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ATheoryoftheOriginoftheState
RobertL.Carneiro
For the first 2 million years of hisexistence, man lived in
bands orvillages which, as far as we can tell,were completely
autonomous. Notuntil perhaps 5000 B.C. did
villagesbegintoaggregateintolargerpoliticalunits. But, once this
process ofaggregation began, it continued at aprogressively faster
pace and led,around4000B.C.,
totheformationofthefirststateinhistory.(WhenIspeakof a state I mean
an autonomouspolitical unit, encompassing manycommunities within
its territory andhavingacentralizedgovernmentwiththe power to
collect taxes, draftmenfor work or war, and decree andenforce
laws.) Although it was by allodds the most farreaching
politicaldevelopment in human history, theorigin of the state is
still veryimperfectly understood. Indeed, notoneof thecurrent
theoriesof theriseof thestate isentirelysatisfactory.Atone point or
another, all of them fail.There is one theory, though, which
Ibelieve does provide a convincingexplanationofhowstatesbegan.
Itisa theory which I proposed oncebefore1, and which I present
heremorefully.Beforedoingso,however,it seems desirable to discuss,
if onlybriefly, a few of the traditionaltheories.
Explicit theories of the origin of thestate are
relativelymodern. Classicalwriters like Aristotle, unfamiliar
withother forms of political organization,tended to think of the
state asnatural, and therefore as notrequiring an explanation.
However,the age of exploration, by makingEuropeans aware that many
peoplesthroughout the world lived, not instates, but in independent
villages ortribes, made the state seem less
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natural, and thus more in need ofexplanation.
Ofthemanymoderntheoriesofstateorigins that have been proposed,
wecanconsideronlyafew.Thosewitharacial basis. for example,
arenowsothoroughly discredited that they neednot be dealt with
here. We can alsoreject the belief that the state is anexpression
of the genius of apeople2, or that it arose through ahistorical
accident. Such notionsmake the state appear to besomething
metaphysical oradventitious,andthusplaceitbeyondscientific
understanding. In myopinion, the origin of the state wasneither
mysterious nor fortuitous.
Itwasnottheproductofgeniusortheresultofchance,buttheoutcomeofaregular
and determinate culturalprocess. Moreover, it was not aunique event
but a recurringphenomenon: states aroseindependently in different
places andat different times. Where theappropriate conditions
existed, thestateemerged.
VoluntaristicTheories
Serioustheoriesofstateoriginsareoftwo general types:
voluntaristic andcoercive. Voluntaristic theories holdthat, at some
point in their history,certain peoples spontaneously,rationally,
and voluntarily gave uptheir individual sovereignties
andunitedwithothercommunitiestoforma larger political unit
deserving to becalled a state. Of such theories thebestknown is
theoldSocialContracttheory, which was associatedespecially with the
name ofRousseau.Wenowknowthatnosuchcompact was ever subscribed to
byhuman groups, and the
SocialContracttheoryistodaynothingmorethanahistoricalcuriosity.
Themostwidely acceptedofmodernvoluntaristic theories is the one
I callthe automatic theory. According to
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thistheory,theinventionofagricultureautomatically brought into
being asurplus of food, enabling
someindividualstodivorcethemselvesfromfood production and to
becomepotters,weavers,smiths,masons,andso on, thus creating an
extensivedivision of labor. Out of thisoccupational specialization
theredevelopedapoliticalintegrationwhichunited a number of
previouslyindependent communities into astate. This argument was
set forthmost frequently by the late
BritisharcheologistV.GordonChilde.3
Theprincipaldifficultywith this theoryis that agriculture does
notautomatically create a food surplus.We know this because
manyagricultural peoples of the worldproduceno such
surplus.Virtually allAmazonianIndians,forexample,wereagricultural,
but in aboriginal timesthey did not produce a food surplus.That it
was technically feasible forthem to produce such a surplus isshown
by the fact that, under thestimulus of European settlers desirefor
food,anumberof tribesdid raisemanioc in amounts well above theirown
needs, for the purpose oftrading.4 Thus the technical meansfor
generating a food surplus werethere it was the social
mechanismsneeded to actualize it that werelacking.
Anothercurrentvoluntaristic theoryofstate origins is Karl
Wittfogelshydraulic hypothesis. As Iunderstand him, Wittfogel sees
thestate arising in the following way.
Incertainaridandsemiaridareasoftheworld, where village farmers had
tostruggle to support themselves
bymeansofsmallscaleirrigation,atimearrivedwhentheysawthatitwouldbeto
the advantage of all concerned toset aside their individual
autonomiesandmerge their villages intoa
singlelargepoliticalunitcapableofcarryingout irrigation on a broad
scale. Thebodyofofficialstheycreatedtodevise
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and administer such extensiveirrigationworksbrought thestate
intobeing.5
This theory has recently run intodifficulties. Archeological
evidencenowmakes it appear that in at leastthreeof theareas
thatWittfogel citesas exemplifying his
hydraulichypothesisMesopotamia, China,and Mexicofullfledged
statesdeveloped well before largescaleirrigation.6 Thus, irrigation
did notplay thecausal role in the riseof thestate that Wittfogel
appears toattributetoit.7
This and all other voluntaristictheories of the rise of the
statefounder on the same rock: thedemonstrated inability of
autonomouspolitical units to relinquish theirsovereignty in the
absence ofoverriding external constraints.
