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A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

Apr 09, 2023

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Page 1: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

Dear AuthorHere are the proofs of your article

middotYou can submit your corrections online or via e-mail middot For online submission please insert your corrections in the online correction form Always indicate the line number to which the correction refers

middot You can also insert your corrections in the proof PDF and email the annotated PDF

middot Remember to note the journal title manuscript number and your name when sending your response via e-mail

middot Check any questions that have arisen during copy editing or typesetting and insert your answerscorrections

middotCheck that the text is complete and that all figures tables and their legends are included Also check the accuracy of special characters equations and additional files if applicable Substantial changes in content eg new results corrected values title and authorship are not allowed without the approval of the responsible editor In such a case please contact us for futher advice

middot If we do not receive your corrections within 48 hours we will send you a reminder

middot The final versions of your article will be published around one week after receipt of your corrected proofs

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

RESEARCH Open Access1

A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing

2

3

Nelson Gonzalez1 Charles Miers14 Fernando Redıgolo1 Marcos Simplıcio1 Tereza Carvalho1Mats Naslund2 and Makan Pourzandi3

4

5

Abstract6

The development of cloud computing services is speeding up the rate in which the organizations outsource theircomputational services or sell their idle computational resources Even though migrating to the cloud remains atempting trend from a financial perspective there are several other aspects that must be taken into account bycompanies before they decide to do so One of the most important aspect refers to security while some cloudcomputing security issues are inherited from the solutions adopted to create such services many new securityquestions that are particular to these solutions also arise including those related to how the services are organizedand which kind of servicedata can be placed in the cloud Aiming to give a better understanding of this complexscenario in this article we identify and classify the main security concerns and solutions in cloud computing andpropose a taxonomy of security in cloud computing giving an overview of the current status of security in thisemerging technology

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Introduction17

Security is considered a key requirement for cloud com-18

puting consolidation as a robust and feasible multi-19

purpose solution [1] This viewpoint is shared by many20

distinct groups including academia researchers [23]21

business decision makers [4] and government organi-22

zations [56] The many similarities in these perspec-23

tives indicate a grave concern on crucial security and24

legal obstacles for cloud computing including service25

availability data confidentiality provider lock-in and26

reputation fate sharing [7] These concerns have their27

origin not only on existing problems directly inherited28

from the adopted technologies but are also related to29

new issues derived from the composition of essential30

cloud computing features like scalability resource shar-31

ing and virtualization (eg data leakage and hypervisor32

vulnerabilities) [8] The distinction between these classes33

is more easily identifiable by analyzing the definition of the34

essential cloud computing characteristics proposed by the35

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)36

in [9] which also introduces the SPI model for services37

Correspondence nmimuralarcuspbr1Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo BrazilFull list of author information is available at the end of the article

(SaaS PaaS and IaaS) and deployment (private public 38

community and hybrid) 39

Due to the ever growing interest in cloud computing 40

there is an explicit and constant effort to evaluate the 41

current trends in security for such technology consider- 42

ing both problems already identified and possible solu- 43

tions [10] An authoritative reference in the area is the 44

risk assessment developed by ENISA (European Network 45

and Information Security Agency) [5] Not only does 46

it list risks and vulnerabilities but it also offers a sur- 47

vey of related works and research recommendations A 48

similarly work is the security guidance provided by the 49

Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [6] which defines security 50

domains congregating specific functional aspects from 51

governance and compliance to virtualization and iden- 52

tity management Both documents present a plethora of 53

security concerns best practices and recommendations 54

regarding all types of services in NISTrsquos SPI model as well 55

as possible problems related to cloud computing encom- 56

passing from data privacy to infrastructural configuration 57

Albeit valuable these studies do not focus on quantifying 58

their observations something important for developing 59

a comprehensive understanding of the challenges still 60

undermining the potential of cloud computing 61

copy 2012 Gonzalez et al licensee Springer This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative CommonsAttribution License (httpcreativecommonsorglicensesby20) which permits unrestricted use distribution and reproductionin any medium provided the original work is properly cited

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The main goal of this article is to identify classify62

organize and quantify the main security concerns and63

solutions associated to cloud computing helping in the64

task of pinpointing the concerns that remain unanswered65

Aiming to organize this information into a useful tool66

for comparing relating and classifying already identi-67

fied concerns and solutions as well as future ones we68

also present a taxonomy proposal for cloud comput-69

ing security We focus on issues that are specific to70

cloud computing without losing sight of important issues71

that also exist in other distributed systems This article72

extends our previous work presented in [11] providing an73

enhanced review of the cloud computing security taxon-74

omy previously presented as well as a deeper analysis of75

the related work by discussing the main security frame-76

works currently available in addition we discuss further77

the security aspects related to virtualization in cloud78

computing a fundamental yet still underserved field of79

research80

Cloud computing security81

Key references such as CSArsquos security guidance [6] and82

top threats analysis [12] ENISArsquos security assessment [5]83

and the cloud computing definitions from NIST [9] high-84

light different security issues related to cloud computing85

that require further studies for being appropriately han-86

dled and consequently for enhancing technology accep-87

tance and adoption Emphasis is given to the distinction88

between services in the form of software (SaaS) platform89

(PaaS) and infrastructure (IaaS) which are commonly90

used as the fundamental basis for cloud service classifica-91

tion However no other methods are standardized or even92

employed to organize cloud computing security aspects93

apart from cloud deployment models service types or94

traditional security models95

Aiming to concentrate and organize information related96

to cloud security and to facilitate future studies in this97

section we identify the main problems in the area and98

group them into a model composed of seven categories99

based on the aforementioned references Namely the100

categories are network security interfaces data secu-101

rity virtualization governance compliance and legal102

issues Each category includes several potential security103

problems resulting in a classification with subdivisions104

that highlights the main issues identified in the base105

references106

1 Network security Problems associated with network107

communications and configurations regarding cloud108

computing infrastructures The ideal network109

security solution is to have cloud services as an110

extension of customersrsquo existing internal networks111

[13] adopting the same protection measures and112

security precautions that are locally implemented113

and allowing them to extend local strategies to any 114

remote resource or process [14] 115

(a) Transfer security Distributed architectures 116

massive resource sharing and virtual machine 117

(VM) instances synchronization imply more 118

data in transit in the cloud thus requiring 119

VPN mechanisms for protecting the system 120

against sniffing spoofing man-in-the-middle 121

and side-channel attacks 122

(b) Firewalling Firewalls protect the providerrsquos 123

internal cloud infrastructure against insiders 124

and outsiders [15] They also enable VM 125

isolation fine-grained filtering for addresses 126

and ports prevention of Denial-of-Service 127

(DoS) and detection of external security 128

assessment procedures Efforts for developing 129

consistent firewall and similar security 130

measures specific for cloud environments 131

[1617] reveal the urge for adapting existing 132

solutions for this new computing paradigm 133

(c) Security configuration Configuration of 134

protocols systems and technologies to 135

provide the required levels of security and 136

privacy without compromising performance 137

or efficiency [18] 138

2 Interfaces Concentrates all issues related to user 139

administrative and programming interfaces for using 140

and controlling clouds 141

(a) API Programming interfaces (essential to 142

IaaS and PaaS) for accessing virtualized 143

resources and systems must be protected in 144

order to prevent malicious use [19-23] 145

(b) Administrative interface Enables remote 146

control of resources in an IaaS (VM 147

management) development for PaaS (coding 148

deploying testing) and application tools for 149

SaaS (user access control configurations) 150

(c) User interface End-user interface for 151

exploring provided resources and tools (the 152

service itself) implying the need of adopting 153

measures for securing the environment 154

[24-27] 155

(d) Authentication Mechanisms required to 156

enable access to the cloud [28] Most services 157

rely on regular accounts [202930] 158

consequently being susceptible to a plethora 159

of attacks [31-35] whose consequences are 160

boosted by multi-tenancy and resource 161

sharing 162

3 Data security Protection of data in terms of 163

confidentiality availability and integrity (which can 164

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be applied not only to cloud environments but any165

solution requiring basic security levels) [36]166

(a) Cryptography Most employed practice to167

secure sensitive data [37] thoroughly168

required by industry state and federal169

regulations [38]170

(b) Redundancy Essential to avoid data loss171

Most business models rely on information172

technology for its core functionalities and173

processes [3940] and thus mission-critical174

data integrity and availability must be175

ensured176

(c) Disposal Elementary data disposal177

techniques are insufficient and commonly178

referred as deletion [41]In the cloud the179

complete destruction of data including log180

references and hidden backup registries is an181

important requirement [42]182

4 Virtualization Isolation between VMs hypervisor183

vulnerabilities and other problems associated to the184

use of virtualization technologies [43]185

(a) Isolation Although logically isolated all VMs186

share the same hardware and consequently187

the same resources allowing malicious188

entities to exploit data leaks and cross-VM189

attacks [44] The concept of isolation can also190

be applied to more fine-grained assets such191

as computational resources storage and192

memory193

(b) Hypervisor vulnerabilities The hypervisor is194

the main software component of195

virtualization Even though there are known196

security vulnerabilities for hypervisors197

solutions are still scarce and often198

proprietary demanding further studies to199

harden these security aspects200

(c) Data leakage Exploit hypervisor201

vulnerabilities and lack of isolation controls202

in order to leak data from virtualized203

infrastructures obtaining sensitive customer204

data and affecting confidentiality and205

integrity206

(d) VM identification Lack of controls for207

identifying virtual machines that are being208

used for executing a specific process or for209

storing files210

(e) Cross-VM attacks Includes attempts to211

estimate provider traffic rates in order to212

steal cryptographic keys and increase chances213

of VM placement attacks One example214

consists in overlapping memory and storage215

regions initially dedicated to a single virtual216

machine which also enables other 217

isolation-related attacks 218

5 Governance Issues related to (losing) administrative 219

and security controls in cloud computing solutions 220

[4546] 221

(a) Data control Moving data to the cloud means 222

losing control over redundancy location file 223

systems and other relevant configurations 224

(b) Security control Loss of governance over 225

security mechanisms and policies as terms of 226

use prohibit customer-side vulnerability 227

assessment and penetration tests while 228

insufficient Service Level Agreements (SLA) 229

lead to security gaps 230

(c) Lock-in User potential dependency on a 231

particular service provider due to lack of 232

well-established standards (protocols and 233

data formats) consequently becoming 234

particularly vulnerable to migrations and 235

service termination 236

6 Compliance Includes requirements related to service 237

availability and audit capabilities [4748] 238

(a) Service Level Agreements (SLA) 239

Mechanisms to ensure the required service 240

availability and the basic security procedures 241

to be adopted [49] 242

(b) Loss of service Service outages are not 243

exclusive to cloud environments but are 244

more serious in this context due to the 245

interconnections between services (eg a 246

SaaS using virtualized infrastructures 247

provided by an IaaS) as shown in many 248

examples [50-52] This leads to the need of 249

strong disaster recovery policies and provider 250

recommendations to implement 251

customer-side redundancy if applicable 252

(c) Audit Allows security and availability 253

assessments to be performed by customers 254

providers and third-party participants 255

Transparent and efficient methodologies are 256

necessary for continuously analyzing service 257

conditions [53] and are usually required by 258

contracts or legal regulations There are 259

solutions being developed to address this 260

problem by offering a transparent API for 261

automated auditing and other useful 262

functionalities [54] 263

(d) Service conformity Related to how 264

contractual obligations and overall service 265

requirements are respected and offered based 266

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on the SLAs predefined and basic service and267

