A Project Report on IndoUS Nuclear Deal(IR)

8/9/2019 A Project Report on IndoUS Nuclear Deal(IR)

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APROJECT

ONINDO-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

SUBMITTED TO:

Miss Pamela

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSSUBMITTED BY:

Santhosh Kumar Gk4th Trimester

REG NO: CC0058BK42AG23AA

Great Eastern Management B-School, Bangalore

INDEX


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Sr. No. Contents Page No.

1. Introduction

- Joint statement- Indias separation plan

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08

2. Need for nuclear deal

- History and background- Current scenario- Technical aspect

- Critics on indo-us civil cooperation- Political aspects- Power sector at a glance

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2022

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3. Conclusion 33

4. References 34

5. Glossary 35

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INDO-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR DEAL

The Indo-US Agreement of 18 July 2005 and the subsequent agreement of 2

March2006, following the visit of President Bush to India, have been discussed

extensively in the Indian and US media for the past ten months. At present, the

US Congress is holding hearings on the proposed legislation to enable the US to

enter into civil nuclear energy cooperation with India and to allow the US

administration to approach the nuclear suppliers group to adjust its policies to

make an exception in the case of India. We shall certainly be hearing of both

support and opposition from various Senators and Congressmen. As of now it is

not clear if the US Congress will accord its approval before the June or July

deadline. There will be a recess thereafter and on reconvening, the US Congress

is expected to be busy with new elections. There is also a possibility that the US

Congress, even if it were to approve the legislation, may include some additional

conditions that India would have to accept. The Indian Governments position is

that it stands by the agreements of 18 July 2005 and 2 March 2006 and that no

new conditions would be acceptable to the Government.

JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND UNITED STATES ON 2ND

MARCH, 2006 AT DELHI:

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today

expressed satisfaction with the great progress the United States and India have

made in advancing our strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the

21st century. Both our countries are linked by a deep commitment to freedom

and democracy; a celebration of national diversity, human creativity and

innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide;

and a desire to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by

intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The

successful transformation of the U.S.-India relationship will have a decisive and

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positive influence on the future international system as it evolves in this new

century.

Reviewing the progress made in deepening the global partnership between the

United States and India since their Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, the

President and the Prime Minister reaffirm their commitment to expand even

further the growing ties between their two countries. Consistent with this

objective, the two leaders wish to highlight efforts the United States and India are

making together in the following areas, where they have:

FOR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND TRADE

(1) Agreed to intensify efforts to develop a bilateral business climate supportive

of trade and investment by:

Welcoming the report of the U.S.-India CEO Forum, agreeing to consider

its recommendations aimed at substantially broadening our bilateral

economic relations, and directing the Chairs of the Indo-U.S. Economic

Dialogue to follow up expeditiously with the CEO Forum;

Endorsing the efforts of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum to reducebarriers to trade and investment with the goal of doubling bilateral trade in

three years;

Agreeing to advance mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment

flows by holding a high-level public-private investment summit in 2006,

continuing efforts to facilitate and promote foreign direct investment and

eliminate impediments to it, and enhancing bilateral consultations on

various issues including tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and

services, and preventing the illicit use of the financial system.

(2) Sought to expand cooperation in agriculture by:

Launching the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture with a three-year

financial commitment to link our universities, technical institutions, and

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businesses to support agriculture education, joint research, and capacity

building projects including in the area of biotechnology.

Endorsing an agreed work plan to promote bilateral trade in agriculture

through agreements that: lay out a path to open the U.S. market to Indian

mangoes, recognize India as having the authority to certify that shipments

of Indian products to the United States meet USDA organic standards,

and provide for discussions on current regulations affecting trade in fresh

fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy, and almonds.

(3) Reaffirmed their shared commitment to completing the WTO Doha

Development Agenda (DDA) before the end of 2006, and agreed to work

together to help achieve this outcome.

FOR ENERGY SECURITY AND A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT

(1) Welcomed the successful completion of discussions on India's

separation plan and looked forward to the full implementation of the

commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation. This

historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our

common objective of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the

United States and between India and the international community as a whole.

(2) Welcomed the participation of India in the ITER initiative on fusion

energy as an important further step towards the common goal of full nuclear

energy cooperation.

(3) Agreed on India's participation in FutureGen, an international public-

private partnership to develop new, commercially viable technology for a clean

coal near-zero emission power project. India will contribute funding to the project

and participate in the Government Steering Committee of this initiative.

(4) Welcomed the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean

Development and Climate, which will enable India and the U.S. to work together

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with other countries in the region to pursue sustainable development and meet

increased energy needs while addressing concerns of energy security and

climate change. The Partnership will collaborate to promote the development,

diffusion, deployment and transfer of cleaner, cost-effective and more efficient

technologies and practices.

(5) Welcomed India's interest in the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, an

international marine research endeavor that will contribute to long-term energy

solutions such as gas hydrates.

(6) Noting the positive cooperation under the Indo-U.S. Energy Dialogue,

highlighted plans to hold joint conferences on topics such as energy efficiency

and natural gas, to conduct study missions on renewable energy, to establish a

clearing house in India for coal-bed methane/coal-mine methane, and to

exchange energy market information.

FOR INNOVATION AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

(1) Emphasizing the importance of knowledge partnerships, announced

the establishment of a Bi-National Science and Technology Commission whichthe U.S. and India will co-fund. It will generate collaborative partnerships in

science and technology and promote industrial research and development.

(2) Agreed that the United States and India would work together to

promote innovation, creativity and technological advancement by providing a

vibrant intellectual property rights regime, and to cooperate in the field of

intellectual property rights to include capacity building activities, human resource

development and public awareness programs.

(3) Agreed to continue exploring further cooperation in civil space,

including areas such as space exploration, satellite navigation, and earth

science. The United States and India committed to move forward with

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agreements that will permit the launch of U.S. satellites and satellites containing

U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles, opening up new opportunities

for commercial space cooperation between the two countries.

(4) Welcomed the inclusion of two U.S. instruments in the Indian lunar

mission Chandrayaan-1. They noted that memoranda of understanding to be

signed by ISRO and NASA would be significant steps forward in this area.

(5) Welcomed the U.S. Department of Commerce's plan to create a

license exception for items that would otherwise require an export license to end-

users in India engaged solely in civilian activities.

FOR GLOBAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

(1) Noted the enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation between the two

countries and stressed that terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and

rooted out in every part of the world.

