a194364.pdf

ME FI[E COPY

,,,I

AIR COMMANDAND

STAFF COLLEGE DTIC. OhELECTE--

STUDENT REPORT gTHE ICBM MODERNIZATION BRIEFER'S

--

"HANDBOOK

MAJOR STEPHEN R. GARCIA 88-1010"'insights into tomorrow"

EA

~I-,.noNT g814 6 1-4

Distribution Unlimited

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions expressed in thisdocument are those of the author. They arenot intended and should not be thought torepresent official ideas, attitudes, orpolicies of any agency of the United StatesGovernment. The author has not had specialaccess to official information or ideas andhas employed only open-source materialavailable to any writer on this subject.

This document is the property of the UnitedStates Government. It is available fordistribution to the general public. A loancopy of the document may be obtained from theAir University Interlibrary Loan Service(AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112-5564)or the Defense Technical Information Center.Request must include the author's name andcomplete title of the study.

This document may be reproduced for use inother research reports or educational pursuitscontingent upon the following stipulations:

- Reproduction rights do not extend- toany copyrighted material that May be containedin the research report.

- All reproduced copies must contain thefollowing credit line: "Reprinted bypermission of the Air Command and StaffCollege."

- All reproduced copies must contain thename(s) of the report's author(s).

- If format modification is necessary too better serve the user's needs, adjustments may

be made to this report--this authorizationdoes not extend to copyrighted information ormateri-a. The following statement mustaccompany the modified document: "Adaptedfrom Air Command and Staff College ResearchReport (number) entitled (title)

by (author)."

- This notice must be included with anyreproduced or adapted portions of thisdocument.

REPORT NUMBER 86-1(40S~TITLET LTHE ICBM MODERNIZATION BRIEFERWS HANDBOOK

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR STEPHEN R. GARCIA. U.SAIMAJOR TERRILL L. KEMP, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR MICHAEL C. MCMULLIN. ACSC3-82-4 STUS/SEMINAR 37

SPONSOR COLONEL CHRISTOPHER I. BRANCH. HO SAC/XPQ

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542

EDCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE y Fr A

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OM No. 070Arodl a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

UNCLASSIFIED2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

I_ STATEMENT "A"2b. DECLASSIFICATION/I DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Approved for public release;

Distribution is unlimited.4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

88-10106a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-55428a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING I 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

ORGANIZATION (if applicable)

Sc. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERSPROGRAM PROJECT ITASK IWORK UI%ELEMENT NO I NO. NO ACCESSIOf

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

ICBM MODERNIZATION BRIEFER'S HANDBOOK12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

GARCIA, STEPHEN R., MAJGR, USAF; KEMP, TERRILL L. MAJOR, USAF13a. TYPE OF REPORT 113b. TIME COVERED 114. DATE OgRE oT,(Year4 Month, Day) 1S. PAGE COUNT

SFROM_ TO16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES i18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP I

19. ABS'TRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) I

The ICBM Modernization Briefer's Handbook_is a guide to assistrequirements officers at HQ SAC/XPQ as they present this briefingto the public. It contains information on the history of ICBMs,evolution of national defense strategy, arms control, the variousbasing modes proposed for MX-Peacekeeper, and the rationale fordeploying Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and Small ICB1s'inHard A16bile

,Ji'aunchers.., Intended to help new briefing officers broaden theirknowledge of the historical perspective of ICBM modernization.

20. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 121. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION0-UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 13 SAME AS RPT [] DTIC USERS TTMInT. AqTFT1'fl

22a. NAMg OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 122b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) I 22c. OFFICE SYMBOLACSC/EDC MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542 (205) 293-2867 I

DO Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS Pi

Ai IW--TU M X X-- fAW5%V 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NEEDS ANA.LYSI.S ............................................. 1

BIBL I OGRAPHY ............................................... .

ATTACHMENTSAttachment 1--Directorate of ICBM Requirements

Sponsorship LetterAttachment 2--The ICBM Modernization Briefer's Handbook

Accession ForNTIS GRA&I -

DTI. DTIC TAB -I Unannounced 13

ZPECTo Justificatfion

By-Distribution/

Availability Codes)t-=-. Avail and/or

IDist SpecialA I3

POSITION PAPER

ON

"THE NEED FOR THE ICBM MODERNIZATION BRIEFER'S HANDBOOK

S1. The purpose of this paper is to examine the need toproduce a handbook (Atch 2) to help new briefing officersassigned to the Headquarters SAC Directorate ofIntercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Requirements (XPQ).XPQ is sponsoring development of the handbook (see Atch l)-.As its name implies, the handbook is designed to provideinformation that complements material presented in The ICBMModernization Briefing. This briefing is-the "centerpiecebriefing presented to all distinguished visitors" (see

3 Atch 1) to inform them about the need for ICBM modernizationand specifically reviews the Peacekeeper (formerly "MX"--for"Missile Experimental") and Small ICBM (sometimes referred tounofficially as "Midgetman") programs. The purpose of thehandbook is to provide'information to new briefers to helpthem more fuliy appreciate some of the concepts andhistorical background of the ICBM modernization program "toenhance [their] ability to convincingly articulate commandrequirements" (see Atch 1). This paper will examine thefollowing areas that frame the need for a handbook: therequirement to present The ICBM Modernization Briefing tomany diverse audiences; the need to be able to confidently2and credibly respond to questions generated by presenting thebriefing to those diverse audiences; and the secondary impactof improving a briefer's leadership potential by increasinghis professional knowledge. The paper will conclude with alook at what is in each chapter of the handbook and why itwas selected.

2. Advocating Peacekeeper and Small ICBM programrequirements is one of the primary functions of XPQ'sAdvanced Missile Development Division (XPQM) (16:47), and thehandbook is designed to enhance the division's effectivenessin accomplishing that function. One of the p-imary methodsof advocating Peacekeeper follow-on basing an,; Small ICBM

N requirements to the public is presenting The ICBMModernization Briefing. The briefing emphasizes I1hePeacekeeper and Small ICBM programs because "[they] havebecome the centerpiece of our ICBM modernization program"(7:25). The Director of ICBM Requirements selects captainsand junior majors from XPQM to present the briefing because

they work with the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and Small ICBMprograms on a daily basis and have the most current knowledgeabout program developments and operations concepts. Whenselected, the only training provided to a new briefer isobservation of other briefers during their presentations,taking notes and stLdying their presentation methodology, andpracticing. The amount of time required to complete thispreparaition is dependent upon a briefer's knowledge,e.,perience, and opportunity to observe other briefer's duringtheir presentations. Since two-thirds of the briefingpresents current program requirements, a new briefer canquickly develop confidence in thiese areas. However, thereare several other aspects of the briefing that a briefer mustdevelop on his own without the benefit of any training. Thegreatest challenge in this area is preparing for the post-briefing question and answer period. Developing confidenceto handle the questions posed by diverse audiences is one of

Sthe most difficult aspects of presenting The ICBMModer-nization Briefing because most new briefers have very"limited knowledge about events that preceded current programactivities. The handbook authors were assigned to XPQ beforeattending Air Command -rnd Staff College, and they presentedThe ICBM Modernization briefing several hundred times. Theone area in which they never really felt totally comfortablewas in answering audience questions during the post-briefingperiod. ,,estions which pertained to aspects of the currentprogram were .not a problem because they worked those programsevery day. However, questions about -he controversialpolitical histor of the PeacekeepLr program or about armscontrol, for example, were difficult to answer because of theauthors' limited backgrounds in these areas. Theirbackgrounds were similar to the backgrounds of currentbriefing officers who are typically on their third assignmentafter having served at an operational missile wing and thenat a second assignment such as the 4315th Combat CrewTraining Squadron, Z901st Strategic Missile EvaluationSquadron, ist Strategic Aerospace Division Headquarters, or15th Air Force Headquarters. Since the credibility of abriefer's presentation is tested during the question andanswer period, a briefer needs to be as knowledgeable aspossible to respond confidently and credibly. This is thebasic reason why the authors prepared a handbook--to enhancea briefer's knowledge and, in turn, his 2ffectiveness inarticulating command requirements.

The ICBM Modernization Briefing is presented to virtuallyevery civilian and military distinguished visitor toHeadquarters SAC to advocate the need for continued ICBMmodernization (see Atch 1). Therefore, XPQ presents thebriefing to literally hundreds of influential people eachyear, including Senators and Representatives and their staff

a

members, senior representatives from the Office of theSecretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of theAir Force, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and seniorUnited States and foreign civilian and military leaders.Other visitors include distinguished civilians from acrossthe United States, including mayors, businessmen, educators,and others who can be extremely influential at the grassroots level within their communities. This latter categoryof visitors also includes national and foreign mediarepresentatives who subsequently prepare articles on ICBMmodernization for publication (6:42). A briefer'seffectiveness in advocating program requirements can beinfluenced by the diverse backgrounds of these audiences.Many people have attitudes that have been affected by thecontroversy surrounding the search for a basing mode for thePeacekeeper missile. This controversy has existed since therequirement for Peacekeeper was first published by SAC in1971 (15:58). Despite the support of the past fourPresidential administrations and the past six Secrataries ofDefense (8:103-104;17:--), the Peacekeeper program is stillfighting an uphill battle to achieve a full 100 missileoperational deployment capability (18:--). Fortunately,senior Air Force leaders continue to provide strong supportfor ICBM modernization. In fact, Air Forcc Chief of Staff,General Larry D. Welch, and General John T. Chain, Jr.,CINCSAC, recently reconfirmed their commitment to completingfull deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles and fielding theSmall ICBM (3:99-101). The Air Force will continue to facetough audiences in the future, and a briefer must be preparedto respond to controversy whenever he presents the briefing.In discussing briefing the public, Air Force Secretary EdwardC. Aldridge, Jr., recently stated, "We share a corporateresponsibility to keep the American people informed aboutwhat we do and how we do it. . . unfortunately nur effortsare often mediocre at best" (10:--). Although he was notspecifically referring to advocacy for the ICBM modernizationprogram, his comment is well taken. When briefing programsto the public, the Air Force usually only gets oneopportunity with each audience, and it cannot be mediocre ifit is to be effective. When an XPQ briefer presents The ICBMModernization Briefing, he is the spokesman for the ICBMmodernization program and personifies the Air Force. He mustproject an image of maturity, confidence, and credibilitysince the success of his advocacy and the reputation of theAir Force are on the line. The handbook is designed to helptoday's ICBM modernization advocate meet the challenge torespond effectively to the controversy inherent in presentingThe ICBM Modernization Briefing to diverse audiences.

