A problematics of belief structures and the creation of the concept of the self

Martin Hogan A Problematics of Belief Structures and the Creation of the Concept of the Self

A Problematics of Belief Structures and the Creation of the Concept of the Self

Author: Martin Hogan

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GLOSSARY

CHAPTER 1 – THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAN, GOD AND SELF

CHAPTER 2 – GODS AND THE SELF IN HOMERIC LITERATURE

CHAPTER 3 – SELF GOD AND OTHER IN EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

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GLOSSARY

Belief Structure ( also Harmony) :

Why a structure and not a system? A sytem implies for a given input there is a

predicatble output; that by living in a certain way, we will achive a known result.

This is not the case with religion, one's behaviour will not of itself grant access to

heaven or any rewards (heaven, rain, a child, a prosperous and contented life &c),

which are in the end at the choice of God.

Whilst one can believe ‘in’ something, it is not a thing in isolation and as such is an

incorrect statement, lacking as it does details of the referents. Humans work with

structures and it is naïve to think that, or to claim that any one part of human life

exists apart from and not connected to other aspects of life. Belief itself is a very

complex and involved notion, such that many books have and will be written on it, as

any cursory survey of a library will show; hundreds of books pertaining to

developments of the referent of belief but little attempting to create an ontology. The

term ‘Belief Structure’ is not a definition of a thing but the acceptance that a

definition of a thing that, inne ipse does not exist; rather, that is, belief is a concept of

(belief in…; belief of…). To enter into a discourse is to create a referential dynamics

and, as such, this cannot be considered as simply a consideration of an ontological and

epistemological dichotomy.

Instead, we have a matrix of involvement that does not defy definition but rather leads

us to multiple and complex definitions, definitions of things that lead us to further

examination of topics and away from our starting point. A Belief Structure then is not

an edifice, within which a particular branch of human knowledge resides, it is not

some embracing concept that holds specific and defined pieces of a complex jigsaw, it

is an admittance that there is a question of relationships that has not been explained

because it lies buried within other branches of knowledge, or perhaps hidden in a pre-

history and certainly obscured by the works of philosophers, psychiatrists and

politicians of the past thousands of years. As with Foucault in this ‘Archaeology of

Knowledge’1, it is easier here to define what is not being said than what is.

1

Foucault, M, Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock, 1972

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There is not point at which I can claim definitively that ‘A caused or resulted in B’,

only that there is some connection between the two events. Nor can I claim that ‘a

nation believes or believed’, any more than I can claim that ‘my family believe’, for

all such statements are general but it is only by making such general statements that

one can then place it within a context and move on to that which is more specific.

The Belief Structure is dynamic and to paraphrase Heraclitus, one cannot expect to

step into the same place twice and have an identical occurrence.

The purpose of this work is to identify the relationship between belief and the self,

from its beginnings in early Greek literature, not to re-analyse a definition of either

belief or of the self; as such a belief structure is a definition of human perspective and

interpretation. It is a description of a thing in flux and as such it is up to the reader to

interpret and question the relationships within a ‘Belief structure’ and to identify its

constituent referents. When the question is raised ‘what about…’; one must come

back to the Belief Structure’ and place the missing pieces as part of the structure still

to be explored and developed.

References to two types of Belief Structure will be made: hominem interallum reder

(Man in the process of reverting) and hominem reputare (Man reflecting back [to its

self]).

i) Hominem Interallum reder (or Vedanta) is a Belief Structure that is referential

to external events and factors. Man is aware that all actions have affects upon

and are affected by external events and its Belief Structures are formulated in

such a way as to attempt to articulate the connections between events (that

which is Human, Natural, Animal, etc.). That which is referential to the

external incorporates its interpretation within its Self, rationalising a circular

continuity of thought and action, creating a striving to maintain a status quo.

ii) Hominem reputare (Karma) is a Belief Structure that is referential to the Self

in the first instance. Man acts upon the world through its Self. Its motive

relies upon its personal requirements and the satisfaction of its own needs and

desires; its primary motive is Self fulfilment. Its interpretation of events lies

within the temporal, exploring contextualities that exist within the domains of

the human experience and can be referenced back through that which is

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primarily human before that which is divine. It is this second group to which

modern man belongs and the creation of this group is defined within the first

part of the work. The implications of this development is explored in the later

sections.

Deity:

The Oxford English Dictionary definition is:

pl. deities) a god or goddess (in a polytheistic religion): a deity of ancient Greece.

• [mass noun] divine status, quality, or nature: a ruler driven by delusions of deity.

• ( usu. the Deity ) the creator and supreme being (in a monotheistic religion such as

Christianity).

- ORIGIN Middle English (denoting the divine nature of God): from Old French deite,

from ecclesiastical Latin deitas (translating Greek theot s), from deus ‘god’.2

That which is other than temporal (that is, not merely or only temporal but also a

stage removed from the temporal); the longevity (even if persisting within a plant or

other animal, it will possess some existence before or after [or both] of that entity that

it occupies) of a deity is considerably greater than that of the human, it belongs to that

which is other, beyond the temporal human existence and form. It is that in which

humans believe but it is not all that is believed and it is for this reason that a Deity

does not comprise a Belief Structure but only a part of it. To this we must add social,

political, environmental and other factors and understand the relationships of the

various referents if we are to begin to understand the structure. The definitions

contained within the OED are sufficient for this Glossary and for an understanding of

this dissertation.

Harmony ( also see Belief Structure):

There is an etymological link between harmony and structure, but if we use the word

‘harmony’, or the interpretation of ‘world-view’, we will miss the difference – that a

structure does not of necessity possess a specific and unalterable form, and what has

been defined in a specific way and accepted, need not necessarily be so now or

previously. The form remains formless, the understanding linked to each component

2 Oxford English Dictionary Online: http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e19797

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but still not dependent upon the shape or form of any particular one, although

dependent upon their presence in some form or other.

Referent:

That to which one refers when expounding or explaining a stance; unlike the

reflexive, the referent is not a binary relationship, nor one of equals. The referent

makes up the complex of links and relationships that comprise a Belief Structure and

can be different for different individuals or indeed, can be different for the same

individual at different times. From the position of us – from the standpoint of that

which is human – there is no certainty for the future or for the past, only of

possibilities and ‘the likely hood of…’ and the degree of certainty lies within our

understanding of the relevant referents and of their complexities.

Self:

The OED sociological definition is perhaps more suitable to this work:

self, the self In sociology, the concept of self is most frequently held to derive from

the philosophies of Charles Horton Cooley, William James, and George Herbert

Mead, and is the foundation of symbolic interactionism. It highlights the reflective

and reflexive ability of human beings to take themselves as objects of their own

thought. For Mead, ‘it is the self that makes the distinctively human society possible’

(see Mind, Self and Society, 1934). In this work, a distinction is usually drawn

between two phases of the self process: the ‘I’, which is spontaneous, inner, creative,

and subjective; and the ‘Me’, which is the organized attitudes of others, connects to

the wider society, is more social and determined. The ‘Me’ is often called the self-

concept—how people see themselves through the eyes of others—and is much more

amenable to study. The self evolves through communication and symbols, the child

becoming increasingly capable of taking the role of others. Mead's discussion

highlights this growth through the ‘play’, ‘game’, ‘and generalized other’ stages. The

generalized other refers to the organized attitudes of the whole community, enabling

people thereby to incorporate a sense of the overarching community values into their

conception of self.3

3 Oxford English Dictionary Online: http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e2031

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http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/?subview=Main&entry=t88.e2290&category=







The self can be a noun or an adjective, here it is better to think of it as a collective

noun, even as an adverb, a critical internal referent to a Belief Structure. The self

identifies a relationship between one human and another, it identifies that which is

human; it identifies that which belongs to a group. More specifically here, it is used to

delineate the difficult to define and understand ground between that which is modern

(The Self) and the creation of a concept of the self, centred around that which is

human, all that which is too human, within the Greek consciousness.

The self is not taken as something a priori, as it has been in the works that deal

specifically with the Greek Tragedies, or Roman and Middle Eastern history. This

begins with a suggestion of a definition for the self, which precedes the philosophical

and historical definitions of the Greek and Roman care of the self outlined in Michel

Foucault’s work on that period of history. The creation of a concept of the self, or the

articulation of a care of the self, as we find in Greek and Roman literature is of great

significance and it is also significant that there is an absence of an analysis of the

creation or imposition of the radically different referent that was their understanding

of the self.

