A Vote of Confidence in Smartmatic? Roberto Verzola Secretary-General Halalang Marangal [email protected].

A Vote of Confidence in Smartmatic?

Roberto VerzolaSecretary-GeneralHalalang Marangal

[email protected]

March 8: Smartmatic full-page ad

Last March 8, 2010a full-page ad by Smartmatic-TIM

came out in several national dailies.

The ad was entitled“A Vote of Confidence for the 2010 Elections”

Hardware / supplies / consumables

82,200 PCOS manu-factured, delivered

1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers and printers delivered

1,722 power generators delivered

180,640 compact flash memory cards purchased

82,200 batteries for each PCOS delivered

338,750 rolls for printing 30 copies of ER per pcnt delivered

82,200 PCOS made, delivered

Note the careful omission: manufactured in China, delivered in Manila, but no mention of full testing and acceptance by the Comelec

Omission creates false impression of readiness

In 2004, thorough testing of 1,990 counting machines took 3 months (source: Comelec Comm. Mehol Sadain, a HALAL convenor)

1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers and printers delivered

No mention of test results or Comelec acceptance

1,722 power generators delivered

No mention of test results or Comelec acceptance

180,640 compact flash memory cards purchased

Each machine uses two memory cards

82,200 PCOS machines, including backups

82,200 x 2 = 164,400 memory cards needed

180,640–164,400 = 16,240 extra memory cards

There are only 75,471 precinct clusters

Warning: potential capability to substitute memory cards in 21.5% of PCOS machines

Hardware / supplies / consumables

Unknown test results: 82,200 PCOS and batteries

1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers, printers, generators

180,640 compact flash memory cards; at least 20% more than necessary

PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS: 80%

Software / certifications / voter education

Source code customization finished

Source code in escrow at BSP

System audit internationally-recognized certification entity finished

Source code public review process opened

Successful field tests and mock elections

Voter education websites launched

Voter educn TV and radio infomercials

Source code customization finished

“Customization” included disabling of voter verification and confirmation feature which is built into the PCOS machine.

This feature would have displayed the names of candidates marked in the ballot. Voters must then confirm through a CAST button that their ballot was scanned accurately.

It assures voters that their votes were scanned accurately. This feature was disabled.

Source code in escrow at BSP

Source code is Smartmatic's general instructions directed to every machine

No mention of source code certification by Systest, for which Comelec paid P72 million

No mention of any certification document, or of the full Systest report, on its source code review

Insiders cite “series of written exchanges” between Systest and Comelec about the review

Release the full text of the Systest review NOW

System audit by internationally-recognized certification entity

System audit covers not only the source code

but all the five sub-systems essential to AES success

Smartmatic claims “finished”. But no certification, much less a full report, has been released to the

public. Full audit report must be released.

Source code public review process opened

Process is highly restrictiveand makes a review extremely difficult

So far, no group has managed to conduct a code review

Successful field tests and mock elections

WHAT A LIE! High ballot rejection rates (light shading of ovals

should not cause ballot rejection)

Transmission problems even in Metro Manila

Blackout on machine accuracy/error rates

A contractor that will put such a lie in a full-page ad can lie about anything

Software / certifications / voter education

System audit and source code review: no full text report or certification released

Source code public review: no local group has done a code review

Successful field tests and mock elections:

What a lie!


Logistics / Support / Preparations

28 multinational experts at the PMT

327 qualified Filipino organic employees

Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed for signal, power, etc.

438 Comelec trainers

23,000 sqm central warehouse and config facility operational

Contracts with logistics providers, forwarders signed

Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs started

Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed for signal, power, etc.

Since there are 48,000 voting centersonly 75% have been covered

904 test and config line employees working two shifts

Tests needed Burn-in of machines, batteries, generators, etc.

Full testing of batteries: will they last at least 12 hrs?