4. By developing a more complete understanding of all facetsof the ICBM modernization program, a briefer can enhance his

3

own future leadership potential. Although this is asecondary objective, the handbook can help a briefer developthis knowledge. One of the foremost professional obligationsof every officer in the Air Force is to improve hisleadership skills to prepare for future supervisory orcommand opportunities. Although there are many aspects ofleadership, Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., a noted expert onmilitary leadership, stated, "professional knowledge isindispensable for success in military leadership"(::2::iii). In addition, during the 1987-1988 ACSC schoolyear, two four-star Air Force generals and one three-starArmy general stated that one of the most important aspects ofeffective leadership is job knowledge. Many XPOM briefersmust rely upon more senior Air Force leaders to provide thedetails about how and why a program developed. However, asthese younger officers progress towards other leadershipopportunities, they will become the senior leaders, and theywill have to answer the tough questions for their ownsubordinates. Although The ICBM Modernization Briefer'sHandbook was not primarily developed to enhance a briefer'sleadership potential, it helps develop that potential throughincreasing his job knowledge and understanding about theprograms he advocates. understanding and knowledge are theessence of maturity, confidence, and credibility, which arethree traits required not only for briefing officers. butalso for Air Force leaders.

5. The preceding paragraphs examined the author's rationalefor the need for The ICBM Modernization Briefer's Handbook,and this paragraph will examine what is contained in thehandbook and ",iy the authors selected it for development. Ingeneral, the handbook contains information the authorsbelieve will nnhance a briefer's ability to effectivelyadvocate ICBM modernization requirements. The authors intendfor the handbook to be a first step in developing a welldocumented reference to help new briefers prepare to presentThe ICBM Modernization Briefing.

a. Chapter One provides an introduction to the reader.It examines the need for the handbook and introduces thecontents cf each subsequent chapter.

b. Chapter Two reviews the basic fundamental conceptsof United States defense policy, nuclear deterrent strategy,and the contributions of the ICBM leg of the strategicnuclear Triad. This information is presented in the one-third of The ICBM Modernization Briefing that does notaddress specific Peacekeeper or Small ICBM programrequirements. This front-end portion of the briefing is veryimportant in framing the need for ICBM modernization for anaudience. In the authors' opinion, clear, concise

4

1v-

articulation of these fundamentals is essential tosuccessful advocacy. Furthermore, General Chain, in a recentarticle, stated, "SAC needs to return to the basics and tryto explain what we are trying to do in the strategic nuclearworld and why we are trying to do it" (5:64). Deterrentstrategy has been effective for the past forty years, and itforms the basis for all subsequent modernization activitiesin support of achieving United States national objectives.

c. Chapter Three reviews the complex interweaving ofdoctrine and nuclear strategy between 1945 and the early1970s and their impact on the early ICBM development program.Many influential senior American policymakers were schooledduring this period, and they may continue to be influenced byattitudes developed early on about the need for ICBMs as partof the US force posture. In the authors' opinion,understanding these early influences can help a new ICBMmodernization advocate appreciate the diverse attitudes ofsome members of his audiences.

d. Chapter Four reviews the impact of the arms controlprocess imposed on ICBM modernization activity. Since thisis one of the three basic pillars of the Scowcroft Commissionrecommendations (14:31) endorsed by President Reagan andCongress in 1983 (12:v), the authors felt this was one areain which briefer knowledge was especially limited. Thischapter specifically reviews the Strategic Arms LimitationsTalks (SALT) I and II, and the role of the Intermediate RangeNuclear (INF) agreement and the proposed Strategic ArmsReduction Talks (START).

e. Chapter Five reviews the early history of thePeacekeeper and Small ICBM programs between the period fromthe initial submission of a requirement for Peacekeeper in1971 (15:58) until the conclusions of the ScowcroftCommission were adopted by the President and approved byCongress in 1983 (12:v) . Special emphasis is placed on the

W recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission report since itsfragile consensus essentially remains as the blueprint forthe current ICBM modernization program (18:--). This chapteralso examines prominent basing modes studied for thePeacekeeper missile.

f. Chapter Six reviews the most recent history of thePeacekeeper and Small ICBM programs. It begins with the 1985Senate restriction on deploying Peacekeeper missiles inMinuteman silos and examines the resulting impact of thisdecision on continuation of the Peacekeeper program. ChapterSix subsequently examines and concludes with the 19 December1986, two-part Presidential decision to enter full-scaleengineering development for the Small ICBM and to enterresearch and development of a rail garrison basing mode for

~ Peacekeeper (13:--).

31w XMJ'M~APM? ~ ~ ~Wi W~M~ AI I JPJ

g. The handbook will conclude with various appendicesto provide additional detail and quick reference facts andfigures.

6. In conclusion, The ICBM Modernization Briefer' Handbookis designed to enhance an ICBM modernization advocate's"effectiveness in articulating program requirements. Theauthors of the handbook spent six cumulative years in XPQ,and they often felt as if they were the inheritors of aSisyphean task. Sisyphus, in Greek mythology, was "a king ofCorinth condemned forever to roll a stone up a hill in Hadesonly to have it roll down again when nearing the top"(3:386). Many capable advocates have preceded today's ICBMmodernization briefers in the effort to push the Peacekeeperprogram to the brink of full operational capability, only tosee it come crashing back down, shrouded in disbelief anduncertainty. Nevertheless, throughout the long andcontroversial history of the Peacekeeper, and more recently,the Small ICBM programs, the essential military requirementfor these weapon systems has not changed. The challengeremains to be mature, confident, and most importantly,credible when presenting this requirement to an oftenskeptical American public. The authors of the handbook"presented many briefings during their tenure-in XPQ withoutthe benefit of a handbook because until The ICBMModernization Briefer's Handbook (Atch 2) was developed,there was no handbook. The authors know what kinds ofinformation would have been helpful to develop betterconfidence, and in turn, be more effective. They havegleaned some of the pearls of wisdom from many sourcedocuments and have consolidated them to produce theirhandbook. The handbook takes a first step towards filling agap in a briefer's knowledge created by the lack of a morestructured training program. In the long run, this knowledgecan make a briefer a better advocate, a better leader, and abetter officer. The handbook is not an end in itself, but ifit helps an 1CBM modernization advocate to be better bothprofessionally and personally, then it will haveaccomplished its objective. The handbook satisfies a validneed for the Strategic Air Command and for the United StatesAir Force.

2. Handbook

6

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Puryear, Edgar F., Jr. 19 Stars: A Study in MilitaryCharacter and Leadership. Nevado, CA: PresidioPress, 1981.

- -- Stars in Flight. Nevado, CA: Presidio Press,1981.

Wheeler, Mary Bray. et al. (eds). Webster's Newreference Library. Nashville: Thomas NelsonPublishers. 1984.

Articles and Periodicals

4. Canan, James W. "Storm Flags on the Budget Front." AirForce Magazine, January 1988, pp. 98-104.

5. Chain, John T., Jr., General, USAF. "StrategicFundamentals." Air Force Magazine, July 1987,pp. 64-67.

6. Dudney, Robert S. "Strategic Fbrces at the Brink o+START." Air Force Magazine, February 1788, pp. 36-43.

7. May, Charles A., Jr., Brigadier General, USAF."Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Modernization."Program Manager, September-October 1986, pp. 24-30.

8. Miller, Franilin C. "Modernizing the Strategic Triad."Signal Magazine, May 1984, pp. 99-106.

Official Documents

9. Office of the President. White House Press Release: Textof Remarks by the President on the Report on thePresident's Commission on Strategic Forces.Washington, D.C.: 19 April 1983.

7

10. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Air ForcePolicy Letter for Commanders. Washington, D.C.,1 June 1987.

11. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report tothe Congress, FY 1988. Washington, D.C.: USGovernment Printing Office, 1 January 1987.

12. Office of the Secretary of Defense. ICBM ModernizationProgram Annual Report to the Committees on ArmedServices of the Senate and House of Representatives.Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office,13 January 1984.

13. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Press Release:Text of the White House Announcement Regarding thePresident's Decision on Full Scale Development ofthe Small ICBM and Development of a Basinq Mode forthe Peacekeeper Missile. 19 December 1986.

14. President's Commission on Strategic Forces. Report ofthe President's Commission on Strategic Forces.Washington, D.C.: 6 April 1983.

