A SENIOR THESIS - ttu-ir.tdl.org

THE MY LAI MASSACRE:

A STUDY OF THE EVENT, AFTERMATH, AND IMPLICATIONS

,

by

Michael C. Howard

A SENIOR THESIS

m

GENERAL STUDIES

Submitted to the General Studies Council in the College of Arts and Sciences

at Texas Tech University in Partial fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

BACHELOR OF GENERAL STUDIES

Approved

DR. CATHERINE MILLER Department of History

Co-Chairperson of Thesis Co~

DR. JAMES RECJ<:i{ER ---u

Department of History .f:e Chairperson of Thesis Committee

Accepted

DR. MICHAEL SCHOENECk£ Director of General Studies

MAY 2001

^ p f f f

T S TABLE OF CONTENTS

^'ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

y • ' '

.11

INTRODUCTION iii

CHAPTER

L THE MISSION 1

Background 1

Landing and Massacre 3

II. COVER-UP: AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS 7

Initial Reports 7

m. FRAMING MY LAI 14

Criminal Investigation and the Peers Panel 14

VVAW and the Winter Soldiers Investigation 23

IV. ASSESSMENT 30

Why the Massacre Happened 30

Why the Cover-Up Happened 33

BIBLIOGRAPHY 36

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Catherine Miller and Dr. James Reckner for their

exhaustive work as the co-chairpersons of my thesis committee. Without their endless

hours of advice on research, organization, and editing, I would never have been able to

write this thesis.

Secondly, I would like to thank Chad Miller for helping me with the research of

the Winter Soldiers Investigation. Without his help, the Winter Soldiers section would

have been much different.

Finally, I would like to thank Megan Miller for putting up with me through the six

months it took me to research for and write this paper. Without her help, I never would

have been able to keep my sanity and finish this thesis.

INTRODUCTION

On March 16, 1968 in Vietnam, the small hamlet of My Lai (4) was completely

destroyed by American soldiers expecting to engage in a tough fight with a brigade of

enemy soldiers of the National Liberation Front (NLF). During the chaos, livestock were

killed and left to rot, food caches were destroyed, huts were set on fire, underground

tunnel systems were destroyed, women were raped and beaten, and between 100 to 500

people were brutally murdered. Some American soldiers systematically moved through

the hamlet killing civilians while others struggled or refused to take part in the slaughter.

Some of the Vietnamese civilians tried to run or hide from the Americans, while others

stood their ground hoping to seem unthreatening; however, American soldiers killed

indiscriminately. Vietnamese women, old men, and children were herded into groups

and shot for no apparent reason.

The soldiers who destroyed My Lai (4) did nothing to report the massacre to their

superiors. Reports of the operation were falsified and included no mention of the vast

number of civilians who had been killed. The number of people killed was drastically

reduced from an estimated 500 to 128. For the most part, the officers who received the

reports of the My Lai Massacre did not question anything submitted to them. The few

questions that did arise were quickly silenced and the incident was covered-up. The My

Lai Massacre did not resurface until 1969. when an ex-G.I. began writing letters to

officials in the military and government to describe the brutal operation.

A massacre worse than any recorded in American military history, the My Lai

Massacre has lived on past the rest of the Vietnam War. At the time, it shocked the

American public and showed many people in the United States that the American soldier

did not always do the right thing. The memory and consequences of My Lai pervade

American society's thinking to the present day. A small subhamlet of the Son My village

in the Quang Ngai Province of South Vietnam, My Lai (4) became far more influential to

the American presence in Vietnam than the soldiers who participated in the atrocity could

have ever guessed.

Scholars trying to determine why the massacre and the ensuing cover-up

happened have studied My Lai for more than thirty years. The military held two separate

investigations into My Lai in order to find out who or what could be blamed for such an

atrocity. The anti-war group, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), held public

hearings in 1971 discussing the issue of American atrocities in Vietnam. Public debate

raged in the late 1960s and early 1970s about the fate of the men who had destroyed the

hamlet and its inhabitants.

In assessing the My Lai Massacre, it becomes obvious that nothing is black and

white. Nothing about the massacre or the cover-up is simple and clear-cut. Conflicting

testimony, different explanations, and different sources of blame make the My Lai

Massacre one of the most controversial topics in American History.

CHAPTER 1

THE MISSION

Background

In the spring of 1967, the U.S. military formed Task Force Oregon to clear the

soldiers of the National Liberation Front (NLF) from Quang Ngai Province and to pacify

the civilian population. The NLF controlled much of the province even though the U.S.

military had long before declared it a "free-fire zone" in which all civilians were

automatically suspected of being either NLF or NLF sympathizers. In these zones. U.S.

forces did not have to get permission from local or Saigon officials to conduct bombing

or artillery missions because it was presumed that there were no innocents to be harmed

in the area. While Task Force Oregon operated in the region, 138,000 civilians were

made homeless and about 70 percent of the dwellings in Quang Ngai Province were

destroyed (Hersh, MY LAI 4 4-5). The Saigon government's Strategic Hamlet program,

along with the devastating results of this heavy fighfing, made pacification efforts in the

area very difficult because the population had little reason to turn or trust the American

and South Vietnamese forces.

The primary enemy of the American and ARVN forces in the region was the 48""

Local Force Battalion of the NLF. Shortly after the Tet Offensive of 1968, this battalion

was repelled from Quang Ngai City into the Tra Khuc Valley by American forces. U.S.

intelligence reported that since being pushed out of Quang Ngai City the battalion had set

up its headquarters in the region designated "Pinkville" on U.S. military maps.

Intelligence officials believed the enemy base was located just outside of the small

hamlet of My Lai (4) with an estimated strength of 10,000 to 20,000 men. Overall, the

area was known to have been an NLF stronghold for 25 years during which the South

Vietnamese troops (ARVN) were not willing to enter (Medina File, Vietnam Archive).

In order to deal with the formidable presence of the NLF, the Americal Division

was assigned to Quang Ngai Province. Task Force Barker was created out of the

Americal to crush what remained of the NLF 48"' Battalion and to pacify the population

in the northern portion of Quang Ngai Province. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker

commanded the new task force, which was divided into Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie

Companies.

Captain Ernest Medina, a former enlisted man who was seen by his superiors in

the U.S. Army as a bright, rising officer, commanded Charlie Company. On March 13,

1968 Barker and Medina devised a plan for the 1̂* and 2"'̂ platoons of Charlie Company

to make their way into My Lai (4) while the two other companies of Task Force Barker

set up blocking positions to keep the NLF from fleeing. The assault was to come in two

waves that were to land 150 meters west of the small village.

Lieutenant William Calley, the leader of Charlie Company's T' Platoon, was very

different from his immediate superior. Captain Medina. As a young former enlisted man,

Medina related to his troops well and was extremely enthusiastic as well as very well

liked by his men. He was known to be tough and to expect the best from his men;

however, the soldiers of Charlie Company also looked to him with respect and affection.