Weseethisinabilitymanifestedagainandagain by political units
ranging fromtinyvillagestogreatempires.Indeed,one can scan the
pages of historywithout finding a single genuineexception to this
rule. Thus, inorderto account for the origin of the statewe must
set aside voluntaristictheoriesandlookelsewhere.
CoerciveTheories
A close examination of historyindicates that only a coercive
theorycan account for the rise of the state.Force, and not
enlightened selfinterest, is the mechanism by whichpolitical
evolution has led, step
bystep,fromautonomousvillagestothestate.
The view that war lies at the root ofthe state is by no means
new.Twentyfive hundred years
agoHeraclituswrotethatwaristhefatherofallthings.Thefirstcarefulstudyofthe
role of warfare in the rise of
thestate,however,wasmadelessthanahundred years ago, by
HerbertSpencer in his Principles of
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Sociology.8 Perhaps better knownthan Spencers writings on war
andthestatearetheconquesttheoriesofcontinental writers such as
LudwigGumplowicz9, Gustav Ratzenhofer10,andFranzOppenheimer.11
Oppenheimer, for example, arguedthat the state emerged when
theproductive capacity of settledagriculturists was combined with
theenergy of pastoral nomads throughthe conquest of the former by
thelatter11 (pp. 5155). This theory,however, has two serious
defects.First, it fails toaccount for the riseofstates in
aboriginal America, wherepastoral nomadism was
unknown.Second,itisnowwellestablishedthatpastoralnomadismdidnotariseintheOldWorlduntilaftertheearlieststateshademerged.
Regardless of deficiencies inparticular coercive theories,
however,thereislittlequestionthat,inonewayoranother,warplayedadecisiverolein
the rise of the state. Historical
orarcheologicalevidenceofwarisfoundin the early stages of state
formationinMesopotamia, Egypt, India, China,Japan, Greece, Rome,
northernEurope, central Africa,
Polynesia,MiddleAmerica,Peru,andColombia,to name only the most
prominentexamples.
Thus,with theGermanickingdomsofnorthern Europe especially in
mind,Edward Jenks observed that,historicallyspeaking, there isnot
theslightest difficulty in proving that allpolitical communities of
the moderntype [that is, states] owe theirexistence to successful
warfare.12And in reading Jan VansinasKingdoms of the Savanna13, a
bookwith no theoretical ax to grind, onefinds that state after
state in centralAfricaroseinthesamemanner.
But is it really true that there is
noexceptiontothisrule?Mighttherenot
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be, somewhere in the world, anexample of a state which
arosewithouttheagencyofwar?
Untilafewyearsago,anthropologistsgenerally believed that the
ClassicMayaprovidedsuchaninstance.Thearcheological evidence then
availablegave no hint of warfare among
theearlyMayaandledscholarstoregardthem as a peaceloving
theocraticstatewhichhadarisenentirelywithoutwar.14However,thisviewisnolongertenable.
Recent archeologicaldiscoveries have placed the ClassicMaya in a
very different light. Firstcame thediscoveryof
theBonampakmurals,showingtheearlyMayaatwarand reveling in the
torture of warcaptives. Then, excavations aroundTikal revealed
largeearthworkspartlysurrounding that Classic Maya
city,pointingclearlytoamilitaryrivalrywiththe neighboring city of
Uaxactun.15Summarizingpresentthinkingonthesubject,MichaelD.Coehasobservedthat
the ancient Maya were just
aswarlikeasthe...bloodthirstystatesofthePostClassic.16
Yet, thoughwarfare issurelyaprimemover in the origin of the
state, itcannot be the only factor. After all,warshavebeen fought
inmanypartsof the world where the state
neveremerged.Thus,whilewarfaremaybea necessary condition for the
rise ofthestate,itisnotasufficientone.Or,to put it another way,
while we
canidentifywarasthemechanismofstateformation,weneedalsotospecifytheconditionsunderwhich
itgaverise tothestate.
EnvironmentalCircumscription
How are we to determine theseconditions? One promising
approachistolookforthosefactorscommontoareas of the world in which
statesarose indigenouslyareas such asthe Nile, TigrisEuphrates, and
Indusvalleys in the Old World and theValley of Mexico and the
mountain
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and coastal valleys of Peru in theNew. These areas differ from
oneanother in many waysin altitude,temperature, rainfall, soil
type,drainage pattern, and many
otherfeatures.Theydo,however,haveonethingincommon:theyareallareasofcircumscribed
agricultural land. Eachofthemissetoffbymountains,seas,or deserts,
and these environmentalfeatures sharply delimit the area thatsimple
farming peoples could occupyand cultivate. In this respect
theseareasareverydifferentfrom,say,theAmazon basin or the
easternwoodlands of North America, whereextensive and unbroken
forestsprovided almost unlimited agriculturalland.