15. Strategic Air Command. SAC Missile Chronoloqy_ 1939-

1982. Offutt AFB, NE: Office of the Historian, 15October 1983.

16. Strategic Air Command. SACR 23-6: Organization andFunctions--Headquarters Strategic Air Command.Offutt AFB, NE: 30 June 1986.

17. US Congress. MX Peacekeeper Missile PrSeram. SenateHearings 99-72. Washington, D.C.: US GovernmentPrinting Office, 1985.

Unpublished Material

18. United States Air Force Unofficial Pamphlet. ICBMModernization Data Book. May 1987.

8

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCEmFALtQU~rl I~S -R .T( cI, A~ COMMA NO

H\'t(~~5 %F11kAS-% "Il 15-001

S1 DEC 1987

XPQ

Sponsorship of Research Project

ACSC/EDC

1. I enthusiastically support Majors Steve Garcia and Terry Kempin their research project to develop The ICBM ModernizationBriefer's Handbook. I am the HQ SAC Director of IntercontinentalBallistic Missile (ICBM) Requirements and this directorate isresponsible for developing, coordinating, and articulating SACrequirements for modifications to deployed ICBM weapon systems aswell as requirements for new ICBMs, specifically the Peacekeeperand the Small ICBM. These high-priority programs are briefed tovirtually every distinguished visitor who visits SACHeadquarters. The handbook proposed by Majors Garcia and Kemphas the potential to enhance this directorate's ability to con-vincingly articulate command requirements. Additionally, such ahandbook will be useful for new directorate briefers.

2. Majors Garcia and Kemp were two.of the most effectivebriefers in this directorate. They have a keen appreciation ofwhat makes briefers more effective, confident, and credible.During their tenure here, we discussed the usefulness of a hand-book to capture the experience of past briefers and to assist newbriefers in presenting the "ICBM Modernization Briefing," a cen-terpiece briefing for all distinguished visitors.

3. I would be pleased to sponsor Majors Garcia and Kemp, andappreciate their decision to assist this directorate. If youhave any questions pertaining to my sponsorship, please contactme at AV 271-5801.

rI STO PHZ FNH CL,IIsDrector of ICBM RequirementsS i

o u Profes - rcn0 ar ,

AIR COMMANDAND

STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORTTHE ICBM MODERNIZATION BRIEF2.'SHANDBOOK

MAJOR STEPHEN R. GARCIA 88-1010-- "insights into tomorrow".

AAjj

PREFACE

Advocating the need for ICBM modernization is adifticult challenge. Despite the support of the last fourPresidential administrations, the Peacekeeper program hasstill not achieved a full 100 missile operational capability"(25: 100-04). AithGugh Peacekeeper deployment in Minutemansilos at Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, is well underway +orthe first fifty missiles, the Air Force faces a continuinguphill nattle to secure support for the second fifty missilesin a Rail Garrison basing mode and for the Small TCBM basedin Hard Mobile Launchers. Obtaining contiored support forthese nationally significant programs will depend upon theef-ectiveness of the adoocacy role conducted by Air Forceofficers who work the program. The challenge remains to bemature, confident, and most importantly, credible whenpresenLing this requirement to an Often skeptical Amer icanpublic.

The ICBM Modernization Bt iefer s Handlbook is designed toenhance an ICBM modernization advocate's effectiveness inarticulating program requirenents. Thle authors of theh,r, dbooi.presenlted many briei.ings during their si': cumulativeyears at Headquarters SAC without the benefit of a harndboo:,and they [now whp! kinds of information would have beenhelpful to develop better confidence, and in -turn, be moreeffective. The authors have gleaned some of the pearls o-oisdom from many source documents and have consolidated theminto this handbook. The handbook La6 es a -irst step towardsfilling a gap in a briefer's knowledge due to the lac- of asFructured training program. Tn the long run, this knowledgecan make a briefer a better advocate, a better leader, and a

- better oificer.

We wiish to acknowledge the support and encouragementpro~ided by Colonel Christopher i. Branch, the Director ofICBM Requirements; Lt Colonel Joseph E. Sutter, Chief of theS0 Advanced Missile Development Division; and especially CaptainDennis E. Lyon, Chief of the Peacekeeper Maintenance Section.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

S Major Stephen R. Garcia is a missile staff officer whohas served in both Minuteman Intercontinental BallisticMissile (ICBM) operations an0 maintenance. His most recentassignment before attending Air Command and Staff College asa member of the Class of 1988 was as an Advanced ICBMDevelopment Planner in the Directorate o ICBM Requirements(XFQ) at Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC), from 1984through July L987. During this three year tour o+ duty MajorGarcia wor-ed primarily in, requirements development for thePeacekeeper weapon system, and for the last two year-s of hisassignment was the Program Element Monitor For Peacekeeper.Major Garcia was also the primary briefer of The ICBMModernization Briefing end presented several hundredbrieiings during his tenure. Major Garcia was instrumentalin the initial developmen-t of the Rail Garrison basing modefor P~eacetkeeper. Before his assignment to HeadqUarters SAC,Major Garcia served for nine years at Francis E. Warren AFB,W/oming. star ting in maintenance and later transitioning intooperations. He subsequently worked in the Plans Division andthe Emergency War Orders Training Branch, completing hisoperatlions tour as the Chi'ef of EWO Training for the 90thStrategic Missile Wing.

Major Terrill L. Kemp is a missile operations starfofficer. His most recent assignment before attending AirCommand and Staff College as a member o- the Class of 1988was as the Chief of the Peacekeeper Test Section in theDirectorate of ICBM Requirements at Headquarters StrategicAir Comnand. During his three and one-half years in XPQ.Maj, or hemp worked e;,c) usively on developing SAC requirementsfor the Peaceteeper weapon system. Major Pemp worked theearly development of the Rail Garrison basing mode forPeaceleeper, and also presented The ICBM ModernizationBriefing. Major hemp was a Top Hand officer in the istStrategic Aerospace Division's Test and Evaluation Deputate,at Vandenberg AFB, California. Before his assignment atVandenberg AFB, Major Kemp had a tour in missile operationsin the 341st Strategic Missile Wing at Malm:trom AFB,Montana. Major Kemp was a Minuteman (I crew member in the10th Strategic Missile Squadron, an evaluator, and anEmergency War Orders training officer.

ii

S TABLE OF CONTENTSPreface ................................................... igAbout the Authors ....................................... 1i

CHAPTER ONE--THE ICBM MODERNIZATION BRIEFER'S HANDBOOKIntrjduati on ........................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO--FUNDAMIENTALS--DETERRENCE AND THE TRIADIntroduction . .......................................... 3National Security and Defense Strategy ...................... 3Diiersity of Strategic Forces .......................... 4The ICBM Contribution ..................................Conclusion ..............................................

CHAPTER THREE--THE ICBM HISTORICAL PERSPECT1 VEIntroduction . .......................................... tlThe ImpE.ct of World War II ............................. 1LThe Truman Administration .............................. I1

Nuclear Superiority .................................. 11Early Missile Research and Development ................. 13

The Eisenhower Administration .......................... 14The New Look ......................................... 14Massive Retaliation .................................. 15Developing an American ICBM Capability ................ 17

Atlas and Titan I .................................. 1iMinuteman I ........................................ 19Titan II ........................................... .21

The Kennedy/Johnson Administrations ....................... 21FIe-,ible Response .................................... 21

he Policy of Assured Destruction ...................... 22Modernizing the ICBM Leg of the Triad ................ .24

Minuteman II ....................................... 24Minuteman III ...................................... .24

The Nixon Administration ........................ ....... 25Conclusion ............................................. .26

CHAPTER FOUR--ARMS CONTROLIntroduction ........................................... 29SDALT I ..SALT I.I ................................................

START and INF .......................................... .Concl usi on ............................................. .4

S -iii

CONTINUED

CHAFTER FIVE--PEACEI

NNS~ Chapter One

INTRODUCT ION

Sisyphus: GreeI. Mythology. A king of Corinthcondemned forever to roll a stone up a hill inHades only to have it roll down again when nearingthe top (10:086).

At first glance, the challenge to advocate the continu-ing need for ICBM modernization appears to be a Sis/pheantass. Manv capable advocates have preceded you in theireffort to push the program to the brink of full operationalcapability, only to see it come crashing bact down, shroudedin disbelief and uncertainty. Nevertheless, throughout thelong and controversial history of the Peacekeeper, and morerecently, the Small ICBM prog-ams, the essential miI 1taryrequirement for these weapon systems has not changed. Thei.hyllenge remains to be mature, confident, and most impor-7tanLli , credible when presenting. this requirement to an oftenskeptical American public.

The purpose of this handbook is to help you become amore effective advocate for the ICBH modernization program.The handbook will try to give you a better appreciation forsome C+ the basic concepts that form the foundation for acredible and defensible position. It will not discuss theprogrammatic details of the Peacekeeper or Small ICBMprograms because in the dynamic environment of ICBMmodernization they are constantly changing. However, it willprovide a brief glimpse at some of the earlier programdevelopments which have shaped the current ICBM moder-nization environment, and which continue to influence theattitudes and opinions of key policy makers in the UnitedStates today. Furthermore, it will examine the continuingrationale for these programs.