Whilst we often consider the self as the individual, it must be borne in mind that it can

mean the one or the many. To quote from Genesis:

You whose names is Jacob,

You shall be called Jacob no more,

But Israel shall be your name.4

It itself, this can be seen as the renaming of an individual but as any knowledge of the

Bible and of history will remind us, the term ‘Israel’ is used for an individual, for a

group, for a nation. This context should be borne in mind throughout this work.

4 Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures, JPS, 1985, pg. 55

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A Problematics of Belief Structures and the Creation of the Concept of the Self

An Introductory Note

Ideally, one would begin an investigation into the relation of belief and the self with

an analysis of the relation within a known Christian/European context. To do this

would be to compare developments that showed a divergence (as for example

between Catholicism and Protestantism) and at a later stage this will be discussed.

Initially however, I wish to explain the origins of the European understanding of

belief and the self, to map out some ground-rules and to define the area under

discussion – belief, structure and self are all topics potentially worthy of their own

discussions even now. For these reasons, this work will come under the heading of

theological philosophy and politics, whilst still utilising tools from anthropology and

sociology, as well as history and other areas of the social sciences. It is difficult to

define the tools used within a project when the definitions currently being used make

no sense to the period and conditions under consideration. To create a concept of a

belief structure within the early Greek period, it is not possible to divide their

behaviour into post-Enlightenment discussions, rather we must re-visit ideas of what

was being done and what was achieved, without direct reference to currently

utilitarianism – direct references to Christianity, for example, cloud the issues raised

within a culture that did not have a monotheistic culture, which did not directly argue

about religion, which did not have a form of social government that would be

acceptable now, and so forth.

The origins of the modern European and Christian ideas of the self can be traced back

to the Greek era, from which the European culture charts its rise. Whilst the Christian

Belief’ itself belongs to the Levant, the associated structure has links with the Roman

and, through that, the Greek world-view. Whilst the theology of the Judaeo-Christian

Bible is of Levant origin, the earliest texts (for both the Christian and Hebrew texts)

are in Greek, the traditional political home of the Christian Church is Rome (although

finally settled upon at a late date, the argument was between Roman cities – Rome

itself and Constantinople)5. I begin with an outline of different approaches to the

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origins of belief and the purposes of belief for the human condition. Whatever model

is followed, it will inevitably be defined as ‘belonging to’ a specific school but this is

an outline of models that can be contained within structures, not a rigid definition –

even a rigid structure has flexibility within its confines – to overuse the required

metaphor. Politics, time and geography remain variables throughout and in this sense;

the concept of a belief structure is dynamic. Any definition of the term will hence

remain not complete because it will change over time. Here I will concentrate upon

some main themes. The definition must of necessity contain references to what is not

included as this is, as it were, the outer perimeter of the definition and it is more

sensible to explain what is not there because of the variability of some terms that are

there but are not clearly delineated at this stage.

God and Gods?

Here we are concerned with the relation of belief. That there is a thing(s) in which

one believes, for which one has a belief or a thing(s) which incorporate a belief is

taken as given. Belief is a palpable part of existence, something that everyone has

and everyone can speak on. At the outset then, we must refrain from adding any

descriptions to the noun. Belief sits at the centre of this work, what is being

investigated is the relation of the human and the Deity to belief.

These questions will not be asked in any form because within the context of a

problematics, the existence or otherwise of a deity is not relevant, in that it is already

take as intrinsic to the subject. There are a variety of things that cannot be seen but

are discerned through their affects; gravity, sound, magnetism, motion, a painting or

other representation of… and so on. Without actually seeing something, we know it

is there by the affect it produces. So too there is the concept of belief. A belief

requires a root or a definition, which lies beyond the scope of this introduction, so this

is an attempt to outline the basic structures used to articulate a belief. The question of

God(s) cannot be ignored however because as soon as one speaks of belief, it is

common to enter into a discourse upon a Deity, even for those who profess to not

believe. Already, there is a conflict of definition as we find ourselves instantly

The use of the Greek language to record these texts was at the instigation of the library at Alexandria, under the control of the Ptolemy’s, thereby completing the embracement of the Greek presence, even during the waning days of their power.

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entering into a debate of what does or does not exist, instead of concentrating upon

the interaction of elements of human existence that constitute belief and it is this

conflict and interaction of events that has led me to use the term ‘Belief Structure’, not

simply ‘belief’.

In many parts of the world, the question of one’s religion is as much a subject of

political interference as is one’s ethnicity and to such a degree that questions relating

to sex, religion, nationality, colour and sexual orientation are gathered by many

organisations attempting to monitor their employment policies or usage of their

services within a community. In England, to not have a religion was impossible until

the 1980’s, where the options of ‘atheist’ or ‘none’ were not included on the data

collection forms. Even though there has been a long standing political and social

problematisation of religion, not least concerning the division of church and state,

English institutions such as the police, military and health services, have by default

labelled their members as Church of England and as such are by default sectarian;

presupposing a belief and imposing the same through their own structures; here again,

belief is centred around a Deity and again we must move back from this and

incorporate the notion of Deity within the socio-political and communal context of

belief. In order to understand something deeply rooted in the European way of life

(indeed, all human), we must constantly bear in mind what we are not saying and

what we are not talking about as much as what we are saying – the separation of types

of belief structure are is what is identified in the first section and to identify this, we

must go back beyond Christianity; using references to more recent times to help

identify events but not to make direct comparisons.

To not believe in God does not end the debate however. One does not believe in God

‘because…’ or one does not believe in God ‘but in …’ Debate is not precluded but

exacerbated by the claim that one does not believe in God, for there is still a feeling of

a need to define a belief in something. This is to confuse cause and effect however.

The pejorative ‘you must believe in something…?’ often imputes a causal ontology,

with the relationship between Man6 and its belief poorly defined; does a belief

comfort Man giving succour a posteriori, helping to justify whatever decisions have

6 Man is used as a proper noun throughout to denote the species genera and is described with the pronoun of third person singular.

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been made and actions taken? The question of belief remains central then. There is a

clear socio-political disjunction of definition that lies beyond the scientific dictionary

definitions of ‘belief’ and ‘faith’ and it is in defining this that the term ‘Belief

Structure’ is used. The definition of a concept lies within other concepts and a

thorough understanding of the interrelation of the subject matter, it is not a singular

event or idea7. Whether one is discussing religious, political, social, economic,

sporting or other issues, the question of ethics and one’s personal commitment to a

cause will be raised – how should one conduct one’s self – and beneath this lies the

question of belief: The structures by which one is justified or with which one seeks to

justify8.

The question of the existence of one or more deities is disputed (even if this concept is

as difficult to conceive as the concepts of theoretical astrophysics), what is not

disputed is that Man has a concept of Deity and, if lacking a belief in what can be

defined as a Deity, a belief in something other, something else. The comment

‘Neither history nor anthropology knows of societies from which religion has been

totally absent’9 has been repeated since the earliest writings and is still true, begging

the question of why and how a (Belief Structure rather than something complex or

advanced as a religion) such a thing would com about. All investigations into a

reality, into that which is will seem causal, determinative or creationist without this

being the case. Once a series of events begins, it can be described but not halted and

whilst there are a number of sentient decision and choices, it is not possible to guess

at or explore them all.

7 As well as the dictionary definitions of belief that are given in Appendix A, a religious definition must include the experience of belief, of the transcendence of the ‘otherness’ and beyond the mundane, Belief acts as a mental fulcrum to attain a state / condition of acceptance.8 The relationship analysed here is that between Man, its Self and God. The relationship from God to Man is one of omnipotent creation and as such it is not subject to alteration or change. Whilst God has free will in having created the world, the continued existence of Man can only be understood through a reference beginning with Man; to begin otherwise would be to presume the Will of God.9 Rappaport, R A – The Sacred in Human Evolution (Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 2:23-44) (1971). http://www.jstor.org/journals/00664162.html. The full sentence reads: ‘Neither history nor anthropology knows of societies from which religion has been totally absent, and even those modern states that have attempted to abolish religion have replaced it with beliefs and practices which themselves seem religious.’ The piece goes on to quote Romer’s Rule from Hockett, C F and Ascher, R (‘The Human Evolution’ Current Anthropology, 1964. 5:135-68): ‘The initial survival value of a favourable innovation is conservative, in that it renders possible the maintenance of a traditional way of life in the face of changed circumstances.’ Whilst the arguments put forward are in line with the definitions of this introduction, the conclusions drawn from them are not, as will become clear in due course.