Lieutenant William Calley was just the opposite. After attending college for one year

and dropping out, Calley joined the Army and trained to become an officer. Calley

joined the military at a time when the premium was set on fresh bodies rather than quality

officers. Disliked by his men and considered unreliable and worthless by his superiors.

Captain Medina even called him "Lieutenant Shithead." One of the men in Charlie

Company summed up Galley's inadequacies when he told a reporter that Calley routinely

got the men lost becau.se he did not know how to use a compass (Olsen and Roberts, 13).

Landing and Massacre

On March 16, 1968, any NLF soldiers that might have been in My Lai (4)

received advanced warning of the attack when, in accordance with U.S. Army policy,

units supporting TF Barker shelled the area surrounding the Landing Zone (LZ) prior to

the drop of troops. So, as the American helicopters approached between 7:30 and 8:00 in

the morning, any NLF in the area would have been able to flee into the brush surrounding

the village (Gershen 5-9). In fact, upon landing with the first wave. Captain Medina

reported that he had encountered no direct resistance. Later, during the initial

investigation of the incident, Medina testified that after he reported that there was no

immediate resistance on the ground, the pilots of the helicopters circling above radioed

that both the helicopters in the air and the troops on the ground were receiving fire from

the village. In this chaotic situation, Medina did not question this contradictory report,

and declared the LZ "hot," or dangerous due to enemy fire. Medina then moved his

troops out in a single line, walking abreast towards the village.

Military intelligence had incorrectly reported to Medina that all the civilians

inhabiting the village would be out selling rice and vegetables at the Quang Ngai market,

so the troops of Charlie Company expected only NLF and their sympathizers to be

present (Medina, Vietnam Archive). The Phoenix Program's agent for Quang Ngai

Province, Robert B. Ramsdell, probably obtained the intelligence for the operation at My

Lai (4). Ramsdell was well known in the region for paying large sums of money for

intelligence reports, which often led the informants to "puff up" the reports to make more

money (Hersh, Cover-Up 85-96). Lieutenant Clarence Dukes, a U.S. Army intelligence

officer, later told investigators that the exact opposite of Task Force Barker's intelligence

would have been true; by daybreak all the men of the village would have been out

working the fields while the women and children would have been left alone in the

village.

As the men of Charlie Company approached the village, a Vietnamese farmer in

the field came running to greet the soldiers yelling, "G.I. number One!" and was

immediately shot (Hersh, MY LAI 4 45). This set the bloody tone for the day. Private

First Class (Pfc.) Paul Meadlo of the T' platoon later said that after the farmer was killed,

the troops moved into the village and gathered the civilians into large groups. Men,

women, and children were rounded up and taken to the center of the village. Lieutenant

Calley approached one group of thirty to forty people and ordered Meadlo to kill them

all. When he saw Meadlo hesitate, he stepped back ten or fifteen feet and started firing

into the group of unarmed civilians. Meadlo then joined in, using up four clips of

seventeen rounds each from his M-16 rifle. He later estimated that he killed ten to fifteen

people in this single incident (Gershen 19-21). Other troops witnessed Galley's actions,

including Pfc. Herbert Carter, a soldier who allegedly shot himself in the foot to avoid the

hellish killing. In a later interview Carter recalled the day: "We went into that village

with guns blazing. . .each was trying to outdo the other to prove he was a better man.

People were pulled out of their huts and kicked and beaten. If a woman looked good

enough, she was raped, kicked and beaten" (Gershen 124). Another incident involving

Lieutenant Calley was reported by Pfc. Michael Terry, a member of the third platoon.

Terry reported that Calley ordered a machine-gunner to shoot a group of mostly women

and children. The soldier followed orders and shot about half of the people in the group

before stopping in disgust. Calley grabbed the machine gun and shot the rest himself

(Gershen 27-29).

All the men saw and did different things around the village, so it is very difficult

to get a coherent picture of what actually happened. Many of the men, when questioned

by the army investigators performing the initial invesfigations, tried to justify the killings

by saying that they thought that the fleeing villagers they had shot and killed were armed.

They were not. They rationalized that those fleeing were obviously doing something

wrong or dangerous, so they were shot in order to protect the American soldiers

(LaCroix File, Vietnam Archive). Some, however, openly admitted that their fellow

fighting men seemed soulless in the village that day, killing people without feeling or

remorse. Carter later said that Calley seemed pleased with his gruesome work while the

other man ordering the killings, Sgt. Mitchell, looked upset and confused

(Gershen 113). "Everyone was more-or-less doing something that they shouldn't be and

way down inside they knew it wasn't right, and yet they felt they were getting re\enge,

and what we felt, we was destroying the enemy," said Carter (Gershen 123). Other

troops there that day did not see their brutality as wrong. Echoing the theory of a "free

fire zone," Simpson recalled, "To us there were no civilians. They were V.C.

sympathizers. To us they were V.C." (Gershen 136).

After watching the chaos from the air and realizing that there was no real

resistance coming from the villagers. Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson landed

between advancing G.I.'s led by Calley and a group of Vietnamese civilians. He

instructed his doorgunners to return fire if the Americans were to fire on him or the

Vietnamese he was trying to rescue. Thompson was able to persuade the Vietnamese to

come out of their bunker and saved them from an almost certain death. This appears to

be the only attempt by an American soldier to prevent the atrocity that occurred at the

small hamlet of My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968.

When Army investigators returned to My Lai in November 1969, they found three

mass graves containing between 450 and 500 bodies of women, children, and old men

(Hersh, MY LAI 4 75). On the other hand. Colonel Frank Barker reported to his

superiors at Americal Division headquarters that the total body count for the operation at

My Lai was 128 killed with only three weapons captured (Hersh, MY LAI 4 77).

CHAPTER II

COVER-UP: AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS

Initial Reports

After the bloodshed that took place at My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968, the soldiers

of Charlie Company returned to their ba.se and many acted as if nothing unusual had

happened. Although most of the men later admitted that they had trouble dealing with

what they had just done and even though many felt extremely guilty, no one made any

type of report of the massacre to their superior officers. When Lieutenant Calley

submitted his official report of the operation, there was no mention of anything unusual.

Calley reported that 69 NLF (or Viet Cong as the report referred to enemy troops) had

been killed; he completely left out any mention of civilians (Calley File. Vietnam

Archive). On March 17, 1968, an official summary of the Son My Operation (the overall

operation that included the incident at My Lai) that was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel

Blackledge, Colonel Henderson's Aid, was submitted to Americal Division. The report

classified the mission as a "victory" for American forces and claimed that the enemy

killed during the operation had been "evading" when shot by Charlie Company; again

there was no mention, whatsoever, of civilians killed (Hersh, Cover Up 144).