We acknowledge that you are very capable of presentingThe !WBM Modernization Briefing without the benefit of thishandbook; obviously, the briefing has been presented veryeffectively for years without one. However, one of the areasthat we usually felt uncomfortable with was the post-briefingquestion and answer period. In retrospect, it appeared thatmost of the tough questions dealt with areas of the briefingthat we were most unfamiliar with, for example, the history

of first and second generation missile systems, arms control,previous basing modes, etc. We didn't have any background inthose areas and didn't work with them in the day-to-dayenvironment. So our approach with this handbook was to startat square -ne and build a product that combines some basicconcepts such as US defense policy, deterrence, the diversityof the Triao, r.r.d the contribution of the ICBM, as well assome information -About the historical development of anAmerican ICEM capability. We felt that this backgroundwould serve you tn yood stead to build a basic framework o+knowledge from which to prepare for the questions that youmay inevitably be asked. We intend for this handbook to be afirst step, and we hope you will build upon it to developeven greater effectiveness in your ICBM modernizationadvocacy mission.

I.2

A Chapter Two

FUNDAMENTALS--DETERRENCE AND THE TRIAD

INTRODUCTION

When presenting The ICBM Modernization Briefinq, it isimportant to properly +rame the requirement for continuedmodernization. The purpose of this chapter is to provide youwith a better appreciation -f-r basic United States defensestrategy and th: concept of deterrence since these arefundamental concepts underlying the need for continued ICBMmodernization. The chapter will subsequently review thenecessity of maintaining a Triad of strategic nuclearoffensive forces and will specifically address the contribu-tions made to the Triad by the ICBM. As General John T.Chain, Jr.

, CINCSAC, recently stated, "SAC needs to return to

Z! the basics and try to explain what we are trying to do in thestrategic nuclear world and why we are trying to do it"(17:64).. This chapter e.amines "the o'hy."

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRATEGV

For the past 39 years, the concept of deterrencehas been the cornerstone of our nuclear policy,and, indeed, of our entire national securityposture. . . deterrence is the most effective means"of preserving the freedom and independence of theWestern World in the nuclear age (25:99).

Deterrence of aggression is the principal objective ofthe US strategic doctrine of flex:ible response, "which hasbeen US strategy since 1961" (34:26). Former Se-_retary ofDefense Caspar Weinberger, in the Fiscal Yaar 1988 AnnualReport to Congress, said:

Deterrence works by persuading potentialadversaries that by their perceptions, the probable

costs of their aggression will exceed the probablegains. Thus, the US strategy to deter aggressiondoes not just depend on our actual militarycapabilities. . . It also involves our adversaries7perceptions about those capabilities as well as theother elements of our strategy. . the

effectiveness of our deterrent will be determinedin our opponents' minds, not in ours" (34:25>.

The National Security Strategy Report, produced by the WhiteHouse, specifically addresses deterrence in terms o+ theSoviet Union:

Nuclear deterrence, like any form of deterrence,requires us to consider not what would deter us,but what would deter the Soviets, whose perceptionsof the world and value system are substantiallydifferent from our own (33:--).

The Soviet leadership must be convinced that anattack on the US or its allies would entailunacceptable retaliatory costs. . . We must be ableto put at risk those types of Soviet targets--including hardened ones such as military commandbunkers and facilities, missile silos, nuclearSv.eapons and other storage, and the rest--which theSoviet leaders have given every indication by theiractions they value most, and which constitute theirtools of control and power (3:161).

EfFective deterrence, then, relies upon making clear toan adversary that the US "will respuind powerfully toaggression" (34:25), but this also requires the US tomaintain credible forces to implement this response. FormerSecretary Weinberger further stated, "our purpose is toprepare for war so well that we successfully deteraggression. . . But should deterrence fail, our strategy istD secure all US and allied interests, and deny the aggressorany of his war aims" (74:27).

The core of our military strategy . . isdeterrence. Deterring strategic nuclear conflictwith credible retaliatory nuclear forces has beenthe cornerstone of US national security posture forover 40 years, and there is no credible alternativestrategy available today (32:--).

DIVERSITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES

The US maintains a Triad of strategic nuclear offensiveforces comprised of ICBMs. manned bombers, and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles to complement the US strategy offlexible response to deter aggression. The uniquecontributions of each of these components combine to achievea full spectrum of deterrence by introducing complexity intothe Soviet planning process. The diversity of the US Triad

4

"enhances the survivability of US strategic forces" (3:8) todeter nuclear attack, and "reduces Soviet chances of successand increases the margin of safety and stability in a crisis"(50:4).

The strategic Triad is designed to support ourdeterrent policy by providing a force posture thatboth minimizes Soviet incentives to initiate anuclear attack on us or our allies, and ensuresthat our forces are capable, under all conditionsof war initiation, of surviving a Soviet firststrike and retaliating effectively (25:99).

There are four basic strengths of the Triad whichcontribute to its effectiveness in enhancing the US de+ensestrategy of deterring war.

First, it makes the enemy's targeting task verydifficult and complex. Second, it requires thatany attack be timed to strike all three components,in all locations, at one time. Third, the enemyhas to split his defenses to protect against threediFferent types of attack. And fourth, it is ahedge against a sudden advance in the technology ofa defense against one of the three types of Triad"weapon systems (1:13).

The first three strengths of the Triad reflect the enhancedsurvivability provided by the diversity of forces. Thisdiversity makes the targeting and timing problems for theSoviet attack planner so complex that he cannot be sure aSoviet first strike against the US would destroy all threeelements of the Triad and thus prevent a second strike by USforces that would inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviethomeland. This is the essence of deterrence. Although thefollowing excerpt from Missiles In The Nineties is lengthy,it best captures the complexities a Soviet planner mustconsider when planning an attack against the US:

If the Soviet Union wishes to launch a coordinated,effective ballistic missile attack on US bombers,ICBMs, SLBMs in port, and US strategic command andcontrol, it must either launch its ICBMs and SLBMssimultaneously or stagger their launches so thatthe SLBM and ICBM weapons arrive at the same time.As a result, the Soviet attack planner faces anattack timing problem because if the plannerelects to launch SLBMs and ICBMs simultaneously,the SLBMs will impact first, but they will not havesufficient accuracy to destroy US ICBMs in theirsilos. The US ICBM force would have time to react

5

before the Soviet ICBMs arrived perhaps 10-15minutes later. However, if the Soviet plannerwants to have his SLBM and ICBM weapons detonate onUS targets at the same time, he must launch hisICBMs first, which will give the bombers and SLBMsan opportunity to survive. The ICBM leg might besusceptible to destruction by the arriving SovietICBMs, but the other two legs of the Triad wouldsurvive. As a result of this attack timingdilemma, the Soviet attack planner can never beconfident that he will be able to confidentlyneutralize all legs of the US strategic nuclearTriad before some elements could escape andinflict unacceptable damage on his homeland.Therefore, the US defense strategy of deterrence isserved because it prohibits a confident, highprobability attack by the Soviets against thecontinental. US (3:9-10).

Diversity further enhances the survivability of USstrategic forces by denying the Soviets the opportunity toconcentrate their research and development efforts oncountering a single component of the Triad. "Thus, theexistence of several components of our strategic forcespermits each tc function as a hedge against possible Sovietsuccesset in endangering any of the others" (37:7). "Forexample, if the United States chose to deploy only missile-carrying submarines, it would run the risk of the SovietUnion being able to concentrate its resources on antisub-marine warfare without having to conduct research anddevelopment activities for the other legs of the Triad"(3:11).

"Hence for the predictable future. the Triad conceptincreases the probability that a significant portion of USstrategic forces will survive a Soviet attack" (3:12).Survivable, effective US military forces, combined with thewill to respond to Soviet aggression, achieves the USobjective of deterrence.

THE ICBIM CONTRIBUTION

ICBMs make a significant contribution to achievingdeterrence in two ways. First, since effective deterrence isa function of Soviet perceptions, US ICBIMs provide acapability that the Soviets respect.

Soviet military writings and Soviet investments inICBMs strongly indicate the Soviets regard ICBMs asthe dominant strategic system. The Strategic

*6

Rocket Forces are the elite military service in theSoviet armed forces. Accordingly, the Soviet Unionperceives an ICBM-armed US as a more powerfuladversary which possesses a significant number ofthe very weapons they themselves would rely on mostheavily in the event of a war (3:13-14).

Second, US ICBMs have unique operational capabilities thatcontribute to the US strategic doctrine of flexible responseto deter aggression.

Land-based ICBMs comprise an essential element oftne strategic Triad and comprise about half of thenation's day-to-day alert weapons. Their highreliability, high alert rate, planning flexibility,and quick response distinguish them among strategicforces (43:2-3).

One of the foremost qualities of the ICBM is its abilityto accurately put a weapon on a target within approximatelythirty minutes. This is what is meant by the term prompt.The bomber force would require hours to arrive over target.and the SLBM requires time to receive and respond toappropriate execution directives. Therefore, only the ICBMcan provide a true prompt response, if required.

For the predictable future, .ICBMs will pos-sess tnebest prompt countermilitary capability of all USstrategic forces: their combination of weaponyield, accuracy, quick reaction time, and shortflight time gives the United States the ability toplace at risk most of the assets which areimportant to the conduct of Soviet war operations--including ICBMs which the Soviets will ha.vewithheld from an initial attack. The ICBMs abilityto attack promptly and destroy key elements ofSoviet offensive forces also provides the greatestmeasure of damage limiting counterforce capabilityto the United States, and the greatest prospectsfor early war termination (3:14).

In addition to its prompt, countermilitary deliverycapability, all US ICBMs are based in the continental US.Not only does this provide an increased measure of security,but a nuclear attack against these forces would constitute anunambiguous attack against the continental US (3:13). Incase this appears to be too obvious, consider the example ofa nuclear submarine in international waters. If an attackoccurred against an American submarine, there might not beclear indications that an attack against the US is underway.An attack against US ICBM forces would provide a clear signal

7

to the National Command Authorities (NCA) to take appropriateaction.

