bridge system comprising automated working places for ship commander, watch officer, navigation officer and steersman). Also it has got a technical assets control system including GEU, EESK and general on-board systems.

The boat endurance by food reserves is 10 days. The crew can work in comfortable conditions: there is commander’s room on board, two-man cabins for officers and four-man ones for master sergeants and eight-seat accommodations, officers’ mess and crew mess.

B.A. Leikis, Chief designerD.Yu.Litinskiy,

department ChiefOJSCCentral Marine Design Bureau Almaz

MAIN SPECIFICATIoNS oF MISSILE BoATS

Type of ship CoMBATTANTE I PKX GIMDoSKURI PRoJECT 20970 KATRAN

Flag Kuwait Republic of Korea Republic of Kazakhstan

Leading ship name Um Almaradim Yoonyoung-Ha

Year of launch 1998 2008 2012

Designer CMN Cherbourg (1995) Hanjin Heavy Industries CMDB Almaz

ManufacturerCMN Cherbourg Hanjin Heavy Industries STX

Korea (Pusan)Zenit plant

(Uralsk)

Main dimensions, m: Length x width x draught 42 х 8.20 х 1.90 63 x 9.00 x ▪ 46 х 8.40 х 1.80

Standard/full displacement, t ▪/245 440/570 ▪/325

Type and power of main powerplant, hp2 x 4,000

MTU 16V538TB93 diesel engineGE LM500 gas turbine engine

2 MTU 16V1163 diesel engines2 MTU diesel engines

Propulsion 2 KaMeWa pump jets 2 pump jets (27000 hp) 2 pump jets

Full speed, knots 30 41.5 30

Economic speed, knots 14 15 14

Operation range, miles (speed, knots) 1,450 (14) 2,000 (15) 1,200 (14)

Crew (including officers) 29 (5) 40 29 (7)

ARMAMENT

Missile striking systems (max fire range, km) 2x2 BAE Sea Skua (15) 2x2 Haesung SSM-700K (140) 4х2 Uran-E (130)

Artillery systems1x1 – 40 OTOBreda

1x1 – 20 Giat M° 621 2 – 12.7

1x1 – 76.2 OTOBreda1x1 – 40

1х1 – 57mm 1х1 – 30mm

2 – 12.7

Air defense missile systems (1x6 Sadral) – Gibka

RADIoELECTRoNIC SYSTEMS:

Low-coverage acquisition radar Thomson-CSF MRR STX RadarSys SPS-100K Pozitiv-ME1.2

Navigation radar Litton Marine 20V90 ▪ Furuno

On-board information-control system Thomson-CSF “Tavitac NT” + +

Artillery fire control system CS Defence “Najir” Mk2 Saab “Ceros 2000” MR-123-02 Bagira

Antiship missile system control system Bae “Seasrpay” Mk3 ▪ ▪ECM system Thomson-CSF DR 3000 S1 ▪ PK-10

STX class

62 • weapons • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

The questions are answered by Mr. Rostislav Yu. Atkov, Director on Foreign Economic Activities Concern Morinformsystem-Agat JSC

At the exhibition DIMDEX-2010 that took place this spring in Qatar the exposition of Concern Morinformsystem-Agat attracted heightened at-tention and continues to be widely debated by spe-cialized mass media even after the exhibition end-ed. What is the reason for such an interest?

Indeed at the Exhibition & Conference DIM-DEX-2010 that was held in March, 29-31, in Doha (Qatar), we presented the information about the new missile systems of Club family. These are the Club-M Coastal Missile System, Club-U Modular Missile Sys-tem and Club-К Container Missile System.

Whereby it should be said that the Club systems can be introduced in several variants of deployment and they employ the missiles of different purposes, range and power meant for hitting surface, subsea and land targets.

The first demonstration of Club-К Container Missile System took place several months earlier at the De-cember International Maritime & Aerospace Exhibition LIMA-2009, on the Langkawi island in Malaysia. At the time the global media took no notice of the system though it had caused a real sensation of that exhibition.

eaCh state has the rightto iNdePeNdeNCe

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • weapons • 63

Now the reaction was totally different. The Brit-ish Daily Telegraph raised the alarm: “The Russian Club-K missile system will change the rules of war and cause the large scale missile proliferation”. And the Reuters Press Agency spread the report under the title new Russian “Deadly weapon can be hidden in an ordinary shipping container”. There it is claimed that: “One of Russian companies is marketing a dev-astating new cruise missile system. This system can be hidden inside a shipping container, providing any merchant vessel with the capability to destroy an air-craft carrier.”

As it is reported by British media, “even not too wealthy countries can get the potent weapon giving the opportunity to mount unexpected strikes against the most protected targets of the enemy that attains military supremacy. A standard 40-feet container with the hidden inside missile system can transform a container ship into a camouflaged warship. Without attracting attention it can come nearer to the car-rier striking force, coast, and naval base and make a crushing missile blow to sea and land targets.”

Container systems, as the British analysts con-clude, can once and for all change the correlation of forces in the world warfare arena. “The idea that you can hide a missile system in a box and drive it around without anyone knowing is pretty new” said Hewson who is the editor of London specialized guide called Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons. “Nobody’s ever done that before.” And clarified: “At a stroke,

Rostislav Atkov,Director on Foreign Economic Activities Concern

Morinformsystem-Agat JSC


the Club-K gives a long-range precision strike capa-bility to ordinary vessels that can be moved to any place on earth without attracting attention”.