The initial investigations into what happened in My Lai (4) began a few hours

after the massacre. Sometime after three o'clock on March 16, 1968, Colonel Henderson

decided he wanted Charlie Company to retrace its steps back to My Lai (4). Colonel

Henderson radioed Captain Medina and ordered him to take his men back to the hamlet

to determine precisely how many civilians had been killed. Medina protested the order.

claiming that it was getting late and that going back would be extremely dangerous

because it would keep the men from preparing their nighttime defensive positions (Hersh.

Cover-Up 121).

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker learned of the order at almost the same time as

Medina and took an immediate and unusual step to stop it. Lieutenant Colonel Barker

went over the brigade commander's head and took his protest to Major General Koster,

who was flying in a helicopter nearby. Barker explained to General Koster that this order

would send the men of Charlie Company back into what he considered a very dangerous

area as darkness approached. Koster agreed with Barker that the order should be stopped

and broke in on Medina's radio, and telling him to disregard Colonel Henderson's recent

order. Unfortunately, Henderson's failed attempt to order Medina and his men back into

My Lai (4) was the most direct attempt made by anyone at the time to determine what

actually happened (Hersh, Cover-Up 121-122). When asked about the civilian body

count, Medina told General Koster that he had seen between twenty and twenty-eight

civilian bodies in the hamlet and Koster responded, according to the Captain, "Well, that

sounds about right" (Hersh, Cover-Up 122).

On March 17, Jay Roberts, the 11"' Brigade combat correspondent, met with

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker. Roberts, who was on the ground with Charlie

Company in My Lai the day before, was disturbed about what he had seen the previous

day and unsure what he should write about the operation in his report to Americal

Division headquarters. Barker told Roberts that he should write up the operafion as an

overwhelming success. In an interview with Seymour Hersh, Roberts remembered

Barker suggesting that his report convey "something to the effect that it had been highly

successful, that. . .two entire companies . . .had moved swiftly with complete surprise to

the VC in the area" (Hersh, Cover-Up 120). When Roberts asked about the high body

count and the usually low number of captured weapons, Barker told him that he would do

a good job writing the story and that he should not worry about such details (Hersh,

Cover-Up 120). Roberts went on to write the report exactly as he had been told, leaving

out any information that might have raised questions about the report's accuracy.

Because of the report's spin on the operation, the army reported to the United States

public that the operation at My Lai (4) had been another overwhelming success for the

U.S. Army in Vietnam.

Only Hugh C. Thompson's after action report dealt with the numerous civilian

deaths at My Lai (4). Thompson, whose intervention on the ground in My Lai (4) had

stopped American troops from killing a group of Vietnamese civilians, was infuriated

about the actions of American troops that day. Thompson filed a report to his superiors

on March 16, 1968 that detailed what he had seen and what steps he had taken to stop the

chaos he had witnessed on the ground. The report was submitted and reviewed by

Captain Barry C. Lloyd, a section leader with the 123'̂ '* Aviation Battalion. Captain

Lloyd was disturbed about what he read and even underlined parts of Thompson's bitter

report. To add emphasis, he wrote the word "NOTICE" in capital letters next to a

statement about civilians being killed at My Lai (4) (Hersh, Cover-Up 129).

After submitting the report, Thompson immediately went to see his chaplain.

Father Carl Creswell, to talk about what he had seen and what he could do to make sure

the Army investigated the incident properly. Creswell told Thompson to file a formal

complaint through the "command channels" and told Thompson that he would file a

complaint through "chaplain channels." Creswell immediately went to see his superior.

Reverend Francis Lewis, to report Thompson's allegations. Creswell was assured that

the report would be forwarded to Jesmond Balmer, then the operations officer for the

division; however, Lewis decided to wait (Hersh, Cover-Up 138).

Major Fredric W. Watke was the next officer to review Thompson's After-Action

Report dealing with the operation at My Lai (4). As the commanding officer of the 123"̂

Aviation Battalion, Watke received the report from Captain Lloyd. After reading the

report, Watke had a major decision to make. Watke later said that he knew at the time

that reporting an atrocity like My Lai would ruin his advancement in the Army, but he

still felt he had to report the alleged incident. After struggling with his dilemma, Watke

met with Lieutenant Colonel Holladay in the late evening of March 16"' to discuss the

allegations.

Early in the morning of March 17"', Major Watke and Lieutenant Colonel

Holladay arrived at Americal Division Headquarters to report the My Lai incident to

Brigadier General George Young. Major Watke said he relayed what was in Warrant

Officer Thompson's report, specifically images of Lieutenant Calley firing into a ditch

filled with Vietnamese civilians, and told the general of the suspicious discrepancy

between the number of enemy soldiers reportedly killed and the meager number of

weapons captured. Holladay recalled General Young's reaction to the allegations as very

odd. "The general seemed more upset over Thompson's action in landing his helicopter

10

and threatening ground forces than in the numbers of civilians slain. 1 had it just the

other way around in my mind" (Hersh, Cover-Up 134).

When being interviewed by the Army's formal investigation into My Lai, the

Peers Commission, General Young recalled his meeting with Major Watke and

Lieutenant Colonel Holladay quite differently than the two officers had reported.

General Young testified that he came away from the meeting with absolutely no

knowledge of any murders. "1 gained the impression that civilians were [caught] in a

crossfire between the friendly forces and the enemy forces." Young claimed the only

confrontation he was told about was that of Thompson and the ground troops (Hersh,

Cover-Up 133-134).

The version of the March 17, 1968 meeting between Young, Holladay. and Watke

that General Young relayed to the Peers Commission is questionable, given General

Young's actions after the meeting. On March 17, 1968 General Young began an

investigation into the problematic operation. Young flew by helicopter to Landing Zone

Dotti to interview the men of Charlie Company. By the time Young arrived at the

landing zone, much of the area to the east was shrouded in the smoke from Bravo and

Charlie Company's operations. Altogether, at least six hamlets had been burned along

the South China Sea coast near My Lai. Young acknowledged later to the Peers Panel

that he probably did fly over the operational area that afternoon but claimed he did not

recall seeing the smoke and destruction on the ground (Hersh, Cover-Up 139).

Once on the ground at Landing Zone Dotti, Young received an extensive briefing

on the previous day's mission. Major Calhoun testified to the Peers Panel that he told the

I I

general that sixty-nine civilians had been killed. Calhoun told the general that he thought

the preparatory artillery fire that had been used to clear the landing zone and the

surrounding area possibly killed them. At that time. Young asked the major no direct

questions about the mission and did not question anything he had just been told (Hersh.

Cover-Up 139).

Although the general gave no indication of it at the time of his briefing, whatever

he had been told must have troubled him. Lieutenant Colonel Trexler, the division

intelligence chief, recalled that sometime on March 17, or perhaps the next day, he was

flying with General Young when they had a conversation about the incident. Trexler

recalled that, " . . .the people had gone beyond what he conceived was proper conduct. . .

Units had indiscriminately burned hootches, burned villages. . .1 think maybe that he did

discuss the value of retaining Task Force Barker" (Hersh, Cover-Up 140).