But what is the significance ofcircumscribedagricultural land
for theoriginofthestate?Itssignificancecanbest be understood by
comparingpoliticaldevelopmentintworegionsoftheworldhavingcontrastingecologiesone
a region with circumscribedagricultural land and the other
aregionwheretherewasextensiveandunlimited land. The two areas I
havechosen to use in making thiscomparisonare
thecoastalvalleysofPeruandtheAmazonbasin.
Our examination begins at the stagewhere agricultural
communities werealready present but where each wasstill completely
autonomous. LookingfirstattheAmazonbasin,weseethatagricultural
villages there werenumerous,butwidelydispersed.Evenin areas with
relatively denseclustering,liketheUpperXingubasin,villages were at
least 10 or 15milesapart. Thus, the typical
Amazoniancommunity,eventhoughitpracticedasimple form of shifting
cultivationwhich required extensive amounts ofland, still had
around it all the forestland needed for its gardens.17 ForAmazonia
as a whole, then,population density was low
andsubsistencepressureonthelandwasslight.
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Warfare was certainly frequent inAmazonia, but it was waged
forreasons of revenge, the taking ofwomen, the gaining of
personalprestige, and motives of a
similarsort.Therebeingnoshortageofland,there was, by and large, no
warfareoverland.
The consequences of the type ofwarfare that did occur in
Amazoniawere as follows. A defeated groupwas not, as a rule, driven
from itsland.Nordidthevictormakeanyrealeffort tosubject
thevanquished,or toexact tribute from him. This wouldhave been
difficult to accomplish
inanycase,sincetherewasnoeffectivewaytopreventthelosersfromfleeingtoadistantpartof
theforest. Indeed,defeated villages often chose to dojust this, not
so much to avoidsubjugationastoavoidfurtherattack.With settlement
so sparse inAmazonia,anewareaofforestcouldbe found and occupied
with relativeease, andwithout trespassing on theterritory of
another village.Moreover,since virtually any area of forest
issuitable for cultivation, subsistenceagriculture could be carried
on in thenew habitat just about as well as intheold.
It was apparently by this process offight and flight that
horticultural tribesgradually spread out until they
cametocover,thinlybutextensively,almosttheentireAmazonbasin.Thus,undertheconditionsofunlimitedagriculturalland
and low population density thatprevailed in Amazonia, the effect
ofwarfarewas todispersevillagesovera wide area, and to keep
themautonomous. With only a very
fewexceptions,notedbelow,therewasnotendency in Amazonia for
villages tobeheld in placeand to combine
intolargerpoliticalunits.
Inmarked contrast to the situation inAmazonia were the events
thattranspiredinthenarrowvalleysofthePeruviancoast.The
reconstructionof
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these events that I present isadmittedly inferential, but I
think it isconsistent with the archeologicalevidence.
Here too our account begins at thestage of small, dispersed,
andautonomous farming communities.However, instead of being
scatteredovera vast expanseof rain forest astheywere inAmazonia,
villages herewere confined to some 78 short andnarrow valleys.18
Each of thesevalleys,moreover,wasbackedbythemountains, fronted by
the sea, andflankedoneithersidebydesertasdryas any in the world.
Nowhere else,perhaps, can one find agriculturalvalleys more sharply
circumscribedthanthese.
As with neolithic communitiesgenerally, villages of the
Peruviancoastalvalleystendedtogrowinsize.Since autonomous villages
are likelyto fission as they grow, as long asland is available for
the settlementofsplinter communities, these
villagesundoubtedlysplit from time to time.19Thus, villages tended
to increase innumber faster than theygrew insize.This increase in
the number ofvillages occupying a valley probablycontinued, without
giving rise tosignificant changes in subsistencepractices, until
all the readily arablelandinthevalleywasbeingfarmed.
At this point two changes inagricultural techniques began
tooccur:thetillingoflandalreadyundercultivation was intensified,
and new,previouslyunusablelandwasbroughtunder cultivation by means
ofterracingandirrigation.20
Yettherateatwhichnewarablelandwas created failed to keep
pacewiththe increasing demand for it. Evenbefore the land shortage
became soacute that irrigation began to
bepracticedsystematically,villageswereundoubtedly already fighting
oneanother over land. Prior to this time,
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when agricultural villages were stillfew innumberandwell
suppliedwithland,thewarfarewagedinthecoastalvalleysofPeruhadprobablybeenofmuchthesametypeasthatdescribedabove
for Amazonia.With increasingpressure of human population on
theland,however,themajor incentiveforwar changed from a desire
forrevenge to a need to acquire land.And, as the causes of war
becamepredominantly economic, thefrequency, intensity, and
importanceofwarincreased.