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http://www.jstor.org/journals/00664162.html


Here then will follow definitions of terms and ideas used to identify what a Belief

Structure is within the parameters of the thesis. In anthropological terms, the point

can be shown by what is not said in the introduction of ‘In Pursuit of Gender’, where

the difficulty of defining gender amongst the contributors was discussed at length

because whilst in some cultures the idea of two genders and clearly differentiated

gender roles was accepted, in others (see also Hidden from History and other works),

it is not. A further point within the question of sexual orientation concerns tolerance

and how and if a society with a monofuctional sexuality can exist within or create a

multi-faceted society; aspects of the use and functions of power and control will be

considered later.10

The Purpose of God / The Purpose of Gods / The Purpose of Man 11

The existence or non-existence of God/s is not a part of the argument outlined here

but the relationships between them has significant repercussions.

To deal with the question of which created which: Again, this leads to an enquiry

upon the existence or non-existence of Deity/ies and as such is not relevant. The

question being posited here is: As Man has a concept of Deity, where could this have

come from and what purpose could such a concept serve – either for the Deity or for

Nature? It must be stressed that although an evolutionary approach (which has

become a normal mode of scientific investigation) is adopted within this section, it in

no way negates the possibility of the existence of a Deity/ies to be discussed later; this

is merely a section of definitions of tools to be used later. An argument that Man does

not have a past outside of the Judeo-Christian or other text is not rejected. Put simply:

there is a stratum of knowledge available to Man and some have chosen to use it,

others have not. To help define the terms used, I have decided to approach these

10 Having questioned the definition and concept of gender, a discourse around the problematics has been created. The absence of such a discourse for the codification and political assimilation of Belief Structures within the social construct of an age of understanding of the functions that lead on to redefinitions of religion and that shift the points of reference and self reference indicate that the set of epistemological, metaphysical, historiographical and historiological questions posited of sexuality (politics, sport and so on) have not been applied to the ontological concept of Belief Structures.11 Purpose should not be taken in a dogmatic sense but as a pejorative, as a question dealing with the relationship between those concerned. There is no necessary derivative or any necessary deterministic, ‘Darwinian’ interpolation intended to be drawn.

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arguments at the more fruitful starting point, then to extrapolate and interpret these

terms upon Greek and early Christian Belief Structures. If we are not to cast aside all

other religions than our own as ‘overtly wrong and pointless’, we must attempt to find

suitable ontological grounds and terms with which to define a genealogy of Belief

Structures.

As has been hinted at, the Belief Structure for Man lies at the root, it is a structurally

ontological reference point by which Man establishes a link between that which is

Man and that which is not Man, a point through which the thought processes of Man

must pass if it is to manipulate its environment.

On Nature

Why Darwin? The name of Darwin is synonymous with the thoughts of the twentieth

century. Whenever we speak of ‘development’ or ‘progress’, we become involved in

a debate that includes Darwin and, even though he contributed very little to the debate

on religion and society, his name is still very much associated with the subjects

because of the usurpation of his ideas into ‘Social Darwinism’ and the very notion of

the ‘progress’ and the ‘evolution of ideas’. To use the name of Darwin here is not to

simply quote him but to use his name within a context in which it has come to be

readily used even if not correctly understood. This then is a discussion of the

relevance of ‘interpretations of Darwin within the context of belief’ and how that

relates to this thesis.

As soon as we begin to speak of the Greeks, we also begin to speak of the

‘development’ of ideas, of progress, of the ‘evolution’ of concepts of philosophy,

history, art, politics; we begin to trace the ‘progress’ of these topics through from the

pre-Socratic to the post-Alexandrian world that was Greece, tracing hundreds of years

and thousands of square kilometres as though it were a single entity. These concepts

cannot be ignored, so here is an outline of what the implications of ‘Darwinianism’ is

within the context of this thesis.

From a Darwinian perspective, the concept of God in itself does not seem to serve any

specific function (the article by Rappaport cited above describes religion as a

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‘cybernetic’ or ‘information’ function.). In ‘The Descent of Man’ (pg. 612), Darwin

states that ‘…a belief in all pervading spiritual agencies seems to be universal…The

idea of a universal and beneficent Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man,

until he has been altered by long-conditioned culture.’ Darwin attributes a belief

structure to Man as an all but universal attribute but then subjectifies the statement by

codifying monotheism as a cultural improvement. As with the existence or otherwise

of a Deity, the quantity is also not relevant to this inquiry, what is significant is that

there seems to be ‘a belief in all pervading spiritual agencies’. The decision to

worship a multiplicity or a singularity of Deities seems more a socio-political choice

than a strictly biological-Darwinian evolution and hence deliberative. Whilst Nature

might imbue Man with the capacity to have a Belief Structure, the utilisation of that

capacity is left to Man in exactly the same way as was the thumb; existence of a thing

does not define its use.

On social constructs, Darwin (Descent, pg. 119) states ‘ We have now seen that

actions are regarded…as good or bad…as they affect the welfare of the tribe…’ and

that ‘with man we can see no definite limit to the continued development of the brain

and mental faculties, as far as advantage is concerned’ (pg. 149). Having applied his

observations of plant and other life forms to Man, Darwin has promptly abandoned

his analysis of transformation and selection and instead opted for a definition of Man

that is an offshoot of the principles of natural selection, by definition, where mental

and social developments of any kind are justified because natural selection, by

definition, only permits advancement according to defined principles. What is

missing from the Darwinian supposition is an analysis of what a Belief Structure

might be and what could be its purpose for Man; why would a Belief Structure have

been developed as a ubiquitous mental facility for man? Either such a phenomenon is

accidental, or it is derived as a response to circumstances. The ‘belief in…’

commences with creation, so some attempt must be made to place the origins of belief

and the concomitant structures within the context of early human history – either as

creations of Nature or of Deity/ies.

The Creation of the Capability to Believe

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Belief is a central attribute of Man. Indirectly and directly it shapes much of the

behaviour of the species and so a sketch of the assumptions is necessary to anchor the

later arguments.

Does God exist? For most, in one life upon Earth, the question remains moot – not

provable or unanswered, for some it is beyond doubt. Is life pre-ordained or does

Man have free will? In either case, for most of Man the next event remains an

unknown and so each must ‘strut and fret his hour upon the stage’12 as best they

might. Whatever are the positions adopted, the following is an attempt to synthesise

the concept of a Belief Structure within a Darwinian / Deistic conjunction.

There is a difference between Man and those things around it and it is the use to

which Man puts the world and, assuming that there is merit in the Darwinian

assumption of evolution, this begs the question of why and how Man developed as it

did (the question remains important precisely because of the absence of a clear

genealogy back through the apes; if Man was simply a slow natural development,

traces of such would be evident).13 Darwin states (Origin, pg. 263) ‘…it may not be a

logical deduction, but to my imagination…’ (that life is as it is) ’…not as specially

endowed or created instincts, but as consequences of one general law…multiply, very,

let the strongest live and the weakest die.’ (and this is known in modern terminology

as reduced instruction protocol) Clearly, there is an indication from Darwin that Man

is a descent of the apes but the evidence for the move is lacking. It is possible

however that such a change was more sudden than evolutionary and it is here, I

hypothesise, that the Darwinist can place the origin of the Belief Structure. For

reasons lost within the past of the Rift Valley, or the end of the last Ice Age, there

evolved a creature from the ape family that was able to adapt its environment because

it faced extinction. Whereas Zenning (Timeless Rock Art, pg. 68-9) claimed early

painting ‘…reflected their simple, innocent desire to control nature.’ I argue that the

art is a representation of a human conjunction with Nature and that the purpose of a

12 Shakespeare, Macbeth V, 5 although of course, there is no need for menace or gloom in its actions. The strutting and fretting is simply the act of one who does not know how to be certain of what will happen next. There are many instances of Man living in ignorance of the future and here the action is just as much a strutting and a fretting but is here the strutting and fretting of someone ‘ad-libbing’, not someone in despair at not knowing the outcome.13 The Darwinian evolutionary concept is primarily passive and reactive, the question to be borne in mind throughout is what aspects of Man are not reactive and how could it come about that Man would or could develop an outlook or approach that strove to alter and to change?

