THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES EDiTOR-IN-CHIEF A . K. Narain University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA EDITORS Heinz Bechert Leon Hurvitz Universitat Gottingen, FRG UBC, Vancouver, Canada Lewis Lancaster Alexander W. MacDonald University of California, Berkeley, USA Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France B.J. Stavisky Alex Wayman WN1IR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, U S A ASSOCIATE EDITOR Stephan Beyer University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA Volume 3 1980 Number 1
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7/28/2019 A Study of the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation
A Study of the M adhyamika Method ofRefutation, Especially of its Affinity to
that of Kathdvatthu
by Shohei Ichimura
- I -
It was a qua rte r of a century ago that Prof. T.R.V. Murti published his
work on the Madhyamika philosophy,1
which has made o ne essential
point of Madhyamika negation thoroughly known to post-war scholarship, i.e., that M adhy amika p hilosoph y is a critique of all philosophical
theses, and that this critique does not imply any thesis of its own but
exclusively reveals an inherent self-contradiction in any and every
philosoph ical thesis. Th is me thod has been called reductio-ad-absurdum
argument after the fashion Stcherbatsky used. My use of the term
Madhyamika Dialectic is also in this pa rticula r sense.
Although Madhyamika dialectic is an age-old subject an d ha s also
been tre ate d in mo de rn scholarship frequend y, I found th at little attention ha s been given to the fact that th ere is an intrinsic affinity between
the Madhyamika and the pre-classical Abhidharmist methods of
refu tatio n. I am especially referring to the meth od which is recorded in
the Kathdvatthu or the Points ofControversy.2
T o demonstrate this affinity
is my prim ary objective in this pap er. In o rd er to accomplish this dem on
stra tio n, first, I will try to show why the pre-classical Bu ddhist deba tors
knew the two basic rules of Syllogistic Inference, namely anvaya and
vyatireha, which I may translate as 'positive and contrapositive instantiations. ' They applied these rules in order to defend their own thesis in
terms of logicality, while refuting the other's in terms of illogicality.
Secon dly, I shall mak e some p oint of affinity clear as to the Madhyamika
m eth od in parallel to that of the Kathdvatthu.
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As to the que stion o f why appeal has to be m ade no t only to positive
instan tiation bu t also to the contrapo sitive o ne , I believe it will become
self-evident in my subse quent dem on stratio n. H ere it suffices to say that
positive instantiation alone cannot fully differentiate those class
m em be rs which are either "capable of bearing smoke but not fire," or
"capable of bea ring fire but n ot smoke." Suppo se when, knowingall this,
som eone en counters an oppo nent in the arena of debate. How should he
conduct his argument? He has to explore every possible error in his
opponent's logic. Sometimes, he may even try to deliberately induce
logical errors in his opponent. Nevertheless, he is obliged to abide in
accordance with the basic rules of logic, such as dual instantiations. Ibelieve that th e debato rs of the Kathdvatthu applied such method an d in
following their step N agarjuna innovated his Madhyamika method of
refutation.
- I V -
T h e re is clear evidence for th e fact that the pre-classical Bu ddhistde ba to rs w ere fully aware of the dual ru les of logical instantiation, a nd
applied these as a me thod of refutation. T he proced ure of argum ent in
the text is so repetitive in form that I shall have to take up only the
initial refutation. The controversy here is concerned with the status of
pudgala. The orthodox Theravadin who rejects the reality of pudgala
faces the challenge by the P udgalavadin in the aren a of debate. Formally,
th e refu tation consists of five consecu tive sessions. First, the Theravadin
presents (1) Refutation against the Pudgalavadin, which is followed by
the latter's (2) Rejoinder, (3) R efutation, (4) Application, and (5) Conclu
sion.*' Their arguments invariably include the dual demonstrations
being applied positively and contrapositively.
No. I
Tw o related predications cum substratum
"P": (Pudgala) "is known in th e sense of a genuinely real th ing"(puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamatthendti)
"Q": (Pudgala) "is known in th e same way a genuinely real thing isknown" (yo saccikattho paramattho tato so puggalo upalabbhatisaccikatthaparamatthendti)
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T h e two pred ica t ion s , which I qu ot ed f rom M rs . Rhys Davids ' t rans la
t ion , can b e t ran scr ib ed as "P " an d "Q " respective ly . A nota t ion "P " is
g iven to t he p red ica t ion : kpudgala "is kn ow n in the sense of a gen uine ly
rea l t h ing , " an d an o th e r n o ta t ion " Q " to : A pudgala "is known in the
same way a genuinely rea l th ing i s known."
No. 2
Positive (anvaya) and Cont rapos i t i ve (vyatireka) Ins tant ia t ions :
T h er av ad in : "P an d Q " is assum ed to be ver if ied by subs t ra tum(sapaksa) such as dharmas, while "-Q and -P" is to be falsified by
s u b s t r a t u m (vipaksa) such as pudgalas.
Pu dg ala va din : "Q an d P" is assum ed to be ver if ied by sub s t ra tum ,
such as pudgalas as well as dharmas, while "-P and -Q" is to be
ver i f ied by a l l those remaining.