Testing for failures rates and mean time between failures (MTBF)

Testing for ballot rejection rates

Testing for scan accuracy/error rates (should be less than 5 per 100,000 marks)

In 2004, testing 1,990 machines took 3 months

Contracts with logistics providers, forwarders signed

Relative unknowns. Have you heard of the ff? (Malaya, 15 March 2010)? Germalin Enterprises (P2.3M 2006 net income)

Agro Intl Forwarders (P3.7M 2008 retained earnings)

ACF Logistics Worldwide (P1.1M 2008 cash balance)

Assuming a delivery team of 3, at least 200,000 delivery personnel needed for 75,471 clusters

Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs started

48,000 field technicians for 75,471 machines?

438 Comelec trainers

For 226,000 BEI members?

Logistics / Support / Preparations

Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed: 75% coverage

438 Comelec trainers: 260,000 BEIs to train

Logistics providers, forwarders: unknowns

Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs: only started


Telecommunications and Transmission

48,000 modems delivered

46,000 SIM cards secured

5,500 BGAN mobile sat xmtrs purchased

680 VSAT mobile sat xmtrs leased

2 data centers for backup of nationwide results with redundancy secured

Contract with major telcos to provide VPN for transmitting results secured

48,000 modems delivered

For 75,471 machines?(63.6%)

How many of them can actually get a signal in the field?

46,000 SIM cards secured

False security:Smartmatic generates passwords, issues digital

certificates, verifies the certificates, and operates the machines

This is like merging in a single person the functions of accountant, cashier, auditor,

operator and vendor!

5,500 BGAN mobile sat xmtrs purchased

48,000 + 5,500 = 53,500

680 VSAT mobile sat xmtrs leased

53,500 + 680 = 54,180(for 75,471 machines, or 71.8%)

2 data centers for backup of results with redundancy secured

Data centers in secret locations whichthe Comelec refuses to reveal to the public

This is equivalent to conducting a canvass in a secret place only the Comelec

and Smartmatic know

Contract with major telcos to provide VPN for transmitting results secured

According to Smartmatic's own field surveys, only 70% of voting centers have reliable signals

Telecommunications and Transmission

46,000 SIM cards: for 48,000 modems?

48,000 modems; 5,500 BGAN; 680 mobile sat transmitters: for 75,741 machines? (72%)

Contract with major telcos: 70% coverage

2 data centers for backup: secret locations


Ballot Printing Infrastructure Delivered to COMELEC and NPO

4 high-speed digital printers

1,500 metric tons of ballot paper

9,380 liters of ink

Over 10 million ballots with security marks (invisible ultraviolet mark and unique barcode) printed

Over 10 million ballots with security marks (invisible ultraviolet mark and

unique barcode) printed

Ballot printing begins after a half-day delay

C. LAPEÑA, K. J. TAN, GMANews.TV02/08/2010 | 02:11 PM

The printing of ballots for the May 2010 elections has finally begun after “technical considerations" hampered the process, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) said Monday.

This was announced by Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal at 1 p.m. after printing was delayed by more than half a day.

Confidential March 1 Comelec memo on ballot printing problem

... The Comelec memorandum noted that as of March 1, some 7.9 million ballots for the electronic balloting had been printed. Of the number, 5.3 million were accepted as “good ballots,” while the rest have yet to be checked.

“Granting that 7,878,480 are all good ballots, we still have to print a total of 42,845,254 for a period of 54 days. This means, we should be able to have a daily production of 793,430,629, more or less, per day from four printers, which is impossible!” the memorandum read.

Smartmatic-TIM has leased to the commission four Kodak VersaMark VL 4000 printers, each capable of printing 200,000 ballots.

Ladra said the printers’ daily output was only 650,000 or 162,500 each. At this capacity, she said only 34.1 million ballots would be printed by April 25, when the Comelec starts to ship out the ballots. (PDI report, 10Mar2010)

7.9 million ballots printedfrom Feb. 8 to Mar. 1

Dates Days BallotsRate

2/8 – 3/1 20 7.9 million 394,000/day

assuming the same printing rate...3/2 – 4/30 60 21.3 million

7.9 million + 21.3 million = 39.2 million If the remaining 10.8 million ballots are printed at the same rate, they will be finished on May 27

1,600 print jobs in 80 days

Each municipality/city has its own ballot designEach ballot design is one print job

1,600 print jobs in 80 daysis 20 print jobs per day

What if a printing error is made?Do candidates verify if their names

are accurately positioned? (Due diligence!)