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Belief Structure within early homo sapien was to construct a relationship between

Man and its environment. Evolutionary theory suggests not that creature (as cited in

the Darwin quotation, see above) multiply and vary in order to survive but there is a

subtle balance between excess and moderation and that variation is brought about of

necessity and by external forces. Whatever the conditions that gave rise to the

creation of Man, the conditions were not such as to require an ‘advanced culture’ that

would be seen as such by Darwin. The modern (European) world is where this

introduction will end and there are numerous recorded civilisations all over the Earth

that clearly did not take a route to Darwin’s higher ‘culture’; Darwin himself

encountered instances of social and economic stasis (Descent, pg. 187) ‘… Mr Coan

… remarks that the natives have undergone a greater change in their habits of life in

the course of fifty years than Englishmen during a thousand.’ But regarded this as an

aspect of the primitive and not of any advanced nature of the indigenous Belief

Structure.

A Belief Structure then is that which is defined through a set of rituals and

(individual) beliefs that come together to create a socially and politically cohesive

group. It might be, as Mauss14 described, that ‘Taking into account the monotony of

its actions, the limited vanity of its representation, the sameness which is found

throughout the history of civilisation, we might assume magic to be a practical idea of

utmost simplicity.’ but this is to already remove the expression from its cause. What

Mauss described as monotonous and simple (-istic?) are in fact actions of precise

repetition with all of the complexity required.

Here then is a relationship between Man and Nature, the meeting place of theology

and philosophy. It is through distancing itself from an event that Man comes to any

understanding from Socratic15 inquisitorial education to Kantian reason to

phenomenology. The conceptualisation of a Belief Structure as an evolutionary

function is an aid in the ability to create and maintain abstract uses for parts off its

environment – the creation and use of tools, fire and so on. Without an outside

reference point (that is, a reference to an ‘other’), the articles would be abandoned,

14 Mauss, M, General Theory of Magic, Routledge, 1972. (pg. 91)15 Plato, Republic, Book I, & c.

9


returned from whence they came. This is not to say that Man must use, alter and

change its environment, only that it retains the ability so to in some circumstances.

As its root then, a Belief Structure could have a Darwinian function and from this

both through selection and outside impetuses to change – it will vary, multiply and

survive.

To put this in more theological terms; God would give Man the capacity to

comprehend a Deity for similar reasons (that is, to enable Man to grasp a reason

outside of itself to which it could reference its actions, thus maintaining a temporal

and creative perspective for its actions and behaviours). Divine knowledge being

preserved for the divine would leave Man without a concept of that which was

Divine. Here again Man has interpreted the nature and purpose of the relation with

the Divine and, as has already been noted, in the absence of affirmative ubiquitous

Knowledge of the existence of the Divine, man must do as best it can within the

confines of its existence, with its Faith of and in a Deity as a point of reference – Man

has a knowledge of but no empirical proof of Deity/ies.

This is the nascence of a Belief Structure, which can be described as embracing (the

reference points are Man, Deity, Nature, all returning to all). It is a link between Man

and Nature that permits man to place its actions and behaviours within the context of

the world around it, out of this Belief Structure grew those that can be described as

cyclical. That is, where the point of reference lies beyond the human, where the

reference point lies within the cycles of the seasons and planets and the Greater and

Lesser Cycles pertaining to the social groups, to the more esoteric relations of Gods

and Man and within such a context, the number (or multiplicities) of Deity is hardly

significant as the kernel of the referent remains in the concept of the cycle, or to be

more specific, at an understanding of the Embracing. This is not to follow

Nietzsche’s argument in Twilight of the Idols,16 that it is better to worship one god

than many. I am concerned here with defining a relationship between the human and

the Diving, not with social and political arguments regarding multiplicity.

16 Nietzsche, F Twilight of the Idols, Penguin, 1984. Bearing in mind Nietzsche’s comments on other multi-deistic faiths, his comments were most probably an attack upon Christianity rather than upon the concept of multiplicity itself.

10


Precisely as there is a known basic symbolism for air, fire, water and so on, so too

there is a composite symbolism for Belief Structures and it is this that is represented

in early art through the world on both rocks and pottery. This is not to impute a

common language; two physicists can happily exchange data and number sequences

without knowledge of another language. Classicists can write to each other in Latin

or Greek but with accents that defy audible understanding. The root, if there is one,

can only lead to a point, not a common language; the understanding is of a concept,

not of a swathe of knowledge. The symbolism is an expression of a core, similarities

between geographically diverse regions can be traced back to this core but it does not

imply a continued communication between them over the period.

What is seen as the dominant position of Man on the Earth is defined here as an

adjunct, one belonging primarily to the Industrial Age (but this is a topic that lies

outside of this definition). Within the Judeo-Christian tradition, the role of Man is

that of exercising ‘dominion’ (Gen Ch. I, v. 28) and a notable section of the Books of

Moses are given up to animal husbandry, of managing the bounty of God upon the

Earth; that is, for the care of livestock and the future supply of food; the Egyptian

Book of Days is also primarily concerned with farming, as is much of the archive

from Mesopotamia. Far from being a dominant position, in all but a minority of

instances, the role of Man can be viewed as that of an ‘overseer’ or ‘caretaker’.

Comparisons between the longevity of Man and the longevity of ‘The Land’ (a

euphemism for land, animals, water and other resources) are common for most Belief

Structures and thus place Man within a functional constraint. Within agricultural

societies, the relation between Man, Nature and God as a triumvirate of co-operation

has persisted. As a creation of Nature or of God, the social-biological construct that is

Man is not perfect and is in a constant state of flux. For Nature, flux seems to be a

necessary function of life in that it requires a sharing of resources, with different

plants and creatures (in the food chain) providing sustenance for others and all

maintaining some underlying idea of ‘balance’. As a creation of God, Man still

remains in flux to carry out its role / task upon the Earth17.

17 God has placed Man in a state of flux, or Man has placed itself in a state of flux through its relationship with God. There is no temporal certainty for Man and the absence of certainty places Man in a state of flux. Only if Man was absolutely certain of the Will of God would it be able to remove itself from a state of flux.

11


Power and Control

To speak technically and also scientifically, control is a key term that must be

considered and understood; it is the hermeneutical connection between definitions of

Belief Structure, Religion and Theology; the linking together of Man and its

surroundings. Control is a subjunctive of a Belief Structure, with utilisation as the

goal. Without the concept of a Belief Structure and the correlative capacity to control,

Man would not be able to find a continuing and repetitive use for its environment, it

would be unable to ask: ‘what can this be used for?’; ‘can it be used beyond the

Now?’

Standard evolutionary theories explain how a creature will adapt to suit its

environment (owls can see at nigh, racing pidgins were detailed by Darwin, moles

have claws for digging), some make minor changes to their environment, (beavers),

some seem to survive anywhere (cockroach, mice). Unlike other creatures, Man does

not move to a more hospitable environment, rather it attempts to exercise control over

it and despite claims to the contrary from the industrialised cultures of Man, it

remains barely a harvest from barbarism. Control then is a deliberative function for

Man. Once an action is taken, the reference to the Belief Structure is a part of that

process and must of necessity and by definition be deliberative such that the

requirement, or goal; the activity, or methodology of control can, through the ritual of

referencing to the Deity/ies, complete the cycle of the Belief Structure.

Control is not a willed thing, it is the deliberative aspect of a Belief Structure and

cannot exist on its own. Some things are not possible without an other thing but there

is a connection between abstract reasoning, justification and the concept of Deity/ies

both linguistically and neurologically and so without making a step into causalism or

into creationism, the argument that a Belief Structure consists of facets of control

remains; it is true that ‘Darwinian Chance’ could have been responsible but that is to

enter upon a speculative discussion of what Man might have been, not what Man is;

such could be a sub species of as homo erectus but this lies outside of the preliminary

sketch. As Darwin says ‘In man, as in the lower animals, many structures are so

intimately related, that when one part varies, so does another, without our being able,

12


in most cases to assign any reason.’18 In other words: what capacities of Man might

be used within a Belief Structure? A Sentiment echoed by Foucault: ‘Mathematical

statements are not added to one another in the same way as religious texts or laws

(they each have their own ways of merging together, annulling one another, excluding

one another, complementing one another, forming groups that are in varying degrees

indissociable and endowed with unique properties).’19

‘What process does a culture put in place to release a self that gets stuck (dries out,

turn heavy or opaque, goes mad, becomes monotonal, stops transforming)?’ asks the

introduction of Self and Self Transformation.20 More to the point: Why should there

be a dynamics of such a construct? Does a Self or a Belief Structure need to

transform? There is evidence of cultures and the associated religious structures

remaining all but unchanged for millennia and there is evidence of the continuation of

some religious practices after the fall of specific civilisations but the need to

transform is a modern socio-political construct for the anthropologist to investigate, it

is not one relevant for an understanding of the ontology of Belief Structures, where

the internal dogmatics required for transformations have not be constructed; this is a

definition to identify a furcation, a forced splitting, not the alterations and changes

that are within the domain of the scientific anthropologist.