The results of General Young's visit were immediate. That afternoon after

Young's visit. Task Force Barker ordered its two companies in the field to completely

stop burning Vietnamese hamlets. From that moment on, the operation suddenly became

a "mercy mission" (Hersh, Cover-Up 141). Medical teams were immediately flown into

the area to inspect and treat the civilians who had been picked up by TF Barker's two

companies during their two-day operation of terror. This change to pacification efforts

amazed the G.I.'s of the task force who had gotten used to the old policies of search and

destroy.

General Young's intervention did yield some positive results, such as the medical

teams; however, no larger investigation emerged. Even though the chaos was stopped.

12

this visit did nothing to alert the "upper brass" in the army that something was terribly

wrong. In fact, after his briefing Young ordered Colonel Henderson, Major Watke,

Lieutenant Colonel Barker, and Lieutenant Colonel Holladay to attend a meeting with

him the next morning at task force headquarters. On March 18, General Young, Colonel

Henderson, Lieutenant Colonels Barker and Holladay, and Major Watke met at nine

o'clock in the morning. General Young started off the meeting by saying, "We are the

only five that know about this." Major Watke then told his story for the third time. Later

Holladay told the Peers Commission that the message from General Young was clear:

there was to be no unnecessary talking about either the meeting or the complaints that

had brought about the meeting (Hersh, Cover-Up 147-148).

Despite Thompson's After-Action report, both Thompson's and Father Creswell's

formal complaints. Major Watke and Lieutenant Colonel Holladay" s meeting with

General Young, and General Young's subsequent intervention, the events at My Lai (4)

remained just another statistic until April, 1969 when an ex-G.l. named Ronald

Riddenhour wrote letters to the Pentagon, the White Hou.se, and other government offices

describing the murders at My Lai (4). Although not physically present at My Lai (4) on

March 16, 1968, Riddenhour was told about the brutal operation in passing conversation

by several G.I.'s who had been there. Riddenhour's numerous letters reawakened the

incident and led to formal investigations that, within four months, uncovered most of the

facts about the massacre. If it were not for Riddenhour's persistence in writing authority

after authority about the incident, the My Lai Massacre could very well have never been

uncovered (Hersh, MY LAI 104-110).

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CHAPTER III

FRAMING MY LAI

The operation that took place on March 16, 1968 in and around My Lai (4) led to

numerous investigations. The first of these inquiries were the early inquires by Colonel

Henderson of the 11"' Brigade and of Brigadier General Young of the Americal Division

Headquarters. Later, the Army opened criminal investigations of the operation and its

apparent cover-up because of Ronald Riddenhour's persistent letters and Task Force

Barker's official report on My Lai that stated that only three weapons were captured from

128 killed NLF troops. Outside of the military, groups like Vietnam Veterans Against

the War (VVAW) held investigations into atrocities committed by the United States

military in Vietnam. The Winter Soldiers investigation, held by VVAW, examined

issues like war crimes, racism, and military policy in Vietnam.

Criminal Investigation and the Peers Panel

Following Riddenhour's letters and the public interest they stirred, the Criminal

Invesdgation Division (CID) of the Army, headed by Colonel Henry H. Tufts, began a

criminal investigation of the My Lai Massacre. As the CID began interviewing members

of Charlie Company to determine what happened on the ground at My Lai, it became

obvious to investigators and their superiors that the My Lai Massacre had been covered

up by officers of the Americal Division and the 11'*' Brigade (Hersh, Cover-Up 228).

14

With public outrage mounting, the Secretary of the Army and other military

policy makers decided an inquiry into the cover-up was necessary. A series of meetings

were held in the Pentagon to discuss ways of stopping the growing criticism from the

American press and public over what seemed to be an obvious cover-up of the My Lai

Massacre. A group that included Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, General

Counsel Robert E. Jordan, 111, Vice Chief of Staff Bruce Palmer, and Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Z. Henkin suggested that some kind of inquiry into

the cover-up was needed. It was decided by this Pentagon group to not entrust the

inquiry to Colonel Tuft's CID office because the men they were interrogating would

outrank his investigators (Hersh, Cover-Up 229).

Instead, in December of 1969, the Army announced to the American public that a

panel had been created to learn the facts behind the My Lai Massacre. The panel was

officially called "The Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations

into the My Lai Incident" and was unofficially known as the Peers Panel after its director.

Lieutenant General William Peers, who was picked by the army because of his tough,

blunt reputation. The Peers Panel was designed to investigate why the atrocity had not

been properly reported, but it also had the power to charge a suspect with a crime, if the

need arose. Although the military supported Peers' appointment completely, officials in

the State Department at the time had reservations because of the insensitivity to the

problems of civilians General Peers had shown during his 1968 command of the 4' U.S.

Division in Vietnam. However. Peers' appointment stood and the panel began work

immediately. General Peers handpicked the rest of the panel, which included Colonel

15

William Wilson of the Inspector General's office and two private New York attorneys.

Robert MacCrate and Jerome K. Walsh, Jr. (Hersh, Cover-Up 228-230).

The growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War in the late sixties and early

seventies made the issue of investigating American war crimes especially delicate. The

appointment of General Samuel Koster, the former commander of the Americal Division,

to the prestigious title of Superintendent of West Point made the investigations even more

sensitive. The press coverage of the panel was, therefore, very limited. Army officials

told the press that the panel's proceedings would be closed to the public but that

individual witnesses would be free to tell the press whatever they chose (Hersh, MY LAI

4 172-174).

There were .some limits that the Peers Panel had to deal with when investigating

the army's actions at My Lai (4). The most important of these limits to General Peers

and his staff was that, because the panel was just an inquiry and not a criminal

investigation, it could not subpoena witnesses or compel them to appear or testify.

Perhaps because of this major handicap, the panel took on a very aggressive and

confrontational style with those witnesses who did appear. For example, Peers himself

clashed severely with 11"' Brigade combat correspondent Jay Roberts. However, some

witnesses did not respond to this aggressive style (Hersh, MY LAI 4 175). These

witnesses had other reasons that compelled them to testify to the panel, including fear,

shame, and a desire to help the Army investigate. Another key aspect of the panel's

invesfigation that led many G.I.'s as well as ex-G.I.'s to testify was that many of the men

were awed by the presence of a colonel or a general. This awe led some of the men

16

having a "less than perfect" understanding of their rights to refuse to appear or testify.

Another power used by the Peers Panel that many witnesses did not fully understand

when giving their accounts of what happened was the power to press charges. Because of

this lack of understanding, many witnesses went into the interview thinking it was a

relatively casual atmosphere and came out with a criminal charge (Hersh, MY LAI 4

175-176).

The panel started its investigation by interviewing the commanding officers of the

11' Brigade and Americal Division in Peers' office deep in the basement of the

Pentagon. Next, the panel moved on to interrogating the men of Charlie Company about

the actual happenings in My Lai (4) on March 16. Later, the panel branched out and

interviewed members of the other two companies that made up Task Force Barker, Alpha

and Bravo. All in all, the Peers Panel interviewed 390 witnesses and compiled over

20,000 pages of witness' testimony (Hersh, MY LAI 4 174-178).