customer needs268

7 Legal issues Aspects related to judicial requirements269

and law such as multiple data locations and privilege270

management271

(a) Data location Customer data held in272

multiple jurisdictions depending on273

geographic location [55] are affected directly274

or indirectly by subpoena law-enforcement275

measures276

(b) E-discovery As a result of a law-enforcement277

measures hardware might be confiscated for278

investigations related to a particular279

customer affecting all customers whose data280

were stored in the same hardware [56-58]281

Data disclosure is critical in this case282

(c) Provider privilege Malicious activities of283

provider insiders are potential threats to284

confidentiality availability and integrity of285

customersrsquo data and processesrsquo information286

[5960]287

(d) legislation Juridical concerns related to new288

concepts introduced by cloud computing289

[61]290

Cloud computing security taxonomy291

The analysis of security concerns in the context of cloud292

computing solutions shows that each issue brings differ-293

ent impacts on distinct assets Aiming to create a security294

model both for studying security aspects in this context295

and for supporting decision making in this section we296

consider the risks and vulnerabilities previously presented297

and arrange them in hierarchical categories thus creating298

a cloud security taxonomy The main structure of the pro-299

posed taxonomy along with its first classification levels300

are depicted in Figure 1F1 301

The three first groups correspond to fundamental (and302

often related) security principles [7] (Chapters 3-8)303

The architecture dimension is subdivided into network304

security interfaces and virtualization issues comprising305

both user and administrative interfaces to access the306

cloud It also comprises security during transferences of 307

data and virtual machines as well as other virtualization 308

related issues such as isolation and cross-VM attacks 309

This organization is depicted in Figure 2 The architec- F2310

ture group allows a clearer division of responsibilities 311

between providers and customers and also an analysis 312

of their security roles depending on the type of service 313

offered (Software Platform or Infrastructure) This sug- 314

gests that the security mechanisms used must be clearly 315

stated before the service is contracted defining which 316

role is responsible for providing firewalling capabilities 317

access control features and technology-specific require- 318

ments (such as those related to virtualization) 319

The compliance dimension introduces responsibilities 320

toward services and providers The former includes SLA 321

concerns loss of service based on outages and chain fail- 322

ures and auditing capabilities as well as transparency and 323

security assessments The latter refers to loss of control 324

over data and security policies and configurations and 325

also lock-in issues resulting from lack of standards migra- 326

tions and service terminations The complete scenario is 327

presented in Figure 3 F3328

The privacy dimension includes data security itself 329

(from sensitive data regulations and data loss to dis- 330

posal and redundancy) and legal issues (related to multiple 331

jurisdictions derived from different locations where data 332

and services are hosted) The expansion of this group is 333

represented in Figure 4 We note that the concerns in this F4334

dimension cover the complete information lifecycle (ie 335

generation use transfer transformation storage archiv- 336

ing and destruction) inside the provider perimeter and in 337

its immediate boundaries (or interfaces) to the users 338

A common point between all groups is the intrinsic con- 339

nection to data and service lifecycles Both privacy and 340

compliance must be ensured through all states of data 341

including application information or customer assets 342

while security in this case is more oriented towards how 343

the underlying elements (eg infrastructural hardware 344

and software) are protected 345

Current status of cloud security 346

A clear perspective of the main security problems regard- 347

ing cloud computing and on how they can be organized 348

Figure 1 Cloud computing security taxonomy Top level overview of the security taxonomy proposed highlighting the three main categoriessecurity related to privacy architecture and compliance

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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture Details from architecture category which is divided in network host application data (security andstorage) security management and identity and access controls ndash all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architectureadopted to implement or use a cloud solution

to ease decision making is the primary step for having349

a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud350

security In this section we analyze industry and academia351

viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need352

to be further developed This study is based on more353

than two hundred different references including white354

papers technical reports scientific papers and other rele-355

vant publications They were analyzed in terms of security356

problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita- 357

tions for each case We used a quantitative approach to 358

identify the amount of references related to each category 359

of concerns or solutions Our goal is not to determine 360

if the presented solutions completely solve an identified 361

concern since most of the referenced authors agree that 362

this is an involved task Nonetheless we identify the num- 363

ber of references dealing with each concern providing 364

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

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Page 2: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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RESEARCH Open Access1

A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing

2

3

Nelson Gonzalez1 Charles Miers14 Fernando Redıgolo1 Marcos Simplıcio1 Tereza Carvalho1Mats Naslund2 and Makan Pourzandi3

4

5

Abstract6

The development of cloud computing services is speeding up the rate in which the organizations outsource theircomputational services or sell their idle computational resources Even though migrating to the cloud remains atempting trend from a financial perspective there are several other aspects that must be taken into account bycompanies before they decide to do so One of the most important aspect refers to security while some cloudcomputing security issues are inherited from the solutions adopted to create such services many new securityquestions that are particular to these solutions also arise including those related to how the services are organizedand which kind of servicedata can be placed in the cloud Aiming to give a better understanding of this complexscenario in this article we identify and classify the main security concerns and solutions in cloud computing andpropose a taxonomy of security in cloud computing giving an overview of the current status of security in thisemerging technology

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Introduction17

Security is considered a key requirement for cloud com-18

puting consolidation as a robust and feasible multi-19

purpose solution [1] This viewpoint is shared by many20

distinct groups including academia researchers [23]21

business decision makers [4] and government organi-22

zations [56] The many similarities in these perspec-23

tives indicate a grave concern on crucial security and24

legal obstacles for cloud computing including service25

availability data confidentiality provider lock-in and26

reputation fate sharing [7] These concerns have their27

origin not only on existing problems directly inherited28

from the adopted technologies but are also related to29

new issues derived from the composition of essential30

cloud computing features like scalability resource shar-31

ing and virtualization (eg data leakage and hypervisor32

vulnerabilities) [8] The distinction between these classes33

is more easily identifiable by analyzing the definition of the34

essential cloud computing characteristics proposed by the35

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)36

in [9] which also introduces the SPI model for services37

Correspondence nmimuralarcuspbr1Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo BrazilFull list of author information is available at the end of the article

(SaaS PaaS and IaaS) and deployment (private public 38

community and hybrid) 39

Due to the ever growing interest in cloud computing 40

there is an explicit and constant effort to evaluate the 41

current trends in security for such technology consider- 42

ing both problems already identified and possible solu- 43

tions [10] An authoritative reference in the area is the 44

risk assessment developed by ENISA (European Network 45

and Information Security Agency) [5] Not only does 46

it list risks and vulnerabilities but it also offers a sur- 47

vey of related works and research recommendations A 48

similarly work is the security guidance provided by the 49

Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [6] which defines security 50

domains congregating specific functional aspects from 51

governance and compliance to virtualization and iden- 52

tity management Both documents present a plethora of 53

security concerns best practices and recommendations 54

regarding all types of services in NISTrsquos SPI model as well 55

as possible problems related to cloud computing encom- 56

passing from data privacy to infrastructural configuration 57

Albeit valuable these studies do not focus on quantifying 58

their observations something important for developing 59

a comprehensive understanding of the challenges still 60

undermining the potential of cloud computing 61

copy 2012 Gonzalez et al licensee Springer This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative CommonsAttribution License (httpcreativecommonsorglicensesby20) which permits unrestricted use distribution and reproductionin any medium provided the original work is properly cited

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The main goal of this article is to identify classify62

organize and quantify the main security concerns and63

solutions associated to cloud computing helping in the64

task of pinpointing the concerns that remain unanswered65

Aiming to organize this information into a useful tool66

for comparing relating and classifying already identi-67

fied concerns and solutions as well as future ones we68

also present a taxonomy proposal for cloud comput-69

ing security We focus on issues that are specific to70

cloud computing without losing sight of important issues71

that also exist in other distributed systems This article72

extends our previous work presented in [11] providing an73

enhanced review of the cloud computing security taxon-74

omy previously presented as well as a deeper analysis of75

the related work by discussing the main security frame-76

works currently available in addition we discuss further77

the security aspects related to virtualization in cloud78

computing a fundamental yet still underserved field of79

research80

Cloud computing security81

Key references such as CSArsquos security guidance [6] and82

top threats analysis [12] ENISArsquos security assessment [5]83

and the cloud computing definitions from NIST [9] high-84

light different security issues related to cloud computing85

that require further studies for being appropriately han-86

dled and consequently for enhancing technology accep-87

tance and adoption Emphasis is given to the distinction88

between services in the form of software (SaaS) platform89

(PaaS) and infrastructure (IaaS) which are commonly90

used as the fundamental basis for cloud service classifica-91

tion However no other methods are standardized or even92

employed to organize cloud computing security aspects93

apart from cloud deployment models service types or94

traditional security models95

Aiming to concentrate and organize information related96

to cloud security and to facilitate future studies in this97

section we identify the main problems in the area and98

group them into a model composed of seven categories99

based on the aforementioned references Namely the100

categories are network security interfaces data secu-101

rity virtualization governance compliance and legal102

issues Each category includes several potential security103

problems resulting in a classification with subdivisions104

that highlights the main issues identified in the base105

references106

1 Network security Problems associated with network107

communications and configurations regarding cloud108

computing infrastructures The ideal network109

security solution is to have cloud services as an110

extension of customersrsquo existing internal networks111

[13] adopting the same protection measures and112

security precautions that are locally implemented113

and allowing them to extend local strategies to any 114

remote resource or process [14] 115

(a) Transfer security Distributed architectures 116

massive resource sharing and virtual machine 117

(VM) instances synchronization imply more 118

data in transit in the cloud thus requiring 119

VPN mechanisms for protecting the system 120

against sniffing spoofing man-in-the-middle 121

and side-channel attacks 122

(b) Firewalling Firewalls protect the providerrsquos 123

internal cloud infrastructure against insiders 124

and outsiders [15] They also enable VM 125

isolation fine-grained filtering for addresses 126

and ports prevention of Denial-of-Service 127

(DoS) and detection of external security 128

assessment procedures Efforts for developing 129

consistent firewall and similar security 130

measures specific for cloud environments 131

[1617] reveal the urge for adapting existing 132

solutions for this new computing paradigm 133

(c) Security configuration Configuration of 134

protocols systems and technologies to 135

provide the required levels of security and 136

privacy without compromising performance 137

or efficiency [18] 138

2 Interfaces Concentrates all issues related to user 139

administrative and programming interfaces for using 140

and controlling clouds 141

(a) API Programming interfaces (essential to 142

IaaS and PaaS) for accessing virtualized 143

resources and systems must be protected in 144

order to prevent malicious use [19-23] 145

(b) Administrative interface Enables remote 146

control of resources in an IaaS (VM 147

management) development for PaaS (coding 148

deploying testing) and application tools for 149

SaaS (user access control configurations) 150

(c) User interface End-user interface for 151

exploring provided resources and tools (the 152

service itself) implying the need of adopting 153

measures for securing the environment 154

[24-27] 155

(d) Authentication Mechanisms required to 156

enable access to the cloud [28] Most services 157

rely on regular accounts [202930] 158

consequently being susceptible to a plethora 159

of attacks [31-35] whose consequences are 160

boosted by multi-tenancy and resource 161

sharing 162

3 Data security Protection of data in terms of 163

confidentiality availability and integrity (which can 164

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be applied not only to cloud environments but any165