A nascent Belief Structure is interallum redere (in the process of reverting)21 – that

which is referential to an external cause – but it is also cyclical in that such references

return back to Man and how it and they interact, such a concept can also be described

as embracing, creating its own dynamics of return and self referral which negates the

need for transformation, the requirement to change and modify for its own sake. The

18 Darwin Descent of Man, Square Peg 2003 pg. 4319 Foucault, M Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock, 1972. pg. 12420 Shulman, D; Stroumsa, G, Self and Self-transformation in the History of Religions. Pg. 1421 References to two types of Belief Structure will be made: hominis interallum reder (Man in the process of reverting) and hominis reputare (Man reflecting back [to its self])

i) Hominis Interallum reder is a Belief Structure that is referential to external events and factors. Man is aware that all actions have affects upon and are affected by external events and its Belief Structures are formulated in such a way as to attempt to articulate the connections between events. That which is referential to the external incorporates its interpretation within its Self, rationalising a circular continuity of thought and action, creating a striving to maintain a status quo.

ii) Hominis reputare is a Belief Structure that is referential to the Self in the first instance. Man acts upon the world through its Self. Its motive relies upon its personal requirements and the satisfaction of its own needs and desires; its primary motive is Self fulfilment.

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transformations that do exist within a culture should be viewed as internal referential

(interallum reder) rights not as a methodology to ‘release a self that gets stuck’ but to

define and codify specific aspects of a Belief Structure within an economic

geography.

For the anthropologist, society already has an internal dynamics, able to ‘move (its-

self) on’ and as such it has already transformed itself from that which lives within its

own (or the) world, to that which lives within its own dynamics, within its own

created self referential framework and the question then begs: Why does a

requirement to volition (and the associated power discourses) seem to exist within

Man and how can it be compatible with the concept of evolution, where there is the

implication of change through modification and adaptation? More precisely: What

could be the origins of an internally constructed aversion to the monotonal?

The existence of a fluid (anthropologically specified) dynamics within a Belief

Structure, one that is defined as a system that will maintain a state of flux and hence

to force (to maintain a rate of) change – to create a climate of adaptation (both interior

(to the self) and exterior, directed towards that which is other) – is to beg the

questions off ontological inquiry where we must explore the how and the why of the

prehistoric through an analysis of the historic. The pre-historic offers us only

conjecture, based upon the remains of a shadow; we must dismantle that which

constitutes our history (and our understanding of events within a history) and through

that come to some understanding of the mechanics of its construction and through the

exposed dynamics of the paths of the known past we might glimpse the tools that

formed the unknown pre-historic of a Belief Structure. That which lies in the past, in

the time before it was considered necessary or useful to ‘write it all down’, to explain

it all or to justify, lies beyond the reaches of history and, as with Eichhorn quoted by

Wolf,22 we must search through the layers of the known to define the layers of the

contextually sound; to commit ourselves to ‘A true, continuous and systematic

recension.’

22 Wolf, F A. Prologomena to Homer (PUP) 1988 pg. 44

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Not all cultures have Belief Structures that contain the Judeo-Christian imposition of

Guilt23 (Gen. 3; 4; 6; 11; etc.) and of a Fall from Grace or Perfection (this is not the

same as a legend of the decline in the abilities of Man); such an idea has a specific

temporal and geographic home. Whilst the Egyptians believed that they were already

in Heaven and that no world could be better and death was no more than a moving to

another Nile Valley (the Egyptians were, in effect, by their own admission, custodians

of Heaven and this helps to explain the longevity of their geographic Belief Structure

and their civilisation. It is an exemplary area to investigate as a case study of an

Embracing Belief Structure – interallum redere), most cultures created Belief

Structures, Man is then able to appeal to whatever rules are deemed necessary to

create and maintain a socio-politico-economic continuum. Provided that the structure

within itself is able to retain its interallum redere, any laws, proscriptions and

prescriptions, will be accepted.

The internal power structure of a society is not strictly governed by or related to its

Belief Structure, bearing in mind that an internal (political) power structure will

normally only last as long as the ruler, where that rule is imposed by the ruler, rather

than a rule exercised as an extension of the beliefs of the people. Generally however,

rule through fear or by force require surplus manpower and so tend to be ineffective

in small or agricultural communities where labour would either be fully utilised

during planting and harvest periods, or primarily surplus when crop or farm labour

was less intensive (when the Europeans asked the North Americans what they did

when they had planted the crops, they were told that they waited for them to grow;

thus showing that the idea of continuous labour is itself a specifically temporal and

geographic construct. A Belief Structure that considers crops to be the property of all

and a gift from the Gods would not require continuous labour and in these

circumstances, once a task has been completed, the labour can devote itself to

activities in the service of the Deity/ies (in Egypt and Maya, this was the construction

of pyramids, in Peru, it was the construction of gigantic rock carvings). There is no

specific mechanism within a Belief Structure that can control the type of power

23 Bottero, J, Everyday Life in Ancient Mesopotamia (Nevill), Edinburgh, 2001. Of course, the idea of The Fall is specific to a type of Theology and not as geographic as Bottero attempts to define it. None the less, it has come to have a significant social and political affect upon European culture. The relation of guilt and god will be discussed later with reference to the Iliad and the Pre Socratic philosophers.

15


structure utilised by a society because the Belief Structure helps to define a

relationship between Man and its environment and providing that a cycle from Man to

the external to the Deity to Man can be explained and more specifically justified,

there is no requirement for a geographic culture to be egalitarian, pacific, military,

dictatorial or anything else. Belief Structures and politics combine to create power

systems, the former on its own defines a mechanics of reference, it is the anchor upon

which Man ties its motives and motivations.

It is the absence of any moral codices that shows, anthropologically, that a Belief

Structure precedes the political utility imbibed from ‘Divine Law’, or

‘Commandments’ and such like; it is only after there is a grasping of the context of

the relationships within interallum reder that a structure of conduct could be

understood - could be passed on. Only when there is a socially cohesive group,

already behaving in a particular way, can it be possible for a Prophet to come with the

Words of Deistic Wisdom (Lao Tzu, Confucius, Zoroaster, Mohammad, Moses,

Heraclitus). Unlike other hermeneutical inquiries, this specifically eschews the

dogmatics off morality and is, as Nietzsche described, approaching from another side,

beyond good and evil. The internal dynamics of an interallum redere Belief Structure

do not prohibit acts of violence, either random and solitary or organised and

protracted; nor do they prohibit geographic expansion or social change but they do

encourage a tendency to ‘…use only that part of their potential of ideas and abilities

which enable them to lead a habitual way of life.’24 In other words, whilst Man has

the potential to achieve more through the adoption of other modes of application, it

(consciously or unconsciously) opts to use its abilities and its potential for technical

adaptation in such a way as to restrict its innovation and confine itself to that which it

knows and understands. Whilst Rudgley is interested in technical matters and

Shulman is speaking anthropologically, their statements appear to run counter (the

former highlighting a stasis, the latter change within the human condition) but this can

be understood in the different points of reference of hominis interallum redere and

hominis reputare, as will become apparent.

Interallum Redere and the Self

24 L B Vishnyansky, quoted in R Rudgley Lost Civilizations pg. 239

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St Augustine described three types of theology in his criticism of Varro25 - the

mystical, the fabulous and the natural. For Augustine, there was only one theology

and that was the theology of God, not of Man. He quotes Varro: ‘they call that kind

mythical which the poets chiefly use; physical, that which the philosophers use; civil,

that which the people use’. Augustine criticises this and seeks to define a ‘City of

God’, of a single and unified church and belief system. Structurally however, there is

a similarity in that both Varro and St Augustine seek to define a God for their own

ends, excluding all others. In his final destruction of Varro’s description of the three

gods used by a society, St Augustine wrote:

What can human learning, though manifold, avail thee in this perplexity? Thou desirest

to worship the natural gods; thou art compelled to worship the civil. Thou hast found

some of the gods to be fabulous, on whom thou vomitest forth very freely what thou

thinkest, and, whether thou wiliest or not, thou wettest therewith even the civil gods.