Continental basing also provides the ICBM component ofthe Triad with the capability to maintain robust and redun-dant, positive command and control. It is this robustcommand and control that permits such quick reaction time anda rapid retargeting capability to provide the NCA withincreased flexibility throughout the spectrum of conflict(7: 14).

ICBMs have traditionally maintained a near 100 percentalert rate for only approximately 12 percent of the Triadoperating and support costs (3:14,15;30:6B).

The high alert rate and quick responsiveness of USICBMs combine to further discourage a surprisefirst strike on the United States by forcing theSoviet Union to worry about vulnerability of theirown strategic forces--a good portion of which arenot on day-to-day alert--to prompt US retaliation(7: 14).

The high alert rate of US ICBMs significantly contributes tOdeterrence of nuclear war because of the fact that theSoviets do not maintain many of their forces on day-to-dayalert.

To illustrate, if the Soviets decided to attack theUnited States, they would want to have available tothem as much of their strategic force as possible.to insure a high confidence, high success attack.But if they generate their forces, the Soviets mayalert the United States, sacrifice the element ofsurprise and diminish the effectiveness of asurprise attack. Thus, contrary to a widely heldbelief, highly responsive US ICBMs inhibit ratherthan encourage Soviet first strike planning('" 14-15).

In summary, the unique contributions of the US ICBMprovide considerable operational capability to enhAnce the USdefense strategy to deter nuclear war.

The distinctive qualities of the ICBM, ascontrasted with other classes of strategic weapons,are the qualities most appropriate to hold at veryplausible risk the highest value assets of theSoviet state. Put in cross-cultural terms, the USprotects its highest value (people) by holding atrisk the highest values of the Soviet Union (the

8

[ in. = * A ' W VIW 2 FJ '1 X~ A .political control structure and major elements ofits most potent military capability). Cruisemissiles, penetrating bombers, and SLBMs all havevaluable synergistic roles to play for deterrence.but they cannot today, or prospectively tomorrow,provide a level of dissuasion capable o+substituting for the ICBM (3:17).

CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed the basic fundamentals underlyingthe need for continued ICBM modernization, essentially "thewhy we are doing it" aspect referred to by General Chain(17:64). The bottom line is that the ICBM modernizationprogram is being conducted to directly enhance the capabilityof US forces to support the US doctrine of flexible responseand the strategy to deter nuclear war.

9

Chapter Three

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTIONOF

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND ICCBM DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The American approach to developing nuclear forces nasbeen significantly influenced by the evolution of post-WorldWar II doctrine and strategy. As Chapter Two pointed out,the US has maintained a doctrine of flexible response since1961. However, this doctrine has embraced many differentpolicies and strategies over the years that have shaped theAmerican approach to developing strategic nuclear andconventional forces to support the objective of deterringaggression. The purpose o+ this chapter is to brieflye.,amine the early evolution of strategy from 1945 through theearly 1970s to see how it impacted the early ICBM developtientprogram. The chapter is organized chronologically byPresidential administrations to accbmplish this purpose.Within each of these major headings. doctrine and strategyare reviewed, then there is a section on ICBM developmentactivity in that administration.

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II

The immediate postwar international and domesticenvironment significantly influenced the de,,elopment ofAmerican ductrine and strategy to secure the naLion'sdefense. With the postwar occupation of Eastern Europe bythe Soviet;, I.he United States faced a serious dilemma: howto contain the Soviets while at the same Lime complying withLhe domestic American desire to demobilize after the war andreturn to normalcy. The answer to the dilemma seemed to bein the United States' virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons.

THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION: 1945-1953

Nuclear Superiority

The Truman administration can probably be bestcharacterized as responding to the dilemma by relying on the

11

US Superiority in atomic weapons and a strategic bomber-delivery capabili ty to contain the Soviets (2:4). ThissoUtior Could comply with domestic pressure tor a rapid

demobilization of American conventional forces, whichoccurr ed betw.een 19A5 and 1950, and was believed to providesufficient cieterrence to Soviet aggression (6:6). Since theAmerican people were reluctant to support continued highdefense budgets to sustain both conventional and nucIAearforces, the emphasis during this administration c.learlyfavored developinert of nuclear technology (9:105-108).Initially, the constrained defense research and developmentbudget forced the Air Force to concentrate on improving tsbinmber capability, and ICBM research remained under-fundedand constrained by technological problems associaited with theheavy atomi: weapons of the period (40:9-10'. Neverthel ess,thie early ICBM research conducted during the TrumanaSmini :tratiori paved the ,,ay for subsequent development of atrue !CBM capability during the subseqtten t EisenhowetAI.I.m!ni stratton.

The Truman Administration, having proclaimed thepolicy of containment in 1947, found in trie nucleardpterrent strength of the Strategic Air Command Aforce th-at promised to -eep the Soviets in line ata very economical cost in defense dollars. . . 7hepublic was very receptive to the concept of nu.cleardeterrence, and the'Government saw it as anintelligent alternative to attempting to match theSoviet's ])rge +iEld force in conventionalstrength. By 1948, with long-range B--6s cominginto the inventory, the Air Force sincerelybelieved that SAC and the A-Bomb would eitherprevent communLst aggression or win any new warthat might erupt (2.4).

Although Uie Truman administration continued itz policyof nuclear super iority through the end of its ter'm, De,.et -l

events occurred between 1949 And 1950 that caused theadmir, stration to ree.,amine defense strateg/ and forcestruc-ture, and the subsequent actions taken in response tothese events would have an indirect impact on the developmentof an American ICBM capability. First, in August 194i9, theSoviets tested their own atomic bomb several years soonerthan the US intelligence community had e;pected (9:107?.Second, "the Communist Chinese defeated the Nationalistfurces of the Repuiblic of China on the mainland and tookpossession of the whole of China, except the island ofTaiwan" (9: 107). The Truman administration regarded theseevents as an increased threat to the West. arid Presi dentTruman made two important decisions to address this newsituation. First, to insure the US would maintain

superiority in nuclear technology, he authorized researchand development of an American hydrogen bomb, called "theSuper" (9:107). This decision would prove to be significantfor subsequent development of an American ICBM capabilitybecause the hydrogen bomb would reduce the weight of anuclear warhead from several tons to hundreds o+ pounds,which was the single-most technological obstacle toovercoming propulsion, guidance. and reentry problems(40:10-11). President Truman's second decision in 194qcreated "an interdepartmental task: force to undertake ageneral review of US national security and makerecommendations for new policies" (9:107). This resulted ina National Securi ty Council document, NSC-68, which "was thefirst comprehensive analysis and synthesis o0 a nationalstrategy for the US in the postwar world" (9:107).

NSC-68 concluded that the US needed much strongernuclear and conventional forces than presentlye- isted. . . and warned that within four years theSoviets would have ample atomic bombs and asuitable delivery system to enable them to ofLsetthe e;xisting US nuclear deterrent capabillt'. (2:55.

The significance of NSC-68 was that it recognized thatnuclear superiority alone'could not completely address USdefense needs to be able to respond to Soviet or Chineseaggression (6:33).

As the Truman administration began to seriously considerthe implications of NSC-68, another event occurred that wouldimpact the development of strategy--the North Korean invasionof the Republic of V:.orea in June 1950 (2:6). The Korei.n Waremphasized a weakness in the doctrine of nuclear superiority.American nuclear superiority had not only failed to preventoutbreak, of this limited war, but the resulting conventionaland strategic forces buildup failed to bring the war to a"quicl-, decisive victory" (2:5). American frustration withthe this new type of "limited" war ushered in the Eisenhoweradministration with a mandate to insure the US never becameembroiled in a limited war- again (9:97).

Earlv, Missile Research And Development: 1945-1953

The first serious study of an American ICBM capabilitybegan during the Truman administration, but for the mostpart, it was a budget and technology constrained effort(2:2,78;40:10). By the end of World War II and as a resultof witnessing the limited successes of the German V-I and V-2programs and the destructive capability of the atomic bomb,the Army Air Forces recognized the potential of a long-range

13

ballistic missile. However. the first constraint todeveloping an ICBM capability was technology. "Thetechnology did not exist to make a rocket fly the nominalintercontinental range of 5,500 nautical miles while carryinga multi-ton thermonuclear warhead" (5:58). This constraintwould not be overcome until the US developed the hydrogenbomb in 1953 (40:10). The second constraint was f*unding.Faced with limited funds to support both research anddevelopment of aeronautical and ballistic missile systems,the Air Force guided missile program was cut from $29 millionto $13 million (49:9). and eleven of twenty-eight activemissile projects were cancelled, including the forerunner todevelopment of the Atlas ICBH (41:5). The remaining projectsfocused on developing air-breathLng guided missiles, whichmore closely paralleled research in aircraft developmenttechnology but would also be useful until technologicalconstraints could be overcome to develop an ICBM capability(2:78-8t). Although the resulting Snark, Navajo, and Rascalguided missile systems were inherently inaccurate.unreliable. and vulnerable (40: 3-4), they providedsignificant developments in propulsion. guidance. and prncqraramanagement for subseqtent development of a true ICBM (4:16').