I n No. 2,1 specify tw o m utua l ly con trar y con com itance s as well as
the i r r e spec t ive con t r apos i t i ons , which the Theravad in and theP u d g a l a v a d i n a p p l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e ir d e m o n s t r a t i o n . It is also in tended
to show th e w ork ings of pos it ive and cont rapo s i t ive ins tant ia t ions w hich
respect ive ly de termine the pos i t ive and cont rapos i t ive c lasses (sapaksa
a n d vipaksa). F o r t h e T h e r a v a d i n , dharmas alone are rea l , and hence ,
they con s t i tu te t he pos i tive c lass. Accordingly , the pos i t ion "P an d Q "
an d i ts co ntra po si t ion "-Q an d -P" shou ld respectively serve as cr i ter ia to
dist inguish whatever is real like a dha rma (sapaksa) and whatever is un real like
an empirical person (vipaksa). For the Pudga lavad in , however , app ly ingthe same concomi tance as tha t of the Theravadin i s obvious ly
d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s . T h e r e f o r e , h e i n t r o d u c e s a n e x a c d y c o n t r a r y c o n
com i t ance to r e fu t e t he The rav ad in , nam ely , "Q and P" an d its con t r a
pos i t ion, "-P an d -Q ". Bu t the Th era va din logical st rategy, and especially
the Pu dga lavad in ' s , can no t be un de r s too d fu lly wi thou t he lp from the
Western form of logica l impl ica t ion, which I prepare in No. 3.
No. 3
Hypothet ica l Syl logism based upon "P then Q" and "Q then P" :
I f "P th en Q ," an d "P , " t he re fore " Q . " (modus ponendo ponens)
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i nde t e rminancy ensued . There seem to be two bas i c r easons fo r t he
in de ter m in at io n of the con t rovers y: (1) both pa r t ies v iola ted the logica l
b o u n d a ry o f pos i t ive an d co nt rapos i t ive c lasses , an d (2) th is in tu rn
a l lowed the Pu dga lavad in to app ly the con t r a ry impl ica t ion .
F i rst , for the The rav ad in , both predica t ions "P" and "Q " shou ld be
ver i f i ed by the subs t r a tum of dharmas, i.e., a dharma "is known in the
sen se of a genu inely re a l th ing " (= "P ") , an d " is kno wn in the same way a
gen u in e ly r ea l t h in g is kno w n" (="Q ") . Th ere for e , h e uses t h is impl ica
t ion as a cr i te r ion to defend the rea l i ty of dharmas an d to refute the
Pudga lavad in he resy tha tpudgalas ar e also real . Bu t h e faces a p ro ble m
he re , becau se , he cann o t r e jec t "Q " abou t pudgalas t h o u g h n o p r o b l e mto do so wi th "P ." Th is me ans tha t the Th era va din viola ted the logical
b o u n d a r y ofsapaksa a n d vipaksa in applyin g "Q " not only to dharmas b u t
also to pudgalas.
T h is logical am biva lence is in fact de r ive d from do ctr ina l reaso ns.
T h e r e p u d i a t i o n o f a n e m p i r i c a l p e r s o n (pudgala) const i tutes the core
of B ud dh i s t do c t r ine . T h e Th erav ad in is ob l iged to a s ser t "Q " because
the unrea l i t y of pudgalas is kno wa ble only th ro u gh the way the real i ty of
psycho-phys i ca l e l ement s (dharmas) is kno wn . T o fur the r com pl ica tethe mat ter , the Pudgalavadin a l so shows a s imi lar logica l ambivalence
d u e to s imi lar doct r ina l reason s . He asser ts "P " abo ut pudgalas but fails
to asser t " Q ," becau se i f he do es so, he is ipso facto completely identifying
pudgala with dharma, which is heresy for the Pudgalavadin as wel l .
Logical ly, he also violates the boundary between the classes of dharmas
arid pudgalas in app lying " P" to the m equal ly .
Seco nd, th e s t rike of ingenui ty on the pa r t of the Pudg alavadin i s the
use of co nt ra ry impl ica tion as a we apon to dem on st ra te the logical vulner abi li ty of h i s o pp o n en t . Th is possibil ity m ust have been in tui ted f rom the
fact th a t th e two contes tants s tood in an exact cont rar ie ty , i .e ., " - P . Q " by
th e Th er av ad in a nd "P . -Q " by the Pudga lavad in . T he i r fo rces o f
a r g u m en t , a s shown in t he cha r t , com e to an equa l ba l ance . T h e Th era
va din a rg ue s : I f you Pu dg alava din asser t the rea l ity of pudgala "P," you
a re also obl ige d to asser t its know abil ity in th e sam e way as dharmas a re
kn ow n " Q ." B ut you d o not , i .e ., " -Q ." I f you d o no t asser t " Q , " you a re
also obl ig ed logical ly no t to asser t "P," i .e., "-Q 3 -P ." Bu t you asser t "P ."T h e re fo re , y ou r cla im "P . -Q " is fa lse . Now , th e Pud galav adin rep l ies : I f
you Theravad in a s se r t t he knowabi l i t y o f pudgala in the same way
dharmas ar e k no w n "Q ," you shou ld a l so asser t i ts rea li ty "P . " But you d o
no t , i . e. , " -P ." S ince you d o n ot asser t "P," you are also obliged logically
no t t o a s se r t4Q , " i. e., " - P ^ - Q . " B u t yo u a ss e rt " Q . " T h e r e f o r e , y o u r
claim "-P.Q" is false.