(2) Welcomed the increased cooperation between the United States and

India in the defense area, since the New Framework for the U.S.-India DefenseRelationship was signed on June 28, 2005, as evidenced by successful joint

exercises, expanded defense cooperation and information sharing, and greater

opportunities to jointly develop technologies and address security and

humanitarian issues.

(3) Reaffirmed their commitment to the protection of the free flow of

commerce and to the safety of navigation, and agreed to the conclusion of a

Maritime Cooperation Framework to enhance security in the maritime domain, to

prevent piracy and other transnational crimes at sea, carry out search and

rescue operations, combat marine pollution, respond to natural disasters,

address emergent threats and enhance cooperative capabilities, including

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through logistics support. Both sides are working to finalize a Logistics Support

Agreement at the earliest.

(4) Welcomed India's intention to join the Container Security Initiative

aimed at making global maritime trade and infrastructure more secure and

reducing the risk of shipping containers being used to conceal weapons of mass

destruction.

(5) Reiterated their commitment to international efforts to prevent the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(6) Building on the July 2005 Disaster Relief Initiative, noted the important

disaster management cooperation and their improved capabilities to respond to

disaster situations.

(7) Recognized the importance of capacity building in cyber security and

greater cooperation to secure their growing electronic interdependencies,

including to protect electronic transactions and critical infrastructure from cyber

crime, terrorism and other malicious threats.

DEEPENING DEMOCRACY AND MEETING INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES

(1) Recalled their joint launch of the UN Democracy Fund in September

2005 and offered the experience and expertise of both Governments for capacity

building, training and exchanges to third countries that request such assistance

to strengthen democratic institutions.

(2) Welcomed the decision of India and the United States to designate a

representative to the Government Advisory Board of the International Centre for

Democratic Transition (ICDT) located in Budapest to facilitate cooperative

activities with ICDT.

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(3) Agreed that the Virtual Coordination and Information Centres set up in

September 2005 should be further strengthened and a bilateral meeting aimed at

developing a practical programme for utilization of its services be held soon.

(4) Expressed satisfaction at the expedited USFDA drug approval

processes that strengthen the combat against HIV/AIDS at the global level and

encourage greater corporate participation to meet this challenge, including the

establishment of the Indo-U.S. Corporate Fund for HIV/AIDS.

(5) Agreed to expand bilateral efforts and continue cooperation in the area

of medical research and strengthen technical capacity in food and drug

regulation in India as well as address the concern on avian influenza, including

agreement to reach out to the private sector, develop regional communications

strategies, and plan an in-region containment and response exercise. The

President welcomed India's offer to host the International Partnership on Avian

and Pandemic Influenza meeting in 2007.

(6) Welcomed India's membership in the Coalition Against Wildlife

Trafficking, a partnership through which we will collaborate in the fight againstillegal trade in wildlife and wildlife parts; we also welcome the opportunity to

strengthen longstanding work together on the conservation of wildlife through

cooperation on park management and ecotourism.

President Bush thanked Prime Minister Singh and the people of India for the

warmth of their reception and the generosity of their hospitality.

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India's Separation Plan:

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has tabled in Parliament additional detailstoday on the Indian nuclear separation plan first unveiled on 7 March 2006.

Specifically, he has identified the 14 reactors which will go under IAEA

safeguards between 2006 and 2014, as well as the individual facilities within the

Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad, which will be offered for safeguards by 2008.

The 14 reactors to be safeguarded are the following:

2006: TAPS 1 and 2; RAPS 1 and 2 Kudankulam 1 and 2

2007: RAPS 5 (under construction)

2008: RAPS 6 (under construction)

2010: RAPS 3 and 4 (currently operational)

2012: KAPS 1 and 2 (currently operational)

2014: NAPS 1 and 2 (currently operational)

In other words, the thermal power reactors which will remain unsafe guarded are:

MAPS 1 and 2 at Kalpakkam (both 220 MWe) ; TAPS 3 and 4 (both 540 MWe) ;

and Kaiga 1, 2, 3 and 4 (all 220 MWe). Plus of course the fast breeders.

The Nuclear Fuel Complex facilities to be safeguarded are:

Uranium Oxide Plant (Block A)

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Palletizing) (Block A)

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Assembly) (Block A)

Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant

Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant

Gadolinia Facility

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1. Through the initiation of a sustained dialogue to address energy security

concerns, the two countries sought to promote stable, efficient, predictable and

cost effective solutions for India's growing requirements. At the same time, they

also agreed on the need to develop and deploy cleaner, more efficient,

affordable and diversified energy technologies to deal with the environmental

implications of energy consumption. India had developed proven and wide-

ranging capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire nuclear fuel

cycle. It is internationally recognized that India has unique contributions to make

to international efforts towards meeting these objectives. India has become a full

partner in ITER, with the full support of the US and other partners. India also

accepted the US invitation to join the initiative on Clean Development

Partnership.

2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the twin challenges of energy

security and safeguarding the environment, the two Governments agreed on 18

July 2005 to undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that would

create a framework for the resumption of full cooperation in this field. On its part,

the United States undertook to:

Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to

achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation.

Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full

civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not

limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded

nuclear reactors at Tarapur.

In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider fuel supply to Tarapur

expeditiously.

To consult with its partners to consider India's participation in ITER

To consult with other participants in the Generation-IV International Forum

with a view towards India's inclusion.

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3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same responsibilities and

practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading

countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.

Accordingly, India for its part undertook the following commitments:

Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and

programmes in a phased manner.

Filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA.

Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under

IAEA safeguards, and

Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian

nuclear facilities.

4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been fulfilled in the last

year. Among them are:

India's responsible non-proliferation record, recognized by the US,

continues and is reflected in its policies and actions.

The harmonization of India's export controls with NSG [Nuclear Suppliers'

Group] and MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Guidelines even

though India is not a member of either group. These guidelines and

control lists have been notified and are being implemented.

A significant upgrading of India's non-proliferation regulations and export

controls has taken place as a result of the Weapons of Mass Destruction

Act of May 2005. Inter-Ministerial consultations are ongoing to examine

and amend other relevant Acts as well as framing appropriate rules andregulations.

Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to

states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit

their spread. This has guided our policy on non-proliferation.

Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and

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Willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a

multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

5. The Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, recognized that India is ready to

assume the same responsibilities and practices as other leading countries with

advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. India has an

impeccable record in non-proliferation. The Joint Statement acknowledges that

India's nuclear programme has both a military and a civilian component. Both

sides had agreed that the purpose was not to constrain India's strategic

programme but to enable resumption of full civil nuclear energy cooperation in

order to enhance global energy and environmental security. Such cooperation

was predicated on the assumption that any international civil nuclear energy

cooperation (including by the U.S.) offered to India in the civilian sector should,

firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and secondly, should not be

transferred from India to third countries without safeguards. These concepts will

be reflected in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India with IAEA.

6. India's nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear

weapons not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. It must beappreciated that the strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear

power programme and consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated

programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have

no strategic implications poses a particular challenge. Therefore, facilities

identified as civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards in

phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility concerned, the activities

undertaken in it, the national security significance of materials and the location of

the facilities are factors taken into account in undertaking the separation process.

This is solely an Indian determination.

7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built nuclear reactors but promoted

the growth of a national industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was

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envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs [pressurised heavy water

reactors] chosen for deployment in the first stage. As indigenous reactors were

set up, several innovative design improvements were carried out based on

Indian R&D and a standardized design was evolved. The research and

technology development spanned the entire spectrum of the nuclear fuel cycle

including the front end and the back end. Success in the technologies for the

back end of the fuel cycle allowed us to launch the second stage of the

programme by constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has

operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has achieved all

technology objectives. We have now proceeded further and are constructing a

500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched

design and development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and

incorporating inherent safety features.

8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to the separation exercise.

Issues related to fuel resource sustainability, technical design and economic

viability, as well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This would

necessitate grid connectivity irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is

civilian or not civilian.

9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme still has a relatively

narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed

viable by much larger programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and

the total installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this out graphically:

Country / Number of reactors / Total installed capacity

India / 15 / 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the total production)

USA / 104 (103 operational) / 99.21 GWe (19.9% of the total production)

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France / 59 / 63.36 GWe (78.1% of the total production)

UK/ 23 / 11.85 GWe (19.4% of the total production)

Russia / 31 / 21.74 GWe (1.6% of the total production)

China / 9 / 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the total production)

Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC

10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small capacity of the reactors

produced indigenously by India, some of which would remain outside

safeguards. Therefore, in assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would

be important to look at both the number of reactors and the percentage of

installed capacity covered. An average Indian reactor is of 220 MW and its

output is significantly smaller than the standards reactor in a P-5 economy. The

chart below illustrates this aspect:

Country / Most common reactor / No. of such reactors

India / PHWRs 220 MWe / 12

USA / 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs. Most plants are in the range of range of 1000-

1250 MWe / 51 reactors in the range of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe

France / PWRs of 900 MWe and 1300 MWe size / 34 PWrs of 900 MWe and

20 PWRs of 1300 MWe

UK / No standard size. AGR is the most common in the range of 600-700 MWe /

14 AGRs

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Russia / 3rd Generation VVER-1000 PWRs and RBMK 1000 Light Water

Graphite Reactors / 9 third Generation VVER-1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK 1000

Light Water Fraphite Reactors

China / PWRs 984 MWe / Four

Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne

11. The complexity of the separation process is further enhanced by the limited

resources that India has devoted to its nuclear programme as compared to P-5

nations. Moreover, as India expands international cooperation, the percentage of

its thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would rise

significantly as fresh capacity is added through such cooperation.

12. India's approach to the separation of its civilian nuclear facilities is guided by

the following principles:

Credible, feasible and implementable in a transparent manner;

Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement; Consistent with India's national security and R&D requirements as well as

not prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;

Must be cost effective in its implementation; and

Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.

13. Based on these principles, India will:

Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for safeguards that,

after separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic

significance.

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The overarching criterion would be a judgment whether subjecting a

facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India's national

security.

However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a

larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not

be normally engaged in activities of strategic significance.

A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that India has determined not to

be relevant to its strategic programme.

14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of reciprocal actions by the

US, will adopt the following approach:

(i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and offer for safeguards 14

thermal power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the 4

presently safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in

addition KK 1&2 that are under construction. 8 other PHWRs, each of

a capacity of 220 MW, will also be offered. Phasing of specific thermal

power reactors, being offered for safeguards would be indicated

separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect, cover 14 out of the22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction

to be placed under safeguards, and would raise the total installed

Thermal Power capacity by MWs under safeguards from the present

19% to 65% by 2014.

(ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a position to accept safeguards

on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder

Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder

Programme is at the R&D stage and its technology will take time to

mature and reach an advanced stage of development.

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(iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place under safeguards all

future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors,

and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such

reactors as civilian.

(iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor,

in 2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA

reactor that was purchased from France outside BARC [Bhabha

Atomic Research Centre] and make the fuel core available to be

placed under safeguards in 2010.

(v) Upstream facilities: The following upstream facilities would be identified

and separated as civilian:

List of those specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be

offered for safeguards by 2008 will be indicated separately.

The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira are

proposed to be designated for civilian use between 2006-2009. We do not

consider these plants as relevant for safeguards purposes.

(vi) Downstream facilities: The following downstream facilities would beidentified and separated as civilian:

India is willing to accept safeguards in the `campaign' mode after 2010 in

respect of the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.

The Tarapur and Rajasthan `Away From Reactors' spent fuel storage

pools would be made available for safeguards with appropriate phasing

between 2006-2009.

(vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the following facilities as civilian:

(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research

(b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre

(c) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics

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(d) Institute for Plasma Research

(e) Institute of Mathematics Sciences

(f) Institute of Physics

(g) Tata Memorial Centre

(h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology

(i) Harish Chandra Research Institute

These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our expectation that they will play

a prominent role in international cooperation.

15. Safeguards:

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel

to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States

has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to

have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation

of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking

agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with

friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create

the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuelmarket, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies

from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is

prepared to take the following additional steps:

(i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel

supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy

under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to

the U.S. Congress.

(ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an

India-specific fuel supply agreement.

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(iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic

reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the

lifetime of India's reactors.

(iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs,

the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly

supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the

United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to

India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-

specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the

IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded

nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for

corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation

of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel

supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear

facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an

appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to Parliament by

the Government.