In 1951, the Air Force initiated "Project Atlas," whichwould e.,entually'result in the first American ICBM on alertin October 1959 (40:9,41:24). However- the outbreak of theKorean War constrained funds even More as the US rapid.,ybuilt up its conventional forces to meet the new threat, andProject Atlas remained under-funded until accelerated byPresident Eisenhower in 1955 (40:9;41:10). This limitedfunding prevented any significant research breakthroughs intechnological problems associated with propulsion, guidance,and nose cone reentry until they could be overcome by theweight redLuction provided by the hydrogen bomb (40:10).

The Truman administration took the first significantsteps towards developing an American ICBM capability.Al though the bulk of development would occur under PresidentEisenhower, these first steps established a solid foundation.

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

The "New Look"

The Eisenhower administration entered the White House inJanua-y 195' with a clear mandate to prevent Americaninvolvement in future limited wars and a self-imposedobligation to balance the federal budget (9:109). As aresult, the administration undertook a revision of defensestrategy known as the "New Look" to accomplish these twoobjectives (2:6). The two pillars of the Eisenhoweradministration's defense policy were "the creation of a large

14

network of military alliances between the US and over fiftyother nations around the globe;" and improving US strategicnuclear technology to preserve superiority (9:109-110).Pursuing this second pillar- resulted in acceleration of ICBMdevelopment activity in response? to Soviet technologicalachievements in ICBM capability, and by the end o+ theadministration's term, the US had its first operational ICBM,the Atlas, on alert (41:24). The ICBM developments madebetween 1953 and 1960 formed the basic foundation for theICBM capability existent today.

The nuclear superiority doctrine of the Trumanadministration changed names to become "massive retaliation"during the Eisenhower administration, but for all practicalpurposes it espoused the same message. "Fresident Eisenhowerbelieved the Soviets could defeat the US in either of twoways: b, a strong nuclear attack on the American homeland. orby forcing the US to spend itself into bankruptcy through aseries of limited wars around the world" (2:6). He did notagree with the recommendations of NSC-68 which called -for theUS to maintain conventional and nuclear symmetry with theSoviet Union (6:55).

According to the Eisenhower administration, nuclearweapons of all descriptions and a strong strategicair force seemed to offer the best defense buy-,, forthey could both deter Soviet aggression and quicklywin any war that might erupt. -Consequently, aprimary element of the New Look was a reallocationof existing military resources away fromconventional ground forces and toward buttressingair power and nuclear capabilities (2:6).

Therefore, just as President Truman had done before, USstrategy would continue to rely upon strategic nuclearsuperiority as the primary means of deterring Sovietaggression.

Massive Retaliation

The Eisenhower administration formulated the doctrine of"massive retaliation" to capitalize on US nuclear superiority"by threatening to respond to [Soviet] conventionaloattacksagainst the free world with strategic warfare" (9:110). By1957. President Eisenhower had made the decision "that allfuture wars on the scale of Korea and above would beconsidered nuclear for planning purposes" (2:6).

The administration did not believe that any suchthing would ever actually happen or be necessary.Massive retaliation was intended as a doctrine and

15

policy of deterrence. It was an attempt to keepthe defense budget relatively low and prevent newwars like Korea, while protecting the security ofthe West by exttracting the greatest possibledeterrent out of US military power (9:110).

Two emerging criticisms of massive retaliation wouldhave an important impact on the subsequent evolution of USdoctrine. strategy. and employment of forces. The firstcriticism centered on the emerging vulnerability of USstrategic forces to a Soviet nuclear +irst strike, andcritics believed massive retaliation was an even moredangerous invitation to resort to nuclear wJeapons on bothsides (9:110-111). One of the primary points of emphasis wasthat deterrence required survivable, second stri2e US forcesto respond to a potential Soviet first strike (9:111). As aresult, the administration began placing strategic bombers on24-hour alert, and subsequent ICBM development wouldemphasize "deployment in hard, underground silos. rel ativeli,invulnerable to anything short of a direct hit by an atomicwarhead" (9: 111).

The second criticism, which had an equally significantimpact on the development of doc:trine and strategy, centeredon the lack: of credibility of emploving US nuclear capabilctyfor a Soviet or Chinese invasion o+ a third iworld ally(9:111-112). Many US allies did not belieVe that the USwould actually launch a nuclear strike, and thereby inviteSoviet retaliation, over an invasion of a third world ally.This might have been possible in the early 1950s when theSoviets had a small nuclear capability with limited abilityto employ it against the US, but that time had passed by1956. More importantly, critics claimed the Soviets andChinese did not believe it either. Since deterrence is afunction o+ an adversaries' perceptions (:4:25). the laci ofcredibillty would noL deter further Soviet or Chineseaggression (9: 110-112).

The Eisenhower administration essentially conceded thecredibility argument a~nd implemented a policy of "GraduatedDeterrence" in 1957.

The theory of Graduated Deterrence . . .represented an attempt to meet partway thecredibility argument against Massive Retaliation,as well as to provide an alternative to maintaininglarge standing conventional forces. Implicitlyconceding that it was hardly credible to threatenstrategic war as a response to most limitedattacks, the administration intended thereby toraise siqnificantly the threshold at which a

16

massive retaliation would be considered, fi'lingthe gap with the threat of tactical nuclear war(9:112).

Thus, the Eisenhower administration began to introduce someflexibility into its strategy, but it would not authorizeincreased defense expenditures to develop a force structureto tr'uly implement a fCLlly flexible response capability onthe same order of magnitude as the Kennedy administration.

Although development of an American ICBM capability waswell underway by 1957, two Soviet events contributed to anacceleration o4 US ICBM development activity. *In mid-1957,the Soviets announced that they had Lested a prototype ICBM,and "On 4 October 1957. the Soviets launched Sputnik I, thefLrst artificial satellite" (9:114). These events, followedby two more Sputnil launches within several weeks ofSputnik 1, awakened fears in the American public that -he USwas falling behind the Soviets in space and missiletechnology, and the seeds of a perceived "missile gap" weresewn (2:95). Although administration officials were prettycertain that this gap was not real, owing to secret U-2reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union, they becameconcerned about the vulnerability of US forces to a SovietICBM attack (9:114). The Soviets had tested a prototype ICBMseveral months before the Sputnik I launch, and soonafterwards Soviet Premier Ni~ita Khrushchev "began publiclyboasting that strategic superiority had passed to the SovietUnion" (9:114). This eventually pro-,ed to be just rhetoric,but the Eisenhower administration was powerless to refutethese claims. This forced the administration intn an-xcceleration of the US ICBM development program t- -ppeasepublic concerns (9:1 4).

Developing An American ICBM Capability

The Eisenhower administration actively pursueddeveloping US strategic nuclear capability to preservesuperiority. Although research and development activityincluded bombers, submarine launched ballistic missiles(Polaris), intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs--Thorand Jupiter) and ICBMs, the concern about a Soviet firststrike capability being able to destroy the bombers on theground resulted in acceleration of the IRBM and ICBMdevelop nent programs. The Eisenhower administration startedthe golden years for the ICBM program. Between 1953 and1960, the administration fielded Atlas, Titan I, and beganresearch and development on second-generation Minuteman andTitan II ICBM weapon systems.

17

Atlas and Titan I. The Atlas and Titan programs werethe first American efforts to develop an ICBM capability.Project Atlas had begun under the Truman administration, butit had remained constrained by budget and technologicalconsiderations until 1954 (A0:10). The -first breakthroughoccurred in late--1953 when the Atomic Energy CommissionBucceeded in developing a hydrogen bomb (40:10). Anotherimpetus for the fledgling ICBM development effort resultedfrom a Soviet announcement in August 1953 that they hadsuc-cesfully tested their own version of a hydrogen bomb(2:80). US intelligence experts had predicted this latterevent would not occur for at least another decade, and itemphasized to President Eisenhower's stientific and technicaladvisors the need for a US ICBM capable of delivering nuclearwarheads to counter the growing Soviet threat (2:80). Theseeverits resulted in reeixamination of development o+ the USTCFN program (40: 10).

As a result, in October 1953, the Air Force empaneledeleven nationally promine:-t scientists to review and evaluateAi' Force missile programs (40:10). The two committeerecomaendations to Pre- .dent Eisenhower were acceleration ofthe Atlas program and development of a backup missile,TitAn I in case the site where the Atlas was beingde',el-cped was attacked or in case of an explosion of adevelopmental Atlas missile (2:82;5:--). The Air ForceResearch and Development Command subsequently formed theWestern pevelopment Division. commanded by Major GeneralBernard A. Schriever, to implement the recommendations, aridin Januar/ 1955, the Air Force and the Convair Division o-General-Dynamics signed a production contract for the Atlas"D." the -First operational version of th- Atlas ICBM (41:9).There were three versions of the Atlas.

The fiLrst operational version of the Atlas, theSeries D Mcldel, was a one and one-half stage,liquid fuel ICBM equipped with a radio-inertialguidance system and a nuclear warhead. It wasstored in a horizontal position on a soft above-ground launcher kunprotected from the effects ofnuclear blasts) and had an effective range, ]ii-eall Atlas models, of approximately 6,500 nauticalmiles. The second Atlas ICBM con'figuration, theSeries E model, possessed all-inertial guidance.improved engines, a larger warhead, and was storedin a horizontal position in a "semi-hard" co-ffin-type launcher. The final model of the Atlas, theSeries F model. was superior to its predecessors inseveral ways. Like the Series E model- the SeriesF Atlas was equipped with all-inertial guidance.but possessed improved engines, a quicker reaction

18

time due to its storable liquid +uel, and wasdeployed in a "hard" silo-lift launcher (40:7).