Thereupon I consider it necessary to state that by placing the Club-K Missile System into the stan-dard 40-feet shipping container we proceeded also from the desire to make the price of the system as low as possible and use the commercial produc-tion where it may be used. And if to speak on the fact that it looks pretty much the same as a common shipping container, Club-K is not an exceptional case in camouflage. The developers do their best to add this capability to any weapon. For example, nobody is surprised or revolted by such types of weapon as submarines, unmanned weapon, mines and etc.

Did you expect such reaction and appraisals?First of all we are very much obliged to the re-

spected worldwide publications for the high assess-ment of our developments. The systems are really worth of it. However we are not able to accept the at-tempts to label our systems as “terrorist weapon”.

Although frankly speaking such reaction was ex-pected and predicted by us. Because the point is not even in new system entering the market, it is rather in new market segment being created that may be caused by the fact that several countries have reap-praised their tactics of safeguarding their substantial coast borders.

The purpose of Container System is to arm mo-bilized civil vessels in the period of threat. In case of possible aggression the coastal state can quick-ly get the fleet intended for struggling sea strike force of a potential enemy. The same contain-ers placed on the coast will shield it from the ap-proaching landing craft. If the roads are available the containers can be easily maneuvered. Gener-ally when placed on automobile and railway plat-forms they turn into mobile antiship systems that can guarantee the stem of enemy forces at a dis-tance of 150-200 km from the shore. That is a very effective weapon for defence. At the same time its cost is many times lower than that of a frigate or a corvette commonly used for coast protection. Club-K can substitute the fleet and naval avia-tion. For many countries with substantial coastline it is a viable alternative to procurement of military equipment with expensive commissioning.

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • weapons • 65

That’s where one should look for the reasons of such a stormy reaction. Our competitors simply don’t want to lose a fair market sector. That is why they strive to speculate on such a charged and sensi-tive issue as terrorism threat.

And what are the real probabilities of falling system into the hands of terroristic groups or the so called rogue states?

They are as abstractive as the possibility that the terrorists will acquire any other type of weapon. If to speak about Russia these probabilities are completely illusive. I would like to remind you that our Russian law that regulates export control and military technical cooperation is the strictest in the world. The laws cur-rently in force eliminate any possibility of selling even a cartridge on the side not to mention missiles.

Besides the state-of-the-art technical capabilities can rule out the possibility of unauthorized weapon employment.

Moreover there should be considered the fact that the Western media publications don’t even

take into account a number of essential techni-cal factors. Club-K is a universal launching mod-ule where the lifting launcher on four missiles is housed, and also the combat management, en-ergy supply, life-support and communication equip-ment. This module provides daily maintenance and missile operational checks; receipt of target des-ignation and fire commands; computation of firing source data; prelaunch preparation; flight mission elaboration and cruise missiles launching. Besides if necessary the system may include the stations for target detection.

It is clear that for that purpose one will need a qualified combat crew, a centralized command post, navigation and communication systems. Terror-ists can hardly afford this.

If to speak about the rogue states from the point of weapon system delivery such name can be given to a state only after the official decision on the sanc-tions and embargo made by United Nations.

More than that our systems are able to play a sta-bilizing part in a number of regions. Keeping in mind

that the enemy has effective means to make a retalia-tory strike the aggressor party will think twice about the appropriateness of military force and may come back to the negotiating table.

What do you intend to undertake and how will you react?

In the “field” of information and advertising I intend to explain the advantages of the system and its philosophy, to discredit the anxiety and de-lusions of some experts. We are expecting the con-tinuation of pressure campaigns on the Russian weapon export aimed at prohibition of promoting high technology product that has no competitors in the West.

And of course to seriously and systematically work with potential customers. The important thing is to do it quickly and confidently. I won’t be surprised if in case of our sluggishness in the market there will appear the similar systems hav-ing the “right” ideological approach and meant for “good guys”.

3M-14KE

3M-54KE


today the equipment for mine barrage laying and demining is widely used by armed forces in all the countries of the world, be it defensive

or offensive operations.With the aim of development of new engineer am-

munition in our country the R & D Institute NII-582 was established in 1946.

Today it is called R & D Engineering Institute (FSUE NIII). FSUE NIII studies and develops technical and technological projects dealing with mines, makes tests and organizes serial production of mines for the Russian armed forces.

FSUE NIII – in cooperation with allied companies – has developed and put into serial manufacture 120 engineer explosive items. Among the most famous projects are 12 mine laying systems, about 20 items of cluster ammunition and 7 systems of explosive mine clearance – all of them do not give way to top foreign analogs; besides, there are some completely unbeaten.

Engineer ammunition, like all the ammunition means, has been constantly developing. In spite of that there are really successful products – created

engineer aMMuniTion: TodaY’S SiTuaTion and proSpecTS

For developMenT

Head of department,FSUE NIII,

Cand. Sc. In EngineeringVladimir Khomutski

Acting FSUE NIII General director,Ph.D. in Economics,

corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (RAEN) Viktor Popov

ТМ-83

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • weapons• 67

many years before – which are still in demand in our days. For instance, it is the antipersonnel fragmenta-tion mine OZM-72, designed and put into serial pro-duction in the distant 1970s.