Once this stage was reached, aPeruvianvillage that lostawar
facedconsequences very different fromthose faced by a defeated
village inAmazonia. There, as we have seen,the vanquished could
flee to a newlocale, subsisting there about aswellas they had
subsisted before, andretainingtheir independence.InPeru,however,
this alternative was nolonger open to the inhabitants
ofdefeatedvillages.Themountains,
thedesert,andtheseatosaynothingofneighboringvillagesblockedescapein
every direction. A village
defeatedinwarthusfacedonlygrimprospects.If itwasallowedtoremainon
itsownland,insteadofbeingexterminatedorexpelled, this concession
came onlyataprice.And thepricewaspoliticalsubordination to the
victor. Thissubordination generally entailed
atleastthepaymentofatributeortaxinkind,whichthedefeatedvillagecouldprovide
only by producingmore foodthan it had produced before.
Butsubordination sometimes involved
afurtherlossofautonomyonthepartofthe defeated village
namely,incorporation into the political
unitdominatedbythevictor.
Through the recurrence ofwarfare ofthis type, we see arising in
coastalPeru integrated territorial
unitstranscendingthevillageinsizeandindegree of organization.
Politicalevolutionwasattainingthelevelofthechiefdom.
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As land shortages continued andbecame even more acute, so
didwarfare.Now,however,thecompetingunits were no longer small
villagesbut,often, largechiefdoms.Fromthispoint on, through the
conquest ofchiefdom by chiefdom, the size ofpolitical units
increased at aprogressivelyfasterrate.Naturally,asautonomous
political units increasedin size, they decreased in number,with the
result that an entire valleywas eventually unified under
thebannerof itsstrongestchiefdom.Thepolitical unit thus formed
wasundoubtedly sufficiently
centralizedandcomplextowarrantbeingcalledastate.
The political evolution I havedescribed for one valley of
Peruwasalso taking place in other valleys, inthe highlands as well
as on thecoast.21 Once valleywide kingdomsemerged, the next step
was theformation of multivalley kingdomsthrough the conquest of
weakervalleys by stronger ones. Theculmination of this process was
theconquest22 of all of Peru by
itsmostpowerfulstate,andtheformationofasinglegreatempire.Althoughthisstepmay
have occurred once or twicebefore in Andean history, it wasachieved
most notably, and for thelasttime,bytheIncas.23
PoliticalEvolution
While theaggregationof villages intochiefdoms, and of chiefdoms
intokingdoms, was occurring by externalacquisition, the structure
of theseincreasingly larger political units
wasbeingelaboratedbyinternalevolution.Theseinnerchangeswere,ofcourse,closely
related to outer events. Theexpansion of successful statesbrought
within their
bordersconqueredpeoplesandterritorywhichhadtobeadministered.Anditwastheindividuals
who had distinguishedthemselvesinwarwhoweregenerallyappointed to
political office and
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assigned the taskof carryingout thisadministration. Besides
maintaininglaw and order and collecting taxes,the functionsof
thisburgeoningclassof administrators included mobilizinglabor for
building irrigation works,roads, fortresses, palaces,
andtemples.Thus, their functions
helpedtoweldanassortedcollectionofpettystates into a single
integrated andcentralizedpoliticalunit.
These same individuals, who owedtheir improved social position
to theirexploits in war, became, along
withtherulerandhiskinsmen,thenucleusof an upper class. A lower
class
inturnemergedfromtheprisonerstakeninwarandemployedasservantsandslavesbytheircaptors.Inthismannerdidwarcontributetotheriseofsocialclasses.
Inotedearlierthatpeoplesattempttoacquire their neighbors land
beforethey have made the fullest possibleuse of their own. This
implies thatevery autonomous village has anuntappedmargin of
foodproductivity,and that thismargin is squeezed outonly when the
village is subjugatedand compelled to pay taxes in kind.The surplus
food extracted fromconquered villages through taxation,which in the
aggregate attained verysignificantproportions,wentlargelytosupport
the ruler, his warriors andretainers, officials, priests, and
othermembers of the rising upper
class,whothusbecamecompletelydivorcedfromfoodproduction.
Finally, those made landless by
warbutnotenslavedtendedtogravitatetosettlements which, because of
theirspecialized administrative,commercial, or religious
functions,were growing into towns and cities.Here theywereable
tomakea livingas workers and artisans,
exchangingtheirlaborortheirwaresforpartoftheeconomicsurplusexactedfromvillagefarmersby
the rulingclassandspentbymembersofthatclasstoraisetheir
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standardofliving.