The Peers Panel and CID investigations focused heavily on Ernest Medina and

William Calley. Testimony from the members of Charlie Company showed how Calley

had ordered soldiers to kill civilians and had killed quite a few himself, but the men of

Charlie Company could not come to a clear consensus about Medina's role in the

atrocity. Harry Stanley testified that during the briefing the night before the operation,

Medina "ordered us to 'kill everything in the village." Charles West remembered Medina

said that when Charlie Company left the area "nothing would be walking, growing, or

crawling." However, others remembered it differently. Gregory Olsen was sure Medina

did not order the killing of women and children. "He never at any time said, 'Slaughter

17

the people'." Ron Grzesik agreed. He heard Medina tell the men "to go in and destroy

the village; to make it uninhabitable," but did not remember Medina ordering the men to

kill the inhabitants (Hersh, MY LAI 4 40-42).

Despite the lengthy investigations by the CID and the Peers Panel, the military

never gave an official explanation for the My Lai Massacre. However, the way the

military handled the formal charges against both the men of Charlie Company accused of

murder and the officers accused of covering-up the incident suggests that the military saw

My Lai as an aberration. Two separate sets of formal charges were brought against

twenty-six men. The first group of men was charged with either murder or assault with

the intent to commit murder. The second group of men was charged with the cover-up

that followed the operation in the field at My Lai (4).

Three officers and nine enlisted men were charged with murder or assault with the

intent to commit murder for their acfions in the hamlet of My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968.

Of these initial twelve men, the military courts only found one. Lieutenant William

Calley, guilty. All of the others were either acquitted or had the charges against them

dropped. Murder charges were dropped before trial at Fort McPherson against Sergeant

Esequiel Torres, Corporal Kenneth Schiel, Specialist Fourth Class William Doherty,

Specialist Robert W. T'Souvas, Private Max D. Hutson, and Private Gerald A. Smith. An

assault charge was also dismissed against Sergeant Kenneth L. Hodges (Hersh, Cover-Up

255). Five men were tried before the military courts and four were acquitted. Captain

Eugene Kotouc was acquitted of a maiming charge at Fort McPherson (his earlier assault

charges had already been dropped), and Sergeants Charles E. Hutto and David Mitchell

were acquitted of assault with the intent to kill charges. Captain Ernest Medina, the

commander of Charlie Company and the man who, by some accounts. ga\e the orders to

kill everyone in My Lai (4), was found not guilty on September 22. 1971 of premeditated

murder, involuntary manslaughter, and two counts of assault after his August 1971 trial at

Fort McPherson (Hersh, Cover-Up 255).

The only man to be found guilty of murder. Lieutenant William Calley. was

brought to trial at Fort Benning Georgia. Unlike the secrecy that shrouded the Peers

Panel Invesfigation, Galley's trial was well publicized throughout the country, creating a

division among many Americans. A substantial portion of the adult population believed

that either Calley was simply a scapegoat for a much larger problem or that his actions in

My Lai (4) were completely justified. Another portion of the population abhorred

Lieutenant Galley's actions and thought he should be punished to the maximum extent of

the law (Hersh, MY LAI 4 151-170). Even though Calley was found guilty of the murder

of at least 109 Vietnamese civilians, he served only three years under confinement, most

of which was house arrest with visitation rights for his girlfriend of the time. Most likely

due to the tremendous backlash the American public unleashed after Galley's conviction

and sentencing to life in prison. President Richard Nixon granted William Calley a full

pardon after only three years of his sentence had been served (Gershen 116-127).

The second group indicted for their role in the incident at My Lai (4) were the

fourteen officers charged with the cover-up of the massacre. These fourteen officers'

charges were reviewed by the commanding general of the P' Army, Lieutenant General

Jonathon O. Seaman, a West Point graduate and a former division commander in

Vietnam. General Seaman's assignment in these cases was to decide whether or not the

evidence against each officer warranted an Article 32 hearing, the military equivalent to a

grand jury hearing (Hersh, Cover-Up 256).

Despite conflicting testimony. Seaman dismissed all charges against General

Young, Colonel Parson, and Major McKnight on June 23, 1970. In these three cases.

Seaman reasoned that the evidence did not support the charges. On July 28, 1970,

General Seaman dismissed the cover-up charges against two other officers, Colonel

Robert Luper and Captain Kenneth Boatman, and he announced that seven of the

remaining officers would face Article 32 hearings. Of the seven who were to face the

next stage of hearings. General Koster, Colonel Henderson, Lieutenant Colonels William

Guinn and David Gavin, Majors Charles Calhoun and Frederic Watke, and Captain

Dennis Johnson, only one would be tried by a general court-martial (Hersh, Cover-Up

259).

On January 6, 1971, General Seaman dismissed charges "because of insufficient

evidence" against Guinn, Gavin, Calhoun, and Watke. Twenty-two days later he also

dropped the charges "in the interest of justice" against General Koster. At the time of

this announcement, there was practically no public indignation over the Army's decision

to drop charges against the most senior officer involved in the My Lai Massacre. Most of

the American press treated the story as a one-day piece. Only one Congressman, Samuel

S. Stratton, challenged the decision to drop the charges against Koster, calling it a "grave

miscarriage of military justice." Congressman Stratton argued that dropping the charges

20

against the top officer responsible in this situation would once again raise the question of

a "military whitewash." (Hersh, Cover-Up 260-263).

On February 26, 1971 General Seaman announced that Colonel Oran Henderson

would be tried by a general court-martial for his role in the cover-up of My Lai.

Although he had been the officer who tried to order Medina to return to My Lai and

investigate. Colonel Henderson never reported the massacre to his superiors. Thus

Henderson became the only officer out of the original fourteen to be charged that was

required to face a court-martial. Colonel Henderson's trial became mired in technical

disputes regarding the validity of the colonel's testimony before the Peer's Panel. On

December 17, 1971, Henderson was found not guilty of the cover-up charges (Hersh,

Cover-Up 265-267).

After the investigations and trials were over, the military examined the Law of

War (LOW) training provided to soldiers in training? unfortunately, there was no clear-

cut answer that would deter war crimes of the magnitude of My Lai in the future.

Changing the military's policy of teaching LOW was very difficult. LOW was already

taught on a semi-annual basis. All recruits and officer candidates received an hour or two

of LOW instruction in training. Dr. Gary Solis, a law professor with expertise in U.S.

war crimes at West Point, poses the question: Where could the military take their LOW

training from there?

But what was there to do? Increase the hours? Make a higher-ranking officer give the instruction? It was already required, there was already DOD [Department of Defense] and DA [Department of the Army] orders on the subject, as well as (in Vietnam) MACV and subordinate orders. There wasn't much more to be done. (Solis, Personal Communication)

21

Directly after My Lai, the only change the military made was to increase the

emphasis on LOW training. "Major General Bill Suter. former Acting JAG of the Army.

now Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, told me that after My Lai, the Army taught LOW

'day and night'. But there were no changes per se" (Solis. Personal Communication).