Thou sayest, forsooth, that the fabulous are adapted to the theatre, the natural to the

world, and the civil to the city; though the world is a divine work, but cities and theatres

are the works of men, and though the gods who are laughed at in the theatre are not other

than those who are adored in the temples; and ye do not exhibit games in honor of other

gods than those to whom ye immolate victims. How much more freely and more subtly

wouldst thou have decided these hadst thou said that some gods are natural, others

established by men; and concerning those who have been so established, the literature of

the poets gives one account, and that of the priests another,--both of which are,

nevertheless, so friendly the one to the other, through fellowship in falsehood, that they

are both pleasing to the demons, to whom the doctrine of the truth is hostile.

That theology, therefore, which they call natural, being put aside for a moment, as it is

afterwards to be discussed, we ask if any one is really content to seek a hope for eternal

life from poetical, theatrical, scenic gods? Perish the thought! The true God avert so wild

and sacrilegious a madness! What, is eternal life to be asked from those gods whom these

things pleased, and whom these things propitiate, in which their own crimes are

represented? 26

Religion is not a thing in which people are communally or incidentally involved, it is

a thing for their betterment, for the improvement of their lot. The discourse upon

religion has entered into the political realm. Compare this to the religions and beliefs

of the Pharaohs, or the West Asian and East Asian areas, where there was a mode of

25 Augustine, City of God, Ch 5 – 6. 26 St Augustine, op. cit Ch 6.

17


behaviour that was required, a social and political requirement to be a part of a society

and the concomitant socio-political structure but not necessarily the need to be a part

of a named religious grouping per se. There is not a ‘politicisation’ of religion, not

even an ‘incorporation’ of religion. The relevance of theology has shifted, it has

become a part of the ‘care of the self’, a part of the particular form of the human that

defines what it is to be human. To misunderstand, or to not worship the God of

choice not only condemns the individual to a miserable afterlife, it gives Man the

right to judge Man for its behaviour, more significantly, for its beliefs, for what is

being thought within its mind, for how it wishes to relate and strives to relate to its

surroundings.

To understand this relationship, we will need to explore the development of the elf

and religion from the Greek perspective; its incorporation into Roman philosophy and

its dissemination into the Roman Empire and into early Christianity.

From the Enlightenment, thought could be defined through three stages of progress

(and here again begins the shadow of what became ‘Darwinianism’); the theological,

when neutral phenomena are seen as the product of the supernatural; the metaphysical

when they are the result of abstract forces; the positive, when observable phenomena

are described as the exclusion of all else. Right of otherwise, these distinctions

clearly show that they had created an ephemeral, a temporal world and that they

believed that they had already achieved (or were very close to achieving) the final

stage of progress – of being in a world that described what it saw to the exclusion of

all else – that is, to describe what is to the exclusion of what is.

There are questions thrown up by the Enlightenments definition of the ideal end of

progress; not least that there is an end and the question of what would happen to the

human imagination and creating if it was unable to move beyond a description of the

observed. The main point here though is that it is not hominis interallum redere but

hominis reputare that is defining its ‘relation to the world’. Augustine expresses

himself more clearly as an example between the references used by the two types of

Belief Structure. Unlike the Greeks of the Classical period, upon which Europe has

come to base most of its structures, Augustine had a concept of progress, although

18


they would on the whole here have agreed with his interpretation;27 the Greek state

was able to act and loosely articulate its dynamics, later civilizations would complete

the lexicon, but this is for a later discussion.

The Enlightenment broke down the structure of human belief to analyse it as a

progression, as a logical series of such that first A then B then C; but also, if C then B

must have been, then A must have been and if C exists and is in a state of being then

B and A must have ceased to exist; if A and B do exist at the same time as C, do those

in the condition of (have the right – or is it a duty?) to stop the practices associated

with A and B? Enlightenment politico-theological arguments can be seen to lead

down the road of justifying attacks on other groups and genocide because they have

not progressed and as such can be deemed ‘redundant’ or ‘backwards’ and such

actions have been documented but such conclusions are to presume that the

philosophers and theologians of their time actually intended such a course to develop.

The consequences of a direct confrontation between hominis reputare and hominis

interallum redere will be considered in detail toward the end of this introductory set

of definitions. Here we see a returning to the reasoning of Aristotle and away from

that of the church fathers, from the Ante-Nicenes.

Progression can only be possible for a Self Referential Belief Structure (hominis

reputare), where the comparison of what it is that constitutes the concept (if not that

which constitutes the conceptual understanding) of the self is conducted within the

Self, where any judgement is specific to that individual and its perceived temporal

significance. That is, an incremental inevitable development; that is, to move and to

progress form ‘now’ to ‘then’ and compare the ‘now’ to the ‘before’.

Hominis interallum redere, like the Greeks (see Dodds op cit.) did not have a word

for progress, only for change – the need for endless dynamic change would not be

understood; the concept of change, can perhaps be best defined as having come of age

when the Ptolemy’s found such a necessity to collect manuscripts, to update what had

gone before and to preserve it. Prior to this, the fear of the past being forgotten was

27 Dodds, E R. Ancient Concept of Progress. Also, to return to the comment so of Vishnyansky ‘…To change substantially and rapidly, a culture must already have a great potential, a reserve of ideas and abilities which are known but not put into practice…’ I believe this holds true for physical and philosophic changes.

19


not crucial and the relation to the Self is projected on to a need for the past; the Deity

is not the point of recognition of the Self, but one’s own past and historical relevance.

After Alexander, the Greeks set out not simply to collect woks of art and literature but

to compile definitive editions; there was now a definition of something that could be

called Truth. The reference points for self or social group advancement, for its own

sake, are lacking and changes occur primarily by reference to Deistic requirements.

The atavistic structure is completely different, with all references, stories and

memories of ancestors related through death rituals, life after death and familial

genealogy (such a genealogy should not be confused with the European action of

ancestry. Here the ‘atavistic truth’ of ancestry is subverted to create a lineage that

befits the occasion and that reflects current social status). There is a subverting of the

atavistic truth and its empirically definable behaviours; a rigid epistemological source

is denied in favour of a plastic history that enables past present and future to merge an

shift to create a cohesive whole about the Belief Structure and its Deity/ies. The dyad

of Belief Structure and the subject / object of Belief defines and clarifies the

differences; it is that which places Man outside its surroundings whilst allowing it to

remain a part, it is a ‘Theological Cartesian Cogito’.

What is the ‘self’, what does it mean to ‘have’ a self? A relationship with the first

person singular? For hominis interallum redere the relationship is not significant and

the questions lack relevance. They have an understanding of what it is to be ‘an’

individual but the individual is a component of a group and whilst its attachment to

that group does not constitute a formal duty or any legal obligation, it does constitute

a biological affiliative bond that at least modifies behaviour although not control it; to

break a bond would not be considered. If asked to define its own relation within such

a group, Man would respond by saying ‘we are one’, describing a homogeneity of

temperament and spirit rather than one of dogmatism and action. Within this

definition, action to change that that is, is not a primary mover; it is survival – and if

survival is not difficult, or under threat, then action (and reaction) are even less

important as more time is devoted to conformity with and expressions of Deistic

ceremony, ritual and referencing.

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Summary

This is a basic outline of a Belief Structure. The existence of Deity/ies remains

unprovable and the associated questions should now have been sufficiently distanced

from this text. One Believes or one does not and in any case, there remains a residual

Belief, an unshakable cogito of some ‘otherness’ and it is this Belief that governs

Man’s relationship with the World. One of the dictionary definitions of belief, which

is the ‘mental acceptance of a proposition’, is a useful start but unless the importance

of the state of mind is fully explored, the theological definition will be missed.

Indeed, in some respects, the theological understanding of belief has returned to its

Germanic root of ‘lub’ - to hold dear, to love – where there is an implied emotional

commitment to and unconditional trust of the other28. There is of course the

additional commitment (certainly for hominis redere) that the love (lub – esteem,

value) need not be returned; existence is a continuum, not a return of good deeds. A

Belief Structure is that set of abilities which enable Man to carry out and to justify its

behaviour of control either of God’s chosen people (eo ipso, it is so that God created

Man and imbued in it the Knowledge of God), or as an evolutionary event that the

archaeological anthropologists have yet to resolve. It is the ubiquity of the Belief

Structure that gives it the appearance of being an innate characteristic and if it is

denied that it is itself innate, then it cannot be denied that its teaching and inculcation

is a human imperative such that the need to educate is all but innate (political, social

and cultural conditions not withstanding); a belief Structure returns to us as the first

manifestation of a joining of the abstract with the temporal. This is not abstract

reasoning, this is Belief and as such it does not rely upon any form of synthetically

arranged logic or reasoning to verify it claims.