The process of political evolutionwhich I have outlined for the
coastalvalleys of Peru was, in its essentialfeatures, by nomeans
unique to thisregion. Areas of circumscribedagricultural land
elsewhere in theworld, such as the Valley of
Mexico,Mesopotamia,theNileValley,andtheIndusValley,sawtheprocessoccurinmuch
the same way and foressentiallythesamereasons.Intheseareas, too,
autonomous neolithicvillages were succeeded bychiefdoms, chiefdoms
by kingdoms,and kingdoms by empires. The laststage of this
development was, ofcourse, the most impressive. Thescale and
magnificence attained bythe early empires overshadowedeverything
thathadgonebefore.But,in a sense, empires weremerely
thelogicalculminationoftheprocess.Thereally fundamental step, the
one thathadtriggeredtheentiretrainofeventsthat led to empires, was
the changefromvillageautonomy
tosupravillageintegration.Thisstepwasachangeinkind everything that
followedwas, inaway,onlyachangeindegree.
Inadditiontobeingpivotal,thesteptosupracommunity aggregation
wasdifficult, for it took 2 million years toachieve. But, once it
was achieved,once village autonomy wastranscended, only two or
threemillenniawererequiredfor theriseofgreat empires and the
flourishing ofcomplexcivilizations.
ResourceConcentration
Theories are first formulated on thebasis of a limited number of
facts.Eventually, though, a theory
mustconfrontallofthefacts.Andoftennewfactsarestubbornanddonotconformto
the theory, or donot conformverywell.What distinguishes a
successfultheory from an unsuccessful one isthat it can bemodified
or elaboratedto accommodate the entire range of
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facts. Let us see how well thecircumscription theory holds
upwhen it is brought facetoface withcertain facts that appear to
beexceptions.
For the first test let us return toAmazonia. Early voyagers down
theAmazon left written testimony of
aculturealongthatriverhigherthanthecultureIhavedescribedforAmazoniagenerally.
In the 1500s, the nativepopulation living on the banks of
theAmazonwasrelativelydense,villageswere fairly large and close
together,and some degree of socialstratification existed. Moreover,
hereand there a paramount chief heldswayovermanycommunities.
Thequestion immediatelyarises:withunbroken stretches of arable
landextending back from the Amazon forhundreds of miles, why were
therechiefdomshere?
Toanswerthequestionwemustlookclosely at the
environmentalconditions afforded by the Amazon.Along the margins of
the river
itself,andonislandswithinit,thereisatypeoflandcalledvrzea.Theriver
floodsthislandeveryyear,coveringitwithalayer of fertile silt.
Because of thisannual replenishment, vrzea isagricultural land of
first quality whichcan be cultivated year after
yearwithouteverhavingtoliefallow.Thus,among native farmers it was
highlypriced and greatly coveted. Thewaters of the Amazon were
alsoextraordinarily bountiful,
providingfish,manatees,turtlesandturtleeggs,caimans, and other
riverine foods ininexhaustible amounts. By virtue ofthis
concentration of resources, theAmazon, as a habitat, was
distinctlysuperiortoitshinterlands.
Concentration of resources along
theAmazonamountedalmosttoakindofcircumscription. While there was
nosharp cleavage between productiveand unproductive land, as there
was
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in Peru, there was at least a steepecological gradient. So much
morerewardingwastheAmazonRiverthanadjacentareas,andsodesirablediditbecomeasahabitat,thatpeopleweredrawn
to it from surrounding regions.Eventually crowding occurred
alongmany portions of the river, leading towarfare over sections of
river front.And the losers in war, in order
toretainaccesstotheriver,oftenhadnochoicebuttosubmittothevictors.Bythis
subordination of villages to
aparamountchieftherearosealongtheAmazon chiefdoms representing
ahigher step in political evolution thanhad occurred elsewhere in
thebasin.24
The notion of resource concentrationalso helps to explain the
surprisingdegree of political
developmentapparentlyattainedbypeoplesof thePeruvian coast while
they were stilldepending primarily on fishing forsubsistence, and
only secondarily onagriculture.18 Of this
seeminganomalyLanninghaswritten: To
thebestofmyknowledge,thisistheonlycase in which so many of
thecharacteristics of civilization havebeen found without a
basicallyagriculturaleconomicfoundation.25
Armed with the concept of
resourceconcentration,however,wecanshowthat this development was
not soanomalous after all. The
explanation,itseemstome,runsasfollows.Alongthe coast of Peru wild
food sourcesoccurred
inconsiderablenumberandvariety.However,theywererestrictedto a very
narrow margin of land.26 Accordingly,while the abundance
offoodinthiszoneledtoasharpriseinpopulation, the restrictedness of
thisfood soon resulted in the almostcomplete occupation of
exploitableareas. And when pressure on theavailable resources
reacheda criticallevel, competition over land ensued.The result of
this competition was toset inmotion thesequenceofevents
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of political evolution that I havedescribed.
Thus,itseemsthatwecansafelyaddresource concentration
toenvironmental circumscription as afactor leading to warfare over
land,and thus to political integrationbeyondthevillagelevel.
SocialCircumscription
But there is still another factor to beconsidered in accounting
for the riseofthestate.