Solis went on to explain that the primary difference between before and after My Lai was

that afterwards, the Army, at least for a while, emphasized LOW instruction more in

training.

The military did make some changes to their LOW policies soon after the My Lai

incident and later in the 1990's; however, very little change was actually implemented

(Solis, Son Thang 58). In 1996, the military brought up the issue of LOW training again.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01, dated 12 August 1996,

"Implementafion of the DOD Law of War Program" was published; however. Dr. Solis

pointed out that this merely republished an instruction (DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD

Law of War Program," 10 July 1979) that, in one form or another, had been in force for

years. Secondly, and more significantly, 18 U.S. Code 2442, the War Crimes Act of

1996, was enacted. This act provided for the punishment of U.S. civilians who violate

the LOW. "This was a glaring gap in our accountability system, because soldiers how

were discharged before their LOW crimes were discovered, as one My Lai suspect was,

were not triable by any legal authority" (Solis, Personal Communication).

22

VVAW and the Winter Soldiers Investigation

On April 15, 1967, six Vietnam veterans met at an anti-war demonstration in New

York and formed an organization to protest the Vietnam War. Vietnam Veterans Against

the War (VVAW) grew quickly in size and importance, becoming one of the leading

groups of the ami-war movement of the 1960's and 1970's. The group played an

important role in the movement by providing speakers, running newspaper ads.

publishing its own newspaper, and organizing demonstrations (Lembcke 57).

The VVAW was organized to voice the growing opposition, among servicemen

and women returning from Vietnam, to the still-raging war in Indochina, and grew

rapidly to a membership of over 30,000 throughout the United States as well as active

duty GIs stationed in Vietnam. Through ongoing actions and grassroots organization,

VVAW worked to expose an ugly side to US involvement in Southeast

(http://www.prairienet.org/vvaw/main.html/whoweare.html).

In late January and early February of 1971 VVAW convened the "Winter

Soldiers Investigation" in Detroit, Michigan. The investigation, which was conducted a

few months before Galley's criminal trial, consisted of multiple panels leading

discussions of atrocities committed by U.S. troops against the Vietnamese people.

Between January 31 and February 2, 1971 more than one hundred veterans presented

testimony to the press and the public on atrocities they either personally took part in or

witnessed. In his opening statement, William Crandell explained the origins of the term,

"Winter Soldier." The term was taken from Thomas Paine, who had dubbed the soldiers

who, in the winter of 1776, shrunk from the crisis facing the country "summer soldiers"

23

and "sunshine patriots." The term implied that the veterans speaking out against what

they had experienced in Vietnam were true patriots because they were trying to expose

something they felt was wrong (Lembcke 58).

The purpose of the Winter Soldiers Investigation was to show the public a side of

the war in Vietnam that was not reported in the American press. Veterans hoped their

testimony would enlighten people concerning the atrocities committed by American

troops against Vietnamese civilians. They were determined to show that American

involvement in cruelty, torture, and unwarranted killings was commonplace in Vietnam.

By doing this they also hoped to close the gap between the American soldiers who were

viewed in America as good, and Vietnamese people who were generally viewed by the

American public as evil and subhuman. The atrocities described by the veterans at the

Winter Soldiers Investigation ranged from general cruelty to out-right murder (Winter

Soldiers Investigation).

In his opening statement on the first day of the Winter Soldiers Investigation,

William Crandell described how VVAW interpreted the My Lai Massacre:

We intend to demonstrate that My Lai was no unusual occurrence, other than, perhaps, the number of victims killed all in one place, all at one time, all by one platoon of us. We intend to show that the policies of Americal Division, which inevitably resulted in My Lai, were the policies of other Army and Marine Divisions as well. We intend to show that war crimes in Vietnam did not start in March 1968, or in the village of Son My or with one Lieutenant William Calley. (Winter Soldiers Investigation, P' Marine Division 1-3)

With hundreds of testimonials of cruelty, torture, and attempted genocide, the Winter

Soldiers Investigation took a large step towards proving just that.

Throughout the Winter Soldiers Investigation, ex-G.I.s recalled how American

soldiers treated Vietnamese civilians and prisoners cruelly. James Duffy, of the Army's

1' Air Cavalry Division, was one of many veterans to describe the atrocities he both took

part in and witnessed while in Vietnam. At the investigation, Duffy described how

Vietnamese children would often beg for food from the American G.I.'s. Duffy

explained how the soldiers would discard the C-ration cans they did not like and then

give the expectant children cans full of extremely poisonous helicopter hydraulic fluid

(Winter Soldiers Investigation, l" Air Cavalry Division, Part II, 6). SP/4 Sam Schorr, of

the Eighty-sixth Combat Engineers Division, described how men from his unit would

throw full C-ration cans at the heads of begging children from a passing truck. Schorr

explained how many times he saw a can hit a child and split his head open, dropping the

child to the ground (Lembcke 59-60).

Rusty Sachs, a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 medivac pilot,

described throwing prisoners out of helicopters as "a big game." Sachs told how

prisoners would be blindfolded, bound at their hands and feet, and forced into the fetal

position. Upon landing, rather than allowing the prisoners to walk off the aircraft, the

American soldiers would throw them out. The men would mark how far each prisoner

was thrown and have little contests to see who could throw their prisoner the farthest

(Winter Soldiers Investigation, T' Marine Division, Part II, 3-4).

Sergeant Scott Camile of the T' Marine Division also described American

cruelty he witnessed while stationed in Vietnam. Camile recounted how he saw a

Vietnamese woman who had been shot by an American sniper asking American troops

25

for water. The soldiers ripped off her clothes, stabbed her in both breasts, then spread her

legs and shoved an entrenching tool up her vagina before finally killing her (, Winter

Soldiers Investigation, T' Marine Division, Part II, 6).

Anthony Palosaari of the Americal Division, 198'̂ Infantry Brigade, told

the audience at the Winter Soldiers Investigation of the murder of Vietnamese civilians.

During an operation in a Vietnamese village, a group of American soldiers approached a

small "hootch" with a bunker. The G.I.'s yelled down into the bunker in Vietnamese, "Is

anyone there?" Simultaneously, while yelling this, they dropped a grenade into the

bunker. Later, Palosaari looked into the bunker and saw what was left of a little boy, a

little girl, and old woman (Winter Soldiers Investigation, Americal Division, Part I 2).

Another veteran, John Beitzel witnessed the same kind of atrocities. As a Sergeant in the

Americal Division, 11'^ Brigade, Beitzel claimed he had witnessed the mutilation of

bodies, torture of prisoners, and many other forms of cruelty and murder. Beitzel

claimed that throwing grenades into civilian bunkers to obtain higher body counts was

common practice in his company. Beitzel told how once they threw a white phosphorous

grenade into a bunker and their victim stumbled out burned and screaming (Winter

Soldiers Investigation, Americal Division, Part I 2-3). Another Americal Division

soldier, SP/4 Gary Keyes, testified how men in his company routinely used the civilian

fishermen they saw for target practice. "They swung their 50-calibers around and they

just shot the shit out of them, for no reason, I guess" (Winter Soldiers Investigation,

Americal Division, Part I 6).

