mBank – CASE Seminars A QUARTER CENTURY OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN UKRAINE: TOO LATE, TOO LITTLE, TOO SLOW 18th December 2014
Jul 14, 2015
mBank – CASE SeminarsA QUARTER CENTURY
OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN UKRAINE:
TOO LATE, TOO LITTLE, TOO SLOW
18th December 2014
OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
II. THE “INPUTS” OF TRANSITION
III. REFORMS, POLICY CHANGES
IV. THE “OUTPUTS” OF TRANSITION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
V. EXPLAINING URAINE’S LAG
VI. CONCLUSIONS
2
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
WELL-KNOWN FACT THAT UKRAINE LAGGED FAR BEHIND POLAND AND CEB
1ST AIM OF PAPER: TO DESCRIBE THE LAG, BOTH ON REFORMS (SEC.II) AND ON PERFORMANCE (SEC.III)
2ND AIM OF PAPER: TO INVESTIGATE CAUSES OF THE LAG (SEC.IV)
WHY REFORMS DEALYED, SLOW?
CORREALTIONS POINTING A THYPOTHEISI THAT DEALY IN EARLY YEARS BY ITSELF IMPORTANT EXPLANATION OF 25 yr. PERFORMANCE
3
6
FIGURE 3INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AMONG WORST
Business Environment
Latvia
Georgia
Ukraine
Lithuania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Poland
Moldova
Russia
-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200
Ease of Doing Business 2011 (country ranking)
Index of Economic Freedom 2012 (country ranking)
50 100150200
Source: World Bank and Heritage Foundation.
17
7
FIGURE 4 CORRUPTPTION RANKING AMONG WORST
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Ukr
aine
Russi
a
Belar
us
Kaz
akhs
tan
Serbi
a
Latvi
a
Turke
y
Hun
gary
Polan
d
Source: Transparency International.2012
18
CUMULATIVE FDI PER CAPITA TO 2012
ESTONIA… 11,177
CE.AVER… 5,671
POLAND… 4,334
ROMANIA 3,534
GEORGIA 2,224
FSUREF.AVER 1,878
UKRAINE 1,469
UZBEKISTAN 264
10
…BUT STILL BETTER THAN IN SOVIET PERIOD
DESPITE LAGGING BEHIND CEB COUNTRIES, UKRAINE HAS PROGRESSED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM SOVIET TIMES
STANDARD OF LIVING IS HIGHER BY MOST DIRECT MEASURES OTHER THAN “OFFICIAL’’ GDP COMPARSIONS (AS IN EBRD REPORTS)BUT THESE ARE HIGHLY FLAWED, NMP BY FAR OVERESTIMATED REAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
GLOBALISATION HAS GONE VERY FAR FROM AUTARKIC TRADE OF SOVIET TIMES; EXPORTS TO RUSSIA (25 %), EU (30%) ABOUT WHAT GRAVITY MODELS PREDICT
UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS WIDELY RECOGNISED IN WORLD, AND AS DIFFERENT FROM RUSSIA
12
UKRAINE REFORM DELAYS AND FAUSTIAN BARGAIN
RUKH AGREES FORMER COMUNISTS(KRAVCHUK) CAN GOVERN, DO ECONOMIC POLICIES, LATTER PROMISE TO SUPPORTINDEPENDENCE
INTEREST OF FORMER COMM. NOT QUICK REFORM, BUT DELAY, GIVE TIME TO BECOME NEW CAPITALISTS
INDEPENDENCE PROMISE KEPT AT COST OF SLOW REFORMS, START OF OLIGARCH CLASS, WANTS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, BUT NOT COMPETITIVE MARKET
ONLY ONE OF ADAM SMITH’S INVISIBLE HANDS INSUFFICIENT TO PROMOTE PROSPERITY
13
OLS REGRESSIONS: 25YRS GDP x TPILIB 1st 4URS
14
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5
ΔGDPl
ΔLIBs
TOWARDS A REFORM COMMITMENT MODEL
TRANSITION GROWTH LITERATURE LEAVES MANY OPEN QUESTIONS, DEBATE ON BB-INST CONTINUES
UKRAINE STORY HIGHLIGHT IMPORTANCE OF INCORPORATING DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO REFORMS IN SOCIETY, BY LEADERS – CANNOT ASSUME STANDARD WELFARE THEORY THAT POLITICIANS WORK FOR PUBLIC GOOD
UKR STORY AND POLISCI LIT GIVES THE HINT: FIND A WAY OF PROXYING COMITMMENT, USE IV TECHNIQUES, SIMULTANEITY
ONE POSSIBILITY: A GOV THAT MOVES FAST ON STABILIZATION IS COMMITED TO LIBERALISATION AND TO INSTITUTIONS
A MODEL WITH COMMITMENT NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED
15
CONCLUSIONS 1
UKR. REFORM DELAY REFLECTS SELF – INTEREST OF NON-LUSTRATED FORMER COMMUNIST NOMEKLATURA
PUBLIC REASONS GIVEN:
WE DON’T KNOW HOW
SHOCK THERAPY WILL BE TOO PAINFUL
POPULATION NOT READY FOR MARKET
NEED TIME TO BUILD INSTITUTIONS
SINCERITY OF ABOVE VERY QUESTIONABLE, ESP. SINCE INSTITUIONS MOVED EVEN MORE SLOWLY THAN LIBERALISATION
16
CONCLUSIONS 2
CASUAL EMPIRICISM (VARIOUS CHARTS SHOWN) POINTS VERY STRONGLY AT CORRELATION BETWEEN EARLY JUMP IN LIBERALISATION AND LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE
CONFIRMED BY CRUDE OLS REGRESSIONS BUT MUCH TOO WEAK TO BE CONVINCING
AFTER 25 YEARS HUGE AMOUNT OF DATA SHOULD ALLOW A MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED TRANSITION MODEL WITH MANY VARIABLES-INCLUDING ONE TO CAPTURE POLITICS OF REFORM COMMITMENT-SIMULTANEITY, AND ADVANCE ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES
17