The antipersonnel fragmentation mine OZM-72 has got a steel container – working as a barrel – with jumping payload; the latter, in its turn, consists of 2,400 damage agents (cylindrical, armoured with polythene; weight: about 0.75g each). The mine is laid in ground and used with detonating fuses of various types. Weighing 5kg, the mine destroys personnel in a 25-m circular zone.

The POB – latest OZM-72 modification – weighs less, 2.5kg, due to modern materials used in its pro-duction and rational payload design; its efficiency has remained the same and now it is much easier for ex-plosive ordnance departments to work with it.

The MON-50 and MON-90 directed action mines have also proved to be efficient against personnel.

At the stage of design specialists take into account both national and foreign experience. Thus, the US-made antipersonnel fragmentation mine M18A1 Clay-more served as a prototype for creation of the MON. The damage area of those mines is 50m (sector: 60²).

OZM-72 POB

YaRM

ТМ-89

MON-50

Their design and weight enable infantrymen to quickly lay controlled barrages near the places of disposition.

The MON-90 is more powerful – it destroys en-emy foot troops at a range of 90m (sector: 50°) and is used against non-armoured vehicles.

Anti-tank mines are the most important ammuni-tion in mine barrage laying, since tanks are widely used in combat operations on land. The Russian-made TM-89 (shaped blast mine) and TM-83 (side-hitting mine) are the most powerful and efficient in this sense.

The TM-89 (shaped blast payload, propelling charge, proximity fuse with magnetic target sensor) is laid by mine planters and destroys all kinds of mod-ern tanks (hits track and/or bottom). In terms of ef-ficiency it has no analog in the world.

The TM-83 side-hitting mines are planted in situ-ations when it is difficult or inefficient to use other kinds of mines.

Destruction of tank armor

PDM-1М

MON-90

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • weapons• 69

The TM-83’s payload creates the so-called “striking nuclear effect” when explodes; it has got a proximity fuse with seismic and IR target sensors. The mine makes 90-100mm-wide penetration holes in armour when it is distanced 50m from the target.

Military specialist pay special attention to cre-ation and development of anti-airborne and beach defence mines – the latter are laid in coastal zones at a depth of up to 10m. In the 1950s-1960s such mines as the PDM-1M, PDM-2, PDM-3Ya, and YaRM (anchor river mine) were developed.

In the 1970s-1980s NATO and the USSR created brand new antipersonnel, anti-tank and anti-airborne and beach defence mines with remote planting.

In parallel with this process appeared such ammu-nition as one-shot cluster dispenser units, aircraft units and jet cargo rounds for remote mine planting (shot from land and helicopters), aircraft containers for front-line aviation and mine planting systems for jet salvo fire.

Remote mine planting systems made it possible to quickly plant a big number of mines both near own defence positions and zones of enemy concentration and its supply routes.

Today Russian-made mines for remote planting weigh 3.5-8 times less than the ones mechanically and hand-laid, being at the same time comparable in terms of efficiency.

Remote planting mines are made with the help of materials and explosive components resistant to high temperatures and overloads which occur when a mine falls on land or in water.

As for mine design, it has turned to be much more sophisticated. To raise combat efficiency, mines are 3D-designed; the processes of explosion and shape blast penetration into combined and dynamically pro-tected armour are thoroughly simulated; external and internal ballistic power and action of fuses and target sensors (magnetic, seismic, optical, acoustic, etc.) are well-calculated and simulated.

In the process of beach defence mines devel-opment specialists take into account such factors as tides, storm resistance, silting-up, depth of efficient explosion and many other. They also pay much atten-tion to interference and trawling immunity and opera-tional safety of mines.

In the last years the level of personnel protection, as well as the one of all the armoured vehicles has substantially grown. With that, armoured vehicles have got more firing power and maneuverability. New means of trawling and explosive demining have been invented. All the above reasons lead to the conclu-sion that the engineer ammunition needs further development.

Traditional and new generation mines should be developed in the following directions:

1. Improvement of payload destroying efficiency with the help of more powerful explosive and design materials.

2. Creation of non-contact explosive devices with the help of microprocessors and multi-channel sensors for target classification.

3. Applied research in terms of creation of robot-ized mines ready for self-homing and with vast destruction zone.

4. Creation of new generation anti-jamming re-mote control equipment for mine barrages and frequency induction fuses.

5. Studies and applied research in terms of cre-ation of new generation remote mine planting systems, such as MLRS-based (Multiple Launch Rocket System) mine barrages and cluster/con-tainer mines for frontline aviation and UAVs.

Notably, today all the engineer ammunition is de-veloped in strict compliance with international agree-ments on mine weapons.

Besides mines, FSUE III runs new projects dealing with development of means of explosive demining and demolition charges. The former are used by en-gineer troops for breaching (antipersonnel and anti-tank mine fields), and the latter for destruction of de-fensive targets, enterprises and other enemy objects.

FSUE NIII develops special equipment for Rus-sia’s paramilitary organizations as well. Among

the latest achievements in this field it is worth mentioning the helicopter-borne ice jam break-ing system DVS-ULZ-FRZ – it provides demolition of ice jams without appearance of people on ice. The system has been already put into service.

There are other new systems, such as the fire extinguisher RISP LOTOS for indoor areas; the safe explosive devices PVV-1 and UVV-1M which can be used in metal mining and oil extraction and by engi-neer troops.