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NEED FOR NUCLEAR DEAL:

The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India

and the United States arose in the context of India's requirement for adequate

and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate

and as recognition of its growing technological prowess. It was preceded by

discussions between the two Governments, particularly between President Bush

and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, of the global energy scenario and the

long-term implications of increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources and

rising oil prices. These developments led to the announcement in April 2005 of

an Indo-US Energy Dialogue that encompassed the entire spectrum of energyoptions ranging from oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear

energy.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND:

To understand the whole gamut of issues involved, it is important to recall

the background to the 18 July 2005 agreement. This agreement itself sought to

redress the anomalous situation India enjoyed in the global non-proliferation

regime. India refused to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which

came into being in 1968, at the initiative of USA, USSR and the UK. The NPT

defined a cutoff date of 1 January 1967 and recognized those countries which

had carried out a nuclear test prior to that date as nuclear weapon states (NWS),

and all other countries as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

Initially, the NPT was conceived to deny the countries that launched the

second world war, namely Germany, Japan and Italy permanently of the ability to

make nuclear weapons. As it turned out, the NPT legitimized USA, USSR, the

UK, France and China as NWS (incidentally, the same five states are also the

five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with veto

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powers) and required other states to give up their rights to acquire nuclear

weapons for all times. India termed the NPT discriminatory and refused to join it

from the very beginning. Pakistan, though receiving substantial military and

economic assistance from USA, also refused to join the NPT, on the ground that

India had chosen to keep itself out of it. Israel also kept itself out of the NPT and

managed to build up a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and 1980s.

Israel did receive assistance from France, Britain and USA in its nuclear

weapons programme. USA and many countries of the world have accepted the

Israel argument that its nuclear deterrent is an existential necessity, as it is

surrounded by a number of countries Who are not reconciled to its very

existence?

India built its first research reactor Apsara, pretty much on its own in 1956.

It was the first research reactor in Asia Outside the Soviet Union. India started its

first heavy-water production facility at Nangal in 1962 and its first plutonium

separation plant in Trombay in 1965. At the Second United Nations Conference

on the peaceful uses of atomic energy held in Geneva in 1958.

Bhabha outlined Indias three-stage nuclear power programme the

first stage consisting of natural uranium-fuelled heavy water-moderatedreactors, to be followed by fast reactors using plutonium from the spent

fuel of the first-stage reactors, producing more plutonium from uranium-

238 or uranium-233 from thorium. In the third stage, either thermal or fast

reactors would operate on the uranium-233thorium cycle.

The logic for this approach has the rather limited resource base of

uranium in India (recognized even at that point of time) and the large reserves of

thorium in the country. The importance of developing capability of producing

heavy water on the one hand and separating plutonium from spent fuel was

obvious. India also undertook all activities to exercise full control over the entire

fuel cycle. Mining for uranium commenced in the 1960s, though earlier to this,

uranium was extracted from the monazite sands. Fuel fabrication for the

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research reactor CIRUS was taken up in the early sixties, followed by fuel

required for the pressurized heavy-water reactors.

During the same period, plants were set up to produce nuclear-grade zirconium

and zirconium alloys required for fuel assemblies. A plant for vitrification of long-

lived nuclear waste coming out of the spent fuel reprocessing facility was also

built. With regard to nuclear power plants, the first twin-reactor unit at Tarapur,

incorporating boiling-water reactors, was commissioned in 1969 using the US

reactor technology. At about the same time, a twin-unit pressurized heavy-water

reactor using Canadian technology was built in Rajasthan. The third nuclear

power station at Kalpakkam was designed and built as a total Indian venture.

India undertook the Peaceful Nuclear Experiment (PNE) in 1974 and in its wake

both the US and Canada imposed embargoes on nuclear commerce with India.

The US, which had contracted to supply low enriched uranium fuel for Tarapur,

told India that it could not supply the fuel due its domestic laws under the nuclear

non-proliferation act. In undertaking the PNE, India had violated no agreements

with USA or Canada. Plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS

reactor was used for the PNE, but at that time both USA and USSR werethemselves carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The nuclear embargoes certainly affected adversely the execution of the Indian

nuclear power projects. They were all delayed considerably as a whole new

nuclear industrial infrastructure had to be built up in the country. During the same

period, USA working with its allies and partners, set up the nuclear suppliers

group and the restrictive supply regimes known as Wassenaar and Energy.

Many research institutions and industrial establishments in India came under the

Entities list of the US Department of Commerce. In spite of the impediments

posed by nuclear isolation, India made steady progress in building nuclear power

plants, heavy-water production plants, fuel fabrication facilities and reprocessing

facilities, in addition to wide-ranging research and development across the entire

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spectrum of nuclear sciences. In parallel, radiation technologies and isotopes

were used extensively in the fields of health, industry and agriculture.

In the 1980s, intelligence information revealed that Pakistan had advanced a

great deal in setting up a centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant. By the end of the

decade of 1980, A. Q. Khan had boasted to a few Indian journalists that Pakistan

had some nuclear weapons in its basement. The strong and ongoing

collaboration between China and Pakistan in nuclear matters was an open

secret. This situation required India to respond appropriately to secure its

national interests. It was under these circumstances that India began its

programme of weaponization.

However, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed to the special session on

disarmament of the United Nations that the NWS agree to a time-bound

programme on universal nuclear disarmament. A timetable of fifteen years was

suggested. While this proposal was welcomed by President Gorbachev of the

USSR, USA rejected this proposal outright. It then became clear to policy

makers in India that it had no option but to embark on a nuclear weapons

programme, given the ChinaPakistan nuclear axis. There was an attempt toconduct a weapons test in the mid-nineties, when Narasimha Rao was the

Prime Minister.

But this decision appears to have been countermanded reportedly under US

pressure. It was in May 1998 that India carried out its tests under the leadership

of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Later that month, Pakistan also carried

out its tests. India also announced its policy of building a credible minimum

deterrent, of no first use and a voluntary moratorium on further tests. Predictably,

sanctions followed at the initiative of the US. But it was found that the Indian

economy had become sufficiently robust and could survive the sanctions without

any discomfort. Contrary to the expectation that with India going overtly nuclear,

Indo-US relations would be damaged severely, after the lapse of a short

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interregnum, Indo-US relations entered a more mature phase based on

pragmatic considerations.