There were many technical obstacles to overcome in thedevelopment of the Atlas program, primarily in the areas ofguidance and control systems, propellants, and reentrytechnology (2:8:). Nevertheless, due largely to the effortsof General Schriever, the first successful Atlas launchoccurred in November 1958 (2:83). On l1 October 1959, the576th Strategic Missile Squadron (SMS), at Cooke AFB,California (now Vandenberg AFB), became the +irst SACstrategic missile squadron to place an American ICBM. aSeries "D" Atlas equipped with a nuclear warhead. onstrategic alert (40_:18:41:24).

The Air Force approved Titan I development in April1955 (2:82). The Titan I improved upon the Atlas design intwo ways. First. it was the first "true" two-stage ICBM.This was considered an improvement because the second stagecould be 3gnited "in near-vacuum" at altitude and providebetter thrust capability (5:--). Second, Titan I wasdesigned to be deployed in hardened silos (49:--). Thissecond characteristic was designed to address the emergingvulnerability of US strategic weapon systems. On 8 September1955, President Eisenhower assigned highest national priori-tyto the Air Force's Atlas and Titan ICBMs, and on 27 October1955 "EHeadquarters Air Force] awarded a research ariddevelopment contract to Glenn L. Martin Aircra+t Company fordevelopment of the Titan weapon system" (41:10). "On 17 June1958. the Air Force accepted delivery of the -first Titan IICBM from the Martin Company, formerly the Glenn L. MartinAircraft Company" (41:18), and the first successful flighttest occurred in February 1959 (2:82). Although the firstTitan I wing was activated at Lowry AFB, Colorado, on 25September 1958, funding constraints delayed delivery of thefirst operational missile until May 1961 (41:19C30)."Eventually between the period 1 April 1958 and 1 October1961, SAC activated 13 Atlas and 6 Titan I ICBM squadrons"(40: 13)

Minuteman I. Minuteman was the first second-generationICBM, and research and development began before the firstAtlas ICBM was placed on alert. The accelerated research anddevelopment activity authorized by the Eisenhoweradministration was resulting in tremendous break-throughs intechnology. One of the foremost advantages of the M.Lutemanweapon system was its use of solid-propellant instead ofliquid propellants used by Atlas, Titan I. and subsequently,Titan !I. General Schriever considered the development ofsolid-fuels "the most important breakthrough since World War11" (2:96). Solid-fuel technology would make it possible to

19

mass produce ICBMs and significantly reduce their reactiontime if required to be launched (2:96). Headquarters USAFobtained Department of Defense approval to develop MinutemanI on 27 February 1958 (41:16). "From its very inception. theMinuteman) program was oriented towards the mass production ofa simple, efficient, and highly survivable ICBM weapon systemcapable of destroying all types of enemy targets withconsistent reliability" (40:17). The Air Force also wanted asystem that was inexpensive to operate and maintain (40:37).

In 1957, the vulnerability of US strategic forces becamean issue as the Soviets began testing and deploying their ownnuclear forces. This resulted in American emphasis ondeveloping a survivable, second-strike capability. Oneconcept that would come back around almost thirty yearslater for Peacel-eeper basing involved placing a portion ofthe programmed Minuteman force (from 50 to 150 missiles' onmobile railroad cars (40:38). "On February 1959,Headquarters SAC submitted a requirement to the Air Sta~fcalling for the first mobile Minuteman to be operational nolater than January 1967" (40:39,40).

In order to determine the feasibility of deployingMinuteman ICBMs on mobile railroad car launchiers,Headquarters SAC ordered a series of tests tQ beconducted, nicknamed Operation Big Star. Be. 1inninyori 20 June 1960, a modified test trai'n, oper:1tingout of Hill AFB, Utah, traveled across varic,,srailroad routes in the western and centralsections of the United States in order to studysuch factors as (1) the ability of the nation'srailroads to support mobile missile trains; (2)problems associated with command, control, andcommunication; (3) the effect of vibration onsensitive missiles and launch equipment; andfinally (4) human factors involved in the operationof a mobile missile system. On 27 August 1960. . . Headquarters USAF announced that the test ofthe Minuteman mobility concept had beensatisfactorily completed (40:39-40).

Although the rail mobility tests demonstrated the capabiLityto make Minuteman survive, "Headquarters USAF continued 'oassign'top priority to the fixed silo-based Minutemanconcept over the mobile one" (40:40). in December 1961. theKennedy administration cancelled this basing mode in favor ofdeploying Minuteman in hardened, underground silos (40:40).

On I December 1961, SAC activated the first Minutemansquadron (MLnuteman I-- Model A). the 10th SMS at MalmstromAFB, Montana, but the first operational Minuteman I in the

10th SMS did not go on alert until 27 October 1962(41:33,37). These +irst missiles in the 10th SMS served asPresident Kennedy's "Ace-in-the-Hole" during the CubanMissile Crisis in October 1962. On 11 December 1962,"Headquarters SAC declared the first two flights of model "A"Minuteman I ICBMs at Malmstrom AFB to be operational. andthis began continuous alert for Minuteman" (41:37).

Titan I1. Headquarters USAF approved the development o+the Titan II ICBM in October 1959, and in May 1960, awardedthe Martin Company a research and development contract(41:23,26). The Titan II was designed to correct many o+ theproblems experienced with Titan I and be able to carry largerpayloads over a greater range (49:--). Titan II incorporatedthree significant improvements over Titan I. It usedstorable, hypergolic ILquid propellants and could be launchedfrom inside its silo without having to be lifted to thesur+ace first. as was the case for Titan I. These twoimprovements significantly improved reactioo- time if themissile was required to launch. Titan II also employed aninertial guidance system, which had been programmed for theTitan I but transferred to Atlas (5:--). This considerablyimproved the guidance accuracy of Titan II over Titan I.

The first Titan II wing, the C90th SMW, and the firstsquadron, the 570th SMS, were activated at Davis-Monthan AFB.,1Arizona, on 1 January 1962. and the first Titan II ICBM wenton alert in April 1963 (41:39). The 'US eventually deployed54 Titan II nissiles. The Titan II was a very capable memberof the US ICBM team -for approximately twenty-four years. On2 October 19Et. "Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C.Carlucci ordE.-2J the deactivation of the Titan Ii ICBM weaponsystem as soon as possible" (41:70), and on 5 May 1987, theimst Titan [I ICBM "rcame off strategic alert at Little Roof-AFB, Arkansas, thus ending an era]" (27:75).

THE K:ENNEDY/JOHNSON ADMINISTRArIONS

Flexible Response

During the Eisenhower administration, Senator John F.Kennedy had been one of the harshest critics about thecredibility of the massive retaliation doctrine, and upon hisentry to the White House in January 1961, he resolved to dosomething about it. His administration's approach to defensebecame known as the "doctrine of multiple options," (2:102)or flexible response, and it remains as US doctrine today(34:26). Flexible response was essentially an extensionrather than a complete revision of massive retaliation sincethe US would still rely upon maintaining superiority of its

S~21

nuclear forces. Under President Kennedy the ICBM programwould improve significantly, but the administration alsoundertook to increase nonnuclear forces as well to provide alimited, flexible response across the entire spectrum ofconflict. Actually, President Eisenhower had favored aflexible response doctrine, but he had been reluctant tospend the funds needed to build up all levels of US mnilitarycapability. President Kennedy reversed this approach todefense spending by ask.ing Secretary of Defense Robert S.McNamara to determine what forces were needed and to budgetaccordingly (2:94)

President Kennedy had e,'pected to enter officeconfronted with Soviet superiority in strategic weapons, butthe facts indicated the opposite (2:8).

Although the Soviets continued to surpass the US inraw numbers of ICBMs even as late as 1962, nomissile gap existed in the sense of an actualstrategic imbalance. What the US lack.ed in n' mbersof ICBMs was more th an made up by the quality ofits ICBMs, by the missiles carried by Polarissubmarines, and by the nuc]ear weapons in itsmanned bombers (2:96).

President hennedy felt it was important that. an inabalance notbe created, and he directed continued build up ofqualitatively superior US *ICBMs.

The Kennedy and Johnson administrations essentiallydoubled the number of ICBMs and SLBMs planned bythe EOsenhower administration (195.Z--1961) andcaused them to be built and put in place withinfive years, by 1966 (6:9).

Secretary of DeFense McNamara, wh- served bothFresidents Kennedy and Johnson, provided a tremendousinfluence on doctrine and strategy development during thesetwo administrations. The policy of Assured Destruction washis.

The Strategy of Assured Destruction

"Assured Destruction was the declaratory nuclearstrategy of the US" (6:11) during the Kennedy-Johnsonadministrations. The concept of Assured Destruction calledfor sufficient nuclear weapons:

To destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society,or, as it was termed, to inflict "unacceptableB2

damaae" on that country. It was assumed that thedestruction of approximately one-third of thepopulation and two-thirds of the industry of theSoviet Union would cause the collapse of the SovietUnion as a modern industrial country. McNamara andhis advisors believed that this capacity, dubbedAssured Destruction. was suf+ic:ent to deter adirect Soviet attack against the US and its mostimportant allies" (6:12).