FSUE NIII’s latest projects are aimed to be useful both in military and civilian fields.

V. Khomutsky, Cand. Sc. In Engineering

Destruction of tank armor

DVS-ULZ-FRZ

RISP LOTOS

70 • HistorY • arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010

RISE AND FALL oF ‘BEKAURI’S EMPIRE’On August 15, 1921 in Petrograd – former

name of St. Petersburg – was founded the Spe-cial Bureau for Military Inventions (Russian abbre-viation that it got later: OTB). With time it became the biggest national R & D centre specialized in ra-dio and telecommunications, automatics and elec-tronics. Today its functions are fulfilled by Granit-Elektron Concern, world-famous company which creates smart weapons.

It is Russia’s oldest R & D centre – its activity started on August 26, 1914, right before WW I. In that time it was called the Central Research and Design Laboratory of the War Department.

The first OTB director was Vladimir I. Bekauri, Georgian by nationality, gifted designer and adven-turous man. He was born in 1886 not far from Tiflis (former name of Tbilisi). Bekauri’s engineering talent, revolutionary activity and frequent contacts with So-viet leaders (first of all with Lenin) played an impor-tant role in the decision of the Soviet government about establishing of OTB. In fact, the young Soviet state really needed to have such a centre for it lived in conditions of constant military threat.

By the end of 1921 Bekauri created the so-called ‘experimental workshop for R & D projects’ (Eks-mani). This structure acquired – with the help of for-eign partners – equipment which OTB needed for its new projects; for example, in 1922 Bekauri per-

sonally visited a German firm which manufactured sensor equipment for OTB.

D. Zakharov, talented engineer, was named to the post of director of the engineering department, and I. Parchaikin became OTB workshop manager. Besides technical problems OTB top managers faced organizational ones: as the project moved forward, new specialists were needed for the radio depart-ment. V. Mitkevich, head of the R & D council, invited several lecturers from the Petrograd Technical Uni-versity – as a result, OTB got qualified specialists who played an important role in its further activity: Pavel Kalantarov, Nikolai Petrov, Aleksandr Solodovnikov, Vladimir Sukhodsky, Ivan Sheglyaev, Samuil Shreiber, and Fedor Strunnikov.

OTB managed to run from the beginning up to the end several projects already in 1921, year of its establishment. On August 16, 1922 in Kro-nstadt passed sea tests of a ‘torpedo with VS unit’ working in spiral mode. Its next tests were organized at Morkom site, and after them a special commission stated that ‘the new unit must be serially produced because it will raise our military potential’.

One of the first OTB projects was a sea mine with remote control. The work on this mine ended in 1925. In general, the projects were very different, and Bekauri’s own achievements speak for them-selves: 1922 – device for slow parachute opening; 1923 – electric lamp and new means for ship de-

graNit-elektroN:the begiNNiNg of historyG-5-type torpedo boats

arseNal 21st century, №3, 2010 • HistorY • 71

struction; 1924 – device for self-moving band and unit for torpedo explosion, etc.

OTB was fully formed in 1924. By that time the centre had determined basic orientations in its work, and the main one was creation of automatic and radio-controlled systems. In the late 1920s OTB became one of the best national R & D centres and consisted of five departments:

• engineering (design of instruments and small submarines, director: professor E. Bravin);

• torpedo (director: P. Bekhterev);• mine-sweep (director: A. Pyatnitsky);• aviation (sights, airborne torpedoes and

parachute mines, director: I. Boryakov);• communication (‘teleboats’, ‘teletorpedoes’,

‘telemines’, communication equipment and steering stabilizers, director: V. Yakhontov).

OTB got at its disposal two plants, KRIZO and Dvigatel, a well-equipped test site in the Gulf of Fin-land and two hangars at Komendantsky aerodrome. On December 8, 1922 Bekauri bought two deck-based torpedo carriers H.P. 19 Hanley with Napier Lion IIB engines (power: 450hp) for remotely con-trolled torpedo tests. OTB was the first purchaser of Tupolev all-metal aircraft – it laid the foundation of national bomber aviatin.

Growing production base – new Gidropribor plant, tests sites near the Ladozhskoe and Onezhs-koe lakes and in the Black Sea – created new possi-bilities for OTB. In 1930 this centre already numbered 1,700 (mainly high-skilled) specialists.

At navy conference held in July 1929 Soviet com-manders stated that ’50 OTB projects are of great interest’. The centre ran a big number of works for navy: gas-propelled torpedoes, torpedoes with com-bustion engine, obstacle mines, detectors for electric mines, etc.

Nevertheless, radio and telecommunications re-mained the main field of OTB activity in those years. New weapons and equipment for navy – especially torpedoes and torpedo boats – needed quality con-trol instruments.

On February 7, 1923 E. Pantserzhansky, direc-tor of the Soviet Naval Force, suggested to create – with the help of TsAGI NTO – a new torpedo boat with remote control. Bekauri and his team showed

their interest to this project, and in 1927 the new boat (designation: ANT-3) was built and sent for tests to Sevastopol. A. Tupolev headed the working process, as well as participated in further projects: in 1928 a serial G-5 boat prototype showed at tests an incredible speed – 63.5 knots!