In dealing with the theory ofenvironmental circumscription
whilediscussing the Yanomam Indians ofVenezuela, Napoleon A.
Chagnon27has introduced the concept of socialcircumscription. By
this he meansthatahighdensityofpopulationinanarea can produce
effects on peopleslivingnear thecenterof thearea thatare similar to
effects produced byenvironmental circumscription. Thisnotion seems
to me to be animportant addition to our theory. Letus see how,
according to Chagnon,social circumscription has
operatedamongtheYanomam.
The Yanomam, who number some10,000, live inanextensive
regionofnoncircumscribed rain forest,
awayfromanylargeriver.Onemightexpectthat Yanomam villages would
thusbe more or less evenly spaced.However,Chagnon notes that, at
thecenterofYanomamterritory,villagesare closer together than they
are atthe periphery. Because of this,
theytendtoimpingeononeanothermore,with the result that warfare is
morefrequent and intense in the centerthan in peripheral
areas.Moreover, itis more difficult for villages in thenuclear area
to escape attack bymovingaway,since,unlikevillagesonthe periphery,
their ability tomove issomewhatrestricted.
The net result is that villages in the
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central area of Yanomam territoryare larger than villages in the
otherareas, since large village size is anadvantage for both attack
anddefense. A further effect of moreintensewarfare in
thenucleararea isthat village headmen are stronger inthat area.
Yanomam headmen arealso the war leaders, and theirinfluence
increases in proportion totheir villages participation in war.
Inaddition, offensive and defensivealliances between villages are
morecommon in the center of Yanomamterritory than in outlying
areas. Thus,while still at the autonomous villagelevel of political
organization, thoseYanomam subject to socialcircumscription have
clearlymoved astep or two in the direction of
higherpoliticaldevelopment.
Although the Yanomam manifestsocial circumscription only to
amodest degree, this amount of it hasbeenenough tomakeadifference
intheir level of political organization.What the effects of
socialcircumscription would be in areaswhere it was more fully
expressedshould, therefore, be clear.
Firstwouldcomeareductioninthesizeofthe territory of each
village.Then, aspopulation pressure became moresevere, warfare over
land wouldensue.Butbecauseadjacent land
formilesaroundwasalreadythepropertyof other villages, a defeated
villagewouldhavenowheretoflee.Fromthispointon,theconsequencesofwarfarefor
that village, and for politicalevolution in general, would
beessentially as I have described themfor the situation of
environmentalcircumscription.
ToreturntoAmazonia,itisclearthat,if social circumscription is
operativeamong the Yanomam today, it
wascertainlyoperativeamongthetribesoftheAmazonRiver400yearsago.Andits
effect would undoubtedly
havebeentogiveafurtherspurtopoliticalevolutioninthatregion.
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We see then that, even in theabsence of sharp
environmentalcircumscription, the factors ofresource concentration
and socialcircumscription may, by intensifyingwar and redirecting
it toward thetaking of land, give a strong
impetustopoliticaldevelopment.
With these auxiliary hypothesesincorporated into it,
thecircumscription theory is now betterable to confront the entire
range
oftestcasesthatcanbebroughtbeforeit.Forexample,itcannowaccountforthe
rise of the state in the HwangValleyofnorthernChina,andeveninthe
Petn region of the Mayalowlands, areas not characterized
bystrictlycircumscribedagriculturalland.InthecaseoftheHwangValley,thereis
no question that resourceconcentration and socialcircumscription
were present andactive forces. In the lowland Mayaarea, resource
concentration seemsnot to have been amajor factor, butsocial
circumscription may well havebeen.
Some archeologists may object
thatpopulationdensityinthePetnduringformative times was too low to
giverise to social circumscription. But, inassessing what
constitutes apopulation dense enough to producethis effect, we must
consider not somuch the total
landareaoccupiedastheamountoflandneededtosupportthe existing
population. And the sizeof this supporting area depends notonlyon
thesizeof thepopulationbutalsoonthemodeofsubsistence.Theshifting
cultivation presumablypracticed by the ancient Maya28required
considerably more land, percapita, than did the permanent
fieldcultivationof,say,thevalleyofMexicoorthecoastofPeru.29Consequently,insofarasitseffectsareconcerned,arelativelylowpopulationdensityinthePetnmayhavebeenequivalenttoamuchhigheroneinMexicoorPeru.
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We have already learned from theYanomam example that
socialcircumscriptionmay begin to operatewhile population is still
relativelysparse.Andwe can be sure that thePetnwas farmore densely
peopledin Formative times than Yanomamterritory is today. Thus,
populationdensity among the lowland Maya,while giving a superficial
appearanceof sparseness, may actually havebeenhighenough toprovoke
fightingover land,and thusprovide the
initialimpetusfortheformationofastate.
Conclusion
Insummary, then, thecircumscriptiontheory in itselaborated
formgoes fartowardaccountingfortheoriginofthestate. It explains why
states arosewheretheydid,andwhytheyfailedtoariseelsewhere.