4 high-speed digital printers

According to insiders, these special Kodak printers

are not available off-the-shelf. Kodak makes them

only when orders are received



Ultraviolet scanning capability disabled, according to CJ Panganiban

(UV mark is a security feature)

ARMM ballots minus NPO security mark




Expected probabilities of success, as of March 8 Smartmatic ad

Sub-project PoS

Hardware and supplies 80%Software and certifications 70%

Logistics and support 80%Telecomms and transmission 70%

Ballot printing80%

Basic Principle of Project Management

(and Reliability Engineering)

To get the overall probability of success of a project with a series of sub-projects,

each one essential to overall project success,

multiply togethereach sub-project's probability of success:

.8 x .7 x .8 x .7 x .8 = ?

If each subproject had 99% chances of success...

.99 x .99 x .99 x .99 x .99

= .95


.95 x .95 x .95 x .95 x .95

= .77


.9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9

= .59


.87 x .87 x .87 x .87 x .87

= .498


.8 x .8 x .8 x .8 x .8

= .33

Estimated AES chances of success, as of March 8 ad by Smartmatic

.8 x .7 x .8 x .7 x .8

= .25

Will Smartmatic vote on behalf of the Filipino people?

The March 8 ad implies that voters have given Smartmatic solid votes of confidence

in each of their five automation sub-projects.

Smartmatic marked those ovals, not the voters.

Will Smartmatic, a foreign company, also speak for Filipino voters on May 10?

I. The COMELEC should ...

Make public test protocols and test results of every machine, particularly the mean time between failures, ballot rejection rates, and scan accurary rates

Allow pol parties to test some machines themselves

Not accept, deploy or pay for machines which do not meet specifications – simple due diligence

Distribute machines randomly: what if bad machines are sent to opposition bailiwicks?

Embargo the 16,240 extra memory cards

II. The COMELEC should ...

Reenable voter verification and confirmation if ballot was scanned accurately by the machine

Make public Systest certification and full reports on the system audit and source code review

Provide stakeholder access to the source code on the same terms and conditions as Systest

Make public the series of exchanges between Comelec and its Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) and Systest

III. The COMELEC should ...

Make public the transmission and power availability survey report of Smartmatic

Make public the list of field offices of all forwarding firms contracted by Smartmatic

Make public the contracts with forwarding firms

Make public the latest version of its machine testing, ballot printing, delivery and training timelines

IV. The COMELEC should ...

Make public detailed continuity plan for areas with weak or no signals, or where transmission failures occur

Make public copy of contracts with telcos

Open to the public Comelec data servers site

Transfer digital security management from Smartmatic to independent third party (DOST?)

V. The COMELEC should ...

Grant observer status to political parties in the ballot printing committee

Conduct random testing of ballots for quality, machine readability and rejection rates

Allow political parties to inspect and test ballot batches themselves

To political parties and the public: beware of ...

Location-specific “problems”, authentic or not:

Regional variations in delivery capabilities, quality/reliability of counting machines, modems, batteries, servers, electricity, generators, telco signals, ballots availability, conduct of trainings, etc.

These variations can bias voter turnout in favor of some candidate bailiwicks over others

Ballot fraud in millions: it is easier with shading ovals than writing names

Reducing the risk of failure

All proposals for ensuring transparency in the AES must be heeded

Every precinct must be authorized and prepared to count votes manually in cases of machine delay or failure, valid but rejected ballots and for a post-election manual audit

Full parallel count by a consortium of citizens' groups based on one of the 8 official ER copies must be authorized and done in public

Options in case of failure...

Orderly constitutional transition must be ensured, if no president, vice-president or senators are proclaimed

Clarify the role of such interim post-GMA government in settling election disputes or even possibly conducting new, credible elections

Turbulent times are coming

Pray for the best

Prepare for the worst

A Vote of Confidence in Smartmatic? Roberto Verzola Secretary-General Halalang Marangal [email protected].

Documents

code review slide

bsp source code

comelec acceptance slide

source code review insiders

months source

systest review

halal convenor slide

pcos machines