solution requiring basic security levels) [36]166

(a) Cryptography Most employed practice to167

secure sensitive data [37] thoroughly168

required by industry state and federal169

regulations [38]170

(b) Redundancy Essential to avoid data loss171

Most business models rely on information172

technology for its core functionalities and173

processes [3940] and thus mission-critical174

data integrity and availability must be175

ensured176

(c) Disposal Elementary data disposal177

techniques are insufficient and commonly178

referred as deletion [41]In the cloud the179

complete destruction of data including log180

references and hidden backup registries is an181

important requirement [42]182

4 Virtualization Isolation between VMs hypervisor183

vulnerabilities and other problems associated to the184

use of virtualization technologies [43]185

(a) Isolation Although logically isolated all VMs186

share the same hardware and consequently187

the same resources allowing malicious188

entities to exploit data leaks and cross-VM189

attacks [44] The concept of isolation can also190

be applied to more fine-grained assets such191

as computational resources storage and192

memory193

(b) Hypervisor vulnerabilities The hypervisor is194

the main software component of195

virtualization Even though there are known196

security vulnerabilities for hypervisors197

solutions are still scarce and often198

proprietary demanding further studies to199

harden these security aspects200

(c) Data leakage Exploit hypervisor201

vulnerabilities and lack of isolation controls202

in order to leak data from virtualized203

infrastructures obtaining sensitive customer204

data and affecting confidentiality and205

integrity206

(d) VM identification Lack of controls for207

identifying virtual machines that are being208

used for executing a specific process or for209

storing files210

(e) Cross-VM attacks Includes attempts to211

estimate provider traffic rates in order to212

steal cryptographic keys and increase chances213

of VM placement attacks One example214

consists in overlapping memory and storage215

regions initially dedicated to a single virtual216

machine which also enables other 217

isolation-related attacks 218

5 Governance Issues related to (losing) administrative 219

and security controls in cloud computing solutions 220

[4546] 221

(a) Data control Moving data to the cloud means 222

losing control over redundancy location file 223

systems and other relevant configurations 224

(b) Security control Loss of governance over 225

security mechanisms and policies as terms of 226

use prohibit customer-side vulnerability 227

assessment and penetration tests while 228

insufficient Service Level Agreements (SLA) 229

lead to security gaps 230

(c) Lock-in User potential dependency on a 231

particular service provider due to lack of 232

well-established standards (protocols and 233

data formats) consequently becoming 234

particularly vulnerable to migrations and 235

service termination 236

6 Compliance Includes requirements related to service 237

availability and audit capabilities [4748] 238

(a) Service Level Agreements (SLA) 239

Mechanisms to ensure the required service 240

availability and the basic security procedures 241

to be adopted [49] 242

(b) Loss of service Service outages are not 243

exclusive to cloud environments but are 244

more serious in this context due to the 245

interconnections between services (eg a 246

SaaS using virtualized infrastructures 247

provided by an IaaS) as shown in many 248

examples [50-52] This leads to the need of 249

strong disaster recovery policies and provider 250

recommendations to implement 251

customer-side redundancy if applicable 252

(c) Audit Allows security and availability 253

assessments to be performed by customers 254

providers and third-party participants 255

Transparent and efficient methodologies are 256

necessary for continuously analyzing service 257

conditions [53] and are usually required by 258

contracts or legal regulations There are 259

solutions being developed to address this 260

problem by offering a transparent API for 261

automated auditing and other useful 262

functionalities [54] 263

(d) Service conformity Related to how 264

contractual obligations and overall service 265

requirements are respected and offered based 266

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on the SLAs predefined and basic service and267

customer needs268

7 Legal issues Aspects related to judicial requirements269

and law such as multiple data locations and privilege270

management271

(a) Data location Customer data held in272

multiple jurisdictions depending on273

geographic location [55] are affected directly274

or indirectly by subpoena law-enforcement275

measures276

(b) E-discovery As a result of a law-enforcement277

measures hardware might be confiscated for278

investigations related to a particular279

customer affecting all customers whose data280

were stored in the same hardware [56-58]281

Data disclosure is critical in this case282

(c) Provider privilege Malicious activities of283

provider insiders are potential threats to284

confidentiality availability and integrity of285

customersrsquo data and processesrsquo information286

[5960]287

(d) legislation Juridical concerns related to new288

concepts introduced by cloud computing289

[61]290

Cloud computing security taxonomy291

The analysis of security concerns in the context of cloud292

computing solutions shows that each issue brings differ-293

ent impacts on distinct assets Aiming to create a security294

model both for studying security aspects in this context295

and for supporting decision making in this section we296

consider the risks and vulnerabilities previously presented297

and arrange them in hierarchical categories thus creating298

a cloud security taxonomy The main structure of the pro-299

posed taxonomy along with its first classification levels300

are depicted in Figure 1F1 301

The three first groups correspond to fundamental (and302

often related) security principles [7] (Chapters 3-8)303

The architecture dimension is subdivided into network304

security interfaces and virtualization issues comprising305

both user and administrative interfaces to access the306

cloud It also comprises security during transferences of 307

data and virtual machines as well as other virtualization 308

related issues such as isolation and cross-VM attacks 309

This organization is depicted in Figure 2 The architec- F2310

ture group allows a clearer division of responsibilities 311

between providers and customers and also an analysis 312

of their security roles depending on the type of service 313

offered (Software Platform or Infrastructure) This sug- 314

gests that the security mechanisms used must be clearly 315

stated before the service is contracted defining which 316

role is responsible for providing firewalling capabilities 317

access control features and technology-specific require- 318

ments (such as those related to virtualization) 319

The compliance dimension introduces responsibilities 320

toward services and providers The former includes SLA 321

concerns loss of service based on outages and chain fail- 322

ures and auditing capabilities as well as transparency and 323

security assessments The latter refers to loss of control 324

over data and security policies and configurations and 325

also lock-in issues resulting from lack of standards migra- 326

tions and service terminations The complete scenario is 327

presented in Figure 3 F3328

The privacy dimension includes data security itself 329

(from sensitive data regulations and data loss to dis- 330

posal and redundancy) and legal issues (related to multiple 331

jurisdictions derived from different locations where data 332

and services are hosted) The expansion of this group is 333

represented in Figure 4 We note that the concerns in this F4334

dimension cover the complete information lifecycle (ie 335

generation use transfer transformation storage archiv- 336

ing and destruction) inside the provider perimeter and in 337

its immediate boundaries (or interfaces) to the users 338

A common point between all groups is the intrinsic con- 339

nection to data and service lifecycles Both privacy and 340

compliance must be ensured through all states of data 341

including application information or customer assets 342

while security in this case is more oriented towards how 343

the underlying elements (eg infrastructural hardware 344

and software) are protected 345

Current status of cloud security 346

A clear perspective of the main security problems regard- 347

ing cloud computing and on how they can be organized 348

Figure 1 Cloud computing security taxonomy Top level overview of the security taxonomy proposed highlighting the three main categoriessecurity related to privacy architecture and compliance

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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture Details from architecture category which is divided in network host application data (security andstorage) security management and identity and access controls ndash all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architectureadopted to implement or use a cloud solution

to ease decision making is the primary step for having349

a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud350

security In this section we analyze industry and academia351

viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need352

to be further developed This study is based on more353

than two hundred different references including white354

papers technical reports scientific papers and other rele-355

vant publications They were analyzed in terms of security356

problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita- 357

tions for each case We used a quantitative approach to 358

identify the amount of references related to each category 359

of concerns or solutions Our goal is not to determine 360

if the presented solutions completely solve an identified 361

concern since most of the referenced authors agree that 362

this is an involved task Nonetheless we identify the num- 363

ber of references dealing with each concern providing 364

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

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Page 3: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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The main goal of this article is to identify classify62

organize and quantify the main security concerns and63

solutions associated to cloud computing helping in the64

task of pinpointing the concerns that remain unanswered65

Aiming to organize this information into a useful tool66

for comparing relating and classifying already identi-67

fied concerns and solutions as well as future ones we68

also present a taxonomy proposal for cloud comput-69

ing security We focus on issues that are specific to70

cloud computing without losing sight of important issues71

that also exist in other distributed systems This article72

extends our previous work presented in [11] providing an73

enhanced review of the cloud computing security taxon-74

omy previously presented as well as a deeper analysis of75

the related work by discussing the main security frame-76

works currently available in addition we discuss further77

the security aspects related to virtualization in cloud78

computing a fundamental yet still underserved field of79

research80

Cloud computing security81

Key references such as CSArsquos security guidance [6] and82

top threats analysis [12] ENISArsquos security assessment [5]83

and the cloud computing definitions from NIST [9] high-84

light different security issues related to cloud computing85

that require further studies for being appropriately han-86

dled and consequently for enhancing technology accep-87

tance and adoption Emphasis is given to the distinction88

between services in the form of software (SaaS) platform89

(PaaS) and infrastructure (IaaS) which are commonly90

used as the fundamental basis for cloud service classifica-91

tion However no other methods are standardized or even92

employed to organize cloud computing security aspects93

apart from cloud deployment models service types or94

traditional security models95

Aiming to concentrate and organize information related96

to cloud security and to facilitate future studies in this97

section we identify the main problems in the area and98

group them into a model composed of seven categories99

based on the aforementioned references Namely the100

categories are network security interfaces data secu-101

rity virtualization governance compliance and legal102

issues Each category includes several potential security103

problems resulting in a classification with subdivisions104

that highlights the main issues identified in the base105

references106

1 Network security Problems associated with network107

communications and configurations regarding cloud108

computing infrastructures The ideal network109

security solution is to have cloud services as an110

extension of customersrsquo existing internal networks111

[13] adopting the same protection measures and112

security precautions that are locally implemented113

and allowing them to extend local strategies to any 114

remote resource or process [14] 115

(a) Transfer security Distributed architectures 116

massive resource sharing and virtual machine 117

(VM) instances synchronization imply more 118

data in transit in the cloud thus requiring 119

VPN mechanisms for protecting the system 120

against sniffing spoofing man-in-the-middle 121

and side-channel attacks 122

(b) Firewalling Firewalls protect the providerrsquos 123

internal cloud infrastructure against insiders 124

and outsiders [15] They also enable VM 125

isolation fine-grained filtering for addresses 126

and ports prevention of Denial-of-Service 127

(DoS) and detection of external security 128

assessment procedures Efforts for developing 129

consistent firewall and similar security 130

measures specific for cloud environments 131

[1617] reveal the urge for adapting existing 132

solutions for this new computing paradigm 133

(c) Security configuration Configuration of 134

protocols systems and technologies to 135

provide the required levels of security and 136

privacy without compromising performance 137

or efficiency [18] 138

2 Interfaces Concentrates all issues related to user 139

administrative and programming interfaces for using 140

and controlling clouds 141

(a) API Programming interfaces (essential to 142

IaaS and PaaS) for accessing virtualized 143

resources and systems must be protected in 144

order to prevent malicious use [19-23] 145

(b) Administrative interface Enables remote 146

control of resources in an IaaS (VM 147

management) development for PaaS (coding 148

deploying testing) and application tools for 149

SaaS (user access control configurations) 150

(c) User interface End-user interface for 151

exploring provided resources and tools (the 152

service itself) implying the need of adopting 153

measures for securing the environment 154

[24-27] 155

(d) Authentication Mechanisms required to 156

enable access to the cloud [28] Most services 157

rely on regular accounts [202930] 158

consequently being susceptible to a plethora 159

of attacks [31-35] whose consequences are 160

boosted by multi-tenancy and resource 161

sharing 162

3 Data security Protection of data in terms of 163

confidentiality availability and integrity (which can 164

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be applied not only to cloud environments but any165