Assured Destruction relied upon an effective US second-strike capabilitv:,which meant US nuclear forces were"expected to be able to ride out the first nuclear strike andsurvive to deliver "assured destruction" on the enemy duringthe second and succeeding stribes" (2:101). "Developing asecond-strile capability meant protecting land-based missilesby hardening the sites and. if possible, deploying themunderground" (2:101

Another essential component of the Assured Destructionstrategy called for a limited counterforce targeting strategyto retaliate against Soviet military targets. This meant theUnited States could hold a relatively small number ofessential Soviet targets at risk with a relatively smallnumber- of nuclear weapons. American strategists liked thisstrategy for two reasons. First. since there were a limitednumber of Soviet military targets, the US nuclear forcerequirements could be hept relatively small, and in turnwould keep defense expenditures down. Second, sufficientcapability to hold Soviet targets at risk could permit the USto refrain from developing US nuclear capability as fast astechnology would allow in hopes the Soviets would followsuit. Unfortunately the Soviets did not embrace an Americanver=ion of Assured Doetruction, and they Droceeded Li d~el,-cpmore and better strategic weapons (6:12).

The Johnson administration continued to endorse thepolicy of Assured Destruction for itE entire term, and inmodified form, Assured Destruction carried over into theNixon administration. The impact of this policy was that anattitude of sufficiency began to shape the strategic nucliarweapons environment. If a sufficient number of nuclearweapons could reduce the Soviet Union as a viable society, as;defined by Secretary McNamara, then the US would achieve apcint of diminishing marginal utility by adding more ICBMs toits inventory. Therefore, the ICBM force structurestabilized at 1000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II missiles andremairned in that strength until the Nixon administrationbeg ..... o review the requirement for a new, advanced ICBM toaddress a prompt, countermilitary capability shortfallpresented by the massive Soviet buildup in nuclear

2Z

weapons. This ICBM would be called the Peacekeeper(3: 159;6:9-18).

Modernizing The 1CBM LeQ Of The Triad: Minuteman II and III

Minuteman II. On 2 October 1963, Headquarters USAFpublished a requirement l:or the Minuteman II ICBM (41:41)."The Minuteman II was a more advanced missile than theMinuteman I and incorporated a new, larger second stage,improved guidance, a greater range and payload capacity, andan increased capability to survive the effects of nuclearblasts" (41:41). In view of the numerous advantages of theMinuteman II over either model of the Minuteman I. on 8November 196; Secretary of Defense McNamara approved theMinuteman Force modernization Program (41:42). This pro3ectentailed the eventual replacement of the entire force o+deployed Minuteman I ICBMs with Minuteman IIs and MinutemanIIls (41:62). To accommodate the Minuteman II, it wasnecessary to completely retrofit the original Minuteman Ilaunch facilities, launch control facilities, and associatedground equipment. The Minuteman Force Modernization Programbegan at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, on 7 May 1966. and wascompleted on 26 January 1975 with the emplacement of the lastMinuteman III missile at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyomingt41: 62; 40: 43).

The second phase of the Force Modernization program,which ran concurrenLly with the first phase modification ofMinuteman I silos, was the construction of new Minuteman I1launch facilities. On 28 February 1964, "Headquarters AirForce issued a contract for the construction of the firstnew Minuteman Il ICBM wing, Lhe 321st SMW, at Grand ForksFAFB, Nor Lb Dakota" (41:43). On I February 109615, "He.d.uz rtr.SAC activated the first Minuteman iI squadron. th 44Lh ESFISat Grand Forks AFB. North Dakota" (41:46). The firstMinuteman II ICBMs went on alert in the 447th SMS in January1966 (41:49). Fourteen months later on 1 April 1966, SACactivated the twentieth and last Minuteman squadron, the564th SMS at Malmstrom AFB, Montana (41:50). Once the 564thSMS achieved operational status on 21 April 1967, thedeployment of the programmed force of 1000 Minuteman ICbMswas completed (40:43;41:52). In November 1964, Secretary ofDefense McNamara made the decision to reduce the totalrMinuteman deployment from 1200 to 1000 missiles prLmarilybecause the Soviet Union could not overcome technicaldifficulties to perfect their second-generation missiles(9:115-116;41:45).

Minuteman III. "By thp time the last Minuteman 1Is ofthe 564th SMS were placed on strategic alert in the spring of

24

1967, significant progress had been made on the developmentof an even more advanced model of the Minuteman, theMinuteman IlI" (40:44). Headquarters Air Force had issuedthe first Minuteman III research and development contract iothe Boeing Aerospace Company on 15 July 1965 (41:48). "TheMinuteman III ICBM possessed an improved third stage.employed more penetration aids to counter anti-ballisticmissile defense systems, and was equipped with the Mark 12Mltiple Independently Targetable Reentry VehicWe (MIRVY)capable of carrying up to three warheads" (41:48). On 17April 1970, the first Minuteman III ICBM was emplaced in asilo in the 741st SMS at Minot AFB, North Dakota (41:55).Eight months later, on 29 December 1970, the 741Et SMS bec:amethe +irst SAC Minuteman squadron equipped with MinutemanIlls to achieve operational status (41:57). On 11 Julv 1975,the 550th Minuteman III ICBM became oper-ational at MalmstromAFB, Montana (41:62). On 22 February 1977, President Carterterminated production of Minuteman III missiles (41:64;.

B, 12 July 1975, the Minuteman ICBM force consisted of450 Minuteman Ius and 550 Minuteman Ills. In addition, anumber of modification programs were being carried ouL, aimedat increasing both the survivability and flexibility of theSAC ICBM +orce. These included the Silo Upgrade program,which increased the hardness of Minuteman silos, and theCommand Data Buffer program, which provided for the rapid,remote retargeting of Minuteman ICBMs (40:45).

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The Nixon administration came to office in January 1 19 6 9,and continued to embrace the policy of Assured Destruction(6:180. However, the concept of Assured Destruction hadbegun to come under critical scrutiny as a result of themassive Soviet buildup oa larger and more accurate ICBMweapon systems, such as their SS-18 which is the world'slargest ICBM (6:18).

By the mid-1970s, the Soviets had surpassed the USin numbers of launchers and throw-weight and waschallenging the US in numbers of megatonnage andaccuracy. It thus became theoretically possiblethat by using the large numbers of extremelyaccurate land-based missiles against US nuclearweapons, Soviet leaders might prevent the US fromexercising its Assured Destruction capability(6:18).

During the early 1970s, policy makers became concernedabout nuclear stability. "Stability e"ists when there is no

25

incentive for one side to resort to a preemptive nuclearstrike" (6: 18).

Proponents of stability favor inaccurate weaponsbecause if either side has the ability to destroythe other's strategic forces, then it mightconclude that there was an advantage to strikingfirst. In conformance with the logic of stability,US policy makers consciously refrained frombuiLding and deploying the large numbers ofextremely accurate missiles and warheads necessaryto attact Soviet missile silos all through the1970s, even though the [US] was capable ofdeploying such weapons well before the Soviets"(6 1I ) .

The stability argument mitigated against an anti-ballisticmissile agreement or ci vi I defense because these imp] iedsurvival against a first-strike, and hence might reduce thedeterrent value of nuclear weapons. The ABM Treaty signedin 1972 essentially codified this understanding by limitingithe number of ABM sites each side could deploy 6:616).

"The Nioron administration felt obligated "to respond tothe drairal-ic growth in Soviet capabilities [manifested by theSoviet decision to deploy over three hundred SS-18 ICBMsJ"(o:18-19). H6wever, in compliance with the stabI'lItyposition, instead of adopting a counterforce strategy anddeveloping a counLerforce capability, the US decided to adopta retargeting strategy to permit limited nuclear options(1:19). To comply with this new targeting strategy, the USalso undertoo[ to develop a new iCBM--the "Missile-E;,periment] ," or "MX".

CONCLUSION

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States andthe Soviet Union have engaged in a seemingly endless armsrace to develop strategic offensive nutclear forces to keepeach other deterred from initiating war. In the post-WorldWar IT period, the United States decided to rely almoste;.clusively on its collective security agreements and itsmonopoly of nuclear forces, limited though they were, toachieve its national security objectives. This encourageddevelopment of an American ICBM capability. Since then,attitudes about the proper force structure and the strategyfor employment of nuclear weapons have evolved frommaintaining a US superiority in nuclear forces and deliverycap3bilities, to sufficiency, and now some would argue theUS needs to develop a war-fighting, counter-force strategy.In any event, many American attitudes have been formed during

26

this tufmlultUous period of complex, changing doctrine andstrategy. Appreciating how the US developed its ICBM forcesin compliance with these strategies might help YOU Lounderstand some of the reluctance to endorse continued ICBMmodernization today.

2 7

IINzFKMI

Chapter Four

ARMS CONTROL

I NTRODUCT ION

The role of arms control and arms reduction are funda-mental to the debate of ICBM modernization. As both the UL1and the Soviets added nuclear weapons to their arsenals,there was a growing world-wide concern that these weaponswere in excess to the numbers needed for mutual deiense.Concerns over the arms race and its e4fect on world stabilityled to the start of the arms control process.

The purpose of this chapter is to review how the armscontrol process has influenced ICBM modernization. One o0the objectives of the ICBM modernization program that isstated in The ICBM Modernization Briefing is to support ar-mscontrol. Therefore, a working knowledge of its history willhelp you better understand the process, and in turn, betteirespond to questions about its role.

SALT I

The first series of Strategic Arms Limitation Talls(SALT I) were conducted from November t969 to Ma, 1t972.These negotiations, conducted in Helsinki and Vienna,produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ADM) Treat; and anagreement to consider other limitations on land and submarinebased offensive nuclear weapons (45:102-177). The beginningof the SALT I negotiations capped the decade o+ the 1960's inwhich efforts