Itshowsthestatetobe a predictable response to certainspecific
cultural, demographic,
andecologicalconditions.Thus,ithelpstoelucidate what was
undoubtedly themost
importantsinglestepevertakeninthepoliticalevolutionofmankind.
NOTES
1 R. L. Carneiro, inThe Evolution ofHorticulturalSystems
inNativeSouthAmerica:CausesandConsequences:A Symposium, J. Wilbert,
Ed.,Antropolgica (Venezuela), Suppl. 2(1961), pp. 4767, see
especially pp.5964.
2 For example, the early Americansociologist Lester F. Ward saw
thestateastheresultofanextraordinaryexercise of the rational. . .
facultywhich seemed to him so
exceptionalthatitmusthavebeentheemanationof a single brain or a few
concertingminds. [Dynamic
Sociology(Appleton,NewYork,1883),vol.2,p.224].
3See,forexample,V.G.Childe,ManMakesHimself(Watts,London,1936)pp.8283TownPlanningRev.
21, 3
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(1950),p.6.
4Ihaveinmyfilesrecordedinstancesof surplus food production by
suchAmazonian tribes as the
Tupinamba,Jevero,Mundurucu,Tucano,Desana,Cubeo, and Canela. An
exhaustivesearch of the ethnographic literaturefor this region
would undoubtedlyrevealmanymoreexamples.
5Wittfogelstates: Thesepatterns [oforganization and social
controlthatis,thestate]comeintobeingwhenanexperimenting community
of
farmersorprotofarmersfindslargesourcesofmoistureinadrybutpotentiallyfertilearea.
. . .anumberof
farmerseagertoconquer[agriculturally,notmilitarily]aridlowlandsandplainsareforcedtoinvoke
the organizational deviceswhichon the basis of
premachinetechnologyoffer the one chance ofsuccess: they must work
incooperation with their fellows andsubordinate themselves
toadirectingauthority. [Oriental Despotism, YaleUniv. Press, New
Haven, Conn.,1957),p.18].
6ForMesopotamia,RobertM.Adamshas concluded: In short, there
isnothing to suggest that the rise ofdynastic authority in
southernMesopotamia was linked to
theadministrativerequirementsofamajorcanalsystem.[inCityInvincible,C.H.Kraeling
and R. M. Adams, Eds. (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago,1960), p.
281]. For China, theprototypical area for Wittfogelshydraulic
theories, the FrenchSinologist Jacques Gernet hasrecently written:
although theestablishment of a system ofregulation of water courses
andirrigation, and the control of thissystem, may have affected
thepolitical constitution of the militarystates and imperial China,
the factremains that, historically, it was thepreexisting state
structures and thelarge, welltrained labour
forceprovidedbythearmiesthatmadethe
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great irrigation projects possible.[Ancient China, from the
Beginningsto the Empire, R. Rudorff, Transl.(Faber and Faber,
London, 1968), p.92].ForMexico,largescaleirrigationsystems do not
appear to antedatetheClassicperiod,whereasit isclearthat the first
states arose in thepreceding Formative or PreClassicperiod.
7 This is not to say, of course, thatlargescale irrigation,
where itoccurred, did not contributesignificantly to increasing the
powerand scope of the state.
Itunquestionablydid.TotheextentthatWittfogel limits himself to
thiscontention,Ihavenoquarrelwithhimwhatever.However,thepointatissueis
not how the state increased itspower but how it arose in the
firstplace.Andtothisissuethehydraulichypothesis does not appear to
holdthekey.
8 See The Evolution of Society:Selections from Herbert
SpencersPrinciples of Sociology, R.
L.Carneiro,Ed.(Univ.ofChicagoPress,Chicago,1967),pp.3247,6396,153165.
9 L. Gumplowicz, Der Rassenkampf(Wagner,Innsbruck,1883).
10G.Ratzenhofer,WesenundZweckderPolitik(Brockhaus,Leipsig,1893).
11 F. Oppenheimer,The State, J. M.Gitterman, Transl. (Vanguard,
NewYork,1926).
12 E. Jenks, A History of
Politics(Macmillan,NewYork,1900),p.73.
13 J. Vansina, Kingdoms of theSavanna (Univ. of Wisconsin
Press,Madison,1966).
14 For example, Julian H. Stewardwrote: It is possible,
therefore, thattheMayawereabletodevelopahigh
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civilizationonlybecausetheyenjoyedanunusuallylongperiodofpeacefortheirsettlementpatternwouldseemtohavebeentoovulnerabletowarfare.[Amer.Anthropol.51,1(1949),seep.17].
15 D. E. Puleston and D. W.Callender, Expedition 9 No.3,
40(1967),seepp.45,47.
16 M. D. Coe, The Maya (Praeger,NewYork,1966),p.147.
17 See R. L. Carneiro, in Men
andCultures.SelectedPapersoftheFifthInternational Congress
ofAnthropological and
EthnologicalSciences,A.F.C.Wallace,Ed.(Univ.of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia,1960),pp.229234.