solution requiring basic security levels) [36]166

(a) Cryptography Most employed practice to167

secure sensitive data [37] thoroughly168

required by industry state and federal169

regulations [38]170

(b) Redundancy Essential to avoid data loss171

Most business models rely on information172

technology for its core functionalities and173

processes [3940] and thus mission-critical174

data integrity and availability must be175

ensured176

(c) Disposal Elementary data disposal177

techniques are insufficient and commonly178

referred as deletion [41]In the cloud the179

complete destruction of data including log180

references and hidden backup registries is an181

important requirement [42]182

4 Virtualization Isolation between VMs hypervisor183

vulnerabilities and other problems associated to the184

use of virtualization technologies [43]185

(a) Isolation Although logically isolated all VMs186

share the same hardware and consequently187

the same resources allowing malicious188

entities to exploit data leaks and cross-VM189

attacks [44] The concept of isolation can also190

be applied to more fine-grained assets such191

as computational resources storage and192

memory193

(b) Hypervisor vulnerabilities The hypervisor is194

the main software component of195

virtualization Even though there are known196

security vulnerabilities for hypervisors197

solutions are still scarce and often198

proprietary demanding further studies to199

harden these security aspects200

(c) Data leakage Exploit hypervisor201

vulnerabilities and lack of isolation controls202

in order to leak data from virtualized203

infrastructures obtaining sensitive customer204

data and affecting confidentiality and205

integrity206

(d) VM identification Lack of controls for207

identifying virtual machines that are being208

used for executing a specific process or for209

storing files210

(e) Cross-VM attacks Includes attempts to211

estimate provider traffic rates in order to212

steal cryptographic keys and increase chances213

of VM placement attacks One example214

consists in overlapping memory and storage215

regions initially dedicated to a single virtual216

machine which also enables other 217

isolation-related attacks 218

5 Governance Issues related to (losing) administrative 219

and security controls in cloud computing solutions 220

[4546] 221

(a) Data control Moving data to the cloud means 222

losing control over redundancy location file 223

systems and other relevant configurations 224

(b) Security control Loss of governance over 225

security mechanisms and policies as terms of 226

use prohibit customer-side vulnerability 227

assessment and penetration tests while 228

insufficient Service Level Agreements (SLA) 229

lead to security gaps 230

(c) Lock-in User potential dependency on a 231

particular service provider due to lack of 232

well-established standards (protocols and 233

data formats) consequently becoming 234

particularly vulnerable to migrations and 235

service termination 236

6 Compliance Includes requirements related to service 237

availability and audit capabilities [4748] 238

(a) Service Level Agreements (SLA) 239

Mechanisms to ensure the required service 240

availability and the basic security procedures 241

to be adopted [49] 242

(b) Loss of service Service outages are not 243

exclusive to cloud environments but are 244

more serious in this context due to the 245

interconnections between services (eg a 246

SaaS using virtualized infrastructures 247

provided by an IaaS) as shown in many 248

examples [50-52] This leads to the need of 249

strong disaster recovery policies and provider 250

recommendations to implement 251

customer-side redundancy if applicable 252

(c) Audit Allows security and availability 253

assessments to be performed by customers 254

providers and third-party participants 255

Transparent and efficient methodologies are 256

necessary for continuously analyzing service 257

conditions [53] and are usually required by 258

contracts or legal regulations There are 259

solutions being developed to address this 260

problem by offering a transparent API for 261

automated auditing and other useful 262

functionalities [54] 263

(d) Service conformity Related to how 264

contractual obligations and overall service 265

requirements are respected and offered based 266

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on the SLAs predefined and basic service and267

customer needs268

7 Legal issues Aspects related to judicial requirements269

and law such as multiple data locations and privilege270

management271

(a) Data location Customer data held in272

multiple jurisdictions depending on273

geographic location [55] are affected directly274

or indirectly by subpoena law-enforcement275

measures276

(b) E-discovery As a result of a law-enforcement277

measures hardware might be confiscated for278

investigations related to a particular279

customer affecting all customers whose data280

were stored in the same hardware [56-58]281

Data disclosure is critical in this case282

(c) Provider privilege Malicious activities of283

provider insiders are potential threats to284

confidentiality availability and integrity of285

customersrsquo data and processesrsquo information286

[5960]287

(d) legislation Juridical concerns related to new288

concepts introduced by cloud computing289

[61]290

Cloud computing security taxonomy291

The analysis of security concerns in the context of cloud292

computing solutions shows that each issue brings differ-293

ent impacts on distinct assets Aiming to create a security294

model both for studying security aspects in this context295

and for supporting decision making in this section we296

consider the risks and vulnerabilities previously presented297

and arrange them in hierarchical categories thus creating298

a cloud security taxonomy The main structure of the pro-299

posed taxonomy along with its first classification levels300

are depicted in Figure 1F1 301

The three first groups correspond to fundamental (and302

often related) security principles [7] (Chapters 3-8)303

The architecture dimension is subdivided into network304

security interfaces and virtualization issues comprising305

both user and administrative interfaces to access the306

cloud It also comprises security during transferences of 307

data and virtual machines as well as other virtualization 308

related issues such as isolation and cross-VM attacks 309

This organization is depicted in Figure 2 The architec- F2310

ture group allows a clearer division of responsibilities 311

between providers and customers and also an analysis 312

of their security roles depending on the type of service 313

offered (Software Platform or Infrastructure) This sug- 314

gests that the security mechanisms used must be clearly 315

stated before the service is contracted defining which 316

role is responsible for providing firewalling capabilities 317

access control features and technology-specific require- 318

ments (such as those related to virtualization) 319

The compliance dimension introduces responsibilities 320

toward services and providers The former includes SLA 321

concerns loss of service based on outages and chain fail- 322

ures and auditing capabilities as well as transparency and 323

security assessments The latter refers to loss of control 324

over data and security policies and configurations and 325

also lock-in issues resulting from lack of standards migra- 326

tions and service terminations The complete scenario is 327

presented in Figure 3 F3328

The privacy dimension includes data security itself 329

(from sensitive data regulations and data loss to dis- 330

posal and redundancy) and legal issues (related to multiple 331

jurisdictions derived from different locations where data 332

and services are hosted) The expansion of this group is 333

represented in Figure 4 We note that the concerns in this F4334

dimension cover the complete information lifecycle (ie 335

generation use transfer transformation storage archiv- 336

ing and destruction) inside the provider perimeter and in 337

its immediate boundaries (or interfaces) to the users 338

A common point between all groups is the intrinsic con- 339

nection to data and service lifecycles Both privacy and 340

compliance must be ensured through all states of data 341

including application information or customer assets 342

while security in this case is more oriented towards how 343

the underlying elements (eg infrastructural hardware 344

and software) are protected 345

Current status of cloud security 346

A clear perspective of the main security problems regard- 347

ing cloud computing and on how they can be organized 348

Figure 1 Cloud computing security taxonomy Top level overview of the security taxonomy proposed highlighting the three main categoriessecurity related to privacy architecture and compliance

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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture Details from architecture category which is divided in network host application data (security andstorage) security management and identity and access controls ndash all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architectureadopted to implement or use a cloud solution

to ease decision making is the primary step for having349

a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud350

security In this section we analyze industry and academia351

viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need352

to be further developed This study is based on more353

than two hundred different references including white354

papers technical reports scientific papers and other rele-355

vant publications They were analyzed in terms of security356

problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita- 357

tions for each case We used a quantitative approach to 358

identify the amount of references related to each category 359

of concerns or solutions Our goal is not to determine 360

if the presented solutions completely solve an identified 361

concern since most of the referenced authors agree that 362

this is an involved task Nonetheless we identify the num- 363

ber of references dealing with each concern providing 364

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

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Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 4: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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be applied not only to cloud environments but any165

solution requiring basic security levels) [36]166

(a) Cryptography Most employed practice to167

secure sensitive data [37] thoroughly168

required by industry state and federal169

regulations [38]170

(b) Redundancy Essential to avoid data loss171

Most business models rely on information172

technology for its core functionalities and173

processes [3940] and thus mission-critical174

data integrity and availability must be175

ensured176

(c) Disposal Elementary data disposal177

techniques are insufficient and commonly178

referred as deletion [41]In the cloud the179

complete destruction of data including log180

references and hidden backup registries is an181

important requirement [42]182

4 Virtualization Isolation between VMs hypervisor183

vulnerabilities and other problems associated to the184

use of virtualization technologies [43]185

(a) Isolation Although logically isolated all VMs186

share the same hardware and consequently187

the same resources allowing malicious188

entities to exploit data leaks and cross-VM189

attacks [44] The concept of isolation can also190

be applied to more fine-grained assets such191

as computational resources storage and192

memory193

(b) Hypervisor vulnerabilities The hypervisor is194

the main software component of195

virtualization Even though there are known196

security vulnerabilities for hypervisors197

solutions are still scarce and often198

proprietary demanding further studies to199

harden these security aspects200

(c) Data leakage Exploit hypervisor201

vulnerabilities and lack of isolation controls202

in order to leak data from virtualized203

infrastructures obtaining sensitive customer204

data and affecting confidentiality and205

integrity206

(d) VM identification Lack of controls for207

identifying virtual machines that are being208

used for executing a specific process or for209

storing files210

(e) Cross-VM attacks Includes attempts to211

estimate provider traffic rates in order to212

steal cryptographic keys and increase chances213

of VM placement attacks One example214

consists in overlapping memory and storage215

regions initially dedicated to a single virtual216

machine which also enables other 217

isolation-related attacks 218

5 Governance Issues related to (losing) administrative 219

and security controls in cloud computing solutions 220

[4546] 221

(a) Data control Moving data to the cloud means 222

losing control over redundancy location file 223

systems and other relevant configurations 224

(b) Security control Loss of governance over 225

security mechanisms and policies as terms of 226

use prohibit customer-side vulnerability 227

assessment and penetration tests while 228

insufficient Service Level Agreements (SLA) 229

lead to security gaps 230

(c) Lock-in User potential dependency on a 231

particular service provider due to lack of 232

well-established standards (protocols and 233

data formats) consequently becoming 234

particularly vulnerable to migrations and 235

service termination 236

6 Compliance Includes requirements related to service 237

availability and audit capabilities [4748] 238

(a) Service Level Agreements (SLA) 239

Mechanisms to ensure the required service 240

availability and the basic security procedures 241

to be adopted [49] 242

(b) Loss of service Service outages are not 243

exclusive to cloud environments but are 244

more serious in this context due to the 245

interconnections between services (eg a 246

SaaS using virtualized infrastructures 247

provided by an IaaS) as shown in many 248

examples [50-52] This leads to the need of 249

strong disaster recovery policies and provider 250

recommendations to implement 251

customer-side redundancy if applicable 252

(c) Audit Allows security and availability 253

assessments to be performed by customers 254

providers and third-party participants 255

Transparent and efficient methodologies are 256

necessary for continuously analyzing service 257

conditions [53] and are usually required by 258

contracts or legal regulations There are 259

solutions being developed to address this 260

problem by offering a transparent API for 261

automated auditing and other useful 262

functionalities [54] 263

(d) Service conformity Related to how 264

contractual obligations and overall service 265

requirements are respected and offered based 266

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on the SLAs predefined and basic service and267