26

Unlike the CID and Peers Panel investigations, the Winter Soldiers Investigation

suggested that atrocities were common, even Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the

American military. When describing the throwing of prisoners from helicopters.

Lieutenant Rusty Sachs conveyed the general feeling of many who testified at the Winter

Soldiers Investigation. "The general attitude of the officers was, 'Well, there's somebody

senior to me here and 1 guess if this wasn't SOP he'd be doing something to stop it,' and

since nobody senior ever did anything to stop it, the policy was promulgated and

everybody assumed that this was what was right" (Winter Soldiers Investigation, T'

Marine Division, Part II 4). James Duffy also described this attitude. "This was common

policy. Kill anything you want to kill, any fime you want to kill it, just don't get caught"

(Winter Soldiers Investigation, 1̂ ' Air Cavalry Division, Part II 6).

Unfortunately, the Winter Soldiers Investigation was virtually ignored by the

American press. Numerous people, including many members of the press, did not

believe that the veterans who testified at the Winter Soldiers Investigation were really

veterans (Lembcke 62). Moreover, the press tended to ignore many of the actions the

veterans took in the anfi-war movement of the sixdes and seventies. The press either

ignored or called the veterans "phonies" when two thousand Vietnam veterans converged

on Washington D.C. in April 1971 to protest. In numerous newspaper articles, the

veterans' authenticity was questioned and, in some cases, so was their manhood.

Echoing these statements, on May 14, Vice President Agnew said, "I don't know how to

describe them, but I heard one of them say to the other: 'If you're captured by the enemy.

27

give only your name, age, and the telephone number of your hairdresser'" (Lembcke 98-

99).

The main assessment of the veterans who testified at the Winter Soldiers

Investigations was that atrocities such as My Lai were examples of how U.S. policy was

routinely aimed at destroying Vietnamese civilians. The men who testified at the Winter

Soldiers Investigations saw the My Lai Massacre as a logical extension of U.S. policy in

Vietnam.

Aside from the Winter Soldiers Investigation, the anti-war position articulated by

the VVAW first pointed to other related atrocities that occurred in Vietnam to show My

Lai was not an aberration, but an extension of policy. At the same time that Charlie

Company was destroying My Lai (4), Bravo Company, also of Task Force Barker,

assaulted the nearby hamlet of My Khe (4). The soldiers of Bravo Company killed

civilians, burned homes, and killed livestock in My Khe (4) in much the same fashion

that the men of Charlie Company destroyed My Lai (4). Survivors of the attack told

army investigators that the G.I.'s killed at least ninety civilians; however, one ex-G.l.,

who was personally keeping count that day, remembered 155 civilians had been killed

(Hersh, Cover-Up 9-25). In 1965, in the village of Son Thang, a unit of Marines killed

about thirty civilians and burned their village down (Solis, Son Thang 4-14). These

events are examples of what some ex-G.I.'s, like many of those who testified at the

Winter Soldiers Investigation, claim happened all the time in Vietnam. Colonel Oran

Henderson, one of those who was charged with covering-up the events at My Lai,

28

explained this idea to reporters covering his court-martial. "Every unit of brigade size

has its My Lai hidden someplace" (Zinn, 479).

The veterans of the VVAW felt that, although few massacres of the magnitude of

My Lai were publicized, this was not the point. These veterans felt that there was

evidence that the everyday actions of the military created a general pattern of brutality.

An example of this concept would be the bombing campaigns the U.S. conducted against

both North and South Vietnam. New varieties of bombs were dropped by the U.S.

military in Vietnam that were devastatingly cruel in many anti-war protestors' eyes. For

example, cluster bombs that released 180,000 fleshettes, "daisy-cutters" that cut

everything in their path down to a few inches, and napalm and white phosphorous that

burned everything they touched were all seen as exceedingly cruel by VVAW veterans

(Young 191).

From this viewpoint, the My Lai Massacre was not an aberration, but a result of a

general policy of brutality and cruelty. The VVAW argued that atrocities such as My Lai

were inevitable.

29

CHAPTER IV

ASSESSMENT

Why the Massacre Happened

Nothing about the Vietnam War can be viewed as simply "black and white".

There are many different issues that must be addressed in an explanation of the My Lai

Massacre. Scholars such as Seymour Hersh, Marilyn Young, and Neil Sheehan point to

terms such as "search and destroy" and "free fire zone," Charlie Company's history, and

the lowering of officer standards in order to explain why My Lai happened. What

occurred in My Lai was an extreme extension of the way the U.S. fought the Vietnam

War. The magnitude of the incident definitely makes it an aberration; however, the

policies of the military and attitudes of many of the soldiers made an atrocity like My Lai

virtually inevitable.

The orders given to the men who fought in Vietnam could have had a hand in the

chaos that ensued. "Search and Destroy", a very ambiguous term, had a different

meaning for almost every soldier who heard it. Lawrence LaCroix, a private in Charlie

Company, explained that he thought the "search and destroy" order meant to destroy

anything that offers resistance; he elaborated that if a 99 year old man or even a small

child was a threat then they would be shot (LaCroix File, Vietnam Archive). Other

members of Charlie Company understood Medina's order to "search and destroy" as a

revenge mission for all the men the company had recently lost to booby traps and mines

(Hersh, MY LAI 4 40-42).

30

The term, "Free Fire Zone," is another designation that might have led to the

numerous civilian deaths in My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968. An area was designated as a

"Free Fire Zone" when it was determined to have an especially strong presence of NLF.

After the civilians had been warned and forced to move out, the area was opened to

unrestricted hostility from the American and ARVN forces. Any civilians still in the area

after this warning were considered to be either NLF or NLF supporters. The primary

problem with this concept is that many times civilians stayed in the area regardless of

their political conviction and were thus subjected to unrestricted fire from American

soldiers. Vietnamese civilians often felt like they had the right to stay on their ancestral

lands and were put in great danger for this decision. According to U.S. Army policy,

populated towns and villages cleared of all civilians before being designated a "free-fire

zone," and anyone left inside a village designated a "free-fire zone" was there at their

own risk. Therefore, many of the men of Charlie Company did not expect to encounter

civilians, only the enemy NLF.

The history of Charlie Company itself illustrates another problem, that of poor

training and inexperience. The men of Charlie Company were inexperienced and most

were fresh out of the draft while the officers were young and untested. In training, the

men of Charlie Company were considered by their superiors to be a bad company

because, overall, the men lacked discipline and were slow to learn. Once in combat in

Vietnam, casualties from minefields, booby traps, and snipers devastated the company.