During the Clinton administration, Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh met in a

number of places around the world to work out a new architecture of Indo-US

relations, including the nuclear area. India repeatedly pointed out about the need

to enlarge its nuclear electric capacity and how it was constrained by the denial

of civilian nuclear technology. The situation from the Indian perspective

appeared unfair when China, once considered by the US as an adversary, could

access civilian nuclear technology from the West and Russia. The legal

argument that it had signed the NPT, although as a NWS, was simply a fig leaf,

in Indias view. In the TalbottSingh negotiations, according to reports, US

insisted on India putting all its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as

a precondition for resuming civilian nuclear energy cooperation.

The visit of President Clinton to India was a big publicity event with his address

to the joint session of Parliament being a crowning event, when Clinton was

mobbed by our parliamentarians. However, there were no substantive

agreements that were then signed and certainly no narrowing of the USIndianuclear differences.

Current scenario of indo-us nuclear deal

It was in this background that discussions on the nuclear issue between India

and the US were resumed under the leadership of President Bush and Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh. There were some impressive achievements in the

nuclear field in India that preceded these discussions. In the period 200005, the

nuclear power units began to operate with high capacity factors, one of them

even creating an international record. The heavy-water plants and nuclear fuel

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facilities were turning in excellent performance. The fast breeder test reactor

using Indian-developed mixed carbide fuel operated well, giving confidence to

launch the construction of the 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor in 2004. In

March 2005, unit no. 4 of the Tarapur atomic power station, Indias largest

reactor and largest single-unit generating-plant attained criticality. The time was

appropriate to launch a much larger nuclear power programme. However, there

were some constraints which are as follows:

Technical constrains:

The first related to availability of uranium in the country. As of now, India

possesses only relatively low-grade uranium ores which cost some four or five

times the international price to extract.

The total quantity available is also limited. The internationally accepted nuclear

power units have a capacity of 1000 MW or more and employ low enriched

uranium an option barred to India due to the extant rules governing nuclear

export.

Thirdly, there is an inevitable time lag before thorium can be used as a source of

energy, as a sufficient capacity of fast reactors using the plutoniumuranium

cycle have to be built before thorium can be utilized.

A parallel development at a political level was the initiative of President George

Bush to change the relationship between USA and India into a strategic one,

recognizing the commitment to democracy in India and its continuing economic

growth at 7 to 8% per annum. In this context, the role of making adequate

quantities of energy, alternative to hydrocarbons, was recognized as urgent and

important.

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The 18 July 2005 agreement noted that India was a responsible country with an

advanced nuclear programme and had an impeccable non-proliferation record.

The US undertook to change its laws to permit full civil nuclear cooperation with

India and to work with its friends and allies in the nuclear suppliers group to

make an exception in the case of India, to allow its members to engage in

nuclear trade with India.

As a reciprocal measure, India agreed to separate its civilian and military

facilities in a phased manner and to place the civilian facilities under IAEA

safeguards. For this purpose, India would negotiate an additional protocol with

the IAEA. In the agreement reached on 2 March 2006 in Delhi between India and

USA, India agreed to put fourteen of the twenty-two reactors, now in operation

and under construction, under IAEA safeguards, retaining eight reactors outside

the civilian safeguarded regime.

India also kept the fast-breeder test reactor and the prototype fast-breeder

reactor outside the safeguards regime. The fourteen reactors would be brought

under safeguards progressively by 2014. Future civilian reactors, including the

breeder-type, will be placed under IAEA safeguards. The agreement recognizes

Indias right to build new facilities committed to its security requirements. The

agreement also provides for application of IAEA safeguards on the upstream anddown-stream facilities like fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities when

handling safeguarded fuels.

Critics on indo-us civil nuclear cooperation :

India has also declared nine research facilities as civilian. The Indo-US

agreement, as negotiated on 18 July 2005 and 2 March 2006, has drawn a wide

spectrum of responses both in India and USA. We shall discuss the reactions in

India first. A number of persons who have been a part of the nuclear

stablishment have taken great interest in this matter. This is to be welcomed, as

these pioneers have formulated the past policies and worked on its

implementation. They have built up a strong nuclear technology base under

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difficult conditions. Naturally, the entire nuclear community wants to ensure that

the gains made against formidable odds are not frittered away now. One set of

these critics feel that the earlier situation of total independence of the programme

must be preserved at all costs into the indefinite future. They are prepared for a

slow growth of nuclear power for the next two or three decades and an

acceleration later, based largely on fast breeder reactors and thorium based

systems.

In this view, the freedom of the country with respect to the size and diversity of

the nuclear deterrent would be maintained fully. It is not adequately appreciated

that a small nuclear power programmes continuing for another two or three

decades may well result in a loss of interest and an eventual abandonment of the

programme. It could be argued that deploying the cream of Indias S&T

manpower on a programme of limited near-term impact was simply not in the

countrys interest.

On the other hand, Indias energy appetite is growing amidst many supplyside

constraints. First, the pressure on hydrocarbons is growing globally and India

has had to depend heavily on the politically volatile Middle East. Indian coal has

high ash content and new mine locations are mostly in areas classified asreserve forests, thus creating a conflict situation in land use. Moreover,

increasing dependence on fossil fuels is adding to the reenhouse problem. So

India has to use more of nuclear energy, hydroelectric energy and non-

conventional sources of energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The mandate of the Department of Atomic Energy is to produce increasing

quantities of nuclear energy to power the Indian economy. Thus an important

section of the nuclear community favours civil nuclear co-operation with other

nuclear dvanced countries so long as Indias credible minimum nuclear

deterrentis protected fully.

In his suo motu statement of 7 March 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

stated that: I might mention:

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(i) That the separation plan will not adversely affectour strategic programme.

There will be no capping of our strategic programme and the separation plan

ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and

future requirements of our strategic programme, based on our assessment of the

threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new

facilities for strategic purposes. The integrity of our nuclear doctrine and our

ability to sustain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent is adequately protected.

Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by the principles of restraint and

responsibility;

(ii) The separation plan does not come in the way of the integrity of our three-

stage nuclear programme, including the future use of our thorium reserves. The

autonomy of our research and development activities in the nuclear field will

remain unaffected. The fast-breeder test reactor and the prototype fast-breeder

reactor remain outside safeguards. We have agreed, however, that future civilian

thermal power reactors and civilian fast-breeder reactors would be placed under

safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision.