customer needs268

7 Legal issues Aspects related to judicial requirements269

and law such as multiple data locations and privilege270

management271

(a) Data location Customer data held in272

multiple jurisdictions depending on273

geographic location [55] are affected directly274

or indirectly by subpoena law-enforcement275

measures276

(b) E-discovery As a result of a law-enforcement277

measures hardware might be confiscated for278

investigations related to a particular279

customer affecting all customers whose data280

were stored in the same hardware [56-58]281

Data disclosure is critical in this case282

(c) Provider privilege Malicious activities of283

provider insiders are potential threats to284

confidentiality availability and integrity of285

customersrsquo data and processesrsquo information286

[5960]287

(d) legislation Juridical concerns related to new288

concepts introduced by cloud computing289

[61]290

Cloud computing security taxonomy291

The analysis of security concerns in the context of cloud292

computing solutions shows that each issue brings differ-293

ent impacts on distinct assets Aiming to create a security294

model both for studying security aspects in this context295

and for supporting decision making in this section we296

consider the risks and vulnerabilities previously presented297

and arrange them in hierarchical categories thus creating298

a cloud security taxonomy The main structure of the pro-299

posed taxonomy along with its first classification levels300

are depicted in Figure 1F1 301

The three first groups correspond to fundamental (and302

often related) security principles [7] (Chapters 3-8)303

The architecture dimension is subdivided into network304

security interfaces and virtualization issues comprising305

both user and administrative interfaces to access the306

cloud It also comprises security during transferences of 307

data and virtual machines as well as other virtualization 308

related issues such as isolation and cross-VM attacks 309

This organization is depicted in Figure 2 The architec- F2310

ture group allows a clearer division of responsibilities 311

between providers and customers and also an analysis 312

of their security roles depending on the type of service 313

offered (Software Platform or Infrastructure) This sug- 314

gests that the security mechanisms used must be clearly 315

stated before the service is contracted defining which 316

role is responsible for providing firewalling capabilities 317

access control features and technology-specific require- 318

ments (such as those related to virtualization) 319

The compliance dimension introduces responsibilities 320

toward services and providers The former includes SLA 321

concerns loss of service based on outages and chain fail- 322

ures and auditing capabilities as well as transparency and 323

security assessments The latter refers to loss of control 324

over data and security policies and configurations and 325

also lock-in issues resulting from lack of standards migra- 326

tions and service terminations The complete scenario is 327

presented in Figure 3 F3328

The privacy dimension includes data security itself 329

(from sensitive data regulations and data loss to dis- 330

posal and redundancy) and legal issues (related to multiple 331

jurisdictions derived from different locations where data 332

and services are hosted) The expansion of this group is 333

represented in Figure 4 We note that the concerns in this F4334

dimension cover the complete information lifecycle (ie 335

generation use transfer transformation storage archiv- 336

ing and destruction) inside the provider perimeter and in 337

its immediate boundaries (or interfaces) to the users 338

A common point between all groups is the intrinsic con- 339

nection to data and service lifecycles Both privacy and 340

compliance must be ensured through all states of data 341

including application information or customer assets 342

while security in this case is more oriented towards how 343

the underlying elements (eg infrastructural hardware 344

and software) are protected 345

Current status of cloud security 346

A clear perspective of the main security problems regard- 347

ing cloud computing and on how they can be organized 348

Figure 1 Cloud computing security taxonomy Top level overview of the security taxonomy proposed highlighting the three main categoriessecurity related to privacy architecture and compliance

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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture Details from architecture category which is divided in network host application data (security andstorage) security management and identity and access controls ndash all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architectureadopted to implement or use a cloud solution

to ease decision making is the primary step for having349

a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud350

security In this section we analyze industry and academia351

viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need352

to be further developed This study is based on more353

than two hundred different references including white354

papers technical reports scientific papers and other rele-355

vant publications They were analyzed in terms of security356

problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita- 357

tions for each case We used a quantitative approach to 358

identify the amount of references related to each category 359

of concerns or solutions Our goal is not to determine 360

if the presented solutions completely solve an identified 361

concern since most of the referenced authors agree that 362

this is an involved task Nonetheless we identify the num- 363

ber of references dealing with each concern providing 364

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 14 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 16 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

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Page 5: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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on the SLAs predefined and basic service and267

customer needs268

7 Legal issues Aspects related to judicial requirements269

and law such as multiple data locations and privilege270

management271

(a) Data location Customer data held in272

multiple jurisdictions depending on273

geographic location [55] are affected directly274

or indirectly by subpoena law-enforcement275

measures276

(b) E-discovery As a result of a law-enforcement277

measures hardware might be confiscated for278

investigations related to a particular279

customer affecting all customers whose data280

were stored in the same hardware [56-58]281

Data disclosure is critical in this case282

(c) Provider privilege Malicious activities of283

provider insiders are potential threats to284

confidentiality availability and integrity of285

customersrsquo data and processesrsquo information286

[5960]287

(d) legislation Juridical concerns related to new288

concepts introduced by cloud computing289

[61]290

Cloud computing security taxonomy291

The analysis of security concerns in the context of cloud292

computing solutions shows that each issue brings differ-293

ent impacts on distinct assets Aiming to create a security294

model both for studying security aspects in this context295

and for supporting decision making in this section we296

consider the risks and vulnerabilities previously presented297

and arrange them in hierarchical categories thus creating298

a cloud security taxonomy The main structure of the pro-299

posed taxonomy along with its first classification levels300

are depicted in Figure 1F1 301

The three first groups correspond to fundamental (and302

often related) security principles [7] (Chapters 3-8)303

The architecture dimension is subdivided into network304

security interfaces and virtualization issues comprising305

both user and administrative interfaces to access the306

cloud It also comprises security during transferences of 307

data and virtual machines as well as other virtualization 308

related issues such as isolation and cross-VM attacks 309

This organization is depicted in Figure 2 The architec- F2310

ture group allows a clearer division of responsibilities 311

between providers and customers and also an analysis 312

of their security roles depending on the type of service 313

offered (Software Platform or Infrastructure) This sug- 314

gests that the security mechanisms used must be clearly 315

stated before the service is contracted defining which 316

role is responsible for providing firewalling capabilities 317

access control features and technology-specific require- 318

ments (such as those related to virtualization) 319

The compliance dimension introduces responsibilities 320

toward services and providers The former includes SLA 321

concerns loss of service based on outages and chain fail- 322

ures and auditing capabilities as well as transparency and 323

security assessments The latter refers to loss of control 324

over data and security policies and configurations and 325

also lock-in issues resulting from lack of standards migra- 326

tions and service terminations The complete scenario is 327

presented in Figure 3 F3328

The privacy dimension includes data security itself 329

(from sensitive data regulations and data loss to dis- 330

posal and redundancy) and legal issues (related to multiple 331

jurisdictions derived from different locations where data 332

and services are hosted) The expansion of this group is 333

represented in Figure 4 We note that the concerns in this F4334

dimension cover the complete information lifecycle (ie 335

generation use transfer transformation storage archiv- 336

ing and destruction) inside the provider perimeter and in 337

its immediate boundaries (or interfaces) to the users 338

A common point between all groups is the intrinsic con- 339

nection to data and service lifecycles Both privacy and 340

compliance must be ensured through all states of data 341

including application information or customer assets 342

while security in this case is more oriented towards how 343

the underlying elements (eg infrastructural hardware 344

and software) are protected 345

Current status of cloud security 346

A clear perspective of the main security problems regard- 347

ing cloud computing and on how they can be organized 348

Figure 1 Cloud computing security taxonomy Top level overview of the security taxonomy proposed highlighting the three main categoriessecurity related to privacy architecture and compliance

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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture Details from architecture category which is divided in network host application data (security andstorage) security management and identity and access controls ndash all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architectureadopted to implement or use a cloud solution

to ease decision making is the primary step for having349

a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud350

security In this section we analyze industry and academia351

viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need352

to be further developed This study is based on more353

than two hundred different references including white354

papers technical reports scientific papers and other rele-355

vant publications They were analyzed in terms of security356

problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita- 357

tions for each case We used a quantitative approach to 358

identify the amount of references related to each category 359

of concerns or solutions Our goal is not to determine 360

if the presented solutions completely solve an identified 361

concern since most of the referenced authors agree that 362

this is an involved task Nonetheless we identify the num- 363

ber of references dealing with each concern providing 364

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 6: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture Details from architecture category which is divided in network host application data (security andstorage) security management and identity and access controls ndash all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architectureadopted to implement or use a cloud solution

to ease decision making is the primary step for having349

a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud350

security In this section we analyze industry and academia351

viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need352

to be further developed This study is based on more353

than two hundred different references including white354

papers technical reports scientific papers and other rele-355

vant publications They were analyzed in terms of security356

problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita- 357

tions for each case We used a quantitative approach to 358

identify the amount of references related to each category 359

of concerns or solutions Our goal is not to determine 360

if the presented solutions completely solve an identified 361

concern since most of the referenced authors agree that 362

this is an involved task Nonetheless we identify the num- 363

ber of references dealing with each concern providing 364

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

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7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 7: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance Details from compliance category divided in lifecycle controls and governance risk and othercompliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies)

Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy Details from privacy category initially divided in concerns and principles Concerns are related to thecomplete data lifecycle from generation use and transfer to transformation storage archival and destruction Principles are guidelines related toprivacy in the cloud

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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RREC

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

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Page 8: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have365

received more attention from the research community366

and which have not been so extensively analyzed Some367

observations about the analysis method368

1 The references consulted came from different369

research segments including academia370

organizations and companies Due to the articlersquos371

length limitations we did not include all the372

consulted references in the References section In the373

following we present some of the main sources of374

consultation375

(a) Academia conference papers and journals376

published by IEEE ACM Springer377

Webscience and Scipress378

(b) Organizations reports white papers and379

interviews from SANS Institute CSA NIST380

ENISA Gartner Group KVMorg381

OpenGrid OpenStack and OpenNebula382

(c) Companies white papers manuals383

interviews and web content from384

ERICSSON IBM XEROX Cisco VMWare385

XEN CITRIX EMC Microsoft and386

Salesforce387

2 Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the388

mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided389

Therefore one reference can produce more than one 390

entry on each specified category 391

3 Some security perspectives were not covered in this 392

paper as each securityconcern category can be 393

sub-divided in finer-grained aspects such as 394

authentication integrity network communications 395

etc 396

We present the security concerns and solutions using 397

pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each 398

categorygroup in the total amount of references identi- 399

fied The comparison between areas is presented using 400

radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each 401

concern categorygroup 402

Security concerns 403

The results obtained for the number of citations on secu- 404

rity issues is shown in Figure 5 The three major problems F5405

identified in these references are legal issues compliance 406

and loss of control over data These legal- and governance- 407

related concerns are followed by the first technical issue 408

isolation with 7 of citations The least cited problems 409

are related to security configuration concerns loss of ser- 410

vice (albeit this is also related to compliance which is a 411

major problem) firewalling and interfaces 412

Grouping the concerns using the categories presented 413

in section ldquoCloud computing securityrdquo leads to the 414

Figure 5 Security problems Pie chart for security concerns

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

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7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 9: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether legal issuescompliance governance virtualization data security interfaces and network security)

Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories showing a clear lack for virtualizationsecurity mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