These invisible enemies made frustration rise in the men of Charlie Company until a

31

release was inevitable. That frustration was released on the inhabitants of My Lai

(Gershen 94-109).

The lowering of officer standards in the U.S. military during the Vietnam War

also helps explain why My Lai happened. At the beginning of the war, the military was

able to pick its officers from a long list of candidates. This depth gave the military the

ability to only select the best applicants to become officers. However, after a few years

of heavy casualties, the military was forced to lower its requirements for becoming an

officer in order to maintain the needed number of officers. Officer standards were also

lowered because many educated young men were able to avoid the draft by attending

college or through political connections. Lieutenant William Calley, a college dropout

with litUe to no leadership skills was a perfect example of these lower standards. Military

analysts claim that Calley would have been denied had his application been reviewed a

few years earlier. Companies with poor leadership, as many argued My Lai to be, were

more susceptible to breakdowns in order, such as the My Lai Massacre.

Neal Sheehan, a reporter and critic of the Vietnam War, sums up why atrocities

such as the My Lai Massacre happened in his book, A Bright Shining Lie, by describing

how U.S. policy made it easier for American troops to kill Vietnamese people with little

or no thought.

The value of Vietnamese life was systematically cheapened in [the American soldier's] mind. Further brutalized by the cycle of meaningless violence that was Westmoreland's war of attrition, and full of hatred because his comrades were so often killed and wounded by mines and booby traps set by local guerrillas and the peasants that helped them, he naturally came to see all Vietnamese of the countryside as vermin to be exterminated. The massacre at Son My was inevitable. The military leaders of the United States, and the civilian leaders who permitted the

32

generals to wage war as they did, had made the massacre inevitable. (Sheehan 689-690)

Why the Cover-Up Happened

There are many different possible explanations tor the cover-up of the events that

unfolded at the small hamlet on March 16, 1968. The two broadest reasons have to do

with the political climate of the 60's and early 70's in Vietnam and the United States as

well as the policies with which the U.S. military promoted its officers. First of all, the

embarrassment and exposure brought about by the Tet Offensive of 1968 led President

Johnson to look for an "honorable" way out of Vietnam. Back in the United States and

the antiwar movement was growing more vocal. These overall conditions made it

important to high-ranking military officials that the war effort seem as positive and

successful as possible. A negative event, such as what eventually leaked out of My Lai.

was to be avoided because of the terrible publicity it could bring the U.S. government and

military. Secondly, career officers in the U.S. Army were very hesitant to report a

potenfial war crime because it would effectively halt promotion (Olsen and Roberts 113).

There was, in effect, a double standard that told officers to report offenses such as My

Lai, but at the same time to never report an incident that would bring bad press to the

military.

More specifically, the policies of the Americal Division and the 11'̂ Brigade help

explain the cover-up of the incident that occurred at My Lai (4). Of these, the Americal's

policies were the most vague but also the most far-reaching. The Americal Division

followed the same broad policies of the rest of Westmoreland's Army in 1968 Vietnam:

33

"body count" and "kill rafio." Both of the these policies stated that the way to win the

war in Vietnam was to fight a war of attrition, making sure that the number of enemy

killed was always substantially higher than the number of Americans killed. These

military-wide policies, in turn, led the Americal Division to "look the other way" when

civilians were killed because it raised the body count and made the kill ratio more

favorable for the American war effort. Lieutenant Colonel Warren J. Lucas, the Americal

Division Provost Marshal (chief law enforcement officer) was responsible for

investigating all crime related to the Americal Division. He later claimed in an interview

that murder was never one of the war crimes he investigated. Lucas explained that he

might investigate the mistreatment of civilians or perhaps an unwarranted village

burning, but never any murders. Lucas said he would hear rumors of murder from the

field but the officer in charge of the operation would declare them "a combat action"

before any investigation could take place. This policy of choosing a high body count

over conducting war crimes investigations for murder was instrumental in what would

happen after My Lai (Hersh, Cover-Up 34-35). As commander of the Americal Division,

Major General Samuel Koster could have court-martialed some violators of international

law for their crimes. This might have successfully limited the number of such violations;

however, it also would have signaled to Americal Division's superiors that such

infractions of law did occur.

The officers of the 11' Brigade followed the same type of policies as their

superiors from Americal Division headquarters. The commander of the 11"' Brigade,

Colonel Henderson, emphasized body count over all else. Competition for enemy kills

34

was constant among the battalions and companies of the 11"' Brigade. Because of this

heavy competition and the fru.strafion of trying to disfinguish civilians from guerrillas, the

murder of civilians was common throughout all battalions of the brigade (Hersh. Cover-

Up 46). "We killed people just for the sake of killing," said William Bezanson, who

served in the Brigade at the time of My Lai. "Guys would come out waving a pass and

we'd just waste them" (Hersh, Cover-Up 37). Filing a formal complaint again.st war

crimes such as these would have been difficult because of how accepted the actions were

for the 11' Brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Herbert, who emerged in public in

1971 for filing charges against his superior officers for alleged war crimes, compared the

filing of a formal war crime charge to ". . .one of the gunmen calling up the head of the

Mafia and saying, 'Hey, tomorrow lets all go to the police'" (Hersh, Cover-Up 35-40).

Both the My Lai Massacre and the cover-up that followed were extreme, but they

were not aberrations. American policies, training, attitudes, and morals all led to

atrocities such as My Lai. My Lai's extreme nature garnered it massive amounts of

attention and public debate, but it was only an extreme example of what many G.I.'s and

military analysts claim happened everyday in Vietnam. "In U.S. infantry units in South

Vietnam, such acts were not unusual. Generals will deny it, colonels and majors may

doubt it, but any captain or lieutenant and any enlisted infantryman who was there will

confirm it. That's just the way it was, not in the best led units, but in most" (Solis. Son

Thang 13-14).

35

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Farber, David. The Sixties: From Memory to History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

Gershen, Martin. Destroy or Die: The Story of MyLai.

Hersh, Seymour M. Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4. New York: Random House, 1972.

Hersh, Seymour M. MY LAI 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970.

LaCroix, Lawrence. Box 1, Legal Documents, My Lai Collecfion, Vietnam Archive. Texas Tech University. Lubbock, Texas.

Lembcke, Jerry. The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

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Olsen, James S. and Randy Roberts. Mv Lai: A Brief History with Documents. Bo.ston: Bedford Books, 1998.

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Sheehan, Neil. A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann an America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.

Solis, Gary D. Personal Communication. Law Professor, West Point: United States Military Academy, 2001.

Solis, Gary D. Son Thang. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997

Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The Winter Soldiers Investigation. Detroit, Michigan. January 31-February 3, 1971.

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http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Resources/Primary/.../WS_02 _opening.htm. Accessed on March 3, 2001.

Vietnam Veterans Against the War Official Website. http://www.prairienet.org/vvaw/main.html/whoweare.html. Accessed on April 18,2001.

Young, Marilyn. The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.

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