18 In early agricultural times(Preceramic Period VI,
beginningabout 2500 B.C.) human
settlementseemstohavebeendenseralongthecoast than in the river
valleys, andsubsistence appears to have beenbased more on fishing
than onfarming. Furthermore, somesignificant first steps in
politicalevolutionbeyondautonomousvillagesmay have been taken at
this stage.However, once subsistence began tobe based predominantly
onagriculture, the settlement patternchanged, and communities
werethenceforth concentratedmore in theriver valleys, where the
only land ofany size suitable for cultivation waslocated. See E. P.
Lanning, PeruBefore the Incas
(PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1967),pp.5759.
19InmyfilesIfindreportedinstancesofvillagesplittingamongthefollowingAmazonian
tribes: Kuikuru,Amarakaeri, Cubeo, Urubtl, Tupari,Yanomam, Tucano,
Tenetehara,Canela,andNorthernCayapo.Underthe conditions of easy
resettlementfound in Amazonia, splitting oftentakes place at a
village population
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leveloflessthan100,andvillagesizeseldomexceeds200.IncoastalPeru,however,
where land was severelyrestricted,villagescouldnotfissionsoreadily,
and thus grew to populationlevels which, according to
Lanning[PeruBefore the Incas (PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.,
1967), p. 64],mayhaveaveragedover300.
20 See R. L. Carneiro,
Ethnograph.archol.Forschungen4,22(1958).
21Naturally, this evolution tookplacein the various Peruvian
valleys atdifferent rates and to differentdegrees. In fact it is
possible that atthesametimethatsomevalleyswerealready unified
politically, others stillhad not evolved beyond the stage
ofautonomousvillages.
22 Not every step in empire buildingwas necessarily taken
through actualphysical conquest, however. Thethreat of force
sometimes had thesameeffectasitsexercise.Inthiswaymany smaller
chiefdoms and stateswere probably coerced into giving
uptheirsovereigntywithouthavingtobedefeatedonthefieldofbattle.Indeed,itwasanexplicitpolicyoftheIncas,inexpanding
their empire, to trypersuasionbeforeresortingtoforceofarms. See
Garcilaso de la
Vega,RoyalCommentariesoftheIncasandGeneralHistoryofPeru,Part1,H.V.Livermore,
Transl. (Univ. of
TexasPress,Austin,1966),pp.108,Ill,140,143,146,264.
23 The evolution of empire in Peruwas thus by no means
rectilinear orirreversible. Advance alternated withdecline.
Integration was
sometimesfollowedbydisintegration,withstatesfragmenting back to
chiefdoms, andperhapseventoautonomousvillages.But the forces
underlying politicaldevelopment were strong and, in theend,
prevailed. Thus, despitefluctuations and reversions, thecourse of
evolution in Peru wasunmistakable: it began with many
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small, simple, scattered, andautonomous communities and
endedwith a single, vast, complex, andcentralizedempire.
24 Actually, a similar
politicaldevelopmentdidtakeplaceinanotherpart of Amazoniathe basin
of theMamor River in the Mojos plain ofBolivia. Here, too,
resourceconcentrationappearstohaveplayeda key role. See W. Denevan,
TheAboriginal Cultural Geography of theLlanos de Mojos of Bolivia,
Iberoamericana No. 48 (1966), pp. 4350,104105, 108110. In native
NorthAmerica north of Mexico the
highestculturaldevelopmentattained,MiddleMississippi, also occurred
along amajorriver(theMississippi)which,byproviding especially
fertile soil andriverine food resources, comprised azone of
resource concentration.
SeeJ.B.Griffin,Science156,175(1967),p.189.
25 E. P. Lanning, Peru Before
theIncas(PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1967),p.59.
26Resourceconcentration, then,washere combined with
environmentalcircumscription. And, indeed, thesame thing can be
said of the greatdesert rivervalleys, suchas
theNile,TigrisEuphrates,andIndus.
27N.A.Chagnon,Proceedings,VIIIthInternational Congress
ofAnthropological and EthnologicalSciences (Tokyo and Kyoto,
1968),vol.3(EthnologyandArchaeology),p.249 (especially p. 251). See
also N.Fock,Folk6,47(1964),p.52.
28 S. G.Morley andG.W. Brainerd,The Ancient Maya (Stanford
Univ.Press, Stanford, Calif., ed. 3, 1956),pp.128129.
29One canassume, I think, that anysubstantial increase in
populationdensity among the Maya wasaccompanied by a certain
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intensification of agriculture. As thepopulation increased
fields wereprobably weeded more thoroughly,and they may well have
beencultivated a year or two longer andfallowed a few years less.
Yet, giventhe nature of soils in the humidtropics, the absence of
any evidenceof fertilization, and the moderatepopulation densities,
it seems
likelythatMayafarmingremainedextensiveratherthanbecomingintensive.
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