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Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 10: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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construction of Figure 6 This figure shows that legal andF6 415

governance issues represent a clear majority with 73 of416

concern citations showing a deep consideration of legal417

issues such as data location and e-discovery or gover-418

nance ones like loss of control over security and data The419

technical issue more intensively evaluated (12) is virtual-420

ization followed by data security interfaces and network421

security422

Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by423

cloud computing in terms of technologies employed con-424

sidering virtual infrastructures scalability and resource425

sharing and its related problems represent the first major426

technical concern427

Security solutions428

When analyzing citations for solutions we used the same429

approach described in the beginning of this section The430

results are presented in Figure 7 which shows the percent-F7 431

age of solutions in each category defined in section ldquoCloud432

computing securityrdquo and also in Figure 8 which highlightsF8 433

the contribution of each individual sub-category434

When we compare Figures 6 and 7 it is easy to observe435

that the number of citations covering security problems436

related to legal issues compliance and governance is high437

(respectively 24 22 and 17) however the same also 438

happens when we consider the number of references 439

proposing solutions for those issues (which represent 440

respectively 29 27 and 14 of the total number of 441

citations) In other words these concerns are higly rele- 442

vant but a large number solutions are already available for 443

tackling them 444

The situation is completely different when we analyze 445

technical aspects such as virtualization isolation and data 446

leakage Indeed virtualization amounts for 12 of prob- 447

lem references and only 3 for solutions Isolation is a 448

perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of 449

citations for such problems represents 7 in Figure 5 450

while solutions correspond to only 1 of the graph from 451

Figure 8 We note that for this specific issue special care 452

has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual 453

machine solution providers (eg XEN VMWARE and 454

KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu- 455

tions A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation 456

is that such concerns are also significant but yet little is 457

available in terms of solutions This indicates the need of 458

evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order 459

to provide better security conditions when migrating data 460

and processes in the cloud 461

Figure 8 Security solutions Pie chart for solutions citations

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 18 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

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Page 11: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Comparison462

The differences between problem and solution citations463

presented in the previous sections can be observed in464

Figure 9F9 465

Axis values correspond to the number of citations found466

among the references studied Blue areas represent con-467

cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions while468

darker red shows where those areas overlap In other469

words light red areas are problems with more citations470

for solutions than problems ndash they might be meaningful471

problems but there are many solutions already addressing472

them ndash while blue areas represent potential subjects that473

have received little attention so far indicating the need for474

further studies475

Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-476

ing data control mechanisms hypervisor vulnerabilities477

assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-478

ronments On the other hand areas such as legal con-479

cerns SLAs compliance and audit policies have a quite480

satisfactory coverage The results for grouped categories481

(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10F10 482

Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent483

an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as484

isolation data leakage and cross-VM attacks on the other485

hand areas such as compliance and network security486

encompass concerns for which there are already a con-487

siderable number of solutions or that are not considered488

highly relevant489

Finally Considering virtualization as key element for490

future studies Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-F11 491

ing on five virtualization-related problems isolation (of492

computational resources such as memory and storage493

capabilities) hypervisor vulnerabilities data leakage 494

cross-VM attacks and VM identification The contrast 495

related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident 496

than for the other issues However the number of solution 497

citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any 498

other security concern reaffirming the need for further 499

researches in those areas 500

Related work 501

An abundant number of related works and publications 502

exist in the literature emphasizing the importance and 503

demand of security solutions for cloud computing How- 504

ever we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses 505

directly the security aspects related to cloud comput- 506

ing We only identified some simplified models that 507

were developed to cover specific security aspects such as 508

authentication We were able to recognize two main types 509

of works (1) security frameworks which aim to aggregate 510

information about security and also to offer sets of best 511

practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions and 512

(2) publications that identify future trends and propose 513

solutions or areas of interest for research Each category 514

and corresponding references are further analyzed in the 515

following subsections 516

Security frameworks 517

Security frameworks concentrate information on security 518

and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks vul- 519

nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them 520

There are several entities that are constantly publishing 521

material related to cloud computing security including 522

ENISA CSA NIST CPNI (Centre for the Protection of 523

Figure 9 Comparison between citations Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions showing the disparities for eachsecurity category adopted

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 12: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories Radar chart grouping the categories showing the difference betweencitations about concerns and solutions regarding each category

National Infrastructure from UK government) and ISACA524

(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association)525

In this paper we focus on the first three entities which526

by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of527

issues and solutions and thus allowing a broad under-528

standing of the current status of cloud security529

ENISA530

ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and531

effective level of network and information security within532

the European Union [62] In the context of cloud comput-533

ing they published an extensive study covering benefits534

and risks related to its use [5] In this study the security 535

risks are divided in four categories 536

bull Policy and organizational issues related to 537

governance compliance and reputation 538bull Technical issues derived from technologies used to 539

implement cloud services and infrastructures such as 540

isolation data leakage and interception denial of 541

service attacks encryption and disposal 542bull Legal risks regarding jurisdictions subpoena and 543

e-discovery 544

Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization Radar chart only for virtualization issues

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bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 14 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 15 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 18 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 13: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 12 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

bull Not cloud specific other risks that are not unique to545

cloud environments such as network management546

privilege escalation and logging547

As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-548

puting ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some549

security practices to customers and also a clear contract to550

avoid legal problems Key points to be developed include551

breach reporting better logging mechanisms and engi-552

neering of large scale computer systems which encom-553

pass the isolation of virtual machines resources and554

information Their analysis is based not only on what is555

currently observed but also on what can be improved556

through the adoption of existing best practices or by557

means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud558

environments This article aims at taking one step fur-559

ther by transforming these observations into numbers ndash a560

quantitative approach561

CSA562

CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry563

practitioners corporations associations and other stake-564

holders [63] such as Dell HP and eBay One of its main565

goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for566

providing security within cloud computing environments567

Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper ndash the568

security guidance [6] the top threats in cloud computing569

[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture570

[64] ndash as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-571

lines researched and published by CSA572

The latest CSA security guidance (version 30 [65])573

denotes multi-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic574

while virtualization can be avoided when implementing575

cloud infrastructures ndash multi-tenancy only implies the576

use of shared resources by multiple consumers possibly577

from different organizations or with different objectives578

They discuss that even if virtualization-related issues579

can be circumvented segmentation and isolated policies580

for addressing proper management and privacy are still581

required The document also establishes thirteen security582

domains583

1 Governance and risk management ability to measure584

the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing585

solutions such as legal issues protection of sensitive586

data and their relation to international boundaries587

2 Legal issues disclosure laws shared infrastructures588

and interference between different users589

3 Compliance and audit the relationship between590

cloud computing and internal security policies591

4 Information management and data security592

identification and control of stored data loss of593

physical control of data and related policies to594

minimize risks and possible damages595

5 Portability and interoperability ability to change 596

providers services or bringing back data to local 597

premises without major impacts 598

6 Traditional security business continuity and disaster 599

recovery the influence of cloud solutions on 600

traditional processes applied for addressing security 601

needs 602

7 Data center operations analyzing architecture and 603

operations from data centers and identifying 604

essential characteristics for ensuring stability 605

8 Incident response notification and remediation 606

policies for handling incidents 607

9 Application security aims to identify the possible 608

security issues raised from migrating a specific 609

solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI 610

model) is more adequate 611

10 Encryption and key management how higher 612

scalability via infrastructure sharing affects 613

encryption and other mechanisms used for 614

protecting resources and data 615

11 Identity and access management enabling 616

authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining 617

security levels and availability for customers and 618

organizations 619

12 Virtualization risks related to multi-tenancy 620

isolation virtual machine co-residence and 621

hypervisor vulnerabilities all introduced by 622

virtualization technologies 623

13 Security as a service third party security 624

mechanisms delegating security responsibilities to a 625

trusted third party provider 626

CSA also published a document focusing on identify- 627

ing top threats aiming to aid risk management strategies 628

when cloud solutions are adopted [12] As a complete 629

list of threats and pertinent issues is countless the doc- 630

ument targets those that are specific or intensified by 631

fundamental characteristics of the cloud such as shared 632

infrastructures and greater flexibility As a result seven 633

threats were selected 634

1 Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing while 635

providing flexible and powerful resources and tools 636

IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical 637

exploitation possibilities built on anonymity This 638

leads to abuse and misuse of the provided 639

infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of 640

service attacks hosting malicious data controlling 641

botnets or sending spam 642

2 Insecure application programming interfaces cloud 643

services provide APIs for management storage 644

virtual machine allocation and other service-specific 645

operations The interfaces provided must implement 646

security methods to identify authenticate and protect 647

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 13 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 14: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 13 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

against accidental or malicious use which can648

introduce additional complexities to the system such649

as the need for third-party authorities and services650

3 Malicious insiders although not specific to cloud651

computing its effects are amplified by the652

concentration and interaction of services and653

management domains654

4 Shared technology vulnerabilities scalability655

provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware656

and software components which are not originally657

designed to provide isolation Even though658

hypervisors offer an extra granularity layer they still659

exhibit flaws which are exploited for privilege660

escalation661

5 Data loss and leakage insufficient controls662

concerning user access and data security (including663

privacy and integrity) as well as disposal and even664

legal issues665

6 Account service and traffic hijacking phishing and666

related frauds are not a novelty to computing667

security However not only an attacker is able to668

manipulate data and transactions but also to use669

stolen credentials to perform other attacks that670

compromise customer and provider reputation671

7 Unknown risk profile delegation of control over data672

and infrastructure allows companies to better673

concentrate on their core business possibly674

maximizing profit and efficiency On the other hand675

the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity676

[66] information about other customers sharing the677

same infrastructure or regarding patching and678

updating policies is limited This situation creates679

uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are680

inherent to the cloud solution681

It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-specific682

issues as it allows the identification of central points683

for further development Moreover this compilation of684

threats is closely related to CSA security guidance com-685

posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis686

assessments while providing recommendations and best687

practices to achieve acceptable security levels688

Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-689

mation related to cloud security and governance is the690

TCI Reference Architecture Model [64] This document691

focuses on defining guidelines for enabling trust in the692

cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities693

for all cloud-based operations The architecture defines694

different organization levels by combining frameworks695

like the SPI model ISO 27002 COBIT PCI SOX and696

architectures such as SABSA TOGAF ITIL and Jeri-697

cho A wide range of aspects are then covered SABSA698

defines business operation support services such as com-699

pliance data governance operational risk management700

human resources security security monitoring services 701

legal services and internal investigations TOGAF defines 702

the types of services covered (presentation application 703

information and infrastructure ITIL is used for informa- 704

tion technology operation and support from IT oper- 705

ation to service delivery support and management of 706

incidents changes and resources finally Jericho cov- 707

ers security and risk management including information 708

security management authorization threat and vulnera- 709

bility management policies and standards The result is a 710

tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery trust 711

and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied 712

in a security-oriented design 713

NIST 714

NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in 715

cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy 716

introduced in section ldquoCloud computing security taxon- 717

omyrdquo This taxonomyrsquos first level encompass typical roles 718

in the cloud environment cloud service provider respon- 719

sible for making the service itself available cloud service 720

consumer who uses the service and maintains a business 721

relationship with the provider cloud carrier which pro- 722

vides communication interfaces between providers and 723

consumers cloud broker that manages use performance 724

and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations 725

between providers and consumers and cloud auditor 726

which performs assessment of services operations and 727

security Each role is associated to their respective activ- 728

ities and decomposed on their components and subcom- 729

ponents The clearest difference from our taxonomy is the 730

hierarchy adopted as our proposal primarily focuses on 731

security principles in its higher level perspective while 732

the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels The con- 733

cepts presented here extend NISTrsquos initial definition for 734

cloud computing [9] incorporating a division of roles and 735

responsibilities that can be directly applied to security 736

assessments On the other hand NISTrsquos taxonomy incor- 737

porates concepts such as deployment models service 738

types and activities related to cloud management (porta- 739

bility interoperability provisioning) most of them largely 740

employed in publications related to cloud computing ndash 741

including this one 742

Frameworks summary 743

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each T1T2

744

framework 745

Books papers and other publications 746

Rimal Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy 747

created from the perspective of the academia developers 748

and researchers instead of the usual point of view related 749

to vendors Whilst they do provide definitions and con- 750

cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model) 751

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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 16 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