The work on radio controlled torpedo boats ended in 1930. The new remote control system was called Volt-R and could control (fm and medium waves) two vessels from a MBR-2VU-type aircraft. The system was able to execute 21 instructions. It was highly ap-preciated by the reception committee headed by A. Berg, and in 1936 the Volt-R became operational in the navy. By 1935 all the Soviet navy fleets had di-visions and detachments of radio guided boats – G-5 modifications.

In 1937 a division of torpedo boats – controlled from aircraft – successfully destroyed the ‘enemy

forces’, and after the exercise all the command-ers together with K. Voroshilov highly appreciated the mission and stated that were no technical fail-ures.

Before the Great Patriotic War the national navy had at its disposal 293 torpedo boats (most of them G-5-type), including 50 with remote con-trol (design: OTB and TsLPS). Unfortunately, in real combat conditions this weapon did not show satis-factory results.

There were several reasons for that. Targets used during tests were not properly chosen, and the re-mote control system itself needed improvement. The system carrier, MBR-2VU aircraft, was consid-ered out-of-date in 1941: it could not be used in day-time because of enemy aviation’s countermeasures; its upgraded version MBR-7 still remained non-field-ed before the war.

Printing cryptograph


On August 27, 1941 general-major A. Yeliseev ordered to liquidate all the remote control systems since the MBR-2VUs could not fly under fire of en-emy fighters. Nevertheless, in July 1943 there was an attempt of direct combat use of a torpedo boat (boat #61). The enemy target was situated near the port of Anapa. The boat – loaded with explosive devices – started to move towards the target, but exploded 300-400m away from the sea wall without

receiving any command: maybe it happened after it met an obstacle or it was hit by enemy shell.

On November 30, 1943 commanders of the Black Sea Navy Fleet ordered to take down two enemy barges near the port of Kamysh-Burun. The boat #41 guided from MBR-2VU (the aircraft was supported by ten Yak-9 and eight LaGG-3 fighters) was sent towards the targets but crashed into a sand bar and exploded without causing loss to the enemy.

Notably, several MBR-2VU-controlled boats re-mained operational in the Pacific Navy Fleet before the war against Japan (1945). With that, they were not used in a single combat mission. Later Volt-R in-struments found use in remote control systems for ships engaged in fire gunnery exercises (project code: ArtShield).

The course indicator ‘K’ (chief designer: A. Zimin) stood among promising projects run in terms of the Volt-R programme – this system was manufactured in series and became operational.

Of course, OTB played a very important role in creation of new torpedo weapons. An instrument invented by Bekauri made torpedoes move spi-rally – as mentioned above – to provide maximum engagement efficiency. The principle was the follow-ing: a torpedo was dropped from an aircraft and after splashdown started its circular motion.

The TAV-15 was the first serially produced sys-tem that became operational – in 1932 – for use on board an aircraft (height of release: 2,000-3,000m). The torpedo was dropped with the help of 3 parachutes. After touching water surface it could either choose motion in circle (VS-guided) or twisting spiral (NVS-guided). The TAV-15 was the first in the world system of airborne torpedo bombing.

Low-altitude torpedo bombing was also an inter-esting aspect of OTB business. The 45-12 torpedo served as a platform for this project. The torpedo was carried under the R5-T airframe and dropped from a 10-15m height (horizontal flight of aircraft; sight-ing: by eye).

The first tests of ‘low-height project’ were run on October 28, 1927. In 1932 the TAN-12 system (the project changed its code) became operational.

In the 1920s OTB tried to create an acoustically-controlled torpedo but this work did not bring suc-cessful results; further OTB concentrated exclusively on radio remote control systems, in particular for air-borne torpedoes. This work was directed by Yegishe Ter-Markaryants. There were problems in this field as well – radio waves could not pass through sea wa-ter and torpedoes for better control needed external antennas. An antenna-equipped torpedo (RUT-45) was created in 1933 and successfully passed tests in the Baltic Sea (with participation of the battleship

V. Mitkevich

Leading specialists of OTB (V. Bekauri in the centre)


Marat). OTB manufactured one more torpedo of the kind – the Vint.

Among other interesting projects run by OTB the Pioner torpedo boat and the first national 533-mm (21 inches) torpedo are worth mentioning. The tests of the Pioner were successful, and OTB received the task to create a new torpedo – with bigger caliber.

The manufacturing process was organized on Dv-igatel Plant premises; as for design work, it was head-ed by P. Bekhterev and R. Korvin-Kossokovsky. Ex-perimental torpedoes (code: 53-27) were produced in 1927 (speed: 45 knots, range: 3.7km, warhead weight: 265kg).

In 1933 OTB started to develop a ‘crew-free’ small submarine: Bekauri was the first project man-ager, and in 1934 he was substituted by F. Schukin. The experimental ‘autonomous’ submarine was built in summer’35. It was a vessel with displacement of about 19m² and onboard open torpedo launchers (450mm). Its crew numbered 4 men, but in case of at-tack they needed to leave the submarine – it passed to control from air. To move on water surface the ves-sel had a 24-36hp diesel engine, and for underwater mode an electric engine.

The ‘automatic’ submarine successfully passed factory tests in August 1935 (Oranienbaum) and sea trials. Navy commanders expressed their wish to get 10 submarines of the kind (5 items in 1936). The ex-perimental submarine got ‘Pigmei’ code and was de-livered to the Black Sea Navy Fleet. The project was adopted on June 27, 1936 by I. Ludri, vice-command-er of RKKA Naval Force.

Nevertheless, there were some technical prob-lems with the Pigmei, and they were never solved in spite of efforts of Schukin and Shebalin. Several submarines were built at the Sudomech shipyard (Leningrad) and then dismantled. Maybe this tech-nical fault was the reason for the infamous Stalinist purges (1937-1940)…

In total OTB designed 4 ‘crew-free’ and radio-controlled submarines: with a 150t, 60t, 19t (Pigmei) and 8t displacement (the latter was intended for transportation with the help of the MK-1 (ANT-22) hy-droplane whose flight tests passed in August 1934).

OTB developed projects for ground forces too. In the mid-1920s it started to design tanks with re-mote control, and in 1929-1930 ran tests of a cable-controlled Renault FT.17-type tank. In spring 1932 the Soviet double-tower tank T-26 got the Most-1 control system, and later it was substituted by the Reka-1 and Reka-2. The OTB-designed systems could execute 16 instructions. In summer 1932 a special tank detachment was formed (detachment #4) in order to study combat possibilities of remotely controlled tanks.

At trials which were run in 1933 the remotely oper-ated tank TT-18 (MS-1 modification) executed 16 in-

structions: it could turn, change speed, stop and start movement again, set off blasting load, set a smoke screen and disperse poisonous agents. The TT-18 could be remotely controlled at distance of several hundred meters. In total there were made seven TT-18 vehicles but they never became operational.

In 1934 OTB created the TT-26 Titan remotely controlled tank, with poisonous agent systems and flame projector. In 1935-1936 about 50 Titans were manufactured. The Titans were controlled from an or-dinary T-26 tank.

The only known case of a remotely operated tank’s combat use was registered in February 1940, when several TT-26s took part in a battle against Finnish tanks (unfortunately, with no success, since they all got stuck in shell craters and were destroyed by Finnish artillery).

OTB-made demolition bombs – also remotely controlled (control range: 170km, 600km and

700km) – showed satisfactory results in 1925. Frun-ze suggested that they should have found use within ground forces. By 1927 OTB created upgraded explo-sion control instruments (code: BEMI); in spring 1928 their serial production commenced and on January 23, 1934 fifty BEMIs were sent to the Special Far East Army.

G-5-type torpedo boats ready for attack, supported by MBR-2 aircraft

MS-1


BEMI was a top secret instrument. Among other top secret projects stood an enemy troops movement recorder, Bredo instrument for coastal surveillance and self-demolition instrument for the BEMI in case of its unauthorized use.

OTB ran several projects dealing with airborne assaults; for example, in 1923 it created a sys-tem for long-range artillery transportation by air. In autumn 1930 near Leningrad passed combined exercises of airborne assault and combat equip-ment delivery to necessary points. OTB-manufac-tured external suspending units made it possible to carry – by aircraft – sidecar motorcycles, cars and even T-27 small tanks (on board the TB-3 air-craft).

In September 1932 OTB ran an explosion exer-cise with participation of two aircraft (one with explo-sive material and one for air control). This exercise can be called the first step in creation of cruise mis-siles (25 years later the Central Design Bureau Gra-nit, OTB successor, began to create control systems precisely for cruise missiles).

In 1930 OTB created a 10-tube receiver (200-2,500m band) for the Soviet navy. It was considered the best in its class at a special scientific conference presided by A. Berg. The receiver was called Dozor and was used in the navy during the whole Great Patriotic War; later it was used in accurate hour’s service.

On September 8, 1937 Becauri was ar-rested in Leningrad. He was sentenced to death, as well as many other OTB specialists: N. Andreev, P. Bekhterev, A. Vilensky, A. Gilyarov, P. Gilyarov, A. Gurin, A. Ivanov, V. Ivanov, G. Ozerov, I. Rappoport, E. Krasnoperov, M. Rudakov, M. Smirnov, F. Sudakov, E. Ter-Makaryants, T. Schukin, M. Chervyakov. With years all of them were rehabilitated…

Lately in some publications Bekauri is de-scribed as an adventurist who did not know much in engineering; they say that the R & D centre headed by him ran non-efficient projects. There are certain reasons for that if we remember that in 1941-1945 many ambitious projects of Bekauri did not find practical use. Only remotely controlled demolition bombs and stabilization systems for Sprut submarines were really efficient. At that period other countries also spent much money on new military projects, and in many cases their results were even worse than the ones shown by OTB (for example, German guided missiles V-1 and V-2).

Bekauri’s projects were sophisticated and sim-ply needed more time for realization. Our contem-poraries say that the engineers of the 1930s were ‘technical adventurers’, but they forget that those people built a platform for today’s success of Gra-nit-Elektron. And Vladimir Bekauri was among the best.

TB-3

The Pigmei submarine


NII-49 BEFoRE AND DURING ThE WARAfter Bakauri’s arrest in 1937 OTB was divided

into independent R & D institutes and workshops, such as the Moscow Institute of Teleautomatics (NII-20), NII-22, TsKB-36, Voroshilov Plant, KRIZO Over-haul Workshop, Leporso Radio Station, etc.

The main part of OTB activities was passed to NII-20 affiliated branch headed by M. Medvedev, and OTB itself received a new director – S. Sandler. Be-sides OTB in the 1920s-1930s there was one more organization in the USSR dealing with the same projects – the Central Laboratory of Communica-tions (TsLPS). These two R & D centres merged in 1939.

The Department of Special Equipment of the Central Radio Laboratory was the platform on which TsLPS was established (1928, Lenin-grad). The laboratory was headed by Aleksandr Shorin, and there were many qualified specialists in its staff: P. Litvinsky, B. Smirenin, S. Obukhov, M. Moshonkin, E. Yakhontov, P. Vorobyov, Y. Salye, A. Polyansky and other.

The Osa combat boat was the first serious project run by TsLPS – it started in 1927. In the late 1920s TsLPS began to develop the Yashma, automatic sys-tem of GAM-34 torpedo boat engine control. The re-mote control system installed in commander’s cabin made it possible to start both engines, turn on con-necting gear, change speed, execute salvo fire with two torpedoes and set a smoke screen. In parallel with that there were several projects dealing with telecommunications. Differently from Bekauri who preferred to install control systems in ships, Shorin chose aircraft: he considered an aircraft to be more efficient in detection of enemy ships and start of re-motely controlled boat attack.

TsLPS created the eight-tube (UB-110 electron tubes) heterodyne receiver Most for giving com-mands from an aircraft. Its frequency was stabilized by a quartz resonator. In May 1930 Shorin presented

his first radio system intended for the serial boat Sh-4 and the YuG-1 aircraft. In August 1931 special exercises passed in the Gulf of Finland and in Sevas-topol in order to decide whose system – Bekauri’s or Shorin’s – was better. The airborne system proved to be more efficient, and so Shorin’s remote con-trol complex became operational in the Red Army in 1932. Bekauri was asked to improve his system and make it airborne. In some time Bekauri created the Kvarts which was also fielded.

Among other TsLPS-run projects stand the sys-tem of tank remote control Delta (15 items installed in T-28 tanks), sound motion pictures, electric sound recorder, television, optic systems for electrocar-diography, and the system of alarm, centralization and blocking for railway transport (used even today). With time TsLPS passed exclusively to navy projects and because of that changed its name (in 1935) for the All-union State Institute of Teleautomatics and Communication (VGITIS).

In 1937 Shorin was appointed NII-10 director and moved to Moscow. VGITIS became a NII-10 daughter company, K. Grudnitsky became its di-rector. On October 1, 1939 NII-20’s and NII-10’s daughter companies in Leningrad merged and thus formed NII-49 – R & D Institute of Sea Tele-communications and Automatics. Grudnitsky took the post of NII-49 director.

In short time NII-49 upgraded the remotely controlled boats Kvarts and Volt-R and paid seri-ous attention to development of new instruments for navy. In 1938 it created an automatic course-keeping gear with two control boards for the Ma-liutka submarine. Later it was produced in small series and used on board the VI-bis submarine from 1938 to 1941.

The course-keeping gear Ugor (chief designer: M. Oryshak) was more successful. It was created in 1938-1939 and used on board the Schuka (X series) submarines. The system provided accurate choice of new course (accuracy: 0.5 degr.) and both automatic and manual control from bridge and central post. The Ugor was fielded in 1939 after in-situ testing. This system served as a platform for creation of similar ones used on board Project 7U destroyers (Yakor) and Project 253 mine sweepers (Mars).

In 1938 NII-49 created the Minoga system (chief designer: V. Shagurin) which was used for depth-keeping on board the Project VI-bis submarines. Three experimental Minogas appeared in 1939, and when the war began this project was stopped.

OTB also produced new stabilizers for subma-rines. In 1936-1937 it presented two models – one with sensors in form of bellow valve and the other with Bourdon tube.

In cooperation with Kulakov Plant NII-49 manu-factured – in 1940 – four stabilizing systems for use

on board the M-83 and Sch-323 submarines. The sys-tem got Sprut code (chief designer: E. Serdiuk) and was recommended for operational submarines.

Instruments for gun fire correction – whose de-sign started in 1937 – were also very important for the Red Army and Soviet Navy.

NII-49 studied prospects for detection of en-emy vessels via their thermal emission. Its infrared station Bambuk (chief designer: G. Naumov) was fielded in 1939 – it registered sea targets in guarded zones of gulfs and straits. Instruments were installed at a distance of 10-13km one from another, their rays crossed and provided detection of whatever ves-sels – from torpedo boats to submarines in surface cruising.

Before the war one more NII-49-created sys-tem – Plast (chief designer: Y. Belsky) – was tested. It could transmit black-and-white im-ages from aircraft to land. Its successor, the Bas (chief designer: Y. Schteinzeig), could receive and transmit black-and-white and gray-scale images.

A. Isaev

M. Medvedev

K. Grudnitsky


Later Schteinzeig created the Dnepr system able to transmit black-and-white images by method of open recording.

NII-49 specialists knew that sooner or later the war would begin. They were already work-ing on defence orders. Sprut tests in Libava were stopped because of approaching theatre of war, and Grudnitsky – together with military engineer Y. Sha-rovsky – had to organize the institute’s evacuation to Sverdlovsk.

By mid-August the main part of NII-49 specialists arrived to Sverdlovsk. Their colleagues who remained in Leningrad were busy with city defence measures and current military projects. Their evacuation planned for the end of August was not realized due to Nazi blockade of Leningrad.

Nevertheless, NII-49 continued its work in Len-ingrad in spite of severe conditions. Such projects as a system of radio interception and telegraph in-terception were successfully finished. The Argon – system of telegraph interception – was fielded after tests in 1941.

Some projects which started before the war also needed finishing. One of them was the Neptun, head-ed by A. Isaev. In 1942 F. Menshikh, P. Klyaritsky, M. Shupta, B. Chiriev, B. Zudin and some other special-ists created the Traks system which soon became operational (communication between aircraft and vessels – spotting; used on board the combat ships Oktyabrskaya Revolutsia and Kirov.

Many specialists who remained in Leningrad did not survive in the years of blockade – in the first three months of 1942 83 of them died. When the Ladozhs-koe lake got frozen it became possible to evacuate to Sverdlovsk the staff remaining in Leningrad – two groups of specialists were sent to Sverdlovsk in March and in July 1942. Only a small team of spe-cialists remained in Leningrad in order to continue work on defence orders.

The group headed by Isaev created new artillery detonators, and the Soviet submariners got (in 1942) new on-board instruments Sprut – E. Serdiuk was one of the leading designers of this system.

The evacuated part of specialists continued work on the projects which started before the war (Sprut, spotting and communication systems). As for the Sprut, the shipbuilding department ordered to equip with this system ‘Sch’, ‘M’ and ‘Series XIV’ submarines. Some time later appeared first refer-ences of submariners concerning the Sprut.

I. Fisanovich, submarine commander and Hero of the Soviet Union, said that this stabilizer ‘reduces electric power consumption and a submarine keeps its position for longer time period. It becomes more secure and does not suffer in case of its propulsion shaft damage’.

NII-49-created instruments gave to Soviet sub-marines many advantages in their combat activity against German vessels. As for the Germans, they managed to create a system more or less similar to the Sprut – with much worse parameters – only by the end of the war. Such systems as the SD and Bis (interception and decoding of telegraph mes-sages) were put into operation in 1944. In 1945 NII-49 created the M-5 Mol magnetic metal locator for drowned objects: this system could detect objects weighing about 200t at a depth of up to 70m. Big objects – ships and submarines – could be found at a depth of about 200m. The M-5 Mol quickly be-came operational, and its designers got the State Prize in 1945.

Remotely controlled demolition bombs stand among the oldest – designed in the 1920s-1930s by Bekauri and Mitkevich – and most successful NII-49 projects. The first three radio commanded bombs F-10 (250kg of TNT each) were used – for the first time in world practice – for mining of big build-ings in Strugi Krasnye during Soviet troops’ retreat. The F-10s got command for explosion at a distance of 150km (from the Gatchinsky Park), and the re-

sults, as the Soviet pilots who flew two days later over the town said, were impressive.

On September 24, 1941 (4:00 p.m.) in Kiev (re-gion of Kreschatik, centre of the city) BEMI-controlled mines destroyed the Detsky Mir shop (this building was occupied by German commandant’s office) and many other buildings. More than 150 German offi-cers died. It was the first mass use of remotely con-trolled mines in world history.

On October 22, 1941 the German commandant’s office in Odessa was destroyed in the same man-ner – at the moment of explosion there were 200 senior Wehrmacht officers in the building. On Novem-ber 13, 1941 a radio-controlled explosion in Kharkov (177, Dzerzhinskogo St.) killed general-major von Braun, commander of German military reservation, and about 20 officers and soldiers.

In November 1941 the Top Secret Platoon of the western front commanded by lieutenant E. Kozhukhov put two radio-commanded mines (600kg each) un-der the bridge across the Istra river. When the enemy troops were crossing the bridge both mines exploded.

On December 22, 1942 I. Nosenko, minister of the shipbuilding industry, issued a decree about link-up, in Sverdlovsk, of two evacuated R & D in-stitutes – the Moscow NII-10 and NII-49. Valeri Kalmykov became the new structure’s director.

After the battle of Stalingrad NII-10 specialists – to-gether with major part of NII-49 staff – returned to Mos-cow. Specialists from NII-49 who remained in the Urals Region successfully organized wirephoto communica-tion with Moscow (via Plast system). By summer’1943 NII-49’s activity in Sverdlovsk stopped.

On November 18, 1943, a month after the offi-cial restart of NII-49’s activity in Leningrad, the insti-tute became specialized exclusively on projects for the Soviet Navy (surveillance systems and automat-ics) in terms of a special decree issued by the Council of Ministers. The work fully started only in March due to lack of specialists and premises. In early March a group of ex-NII-49 specialists (21 persons) returned to Leningrad from Moscow. K. Grudnitsky, former NII-49 director, took up his post once again. N. Charin became chief engineer, S. Zaitsev vice-production director, D. Tolstopyatov chief designer, and M. Bibik-sarov vice-director of economic activity.

The main part of the institute’s structure was re-stored by the end of 1944. Its specialists created two new instruments, repaired by own means production premises (total cost of repair works: 480,000 rubles) and restored the heating system, the powerhouse, the galvanic and casting workshops. With such a base the number of planned projects for 1945 grew 2.5 times.

NII-49’s activity got high appreciation of the So-viet government. On March 6, 1945 many of its spe-cialists got Soviet awards.

Vladimir Ilyin

D. Tolstopyatov

N. Charin

3(8), 2010

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Surface picture and target indication radar systems for surface vessels, submarines, and coastal missile complexes

Precision missiles and anti-submarine weapons control systems

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