There are various interpretations of Deism (that is, the objectified perception of the

‘other’), each developing its own economics and politics relevant to its own society

and geography but there is little purpose in attempting to create a genealogy back to

some primeval noise which is best known as ‘OM’. That they develop is the point

under investigation and instead of sculpting a tree, my intention is to look back to a

28 Whilst ‘love’ and ‘believe’ are words dating back to the earliest records in the English language (see Appendix A), they have no relevance to the pre-Christian religious discourses because the hominis/Deistic relationship was not based upon any notion of reciprocity, it was a cyclical , or, after the Greeks, a linear structure, as explained above.

21


point when a sudden change in Belief Structures can be identified; to dig down into its

historiography for a schism that expresses a self referential politics within theology,

that is, to identify the self referential as opposed to interallum redere that has so far

been identified.

From time to time Man has confronted itself with the idea of apocalyptical events but

it took deepest root in the Semitic religions29 (at least, there has been a significant

political exploitation of the concept from this root), where it seems to be linked with

the concept of Guilt, most famously in the Hebrew Testament. Whilst Guilt might

seem to be an interesting diversion from the norm, it acts more as an explanation for a

given position than any specific change in perspective or points of reference of other

religions (ass such it is a political and economic tool more than a theological tract and

much too deals with the genealogy of a people, relating them to themselves and to

their Deity).

Baines argued that the Egyptians also had a concept of guilt but this is not as strong as

the Hebrew sense (which is again not as strong as modern European senses): ‘I made

every man like his fellow. I did not ordain that they do wrong (izfer, ‘disorder’). It

was their desires that damaged what I had said.’ The instruction for Merikore (the

creator) reads: ‘he has built himself a shrine around them (the people); when they

week, he hears’ (line135)30 Here, the God is giving Man free will. Whilst everything

is relational to the Deity/ies, there is still the ability for the individual to choose their

own course, to be responsible for what they do and not to put all of the onus upon

God to ensure their survival and well being. Man does not have domain over God but

is able to misinterpret the words, here it is Man’s responsibility to exercise

temperance and ensure that the Laws of God are followed. That the creator hears the

weeping of the people is a sign that it is a caring creator, not wrathful or malicious,

aware of the hardships of life and of the need to offer succour to them.

29 Bottero, J Everyday Life in Mesopotamia, Ch 15: How Sin Was Born Edinburgh 2001. See also Lichteim, M: Ancient Egyptian Literature, California, 1975: ‘I made every man like his fellow. I did not ordain that they do wrong (izfet, disorder). It was their desires that damaged what I had said.’30 Baines, J Society, Morality and Religious Practice, in Shafer, B (ed) Religion in Ancient Egypt, Routledge, 1991.

22


What is the relation of Man to its Belief Structure? As Thomas discovered in his

research, it has been difficult within Christian Europe to maintain church attendances

and even when people do attend a Christian service, it has not stopped them from

worshipping other deities at other times31. Different geographies have achieved very

different results with respect to Christianity and this is one of the more clear

distinctions between hominis interallum redere and hominis reputare. For the former,

the Deity/ies form a part of a structure that encompasses everything Man is it

embraces their actions and everything refers back and through it; there is no notion of

giving in order to receive, or behaving in a manner that will win more than a small

advantage; the failure to have a wish granted is nothing other than that, future wishes

and offerings might prove a different result. For the latter, dealings with the Deity/ies

are viewed as that. Favours are asked and granted or lost because of a personal

relationship with the Deity/ies; Man seeks a level of control (even power) over its

Deity. Religion takes on a reduced function, is of much less significance having or

finding its own role usurped by other interests of the individual as it looks to its Self,

attempting to secure something beyond its present condition rather than within it and

by so doing, it relegates its Deistic practices to satisfying the requirements of the

dogmatis theologia instead of the Deity/ies. Again, in its drive to reference through

itself, hominis reputare will constantly compare, seek for a justification through a

movement of the Self from where it was; interallum redere is justified through the

continuation of existence (not life per se), the placation of distress and the self

fulfilling justification of an embracing Belief Structure.

Belief Structures will begin to diverge and become distinct as groups become

physically separated and as the prevailing theology is adapted to explain a current

condition as well as to define, proscribe and prescribe modes of behaviour and

conduct but none of this need lead to a specifically radical change in the references of

the structure. Indeed, bearing in mind the human proclivity of stasis, radical changes

in Belief Structures seem unlikely.

A belief Structure manifests itself through Man’s interaction with the world; this

includes physical activities, the pictorial, the written and the oral. Physical and oral

activities are wholly ephemeral; it has been noted that oral tradition can be passed on

31 Thomas, K Religion and the Decline of Magic, Penguin, 1991

23


with a very high degree of accuracy. Groups sit down and listen to one or more recite

a story and correct them if they change anything (e.g. Rink, H; Tales and Traditions

of the Eskimo, Dover, 1997); this is both a way to learn stories and a game to spot

when a change has been made. So too, oral meetings can seem over as soon as they

begin and if they are remembered, it is in tradition and interpretation, leaving the

future generations wondering if anything has changed or stayed the same. Written

activities are more accurately recorded but every iteration is subject to mistakes or

deliberate alteration32. The examples of forgotten languages (Egyptian hieroglyphs,

Linear A, Linear B, Sumerian, etc.), are useful in understanding a culture as it is at

any time but this will not chart or identify changes; only articulate the present, rarely

with any criticism. This leaves us with the medium of the graphic – that which is

drawn and painted. That which has a specific meaning at the time of its creation and

of its use is the most reliable way of understanding a change several generations later

precisely because we can identify symbols used ostensibly for the same purpose,

ostensibly by the same people (or their direct descendants) in a specific geography.

Much of the art is taken as having some religious significance, so it would appear that

if there is a change in the art, there will also be a change in the religious practices. It

is also possible that there will be a change in the perception of the relationship

between Man and Deity/ies (particularly so if there has not been any apparent change

in the rituals and practices adopted at a site). Within the Catholic Church, the use of

local languages in place of Latin could be viewed as a change in the relationship to

the Deity because it expresses a changed role for the participants – a modification of

their ‘mental acceptance’ to quote and transcend the dictionary definition and the

same can be said for the incorporation of women within the offices of the Protestant

Church. That this change within the Catholic Church is so significant is the point – it

has created an enormous discourse and yet the changes within the Greek tradition, as

will be explained below, does not seem to have created any discourse. In this respect,

the Greek philosophers remained silent upon religion, speaking not of changes but of

how a thing could be used.

32 See Cambridge History of Mediaeval Philosophy, which describes the differences and inconsistencies in the works of various European scribes. Some alterations were accidental, some resulting from poor writing, others were attempts at improving a manuscript.

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CHAPTER 2 – GODS AND THE SELF IN HOMERIC LITERATURE

Greek Literature is a difficult concept to define. As has already been said, the

Homeric legends as they relate to the Iliad and to the Odyssey are without a date,

being written about events that occurred around 1400 BCE, first committed to writing

around 800 BCE and turned into a finally approved document in the libraries of

Alexandria by Ptolemy.

Did Homer exist? Did the Pre-Socratics exist? Did Socrates exist? All these people

exist within our beliefs of the Greeks – all these people exist within our perception of

a historico-geographic framework that stretches over a thousand years and a

collection of island and city states from Asia Minor to central Italy. What is identified

here is the spread of an interpretation of the self as a human form, as a direct and

clearly defined representation of the human it-self, hence the specific geography is

less important than knowing that there is a chronologic-political development that

links those areas known as Greece. Within this geo-political context, it is known that

various versions of texts were circulated and such differences show that the referent to

the deity varied certainly within different regions, although our inability to date texts

means that we do not know if there is a significant difference in the time when the

texts were being circulated; the difference is in the naming of Zeus as being

responsible for the war against Troy; was it at the Will of Zeus, or at the willing of

Zeus, or at the counsel of Zeus? This is not a pedantic exercise; if Zeus Willed the

war against Troy, as a means of reducing the population, He also Willed the abduction

of Helen and influenced the minds of men to drive them to such a destruction for the

sake of a woman. If Zeus was responsible for willing a war, then it remains within

the realms of Man to determine at least some of the destruction wrought and at some

stage to call a halt. The different possible openings within line 5 of the Iliad make the

story palpable to those within the Greek sphere but leave open to debate and question

the role of the Gods – the cruelty of the Gods, the knowledge of the Gods. Greek

Gods did not act alone though; they did not have full and sole responsibility for their

actions but acted as a ‘committee’. Having ‘willed’ a war in Chapter I, Zeus then

becomes embroiled in a bitter dispute with the other gods, mirroring the dispute

between the humans in Chapter II.

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From where we stand, we know only that there was a text (oral then written) that has

come down and has been interpreted that has become known to us at The Iliad. Even

the more recent works of Shakespeare suffers from numerous texts and from the

works of F A Wolf (Prolegomena), R Lattimore and many others, it is clear that there

are many possible readings of Homer. In his essay, The Kypria and its Early

Reception, Classical Antiquity 1995, pg. 164-197), R. Scaife points out that there are

different versions of the Iliad, with particular geo-political implications. Further,

concerning the early extant manuscripts: ‘No papyrus fragments have ever been

identified, and the brief sketch I present here depends mainly on the summary

produced by a grammarian named Proklas, itself only partially preserved in the

Bibliothek of the ninth-century Byzantine scholar Photios.’33 Here, we already

removed from Homer. Not only removed from the story of the Iliad through the six

hundred years between the event and the first writing down, or for another three

hundred years for the comments by Plato but a total of more than two thousand years

from the initial telling of the story (surely an event talked of during its own time) to

the fragments available in the work of Photios.

Aristotle gives us the earliest and most detailed references to Homer in detail in the

Poetics (1459a19-b8) and whilst this might mean that Aristotle ‘restored’ Homer to

the public, it is also likely that his is the first extant work on the subject. Aristotle

does not introduce Homer as a subject for which he believes detailed explanation is

needed, he simply includes Homer as the example of a literary genre. Homer was not

unknown, there was no problematisation of the author or of the subject matter; simply

a statement of eulogy ‘…in addition to what has been said about him previously, one

can hardly avoid feeling that Homer showed godlike genius…’ – comments that

Aristotle could not have made if Homer was not both known and respected, not least

because Aristotle was a respected teacher and would not stake his reputation on

Homer if he was a failed poet.

Aristotle is concerned with the role of Homer as a poet and a dramatist, not with the

nature of the story contained within the Iliad; either to discuss it as an articulation of a

theological quandary, or as a political treaties on the behaviour of Greeks – or of the

Gods. What should the articulation of theology and politics have been from the Iliad,

33 Scaife, R. The Kypria and its Early Reception, Classical Antiquity. 1995, pg. 164-197

26


at a time when the Greeks were discussing forms of government and the roles of men

and gods? There was no referent through the Gods in Homer because the Iliad was

written by and about men; the references to the Gods mirrored the behaviours of the

human participants and as such were not beyond the realm of the human. That the

story was about men and this behaviour was reflected in the behaviour of the Gods is

shown in the ordering of the narratives: the story opens at Troy, then moves to

Olympus. The problematisation of Greek theatre was not considered by the

Platonists; only whether or not such poets and artists should have a role in society,

there is no real criticism (constructive or destructive), concerning the content, no

comments upon the creation and development of a mode of discourse within Greek

theatre and poetry.

Plato is concerned with Homer as a poet and theologian, with the concept of religion

within Homer. The discussion in Plato is primarily of types, he is not concerned with

the actual development of a theology as a problematics; the only development within

Plato is a linear module, through from what is believed to be the earlier to the later

works of his ouvre.34

In contrast to the plastic arts, where the human form was eulogised and the separation

between Man and God all but vanished, within literature, the position of the human

was unquestioned, with the deity (as opposed to theology) being supplemental,

referred through the human (as in the case of the comparison between Chapter I and

Chapter II of the Iliad).

For Homer, Zeus gave the Greeks the ability to appreciate politics by means of aidos

and dike; that is, through (an awareness of) shame and a respect for others35. This is

one of the first descriptions of the human as Homnis reputare – a being that is

referential to the Self in the first instance. The apportioning of such a knowledge

upon the Greeks distanced the human from God in that it made it responsible for its

own actions and also made it the self-referential judge of its own actions. This is

illustrated in the refusal of Achilles to fight, Agamemnon’s disparaging and insulting

34 Murcoch, I, Fire and the Sun, 35 Plato, Protagoras, b-d

27


of a prophet in Book I; the treatment of prisoners later in the story and the mirrored

arguments and disputes between Gods and, elsewhere, between men.

28


CHAPTER 3 – SELF GOD AND OTHER IN EARLY CHRISTIAN

LITERATURE

Did Moses exist? Did Jeremiah exist? Did Jeremiah exist? Did Ezekiel exist? Did

the minor prophets of the Hebrew text exist? Did Jesus exist? Did the disciples of

Jesus exist?

Again and again and for the third exegesis the questions are not relevant. Not only

will these questions not be answered but they must not be answered within a Belief

Structure that is homnis interallum redere, within which Belief is based wholly upon

the external, upon the ‘otherness’ of that which is a being within itself; the referent

lies beyond and remains beyond that which is human. The repetitions and mantras of

the referent creates the essence of the structure, not a default to ‘some form’ of a

scientifically defined reality or truth (cogito veritas).

For homnis reputare, the confirmation of the physical existence of the once removed

literary referents (that is, the existence of those who wrote texts about what homnis

reputare seeks to prove to be factual historical events), serves to further remove God

from the realm of men; increasing the separation through the affirmation of the linear

subjectivity of the temporal.

Having shown the point of divergence of the referents within the two modes of belief

identified and explored the changed referent to the self within early Greek plastic arts

and literature; having looked at the changes in subject matter in the works of Hesiod

(Theogony, Works and Days - theistic), Aesop (zoomorphic); Homer (theomorphic);

identifying areas of change in pre-Socratic thought, from the Eliatic discourse on

cause and effect to Zeno’s paradoxes of separation; the final section can now deal

with the later effects of the Greek concept of belief and the references to the self

contained within it.

Within this section, I will explore how the manifestation of the self referential nature

in Greek literature (Homnis reputare) and the otherwise referential, theistic cultures

(Homnis Interallum Redere) have resulted in self-referential structures such as

Christianity and explain why polytheistic Christianity, particularly icon worship, is

29


better suited to this model than other theistic cultures as the predominant Belief

Structure. If Christianity is not described as ‘inevitable, but rather as the most

successful of a number of possibilities, then this work outlines the early development

of a route to the development of the relation of the self and a of a sole deity to

Christianity.

There are many books that describe the self, explaining which part of the history of

man is responsible for a particular understanding but here we are concerned not with

any set of definitions of the term, nor specifically with its nature, rather it is with the

use of the adjective of self as a referent for human behaviour and the modifications of

structures of belief. Most, as with Charles Taylor in The Sources of the Self36, seek to

‘…write a history of the modern identity. With this term I want to designate the

assembly of (largely unarticulated) understandings of what it is to be a human agent

… the modern West.’

The questions of ‘dos the self exist’; ‘How?’; ‘What are the sources of its interaction

– its ontology.’ Are not considered, being long lost in the prehistory of the sources of

the self. There remains however, the possibility of surmising an origin from the early

articulation of the ‘Western Self’ and an analysis of how this interacts with the other

cultures and beliefs. It is normal to speak of a ‘self’ or ‘an awareness of self’ when

discussing any socio-geographic ethnography and this is usually discussed in terms of

an awareness of or an understanding of ‘The Self’. Here however, the self is not a

central point from which to construct a world-view; it is a referent than can be either

strong or weak and helps formulate the contextual relationship in which human

activities take place

The questions here becomes ‘how does a particular religion or form of belief fit into

the Belief Structures defined? Is Ether one Or an other? What are the relationships

that are formed between different parts of a belief if we view it as belonging to either

Homnis reputare or Homnis Interallum Redere? How does Christianity affect (or

interact, or is interacted from) other Belief Structures? Is ‘Christianity’, ‘Christianity’

in an altered form, or is ‘Christianity’ another belief under the guise of ‘Christianity’?

Is the difference between geographies more significant than differences in religion?

36 Taylor, C, The Sources of the Self, Cambridge, 1992, pg. ix

30


What is the effect upon the literature and the plastic arts of a changed in the referents

of belief and how was a changed discourse articulated?

31

A problematics of belief structures and the creation of the concept of the self

Spiritual

concept of belief

types of belief structure

term belief structure

referent of belief

self god

self chapter

self fulfilme

martin hogan concept