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7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 15: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 14 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks t11

t12Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t13CSA Guidance

bull Recommendations for reducing risksbull No restrictions regarding specific

solutions or service typesbull Guidelines not necessarily applicable

for all deployment modelsbull Provide initial structure to divide efforts

for researches

bull One architectural domainbull Governance domains risk management legal concerns compliance

auditing information management interoperability and portabilitybull Operational domains traditional and business security disaster recovery

data center operations encryption application security identificationauthorization virtualization security outsourcing

bull Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologiesthough cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures toprovide flexibility and scalability

t14CSA Top Threats

bull Provide context for risk managementdecisions and strategies

bull Focus on issues which are unique orhighly influenced by cloud computingcharacteristics

bull Seven main threats

ndash Abuse and malicious use of cloud resourcesndash Insecure APIsndash Malicious insidersndash Shared technology vulnerabilitiesndash Data loss and leakagendash Hijacking of accounts services and trafficndash Unknown risk profile (security obscurity)

bull Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples remediationguidelines impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)are affected

t15CSA Architecture

bull Enable trust in the cloud based onwell-known standards and certificationsallied to security frameworks and otheropen references

bull Use widely adopted frameworks inorder to achieve standardization ofpolicies and best practices based onalready accepted security principles

bull Four sets of frameworks (security NIST SPI IT audit and legislative) and fourarchitectural domains (SABSA business architecture ITIL for servicesmanagement Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)

bull Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery trust andoperations

bull Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to servicesoperation and security

Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance top threats and TCI architecture) t16

virtualization management service types fault tolerance752

policies and security no further studies are developed753

focusing on cloud specific security aspects This charac-754

teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]755

whose efforts converge to the definition of service models756

and types rather than to more technical aspects such as757

security privacy or compliance concerns ndash which are the758

focus of this paper759

In [7] Mather Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the760

current status of cloud security and what is predicted761

for the future The result is a compilation of security-762

related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-763

tructure data security and storage identity and access764

management security management privacy audit and765

compliance They also explore the unquestionable urge for766

more transparency regarding which party (customer or767

cloud provider) provides each security capability as well768

as the need for standardization and for the creation of769

legal agreements reflecting operational SLAs Other issues770

discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage- 771

ment capabilities currently offered as well as the need for 772

multi-entity key management 773

Many publications also state the need for better security 774

mechanisms for cloud environments Doelitzscher et al 775

[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud 776

computing They also highlight the lack of flexibility of 777

classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual- 778

ized environments suggesting the use of special security 779

audit tools associated to business flow modeling through 780

security SLAs In addition they identify abuse of cloud 781

resources lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc- 782

ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal 783

points to be managed Their analysis of top security con- 784

cerns is also based on publications from CSA ENISA and 785

others but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus 786

switch to their security auditing solution without offer- 787

ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and 788

areas of concern 789

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 15 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 16 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 18 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 16: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 15 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks t21

t22Framework Objectives Structure and comments

t23ENISA Report

bull Study on benefits and risks whenadopting cloud solutions for businessoperations

bull Provide information for securityassessments and decision making

bull Three main categories of cloud specific risks (policy and organizationaltechnical legal) plus one extra category for not specific ones

bull Offers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating theireffects

bull Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building(certifications metrics and transparency) large scale data protection(privacy integrity incident handling and regulations) and technicalaspects (isolation portability and resilience)

bull Highlights the duality of scalability (fast flexible and accessible resourcesversus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providinginfrastructure for aiding their operations)

bull Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability

t24NIST Taxonomy

bull Define what cloud services shouldprovide rather than how to design andimplement solutions

bull Ease the understanding of cloudinternal operations and mechanisms

bull Taxonomy levels

ndash First level cloud roles (service provider consumer cloud brokercloud carrier and cloud auditor)

ndash Second level activities performed by each role (cloudmanagement service deployment cloud access and serviceconsumption)

ndash Third and following levels elements which compose each activity(deployment models service types and auditing elements)

bull Based on publication SP 500-292 highlighting the importance of securityprivacy and levels of confidence and trust to increase technologyacceptance

bull Concentrates many useful concepts such as models for deploying orclassifying services

Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks t25

Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group790

[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security shrink-791

ing hypervisor footprints defining the security perimeter792

virtualization and linking security and VM provision-793

ing for better resource management Aiming to address794

these requirements they suggest the use of increased795

automation for security controls VM identity manage-796

ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open797

Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-798

nected to state-of-art key management practices) Wallom799

et al [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual800

machinesrsquo trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)801

to perform security-critical computations and to han-802

dle sensitive data therefore presenting a solution which803

integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-804

able cloud infrastructures Dabrowski and Mills [74] used805

simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and806

resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-807

formance and crashes they also propose the addition808

of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-809

ronment to offer higher availability levels while keeping810

overhead costs under control Ristenpart et al [44] also811

explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-812

tion leakage specially sensitive data at rest or in transit813

Finally Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security 814

API for federated access to cloud resources and authority 815

delegation while setting fine-grained controls and guar- 816

anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud 817

environments These publications highlight the need of 818

security improvements related to virtual machines and 819

virtualization techniques concern that this paper demon- 820

strates to be valid and urgent 821

Discussion 822

Considering the points raised in the previous section a 823

straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes 824

old and well-known issues ndash such as network and other 825

infrastructural vulnerabilities user access authentication 826

and privacy ndash and also novel concerns derived from 827

new technologies adopted to offer the adequate resources 828

(mainly virtualized ones) services and auxiliary tools 829

These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi- 830

sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according 831

to the studies and graphics presented) data location and 832

e-discovery (legal aspects) and loss of governance over 833

data security and even decision making (in which the 834

cloud must be strategically and financially considered as a 835

decisive factor) 836

UNCO

RREC

TED

PRO

OF

Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 16 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

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56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 17: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

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Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 16 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

Another point observed is that even though adopt-837

ing a cloud service or provider may be easy migrating838

to another is not [76] After moving local data and pro-839

cesses to the cloud the lack of standards for protocols840

and formats directly affects attempts to migrate to a dif-841

ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-842

sons such as non-fulfillment of SLAs outages or provider843

bankruptcy [77] Consequently the first choice must be844

carefully made as SLAs are not perfect and services845

outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing846

multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof After a847

decision is made future migrations between services can848

be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs most849

likely this task will require an extensive work for bring-850

ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before851

redeploying them into the cloud852

Finally the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-853

ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-854

studied security concerns for which plenty solutions and855

best practices have been developed such as those related856

to legal and administrative concerns On the other hand857

many issues still require further research effort especially858

those related to secure virtualization859

Considerations and future work860

Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-861

ronment and then enable the use of applications in the862

cloud and for moving data and business processes to863

virtualized infrastructures Many of the security issues864

identified are observed in other computing environments865

authentication network security and legal requirements866

for example are not a novelty However the impact of867

such issues is intensified in cloud computing due to868

characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-869

ing since actions from a single customer can affect all870

other users that inevitably share the same resources and871

interfaces On the other hand efficient and secure vir-872

tualization represents a new challenge in such a context873

with high distribution of complex services and web-874

based applications thus requiring more sophisticated875

approaches At the same time our quantitative analysis876

indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area877

regarding the number of solutions provided to identified878

concerns879

It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-880

vide the required security level by isolating virtual881

machines and the associated resources while following882

best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-883

ance to SLAs Among other requirements such solutions884

should employ virtual machine identification provide885

an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-886

bined with a constant observation of shared ones and887

examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data888

leakage889

A secure cloud computing environment depends on 890

several security solutions working harmoniously together 891

However in our studies we did not identify any security 892

solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get 893

high levels of security conformity for clouds Thus cloud 894

providers need to orchestrate harmonize security solu- 895

tions from different places in order to achieve the desired 896

security level 897

In order to verify these conclusions in practice we 898

deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and 899

XEN) and analyzed its security aspects we also analyzed 900

virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed 901

networks This investigation lead to a wide research of 902

PaaS solutions and allowed us to verify that most of them 903

use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo- 904

gies such as VMWARE XEN and KVM which often lack 905

security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed 906

the XEN source code in order to include security fea- 907

tures but unfortunately the modified code is not publicly 908

available and there appears to be no article detailing the 909

changes introduced Given these limitations a deeper 910

study on current security solutions to manage cloud com- 911

puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should 912

be a focus of future work in the area We are also working 913

on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related 914

to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi- 915

ronment This work should address basic needs for better 916

security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi- 917

tectures guiding other future researches in the security 918

area 919

Competing interests 920The authors declare that they have no competing interests 921

Authorrsquos contributions 922NG carried out the security research including the prospecting for information 923and references categorization results analysis taxonomy creation and analysis 924of related work CM participated in the drafting of the manuscript as well as in 925the analysis of references creation of the taxonomy and revisions of the text 926MS FR MN and MP participated in the critical and technical revisions of the 927paper including the final one also helping with the details for preparing the 928paper to be published TC coordinated the project related to the paper and 929also gave the final approval of the version to be published All authors read 930and approved the final manuscript 931

Acknowledgements 932This work was supported by the Innovation Center Ericsson 933Telecomunicacoes SA Brazil 934

Author details 9351Escola Politecnica at the University of Sao Paulo (EPUSP) Sao Paulo Brazil 9362Ericsson Research Stockholm Sweden 3Ericsson Research Ville Mont-Royal 937Canada 4State University of Santa Catarina Joinville Brazil 938

Received 30 January 2012 Accepted 5 June 2012 939Published 12 July 2012 940

References 9411 IDC (2009) Cloud Computing 2010 ndash An IDC Update 942

slidesharenetJorFigOrcloud-computing-2010-an-idc-update 9432 Armbrust M Fox A Griffith R Joseph AD Katz RH Konwinski A Lee G 944

Patterson DA Rabkin A Stoica I Zaharia M (2009) Above the Clouds 945

UNCO

RREC

TED

PRO

OF

Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

UNCO

RREC

TED

PRO

OF

Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 18 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 18: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

UNCO

RREC

TED

PRO

OF

Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 17 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing Technical Report946UCBEECS-2009-28 University of California at Berkeley947eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2009EECS-2009-28html948

3 Rimal BP Choi E Lumb I (2009) A Taxonomy and Survey of Cloud949Computing Systems In Fifth International Joint Conference on INC IMS950and IDC NCM rsquo09 CPS pp 44ndash51951

4 Shankland S (2009) HPrsquos Hurd dings cloud computing IBM952CNET News953

5 Catteddu D Hogben G (2009) Benefits risks and recommendations for954information security Tech rep European Network and Information955Security Agency enisaeuropaeuactrmfilesdeliverablescloud-956computing-risk-assessment957

6 CSA (2009) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud958Computing Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance959

7 Mather T Kumaraswamy S (2009) Cloud Security and privacy An960Enterprise Perspective on Risks and Compliance 1st edition OrsquoReilly961Media962

8 Chen Y Paxson V Katz RH (2010) Whatrsquos New About Cloud Computing963Security Technical Report UCBEECS-2010-5 University of California at964Berkeley eecsberkeleyeduPubsTechRpts2010EECS-2010-5html965

9 Mell P Grance T (2009) The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing966Technical Report 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology967wwwnistgovitlclouduploadcloud-def-v15pdf968

10 Ibrahim AS Hamlyn-Harris J Grundy J (2010) Emerging Security969Challenges of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure In Proceedings of APSEC 2010970Cloud Workshop APSEC rsquo10971