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My f inding a bo ut the M adhy am ika m eth od as para l le l to tha t of theKathdvatthu is rath er a simple on e, nam ely th at i t seeks to create a discon
nec t ive re l a t ionsh ip be tween co ncep tua l t e rms , p red ica t ions , o r p ro po
si t ions in the forms of " P . - Q " an d "- P.Q ." If on e speaks of a m otio n, for
ins tance , we can match h is s ta tement wi th another about i t s agent as
rega rds to the i r r e l a t ionsh ip . 7 In the Vigrahavydvartani, Nagar juna
crea tes th is par t icu la r contex t by the me tap ho r of ' ligh t ' and 'darkn ess . '
H e re m in ds us tha t ou r cogni t ion a lways involves cognizer and cognized
ju st as the fact of i l lum ina t ion . H e ass igns predica t ions to the i lum ininga n d th e i l lum ine d respectively as "is capab le of i l luminin g" ("P") and "is
capa ble of da rk en in g" ("Q") . By apply ing both predica t ions to ' ligh t' and
'da rk nes s , ' he ob ta ins the fo rmula s o f "P . -Q " and " -P .Q ." H e a rgues :
W he re ve r th er e is a l igh t i l lumining , there sho uld be no darkn ess ("P.-
Q " ) a n d vice versa ("-P .Q") , which m eans tha t the two never can me et . 8
T h e sta te of affa irs is precisely paral le l to tha t of the Kathdvatthu
c o n t r o v e r sy .
Ho w d id Na garju na try to solve this logical absurdity? As I u nd ers tan d,
he ge nera l ly tak es two ap pro ach es . F i rst , in accordan ce wi th con vent ion ,
w hich as sum es bo th ' l ight ' an d 'dark ne ss ' for the fact of i l lum ination, h e
po in ts o ut tha t th e only way to make th is posit ive concomitance "P .Q "
poss ible is to re pu di at e the conce pt of ow n-be ing (self- identifying prin
ciple) from the se enti t ies, so as to accept l ight an d da rkn ess in ter m s of
the i r rec iproca l exchangeabi l i ty . Second, in accordance to t rans-con
ven t ion , he re pud ia te s bo th "P . -Q " and " -P .Q ," wh ich he mus t have
just i f ied in re fe ren ce to two con tra ry impl ica tions "P o Q " a n d " Q 3 P" in
para l le l to the Kathdvatthu controversy . H er e may I poin t ou t the fac t tha t
" P D Q " an d " Q ^ P" tog e th er expre ss logical rec iproci ty .
In co nc l ud ing m y pap er , I am obl iged to s ta te two poin t s : (I) As evi
d en t in my dem on st r a t io n , th e logical concom itance of two predica t ions
dif fer en tia te d fo ur dif fere nt c lasses of variables. I bel ieve tha t the
B ud dh is t fou rfo ld logica l ca tegory such as catuskoti has its relev ant basis
in th is log ic of conco m itance . (2) O u r concep tua l and logica l t rea tm en t
of re l igious insight in general has i ts own l imita t ion. To deal with the
s ta tements tha t re fe r to the d ia lec t ica l d imension which br idges the
em pir ica l an d t he tran s-em pirica l in term s of logical rules is i tse lf to be g
fu rt h er qu est ion . In this sense , I ca nn ot go along with th e idea to identify
rel igious truth with the logical formula of reciproci ty such as
"P r)Q.Qr> P." Nevertheless, I am convinced that this kind of analysis
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helps us to understand better as to how the same problem was
app roac hed by the ancients.
N O T E S
1. The Central Conception o) Buddhism, L ondon : 1960 .
2 . Kathdvatthu ed . by A.C. Taylo r , PTS : 1894-7; t r . by S.Z . Aun g and Mrs . Rhys
Davids , PT S: 1915 .
3. T h e R oman ized t ex t , ed . by Joh ns ton and Kuns t , MCB IX (1951) , Ap pend ix .
sarvatra svabhdvo n o vidyata iti krtvd sunydh sarvabhdvd iti/. . . .
yasmdn nihsvabhdvas tasmdc chunyahl ( C o m m e n t o n kdrikd 1; loc. cit., p. 10)T h e p a t t e r n o f a rgu m ent : "wha t eve r is devo id of oxvn-being is e m p t y , " r e c u rs t h r o u g h o u t
the work .
4. Loc. cit., p . 52 : kdrikd 7 0 :
prabhavati ca Sunyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvdrthdh/
prabhavati na tasya kirn cinna prabhavati iunyatd yasya/i
5. S a n k r a s v a m i n f o r m u l a t e d D i g n a g s trairupya theory in his Nydyapravesaka-
sutram very concisely as follows: (COS Vol. 33, 1930, p. 1):