In an article in The Asian Age of 15 April 2006, P. K. Iyengar (former Chairman,

Atomic Energy Commission) and M. Gupta have taken strong objection to putting

a number of research facilities, including the Tata Institute of FundamentalResearch, Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics

and the Institute of Plasma Research under the civilian list. They have gone on

to say: An international license-permit raj on Indian scientific creativity will be

here to stay and the army of IAEA inspectors will invade all related public and

private sector entities, sometimes even without prior intimation. At the very least,

it would guarantee that scientists and engineers would be endlessly tied up in

bureaucratic red-tape so as to satisfy an infinite number of equerries so that very

little constructive work is actually achieved. It is necessary to recall that the

research facilities identified as civilian now, have in fact figured in the Entities

lists of the US Department of Commerce and are unable to obtain dual use

equipment, except on a case-to-case clearance basis. These restrictions are

also imposed by other supplier nations under the Wassenaar and Energy

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guidelines. By declaring them as civilian facilities, these restrictions will not

apply; nor is there any bar on these facilities collaborating freely with institutions

in other parts of the world in an unfettered manner.

The question of IAEA inspection arises only if fissile materials, namely uranium-

235, plutonium-239 or uranium-233 are in use in significant quantities or if work

is in progress on uranium enrichment or on spent fuel-reprocessing or if activities

involving weapons research are undertaken. None of the nine listed facilities

have been involved in these activities in the past nor will they be so involved in

the future. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic

Research,Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology and other strategic

facilities are outside the list of facilities accessible to IAEA inspection.

While in the early stages of the programme, the civilian and strategic activities

were taken up in the same premises, this is no longer the situation. Also using

dedicated S&T personnel and technicians for strategic activities is a reality now

and does not in any way weaken this effort. So the concerns expressed by

Iyengar are grossly exaggerated and do not have any basis in reality. So far as

the strategic community is concerned, the response indeed covers a widespectrum. A number of them with a strong media presence, have stressed the

importance of an emerging strategic relationship between India and USA. They

have been critical and impatient about the rigidity of the nuclear establishment

during the negotiations and have, unfairly in my view, accused the latter of

derailing the agreement.

There is another segment of the strategic community at the other end, which

wants the present totally autonomous, some say, autarchic position on

independence of Indias nuclear policy to continue. They would pitch for a large

nuclear arsenal and matching missile capabilities. The sober middle ground finds

a larger measure of support. They agree that it is good for India to end nuclear

isolation and use civil nuclear cooperation with other advanced countries to

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rapidly increase nuclear power capacity, without compromising on the nuclear

deterrence or the freedom to pursue the three-stage programme, including

thorium utilization.

Political aspect of n-deal :

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her testimony to the US Congress on

5 April 2006, has strongly supported this agreement and urged the support of the

United States Senate. Rice has argued that the agreement is good for America

as also for India. President Bush said in New Delhi: India in the 21st Century is a

natural partner of the United States because we are partners in the cause of

human liberty. Rice elaborated this point and said, It (India) is a vibrant,

multiethnic, multi-religious democracy characterized by individual freedom, the

rule of law, and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and fair

elections. She also went on to recognize that India is a rising global power and a

pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia. She forecasted that by 2025, India

will most likely rank among the worlds five largest economies.

Since a large part of Indias civil nuclear facilities will be open to IAEA inspection,

the agreement is seen as a gain to the pursuit of nonproliferation, with India

becoming a full partner in achieving this objective. Rice stressed that the nuclear

agreement was a key element of the growing strategic partnership between the

US and India and that the two countries would cooperate in many areas to

mutual benefit. She opined that if the agreement did not go through, all the

hostility and suspicions would be doubled. India and the US would then continue

to be estranged democracies.

In the testimony, Indias needs for energy to sustain high rates of economic

growth have been noted and the importance of measures to reduce dependence

on hydrocarbons (especially from volatile regions of the world) and equally to

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reduce greenhouse gases has been stressed. Certain suggestions made from

the US in the past few weeks, however, have caused concern in India. There has

been a suggestion that India define the size of its credible minimum deterrent.

India has rightly refused to do so, as none of the other nuclear weapon powers

have done so.

Moreover, the Indian Parliament itself is fiercely protecting the pursuit of

economic development and is not known to support jingoistic proposals for

acquisition of military might for its own sake. A second suggestion has been

made to include a provision for fore-swearing future nuclear weapon tests in the

bilateral agreement between India and the US. This suggestion is also not

acceptable to India, which has reiterated its voluntary moratorium on future tests.

However, a new situation would arise if some other states, especially in Indias

neighborhood were to undertake a test in future.

Regarding the fissile material cut-off treaty, India has stated that it will join

negotiations with other countries, in good faith, in the conference on

disarmament; however, this matter was not a bilateral issue between India and

the US. India continues to support universal nuclear disarmament, whenever theglobal community is ready for it. As Rice told the US Senate, the agreement in its

present form should go through, as renegotiation would just not be possible. As

of the time of writing (May 2006), it is not clear when and in what manner the US

Congress will approve the agreement.

If it is approved in its present form, India will benefit from civil nuclear

cooperation and expand the nuclear energy base rapidly. Isolation in the nuclear

field, imposed on India in unnatural circumstances, will end. India can then

participate fully in international developments leading to global energy security. If

the initiative were to fail because of unacceptable conditions that the US

Congress may impose, then India will continue its autonomous nuclear energy

programme, even if in the near term, the growth of nuclear energy may be slow.

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The relationship between India and the US may grow in other areas but it is

unlikely that a fully grown, mature relationship will emerge. So the stakes are

high both for India and the US, and it is hoped that the US Congress will take a

balanced and mature view.

TO HAVE MORE ELABORATED IDEA LETS HAVE GLANCE AT OUR

POWER SECTOR

Power Sector at a Glance "ALL INDIA" 27th Oct , 2006

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1.Total Installed Capacity:Power for All by 2012

Sector MW %age

State Sector 70,569 55.3

Central Sector 41,673 32.6

Private Sector 15,431 12.1

Total 1,27,673

Fuel MW %age

Total Thermal 83,982 65.8

Coa

l

69,198 54.2

Gas 13,582 10.6

Oil 1,202 0.09

Hydro 33,600 26.3

Nuclear 3,900 3.1

Renewable 6,191 4.9

Total 1,27673

[Pl.Dn.]

2.High Voltage Transmission Capacity:

Capacity MVA Circuit KM

765/800 KV -- 1,774

400 KV 87,387 70,295

220 KV 1,48,977 1,10,707

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HVDC 3,000 5,872

[Trans.Dn]

3.Per Capita Consumption of Electricity:

(Year 2004-05) 606 KWH / Year

[Pl. Dn.]

4.Rural Electrification:

No. of Villages (Census 1991)

Villages Electrified (30th May

2006)

Electrification %age

593,732

439,502

74%

Rural Households (Census 2001)

Having access

Electrification %age

138,271,559

60,180,685

44%

[RE. Dn.]

5.Power Situation: (April 2006-September 2006)

Demand Met Surplus/

Deficit

Energy 334,330 MU 307,537 MU -8.0 %

Peak Demand 95,583 MW 83,933 MW -12.2 %

[OM Dn.]

MW: Mega Watt

MVA: Mega Volt Ampere

MU:Million Unit

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Power Generation In India

The total Installed capacity as on 31st Jul 06 is as follows:-

Mode of Capacity

Generation ( in MW) Load Factor Percentage

Thermal 83,772 65% 66.50%

Hydro 32,976 On water storage 26.65%

Gas 13,582 Very high, but 10.7%

Gas shortage

Oil 1202 NA 0.95%

Nuclear 3900 40% 3.07%

Renewable 6191 20 % 4.88%

Total Generation is 1,26,839 MW as on 31st Jul 2006.

Average Load Shortage is 8.7%

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Peak Load Shortage is -12.8%

The existing data is in favour of Thermal Generation as on to date.

Let me take each sector and discuss in detail:

Thermal: Coal available in India, is of extremely low grade, with ash content

of over 40%, most of the coal for our plants is imported from Australia. The

performance of Thermal plants is more or less based on capacity and vintage.

Most of the 100 /110 MW plants are operating at 20 to 22% load factor, and have

outlived their service life. The 220MW & 500 MW plants are operating with very

high load factor, similarly, plants operating in UP & Bihar, irrespective of vintage,

have much lower efficiency, than say, Andhra Pradesh.The last technology

partnership BHEL had with Semens,germany, ensured mastering of

technology for 500 MW generators

The world has moved over to most efficient generators based on Super critical

thermal plant technology, with 660 MW capacity as the standard, this technology

ensures a conversion ration as high as 60% as compared to 45% of conventional

thermal plants. . The super critical thermal plants reduce the cost of generationby whopping 15 to 20%. However, till date no single plant has been built on this

technology in India for various reasons including costs of erection. The question

of Co2 emissions is also some thing we need to bother.

Hydro: Though the installed capacity is large, actual power production is

fluctuating for want of stored water. Only in 2005, record Hydel power has been

generated, thanks to the max storage levels for over 5 months. The cost of

electricity produced is very low for depreciated plants like Nagarjuna Sagar Dam,

it works out to be just 32 paise per unit. However, it was only in 2005, Nagarjuna

Sagar had complete storage for 6 months, thanks to floods in Maharastra &

Karnataka. With environmentalists being over active, two major multipurpose

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dams are getting delayed, thereby, enhancing the carrying costs of the project.

Therefore, the cost of production of electricity is going to be very high.

Gas : The gas based plants are the fastest to come up, however, they are worst

hit on account of perennial shortage of gas as well as fluctuating costs. The gas

finds in various parts of the country has not given enough confidence for any one

to dare and set up plants. All those who announced large-scale plants have

quietly buried them. The Gas find in Krishna basin is a hope, provided we are

able to harness it, very few countries know, how to handle very high pressure

source, this place has gas pockets with pressure over 10,000 Psi .

Renewable

The renewable energy scenario was boosted by the government scheme

of allowing 100% depreciation in first year it self for Wind turbines, the installed

capacity of Wind turbines is 5th largest in the world. However, the efficiency of the

plants is around 20 to 22%. The corridors having good winds have been

saturated and still whatever potential is left, is being exploited. A technological

revolution can change the scenario, rather than finding new corridors withperineal winds. The installation cost per MW of Wind Turbine works out to be Rs

4 to 4.5 crores.The cost per unit of power from solar power works out to be Rs

11/-.down from Rs 15/- few months back, still its, too expensive to be consider

on large scale.

Nuclear

The installed capacity and the power load factor indicate a different story. The

whole debate of Indo US Nuclear deal will be a silly talk, considering the

installed capacity of the Nuclear power plants in India of 3900MW and the load

factor of 40% of capacity. The reasons vary from technical shortcomings to

shortage of fuel.

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Essentially, the Nuclear establishment in India has met the national

objective of :

Making India a Nuclear weapon statea

Ensured continuous R&D, despite complete isolation in the world.

Developed to some extent successfully indigenous Nuclear fuel.

Developed alternate proto type reactors, with our own design including

fast breeder under construction at Kalpak am.

If we analyze our Nuclear establishments, we can carefully conclude:

Only a imaginary line separating its civilian & military establishments.

Been isolated for too long from the world, to know the actual changes

taking place.

The Power sector much beyond the schedule time frame, the ambitionof10,000 MW of power never meet the goal.

Hard Reality

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The needs for stable reliable power supply, for the growth of other sectors of

the economy, cannot be over looked for too long, in the name of self reliance,

and at the same time gains of Indigenisation cannot be withered away by a deal.

All short term means of producing power have proved too expensive on long

terms, see ,what's happening in Dhabol. The fuel prices may stabilize to 80 to

100 Dollars in medium to long term , therefore generation will become highly

expensive , we know the politics of Iranian Gas pipeline, simillarly, cost of

imported coal may one day, make the thermal power costly and highly

inefficient.

Iran & Oman have pledged us Gas, however, with rising prices,they have gone

back on accords, reached earlier, and have since asked for re-negotiations.

Bangladesh has Gas reserves in Chitagong tracks, but politically, no formation in

bangladesh has seen the economic benefits in sharing it with India. The

proposed Iranian pipeline will remain a pipe dream with so many uncertainties of

the region and lack of international guarantee of supply at fair price.

Global Scenario on Nuclear Power.

The 17 % of worlds power needs are meet by 442 Nuclear plants all over the

world, if we consider the complete energy basket, the break up of fuel source is

as follows:-

Fossil Fuels 85.96%

Nuclear 8.13%

Renewable 6.06 %

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Break up Nation Wise Nuclear Power

US have 103 Nuclear plants producing 78,020 MW of power, which is

approximately 20 % of its power needs.

France has 56 Nuclear plants meeting 76% of power needs, mostly on

technology of American pressurized light water plants.

Japan has 53 Nuclear plants generating 42,369 MW of power.

K has 16 plants, meeting 20 % of power requirements.

China has 31 operating plants with installed capacity of 21,743 MW and

adding two 1000MW of Nuclear plants every year till it achieves 23% of

the total power requirements.

Similarly Germany & Russia have a large portion of power coming from

Nuclear plants.

The largest single Nuclear power reactor is under construction in Finland,

its capacity is 1600 MW.

Inference

Looking at the prospects and the reality, Its hard to discount Nuclear power as

an option.

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The Nuclear power plants have long gestation periods, but remain in service for

more than 40 years, the cost of power of depreciated plants will be very low and

for new plants, it will be comparable with thermal plants.

The World's Major Disasters

On 26th Apr 1986, Chernobyl Nuclear stations unit 4, a 1000 MW plant had a

blast, which lead to exposure of radiations in the atmosphere, across long

distances.

The accident was caused by an experiment conducted by Electrical Engineers

with no knowledge on Nuclear physics, they were interested in drawing electricity

from the generator when no longer driven by the reactor, but spinning inertially.

They carried out rapid loading & unloading operations, to save time, as the

planed experiment was delayed by few hours by a heavy demand of power for

few hours, therefore, these men did rapid unloading, when the instability set in

put sudden loads leading to a cycle of instability and failure of cooling pumps. It

was all about negligent operations; the pressures build up let to the throwing up.

The pressures built up were 150 times what is permitted. The completeexperiment defies the Nuclear physics.

On 28th Mar 1979,Unit 2 of Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania, had

partial melting of core, most of the radioactivity was captured with in containment

building, however, some radioactive material escaped into atmosphere. The fault

was again attributed to the operators, for not knowing the operations connecting

to safety. It also exposed the study conducted by probability risk assessment

team, which predicted an accident once in every 1,000,000 reactoryears of

operation, but it happened with in 17,000 reactor-year of operation. This single

incident was good enough for US to stop licensing new plants.

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Understand the policy is being reviewed due to changing scenario of world fossil

fuels, especially the price of crude oil shooting the roof. Two new nuclear pants

are going to be licensed soon.

Despite the above incidents, Nuclear power is much safer; the question of the

fuels reaching critical mass for atomic explosion is just not possible as the fissile

material used for initiation of chain reaction is enriched just to 4 to 5% and the

equired mass is also not available. To make a nuclear device, the plutonium 239

has to be more than 93% enriched to sustain chain reaction.

What we need to do:

Look pragmatically the options open to us through the deal.

Safeguard the Fast breeder program of indigenous experimental reactor

of 500 MW at Kalpakam from international scrutiny.

Insulate, our Nuclear establishments for the gains we had on strategicfront.

Launch massive projects of say Rs 2, 00,000 Lac Crores for power

generation through Nuclear power plants over a period of 10 years, as we

have done for golden quadrilateral project.

America needs as much as we need them, its a pure economic need of

us, and for US, its the pressure from companies like GE, who are

supposed to be pioneers, loosing out on expertise as well as on markets.

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Mr George Bush is the best bet, we need to force a decision before the term of

congress expires, its open secret that next congress will be Democrat

dominated, and for reasons un-know, they are for non-proliferation regime.

Russia & France are waiting in the wings to sell their plants.

Let our Nuclear establishments work concentrated towards developing hybrid

reactor with Thorium as primary fuel. We all know the advantage of Thorium as

fuel , it can be easily converted to fissile material U 233, hence like U238 is fertile

and better than U235 & Plutonium 239 as fissile material. Slow bombardment of

Th 232 with neutrons will produce U 233 and has higher Neutron yield. The fuel

for hybrid breeder essentially will consists of 20% enriched central/ inner seed

and the blanket of Thorium232 & U238.

India and Australia have half of worlds Thorium deposits ready to be exploited.

The most conservative estimate says, the deposit, will last for 2500 years.

The Scientific community fears stoppage of funds once commercial Nuclear

power plants are constructed. The fear is genuine and need to be addressed asa national policy, to continue our march for self-reliance.

The Scientific community should also realize, whatever they know now on

technology front,was based on knowledge gained out of old projects with

Canada & America, perhaps long time back. The new technology will help over

come technological gaps, and who knows, one day, India will be the worlds

source for trained manpower for running Nuclear establishments.

I have deliberately avoided discussing politics; The aim of the twin papers is for

the readers to know the facts on the ground.

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Conclusion

We in India have little option but to grab the offer, looking at bleak power

scenario considering future growth of our economy at 8%.

Enough countries are waiting in the wing to supply power plants, with

open credit lines.

India to safe guard its R& D and Military establishments on Nuclear

energy( we have achieved success in this field)

We need not worry to much about unilateral moratorium, if we are

economically strong we can break it at will and still no one will complain.

Might is always right, goes with out saying.

We can be worlds manpower source for operating nuclear plants.

The experimental 500MW plant at Kalpakam to be shielded from

inspection, as it can be potential winner.

Hurry up the legislation in US congress, as George Bush is over best bet.

Need to take up new Nuclear projects at the scale of China to meet 20%

of power needs by 2020 AD

And stop politics on national issues concerning common good

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References:

www.pbs.org

www.uic.com

www.chinadaily.com

www.antiwar.com

www.thehindubusinessline.com

Articles by Sidharth Vardharajan

Articles by Prafful Bidwai

www.world.nuclear.org

www.statindia.com

www.rediff.com

Indian Statistical Institute data

Min of power data

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http://www.pbs.org/http://www.uic.com/http://www.chinadaily.com/http://www.antiwar.com/http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/http://www.world.nuclear.org/http://www.statindia.com/http://www.rediff.com/http://www.pbs.org/http://www.uic.com/http://www.chinadaily.com/http://www.antiwar.com/http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/http://www.world.nuclear.org/http://www.statindia.com/http://www.rediff.com/


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Glossary

NPT: Non-proliferation treaty

It was initiative of USA,UK and USSR. The NPT defined a cutoff date of 1

January 1967 and recognized those countries which had carried out a nuclear

test prior to that date as nuclear weapon states (NWS), and all other countries as

non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

NWS: nuclear weapon states

USA, USSR, UK, France and china

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Association

NSG: Nuclear supplier group

A Project Report on IndoUS Nuclear Deal(IR)

Documents