11 Gonzalez N Miers C Redıgolo F Carvalho T Simplıcio M Naslund M972Pourzandi M (2011) A quantitative analysis of current security concerns973and solutions for cloud computing In Proceedings of 3rd IEEE974CloudCom AthensGreece IEEE Computer Society975

12 Hubbard D Jr LJH Sutton M (2010) Top Threats to Cloud Computing976Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance cloudsecurityallianceorgresearch977projectstop-threats-to-cloud-computing978

13 Tompkins D (2009) Security for Cloud-based Enterprise Applications979httpblogdtorgindexphp200902security-for-cloud-based-980enterprise-applications981

14 Jensen M Schwenk J Gruschka N Iacono LL (2009) On Technical Security982Issues in Cloud Computing In IEEE Internation Conference on Cloud983Computing pp 109ndash116984

15 TrendMicro (2010) Cloud Computing Security - Making Virtual Machines985Cloud-Ready Trend Micro White Paper986

16 Genovese S (2009) Akamai Introduces Cloud-Based Firewall http987cloudcomputingsys-concomnode1219023988

17 Hulme GV (2011) CloudPassage aims to ease cloud server security989management httpwwwcsoonlinecomarticle658121cloudpassage-990aims-to-ease-cloud-server-security-management991

18 Oleshchuk VA Koslashien GM (2011) Security and Privacy in the Cloud - A992Long-Term View In 2nd International Conference on Wireless993Communications Vehicular Technology Information Theory and994Aerospace and Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless VITAE) WIRELESS995VITAE rsquo11 pp 1ndash5 httpdxdoiorg101109WIRELESSVITAE20115940876996

19 Google (2011) Google App Engine codegooglecomappengine99720 Google (2011) Google Query Language (GQL)998

codegooglecomintlenappenginedocspythonoverviewhtml99921 StackOverflow (2011) Does using non-SQL databases obviate the need1000

for guarding against SQL injection1001stackoverflowcomquestions1823536does-using-non-sql-databases-1002obvia1003te-the-need-for-guarding-against-sql-injection1004

22 Rose J (2011) Cloudy with a chance of zero day wwwowasporgimages1005112Cloudy with a chance of 0 day Jon Rose-Tom Leaveypdf1006

23 Balkan A (2011) Why Google App Engine is broken and what Google1007must do to fix it aralbalkancom15041008

24 Salesforce (2011) Salesforce Security Statement1009salesforcecomcompanyprivacysecurityjsp1010

25 Espiner T (2007) Salesforce tight-lipped after phishing attack1011zdnetcouknewssecurity-threats20071107salesforce-tight-lipped-a1012fter-phishing-attack-392906161013

26 Yee A (2007) Implications of Salesforce Phishing Incident1014ebizqnetblogssecurity insider200711-implications of salesforc1015e phiphp1016

27 Salesforce (2011) Security Implementation Guide 1017loginsalesforcecomhelpdocensalesforce security impl guidepdf 1018

28 Li H Dai Y Tian L Yang H (2009) Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud 1019Computing In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud 1020Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1021

29 Amazon (2011) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) awsamazoncomec2 102230 Kaufman C Venkatapathy R (2010) Windows Azure Security Overview 1023

gomicrosoftcomlinkid=9740388 [August] 102431 McMillan R (2010) Google Attack Part of Widespread Spying Effort 1025

PCWorld 102632 Mills E (2010) Behind the China attacks on Google CNET News 102733 Arrington M (2010) Google Defends Against Large Scale Chinese Cyber 1028

Attack May Cease Chinese Operations TechCrunch 102934 Bosch J (2009) Google Accounts Attacked by Phishing Scam BrickHouse 1030

Security Blog 103135 Telegraph T (2009) Facebook Users Targeted By Phishing Attack The 1032

Telegraph 103336 Pearson S (2009) Taking account of privacy when designing cloud 1034

computing services In Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on 1035Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing CLOUD rsquo09 1036

37 Musthaler L (2009) Cost-effective data encryption in the cloud Network 1037World 1038

38 Yan L Rong C Zhao G (2009) Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with 1039Federal Identity Management Using Hierarchical Identity-Based 1040Cryptography In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on 1041Cloud Computing CloudCom rsquo09 1042

39 Tech C (2010) Examining Redundancy in the Data Center Powered by the 1043Cloud and Disaster Recovery Consonus Tech 1044

40 Lyle M (2011) Redundancy in Data Storage Define the Cloud 104541 Dorion P (2010) Data destruction services When data deletion is not 1046

enough SearchDataBackupcom 104742 Mogull R (2009) Cloud Data Security Archive and Delete (Rough Cut) 1048

securosiscomblogcloud-data-security-archive-and-delete-rough-cut 104943 Messmer E (2011) Gartner New security demands arising for 1050

virtualization cloud computing httpwwwnetworkworldcomnews 10512011062311-security-summithtml 1052

44 Ristenpart T Tromer E Shacham H Savage S (2009) Hey you get off of 1053my cloud exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds 1054In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and 1055communications security CCS rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 199ndash212 1056doiacmorg10114516536621653687 1057

45 Chow R Golle P Jakobsson M Shi E Staddon J Masuoka R Molina J 1058(2009) Controlling data in the cloud outsourcing computation without 1059outsourcing control In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on 1060Cloud computing security CCSW rsquo09 New York NY USA ACM pp 85ndash90 1061httpdoiacmorg10114516550081655020 1062

46 Sadeghi AR Schneider T Winandy M (2010) Token-Based Cloud 1063Computing - Secure Outsourcing of Data and Arbitrary Computations 1064with Lower Latency In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference 1065on Trust and trustworthy computing TRUST rsquo10 1066

47 Brandic I Dustdar S Anstett T Schumm D Leymann F (2010) Compliant 1067Cloud Computing (C3) Architecture and Language Support for 1068User-driven Compliance Management in Clouds In 2010 IEEE 3rd 1069International Conference on Cloud Computing pp 244ndash251 httpdx 1070doiorg101109CLOUD201042 1071

48 Brodkin J (2008) Gartner Seven cloud computing security risks http 1072wwwinfoworldcomdsecurity-centralgartner-seven-cloud- 1073computing-security-risks-853 1074

49 Kandukuri BR Paturi R Rakshit A (2009) Cloud Security Issues In 1075Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Services 1076Computing SCC rsquo09 1077

50 Winterford B (2011) Amazon EC2 suffers huge outage httpwwwcrn 1078comauNews255586amazon-ec2-suffers-huge-outageaspx 1079

51 Clarke G (2011) Microsoft BPOS cloud outage burns Exchange converts 1080httpwwwtheregistercouk20110513 1081

52 Shankland S (2011) Amazon cloud outage derails Reddit Quora 108253 Young E (2009) Cloud Computing - The role of internal audit 108354 CloudAudit (2011) A6 - The automated audit assertion assessment and 1084

assurance API httpcloudauditorg 108555 Anand N (2010) The legal issues around cloud computing httpwww 1086

labnolorginternetcloud-computing-legal-issues14120 1087

UNCO

RREC

TED

PRO

OF

Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 18 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom

Page 19: A quantitative analysis of current security concerns and solutions for cloud computing

UNCO

RREC

TED

PRO

OF

Gonzalez et al Journal of Cloud Computing Advances Systems and Applications 2012 111 Page 18 of 18httpwwwjournalofcloudcomputingcomcontent1111

56 Hunter S (2011) Ascending to the cloud creates negligible e-discovery1088risk httpediscoveryquarlescom201107articlesinformation-1089technologyascending-to-the-cloud-creates-negligible-ediscovery-risk1090

57 Sharon D Nelson JWS (2011) Virtualization and Cloud Computing1091benefits and e-discovery implications httpwwwslawca201107191092virtualization-and-cloud-computing-benefits-and-e-discovery-1093implications1094

58 Bentley L (2009) E-discovery in the cloud presents promise and problems1095httpwwwitbusinessedgecomcmcommunityfeaturesinterviews1096bloge-discovery-in-the-cloud-presents-promise-and-problemscs=1097316981098

59 Zierick J (2011) The special case of privileged users in the sloud http1099blogbeyondtrustcombid63894The-Special-Case-of-Privileged-Users-1100in-the-Cloud1101

60 Dinoor S (2010) Got Privilege Ten Steps to Securing a Cloud-Based1102Enterprise httpcloudcomputingsys-concomnode15716491103

61 Pavolotsky J (2010) Top five legal issues for the cloud httpwwwforbes1104com20100412cloud-computing-enterprise-technology-cio-network-1105legalhtml1106

62 ENISA (2011) About ENISA httpwwwenisaeuropaeuabout-enisa110763 CSA (2011) About httpscloudsecurityallianceorgabout110864 CSA (2011) CSA TCI Reference Architecture httpscloudsecurityalliance1109

orgwp-contentuploads201111TCI-Reference-Architecture-11pdf111065 CSA (2011) Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud1111

Computing V30 Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance [Httpwww1112cloudsecurityallianceorgguidancecsaguidev30pdf]1113

66 Ramireddy S Chakraborthy R Raghu TS Rao HR (2010) Privacy and1114Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing - A Research in1115Progress In AMCIS 2010 Proceedings AMCIS rsquo10 httpaiselaisnetorg1116amcis20105741117

67 NIST (2011) NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture SP 500-2921118httpcollaboratenistgovtwiki-cloud-computingpub1119CloudComputingReferenceArchitectureTaxonomyNIST SP 500-292 -1120090611pdf1121

68 Youseff L Butrico M Silva DD (2008) Toward a Unified Ontology of Cloud1122Computing In Grid Computing Environments Workshop 2008 GCE rsquo081123pp 10 1 httpdxdoiorg101109GCE200847384431124

69 Johnston S (2008) Sam Johnston taxonomy the 6 layer cloud computing1125stack httpsamjnet200809taxonomy-6-layer-cloud-computing-1126stackhtml]1127

70 Linthicum D (2009) Defining the cloud computing framework http1128cloudcomputingsys-concomnode8115191129

71 Doelitzscher F Reich C Knahl M Clarke N (2011) An autonomous agent1130based incident detection system for cloud environments In Third IEEE1131International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science1132CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 197ndash204 httpdxdoiorg101109CloudCom11332011351134

72 Oltsik J (2010) Information security virtualization and the journey to the1135cloud Tech rep Cloud Security Alliance1136

73 Wallom D Turilli M Taylor G Hargreaves N Martin A Raun A McMoran A1137(2011) myTrustedCloud Trusted Cloud Infrastructure for Security-critical1138Computation and Data Managment In Third IEEE International1139Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science CloudCom11402011 CPS pp 247ndash2541141

74 Dabrowski C Mills K (2011) VM Leakage and Orphan Control in1142Open-Source Clouds In Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud1143Computing Technology and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 554ndash5591144

75 Chadwick DW Casenove M (2011) Security APIs for My Private Cloud In1145Third IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology1146and Science CloudCom 2011 CPS pp 792ndash7981147

76 Claybrook B (2011) How providers affect cloud application migration1148httpsearchcloudcomputingtechtargetcomtutorialHow-providers-1149affect-cloud-application-migration1150

77 CSA (2011) Interoperability and portability1151

doi1011862192-113X-1-11Cite this article as Gonzalez et al A quantitative analysis of current securityconcerns and solutions for cloud computing Journal of Cloud ComputingAdvances Systems and Applications 2012 111

Submit your manuscript to a journal and benefi t from

7 Convenient online submission

7 Rigorous peer review

7 Immediate publication on acceptance

7 Open access articles freely available online

7 High visibility within the fi eld

7 Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropencom