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A People's Agenda?Post - Tsunami Aid in Aceh

February 2006

Cover by Fahmi

We are grateful for the financial support of

Trocaire Kerkinactie ICCO

EYE ON ACEH

AIDWATCH

in consultation with

:Acknowledgements

The list of those to whom we are greatly indebted, and without whose generosity of time this report would not havebeen possible, is indeed long: a very special 'thank you' to the local government officials in Aceh who gave not onlyinformation and insight, but also their on- and off-the-record opinions.

We are also grateful to the staff of the donors for whom policies of transparency translate into practice: the WorldBank, both in Jakarta and Aceh; the staff of the Multi Donor Trust Fund; the ADB, and the delegation of the EuropeanCommission, all were most helpful. In addition, to the many local and international NGOs whose staff spent time toexplain projects, share data, and occasionally even give an 'insider's' overview of programmes - thank you.

Many thanks also to friends who gave advice during the long process of researching and writing this document, andthe reviewers whose candid and insightful comments were invaluable. We are also grateful to the patience andassistance of friends in both the Eye on Aceh offices, and to our network in Brussels. There is one friend who joinedthe team in the closing months of this project whose intellect and co-authorship has been invaluable: to WynneRussell, many thanks.

And finally, to the Acehnese people - the victims of the tsunami - whose lives were ripped apart that day on 26December 2004, and whose surreal existence forms the basis of this report: our gratitude, our admiration, and oursolidarity lies with these courageous people.

Eye on Aceh Research Team: Dhoni, Firman, Jenny, Muhib, Safril, Samsul, Sofia, and Zakaria.

:Executive Summary

This assessment gives voice to the responses of ordinary Acehnese - men and women - to some of the completedand ongoing rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes being conducted in post-tsunami Aceh. We werecurious to know how individuals and communities in Aceh had been affected by their experience of the relief,reconstruction and development assistance programmes that have been mounted in the province since thedisastrous events of 26 December 2004. In the course of our research, we asked Acehnese communities andindividuals: Were they satisfied with the way that such assistance programmes had been carried out in theircommunity? Were they consulted at the needs assessment, concept, or design stages of the programme? If so, towhat extent? What measures were taken to ensure that all community members - including women, whotraditionally have been marginalised in the Acehnese decision making process - were consulted? Were people keptabreast of developments as the project progressed through various stages of planning and implementation? Howrelevant and useful were the projects? Had there been a transfer of skills to local people during the planning orexecution of the project? What had been the impact of the aid on local communities or individuals? And how couldaid have been delivered more effectively?

Our research identified four main areas of concern. The first of these was consultation and communication withbeneficiaries. All too frequently, we heard that Acehnese beneficiaries feel excluded from the rehabilitation andreconstruction process, reduced to the status of passive observers while others lay the foundations for their future.People often spoke of the anxiety they felt in the face of unexplained delays, and of their frustration when easilyavoidable mistakes - design flaws in houses or boats, for instance - rendered assistance ineffective orinappropriate. Rather than a seamless transition from relief to rehabilitation and then to development (the LRRDprinciple), for many local people there was a disconnect between what was needed for recovery and rehabilitationand what was delivered. We found that many of the concerns raised might have been avoided had donors andimplementers placed more emphasis on consultations with communities, including women, as part of pre-planningneed-assessment exercises, project design, and project implementation; ensured that recipients were kept up todate on developments in projects; and capitalised on local expertise. In this context, we were troubled by thecurrent emphasis on "socialisation," which suggests a one-way flow of information after plans are in place, ratherthan on genuine and equal two-way communication.

The second area of concern related to the impact of projects on Aceh's social fabric. Reconstruction aid to Acehhas all too frequently come at a social cost. Unequal levels of assistance, whether within or between communitiesor regions, and the ability of some individuals to profit from the presence of international agencies while others bearthe brunt of inflation, are already fuelling social jealousy. Meanwhile, the potential for tension between thosedisplaced by the tsunami and the communities into which many have settled will only grow as more people migratefrom 'non-tsunami-affected' regions into 'tsunami-affected' ones in search of employment and assistance. As thedivide between winners and losers in the reconstruction aid stakes grows, and social capital is steadily eroded, thechances increase for social conflict. Indeed, despite increasing attention in the international developmentassistance community to the relationship between development assistance and conflict, many of the programmesexamined in this study appeared to lack a conflict-sensitive perspective. Meanwhile, the marginalization of womenin decision-making processes reinforces existing patterns of gender discrimination.

The third area of concern was the way in which donors and implementers handled the project cycle. In particular,we were surprised by the lack of donor and implementer monitoring of projects, which might have identified ongoingproblems, and of post-project evaluation, which might not only have identified issues of concern but might alsohave led to a crackdown on incompetent or corrupt partners. We also were alarmed to find that donors andimplementers frequently ignored the recommendations of internal and external evaluations of broader agencystrategies.

The final area of concern was that of sustainability. Donors and implementers often appeared more focused ontheir own short-term need for visible results than on the longer-term needs of the local population. We wereconcerned that in the rush to spend money, not only were donors and implementing agencies too busy to activelybuild the local capacity that will be vital if ambitious programmes are to be sustained after outside actors leave, butsome programmes' partnerships actually lowered capacity and morale in some local groups. We further identifiedan alarming level of ongoing environmental damage related to reconstruction efforts, in particular deforestationresulting from illegal logging, which not only threatens the province's biodiversity and potential for economicactivities such as ecotourism but has the potential to lead to yet more natural disasters such as the flooding andmudslides that killed around 20 people and displaced thousands more in 2005.

Taken together, these areas of concern appear to have contributed to a number of worrying outcomes. First, manybeneficiaries have been left feeling powerless and frustrated, adding stress to an already traumatised population.Second, persistence in inappropriate or ineffective programmes has led to substantial waste, both of money andmaterial and of good will. Third, disparities in reconstruction assistance between individuals, communities andregions runs the risk of creating new social divisions as well as of exacerbating existing ones. Finally, the study'sfindings raise serious questions about whether Aceh's social or physical environment will be able to stand up to theshort-and long-term effects of many aspects of the reconstruction effort.

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In light of these findings, we offer 20 recommendations, grouped into five general categories:

Communication and consultation with local communitiesImprove community consultation at all stages of project implementation.Improve communication with communities.Increase community participation in project implementation.Increase women's participation in community consultation, communication, and implementation.Increase involvement of civil society organisations.Be sensitive to broader community priorities when initiating projects.

Building local capacityStrengthen cooperation and collaboration with local government.Take steps to prevent brain drain from the civil service.Work to increase the capacity of local NGOs using a needs based agenda.

Avoiding social conflictBe sensitive to potential conflicts between locals and outsiders.Reduce the aid gap between 'tsunami-affected' and 'non-tsunami-affected' areas.Defuse social jealousy emerging around the issue of different types of housing.Ensure cash-for-work schemes do not widen the poverty gap, or cause social jealousy.Prioritise efforts to address the policy gap vis- -vis ex-renters and the landless for rehousing.Avoid individualistic approaches that erode traditional communal forms.Integrate a conflict management perspective into all programmes.

Protecting the environmentTake tough steps to reduce the use of illegally logged timber and to ensure that other construction materials comefrom environmentally sound and legal sources.

Monitoring and evaluationRestructure the project and programme evaluation processes to include beneficiaries.Engage in more monitoring of local partners.Be responsive to changes in conditions and needs.

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AcronymsI. Introduction

The assessment- Methodology

II. Aceh and the tsunamiA devastating earthquake and tsunamiHumanitarian response: the emergency phaseShifting from relief to reconstruction

- Bureaucratic delays: the dilemma of on-budget mechanisms- Reconstruction efforts assisted by new peace agreement

III. A people's reconstruction agenda?The reconstruction process

- Difficult problems, difficult choicesConsultation and communication

- Consultation during pre-project needs assessments- Consultation during project design- Social accountability to beneficiaries- All-inclusive consultation and communication- Disconnects between priorities

Social impact- Inequalities and the potential for conflict in post-tsunami Aceh

Civil society and local government- Building capacity- Under-valuing local government, overstretching NGOs- Local or Indonesian NGOs- Brain drain from the civil service

Corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN)

The environmental cost of reconstructing Aceh- Deforestation- Laundering illegal timber in North Aceh

Donor and implementer 'best practice’- Coordination between donors

- Monitoring and evaluation- Reacting to evaluations and changing conditions

IV. Conclusion

V. Recommendations

Appendix 1 - Donors at GlanceMulti Donor Trust FundAsian Development BankGovernment of AustraliaEuropean CommissionWorld Bank

Notes

Case Study UNICEF children centres

Case Study ACTED'S 'aid' boats

Case Study Going it alone is risky: the case of the Queensland government

Case Study TGH aid boats - still afloat

Case Study The MDTF's shelter programme

Case Study AIPRD support for sub - district and village government

:Table of Contents

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A PEOPLE'S AGENDA? POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION AID IN ACEH

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:Acronyms

ACTED

ADBAIPRD

AIROALGAP

AMM

ASEANATFAusAID

BAPPENAS

BRR

BRRD

CARDI

CBOCCSC

CDACDDCFWCGICHFCoHACRSCWSHP

DECDIPA

DPR-RI

DPRD I

DPRD II

ECECHO

ESPNAD

ETESP

EUFAOFFIGAAGAM

GDPGTZ

ARF

BAKORNAS PBP

BPK

BPN

IAIN

Agency for Cooperation and TechnicalDevelopmentAsian Development BankAustralia - Indonesia Partnership forReconstruction and DevelopmentAustin International Rescue OperationAceh Local Governance ActionProgrammeAceh Monitoring MissionAceh Recovery ForumAssociation of South East Asian NationsAsian Tsunami FundAustralian Agency for InternationalDevelopmentNational Coordinating Agency for IDPand Disaster Management

National Development Planning AgencySupreme Audit Institution

National Land Agency

Reconstruction and RehabilitationAgency

Village Reconstruction andRehabilitation Agency

Consortium for Assistance andRecovery towards Development inIndonesiaCommunity-Based OrganisationCommunity-Construction SupportCentresCommunity-Driven AdjudicationCommunity-Driven DevelopmentCash-for-workConsultative Group for IndonesiaCommunity Habitat FinanceThe Cessation of Hostilities AgreementCatholic Relief ServicesCommunity Water Services and HealthProjectDisaster Emergency CommitteeBudget Implementation Lists

People's Representative Council _ theRepublic of Indonesia

Local parliament at provincial level

Local parliament at district level

European CommissionEuropean Commission HumanitarianOfficeEmployment Service for the People ofNanggroe Aceh Darussalam ProvinceEarthquake and Tsunami EmergencySupport ProjectEuropean UnionFood and Agriculture OrganizationFauna and Flora InternationalGerman Agro ActionFree Aceh Movement

Gross Domestic ProductGerman Technical Cooperation AgencyState Islamic Institute

(BadanKoordinasi Nasional untuk PenangananBencana dan Pengungsi)

(Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan)

(Badan Pertanahan Nasional)

(Badan Rehabilitasi danRekonstruksi)

(BadanRehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Desa)

(Daftar Isian Proyek Anggaran)

(DewanPerwakilan Rakyat _ Republik Indonesia)

(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I)

(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II)

(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)

(Instilute Agama Islam Negeri)

ICASERD

ICMC

IDPIFRC

ILOINGO

IOMIRCJFPRJRSKDPKKN

KKTGA

KPK

KPKN

LBHLRRD

MDTF (ANS)

MoUMSEMSFNADNGONRCOBIPAPAN

PEFPPK

PT

RALAS

RpRSUZA

SAK

SATKORLAK PBP

SATLAK PBP

SKSHH

TGHTNI

UKUNUNDP

Indonesian Center for Agro-Socio-Economic Research and DevelopmentInternational Catholic MigrationCommissionInternally Displaced PersonInternational Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent SocietiesInternational Labor OrganizationInternational Non-GovernmentalOrganisationInternational Organization for MigrationInternational Rescue CommitteeJapan Fund for Poverty ReductionJesuit Refugee ServiceKecematan Development ProjectCorruption, collusion and nepotism

Task Force for Gender Transformationin Aceh

Corruption Eradication Committee

Office of Treasury and State Treasury

Legal Aid FoundationLinking Relief, Rehabilitation andDevelopmentMulti Donor Trust Fund(for Aceh and North Sumatra)Memorandum of UnderstandingMicro and Small EnterpriseMedecins sans FrontieresNanggroe Aceh DarussalamNon-Governmental OrganisationNorwegian Refugee Council

Defender for Farmers and FishermenFoundation

Poverty and Environment FundProgramme Pengembangan Kecametan

Limited Corporation

Reconstruction of Aceh LandAdministration SystemIndonesian RupiahZainal Abidin General Hospital

Corruption Eradication Unit

Coordinating and ImplementationAgency for IDPs and DisasterManagement

Implementation Agency for IDPs andDisaster Management

Legal Certificate of Forest Product

Triangle Generation HumanitaireIndonesian Armed Forces

United KingdomUnited NationsUnited Nations Development Programme

(Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme)

(Kelompok Kerja TransformasiGender Aceh)

(Kornisi Anti Korupsi)

(Kantor Perbendaharaan dan KasNegara)

Obor Berkat Indonesia

(Yayasan Pembela Petanidan Nelayan)

(Kecamatan Development Project)

(Perseroan Terbatas)

(Rumah Sakit Umum Zainal Abidin)

(Satuan Anti Korupsi)

(Satuan KoordinasiPelaksana untuk Penanganan Bencanadan Pengunusi)

(SatuanPelaksana untuk Penanganan bencanadan Pengungsi)

(Surat Ketetangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan)

(Tentara Nasional Indonesia)

A PEOPLE'S AGENDA? POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION AID IN ACEH

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UNFPAUNICEFUN-OCHA

UNSYIAH

UPPUKUSUUPA

WALHI

WB

United Nations Population FundUnited Nations Children's FundUnited Nations Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian AffairsSyiah Kuala University

Urban Poverty ProgrammeUnited KingdomUnited StatesIndonesian Agrarian Laws

Indonesia's Friends of the Earth

World Bank

(Universitas Syiah Kuala)

(Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria)

(Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia)

AdatBahasa IndonesiaBarakBupatiCamatDesaDinas

DusunGeuchikGotong Royong

Kabupaten

Kecamatan

MadrasahMeunasahPanglongPolsekPoskoProvinsi

TambakWalikotaWarung kopiYayasan

Customary lawThe language of IndonesiaTemporary shelterDistrict headSub-district headVillageLocal government department of lineministriesSub-villageVillage chiefCommunity joint works for communitypurposesGovernment administration at districtlevelGovernment administration at sub-district levelIslamic educational institutionCommunity/village hallShop where people buy processed woodSub-district police officeTemporary Coordination CentreGovernment administration at provinciallevelShrimp/fish pondsMunicipal headCoffee stallsFoundation

:Glossary of Terms

The assessment

This assessment gives voice to the responses ofordinary Acehnese - men and women - to some of thecompleted and ongoing rehabilitation and reconstructionprogrammes being conducted in post-tsunami Aceh.We were curious to know how individuals andcommunities in Aceh had been affected by theirexperience of the relief, reconstruction anddevelopment assistance programmes that have beenmounted in the province since the disastrous events of26 December 2004. In this respect, we were interestednot just in the degree to which various programmes hadmet quantitative targets, but to what extent ordinaryAcehnese felt that reconstruction programmes hadbeen sensitive to, and in fact met, what they identifiedas their needs. In this context, we were interested bothin how donors and implementers had includedcommunities in project conceptualisation, design andexecution and in how they monitored the success oftheir projects. This study does not purport to be anoverview of the entire relief, rehabilitation orreconstruction process in Aceh. Rather, using a seriesof case studies from the activities of five major donors,mainly from the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase,we identify common trends that were also visible inmany other projects and aspects of broaderreconstruction efforts.

There is no doubt that international assistance was vitalto the relief effort in Aceh, providing food, water, shelterand medical care for hundreds of thousands of tsunamivictims. In moving from relief to rehabilitation, and finallyto the reconstruction and development phases, theinternational community, and in particular the fivedonors on whose projects this study primarily draws,have made enormous contributions. This report doesnot seek to denigrate this very positive and necessarywork. Rather, it seeks to make a constructivecontribution towards identifying ways in which pastmistakes might be avoided in the future and ongoingprojects might be improved.

Most projects had some things go right and some thingsgo wrong. In presenting a few detailed stories that arescattered throughout the report, the intention is not toissue individual praise or indictments, but to providefully contextualised examples of themes that emergedin many projects. These case studies are presented toshow how the positive or negative dynamics from oneaction or issue can spill over to the larger projectenvironment, affecting mechanisms and creating resultsthat may linger in the community long after the donor isgone. Ideally, these lasting impacts would be positive,but in many cases they tend to be more negative.

Between March and December 2005 we visited over ahundred communities and looked at almost 50 projectsacross five major areas - emergency aid, health,housing, livelihoods, and infrastructure - funded by fivemajor donors. We conducted individual and focus groupinterviews, meetings, and briefings, as well as directobservation; we also conducted random questionnaire-style interviews in communities. To hear the other sideof the story, we also collected print information from andtalked to donors and implementers.

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Methodology

I. Introduction The research was carried out by a team of sixAcehnese researchers, one Indonesian researcher inJakarta, and researchers in Australia and in Brussels. Intotal, we collected information from over 120 Indonesianand international government and non-governmentorganisations, intergovernmental organisations, andinternational financial institutions; in the process, wespoke to about 1,000 individuals.

The donors from whose programmes the bulk of thecase studies and examples are drawn are the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB), the World Bank, Australiangovernment assistance, primarily through the newAustralia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction andDevelopment (AIPRD), the European Commission (EC),and the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and NorthSumatra (MDTFANS, hereafter MDTF). Some of thesedonors, such as the ADB and World Bank, work closelywith the Indonesian government and channel themajority of their funding on-budget via the IndonesianMinistry of Finance. This has led to delays in disbursingfunds; in fact most of the ADB's programmes plannedfor the first year have been delayed until 2006. Bothdonors have expanded existing programmes, andestablished new ones to assist in reconstruction efforts.The ADB and World Bank are involved in the medium tolong-term reconstruction and rehabilitation process,contributing not only money, but much-needed technicalassistance to Indonesian government departments andmechanisms. In contrast, the AIPRD usuallyimplements programmes via managing contractors,using these companies to disburse funds directly to theproject in the field. Their rationale for this approach isthat it partly allows for quicker implementation ofprogrammes. Similarly, the European Community'sHumanitarian Aid department (ECHO) responds toemergency situations via a system of long-standingpartner organisations. Its funds can be disbursed swiftlyand off-budget; although primarily emergency focused,ECHO can continue to fund secondary emergencies forseveral years in one disaster zone. Meanwhile, theEuropean Commission has put its reconstruction faith inthe MDTF, committing all its longer-term rehabilitationand reconstruction assistance to the Trust Fund tomanage. As the single largest donor to the Trust Fund,the EC is the co-chair and is able to have substantialpolicy input into both on and off-budget grants from thefund. The MDTF itself was established by theIndonesian government and the World Bank; its 15members have contributed more than $530 million. TheFund was initially established to support large-scale on-budget programmes using Indonesian governmentmechanisms, but more recently has turned to somedirect (off-budget) funding to partner organisations.Together, these donors represent a variety ofmechanisms for channelling assistance; even thoughnot all are among the largest donors to the Acehnesereconstruction effort, their programme variety in termsof substance and mechanisms make them of interest.

The initial problems faced by the research team werethose relating to identifying who in a particular agencyor donor was responsible for specific programmes, andwho had the information that was required for ourresearch. We were conscious of the drain on alreadyoverstretched human resources of many donors andimplementers, and were careful to consider time andother constraints. For the most part, staff from theprimary donors were extremely accommodating with

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their time and forthcoming with Information. The MDTFand the World Bank operated an almost 'open door'policy with our team; the ADB and EuropeanCommission delegations were also very helpful. Theexception was the AIPRD and its parent agencyAusAID; despite several attempts by phone, e-mail,and even personal visits to the offices in Aceh, requeststo meet senior members of staff were refused. We weretold on several occasions that a dedicated member ofstaff in Canberra, Australia was the only person with theauthority to provide information on the reconstructionprocess; this person, however, was uncontactable byphone or e-mail. For this reason, the analysis ofAustralian programmes is almost wholly informed by ouron-the-ground research, with minimal input from

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members of the Australian government's publicrelations staff in Jakarta and some junior staff in Aceh.Meanwhile, we met with varying degrees of helpfulnessfrom implementers, ranging from a high level oftransparency to a refusal to speak with us; many werereluctant to speak about project specifics such asbudgets and such basic information as the exactlocation of a project and who implementing partnerswere. There was particular sensitivity when theimplementing partner was a local non-governmentalorganisation (NGO) or community-based organisation.The research team was often left with the impressionthat site visits and in-depth discussions with staffmembers were most unwelcome.

Before the tsunami, Aceh was, in the Indonesiancontext, a relatively wealthy province in terms ofresources availability. Most people lived in their ownhomes and had access to land. Economic activity wasfocused largely around traditional farming and fishing,as well as forestry with 47% of Aceh's workforceengaged in these sectors. Many others were smalltraders or civil servants or worked in the service sector.Nevertheless, this is not to say there was no poverty inAceh: violent conflict in the province had all butdestroyed Aceh's economy. Government data showsthat in September 2004, 53.3% of families in Aceh wereliving below the poverty line.

At the time when the tsunami swept ashore, a bloodywar of independence had been raging in the provincefor almost 30 years, leading to an estimated 15,000deaths. Many thousands more were tortured orimprisoned, or simply disappeared. The social andeconomic fabric of Aceh's society was considerablyweakened, leav ing many communi t ies wi thimpoverished social services and economies that hadlong ceased to function. After years of escalatingviolence, a peace process began in 2000 that producedweak agreements aimed at stemming the violence;unfortunately, none were long-lived. Finally, inDecember 2002, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement(CoHA) was signed between the Indonesiangovernment and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).Many were hopeful that the CoHA could in fact bringpeace to the troubled province, but several monthslater, amid escalating violence in the field and anincreasingly hardline stance from some members of theIndonesian government and the armed forces (TNI),further peace negotiations were cancelled and waragainst the separatists was declared. The CoHAcollapsed on 18 May 2003, and martial law wasimposed in Aceh one day later. The GAM peacenegotiators were arrested, charged with treason andimprisoned. Several weeks later, Aceh was effectivelyclosed to the outside world, and local media was tightlycontrolled as the Indonesian military embarked on asearch-and-destroy mission to "crush" GAM and itssupporters. Finally, after a violent and bloody year ofmartial law in which 2,000 people (largely civilians) werekilled, the security situation was downgraded to a stateof civil emergency. But the estimated 40,000 militaryand police that had been stationed in the provinceduring martial law to fight GAM remained, and were infact instrumental in saving lives in the hours and daysafter the earthquake and tsunami of December 2004.

At 8 am on 26 December 2004, an earthquakemeasuring 9.0 on the Richter scale occurred in theIndian Ocean. Its epicenter was just 150 kilometresfrom Indonesia's most northwestern province of Aceh.Less than an hour later, a tsunami reached the shoresof Aceh and the North Sumatran island of Nias, itswaters reaching as far inland as seven kilometres insome places. Similar waves also struck over a dozenother countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia and EastAfrica.

The damage inflicted by the tsunami that hit Acehshocked even the most experienced disaster specialist.

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A devastating earthquake and tsunami

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Seemingly sturdy structures were razed; ships wereripped from their moorings and came to rest on top ofbuildings; thousands of dead bodies lay scattered. Inthe area worst affected, the administrative district ofAceh Jaya, 85% of buildings were damaged, while theprovince's capital of Banda Aceh sustained 75%damage. Thirteen of Aceh's twenty-one administrativedistricts were affected by the tsunami, six of themseverely. The coastline was redrawn, with land both lostto and gained from the sea. The damage toinfrastructure was massive: communications werewiped out, fuel depots destroyed, drinking watersupplies contaminated, bridges and ports unusable.Hospitals and clinics were washed away, collapsed, orwere so badly damaged that they became inoperable.

In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the militaryand teams of volunteers raced to bury the tens ofthousands of bodies that littered the streets, weretrapped in the debris and cars, or were even found intrees and on top of buildings. Across Aceh, 130,736people were killed and 37,066 people left missing; morethan 100,000 bodies are now buried in mass graves.Among these were thousands of individuals whoseskills would have been vital to the emergency reliefeffort: health personnel, police and military, and localgovernment officials and civil servants.

Meanwhile, with around 123,000 houses destroyed,some 514,150 people fled to refugee camps, with anestimated similar number moving in with relatives orfriends or building makeshift huts. Some of the moreremote camps lacked food and many were short ofpotable water and sanitation facilities. In the first fewdays, the shortage of clean drinking water, medicalassistance, medicines, and lack of sanitation created apotential public health emergency.

As the waters receded, it became evident that hundredsof thousands of livelihoods had been destroyed.Thousands of fishing boats were damaged and lost,along with half of the existing fishing industryinfrastructure. Meanwhile, 25,840 out of 36,614hectares of brackish water shrimp/fish ponds (tambak)were damaged. In addition, fields and plantationsdisappeared under water, or became so silted up withmud and salt that they were rendered useless. In theagriculture sector, 57,758 hectares of irrigated land, and29,948 hectares of non-irrigated agricultural land weredamaged and in need of minor or extensive repair.Irrigation networks in these districts were alsodamaged. Thousands of head of livestock were lost. Intotal, more than 240,000 families traditionally involved inthe agriculture sector lost their livelihoods, and riceproduction in 2005 decreased by 397,504 tons from theprevious year.

The province had also suffered terrible damage toinstitutions critical to its long-term reconstruction. Theprovincial government and many local leveladministrations were devastated, suffering substantialloss of personnel, expertise and infrastructure: inFebruary 2005, it was announced that 2,992 out of atotal of 77,530 registered civil servants in Aceh werekilled, with a further 2,274 still missing. District, sub-district and village level governance was alsoweakened; many current (sub-district heads) and

(village heads) have been appointed post-tsunami. The damage to the health and education

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camatkepala desa

II. Aceh and the tsunami

sectors was substantial. More than 500 health workersdied or are missing, 8 hospitals were damaged, and 114health centres. In education, over 380 schools weredestroyed, and 954 damaged, and more than 2,000teachers are dead or missing. The Department ofReligious Affairs also reported that 209 of its(religious schools) and 155 (traditionalIslamic boarding schools) were damaged. The StateIslamic Institute (IAIN), one of the biggest and mostprestigious universities in Aceh, sustained substantialdamage; the Directorate General of Higher Educationreported that as many as 200 university lecturers acrossthe province were killed. The local media infrastructurewas also ravaged. Aceh's daily newspaper,

, was unable to cover the biggest story in itshistory: located only 500 metres from the coast,

office and printing presses were destroyed,and almost half of its staff killed. Banda Aceh also lost16 radio stations, while in Meulaboh on the west coast,all four local radio stations were either completely orpartially destroyed.

By the evening of 26 December, Indonesian PresidentSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared a nationaldisaster and ordered line departments and ministries tomobilise available resources for the emergencyresponse and recovery processes. For the emergencyrelief and rescue efforts, Vice President Jusuf Kalla wasappointed to lead an existing government emergencymechanism, the National Coordinating Board forDisaster Management and IDPs (BAKORNAS PBP). Inthe days immediately following the disaster,BAKORNAS PBP was mainly tasked with providingimmediate assistance to tsunami survivors in the formof search and rescue, food, shelter, and medical help,as well as with burying the dead. In these tasks, theywere joined by the forces both of GAM (which declareda unilateral ceasefire on 26 December and joined inrelief efforts) and of the TNI (which, to a far greaterextent than GAM, had itself suffered significant lossesof life and equipment). Some 15,000 of the 40,000 TNItroops in Aceh were detailed to the humanitarian reliefoperation, and an additional 12,000 troops were sent toAceh on 14 January 2005 to hasten the burial of bodiesand clearing of debris. These efforts were quicklyjoined by thousands of volunteers from the provincialgovernment, the centra l government, re l ieforganisations, and communities from elsewhere inIndonesia.

During the first days after the disaster, Aceh remainedclosed to outsiders, as it had been during both martiallaw and the subsequent civil emergency. It soonbecame evident, however, that the scope of the disastermade outside assistance imperative. On the afternoonof 28 December 2004, the Indonesian governmentformally requested the help of the UN and others for therelief effort. In particular, Kalla invited the UnitedNations Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (UN-OCHA) to coordinate the international reliefeffort and international aid workers. Many relieforganisations had already dispatched emergencymedical and rescue teams to stand by in neighbouringareas waiting for permission to enter Aceh. When theprovince was opened on the evening of 28 December,international NGOs and foreign government relief teamsstreamed in. Meanwhile, foreign militaries arrived in

madrasahpesantren

SerambiIndonesia

Serambi's

Humanitarian response: the emergency phase

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Aceh with helicopters, transport aircrafts and ships tofacilitate the movement of logistics and key personnel tothe areas that were cut off. A TNI press release on 17January noted that 4,478 foreign troops were already inAceh. Any immediate or real threat to the lives ofsurvivors was minimised by international teams playinga key role in providing health services, temporaryaccommodation, and clean water for survivors.

It soon became evident that massive international fund-ing would be necessary across the tsunami-affectedregions not only for the emergency relief effort, but alsofor longer term reconstruction efforts. Many donorsrapidly rose to the occasion. Within only a few hours ofnews of the tsunami, the EC, through its humanitariandepartment ECHO released €3 million ($3.6 million) inimmediate assistance for the region, with a further €20million committed later that week. The UNDP alsoreleased funds ($500,000) on the same day,and by 27 December, Australia had already dedicatedA$10 ($7.5) million to tsunami-affected regions; manyothers scrambled to respond quickly. A few days afterthe tsunami, the international community had alreadypledged half a billion dollars for support to the affectedcountries in the region. That figure jumped to more than$800 million by the end of December 2004, when theUnited States increased its pledge from $35 million to$350 million. On 6 January 2005, the UN SecretaryGeneral launched a Flash Appeal for the affectedregion. At a meeting in Geneva on 11 January, donorspledged 77% of the $977 million requested forimmediate relief ($371 million of which was forIndonesia). By 6 April 2005, a midterm review of theFlash Appeal adjusted the amount needed across thetsunami affected region upward to $1.087 billion. Theallocation for Indonesia alone had increased to $396million. A further review of the Appeal is planned for theperiod January-June 2006; it is likely that the total willrise again.

Meanwhile, the outpouring of private charitabledonations worldwide was unprecedented; eventuallyreaching $2.5 billion. In Britain alone, the publicpledged 20 million ($35.35 million) in less than 48hours after the UK Disasters Emergency Committee(DEC), an umbrella group for a dozen British charities,launched its Tsunami Earthquake Appeal on 28December 2004. American private donations fortsunami affected countries were estimated at around$1.3 billion; Australian private donations to NGOstotalled A$375.3 million ($281.1 million). Manyorganisations indeed ended up closing their appeals; forinstance, the DEC closed its appeal - the biggest-everfundraising campaign in UK history - on 26 February2005, after raising more than 300 million ($528.8million). The Red Cross organisations also stoppedtaking donations, as did many others.

In this context of generous giving, both the Indonesiangovernment and the international community movedrapidly to determine the country's needs. Indonesianline ministries, in particular the National DevelopmentPlanning Agency (BAPPENAS) was tasked withdocumenting the loss and damage of assets and theanticipated costs of reactivating local government andsocial services. Hundreds of (temporarycoordination centres) sprang up throughout Aceh, and

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acted not only as distribution points but data collectioncentres. The estimated total damage and loss for Acehand affected areas of North Sumatra was totalled at$4.5 billion - 97% of Aceh's pre-tsunami annual grossdomestic product (GDP). After a subsequentearthquake on 28 March 2005, the damage and lossfigure increased to $4.8 billion. The total estimatedneeds for long-term recovery and rebuilding ofIndonesia's tsunami-affected regions were $5.0-$5.5billion.

In response, donor pledges were generous. Accordingto the United Nations Special Tsunami Envoy, as ofDecember 2005 the total funds pledged by theinternational community for Indonesia's long-termrecovery came to $6.1 billion. Of the funds pledged,approximately $3.6 billion is from multilateral andbilateral donors and international financial institutions,with another $2.5 billion from NGOs, the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies(IFRC), and others.

In June 2005, the Indonesian Parliament approved anincrease in the National Budget allocation for Aceh fromRp 10.7 trillion ($1.15 billion) to Rp 13.3 trillion ($1.4billion) to contribute to the rehabilitation and recon-struction process. Of the $1.4 billion total, Rp 8.8trillion ($948 million) comes from funds released bynternational creditors' debt moratorium and the resche-duling of foreign loans; Rp 3.9 trillion ($420 million) inthe form of grants from foreign governments, and Rp 0.6trillion ($420,000) from re-allocation of project loans.

While there thus is no shortage of funds for post-tsunami needs, the money has not been flowing toprojects as quickly as expected. Some donors, such asthe AIPRD, lacked capacity to implement programmesquickly after the disaster and came under muchcriticism at home for slow disbursal of funds, whileothers, such as the ADB and World Bank, chose tochannel funds on-budget. Indonesian governmentfinancial mechanisms, newly reformed to promotesound financial management, were unable to cope withthe sudden influx of such large amounts of money.Extensive bureaucratic requirements, including a newlydevised programme planning and expendituredocument have caused long delays, with grantdisbursement approval often stuck in the Ministry ofFinance. Under the coordination of the line ministries,new working units put in place to submit draft activityand budget plans also caused delays; according to anofficial from the ADB: "Staff were slow to understandthe new mechanism, which was in fact itself poorlydeveloped." It is not unusual to hear officials of somelarge on-budget donors complain about the lack ofcapacity within these government ministries to deal withtheir own mechanisms. As one senior diplomatremarked: "Indonesia is an incredibly over-bureaucraticcountry. But if we try to interfere in that bureaucracy, thewheels will turn even more slowly." There is alsofrustration within the BRR. An Indonesian officialconcurs with the generally held view: "The excessivebureaucracy is making processes laborious and veryslow. We really need the finance department to show asense of emergency in this very unusual situation."

The excessive and inefficient bureaucracy has had

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Bureaucratic delays: the dilemma of on-budgetmechanisms

significant impact on the rolling out of many projects,for instance those of the ADB. In April 2005, the ADBadopted a $290 million grant agreement with theIndonesian government to fund 12 sectors andimplemented by the various line ministries. However,grants did not even begin to reach the localdepartments in Aceh until late November 2005. TheADB said its programmes had been frustrated by thedelays caused by the complicated bureaucracy in theMinistry of Finance, and that the ADB had been inconstant correspondence with Jakarta in an effort torelease blockages. The head of the Department ofAgriculture in Aceh was also frustrated after waiting sixmonths for the ADB money, and afraid ofmismanagement and waste if the programme had to beimplemented too quickly. "The Department of Agicultureis scheduled to receive Rp 72 billion ($7,754 million) tobe spent on repair and development of the agriculturesector between September and December 2005," hesaid. "But this is already November, and the money hasnot yet arrived, how can we spend it? I want thegovernment to extend the programme implementationperiod until April." When the grant eventually reachedthe department in late November, an extension untilApril 2006 had been granted.

Similar frustrations have also been experienced by theMDTF, which has also channelled significant amountsof funds via on-budget mechanisms for variousprogrammes. One programme whose start was delayedwas the MDTF's "Reconstruction of Aceh's LandAdministration System" (RALAS) programme. Ir. RazaliYahya, head of Aceh's branch of the National LandAgency (BPN), was not happy. "This process of landownership should have begun much sooner", he said."But the problem is that the MDTF insisted the moneybe channelled on-budget, via the Ministry of Finance,and we had to then submit a complicated budget andplanning proposal. We effectively received the moneyear ly October , and began the programmeimmediately." A representative of the MDTFresponded: "I am not saying the government's processis bad, but it is definitely slow. However, this is agovernment mechanism, and we cannot interfere inthat. But what we can do is to tell them that theirbureaucracy is very, very slow."

The terrible devastation caused by the tsunami had onepositive effect: GAM and the Indonesian governmentreturned to the negotiating table for further talks on howto reach a peaceful solution to the long and violentconflict. Several rounds of peace talks took place in thepost-tsunami environment, which not only carried addedurgency but was also more politically congenial tocompromise than that of previous negotiations. Finally aMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on15 August 2005 that was wide-ranging and aimed atsustainable peace and continued dialogue. Theagreement leaves many issues for further negotiationand compromise and cannot be seen as a fullguarantee of peace, but it does contain a greatermeasure of political good will than previousagreements. GAM has fulfilled its commitment todecommissioning a pre-agreed number of weapons(which it says are all its weapons); in return, theIndonesian military has withdrawn significant numbers

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of its troops.

Many political, social, and economic issues arenevertheless sure to arise as the MoU unrolls in theshort and medium term. And potential spoilers exist onboth sides within GAM and the Indonesian securityforces and their proxy militia armies. The unarmed AcehMonitoring Mission (AMM), made up of representativesfrom the EU, five ASEAN countries, Switzerland andNorway, is tasked with supporting both sides in theirattempts to adhere to the spirit and letter of theagreement, to monitor implementation, and to rule ondisputed cases; but its task is vast and the road aheadis potentially troubled. The implementation of the MoUhas certainly calmed what was a volatile post-tsunamisecurity environment, making it much easier for donorsto travel around the province, and paving the way for aless troubled implementation of programmes. The

A variety of Indonesian government arms have been tasked with Aceh-related responsibilities. The NationalCoordinating Board for Disaster Management and IDPs (BAKORNAS PBP) was tasked to coordinate theemergency relief and rescue operations, as well as recovery in the emergency phase. In oversight of theemergency relief effort on a day-to-day basis, a provincial extension of BAKORNAS PBP, the ProvincialCoordinating Board for Disaster Management and IDPs (SATKORLAK PBP) took control. At the districtlevel, these boards are known as Implementation Units for Disaster Management (SATLAK PBP).Meanwhile, the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) has been charged with coordinatingthe work plan and funding for longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction. BAPPENAS was charged withpreparing a blueprint or master plan for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias island, finallysubmitted on 15 April. The Department of Finance, together with BAPPENAS, is responsible forcoordinating the funding and controlling the finances for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Meanwhile, there was an immediate need for an oversight body that would coordinate overall rehabilitationand reconstruction Aceh. The Bureau of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (BRR) was established bypresidential decree on 29 April 2005 to ensure a coordinated approach to planning, fundraising andimplementation. The bureau's initial operational expenses were covered by $12 million from the IndonesianMinistry of Finance; the bureau also relied on assistance to start from the Australian government, andcontinues to receive funds and technical support from many donors. The MDTF has committed $ 14.7 millionto the BRR, and is providing technical assistance for human resource management, quality assurance andlegal services, project management and other assistance. There is also significant information technologyassistance, and an emphasis on monitoring to ensure a corruption-free process. The UNDP has also beencharged with recruiting technical assistance, although the process has been subject to some delays due tobureaucratic bottlenecks within the UNDP. Furthermore, because the issue of foreign technical assistancehad not been adequately socialised among local BRR employees, many feared that foreign assistancecoming in would result in changes to systems that people had already worked hard to put in place. Theseproblematic issues have now been worked out, but caused unnecessary delays earlier on.

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quantity and quality of the reconstruction programmewill potentially have a profound impact on thesustainability of the new peace. Some donors haverecognised the need for cross-mandate activities thatwill include ex-GAM soldiers and conflict-affectedcommunities. For example, the World Bank hasconducted GAM reintegration needs assessments,aimed at providing information to help understand thedevelopment needs of former combatants and theircommunities, and to consider current reintegrationprogramming and potential obstacles. In essence, thesequalitative assessments are aimed at identifying whatdevelopment programmes might be included that willhelp to strengthen the peace process. The EuropeanCommission is also providing support to assist inmeasures to reintegrate former GAM combatants intocivil society and democratic political life, and areconsidering assistance to wider conflict areas.

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III. A people's reconstruction agenda?

The reconstruction process

Difficult problems, difficult choicesAid donors and implementers have faced manyconstraints in their reconstruction and developmentoperations. Donors and implementers, their effortscomplicated by high staff turnover in Aceh and theirown internal bureaucracies as well as that of theIndonesian government, have had to grapple with amyriad of complexities related to rebuilding in sucha damaged environment with shortages of availablematerials, as well as with the logistical and financialproblems of moving and purchasing materials in asituation where roads, bridges and ports have allbeen damaged and where prices have been risingdramat ica l ly . The fact that the Indones iangovernment lacked a coordinating agency fortsunami aid until April 2005 meant that in manyc a s e s p r o j e c t s w e r e l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e duni lateral ly, and in a very ad-hoc manner.Uncertainty over an Indonesian prohibition (nowlargely ignored) on building within 2 kilometres ofthe coast as a safety measure only added to theconfusion. And other issues have presentedthemselves as well:

The tension between building back fast and buildingback well. There is an obvious tension between theneed and desire for quick results and the need forinterventions to be done in a correct and sustainableway, which inevitably requires a longer planning period.In the enormous outpouring of public, corporate andgovernment sympathy that drove the tremendousfinancial response, there was an immediate andpressing sense of obligation on the part of the donorsand implementers, to show that results could be fast,visible and wide-ranging. Hence, tremendous pressurearose to disburse large amounts of resources veryquickly.

The tension between simple reconstruction andbuilding back better. The state of pre-tsunamiinfrastructure in Aceh was poor, due to years of under-investment by the government and a lack of privateinvestment due largely to Aceh's volatile securityenvironment. The reconstruction efforts present aunique opportunity for the improvement of sewage anddrainage systems, roads, schools, clinics and otherpublic infrastructure, as well as for the establishment ofnew facilities such as libraries, pre-school facilities, oremployment centres. But such improvements, whichrequire careful planning, take time.

The problems of working in an infamously corruptenvironment. Both donors and the Indonesiangovernment have taken steps to combat corruptionwithin the relief effort, but the issue has consumed timeand resources that might otherwise have been availableelsewhere.

The problems inherent in working with a traumatised,dispersed population with a low skills base, few or noresources, and severely damaged social structures,most of whom had no previous exposure to aidagencies, and the working practices of the UN, bilateraldonors, INGOs and others.

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In this difficult environment, most donors have madestrong on-paper commitments to high standards ofpractice, including a commitment to gender sensitivity,env i ronmenta l protect ion, consul ta t ion wi thbeneficiaries, and the implementation of anti-corruptionmechanisms. For an overview of the programmes of thefive donors on whose projects this study draws, seeAppendix 1, page 43

The 50 or so programmes that this study surveyedvaried widely in their scope, their objectives and theirimpact on local communities. Virtually all projects hadaspects that had gone well; most had also faceddifficulties in at least a few areas. In looking at theimpact of programmes, we tried to think not only abouttheir current impact, but also about their probableimpact in the months and years to come. In this context,a few consistent areas of concern emerged.

Pre-project needs assessments are vital to thesuccessful identification and design of rehabilitation andreconstruct ion act iv i t ies. They help donorsconceptualise and prioritise projects, as well as to layout provisional budgets. For the most part, however, wefound that donors and implementers rarely consultedwith communities (or indeed each other) during the pre-project assessment process. Such consultation mighthave helped ward off future problems, includingineffective or inappropriate projects or waste.

For example, better community consultation might haveled to less wastage of small grants. Many donors areimplementing small grants schemes in areas where nopre-tsunami economic profile has been conducted. Insome of these areas, however, many of the businessesdestroyed were medium-sized businesses, whoseowners neither want nor need micro-credit. In BandaAceh, for example, many of the communities now leftdestitute by the tsunami were in fact quite wealthy byAcehnese standards, and would like to restart thebusinesses they lost at the level at which they werepreviously operating. These people need access tolarger credit facilities than are currently available fromdonors. Moreover, the small grants on offer - whichusually do not exceed $250 per person - are inadequateto begin a business in Aceh's high inflation economy.As a consequence, small grants given out by donorssuch as Mercy Corps, Oxfam, IOM, CHF, IRD, WorldVision and many others are sometimes used to repayexisting loans, buy second-hand motorbikes, repairdamaged housing, or other "non-business" activities.Aminah and her friend are not untypical: the smallbusiness grant of Rp1.5 million ($162) received fromIRD was spent on new hand phones. "What do theyexpect us to do with that small amount of money?Actually, we don't want to begin a small business butthey offered the money, so we took it. Our husbandsneed a loan to restart their previous business. Thatwould be more useful, but is not available," she said.(See "Grants versus Microcredit," page 21). Efforts topull together groups into cooperative or communalbusinesses, or even to open small kiosks or begin homeindustries, are encountering similar issues of localappropriateness.

Consultation and communication

Consultation during pre-project needs assessments

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Donors have struggled to figure out how to deal with Indonesia's endemic corruption. The government does nothave a good reputation for public finance management. This is one of the main reasons many of the donors tothe Multi Donor Trust Fund give for channelling funds this way. The EC decided to channel its longer term aidthough the MDTF: "The World Bank, as a trustee of the Fund, has the capacity to ensure transparency andaccountability. We needed to be sure there is no leakage from our aid, and we are confident that the Fund'smechanisms can do that." The ADB's on budget mechanism also requires that they pay special notice to theissue of leakage. Therefore, the ADB has made it a core component of its work to be involved in several of theanti corruption mechanisms relating to the reconstruction process in Aceh. The ADB is working with the existingCorruption Eradication Committee (KPK), a government mechanism that has recently undergone reforms as partof the effort to rid the country of the endemic corruption for which it is infamous, and has also placed consultantswithin the BRR to assist with policies and processes for best practice "not only for our own grants, but to ensureall donors are protected against possible loss of funds. In this effort, we collaborate with others such as theauditing firm Ernst and Young."

Meanwhile, the chief of the BRR, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, is himself keen to ensure the agency is "free fromKKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism)." As part of these efforts, the BRR established an Anti-Corruption Unit(SAK) as a joint initiative with Indonesia's KPK; its main operating components are corruption prevention,investigation, education and the enhancement of integrity. The establishment of SAK was encouraged and issupported by foreign donors. A BAPPENAS official explained: "Basically, the donors pushed SAK on the BRR.They have given so much money to Indonesia for Aceh's reconstruction, and they will continue to give overseveral years. It's important for them to be sure government officials are not siphoning off some of those dollarsfor themselves." SAK has actively sought out cases of existing and potential corruption; between its inception inmid-September 2005 and mid November 2005, it received 120 reports, 20% of which were related to the issue ofpotential corruption, 18% were related to the issue of corruption in tender process, and 16% related to the workethic of BRR staff.

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underway. Of those waiting for houses, around67,000 live in tents, and between 60,000 to 70,000in barracks. The remaining live in makeshift huts,or with relatives and friends. The process ofproviding housing in Aceh is inevitably slow due tothe complexities of the task. Land ownership mustbe confirmed before building can take place; someland remains under water; there are greatdifficulties in transporting building materials; ashortage of legally-sourced wood; water andsan i ta t ion fac i l i t ies take t ime to p lan andimplement, and clean water has to be trucked in tosome areas. All of these factors conspire to stymiethe efforts of agencies involved in the housingsector. The magnitude of such logistics problemsand the often vocal impatience of Acehneset rapped in tents or unsat is fac tory bar rackaccommodation serve to compound what oneforeign NGO worker calls "the misery of working onhousing in Aceh." In such an environment, greateragency coordination and collaboration (instead ofthe usual competition), and consultation with localpeople, would go at least some of the way towardalleviating these problems. As it stands, manyimplementers view adding on a potentially lengthyconsultation process as a recipe for disaster, onlycomplicating matters and lengthening delays. Ourresearch suggests, however, that the frustration ofthose waiting for housing could be substantiallyreduced by employing a more interactive method ofhousing design. The frustration and anger thatmany local people feel in the face of delays is oftengreatly compounded when they see houses beingbuilt that are unsuitable to their family's needs. Forexample a housing project for civil servantssponsored by the Queensland government ofAustralia has resulted in houses that the occupantsdo not wish to inhabit (see "Going it Alone is Risky,"page 27 ). Some communities, however, such asthose working with the Catholic Relief Services(CRS) in Meulaboh have been given toolkits,materials and the necessary technical assistance

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By contrast, the World Bank's Kecamatan (Rural)Development Programme (KDP) and the Urban PovertyProgramme (UPP), two community-driven developmentschemes, whilst not without problems, have given somemeasure of input for the local population into the needsassessment process. These schemes, which makeblock grants available to local communities for publicinfrastructure, are implemented through a system ofsub-district and village facilitators, in coordination withtechnical experts, consultants and province andprogramme coordinators. The job of facilitators is tocoordinate participatory planning meetings and toensure broad consultation on the priorities of the villagein preparation for submitting the proposal on theinfrastructure projects for which the block grant isrequested. Several hundred new facilitators have beenrecruited and trained to support the programme's post-tsunami expansion. During the emergency period, some25% of the local block grants funds were madeavailable to meet urgent and immediate needs ofcommunities.

Once needs assessments have been conducted,consultation with beneficiaries over project designcan also help ensure appropriate and sustainableoutcomes. This study found, however, that all toocommon failure to consult with beneficiaries oftenled to potentially highly successful projects goingbadly awry, leading to wasted funds and leavingbeneficiaries frustrated and demoralised, whiledonors who do consult often have more congenialrelations with local communities, and better projectoutcomes.

Two areas extending across many donors andimplementers that suffered badly from lack ofcoordination were those of housing and fishingboats. Twelve months after the tsunami, withalmost 500,000 people still displaced, only 16,200houses had been completed, with another 13,200

Consultation during project design

Although most donors and implementers consulted national and local government officials at least to somedegree during the needs assessment phase, few mechanisms exist for consultation of civil society groups. Theactivities of civil society groups - non-governmental organisations, civic action groups - were severely disruptedduring the conflict in Aceh, very few NGO councils or other mechanisms exist that could bring togetherrepresentatives of Acehnese NGOs. Some of those formed in the wake of the tsunami, such as the AcehRecovery Forum, have also experienced a loss of local confidence as they move farther out into the politicalarena. Some local NGOs, for example the Aceh Legal Aid Foundation (LBH-Aceh), have attempted to engagewith international donors, for instance through the production of ad hoc recommendations; regular informaldiscussions between implementing international NGOs and some local NGOs also occur. A regular participant atthese meetings said that the impact on policy or implementation is minimal: "It seems that these internationaldonors have their own agenda; they will not change that whatever we say."

The MDTF, alone among donors, has two civil society representatives on its Steering Committee. In interviewsfor this report, however, neither of the Acehnese representatives, Naimah Hassan nor Humam Hamid, seemedto understand why they had been appointed to this body nor by whom these appointments were made. BothHassan and Hamid said they make no claim to representing civil society on the Steering Committee, as theywere not elected by the Acehnese people. Hamid stated: "When the person from the World Bank asked me toparticipate in the Steering Committee, I told them I thought it would be a conflict of interests because I am on thesupervisory board of BRR. But they said that is no problem." Hamid intimated that there were minimaldiscussions before and after his appointment and that he has (by November) been to only two meetings. "I wastold by the MDTF I was the civil society representative but they never explained why I was appointed, and whatmy rights and responsibilities are." The Trust Fund secretariat is aware that the system is imperfect. "We areaware that the civil society representatives "are not wholly representative, but we had no alternative at thetime," said the Trust Fund manager. Moreover, he continued: "To embark on a process of democraticallyelecting civil society representatives would be long and arduous. But it is better to have some level ofrepresentation than none." The seventh meeting of the Steering Committee took place in December, with still nosign of any moves to make the civil society representation more representative.

At the same time, very few people within Aceh know of the existence of Acehnese representatives on theSteering Committee. Several months after its establishment, leaders of some of the larger civil society networksin Aceh were surveyed to assess the level of input to the Trust Fund's process. Of ten interviewed, only twowere aware of any civil society representation. A representative of the Aceh Institute commented: "I know bothNaimah and Humam in their private capacity, but I had no idea they were sitting on the Steering Committee ofthe MDTF f they are representing civil society, [they should] coordinate with other civil society actors."Moreover, Chair of the influential Ulama Consultative Council (MPU), was not even aware of the existence of theMDTF. Both representatives on the Steering Committee admit that few Acehnese are aware of or understandtheir roles, positions or activities in the Trust Fund. Hamid explains: "If the Trust Fund wants us to socialiseideas and gather opinions here in Aceh, then they should give us financial resources to do so. But they do not."By November, the MDTF had adopted a policy to socialise its activities to the communities in Aceh in preparationfor the unrolling of its programmes, such as housing, and others that will directly involve the communities on aday-to-day basis. Yet more clearly must be done for the MDTF or the Acehnese community to reap benefits fromthe presence of these 'civil society representatives' on the Steering Committee.

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fishermen themselves. Indeed, if one travels thecoastal area of Aceh, many 'aid boats' can be seenunused. The engines or other parts have usuallybeen taken to use in other boats or to sell.Frustrated at the lack of positive response to theirlobby ing e f fo r ts w i th in te rna t iona l donors ,Panglima Laot said "the most important thing formany agencies is to be able to say they have givenboats; whether or not the boats are then used is oflittle concern to some donors." The fishingassociation has further recommended that donorsand agencies stop distributing boats under sevenmetres, as well as to consider environmentallyfriendly nets and other equipment.

For example, ECHO gave the Agency for TechnicalCooperation and Development (ACTED) nearly $1million for the much-needed construction and purchaseof seagoing boats and equipment for fishingcommunities in Nagan Raya and Aceh Barat districts.The first ten boats were handed over to fishermen inNagan Raya in June 2005. However, five months later,none of the boats had ever been used for fishing - noteven in the river.

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to rebuild their homes, while those assisted byMuslim Aid in Kampong Jawa, Banda Aceh, areable to adapt a basic design to suit their own needs,even negotiating the size of the house dependingon the number of people in the family. In suchcircumstances, community shelter meetings aremuch less heated affairs.

Meanwhile, the need for boats to replace thethousands lost in the tsunami was real and urgent.Many donors or implementers, however, did notconsult with the local fishermen about the type andsize of boat needed. According to Aceh's traditionalfishing association, Panglima Laot, almost half ofthe thousands of boats donated after the tsunamiare ei ther ent i re ly inappropr iate for Aceh'streacherous waters or are too small (under 7metres) to be used outside coastal waters andrivers, with implications for over fishing of coastalzones (see page 30). In some places, people weregiven boats of a poor standard, and some receivedno fishing equipment or funds to cover initialoperational costs; in other cases beneficiariescomplained that the nets given with the boats werethe wrong type, and had to be replaced by the

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When the earthquake and tsunami struck Aceh, the World Bank's KDP programme was already beingimplemented in 87 of Aceh's 220 rural sub-districts; with additional $68 million funding post-tsunami from theMDTF, it has expanded to all rural areas in Aceh. The KDP's urban counterpart, the Urban Poverty Programme(UPP), already a common feature elsewhere in Indonesia, also was introduced after the tsunami into Aceh'surban areas with a grant of $18 million from the MDTF.

Both the KDP and the UPP are promoted as "community-driven development" (CDD) programmes - the formerbeing one of the largest CDD projects, according to the World Bank, in East Asia. The KDP/UPP processes aimto facilitate community-driven development using its network of 1,450 facilitators to initiate village forums todiscuss local infrastructure needs and provide channels by which that information then makes its way to the sub-district and district levels. A KDP trainer explains the ethics he tries to instil in the network's sub-district facilitatortrainees: "I tell the new recruits that as a KDP facilitator, their job is to hold discussions on the initiatives andpriorities of the local villagers. I tell them 'Be careful there is no outside influence in this discussion. You must besure these priorities really are those of the village as a whole. Actually, their job is very simple: always representthe wishes of the people, always negotiate on the community's behalf, and always be open and honest withthem." The Chief of the BRR is very much in favour of such programmes: "The mechanisms used by the [WorldBank's] rural and urban community recovery projects are strong community-driven platforms. [They] can and willbe used by other NGOs and organisations; this is in line with the BRR's principle of using a bottom-up approach.This will greatly enhance an effective reconstruction and rehabilitation process of Aceh and Nias, led by thecommunities themselves."

This study, however, found reason to be concerned about the use of the KDP and UPP mechanisms to informcommunities of project plans that have been formulated by others with very little or no community discussion,rather than to collect information from the villagers about their community's own priorities and to assist them inconceptualizing and designing their own projects. KDP personnel are trained to facilitate discussion amongvillages and to communicate their priorities upwards, not act as messengers from donors to the communities.Increasingly, however, the KDP mechanism is being employed as an implementing mechanism, and as achannel of communication from the top down. For example, in relation to the construction of village offices andvillage halls in the sub-district of Baitussalam, Aceh Besar, the AIPRD has been sending messagesdown the KDP system about timing and other related issues. Local KDP facilitators explained: "Our role here isreally only to pass messages to the people when the Australian representatives tell us to do that. And to be surethat the money that comes to the KDP bank account is spent as it should be, that's all." This places KDPfacilitators in an awkward position with the local communities, as they are reluctant to reveal the truth aboutdelays and other problems relating to the AIPRD-funded village office programme. "We don't want to talk to thevillagers in case there is a further delay, or the programme is not implemented in all villages. To be honest, we[KDP facilitators] don't really know how to tell the people," said one facilitator. "The Australians say they will giveus training later this month, perhaps after that we can socialise the idea of village offices in Baitussalam." Theuse of the KDP and UPP as mouthpieces for donors and implementers, rather than for communities, willeventually lead to the community feeling distanced from the KDP/UPP mechanism, and will erode the integrity ofthe whole KDP/ UPP network.

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"We don't want to use these boats," a local fishermansaid. "They are not the usual boats we use around here.It would be dangerous to take them outside the river.ACTED never consulted with us about the boats. If theyhad asked us for input, we would have been very, veryhappy to help. They didn't, and now the boats are sittingin the water - they cannot go anywhere."

Fishermen in Aceh Besar working with a French NGOTGH have a quite different experience: discussionswith the TGH staff, local boat makers as well as an'open invitation' to visit the boat shed to check on thequality and progress of the boats being made for themhas led to a sense of ownership in the process, andgood relations between the donor (TGH) and localcommunities. (See"TGH aid boats - still afloat," page31).

By contrast, staff at the emergency department of theZainoel Abidin General Hospital (RSUZA) in BandaAceh, which is being rehabilitated under a partnershipagreement between the AIPRD, Indonesia and

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"We don't really want the boat from ACTED,but we will take it. It's an 'aid' boat - that's all."

Abdul Manaf, Nagan Raya, 13 December 2005

Germany, reported a highly successful consultativeprocess, both during the needs assessment processand in project design. The process of reconstructing thehospital's emergency facilities was a collaborative effortbe tween sen io r hosp i ta l s ta f f and AIPRDrepresentatives. "I've very happy with the newdepartment," said the head of the hospital "Wedesigned the layout ourselves, and the new equipmentis exactly what we requested." Staff will be trained inthe use of the more advanced equipment before thenew department becomes fully operational early thisyear.

One of the most common areas of concern amongbeneficiaries was lack of information, explanation andongoing consideration. Many beneficiaries seem tohave only a vague idea about what was involved inprojects; until and unless the communities actually sawthe progress of the project in its physical form, therewas often a very low understanding of what exactly theproject would deliver, and little awareness of aprogramme's timeline The lack of information madepeople feel helpless, and often made them questionwhether absent donors and implementers were sincerein their commitments to return to the village at all,

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Social accountability to beneficiaries

Inadequate communication can leave communitiesconvinced that implementers have abandonedthem. This problem has been particularly acute inrelation to housing. Many communities have waitedfor NGOs such as CARE in Simeulu, Oxfam inBlang Oi, or Samaritan Purse in Aceh Jaya, andother agencies such as the ADB in Lambada Lhok,to return to fulfil earlier commitments to buildhouses. Not wanting to renege on agreementsmade, the communities have turned down offers ofhousing by other donors. In September, the iin Aceh Jaya said that of the 12 MoUs signed withimplementers, most remained unfulfilled. Hisfrustration was evident: "We just called SamaritanPurse and told them if they don't fulfil what theypromised, they will no longer have an MoU. I willcancel it. The same for the others who do notrespect our desperate needs or the agreement theymade with us." he said. "The Turkish governmenthas delivered the houses it said it would, the others- not yet."

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Feeling abandonedBox

For example, in the AIPRD's project to construct villageoffices and in the sub-district of Baitussalam,lack of information flow described above was taking itstoll. When researchers interviewed the head of onevillage in October, he had been waiting for his AIPRD-funded village office for several months, and was underthe impression that construction would begin inNovember. A follow-up visit in early January 2006 foundhim losing patience: "I don't have any more news sinceyou were last here. Nobody has been to tell us thelatest update on our village office, and you can see foryourself it has not even begun. No Australians or theirrepresentatives ever came to meet us here." The lackof information flow has created a climate of virtualindifference in some villages in Baitussalam; some nolonger believe their own village will receive an office aspart of this programme - and many, it seems, no longercare: "if they build us an office, ok. If they don't, whatshould we do? We have become professionals at thewaiting game - but it's a boring job, and with no pay."

By contrast, the UNICEF child centre programmeimplemented with the help of Muhammadiyah on thewest coast of Aceh is an example of where the two-wayflow of information has led to the implementation of asuccessful programme. The programme was interactivein the planning stage, and retains a rolling mechanismof evaluation and discussion involving the parents of thechildren at the centres, the village elders and centrestaff. At a two-week staff training course before thecentres opened, negotiation, communication, and

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Many groups, ranging from the UNDP to MercyCorps, FAO, IOM and others, have employedthousands in temporary cash-for-work (CFW)schemes to help clean villages and to work onproject sites. However, interviews showed thatmany people who participated in these programmesdid not understand their temporary quality; as aconsequence, they felt let down by donors who hadnot made the cash-for-work scheme's timelimitations clear. In Lhok Nga, two groups of womenhad been preparing their grated coconut businessplans for several weeks when the FAO arrived inSeptember and offered a cash-for-work scheme(funded by ECHO) paying $4 per day to clear farmland. Needing money, and not understanding thatthe FAO scheme was only for several weeks, thewomen abandoned the discussions with a localNGO about their coconut business in favour of theinstant cash. But by October, the cash-for-workscheme had ended, and the women wereunemployed with no idea what to do to earn moremoney. The local NGO coordinator for the areaexplained: "Now the group wants to have thegrated coconut business again, but now we don'twant to help - what if FAO comes back with anothercash for work scheme? Everything in Aceh is beingdistorted by too much money. [But] we can't blamethe local people, they are desperate." She went onto say: "We can blame the international agencieswho exploit that desperation, and use local peopleas cheap labour. They stamp on local initiatives likeours, yet we will always be here - long after they aregone." This is a harsh judgment indeed, but suchsentiments are not rare in Aceh, and are a signal ofpotential problems in the months, even years,ahead.

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When a job and a livelihood vanishesBox

conflict resolution skills were high on the agenda. Localstaff explain: "This programme cannot be implementedwithout the approval and cooperation of the children'sparents. That's why we always introduce our ideas tothe parents, usually the mothers, in the planning stage.Sometimes they say they don't agree with this or that -it's ok, we can adjust everything to suit localconditions."

In Aceh, processes of decision-making reflect thehierarchical and male-dominated social structure inwhich the perceived needs and aspirations of thewealthy and powerful are prioritised over the real needsof the broader community. For the most part, it appearsthat women, the poor, the landless and othermarginalised groups have been sidelined in thedecision-making processes accompanying thereconstruction effort. Such sidelining by internationalactors indeed reinforces existing cultural practices,leaving these groups even more marginalised thanbefore. Care must also be taken not to excludeAcehnese who speak no Bahasa Indonesia-often theelderly, or those in mountainous and more remoteareas.

In the case of women, for instance, far more activemeasures must be taken to ensure inclusion. Womenhave traditionally been marginalised from Acehnese

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All-inclusive consultation and communication

sometimes leading to fiery displays of anger.Furthermore, when external contractors come in, theyoften fail to demonstrate budgetary transparency,leading locals to suspect that they are skimming offproject funds.

"Yes, they built a new office for me. But I don'tknow exactly how much that building cost. That'ssomething for GHD and the Australians, they don't

share that information with people like me."Muchtar Yacob, camat of Baitussalam, 2 August 2005.

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Some donors and implementing agencies have tried to simplify the consultation and communication process byrelying on local NGOs or community committees to disseminate information in communities. This study's findingssuggest, however, that such a strategy is usually ineffective on its own; rather, these methods should be used intandem with direct communication and discussion between the donors and the beneficiaries. For example, ahousing project run by the ECHO-funded German Agro Action (GAA) in Matang Bangka, Jeunib, ran into delaysand changes of plan that were themselves of concern to villagers, but of greater concern was GAA's lack ofdirect communication with the local people. The situation became so hostile that it undermined the entire projectfor several months. A local committee, the BRRD (village rehabilitation and reconstruction agency) had beenestablished to represent the community in regular meetings with GAA and its local NGO partners. While GAAhad initially encouraged villagers to attend these meetings, after only four meetings GAA adopted a closed-doorpolicy, with villagers no longer invited. The situation further soured after villagers discovered that despiteprevious promises, local people would not necessarily be the ones employed to build the houses, and thatmaterials would not necessarily be sourced locally. As the information of this week turned into the misinformationof the next and still no houses had been built, the local community became distrustful of GAA, and saw the localpartner, Fosoma, as no longer representing their interests. The channelling of information through the BRRDand the local NGO simply bred suspicion and anger among locals; members of BRRD were ostracised by othervillagers. Tensions escalated, and during a chance meeting with GAA staff in December, some villagersexpressed frustration at the lack of information coming directly from GAA, and lack of implementation. Inresponse, GAA staff said: "If you keep complaining, we will pull out of the village and cancel the housing. Wouldyou prefer that?" A villager explained: "GAA said they would build houses in October, then November, now it isDecember - do you see a house? No!" After several months of miscommunication, the problem was finallyresolved, but only after GAA staff finally made several site visits to speak to the villagers directly. However, thelegacy of animosity and distrust lingers, and will take some time to repair.

The use of community committees as bridges between communities and donors can also put these groups inawkward situations when communication gaps occur. For example, in the same project, GAA asked members ofthe BRRD to find information on costs and availability of local supply of materials. Thinking that GAA woulddefinitely purchase from local business, members of BRRD approached suppliers and negotiated cost andtiming of supply. When GAA then said they would bring supplies in from elsewhere, those local BRRD memberswere very embarrassed in front of the local businesses, and angry with GAA.

Meanwhile, agencies must ensure that people purporting to speak on behalf of potential beneficiaries orengaging in facilitation have the social standing and moral authority to do so. Many agencies doing assessmentsin tsunami villages had no personal introduction to the village, did not do any background checks on who theywere speaking to, and whether those people had any mandate to speak on behalf of villages in terms of priorityneeds. Many village heads are not living in the villages, many were appointed post-tsunami, have no experienceof being in this position, and as they have no village facilities they are not available on demand when agenciesarrive. Others in the villages, who are vocal and confident, often appoint themselves to speak on behalf ofothers. On the whole, agencies accept this without attempting to clarify with formal and informal village leaders,male and female representatives, those living back in villages and those still with families or othercamps/barracks outside the area.

Finally, miscommunication occurs due to language barriers. Many people in the more remote and mountainousareas, especially the elderly, only speak the local Acehnese language. Khairuni feels frustrated with GAA overthe many delays and problems associated with the housing programmes in her village. Living in a makeshift hut,she explains why she has never voiced her frustrations to GAA: "I can't complain to GAA, I don't speak BahasaIndonesia."

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Communications pitfallsBox

decision making processes at all levels (see "The Roleof Women in Decision-making in Aceh," page 15). Of allthe government officials we interviewed - at the village,sub-district, district and department level - weencountered only three women in managementpositions, all in department administrations, and nonein village or sub-district roles. The poor level of women'srepresentation in local government in Aceh is reflectedin women's exclusion from traditional communitydecision-making. Furthermore, in many tsunami-affected areas, not only are the majority of survivorsmen, but the majority of early returnees to villageswhere camps have been set up are also men; thewomen live further away in barracks, or with family andfriends. Since the community meetings are often ad-hoc, the women simply "miss out" on the opportunity toparticipate. Even where donors and agencies haveencouraged women's participation in meetings, all too

frequently in actuality their role is limited to that ofpassive observers, with little effort made to draw theminto the discussion. Given the cultural and interest-based resistance to all-inclusive consultation anddecision-making, donors and implementers need toassert policies and pre-conditions to actively includewomen and other marginalised groups presence andparticipation in the these processes.

For example, speaking about the governance projectwhich includes the construction of village halls inBaitussalam, the AIPRD's senior public affairs officeremphasised the AIPRD's overall commitment toengagement with communities through consultation withvillage and sub-district heads. Asked about efforts byAIPRD to include women, however, her answer was: "Interms of including women in the consultation process,as far as I know, we do not exclude women, but have

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Whether it be an issue that has come from thehead of the sub-district or above, or an issue oflocal village politics, one thing is certain: in Aceh,the meetings that make these community decisionsare, almost without exception, attended exclusivelyby men. If a decision on a particular issue isrequired by local government structures, the villagehead will usually call for a village meeting. Menfrom each house are invited, often at night, to meetin the . Women are rarely invited tothese 'important events,' even if they are the headof a household; they are informed later of thedecision by their father, husband, brother orthrough the village network. For internal villageissues, informal meetings often take place in the

(local coffee shop), which in Aceh isviewed as a man's 'second home.' Women simplydo not go to the . Matters resolved inthe will be socialised to women when themen return home, or a decision might be made tohold a more formal meeting - usually after eveningprayers, which again are almost always attendedsolely by men. Even the annual village meeting isnormally a wholly male event. The exception is intsunami-affected areas, where sometimes, but notoften enough, an international agency insists on aquota or on a policy of positive discrimination formeetings, workshops, and employing facilitators.

meunasah

warung kopi

warung kopiwarung

The Role of Women in Decision-Making in AcehBox

no special policy to include women. We do realise thatthe village heads and sub-district heads are, of course,all men." Meanwhile, in order to reach a broadaudience, the World Bank and its partners began inSeptember to distribute a bi-weekly tsunami updatenewsletter that is distributed with Aceh's mainnewspaper, . But this only goes some waytoward getting around the problem of how women andother marginalised groups access information: freecopies are distributed to IDP camps and barracks, buteven these copies are more commonly found with menthan with women. Moreover, a male resident in an IDPcamp complained: "Everything that is delivered here,even , is taken by the committee anddistributed to their friends." More generally, communalcopies of are found in many , butthese coffee shops are the exclusive domain of men.

By contrast, the MDTF's Settlement Rehabilitation andReconstruction project to build housing, which enteredits pilot phase in December, stipulates that womenbe involved in the community housing committeesthat are established by beneficiaries to takeresponsibility for finance, planning, construction andaccounting. For women in Aceh, this is an unusual role,and so many are working hard to meet competingdemands: "I'm the secretary of [our community's]committee, so I have to struggle to meet mycommitments to the group and to my family at the sametime," said one woman. "But it's interesting, and I feelimportant in this process. I'm very happy to beinvolved."

In addition to the issue of consultation, women havebeen largely marginalised in their access toemployment opportunities arising from the rehabilitationprocess. Traditionally, there has been clear employment

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Serambi

Serambi

Serambi warung kopi

segregation between men and women in Aceh, with theworkplace of many women being the home and family.After the tsunami, many more women, forced byeconomic necessity, registered for employment in theInternational Labor Organization (ILO) sponsoredemployment offices that have been established inseveral locations in Aceh. The typical sectors in whichthey are seeking work are weaving, cooking, makingclothes, midwifery, nursing, and teaching. Donors arealso addressing livelihood issues for women, but aworrying trend has begun to emerge: almost alllivelihood assistance available for women in Aceh is inhome industries, for small trader activities such as cakemaking, sewing, drying fish etc. Low level assistancesuch as this is in danger of preserving women's pre-tsunami position in Aceh in 'poverty livelihoods,' whichare located in the informal economy, are insecureeconomic activities, and have low status and low pay.There is very little livelihood intervention for women thatgives them assistance to enter longer-term courses fornew and, in the words of one Acehnese woman, "moreexciting" job opportunities. Similarly, the imminentconstruct ion boom wil l provide employmentopportunities, but already huge disparities are evidentbetween the opportunities for men and women, with theresult that female-headed households will remaindisadvantaged.

Areas identified by donors as priorities may not alwaysmatch the immediate needs of tsunami victims. Whilepriorities imposed from the top-down are sometimesinevitable, their rationale is not always immediatelyclear to locals, and we found that sometimes they canalso create public relations problems. These could beovercome by better coordination among donors andimplementers to make sure that local needs are beingmet at the same time that longer-term projects arebeing carried out.

For example, AIPRD - which does not engage inhousing projects - is engaged in the Ulee Lheue portproject in an area where there are some specifichousing needs. There is no doubt that this project is ofvital importance to the reconstruction effort. At the sametime, many of those who live in the area lost their landto the sea, and remained in tents for twelve months. Itwas only in December, when President Susilo BambangYudhoyono was due to visit, that tents were dismantledand barracks hastily erected to give the impression ofprogress. A site visit one day prior to the President'svisit found these hastily erected barracks to be unstableand not durable; the people's longer term futureremains uncertain. Local people complain there was nowritten or oral announcement of the port project, andfeel they have only observer status as they sit outsidetheir tents watching as UN vehicles pass back andforward. In such an environment, the port reconstructionproject is viewed with resentment by many, includinglocal officials. "Although the port is important, the mostimportant priorities for people who live here are houses,livelihood recovery, and jobs," said a sub-village head.

By contrast, some agencies have adopted a moreholistic approach. For example, in West Aceh, theSalvation Army has been implementing a programmewhereby basic needs such as food, water andtemporary shelter were secured before communityconsultation over supplying village infrastructure began.

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Ensuring land rights for survivors will be a key factor in the longer term sustainability of the rebuilding of Aceh'sphysical, economic and social infrastructure, as well as in an enduring peace. During the years of conflict, apattern of land-grabbing emerged, often involving the military, who were employed by individuals and companiesto seize land to be logged, for plantations, or other sources of economic gain. Rumours are already rife in Acehthat villagers will lose their land to corrupt government officials, and that government and international aidagencies will use private land for large infrastructure projects. Many in fact suspected that the government's earlystipulation that no building could take place within a 2 kilometre strip of the coast, reportedly proposed for safetyreasons, was in fact just a way for the government to seize potentially valuable coastal land.

Compensation for land taken for new infrastructure projects is already emerging as a vexed issue. For instance,local villagers have been seeking compensation for the land crossed by USAID's $245 million 'new improved'reconstruction of the road connecting Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. When the villagers approached BRR forcompensation, they were told by the agency's chief, Kuntoro, that compensation is a matter for the roadcontractor. Former acting governor of Aceh, Azwar Abubakar, said money had been set aside by the localauthorities for compensation payments; but the policy for disbursement remains unclear.

In such an environment, donors must be sensitive to potential or ongoing land disputes. For instance, the AIPRDis involved in the rehabilitation of the major port of Ulee Lheue, which the tsunami left cut off from Aceh'smainland. The port is however, the subject of an ongoing legal battle. The issue revolves around a 3 hectare plotof land which seven members of the original land owner, the T. Poecot Oemar Keumangan family, say theyinherited, and which they claim was taken without permission by the local government in 2001 to build the port.In 2001, without prior consultation with local people, the local government began to build a port in the UleeLheue area; compensation was mistakenly paid to some people living on the land, who the local authoritiesassumed were the owners. The rightful owners had no land certificate, but local people accepted the family'sclaim to ownership. In November 2001 the plaintiffs filed a compensation case in the Banda Aceh district court,which they later won. The government appealed to the Aceh High Court; the court's decision was that it could notrule on the case because the building had not begun, yet during the previous hearing at the District Court it wasacknowledged that construction had taken place. The case has now moved to the Supreme Court in Jakarta andis currently awaiting a hearing. When asked about the ongoing land dispute, a representative of the UNDP,AIRPD's implementing partner for the port project, said: "I don't know about the land dispute, but if there is one,it's not our business. That is an issue for the local authorities." AusAID and AIPRD representatives say thattheir consultations with local people revealed no land disputes: "All AusAID programme are community driven.We always have broad consultations with local people, and do extensive land checks. In the case of Ulee Lheueport, we have documents signed by local people giving the status of the land there." But the AusAID official wasunable to prove that such documents exist, and local community leaders disagree strongly with this statement:"We have never signed, or been asked to sign by the Australians, any documents about land in this area."

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Land disputesBox

Once it did begin, the process moved relatively quickly.On the anniversary of the tsunami, 500 houses werehanded over to local communities in Suak Ribee andSuak Sigadeng, Meulaboh. Public health clinics havealso been supplied, and a women's and children'scommunity centre. The of West Aceh praised theproject: "They [the Salvation Army] always coordinatewith us, and the result is a very successful programmeof v i l lage rehabi l i ta t ion." Simi lar ly , CAREInternational's ambitious Beudoh (Recovery) project inSimeulu, Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar, fuelled in partby ECHO and Australian funds, takes an integratedapproach towards shelter, water and sanitation, health,l i ve l i hood recove ry and r i sk managemen tprogrammes.

Where such well-thought out rehabilitation strategiesare in place, the Acehnese spirit of self-help could alsoplay a vital role. Acehnese communities are notunfamiliar with rallying after natural disasters. In manyplaces in the province, for instance, the annual wetseason brings an almost inevitable displacement ofpeople, loss of property and livelihood, and even deathdue to floods and mudslides; in the absence ofgovernment assistance, communities have historicallyresponded to these disasters, and to the effects ofconflict, in cooperative fashions. But some ill-conceived and badly implemented cash-basedinterventions have, according to some communityleaders, eroded this cultural norm. Furthermore, the

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tendency, already noted above, of all too many donorsand implementers treating local people and localstructures as helpless observers of the reconstructionprocess - despite pleas for inclusion by localgovernment officials, academics, religious leaders,village hierarchy, civil society groups and others - hasnot only undermined morale, distorted social priorities,but has also had the side-effect of undercutting existingsocial mechanisms for mobilising community labour.

Cash-for-work schemes instigated by many donors andimplementers are one such example of an interventionthat has had mixed impact. Such schemes have beenused widely during the emergency phase and in orderto help speed up the process of clearing debris; manyagencies continue to offer cash-for-work forreconstruction projects. Many argue that such schemesdecrease dependency on handouts, restore dignity toparticipants by leaving them free to set their ownpriorities and to spend the money as they wish, and canhelp to stimulate a market recovery as money is spentlocally. Most of our interviewees indeed agreed thatCFW schemes played a valuable role in the early daysafter the tsunami. However, many also fear that thelonger such schemes continue, the more distortionthere will be in the local labour market as the NGOs andUN agencies paid higher cash-for-work rates of paythan pre-tsunami salary levels. Furthermore, some inlocal government, including sub-district and village

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heads, fear that CFW schemes are having a negativeimpact on the traditional system of , asystem whereby members of a community do unpaidwork for the communal good. In response to growingconcern, the UNDP and the local Syiah Kuala Universityinitiated a study to look at the impact of these cash-for-work schemes on such customary practices. The UNDPinsists that preliminary results show that "cash-for-workschemes have not had any negative impact on the local

system." But the head of Lampineungvillage disagrees. "Cash for work schemes are like apoison. They have destroyed the traditional system of

here. A week ago, the sent aetter asking the ommunity to tidy up the village before

gotong royong

gotong royong

gotong royong camatl

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17 August [Indonesia's independence day] - to clear thelocal canal, the road, etc. But the community refused,saying 'no pay, no work.' It was never like this before."Some UNDP officials also are sceptical of the results ofthe study so far, admitting that they recognise "possiblenegative consequences of all the cash for workschemes, and I include the UNDPs schemes in that."The challenge for donors and implementers thus is howto design and implement programmes that draw on andstrengthen existing social mechanisms for mobilizingcommunity labour, rather than undercutting them.

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"Why would we report to the military or police that construction materials from the port wasmissing? It is very likely they themselves were involved in the mysterious disappearances."

Senior UNDP official, Banda Aceh, 27 October 2005.

The lack of a sense of ownership that comes with inadequately integrated projects can be costly to donors. In thecase of the Ulee Lheue port reconstruction project, material has been disappearing from the construction site,ranging from easily portable items to heavier pieces of iron to the project's BEAM (moveable bridge). The BEAMalone was worth $10,000. While the local population - most of whom are living in tents, and few of whom wereemployed by the project - may have been responsible for the theft of lighter items, several intervieweessuggested that the military or police had taken the heavier goods. One eyewitness explained: "The TNI from themilitary post in Ketapang [Banda Aceh] took the material, and until now store it at their barracks there. How do Iknow? I followed the TNI when they stole the stuff. If you want to see it, go to the military barracks in JalanFatahillah. There is a container with iron and other stuff from the port beside it." A visit to the military barrackconfirmed this to be the case. Asked why they had not reported the theft to UNDP (the project implementer),some commented that if the port had offered more employment to the local community, not only would thepeople not have stolen the material themselves, but they might have felt inclined to report the theft by thesecurity forces. A representative of the UNDP admitted: "We [UNDP] made a mistake by not putting security inplace earlier, but there is security now." There was however, no acknowledgement from UNDP that consultationwith local communities was necessary: "It's a port, not a house, so no need for consultation."

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Where resentment imposes costsBox

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With partial funding ($670,000) from ECHO, UNICEF has established 21 child centres in Aceh. These centresorganise play groups, give psychosocial support to children suffering from trauma, address issues of child abuse,and play an important role in protecting the children from trafficking. They also act as tracing centres working toreunite children with parents, relatives or friends. There are three centres located in several villages in the sub-districts of Samatiga and Kaway XVI that cater for 2,243 children.

These centres and related programmes are well planned, have been implemented in an inclusive andtransparent manner, and show positive results not only for the children, but for the family and the communitymore generally. As part of the project, UNICEF has collaborated with staff and volunteers from Muhammadiyah,the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. Volunteers attend a two-week training course that covershow to register children for tracing purposes; how to conduct therapeutic activities for children; how to recognisechildren who might need specific psychosocial care, or those who might be subject to abuse; and how to ensurethe programmes matched the needs of the local people by holding regular consultations with parents orguardians, and by actively encouraging family members to become involved in the day-to-day running of thecentres. Activities include painting and drawing, active games, reading the Qu'ran, learning about computers,environmental awareness, revisiting areas of trauma including the beach, paddling in the sea and many othersdesigned in a developmental way.

Nurhayati has two young children and lives in a tent in Reusak village. Since her husband was lost in thetsunami, her youngest child has been showing signs of trauma. But playing with other kids at theMuhammadiyah-run child centre, and participating in the other activities on offer, her son has begun to showimprovements. Staff watch for signs of trauma and have been trained in how to address this. Staff report that thenumber of children including images of the tsunami, dead bodies and destroyed buildings in their drawings hasdecreased; a sure sign that their psychological state is improving. Nurhayati and other mothers in Reusak havealso been taught how to deal with trauma among the children and others, so the community at large exudes amore positive perspective on their situation, despite the fact they still live in tents.

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"Before my youngest child joined the child centre, he used to cry and ask about his father whowas lost in the tsunami every night. But now, after several months, I can see the development

- he doesn't cry so much." Nurhayati, Reusak village, 27 December 2005.

UNICEF children centres

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CASE STUDY

Social impact

Inequalities and the potential for conflict in post-tsunami AcehIn the post-tsunami environment, inequalities haveopened up between Aceh's regions, and amongtsunami victims themselves. Such issues have thepotential to stir up conflict, as well as to undermine theability of communities to pull together in thereconstruction effort. These inequalities emergebetween:

For example, farmers in tsunami-affected areas in thewest of Aceh have received less help than tsunami-affected communities along the east coast: byDecember 2005, 70% of affected farmers in the east,but only 20% in the west, had received assistance.

The coastal areas of Aceh destroyed by the earthquakeand tsunami are not the only parts of Aceh that arepoor; many conflict-affected communities are alsoimpoverished. For example, the village of Cot Keueng inAceh Besar, located less than 8 km from the devastatedarea of Baitussalam, escaped the impact of theearthquake and tsunami, but was for many years atarget for military reprisals due to its reputation as aGAM area. As a consequence, the village'sinfrastructure is in shambles; houses are derelict,transportation is poor and only the former villagesecretary has a telephone. Meanwhile, only a fewkilometres away, the road is busy with UN vehicles andother jeeps from international agencies ferrying goods,services and people to implement housing,water/sanitation, livelihood and other tsunami

Regions

Tsunami-affected and non-tsunami-affected areas

reconstruction programmes. Only one, (unnamed) NGOhas stopped at Cot Keueng to collect data, but nevercame back. Some people in Cot Keueng resent the factthat the aid is bypassing them: "We are very poor, mostof us are farmers and vegetable sellers... Yes, manypeople are disappointed no NGO visits here to help oursituation. But what can we do about that? Many men,including the head of village, are working in theconstruction sites in Banda Aceh. That has causedsome bad feeling; the head of village should stay hereto try to get us assistance, but instead he is helpinghimself in Banda Aceh."

There is some internal migration within Aceh now, assome people, displaced because of the conflict, want toreturn to their original villages where tsunami assistancemight be available. One such case took place in mid-December, some 4,500 people displaced to Bireun andPidie from the conflict districts of Bener Meriah andCentral Aceh by militia attacks in 2001 began thejourney home after hearing rumours that assistancewas available. Many turned back after several dayswhen they heard that there was in fact no help for themat their destination. "We heard rumours that there weremany foreigners who would build houses for us, withgood medical care and schools for the children, so wedecided to return home," said one. "But then on theroad we met people who told us there were noforeigners in Central Aceh, that we would be better tostay in Bireun, so some of us turned back. The othershave continued; I haven't heard news of them." In fact,almost 1,000 are now camped close to their originalvillages and are negotiating the terms of their returnwith local communities, many of whose members fearthe additional drain on their scarce resources.

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The influx of international aid workers and issues around supply and distribution have caused housing,food, transport and other costs in Aceh to soar. These factors, combined with the March and Octoberincreases in fuel prices nationally, resulted in a December year on year inflation rate in Aceh of around23%. Houses that would have been rented for $800 a year before the tsunami are now fetching$15,000 a year, with some of the bigger donors and implementers paying $30,000 or more a year forlarger houses. Even with a job, most local people on local salaries cannot afford to rent a house.

Gaps have also emerged between those who have benefited from international schemes and those whohave not. For instance, many of the study's interviewees complained that cash-for-work programmesbenefited only a small cluster of people, leaving behind others who did not have the contacts or skills togain favour with the donors. For example, an analysis of the Mercy Corps cash-for-work interventionthat ran from January to July 2005 and involved 10,905 workers in four areas found that 68% ofhouseholds had multiple involvement in the scheme; meanwhile, nearly a third of households in thelocal area missed out completely. The same study also showed that the average monthly income of thehouseholds involved was Rp 2,910,600 ($314) - much greater than the pre-tsunami average familyincome in Aceh.

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"I have a job, but my monthly salary is only Rp 3 million ($323). My house was damaged duringthe tsunami, but I can't afford to repair it. I can't afford to rent a house for my wife

and children to live in, so we must be apart until I can save money to repair my old house- about Rp 15 million ($1,615), I think. My wife went to live with family in Medan,

and I rent a small room here in Banda Aceh.”Firdaus, Banda Aceh, interviewed 1 September 2005.

Inflation and inequalityBox

Those who fled the tsunami-affected regions during theyears of conflict and those who remainedTensions are sometimes emerging between people whofled the tsunami-affected area during the years ofconflict but who are now returning to try to takeadvantage of assistance programmes. Many of those

19

who remained in areas badly affected by the war livedfor years in fear and abject poverty; they resent theperceived "fickleness" and lack of loyalty of returnees.There are many such cases. For example, a family whofled five years ago from Kembang Tanjung, Pidie toBanda Aceh to escape the conflict, has returned to their

village since the tsunami to benefit from the shelter,livelihood and other assistance now available there.Some of the local Kembang Tanjung community are nothappy with the family's return. Discussions with a groupof men in the local uncovered a measure ofdiscontent: "They are our neighbours and we must helpthem return to their home. But where were they whenwe needed help? They abandoned the community here.And now they come back expecting to benefit - well, it'sour right to ask them 'will you leave again after youhave taken all there is to take? If so, leave now.'"

Problems also emerge when people return temporarilyafter an even longer absence in Jakarta or elsewheresimply to claim land inheritance or other benefits. Forexample, Bachtiar returned to his parent's village ofBlang Oi after eight years in Jakarta. Self-confident andnot suffering from the trauma of experiencing thetsunami first hand, Bachtiar "offered" his services toWorld Vision as the village facilitator to distributeemergency provisions. Funded in part by AusAID,World Vision sought facilitators in all villages where itwas distributing emergency aid, at the organisation'sown admission, some of these facilitators may havebeen unsuitable: "We had no time, and no capacityduring the emergency phase to do a selection process,and we know some of our facilitators were badchoices." In Blang Oi, the local NGO later sub-contracted by World Vision to coordinate the aid foundthat beneficiary signatories on Blang Oi distributionforms were false, and that little aid had actually reachedthe people. Although no longer acting as a facilitator forWorld Vision, Bachtiar is now living in barracks,awaiting a house to replace his parents' house whichwas lost in the tsunami. Both his parents are dead. Hemakes no secret of the fact that he plans to rent thehouse out, and return to Jakarta. Communities whosuffered during the tsunami are, quit understandably,resentful of such behaviour.

Tsunami victims displaced within communities, forinstance living with host families, have often found ithard to obtain assistance. In the early post-tsunamimonths, most agencies focused their efforts on thecamps, where those who had lost everything gathered.This created a substantial burden on host families, whowere sometimes sheltering anywhere from 1 to 40additional people in their homes, yet were largelyexcluded from the distribution of aid. Most agencies stillnow refuse to give food and other emergencyassistance to those not living in camps or barracks.

Whether or not correctly, many Acehnese believe thatthe better-off have benefited more from reconstructionprogrammes. Entrepreneurs and those with access toresources such as vehicles, houses and shops to rentout have done well, as have the better educated andthose with foreign language skills. Meanwhile, it wouldappear that the poor, women and other marginalisedgroups have come off worse.

All of these divisions have the potential to serve as thefault lines along which future conflict may emerge.

Social jealousy has also emerged between differentgroups of beneficiaries due to discrepancies in the

warung

Those who have gone into camps and those who aredisplaced within communities

The haves and the have-nots

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types of assistance provided to different communities orwithin single communities. Three major areas ofsensitivity are:

The process of re-establishing land ownership in Acehfaces formidable challenges; but processes that putcommunities in the driving seat appear to be doing agood job of warding off potential conflict. The tsunamichanged the physical landscape of many towns andvillages in the province. Substantial tracts of land wereswept away or lie submerged by sea or fresh water. Insome places, the landscape has changed so much thatland boundaries are no longer recognisable. Theseproblems are compounded by the question of landrights. In Aceh, land rights have traditionally beenbased on statutory land titles or customary rights.The majority of people simply claimed ownership to theland they lived and worked on by customary law, and sohad no title documents. The few land certificates thatdid exist in the tsunami affected areas were lost ordamaged. The underpinning authority for landownership now rests on the witnessing by survivingmembers of the community, local village heads, andcommunity leaders.

In order to divert any potential conflict over landownership, and to press ahead with shelterprogrammes without waiting for the BPN (the NationalLand Agency) to register land ownership, communitiesbegan to map their land according to village processes,involving owners and neighbours, to use witnesses andsurvivors to determine land ownership. This processwas in itself a conflict resolution exercise. Many NGOsworked with local communities to help residents maptheir villages, with details of who lived where, and whoowned what piece of land. Approved by neighbours,other community members, and finally by the head ofthe village, these community land mapping exerciseswere deemed sufficient by some implementing agenciesto begin to unroll temporary housing programmes. Inareas where much of the population was lost in thetsunami, and no human archive exists, the process hasbeen slower; however, it does appear to be progressingwith little conflict among communities.

This community mapping exercise is an importantstarting point in registering land, but is not standardised;further adjudication by BPN is necessary to legalise thisprocess. In June 2005, a Community DrivenAdjudication (CDA) manual was drafted by the MultiDonor Trust Fund, in conjunction with several NGOs,Acehnese civil society groups and others. The manualstates that a bottom-up, community-driven adjudicationsystem should be used to identify land titles, followingwhich BPN adjudication teams will complete theprocess of legally establishing land titles. A decree wassubsequently issued by the BPN giving the manuallegal status; it is now the standard for land mapping inAceh. Under this standard, land ownership for womenand other vulnerable groups remains protected by the1960 agrarian law -UUPA), which states that women and men have equalrights to land ownership. By far the most significantsupport for land mapping has come from the MDTF's'Reconstruction of Aceh's Land Administration System'(RALAS) programme. After a three-month bureaucraticdelay, the project has brought together the efforts of theNGOs, donors, the UPP and KDP mechanisms under a

Land

(adat)

(Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria

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common set of processes that will allow community landmapping to meet the requirements of the BPN, the onlybody with the legal authority to issue land titles. TheTrust Fund believes this programme, which is piloted inBanda Aceh and Aceh Besar, is "the underpinningcorner-stone on which communities will rebuild."

Interviews conducted in October in several villages inAceh Besar and Banda Aceh show the land mappingexercise is well underway. Village secretaries andheads of villages report that the witness system seemsto be working efficiently, and that they find the BPNsystem somewhat under-resourced and a little slow, butvery supportive. BRR, UNDP, UN-Habitat, and RALAShave collaborated to issue thousands of leafletsinforming people of their rights and also of thegovernment's obligations to provide everyone withadequate shelter. The leaflet also contains a form that,once completed by the beneficiary and given asignature of approval by local officials, serves as atemporary proof of ownership certificate. The aim is tohelp people secure proof of land ownership, whichremoves one of the main obstacles to building a newhouse. This leaflet is a very positive initiative indisseminating information and engendering a self-helpapproach. However, awareness of who and what isbehind the RALAS programme remains lacking; anissue that should be more comprehensively addressedby the Trust Fund and others.

The size and quality (and also the cost) of the house abeneficiary receives varies significantly depending onthe provider. Most houses are Type 36 (36 metressquare) and cost between Rp 32 million ($3,436) andRp 50 million ($5,370). Some, however, are much largerand can cost as much as Rp 100 million ($10,740) ormore. For example, CRS is providing Type 45 houses(45 square metres) in some project areas; meanwhileGAA plans to build Type 45 in Simeulu and Type 42(42 square metres) in Jeunib. Not only does the size ofhouse between villages differ, but without a "oneprovider, one village" policy, the size of houses in onevillage can also vary. Depending on the materials used,the different quality of houses built in one village canalso exacerbate tensions. Furthermore, many housesare still being constructed without basic amenities suchas running water and sanitation facilities. The level ofpublic infrastructure varies from community tocommunity, as some NGOs and agencies build only thephysical structure of the house, while others repairaccess roads, repair or build schools and clinics, andprovide other amenities. In cases where such sharpdiscrepancies exist in close proximity, within or betweencommunities, social jealousy and conflict are likely toensue.

In an attempt to avoid such problems between villages,GAA has told local people that the houses they arebuilding in Jeunib are Type 36+, similar to those inneighbouring communities. The '+' is for the bathroomthat is included, which in fact brings the size of thehouse to Type 42.

A second issue is that of housing for the landless andex-renters. The land in some tsunami-affected areas -such as in the Ulee Lheue area of Banda Aceh andmany areas of the west coast - has literally disappearedor is severely flooded. These communities are still in

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tents, with no information forthcoming on rehousingplans. Furthermore, many whose homes were rented donot qualify for a new home. There is no common policythroughout Aceh to deal with this problem; someagencies, such as the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS),are trying to secure land to give houses to the landless,but most have not addressed the issue.

To resolve the issue of landlessness, many districtgovernments are planning to purchase land elsewhereto build low cost housing. For example, for those inUlee Lheue the municipal government has bought landin several locations in Banda Aceh and will build housesthere for people who are willing to relocate. A localsenior government official said: "The people at UleeLheue might be offered flats to rent at a subsidised rate.We might even decide to offer the flats rent free for thefirst few years." But some residents do not want to beforced to leave the areas they are familiar with, a localcommunity leader in Ulee Lheue said: "Perhaps somepeople will want to be relocated. But we shouldn't beforced to move away from here. The government shouldoffer us the choice." In Aceh Jaya, land has alreadybeen identified in three sub-districts for a similarinitiative, but the local is still unsure when theprocess of resettlement will begin: budgets have not yetbeen disbursed, so implementation is slow. It will benecessary to engage in consultation not only with thosebeing resettled, but with those into whose areas thoseresettled will move, to ensure the solution to oneproblem does not in fact become a problem in itself.

Aceh's economy, which included substantial smallbusiness and informal economic activity components,was dealt a massive blow by the events of 26December 2004. To address this, several livelihoodintervention strategies have been put in place in a bid toalleviate poverty and to kick-start the local economy,generating income and promoting employment. Theseinclude small grant schemes, soft loans, microfinance,and preliminary discussions about bank guaranteeschemes for larger businesses. However, not all thesemodels are appropriate to all areas of Aceh. Indeed, ithas been suggested by some concerned NGOs that ina post emergency situation, non-cash alternatives suchas tools for work, infrastructure improvements, trainingetc. are often more appropriate. And indeed, unlessagency and partner organisation staff are properlytrained and ongoing support is given, interventions suchas loans can result in beneficiaries spending more timemanaging the debt than securing a sustainablelivelihood.

However, these programs have also led to socialjealousy. The diversity of interventions has led to asituation where some communities or individualsreceive grants, while other receive loans, sometemporary employment - and others receive very little ornothing. Unsurprisingly, many local people favourgrants and cannot see the benefits of loans. Unfamiliarwith the broader benefits of revolving credit schemesand other forms of credit, and in the absence of agencystaff capable of explaining, some communities have azero-sum view: no requirement to repay is good,required repayment is bad. This is the case in some ofthe areas where Mercy Corps is implementing the ADB-funded micro-enterprise scheme; the first phasedisbursed grants, but later some beneficiaries will be

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Grants versus microcredit

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given loans. Within these latter communities many aredissatisfied at the prospect of having to repay a loan.While Mercy Corps, to their credit, has a comprehensivesupport mechanism in place with substantial expertiseon livelihood issues, many staff members appear not tohave the social skills required to encourage open andhonest dialogue with local communities, who are afraidthat if they criticise in any small way, the scheme maybe stopped; honest assessment of what beneficiaries

The case of Yayasan PAPAN, a small local NGO based in Meulaboh in West Aceh, is a textbook example ofhow cash-based livelihood schemes can go badly wrong, damaging the moral fabric of the group and, moreimportantly, having a devastating impact on the beneficiary community. Without proper pre-partnership checkson the capacity of the local NGO to implement the programme, the donor's good intentions resulted in badoutcomes.

Yayasan PAPAN was given a grant by a European-based funding organisation to conduct a three-prongedprogramme in five villages in Nagan Raya and Aceh Barat over a period of six months, due to end in January2006. One of the components was to administer small grants to 250 women. This programme, however, hasbeen problematic. According to PAPAN, the programme was designed and implemented with full consultation ofthe local communities "after many meetings in each project area." However, site visits in November andDecember uncovered a different picture. During discussions with women in four of the five villages, it becameclear that there had been no process of consultation between PAPAN or its NGO subcontractor, YayasanAnnisa, and that information flow was extremely poor. Potential beneficiaries of the women's livelihoodprogrammes spoke of a lack of information, changing schedules and inconsistent promises, as well as ofdissatisfaction with the concept of the programmes even if they are eventually implemented. The 250 womenbeneficiaries were originally told they would receive a Rp 1.5 million ($161.2) grant to start businesses. But facedwith rising costs, low staff numbers, and lack of experience, PAPAN changed the programme withoutconsultation into one where women who want to start a business must complete a form listing what businessstart-up material they need (the maximum value has been adjusted down to Rp1.4 million), and PAPAN will thendeliver the goods. By 10 December, the women in all five villages had received nothing, but PAPAN has saidthey will complete the distribution of material by January. PAPAN is now in a race to distribute start-up materialsto a somewhat reluctant set of beneficiaries before the project term expires in January.

In addition, the scheme has been changed from one of grants to a revolving credit scheme, which requires therepayment of the loan. PAPAN clearly does not know how to address the disconnect between the programme itnow plans to implement (revolving credit), and the grants being demanded by the beneficiaries. By December,outright hostility to several of the programme's core components was evident in several villages. In interviewswith 20 potential recipients from 4 villages, there was universal opposition to the PAPAN livelihood scheme.Eldiani's comment is typical of other interviewees: "If PAPAN gives me material, great. If they don't, great too."When Rosmiati discovered she would have to repay, she withdrew the form she had submitted requesting Rp800,000 ($86) to start a vegetable stall; the thought of having such a large debt upset her. Murliana complained:"They haven't told us over how long we should repay or what's the mechanism for repayment." Rather than leavepeople with a sense of fulfillment, the livelihood components of this project are overwhelmingly disempoweringfor the local communities. A better approach would have been for PAPAN to have given information about bothschemes, and then to engaged in discussion with the women so that they could make an informed choicebetween grants or revolving credit.

An evident source of the problems here has been PAPAN's lack of experience in managing grant or loansprogrammes. PAPAN has struggled to increase its capacity to meet the demands of this and other projects it isengaged in. PAPAN staff have themselves voiced concern that faced with rising costs, low staff numbers, andlack of experience in retrospect, this project, to be implemented in a relatively short period of time, hasoverstretched an already overburdened capacity.

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The PAPAN CaseBox

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actually think and what they want remains elusive insome villages.

"I decided not to get involved with that programme(PAPAN) any more. I didn't know it was a loan.

I've never had a loan before. I'm afraid I won't beable to pay." Woman in Peunaga Pasi,Meurebo, Interviewed 10 December 2005.

In February 2005, ECHO gave the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) $970,658 for'emergency support to livelihood recovery through fishing boat construction and equipment' for tsunami-affectedcommunities in Nagan Raya and Aceh Barat districts.' Several other donors also have contributed to thisproject, which plans to establish eleven boatyards to make 200 boats for local fishermen. In June 2005, ACTED'swebsite announced that the first 10 boats had been handed over to fishermen in the sub-district of Kuala Tadu, inNagan Raya, and showed a small group of fishermen standing in a boat on the river, waving. Five months later,not one boat had ever been used for fishing; all remained in the shallow waters of the local river. One of thebeneficiaries in Langkak village, explained the problem: "The boats have many structural problems, and are notthe usual boats we use here. It would be dangerous to use these boats outside the river." ACTED staff insist:"We are partners with the local government, and are implementing our boat building programme in consultationwith the local Panglima Laot." But the local Panglima Laot tell a quite different story: "The main problem with theprogramme is that ACTED never coordinates with the local people or with us, the local fishing association. Theywork alone, very distant from the fishermen."

On 10 December, ACTED again announced that ten boats had been given to communities in Nagan Raya. Butthese were in fact simply the original ten boats given in June that had, according to the ACTED coordinator inNagan Raya, been repaired and upgraded. Local fishermen say, however, that the boats are no different to thefirst time around, and the boats makers confirm that no repairs had been carried out. "I know the fishermen saythere are problems with the boats, but we only make the boats as ordered by ACTED," said one boat maker. "Nochanges or upgrades have been made to the boats since they were originally given in June." Indeed, byDecember, the boats' paint was peeling; their engines, which had been sitting in water and not maintained for fivemonths, were in very poor condition, and some were leaking. Several fishermen who received the boats inLangkak and Kuala Tadu said it would take about Rp 4 million ($430) to repair the boat to the required safetystandard. Abdul Manaf explained: "We can't go to sea in that boat. The engine is making a strange thumpingnoise. I don't know what's wrong with it, but I know it's not right." Other beneficiaries complain that the nets givenwith the boats are the wrong type, and must be replaced by the fishermen themselves. Causing further insult to thefishermen, ACTED insisted the three fisherman who are co-owners of each boat sign an MoU which includes aclause stating "ACTED is no longer responsible for future technical problems, any mistakes in making the boats, orany decay of the boat's quality." Yet ACTED is very well aware that in their current condition, none of the boatscan be taken to sea.

An FAO boat-building programme funded by ECHO has created two training workshops for boat makers, one inNorth Aceh in collaboration with Help Germany, the other in Nagan Raya in collaboration with ACTED. Theworkshops sought to begin to address the issue of unsafe and low quality boats being made by unskilled boatmakers in Aceh, and took place under the guidance of the FAO master boat maker. Even experienced Acehneseboat makers were quite positive about the workshops. "The boat design is quite good," said one participant. "It'snot very different to the boats I usually make, but I did learn some tricks that will help the boat last longer, likejoining wood together in a new way, and using different nails that will not rust in the sea water." Unfortunately theresults of the workshop have not been transferred into the making of the ACTED boats.

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ACTED's 'aid' boats

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CASE STUDY

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Civil society and local government

Building capacityOne of the issues that emerged strongly from this studyis the need for capacity-building work at all levels ofAcehnese society. Most relief and reconstruction groupsare planning to be in Aceh for only three to five years.After that, the responsibility for implementingprogrammes will be handed over to a local communitythat currently lacks both technical expertise and, inmany cases, a general skills base. Some implementersare indeed engaging in capacity-building activities, butall too often these are narrowly-focused trainingsdesigned simply to build the limited skills for immediateimplementation of programmes. There is a need formore training that looks beyond the immediate projecthorizon to build broader skills. These issues areparticularly important in relation to two segments ofAcehnese society: local government and local NGOs.

Aceh's local government, weakened by years of under-resourcing and suffering the ravages of conflict, wasalready in poor condition when the tsunami hit. Manygovernment offices had been burned and destroyedduring the conflict; government officials often werekidnapped, killed and tortured by Indonesiangovernment security forces who accused them of beingsympathetic to GAM and the struggle for independence.As a consequence, in most (local governmentdepartments), capacity is low. However, relatively fewdonors are working to build local government capacitybeyond the level required to implement currentprogrammes.

One positive step is the EC 's six-month, €3 million ($3.6million) Aceh Local Governance Action Programme(ALGAP), which started in October 2005 in all 21districts and city governments of the province. Theprogramme, implemented by the German TechnicalCooperation Agency (GTZ), is designed to strengthenthe capacity of local government, in terms both ofinstitutional infrastructure and management of therehabilitation process, through training and provision ofbasic equipment. A three-day conference organisedby ALGAP brought together 198 government officialsand members of the local parliaments in December,which several participants assessed highly: it "gave memany new ideas to consider in my work at BRR, and toshare with my other colleagues," said one attendee.The AIPRD governance programme, of which thebuilding of village offices in Baitussalam is part, alsoincludes capacity-building components for localgovernance structures at the village and sub-districtlevel, but its implementation is too slow. Nevertheless,such programmes will be vital to the eventualsuccessful handover of many of the projects beingimplemented across the province.

As already noted, most local NGOs were severelycurtailed in their activities and development during theperiod of conflict. In the immediate aftermath of thetsunami, however, all sectors of the local NGOcommunity, from humanitarian agencies to the more"radical" political activists, hurried to become involved inthe relief effort, handing out emergency provisions oracting as guides or translators for the internationalagencies. Buoyed by operational and overhead costs

Local government

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provided by donors, many have since moved quickly onto other programmes, such as psychosocial counselling,livelihood and grant disbursements, building housesand schools, and many other types of work. Many ofAceh's NGOs thus have in effect become implementingagents, even cheap labour, for the international aidcommunity, many of whom have sidelined best practicepre-partnership assessment criteria in their desperationto find an implementer for their programmes. In manycases, however, these local groups have lacked notonly the capacity to implement and manage projects,but also the skills to conduct satisfactory financial ornarrative reporting. There are many cases of indicationof misspending and mismanagement. Some of the moreegregious examples of mismanagement uncovered inthe course of this research involved local NGOs whosecapacities were hopelessly overstretched. Training inmanagement skills will be vital not only to thesuccessful and accountable implementation of projectsduring the reconstruction period, but also to thesegroups' ability to find and manage funds in the post-reconstruction future.

Too few organisations have provided training for localNGO partners that extends beyond immediateimplementation needs, but most has been couchedwithin the 'capacity building for recovery' banner. In thefirst year of post-tsunami rehabil i tation andreconstruction, the intention of donors and agencies tobuild the capacity of local NGOs for long term purposeshas not yet been visible. Even agencies that offeredtraining for some long-term partners failed to offertraining for other partners perceived as short-termlabour. For example, the International CatholicMigration Commission (ICMC), in its partly-ECHO-funded psychosocial programmes in IDP camps acrossAceh, drew on several local NGO implementingpartners which had no experience in psychosocialprogrammes. In ICMC's own evaluation of the firstphase of the programmme, one of the mainrecommendations was that the capacity of local NGOpartners should be increased. While some groupsreceived four-day trauma training courses, mostreceived no training and never really figured out whatthey were there for. "We didn't do anything much on thisprogramme," said one local NGO employee. "Weorganised painting classes, and arranged for others tocome to teach the children how to dance. It was only forfour months and after that we never went to the groupsagain."

This problem has been recognised by some, who arebeginning to take measures that will begin to addressthe issue. For example, the UNDP has conducted anassessment of civil society group needs in Aceh, andhas already conducted initial training, is providing someinstitutional support and is launching a major newprogramme to increase the capacity of civil societyorganisations. In addition, a programme for raising thecapacity of civil society groups funded by the MDTF willbegin in 2006. The objective of this programme is toenhance grass root participation in reconstructionprocess and to empower local civil society group inAceh. It remains to be seen what impact suchinitiatives, and others being planned, will have on thelonger term capacities of Aceh's civil society sector.

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Under-valuing local government, overstretchingNGOsA divide appears to have opened up in implementers'attitudes towards local government departments andlocal NGOs. Very few international implementersappear to have assigned significant value to workingwith local government departments; they have turned tolocal government departments for damage-related andsocio-economic information, but rarely as coordinatingpartners. Local civil servants are not oblivious to the factthat in many cases they have been, and continue to be,relegated a secondary role.

For example, as part of an FAO programme funded byECHO, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and MercyCorps distributed 11.6 tons of seed rice, purchasedfrom two suppliers in West Aceh and one in SouthAceh, to seven local villages. The seed, however, wassub-standard and falsely labelled, something that wouldeasily have been picked up in an inspection by the localDepartment of Agriculture. "It's a pity that those twoNGOs never coordinated with us before distributing theseed," said one official. "Now the farmers will suffer; thecrop yield will be only 50% of that from standardseed." Several months later, the problem of levels ofcoordination had not improved. "The UNFAO is the onlyaid agency that coordinates with us. But people arevery quick to blame government departments when amistake like this one with the seeds occurs," said thehead of Aceh's agriculture department. "Why do theynot coordinate with the agriculture authorities if theywork in the agricultural sector? If the FAO itself sees thevalue of coordinating with the local authorities, why thendoes it not enforce such a policy on its partnerorganisations? " The coordination problems seem tohave become worse in West Aceh; the twice-monthlycoordination meetings initiated by the local agriculturedepartment were finally discontinued in late August. TheHead of Programmes in the department explains:"There was no point having meetings when the numberof NGOs and others attending decreased to such alevel that we in the department were more or lesstalking among ourselves. What many of these agenciesare doing is my guess, just as it is yours. I don't knowwhat they are doing." Overlooking local government inthis way bodes ill for the future of programmes: if thereis no sharing of expertise and skills, the programmes oftoday will vanish after donors leave and localdepartments are left to implement their own agenda."They can do what they want today, and we will smileand say 'thank you,'" said a senior official in Aceh Jaya,"But when they leave, we might change the programmeto be more relevant to the local people. Let's see."

Meanwhile, many implementers have rushed to createpartnerships with local NGOs and others without criteriaagainst which to measure the suitability of localpartners. "We had no time to do suitability tests duringthe emergency phase, it was simply a matter of whowas available," a representative of Save the Childrensaid. A similar excuse was given by World Visionwhen asked about the case of Bachtiar in Blang Oi,described above. Regarding the lack of local partners,IOM was also defensive, saying that most internationalagencies faced the same problem: "We all needed localpartners in Aceh; it was a bit of a race to secure localgroups. The suitability of many of our local partners isquite frankly, much less than we would ideally want, but

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it's a sellers market." As a consequence, many smallgroups and organisations have experienced a hugebudgetary increase. For example, the budget ofMatahari, a local NGO working on women's issuesbefore the tsunami, has increased by almost ten times,from Rp 150 million ($16,700) in 2004 to Rp 1.4 billion($155,000) for the period from March 2005 to March2006; around half this amount was to be used byNovember 2005. Many other groups have seen theirbudgets rise as much as 20 to 30 times pre-tsunamilevels; and most are experiencing managementproblems. The pressure on groups that lackimplementing capacity to rapidly disburse suchunexpectedly large sums has led in many cases towaste or misuse of funds. Furthermore, the lure ofgenerous funding has pulled organisations with limitedcritical capacity to self-evaluate or self-monitor intounfamiliar operating territories; very rarely does a localNGO recognise its own lack of capacity and reject theoffer of a contract. "Some local [Aceh based] NGOshave expressed vague concerns at what they werebeing asked to do, and at the amount of money beingthrown at them," said one observer. "Are they reallyconcerned? No, I don't think most of them are."However, when things go wrong, as they clearly oftendo, it is the beneficiaries who bear the costs.

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The problems in ACTED's boat building project inNagan Raya, some of which arose from a basiclack of consultation, were compounded by thechoice of the wrong local partner. YayasanIndonesia Cerdas (YIC) is a local Nagan Rayaorganisation established after the tsunami. Despitethe fact that the director of this NGO, Ika Suhanas,is a senior official in the fishery department in WestAceh, the boats built by Cerdas were substandardand subsequently rejected by the fishermen.ACTED recognised quite early on that Cerdaswere not up to the task at hand: "But it took a fewmonths for us to establish a mechanism to replaceCerdas. And we had to repair the boats theymade." The fishermen further refute the claimthat repairs were made.

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When use of the wrong local partner hurts beneficiariesBox

Local or Indonesian NGOsMany implementers found when they arrived that theskills they needed were lacking in Acehneseorganisations. Some agencies are taking steps toaddress this by training staff in skills needed toimplement programmes which sometimes includelanguage courses; the ILO is also running several shortvocational classes. To help address this local skillsshortage in the short-term, many implementers havebrought in organisations from elsewhere in Indonesia.

For example, for an ECHO-funded housing project inMatang Bangka, Jeunib, GAA contracted an Indonesianorganisation called LPTP to oversee day-to-daymanagement. However, GAA subsequently discoveredthat many of the local community could only speak thelocal Acehnese language and that a local communitygroup, recently renamed Fosoma, had been workingwith the people of Matang Bangka since before thetsunami; Fosoma was also then contracted to assist inimplementation of the programme. By all accounts,levels of communication and trust between GAA, LPTP,

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Fosoma and the community were initially extremelygood. But as the months passed and difficultiesmounted, a series of bad decisions by GAA, due in partto LPTP's lack of local knowledge, have left someFosoma members disillusioned. "We at Fosoma feelwe are used only as a bridge into the community," saidthe head of the organisation. "GAA never listen to oursuggestions. We realise now that our input is notimportant; GAA will do exactly what it wants." GAA isalso seeking an Acehnese or Indonesian NGO from themainland to implement its housing programme inSimeulu; a measure sure to meet with some resentmenton the island.

International organisations, which pay substantiallyhigher salaries than other areas of employment,inevitably have attracted many of Aceh's most skilledindividuals. While Acehnese who work for internationalagencies will eventually be returned to the local talentpool when these groups leave, in the short term thebrain drain has often severely harmed the performanceof local entities, especially local government. Civilservants were badly paid even before the tsunami,which is why many government employees often hadtwo jobs, spending little time at their government offices.Now the stakes are even higher: it is not difficult tounderstand why a teacher in a state school receiving Rp650,000 ($70) to 1.8 million ($194) per month, or a rank2 or 3 civil servant whose salary is around Rp 900,000($97) to 1.2 million ($129), can easily be lured away byINGO salaries of Rp 3 to 10 million ($323 to $1,077) amonth plus other benefits. Some civil servants in facthave been living a double life, filling a civil service slotwhile actually working full-time for an internationalemployer-a fact of which some INGOs are aware, butturn a blind eye. Such practices can reduce localgovernment entities to ghost towns, bringing theiroperations to an effective halt. In West Aceh, thesituation indeed became so bad that the localgovernment warned staff to resign from their secondINGO jobs by 30 August or face disciplinary action. Inthe end, two resigned from the civil service, but manysimply ignored the ultimatum and became more discreetabout their second job. Local government officials tooka resigned tone. "We know many are still working withINGOs," said one public servant. "We can't blame them,because the salary is high; but we would prefer that theinternational agencies did not employ them at all."

Corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) are widelypresent in Aceh, including in the reconstructionenvironment. Stories of nepotism by local officials andlack of accountability breed suspicion that everyoneinvolved in executing projects is creaming off at least alittle for themselves. Local anti-corruption NGOs suchas SORAK and GERAK have amassed a substantialbody of evidence showing that the military has siphonedoff aid and is involved in supplying timber and othermaterials for reconstruction, and that local governmentofficials are also benefiting.

As noted above, most donors and implementers havestrict anti-corruption policies on paper, and the questionof how to identify and deal with KKN is commonly

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Brain drain from the civil service

Corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN)

discussed among operations staff in Aceh. However,many agencies appear unable to recognise thepresence of KKN in their own projects. For example,research by FAO and Panglima Laot suggests that KKNhas been rife in the provision of boats, leading to anexcess in supply. Family and friends of local facilitatorstasked with providing data on beneficiaries, or thosewho are friends of the head of village, have been foundto claim boats for which they do not qualify. Somepeople in fact have ended up with more boats than theyhad before; for example, fishermen who previouslyshared a boat among two or three people now registerfor one boat each - including in some villages suppliedby FAO. The secretary of Panglima Laot says:"Actually, some of those who received boats were noteven fishermen, and immediately sold the boat orengine."

Even when international agencies' suspicions arearoused, many are unable or unwilling to investigatefurther, particularly given the frustrations ofimplementing projects on the ground. "Petty corruptionis present in most projects in Aceh, but quite frankly, wedon't have time to do anything about it," said one staffercandidly. For example, Oxfam bought 47 cubic metresof wood to be transported to Calang in West Aceh, butran into problems when they tried to transport 20 cubicmetres of the wood without the required SKSHHcertificate which gives permission for legally felledtimber to be transported. The first batch of wood wasfinally transported, but the process required severalfrustrating weeks of negotiations. When the time cameto transport the remaining wood, not wishing to repeatthe delays experienced by the first consignment, Oxfampaid the 'fee' of Rp 5 million ($538) requested by theforestry department to issue the SKSHH certificate.According to a member of Oxfam staff who preferrednot to be identified, the NGO was aware that thecertificate should be issued free of charge: "Yes, weknew at the time that we were paying a bribe. Not onlythat, we also knew that there was a very high chancethe Department of Forestry would not know whether ornot the wood came from a legal source. We just wantedthe certificate." Having waited one month for thecertificate, Oxfam has since requested (and received)the Rp 5 million back from the department. But theproblem of transporting the wood remained unsolveddue to the absence of the necessary SKSHH certificate.

By contrast, in recognition of KKN pitfalls, the MDTFhousing programme has established strict measuresdesigned to encourage self-policing by communities.Any case of corruption or mismanagement of funds in ahousing committee is subject to immediate sanction bythe village Board of Trustees, with the ultimate sanctionbeing that no further funds will be disbursed to theentire village until the matter is cleared up. Thepressure not to jeopardise the village's programmeshould, says the MDTF, prove a strong disincentive todiversion of funds.

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"There are two reasons that have caused anover-supply of boats in Aceh; the donors

desire to spend the money quickly and the greedand nepotism of many local people."

Adli Abdullah, Panglima Laot, 8 November 2005.

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CASE STUDYMany sub-national government entities that do not ordinarily administer aid programmes responded extremelygenerously after the tsunami. These bodies have sometimes chosen to channel their funds through national leveldevelopment assistance schemes, but also have sometimes chosen to go it alone. Such an approach, however,has sometimes proved risky, as donors lack the capacity to monitor and evaluate the results of their assistance.

For example, the Queensland government and the IOM have been working together since April 2005 to providetemporary housing for civil servants in Aceh. IOM in April signed an MoU with the local government in BandaAceh to provide 11,000 temporary shelters, 1000 of which, at the request of the governor of Aceh, were to beallocated to local government employees. Meanwhile, the Queensland government announced that it hadcommitted A$3 million ($2,247 million) towards a project to construct 770 temporary houses for civil servants inAceh. The spin-off benefit was to be employment for around 500 local tsunami victims. The Queenslandgovernment contracted IOM to provide the molded concrete Type 36 units. According to the agreement, IOMwas to be responsible for the provision of amenities such as electricity and water, which would be supplied withthe completed houses. (The Queensland government media release announcing the project said "The wooden-framed, 36 square-metre homes have water and power." ) The Queensland government also believed that IOMwould design the houses in consultation with communities.

The project, however, has not lived up to the Queensland government's expectations. First, despite promises byboth parties that locals would make up the bulk of labourers on the project, in fact IOM's contractors typicallybrought in workers from elsewhere. For example, PT Alhas Jaya, a company from Lhokseumawe contracted tobuild the houses for the transport department, brought a team of workers from North Aceh for the project.Second, delays in construction due to lack of available land rendered the project vulnerable to the soaring costsof material and transport in Aceh; although IOM initially agreed to construct 770 houses, in September itinformed the Queensland administration that the existing budget was only sufficient for 500 houses.

Finally, the project has been plagued by serious quality control issues. By December, 156 houses in four areashad been completed and keys given to occupants. But a survey conducted mid-December found while thehouses for the Department of Transmigration (the first to be completed) had 100 percent occupancy, only 67percent of transport department houses and 7 percent of houses built for the police force had people living there,and not one of the 12 houses built for the agriculture department was occupied, despite the fact that keys werehanded over in September. Beneficiaries of the latter explained why: "There is only one well between twelvehouses, and anyway, the water is too dirty to drink. There is no electricity and the doors don't shut properly. Idon't mean to sound ungrateful - but do people in Australia live like this?" IOM did confirm that "all the houseswill have clean water supply." Of the residents of the 65 houses (out of a total of 153) occupied, all of whomwere surveyed, only two people said they were satisfied with the condition of the houses. The main causes ofdissatisfaction and delay in taking up occupancy cited in the questionnaire were: the lack of an internal ceiling,meaning that houses became very hot; doors and windows that do not fit properly and many that cannot belocked; dirty water sources, requiring the purchase of drinking water; and lack of an electricity connection, theinitial fee for which not all residents could afford. The houses must be repaired by the beneficiaries, requiringskills and financial resources that many lack. Instead, they continue to live with relatives or friends. TheQueensland government holds that its responsibility ends with the construction of the houses: "We recognisedthere would be shortcomings, but we left IOM to negotiate those." Meanwhile, IOM says that it did not makeany promises about amenities. A local government official in Aceh sought to clarify: "IOM didn't promiseelectricity and water in the semi-permanent houses for the civil servants. In fact, IOM doesn't have a budget forthat. We are aware of the problem there, and IOM has said they will try to find a solution." By mid-December,however, when the questionnaire was conducted, no attempt had been made by either IOM or the QueenslandGovernment to rectify the problem.

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"Eighty percent of those who will work on the Queensland houses will be local IDPs."Paul Dillon, IOM Information Officer, 28 July 2005.

Going it alone is risky: the case of the Queensland government

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The environmental cost of reconstructing Aceh

One of the most striking results of our research was thediscovery of how much damage is being done to Aceh'senvironment by badly designed, badly monitored aidprojects. While the imperative for speed inreconstruction is obvious, the consequences of suchdamage - in particular deforestation - has the potentialto affect Aceh long after the last aid agency has left theprovince.

Indonesia is home to 10 percent of the world's tropicalforests. Aceh itself is a province endowed with richforest reserves. It includes the Leuser Ecosystem whichstraddles the south of Aceh and North Sumatra,covering approximately 2.6 million hectares of tropicalrainforest, and home to a variety of wildlife such astigers, elephants and rhinoceros, orangutans, hornbills,cloud leopards and the world's largest flower, therafflesia. Set in this ecosystem is the Gunung LeuserNational Park, declared a world heritage site by theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO). The EC devoted €35 million($42 million) between 1995 - 2004 to the LeuserDevelopment Programme to support the conservationand development of this ecosystem.

Nevertheless, illegal logging in Aceh is rampant.Indonesia as a whole in fact has the highest rate ofdeforestation in the world, with about three millionhectares of forest lost every year. In Aceh alone,270,000 hectares of forest disappears annually, in largepart to illegal logging - much of it within Leuser, which,despite being a "protected area" under Indonesian law,is one of the most exploited areas in the entirecountry. Logging regulations in Indonesia in general,and in Aceh itself, are notoriously riddled withloopholes, and frequently ignored altogether. Forinstance, a logging moratorium technically had been inplace in Aceh since 2001; however, it was continuallyviolated, and was eventually lifted in September 2004.Illegal logging in the province before and since thetsunami has been linked by many to the military, thepolice, and local government officials.

Aceh's forests are now in even more danger as thedemand for timber soars. It is estimated that theminimum wood requirement for the reconstruction andrehabilitation period (estimated at five years) is446,000m3 of sawn timber, equivalent to 1.1 millioncubic metres (m3) of logs. Not only has illegal loggingincreased; in response to the estimated timberrequirement, the Department of Forestry in Jakarta hasrecently issued permits for eleven companies to harvestwood in Aceh Jaya, Singkil, East and Southeast Aceh,Bireun, Pidie, Bener Meriah, Simeulu, and AcehTamiang. The October 2005 Forestry Decree increasesthe timber quota in Aceh's production forests from50,000 m3 to 500,000 m3. The previous actingGovernor of Aceh, Azwar Abubakar was unhappy withthis policy: "If this [policy] goes ahead, almost half ofAceh's forests might be destroyed, and we willexperience even greater disasters, such as widespreadand never-ending floods." Local environmental groupssay that such incidents have increased with thestripping by logging of the tree cover and othervegetation which would normally absorb water duringthe rainy season, creating the potential for more floods

Deforestation

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and mudslides of the type that killed more than 20people and displaced thousands more in 2005.

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The Indonesian government reconstructionblueprint suggests that to meet the demand fortimber needed for reconstruction, four sources areavailable: a). confiscated/found wood, b)contribution from surrounding provinces, c) landclearing, d) relinquished forest. The EC concursand has advocated a "creative" solution to theshortage of timber in Aceh: "In the short-term, theexisting reserves of government-seized illegally-logged timber could be used." The challenge,however, is to ensure that the policy does notactually encourage further illegal logging throughcreating a market for "confiscated" timber. Localforestry departments have been known to sell suchtimber at a profit, not only violating the law but alsoraising the possibility that part of the fee is goingback to those who cut the forests in the first place -often with military backing - creating an incentive tocontinue logging.

For example, on the western island of Simeulu,CARE International Indonesia is executing anintegrated programme that includes theconstruction of 470 houses in two differentlocat ions. Under pressure to speed upimplementation, but faced with a shortage ofmaterials, especially wood, CARE turned to thelocal forestry department to negotiate the purchaseof a stock of confiscated timber. Simeulu had beenat the centre of rows over illegal logging for severalyears, but the logging companies, many of themfrom Malaysia and Thailand always worked incollusion with the local government, police andmilitary. The head of the local forestry departmentexplains: "We have been trying to stop illegallogging in Simeulu for years. During martial law, thecompany-military/local government protectionmechanisms broke down; a crackdown by themartial law authorities in 2004 resulted in theseizure of more than 1,500 cubic metres of hardwood." After much negotiation between theforestry department and CARE, and lobbying by theowner of a local saw mill, an agreement worth Rp830 million ($89,970) was signed on 30 August2005. The price paid by CARE to the departmentwas Rp 1.3 million ($141) per cubic metre, thesame price as in a commercial (woodshop) in Simeulu. But according to an official inthe Banda Aceh forestry department: "When CAREbought the confiscated wood in Simeulu, the pricethey paid should have been sufficient only to coverthe cost of administration and the processing of thewood - there should be no profit to the department.That is our law. If they [CARE] paid more, then thetransaction is illegal."

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Confiscated timber: solution or problem?Box

Meanwhile, a steady flow of illegally-felled timber ismaking its way into the construction sector to fuel theendless appetite of local and international customers forbuilding materials. Most international agenciesoperating in Aceh have declared themselves sensitiveto environmental issues. The EC's Tsunami IndicativeProgramme document lists "sustainable development"as one of its key objectives, and talks of mainstreaming

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the environment into all activities. Meanwhile, theMDTF says that "sustainability" is a core principleof its reconstruction programme - particularly sinceit faces pressure from its donors to meet highenvironmental standards in all projects. Manyinternational actors have also taken practical stepsto try to enforce environmentally sensitive policies.For instance, to try to ensure that its shelterprogramme has "minimal negative impact on theenvironment," the MDTF has devised several criteriathat the local housing committees must adhere to,which include a maximum amount of timber to beused in each house and a list of pre-selectedsuppliers that have been vetted for the legal statusof their wood. Most implementing agenciesindeed say that they ensure timber is legal byinsisting the supplier provide all necessary certificates.

However, two problem areas are clear. First, therehas been little coordinated effort to overcome theissue of lack of materials for housing, boats,and other const ruc t ion pro jec ts . A t imberworking group established in the early monthsof the rehabilitation process collapsed due to lack ofinterest. While the initiative was revived byUN-Habitat, the first meeting in September 2005 wasattended by representatives from only three INGOs, theCanadian embassy, and a Canadian forestry company -a disappointing turn-out, given that almost 100organisations are involved in house construction. Thethree implementing agencies present at the meetingspoke of difficulties sourcing timber, and notedthat supply lines are not secure for the longer term.

Second, there often appears to be a substantialgap between policy and practice in the activities ofimplementers. For example, Yayasan AIRO, a localNGO in Aceh Besar, was one of eight organisationstasked by FAO, with ECHO funding, to build small boatsfor local fishermen. AIRO and other FAO projects in thearea all source their wood from deep in the mountainsof Lampanah Leungah. The wood cutters explain thatwhen wood is needed, someone comes from AIRO: "Aforeign guy who can speak some Bahasa Indonesia,sometimes more than one foreigner, meets with theboss here, Yah Li, to order the wood." Using chain sawsand other equipment provided by AIRO, Yah Li and hismen cut the wood for the boats to order, the price ismuch less than in the local . At the end ofDecember 2005, Yah Li was busy in the forestfulfilling a recent order for 100 pieces of timber forAIRO who will return by mid-January to collect it.One of the workers commented: "I know cutting thiswood is illegal as we don't have a permit, but ifI don't cut wood then I don't earn money.You gather information for your office, right? And soyour office pays you for that. If I cut wood, I also getpaid." When asked about the source of wood,the FAO master boat builder, said: "We rely onour local NGO partners to source the woodlegally and locally. But it's very difficult to prove here inAceh; we are aware that wood certificates can bebought."

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"To be honest, if we have to double checkevery piece of wood we [FAO] purchase to buildboats is legal, we wouldn't be able to build any

boats to help the local communities."Michael Savins, interviewed 27 December 2005.

MDTF houses will be made largely from brick, aswill many others in Aceh. However, brickmanufacture is itself destructive to the forests: FAOhas said that between 125,000 to 250,000 hectaresof forest would need to be cut to provide enoughwood for the brick kilns in Aceh over the period ofreconstruction. But few donors have factored thedamaging effects of this 'traditional' method ofmanufacturing bricks into their 'sustainabledevelopment' or 'best environmental practice'policies. There is an alternative method of makingbricks using soil and other organic materials, inwhich they are not burned but pressed (these bricksare called in Acehnese). However, in Aceh,

are not used for housing along the coastalareas because their durability is affected by thesalty air. The GAA initially proposed the use of

in the Jeunib housing project, but localvillagers rejected this in favour of traditional bricksmade by highly polluting factories in North Aceh:"Only very few people in our community chose the'sand' bricks, 90% want bricks from kilns, then weknow the houses will last longer." Finally GAAtested the site, and agreed would not be agood building material for this area.

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Wood versus brick?Box

By contrast, GAA has attempted to take a minimal-impact approach in its housing projects in SimeuluTimur by planning to build its "semi -permanent" housesfrom coconut wood. Environmental groups such theIndonesian group WALHI have advocated the use ofcoconut wood as an alternative to hardwoods; theInstitute of Technology in Bandung says houses madefrom coconut wood can last for 20-30 years. Althoughthere are not enough coconut trees in Aceh to meet thisneed, the wood can adequately be imported fromelsewhere in Indonesia. GAA's attempt to use coconutwood in Simeulu has not been without its challenges:the wood has been hard to source, and somebeneficiaries consider it to be a "low status" buildingmaterial. However, if these issues can be overcome, theapproach will be a valuable contribution to reducing thestrain on Aceh's forest reserves.

In Aceh, , and hardwoods are all on offer to the aid agencies. In several

in North Aceh, legal and illegal wood arestored side by side. In a in the main roadbetween Samudera and Syamtalira Bayu sub-districts, the stock comes from a variety of sources, asexplained by the owner: "I get the wood from a supplierin Matang Kuli area, and I also own five chainsawsmyself. I pay 30 local people to go to cut the wood inthe forests. I opened my just this yearbecause there is a big demand for wood from someNGOs." The wood (legal and illegal) has been sold toseveral NGOs, including Oxfam in Banda Aceh.According to the owner, Oxfam ordered 30tons of wood: "Yes, some of the wood in thatconsignment was illegal." The owner has apartner, a first sergeant in (sub-district policeoffice) in one sub-district of North Aceh. With abusiness partner in the police, the illegal wood isprotected from threat of confiscation; but it does notmean his business is free from illegal fees. "Having

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Laundering illegal timber in North Acehmeranti, kruing, semaram merbau

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police as a partner does not mean I don't have to paythe military. It's not very much, about Rp 100,000 ($11)to two local [military] posts. I think it's ok."

In a in Lhokseumawe, the system is similar.Nurdin explains: "The wood comes from various areasin North Aceh; Cot Girek sub-district, Gunung Salak,Kreung Tuan, and from Matang Kuli. The trucks thatdeliver are always escorted by either the police or themilitary. I also buy wood from the villager, and fromsmall businessmen, but NGOs are my main customers.Oxfam orders direct from here. They bought 30 tonsthat they told me was to be used in North Aceh. [ECHO-funded] IRC/CARDI also have bought several timesfrom me, including five tons of hard wood for clinics,and a lot of chipboard. CARE from Banda Aceh boughtwood for ceilings and window sills, but they ordered viaan agent. Only IRC/CARDI asked me if the wood islegal, I said "yes." They asked me to confirm that bywriting it on the purchase order, I said "ok." [But] I didn'tget this wood from the big sawmills, only from thevillagers and businessmen who cut the forest - neitherof them has a certificate." Had IRC/CARDI asked tosight a certificate that would give proof the wood was in

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fact legal, Nurdin would not have been able to producesuch a document. This would then have given anindication to the buyer that the timber was not legal andshould not be purchased.

: Worthy of brief mention here is the issueof over fishing; Aceh's shallow coastal waters have longfaced excessive demands. "Even before the tsunami,there was already an indication of over fishing in Aceh,"an FAO official said. Since the tsunami, however, anoversupply by aid agencies - including the FAO - ofsmall boats that cannot venture into deep waters hasput coastal fishery stocks at even greater risk. "Nowthat many small boats have been donated, the situationmight get even worse," said the FAO official. "Better togive bigger boats to allow the fishermen to go to opensea.” Such points had already been raised with theFAO by Panglima Laot, which advised supplying fewer,but larger boats, preferably not less than 15 metres,and discontinuing the supply of boats under sevenmetres But the FAO itself has continued with itsprogramme to distribute small boats, and refused tocomment on the disparity between their prescriptionsand actual programme practice.

Over fishing

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The French NGO Triangle Generation Humanitarie (TGH) is working to reactivate fishing activities in the districtof Aceh Besar. The programme, which includes providing 131 fishing boats, is funded by several donors,including a $365,383 contribution from ECHO. The ECHO contribution funded 50 boats made by local boatmakers.

From the beginning, this programme was based on the premise of inclusiveness. By discussing concept, designand processes of implementation with the beneficiaries and also Panglima Laot, Triangle has successfullycreated a sense of ownership in all aspects of the programme. Boats are assigned to beneficiaries based on aletter of recommendation from the head of the village, and an assessment by Panglima Laot and the fishermenthemselves.

Even before Ramli began work, each of the 8 to 9 metre boats to be made in his boat yard were alreadyassigned to a fisherman. The wood is sourced from a in Lhoong where the owner Rusli, is happy toprovide eight different documents to prove the wood he is selling is legal. The boatyard is paid Rp 2.5 million($269) per boat, and the design is a result of input from TGH staff and Panglima Laot who visit the workshopseveral times each week. The beneficiaries are also encouraged to visit the yard to check on the progress oftheir boat: "It's nice to see my boat being built, but I don't need to give input on the design because that foreignguy from TGH has a very clever boat building technique," said one. The fishermen who have already receivedtheir boats are also very satisfied: "We are all very happy with these boats - the quality is very good. TGH andPanglima Laot have done a very appropriate programme here, and we are very grateful."

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TGH aid boats - still afloat

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CASE STUDY

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Donor and implementer 'best practice'

In all of the areas of concern discussed above,problems have been exacerbated by three issues: lackof coordination between donors, failure of donors andimplementers to monitor and evaluate projects, andfailure of donors and implementers to heed therecommendations of existing evaluations or to respondto changing conditions.

A common refrain in evaluations and internal reports ofmany international NGOs and others operating inemergency situations around the world is the need forcooperation and coordination with other donors andagencies. Given what an official from AIPRD calls the"turf wars" (competition for project areas) that havetaken place in Aceh between many of the implementingagencies, this competitiveness has led to even greaterreluctance to exchange "real information."Coordination meetings are often simply an arenawhereby representatives of agencies agree to worktogether, and then "go away and do exactly what wewant and had planned anyway."

There are many examples of friction between donorswhen one organisation's project "ownership" faces a"hostile" bid from another agency. For example, thevillage of Blang Krueng in Baitussalam needed 367houses, and in March 2005,(OBI) promised to provide housing; however, it pulledout before implementation began. Villagers wereunderstandably very pleased to accept a subsequentoffer in May 2005 from the ADB, which promisedhouses and other village needs, and even left plans ofthe houses with the head of the village. But bySeptember, the ADB had not returned to Blang Krueng.Persuaded by the frustrated community, the head of thevillage turned to World Vision, who agreed to take onthe project. Villagers subsequently witnessed anexchange between World Vision and ADB staffmembers, during which the ADB representativeaccused World Vision of having a "competitive spirit."The head of the village was puzzled: "Why is the ADBnot happy when others want to help us? Anyway, theyshould have complained to me, not to World Vision.Their attitude is unacceptable."

Sometimes agencies do coordinate to "rescue" acommunity from a programme that has either failed tomaterialise or that has hit insurmountable obstacles.One such example is that of the Oxfam shelter project

Coordination between donors

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in the village of Blang Oi in Banda Aceh, which inessence collapsed and was 'rescued' by the MDTFhousing programme. As Oxfam was trying to quietlydownsize its programme in Blang Oi, local communityleaders and a local NGO working on behalf of thecommunity, essentially pushed Oxfam into finding asolution. Over a period of several weeks beginning earlyOctober, Oxfam staff held meetings with the communityin Blang Oi, and promised 330 Type 36 houses. Thecommunity of Blang Oi had been promised housing ontwo previous occasions, by the Indonesian NGOJenggala (recently renamed YPKI) who promised 100houses, but built only 20 of such poor standard thatnobody would live in them, and by World Vision who didnot even reach the stage of laying the foundations.Oxfam put a picture of the houses they would build onthe village notice board for all to see before signing upfor a house. In total, 273 people registered, and the listwas submitted to Oxfam for the MoU to be drafted - aprocess that would, according to Oxfam staff, take only24 hours. As time passed and the MoU promised byOxfam was not forthcoming, the people of Blang Oi lostpatience quickly. The local organising committee wasonly slightly surprised when, mid-December, theyreceived news that "Oxfam, with its limited budget nextyear, will not be able to meet all of Blang Oi's housingneeds." The positive outcome is that the MDTF hastaken over responsibility of 218 houses from Oxfam,leaving Oxfam with only 50 to build - a face-savingmeasure. The community is getting its housing; butOxfam's reputation is dented, despite the fact they haveoffered to give technical advice to villagers who mightneed it during the construction of their houses.

By contrast, it is heartening to see progress inreconstructing communities that are the result of multi-agency efforts. In the coastal village of Kuala Keureutouin Tanah Pasir sub-district of North Aceh, there arethree agencies working side by side: Save the Children,Help Germany and IRC/CARDI. From the villagers'perspective, coordination and collaboration betweenthe three is very good, and has translated into somevery positive results for the local community. Basic foodneeds are being taken care of by Save the Children,who are also giving training on how to start smallbusinesses. Meanwhile, Help Germany is providingType 36 houses, and 27 boats for local fishermen, builtby boat makers who attended the FAO training coursefor boat-makers; water and sanitation needs are beingcoordinated by IRC/CARDI. More importantly, theatmosphere in the village - both among the agenciesand the villagers - is very positive and supportive.

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The MDTF's two-phase Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction project is working together with the KDPand UPP to build and repair housing for hundreds of villages in Aceh and Nias.. Soaring costs in Aceh haveaffected the scope of this project: soon after the project was approved, the BRR increased the minimum priceper unit from Rp 28 million ($3,015) to Rp 42 million ($4,523). In response, the Trust Fund reduced the numberof villages in which the project will be implemented, and made a downward adjustment in the total number ofhouses to be built in the first phase to 6,000; the number of repairs has also decreased. The pilot phase, whichbegan in December 2005 with UPP facilitators' support, will fund the construction of almost 1,000 houses and therehabilitation of several hundred more in the Banda Aceh area.

Implementation of the Fund's housing programme is grounded in the same philosophy as the UPP and KDPmechanisms: the belief that community empowerment and education should be an integral part of a communityinfrastructure programme. The programme has recruited UPP facilitators, and expanded on the existing networkof KDP staff, as well as recruiting and training new staff whose focus is solely on housing. Local housingcommittees of 10-15 people are being established in the target villages, as well as a local oversight Board ofTrustees, all of whom are notarised. Via the local housing committees, the scheme gives cash grants of Rp 42million (the BRR approved rate for a standard Type 36 house) to each beneficiary, whose responsibility it is toplan, design and implement the building of their own homes. The houses must meet earthquake proof,environmental, and other standards, including the possibility for future extension. Grants of Rp 15 million($1,615) are also available to those in the area who need money to repair their houses. The money is disbursedvia a special account established by the housing committees. The Fund has also placed consultants in the fieldto assist with design and other technical matters, and to help ensure that pre-requisites of transparency,accountability, environmental standards and others are met. This is, according to the MDTF, "the ultimate incommunity driven development."

This programme is on-budget, with funds being channelled via a special account held by the Ministry of Financein Jakarta. As with most on-budget programmes, the MDTF's settlement programme got off to a slow start. Thebureaucratic procedure is, according to the Trust Fund Manager, "too slow. Housing is a particularly urgentsector; delays are really unacceptable." BRR has itself been frustrated with the sluggish pace at which thegiant wheel of bureaucracy in Jakarta turns; a spokesperson quoted in the local media said: "We understand thatthe ministry of finance's job is to control; but if the control puts a stop to (reconstruction and rehabilitation) thenit's not right." For its part, the Ministry of Finance says the delay is because the implementers don't understandthe system: "Yes, we know some people think the delay is in the finance department, but we will not approve theprocedure while the project remains unclear. Until the DIPA is in order, the programme will not go ahead."

In Gampong Baru, Banda Aceh, the community is very happy with their new situation, one resident explains:"We've been promised houses by several NGOs. UPLINK came to do land mapping in April and promised 250houses-no implementation. World Vision arrived here in September to build barracks, and they said they wouldfollow that with 213 houses-no implementation. Perhaps that's lucky for us in some way. The UPP came lastweek and told us we could have this new housing scheme. We can already see the results in that we havealready set up housing committees and have begun to discuss budgets and building strategies; it's great." Forcommunities frustrated by empty promises, the MDTF housing scheme is the opportunity to take control of atleast some part of their lives.

No scheme, however, is without potential problems. A number of interlocutors voiced concerns about thepotential for corruption, in the form of giving 'coffee money,' to those whose task it is to approve each phase. Asin all Trust Fund projects, strict anti-corruption mechanisms have been put in place in principle: the money for anew house is given in three tranches and for repairs in two tranches, and any non-fulfilment of requirements orhint of malpractice will result in the next tranche being withheld. The assessment of progress is conductedthrough a community adjudication committee that gives technical assistance to people to help design their ownhomes. Nevertheless, a local community group based in the same sub-district as the pilot project voicedconcerns: "The opportunity for some corruption in this MDTF mechanism is very high. For example, it would beeasy to over-price materials, or over-charge for building contractors etc. That's the Acehnese way, but we don'tcall it corruption." Meanwhile, some of the beneficiaries are concerned that the Rp 42 million might not beenough to build the houses given the soaring costs of materials in Aceh. There are already discussions in thevillages about if, when, and how the MDTF should be approached for an increase to the allocated grant, orwhether communities that will be involved in the next phase of the projects should simply reject the project andwait for another agency to provide a house.

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"The MDTF only has a monitoring role in this programme. It is the communitiesthemselves who should decide who receives a grant to build a new house,

and who needs financial assistance to repair their house."Safriza Sofyan and Guemala Yatim, MDTF, Banda Aceh, 26 November 2005.

The MDTF's shelter programmeCASE STUDY

34

The town of Geudong in Samudra sub-district in North Aceh was not directly affected by the earthquake ortsunami, but those from surrounding areas whose villages had been destroyed flocked to the area to seekrefuge. The local Geudong community helped to source food and other items that were needed by the 1,500families (5,378 people) from nine villages that settled there. The Geudong mosque became the focal point forIDPs who set up camp on the community owned land adjacent to the mosque. A (emergency coordinationcentre) was established in the mosque, and Haji Syukri, a community leader, was elected as its head. Manyorganisations distributed goods through the , including local partners of Save the Children, which wasoperating with Australian and ECHO funding. The distribution system was, according to local people, workingvery well; each village camped in the grounds of the mosque had formed a Board who gathered informationweekly on what was required, then placed an order with the . But problems began when, after one month,the SATLAK (a sub-district board for disaster management consisting of sub-district level government, police andmilitary) arrived to appoint a new head of the . The local people were afraid of the new head, who wasknown to be very close to the military.

In late February, against the wishes of Syukri and others, the was moved to the office, about onekilometre away from the IDP camp. The SATLAK and the new head said the mosque was overcrowded,and that the was disturbing the activities of the mosque. But in fact, the mosque committee say this is nottrue: it was an elaborate ploy to facilitate the theft of aid. Local people explained how many of the goods thatarrived - including baby milk, mattresses, buckets, blankets, sanitary products, clothes, sarongs, shoes, blankets,raincoats, kitchen equipment, tent equipment from Oxfam and other items - were taken away by the newhead, staff from the office, and SATLAK staff. The villagers were powerless to complain.

Staff at the office explain that although records were kept of what was given to the , those recordshave gone missing. "The office has been cleaned and I don't know where the books went," said a staff member."Perhaps they are already burned with other paper; that's what we usually do. I do remember that Save theChildren, Oxfam, ICRC and others gave a lot of things." When pressed about the ethics of burning governmentdocuments, the staff member suddenly changed his mind: "Perhaps the record books are in that cupboard, but Idon't have a key." Given the weight of evidence, it seems quite likely that at least some and possibly most of theaid was misused and diverted to parties for which it was never intended. To date, none of the guilty parties havebeen brought to account on this matter by any of the donors, NGOs or their relevant constituents, despite thefact that the misappropriation is well known within the local population.

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Monitoring and evaluationFailure to monitor processes and outcomes canlead to a variety of negative outcomes. Monitoringis vital to heading off corruption, quality controlissues, and non-delivery of promised outcomes.Failure to monitor in turn can lead to feelingsamong beneficiaries that implementers gain morethan they give, and don't much care about theoutcomes for the recipients. Meanwhile, failure toconduct post-project evaluations permits badimplementers to get away with poor performanceand to proceed to the next job, leaving behind badquality projects and bad feelings.

For example, in July the IOM, handed over 157ECHO-funded market stalls in four locations on thewestern island of Simeulu. But by December, mostof the market stalls outside Sinabang, the island'smain town, remain empty. In Latiung village,Teupah Selatan, not one of the 14 market stallsbuilt by IOM, is being used. Local villagers saynobody will ever use the market which has falleninto a state of disrepair in only a few months. "Thecondition of the stalls is terrible. It doesn't look likea market, it looks like a series of chicken sheds.There are many holes in the walls, nobody wantsthese stalls now." The local bristles whenasked about the IOM market stalls: "Well, I wantedto discuss the style of the market with IOM, butseems they didn't want my suggestions. Apart fromthose in Sinabang, the market stalls are just awaste of time and money." Had IOM returned toSimeulu to evaluate the impact of this project, theymight have been able to rectify some of theproblems by repairing the broken stalls, while at thesame time building better relations with the local

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a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e l o c a lcommunities. On Simeulu, IOM has earned areputation as a ‘couldn't care less' organisation forwhom tsunami reconstruction is 'only a project.'

By contrast, the IRC/CARDI health programmepartly funded by ECHO in North Aceh has,according to local staff employed to work on theprogramme, an ongoing system of monitoring andevaluation. The programme is wide-ranging, andincludes the construction of 9 (villagelevel community midwife clinics), supplying allequ ipment for the new cl in ics , t ra in ing ofcommunity midwives, and in collaboration with theMin is t ry o f Hea l th and the Assoc ia t ion ofI n d o n e s i a n M i d w i v e s ( I B I ) , I R C / C A R D I i scollaborating to standardise training for Acehnesemidwives. When it became evident that people inmany areas had very little knowledge of basichygiene practice, IRC/CARDI employed localvolunteer staff on per diem salaries and initiated atwo-month training course. At several steps alongthe way the training was re-evaluated and the localcommunities were consulted; the result is aprogramme that is having a positive impact onbasic hygiene and health care in some of the mostvulnerable populations in the area, where many stilllive in barracks where conditions are unclean and

"The foreign NGOs will be in Aceh as long as itsuits their interests to be here. I think theonly motive they have for being in Aceh is

because there is money available; as soon asthe money dries up, they will leave."

Adli Abdullah, secretary of Panglima Laot, interviewed16 November 2005.

35

sometimes overcrowded. In the area of KeudeLapang, in the sub-district of Tanah Pasir, anIRC/CARDI local 'volunteer' who is paid Rp 25,000($2.70) per day to live in the barracks with the localcommunity to improve basic levels of hygiene andhealth care said: "I'm happy with the training Ireceived from IRC/CARDI. I do like working here,and I know the local people appreciate our work."The programme has not been completely free ofproblems, but the beneficiaries are relativelysatisfied. In discussions with several villagers int h e b a r r a c k c o m m u n i t y , t h e r e w a s m u c henthusiasm for the IRC/CARDI programme, andpraise for the fact that there is an ongoing system ofmonitoring, evident from the visits by more seniorstaff who sometimes come to the village to checkon implementation and from the fact that when thecommunity requested change (such as lessemphasis on health and more on basic householdhygiene), local staff responded immediately.

All too frequently, researchers heard that organisationshad already recognised or been told of the problems athand. Often however, it seems that agency staff hadeither lacked confidence or did not have the authority touse their own initiative to either properly assesschanging conditions or to respond to recommendationsfor change. This has led to waste as well as tofrustration on the part of beneficiaries.

For example, throughout Aceh, World Food Programme(WFP) food bearing the words 'Not For Sale' can befound for sale in many small shops and markets. IDPswith no income prefer to sell most items in the WFPfood basket (which has not varied its contents over thepast 12 months), or to trade them for othercommodities. The problem is partly one of oversupply,and partly one of local tastes. "I would say 80% of thepeople here don't want to eat tinned sardines fromWFP, so we sell them," one camp dweller explained."When the food is delivered, we call the agent to collectit and the agent pays us Rp 1,000 ($0.10) per tin [ofsardines]." In Banda Aceh, the pattern is the same, butthe price paid to the IDPs per tin is only Rp 500 ($0.05).

This market in "Not For Sale" food is not limited toAceh, however. An extensive trading network distributesbiscuits, tinned sardines, rice and other WFP suppliedfoodstuffs all around North Sumatra. Much of the food issent to the bigger markets in Medan via a network oflarger agents. A local agent in North Aceh explains:"After I buy from the IDPs, I take the stock to a shop inSyamtalira Aron, where it is taken by truck to Medan."To counter potential problems at police or militarycheckpoints, trucks usually carry a letter purchasedfrom the local police or military confirming that "this aidis not stolen, but has been sold by the IDPs."

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R e a c t i n g t o e v a l u a t i o n s a n d c h a n g i n gconditions

"The bigger buyer in Medan will call us if a truckarrested or checked by the police. Then we mustexplain to the police that the stock is not illegalbut has been sold by IDPs who need the moneyto buy other things." Local village agent, Samudra,

17 December 2005.

Unsurprisingly, considering the scale of these sales, theproblem has been brought to the WFP's attention invarious ways. For instance, in July 2005 the IndonesianCenter for Agro-Socio-Economic Research andDevelopment (ICASERD) conducted research to assistthe WFP in formulating its food aid policy in Aceh. Thereport noted that people were finding the food basket onoffer less and less appealing, and that some of the foodwas regularly sold by beneficiaries. In particular, theICASERD report recommended that the cannedsardines be cut out of the food basket, perhaps to bereplaced by other fish products closer to local tastes.A December 2005 FAO/WFP report indeed addressedthe growing problem of inappropriate food aid. But thereport devoted only two short paragraphs to the issue,portraying such incidents as anomalies involving onlyIDPs with higher income status and those involved incash-for-work schemes; and the same food basket willcontinue to be distributed by the WFP until March 2006because the stocks have already been bought.

By contrast, the ADB has taken a highly flexibleapproach in its programmes, checking to make surethat needs remain current before projects begin. Forexample, an ADB housing project has been deliberatelydelayed to permit re-assessment of the needs in thepreviously planned areas for the pilot project: "In Junewe had some initial ideas of where the housing projectwould begin, but now we must look again because Ithink some NGOs are already providing houses there,"said an ADB official. Moreover, the amounts set foreach department are fluid, and subject to ongoingassessment and adjustment. "The decision of exactlyhow much will go to each department is still in theprocess of being reassessed due to changing needsand conditions," explained an ADB Project Manager."Probably the Agriculture Department doesn't need asmuch as we originally allocated - we can divert thatmoney elsewhere." The flexible approach indeedextends to sectoral redistribution. "In the last MDTFSteering Committee meeting, we discussed the fact thatthere are sectors that have received financialallocations from donors that exceed their actual needs;but for other sectors such as public infrastructure forroad and bridges, there is a shortfall in allocation," saidthe head of ADB's extended mission in Sumatra. "TheADB is considering diverting funds from over-financedsectors to infrastructure and other sectors."

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Fuelled by the sound principle that the sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh must rest on thefoundation of a functioning local government structure, the AIPRD's post tsunami assistance package includes agovernance programme. This comprehensive programme includes the building or repair of up to 180 villageoffices and , as well as providing equipment for these offices and ongoing training programmes forlocal staff. An initial allocation of A$3 million ($2,239,000) has been made for the project. The first phase of theproject will provide 66 village offices or in Aceh Besar; and has already begun in Baitussalam, wherea sub-district office and 13 village offices will be repaired or reconstructed. The AIPRD has employed theservices of an Australian management contractor, GHD, to assume overall responsibility for execution of theprogramme, including to oversee design, consultation with local people, and budgets. A special grant agreementhas been signed with the World Bank to facilitate funds being disbursed via the Bank's KDP mechanism. Unlikethe KDP's block grants, however, which have a degree of flexibility in their use, the Australian grant is earmarkedspecifically for local government infrastructure.

Use of the KDP mechanism, however, has secured neither adequate communication with beneficiaries (bothlocal government officials and villagers) nor an understanding of their priorities and needs. Plans for the officeswere not shared with local government officials until late in the implementation process. In the case of -level offices, objections by local officials have been taken on board, but have led to delays in implementation. AnAIPRD official commented: "The first design for the sub-district office would have cost Rp 500 million ($53,700),but the didn't want it. So, the sub-district office had to be redesigned - in fact, the budget was thenreduced to Rp 300 million ($32,220)." In the case of village-level offices, however, such flexibility has not beenextended. A local KDP facilitator said: "The scheme is a good one. The only problem is that for this project, weare directly under the control of the GHD/AIPRD. They gave us the design of the office, and the breakdown ofcosts after everything was agreed, so we are able to make some small adjustments in allocation. Andunfortunately, we cannot change the design because AIPRD said the design should be like that."

Meanwhile, villagers appear neither to have been asked about their priorities nor kept informed of the progress inthe projects. Researchers for this study conducted questionnaire-style interviews with 260 residents ofBaitussalam between 16 and 21 November 2005. The purpose of the questionnaire was to assess level ofsatisfaction with the process of consultation and implementation of the village offices programme in the sub-district. The study involved 20 respondents (10 women and 10 men) from each of Baitussalam's 13 villages.None of the 260 respondents interviewed had attended a village meeting. Furthermore, none of the 130 femalerespondents had ever been invited to attend a meeting either about the planning process or to be informed thatvillage offices would be built. Women who did know of the project had been told by a male relative. Very fewrespondents outside Kajhu (the location of the pilot office) had heard of the project at all; even in Kajhu, whereconstruction was taking place when the interviews were conducted, respondents said they had no idea who wasbuilding the village office, but they did know that very few local people were actually involved. The results of thequestionnaire confirmed that information was not forthcoming, and the KDP facilitators themselves explained thatthey must await instructions from GHD. Meanwhile, not one respondent cited the village office as the top priorityfor the community. Several village heads said that while the people remain in temporary accommodation, thevillage office should not be a priority for donors. Asked to list priorities for the villages in Baitussalam, 75% ofrespondents to the questionnaire mentioned housing and related services such as water, sanitation, andelectricity supply, while 9% prioritised livelihood opportunities as more important to rehabilitate the communitythan a village office. The remaining 16% mentioned general communal facilities; even when explicitly askedabout the village offices, none said they were a priority.

This lack of communication is leading to frustration with perceived delays. In October, the head of Cadek villagehad been waiting for his new office for several months: "We are grateful the Australians will build our villageoffice, but we must wait until after they build the pilot office at Kajhu. There are always delays. Now they say theywill begin after [religious day of celebration] in early November." But in reality, there was never anychance the building would begin in November. The local KDP facilitator for Cadek confirmed that it would beearly 2006 before the first stone would be laid. When asked whether he had told the head of the village of thenew date, he replied: "No, I haven't informed them of the schedule. We are waiting to receive confirmation fromthe Australians that everything is ok." Meanwhile, delays are leading to frustration. Villagers suggested thatthe KDP should release the funds to enable local people to build the village offices themselves: "It's not a priority,but if it's going to be done - then let's do it" said the head of the village. Furthermore, several local residentsasked the researchers: " Can you give a message to the Australian government? We, the people of Cadek, aretired of your empty promises. Take your village office and promise it to someone else - we don't want to be your'project' any more."

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AIPRD support for sub-district and village governmentCASE STUDY

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IV. Conclusion

"We need honesty and commitment,not just promises."

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There is no doubt that the reconstruction of Acehpresents massive challenges, even to the mostseasoned aid agencies. The work of the international,national and local aid communities has already madecrucial contributions to Aceh's rehabilitation, and willcontinue to do so well into the future.

Nevertheless, this study has highlighted several criticalconsequences of aid programmes in Aceh. Theseproblems stem in large part from the failure of donorsand implementers to consult with communities as wellas to coordinate among themselves, as well as toconsider the appropriateness and potential impact oftheir projects. They include:

Distressingly, the lack of consultation andcommunication with beneficiaries often clearly hasheaped added stress on an already traumatisedpopulation. "Outsiders come into our community to takepictures or lay foundation stones, media come to reporton ‘progress’, the BRR visits, but we get no opportunityto say anything," said one person. "We smile politely,then they all leave, but nothing happens for months.This is our life; but we are not the background for aphoto shoot or a movie - this is real life."Beneficiaries treated as passive recipients particularlyresented the "dumping" of inappropriate or poor qualitymaterial aid, such as poor quality housing, food,livelihood schemes or other ill-conceived, supply-drivenprogrammes. The failure to adequately consult withbeneficiaries seems a particularly egregious oversight inthe case of housing design, a highly emotive area formost people. Few readers of this report, if their housesburned down, would relish the thought of second partyhaving sole responsibility for and control over thedesign of a replacement. Similarly, many Acehnese aredeeply frustrated at having to stand by while houses areconstructed that do not meet their needs.

These feelings of powerlessness and frustration oftenturn into anger against implementers and donors. Manyfelt let down by agencies who came to get data so theycould solicit funds from overseas, but never returned toimplement projects. "Many people promise usprogrammes," said one official, "but actually they onlycome as tsunami tourists. Then they feel sorry for whatthey see, and want to help. So they promise thevillagers to build houses, schools and other things; thenthey go back to their country to source the money. Butthey either can't source the money, or they don't getenough, so they don't come back." Some peopleexpressed great cynicism about the motives and goalsof international agencies. "Actually, here on Simeulu wecall CARE - that means they deliberatelymake things difficult for themselves. You want to knowwhy CARE implements its housing programme onSimeulu so slowly? Well, that's because many comefrom elsewhere to work for CARE here, they like it andwant to stay longer; if they implement the programmemore quickly, they will lose their jobs." Others wereenraged. "If any other single NGO comes to promisewithout working, I will chase them with a machete," said

Feelings of disempowerment and frustration amongbeneficiaries:

cari repot

one village head in Aceh Besar. Most, however,quietly stated that they simply wanted fair treatment."We will accept any NGO who can help us here inAceh Jaya," said one district secretary, "but if theNGO has an empty promise, then please stayaway."

Meanwhile, Acehnese cast in the role ofin te rmed ia r ies be tween communi t ies andimplementers were particularly upset when failures onthe part of donors or implementers left them in anawkward situation with the local people. For example,when Oxfam began to downscale its support forhousing in Blang Oi, local committee members toldthe INGO that it needed to attend the communitymeeting at which the bad news would be told, as they(the local committee) had worked hard to obtainsupport for Oxfam's housing programme, and felt thevillagers would blame them for its partial collapse:"You [to an Oxfam staff member] better bring yourself,and some others to the meeting," said one. "We willnot let the villagers down again - we want you [Oxfam]to tell everyone that it has nothing to do with thevillage committee, that the mistake lies with Oxfamalone."

Some implementers have found the resilience andstrength of the local people, which is an invaluable aidto the overall reconstruction process, a "hindrance.""The problem with the locals here in Aceh [is that]they're too stubborn, they think they know better, andrarely say 'thank you'," one staffer said. People whorefuse to move into houses that are too small or intobarracks that are far from livelihood opportunities, orto work for no pay when around them arecommunities employed in cash-for-work schemes, arethought of as "ungrateful." But it is not ingratitude todemand fair, open and accountable treatment.

The stories scattered through this report areample testimony to the scale of waste occurring asthe consequence of lack of consultation andcoordination. Houses that people do not want to livein, boats that are not seaworthy, grants that are notadequate to their purpose and so are being spent onother things - these are a dishonour to governmentsand individuals who have contributed their money, toindividuals and organisations who have worked hardto create projects, and to "beneficiaries" themselves.

Reconstruction aid to Aceh has all too frequentlycome at a social cost. Unequal levels of assistance,whether within or between communities or regions,and the ability of some individuals to profit from thepresence of international agencies while others bearthe brunt of inflation, are already fuelling socialjealousy. Meanwhile, the potential for tension betweenthose displaced by the tsunami and the communitiesinto which many have settled will only grow as morepeople migrate from 'non-tsunami-affected' regionsinto 'tsunami-affected' ones in search of employmentand assistance. As the divide between winners andlosers in the reconstruction aid stakes grows, andsocial capital is steadily eroded, the chances increasefor social conflict. Indeed, despite increasing attentionin the international development assistancecommunity to the relationship between development

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Waste

Creation or exacerbation of social divisions:

:

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assistance and conflict, many of the programmesexamined in this study appeared to lack a conflict-sensitive perspective. Meanwhile, the marginalisation ofwomen in decision-making processes reinforcesexisting patterns of gender discrimination.

: This study's findings raiseserious questions about whether Aceh's social orphysical environment will be able to stand up to theshort- and long-term effects of many aspects of thereconstruction effort. A failure by implementers todevelop local capacity is likely to lead to the collapse ofambitious projects after international agencies leave theprovince. Meanwhile, the illegal logging accompanyingthe reconstruction process robs Acehnese of fair returnon public goods; threatens the province's biodiversityand potential for economic activities such asecotourism; and has the potential to lead to yet morenatural disasters in the future.

In addition to the problems mentioned above, thereappears to be an underlying reluctance by theinternational community to recognise the self-helpcapacity of the Acehnese people. All around Aceh, localpeople - tired of waiting for assistance from others - arebuilding their houses and schools from debris and areproviding their families basic needs. Through their owninitiative, they have established community committees,

Unsustainable practices

and are giving support and spirit to those who have lostso much in the tsunami. These people do not claim'ownership' or reward for such efforts. There are noglossy brochures or websites announcing to the worldthe role that local people play in the rehabilitation andreconstruction efforts in Aceh. They do not attendinternational seminars, do speaking tours with power-point presentations, or press interviews to gain kudos ormaterial reward. The role local people are playing intheir own rebuilding is one of the great success storiesof the post-tsunami period. A more thorough recognitionby donors and implementers of this role is clearlyneeded.

The ultimate lesson of this study is that the success ofprojects must be measured not just in quantitative, butalso in qualitative terms, with input from beneficiaries aswell as observers. Assessment and evaluationapproaches that focus exclusively on quantitative talliesof number of beneficiaries, number of houses built etc.,will ultimately fail to appreciate either the full success(or lack of it) of projects or their long-termconsequences, both anticipated and unanticipated. Totruly get a sense of the impact of projects, as well as toassess whether relief, rehabilitation and developmentphases are actually building on each other in aconstructive way, it will be necessary to ask theirbeneficiaries - as indeed this study has attempted to do.

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V. Recommendations

Consultation and communication with communities

Improve community consultation at all stages ofproject implementation, including pre-projectneeds assessment and project design.

Improve communication with communities.

Failure to consult all members of communities, bothmen and women, the wealthier and the poor, during allstages of project implementation can lead to ineffectiveor inappropriate projects and people feeling cut off fromtheir own futures. Top-down needs assessments shouldbe replaced immediately with bottom-up consultations.This means going beyond the level of the or

to the people in the villages. Rather thantalking of information flows the implementingagencies the communities, information thecommunities the implementing agencies should beprioritised. Specific resources should be made availableto facilitate a substantive two-way flow of information.The process should be a coordinated effort betweendonors who plan to enter a certain area, perhaps byestablishing a joint needs assessment team.

Lack of access to information is causing discontentwithin communities, even spilling over into anger andresentment against implementing agencies who are latein fulfilling promised infrastructure, livelihood and otherprogrammes. Indirect information flow that passesthrough different layers of local authority not onlyensures that bits of information drop out, but runs intoproblems related to a hierarchical and male-dominatedsocial structure. Many information strategies currentlyunder use by donors and implementers, such as noticeboards, clearly are not being updated regularly. TheMDTF housing programme has made a publiccommitment to the local communities to ensure itsnotice boards are kept updated with information onfunds disbursed, to whom, and with what progress.This initiative should be monitored carefully for quality ofinformation, and if proven effective, it should bereplicated elsewhere.

More community involvement in project planning andimplementation not only gives people a sense ofownership, but helps head off unanticipated issues suchas questions of relevance, impact and appropriateness.Give local people the resources directly: enable them toaccess technical assistance, materials to build, andother help they might need to execute, complete andreport on their own community projects. At the sametime, the donors must adopt a more flexible, less self-interested attitude in terms of timeline and projectbudgets.

Due to the patriarchal structure of Acehnese society, ifwomen are not explicitly included in the consultationprocess, they will be excluded. Donor and implementers

camatkepala desa

fromto from

to

Increase community participation in projectimplementation.

Increase women's participation in communityc o n s u l t a t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n dimplementation.

•

•

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need to ensure women have equal opportunities toparticipate in decision making processes by challengingthe self-appointed role of men in positions of leadershipwithin communities. For community meetings, policiesof positive discrimination, including quotas, may ensurethat women are nominally present; however, womenattendees often remain silent. A better option would beto conduct separate women's meetings, as manywomen lack the confidence to express their views, in amale dominated environment, especially if localgovernment representatives are present. Thesewomen's meetings should elect representatives toattend community meetings to present the women'scontribution. Implementers and donors should also tryto use more female outreach staff, as many womencomplain that it is difficult to become involved in aprocess on an equal footing when most of the visibleaid agency staff are men, and should considerprogrammes aimed at changing men's attitudes in orderto ensure changes are sustainable and ultimatelybecome an Acehnese-driven agenda, rather than oneimposed temporarily by outsiders.

For example, no resources are available to civil societyrepresentatives on the Steering Committee of the MDTFto undertake consultation and information sharing. Therights and responsibilities of these two representativeson the committee should be made clear to them, andresources must be made available to enable them toengage in processes with other members of civil societyto solicit ideas for policy, and to share decisions made.

Starting major infrastructure projects while locals areliving in tents can create public relations problems ifdiscussion and negotiation has not taken place. Donorsshould coordinate to ensure that communities agree to,and appreciate the urgency of public infrastructure tothe broader reconstruction process. At the same time,agencies should ensure basic needs are being met bythe time other projects begin.

Provincial and district government officers often expressfrustration and resentment that donors and agenciesare bypassing existing mechanisms and taking on therole of a second, parallel government. In order to givelocal officials their place in the process and to ensuresustainability, their ownership in the reconstructionprocess must be strong, and collaboration andcooperation must be strengthened. A participatoryrelationship that results in local government officialsbeing included in planning, monitoring, evaluation, andtraining would have the potential to benefit all parties.Meanwhile, international donors and implementingpartners should refrain from absenteeism at

•

•

•

Increase representation by civil societyorganisations on donor and implementer steeringcommittees, and provide resources for suchrepresentatives to engage in consultation andinformation sharing.

Be sensitive to broader community prioritieswhen initiating projects.

Strengthen cooperation and collaboration withlocal government.

Building local capacity

40

coordination meetings called by local governmentdepartments, instead sending at least a mid-rankingofficial to each meeting.

After donors and implementers move on, responsibilityfor the continuation of many projects and for a betterfuture for Aceh will lie largely with local government.Brain drain from the civil service now bodes ill for thefuture, and might be reduced by offering civil servantswho have attained a certain term of service - say, fiveyears - the opportunity to apply for one- or two-yearsecondments to an INGO working in a similar sector. Inthis way, experienced workers can enjoy additionalsalary and benefits while gaining experience andexposure to new ideas that can eventually be returnedto their original workplace. Such a strategy could turnwhat is currently a negative phenomenon for the civilservice into a positive one.

Local NGOs or community based groups should haveaccess to capacity building opportunities independent ofproject implementation, and with an eye to the longer-term future of civil society groups in the province. Inaddition, a list of resources for capacity buildingopportunities that will help these local groups complywith international donor standards of monitoring andreporting should be made available.

Aceh has become a land of opportunity for many inIndonesia, with people arriving from Jakarta and furtherafield in search of highly paid jobs with the internationaldonor community. The aid community should be awarethat if the majority of jobs, or the majority of the moresenior positions are seen to be filled by 'incomers' thenresentment will spillover into latent and finally outrightsocial conflict. There are already examples of conflictwithin INGOs which have different rates of pay forAcehnese and for those who come from outside theprovince. All Indonesians should be given the same rateof pay, and where possible, agencies should have apolicy of employing local people. There are alsoconflicts emerging as workers from outside the area arebrought in to work on construction projects, ostensiblyor actually because skilled Acehnese labour is notavailable. To address the issue of a low skills baselocally, training schemes with recognised certificationshould be offered. Since some agencies will be in Acehover the next two to five years, it is quite possible tooffer full apprenticeships in some vocational skills.

The concept of 'tsunami-affected area' in some waysextends to all of Aceh. For example, the collapse of thelocal transport systems and markets has affected theagricultural sector across the province, furtherimpoverishing residents of many conflict-ravaged areas.Many people outside the areas immediately affected bythe tsunami now complain they are living in an

•

•

•

•

Take steps to prevent a brain drain from the civilservice.

Work to increase the capacity of local NGOsusing a needs-based agenda

Reduce the aid gap between 'tsunami-affected'and 'non-tsunami-affected' areas.

Avoiding social conflict

Be sensitive to potential conflicts between localsand outsiders.

'opportunity ghetto.' Migration to tsunami-affectedareas, where possibilities of employment, skills trainingand other opportunities exist, is causing a brain drainfrom non-tsunami-affected areas, many of which arenow slipping into even greater poverty after havingsuffered the ravages of conflict. Donors should examineways of expanding operations to include conflict-affected areas and ex-GAM communities.

In consultation with local communities, adopt one orseveral appropriate models of house for one village. Ifpossible, a one housing provider-one village policyshould be followed; where this is impossible, thendonors and implementers operating in a communityshould strictly coordinate to ensure rough parity in sizeand quality of houses. At the same time, increasingrecipients' involvement in the planning andimplementation processes will build ownership and mayoften lead to acceptance of non-essential andunplanned discrepancies.

Implementers must ensure not only that cash-for-workschemes are well-targeted and employ local people, butalso that communities are clearly informed that suchschemes do not represent long-term employment. Suchschemes must be immediately followed by otherlivelihood initiatives. In some areas, it might be moreprudent to offer tools for farming, fishing or otherlivelihood sectors in place of cash, thereby helpingpeople secure resources that will help them to rebuild asustainable livelihood.

The concentrated distribution of housing in certainareas, and for certain groups of people, is resulting inincreasing levels of tension between and withincommunities. Of deep concern is the government'sinability to come up with a concrete and long-term policyfor those landless and ex-renters who are becomingincreasingly distanced from their surroundingcommunities. The local government must establishdialogue with groups such as the landless and the ex-renters, in order to discuss policy options for the short,medium and longer term for these groups. Such policiesshould be implemented as quickly as possible.

Individualistic approaches to the distributionof food, housing, and livelihoods have resulted ininequities and not only created divisions betweenpeople affected differently by the tsunami, butare also breaking down the communal way ofl i fe that existed in many places in Aceh,in some areas even leading to conflict withincommunities. Donors and implementers shouldat least allow for, and if possible promote,group approaches towards housing and livelihoods,for instance through the creation of credit unions.

•

•

•

•

Defuse social jealousy emerging around theissue of different types of housing.

Prioritise efforts to address the policy gap vis- -vis ex-renters and the landless for rehousing.

Avoid individualistic approaches that erodetraditional communal forms.

Take steps to ensure that cash-for-work schemesare not exacerbating poverty gaps or creatingsocial jealousy.

5

ā

41

•

•

•

Integrate a conflict management perspective intoall programmes.

Particularly in destabilised environments such as Aceh,which is reeling not only from the effects of the tsunamibut from years of civil war, development assistance hasthe potential to exacerbate existing social tensions andcleavages and to create new ones. Among the potentialsources of conflict that our research has uncovered are:social jealousy within the tsunami-affected zone, bothwithin and between communities (over housing, etc.);differences in economic opportunity between tsunami-affected and non-tsunami-affected zones; the creationof a black market for illegal goods (timber); and a dearthof programmes aimed specifically at assisting thereintegration of former fighters Aceh-wide and theirsupport communities. Donors should conduct area-specific joint conflict vulnerability assessments toidentify and prioritise potential causes of social conflictor threats to the peace agreement in Aceh, anddetermine not only how existing and plannedreconstruction activities might be exacerbating thepotential for conflict, but also how such activities canmost effectively support local efforts to promote peace.

Timber sourced from within Indonesia and accompaniedby a certificate is not necessarily legal. The EC andothers have said confiscated timber is one possibleacceptable source of wood, but this is creating a seizedtimber market. Agencies should seek responsiblysourced timber from overseas wherever possible.Consultation and cooperation in sourcing alternativematerials or foreign supplies of wood from sustainablesources could be enhanced through the timber workinggroup, membership of which should be mandatory forall international and local implementing agencies, withsanctions imposed by back donors for non-compliance.Meanwhile, in several places there are visible signs ofillegal quarrying to supply materials for the constructionboom that is just beginning in Aceh. Agencies shouldensure that the vast quantity of mountain rocks (

) being used in their projects come from quarrysites that are legal, environmentally sustainable andhave proper quarry management. Support to traditionalwood-fired brick kilns should cease, with training andsocialisation in methods of making environmentally-friendly bricks being prioritised.

Protecting the environment

Monitoring and evaluation

Take tough steps to reduce the use of illegallylogged timber and to ensure that otherc o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s c o m e f r o menvironmentally sound and legal sources.

Restructure the project and programmeevaluation processes to include beneficiaries.

batugunung

In their reports to the public and in their evaluations,implementers often appeared more intent on promotingtheir own "brand" than on the needs of theirbeneficiaries. Most donors, management contractorsand implementers engage in internal evaluationsconducted by their own members of staff, or at best aconsultant employed by them directly. These tend to beoutput-driven, and almost never include qualitative

assessments by the beneficiaries themselves. Theresulting evaluations are often not for publicconsumption or are modified before being madeavailable outside the organisation. Allow independentevaluations to take place. Engage in participatoryevaluation exercises whereby the beneficiaries arestakeholders in the evaluation process. This multi-levelapproach should begin at the design stage, andcontinue through implementation and interpretation ofresults. Make unabridged results of all evaluationsavailable to all interested parties, especiallybeneficiaries.

The lack of regular and systematic monitoring of localpartners by donors encourages mismanagement andleaves beneficiaries without recourse. When field visitsdo take place by donors, or management contractors, itis often found that programmes are not implemented toplan, or within a given time-frame, and that beneficiariesare dissatisfied and demoralised. Yet many of thesefindings do not appear in evaluation documents. A moresystematic and structured practice of monitoring localpartners, and in obtaining reports and field visits, willhelp to overcome these problems, as well as permittinginformation on problems and solutions to be shared.

In allocating funds and other resources to projects,there seems an unwillingness to embark on a processof continuing evaluation to assess whether and to whatextent the existing project concept remains valid. Onlythe ADB spoke of reassessing requirements anddownsizing particular programmes. It is imperative toundertake ongoing and continuing assessment of thechanging project environment, and local needs.Resources allocated to projects should be alteredaccording to need, and rapidly redeployed. All donorsand implementing agencies should have the flexibility toabandon plans for programmes that are no longerneeded and that might not be in the long-term interestsof the communities they aim to help.

•

•

Engage in more monitoring of local partners.

Be responsive to changes in conditions andneeds.

:APPENDIX 1DONORS AT A GLANCE

42

Reconstruction of Aceh Land AdministrationSystem (RALAS)

Community Recovery through the KecamatanDevelopment Project

Urban Poverty Program (UPP )

Technical Support for Badan Rehabilitasi danRekonstruksi (BRR) NAD-Nias

Community-based Settlement Rehabilitationand Reconstruction Project

Tsunami Recovery Waste ManagementProgram

Aceh Forest and Environment Project

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Ports,Phase I

Flood Mitigation Program for Banda Aceh

Sea Delivery and Logistics Program, Phase I

Project Name Focus Area

All tsunami areas, starting with Banda Acehand Aceh Besar

Tsunami-affected kecamatans, with identifiedpriority need.

Tsunami-affected urban villages, with identifiedpriority need.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction inAceh and Nias

Aceh and Nias

Banda Aceh, Aceh Barat and otheraffected districts

Calang, Sinabang and Gunung Sitoli

Banda Aceh

Various ports

$28.5 million

$64.7 million

$18 million

$14.7 million.

$14.5 million

$14.5 million

$3.7 million

$4.50 million

$24.6 million.

Allocation

$150 millionin two phases;Phase I $85million

Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)

The Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTFANS, hereafter MDTF) was launched in April 2005by the World Bank with the Indonesian government and fourteen other donor partners. The World Bank'sInternational Development Association (IDA) acts as trustee and operates the secretariat. Donors include theEuropean Commission (EC) and the governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway,Canada, Sweden, Germany, the United States, Finland, Belgium, New Zealand and Ireland, in addition to the WorldBank and the Asian Development Bank. The fund is governed by a Steering Committee co-chaired by the EC (thesingle largest donor), a representative from the Indonesian BRR, and a representative from the Fund's trustee, theWorld Bank. Donors who have pledged over $10 million are voting members of the Steering Committee; there arealso two local representatives of Aceh's civil society (see page 11), and members from the Indonesian government,and from local government in North Sumatra and Aceh. As of 19 January 2006, $532.27 million has been pledged tothe MDTF by 15 donors, including $245.33 million by the European Commission, $100 million from the Netherlands,$45 million from the UK and $25 million from the World Bank itself. While initially all the MDTF's funds wereplanned to flow on-budget through Indonesian government financial mechanisms, newer projects include off-budgetfinancing. In contributing to the Trust Fund, all agree to the general principles and priorities of the Fund; donors arenot able to earmark funds for particular programmes.

210

Table: MDTF - Projects in tsunami-affected areas, Aceh and Nias.211

43

Project Name Allocation

$290 millionETESP - Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project.218

MDTF contribution

Loan Reprogramming

CWSHP - Community Water Services and Health Project$ 16.5 million

Technical assistance

Co-financing from other projects

$10 million

$64.5 million

$16.5 million

$10 million

$4.5 million

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

The ADB's total financial commitment to tsunami-affected countries to date is $851 million, which includes $175million that can be redirected from ongoing projects and programs for the tsunami effort. The pledges are largelyadministered through the Asian Tsunami Fund.

In total, the ADB's contribution to the tsunami-affected regions of Indonesia comes to over $390 million. TheEarthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ETESP) was created in April 2005 with $290 million fromthe Bank's Asian Tsunami Fund and an additional contribution of $10 million to the MDTFANS. Taken together, the$300 million allocated is the largest single grant in the ADB's history. ETESP's two-phase programme is intended torestore essential public services, rebuild infrastructure and promote the resurgence of private economic activity.General areas of focus include livelihood restoration, community infrastructure, social services restoration, physicalinfrastructure, and fiduciary governance. The first phase addresses urgent priorities in disaster management,rehabilitation and reconstruction in some of the less devastated zones, including health, rural water and sanitation,irrigation and flood control, restoration of roads and bridges, local government capacity building, and spatial planning.The second phase will carry out disaster management and reconstruction activities in the most devastated zones.Work will include expansion of activities under Phase 1, restoration of community infrastructure, spatial redesign ofaffected zones, power and rural electrification, and public administration. Under ETESP, the ADB also givessupport to the Indonesian Supreme Auditing Institution (BPK), as well as to the Ministry of Finance's Banda Acehoffice dealing with on-budget expenditure.

Meanwhile, the Community Water Services and Health Project (CWSHP) has been expanded to include a specificgrant for Aceh and North Sumatra, from a total $ 81.2 million project allocation (throughout Indonesia), $16.5 millionhas been dedicated for tsunami affected areas. This grant, approved on 7 April 2005, will cover the rehabilitation andreconstruction processes and aims to encourage communities to design, build, operate and manage their own waterand sanitation facilities. The CWSHP will be administered by the ABD and will last for four years. The Aceh andNorth Sumatra component of CWSHP will be co-financed by the UK’s Department for International Development($7.5 million), Government of the Netherlands ($5 million), and the Canadian International Development Agency ($4million). In addition, $64.6 million has been allocated for loan reprogramming. Thus far, 11 projects have beenreprogrammed, with a resulting surplus of $64.4 million. The reprogrammed projects are in the agriculture andnatural resources, health, education, transport and power sectors, and the funds will be used in the same sectors asthe original projects. Most of the planned programmes described here have not yet begun due to 'proceduraldelays'. Bottlenecks caused by bureaucratic processes meant that ADB's role in reconstruction in 2005 did not meetits full potential. All parties, the ADB, the BRR, and the Indonesian government are working to overcome theseproblems for 2006.

212

213

214

215

216

Table: Asian Development Bank - Project commitments in tsunami affected areas Aceh and Nias.217

Government of Australia: Australia Indonesia Partnershipfor Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD)

The Australian government rapidly approved a total of A$33.4 million ($25.5 million) for immediate relief to theIndonesian tsunami-affected regions, which contributed to coordination and transportation for relief efforts. AustralianDefence Force and other government agency contributions to the immediate relief effort were further valued atA$37.4 million ($27.7 million).

The Australian government, citing its special position as Indonesia's nearest neighbor, announced on 5 January2005 an additional relief and reconstruction package of A$1 billion ($741 million), to be disbursed over five years.The program is additional to Australia's ongoing Development Cooperation and Defence Cooperation Programs,bringing aid to Indonesia to a total of A$1.8 billion ($1.33 billion) over the next five years. Of the funds, half are in theform of grant assistance; the remaining half are designated as low interest loans-a departure from the usualAustralian practice of grant aid. While the package stipulates a priority for tsunami-affected regions, all areas ofIndonesia are eligible for assistance. As of 8 December 2005, A$947 ($702 million) had been allocated to programs;of this, A$156 million ($115.6 million) has been committed to tsunami-affected areas, with the remainder allocated toprojects elsewhere in Indonesia. Of the funds dedicated to the AIPRD Aceh and North Sumatra projects, A$23.7million ($17.6 million) had been spent as of 30 November 2005. Programmes have so far focused primarily onrestoring health and hospital services, rebuilding schools and revitalising higher education, repairing essentialinfrastructure, rebuilding communities, and re-establishing livelihoods. The funding is administered by the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD). The AIPRD is in principle a partnershipbetween the Governments of Australia and Indonesia, established through a bilateral agreement. Funding targetsand disbursement are approved by joint ministerial meetings, the first of which was held in March 2005. However,AIPRD allocations are not disbursed through the Indonesian government's budget, instead remaining off-budget; andwith the exception of a grant to establish the BRR, projects are to be implemented directly.

219

220

221

Table: AIPRD committed funds.222

Project Name Allocation

Aceh Rehabilitation Program to restore health,education and local government services A$80 million ($59.2 million)

Community infrastructure A$25 million ($18.5 million)

Livelihoods A$5 million ($3.7 million)

Education, research and training A$3 million ($2.2. million)

Temporary shelter technical assistance A$3 million ($2.2 million)

Rebuilding schools in conflict-affected areas A$10 million ($7.4 million)

Regional enterprise development A$7 million ($5.2 million)

Aceh port A$8 million ($5.9 million)

Humanitarian food aid A$10 million ($7.4 million)

44

European Commission (EC)

European Commission post-tsunami aid to Indonesia has come to approximately €246.5 million ($293.6 million), ofwhich €207 million ($173.8 million) has gone to the MDTF. Assistance from the European Commission plus theEuropean Union member states constitutes 85% of the total funds at the MDTF's disposal. The opening of EuropeHouse in Banda Aceh has facilitated close guidance and monitoring of all Commission contributions.

Meanwhile, €39.5 million ($47 million) has been administered as humanitarian assistance, the Commission'sHumanitarian Aid department (ECHO) operates a rolling programme of decisions that have the flexibility to respondto changing circumstances. Humanitarian focus areas have included distribution of household items and hygienekits; creation of centers to register, trace and reunify separated and/or unaccompanied children; assistance inrebuilding houses with materials and tools; water, sanitation and food aid for IDP camps; primary health services andpsychosocial support; physiotherapy rehabilitation; livelihood assistance in fishing and agriculture; and additionalassistance for 500,000 victims of the March 2005 aftershock in Nias. In addition, the EC has shown itself assensitive to the conflict dimension in Aceh: in its 2005 aid strategy, ECHO had already identified assisting andprotecting civilian victims of the conflict in Aceh and facilitating the return of IDPs to their homes or their resettlementand integration in new places of residence as a priority. The Commission's Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) hashelped finance the mediation activities which led to the signing of the August 2005 peace agreement between GAMand the Indonesian government; the Commission views the successful reintegration of GAM former combatants ascrucial to the reconstruction efforts and to sustainable peace, and has also committed funds to this programme.

223

224

Table: EC - Tsunami allocations in Aceh and North Sumatra

45

Area Allocation

To MDTFANS € 200 million ($240 million)

Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) € 7 ($8.4 million) of which€3.5 to MDTF

Humanitarian Assistance €39.5 million ($47.5 million)

46

World Bank

Prior to the tsunami, The World Bank's involvement in development programmes in Aceh began in 1998with the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) which promotes community based driven development(see page 12). The Bank has also, over the past few years, supported various peace initiatives in Aceh.

Immediately following the tsunami, the World Bank announced a grant of US$25 million for Indonesia. InFebruary of 2005, the Bank further constituted the US$525 million dollar Multi-donor Trust Fund for Acehand Nias (MDTFANS), bringing together 15 donors to support a common set of post-tsunami programmes.By December 2005, the Bank had disbursed $87.5 million.

Since the tsunami, the KDP's urban counterpart, the Urban Development Project (UPP), has also beenintroduced into Aceh. As of December 2005, KDP and UPP programs are implemented by a network of1,450 facilitators who work in 6, 000 villages assisting communities in Aceh (including Nias Island). TheBank's work is now comprised by the following four tsunami related components:

]Debt restructuring: - In January of 2005 the World Bank restructured its loan programmes to Indonesiaimportantly freeing up much Government money which could be utilized in the reconstruction process. Thishas actively assisted funds being directed to the provincial Government in Aceh.

KDP - Ongoing before the tsunami, the World Bank remained one of the very few donors operating in Aceh.Restructuring the Community Driven Development Programs through the allocation of US$40 million in softloans, with the addition of $US13.5 million from CIDA, DFID and USAID for the KDP program aimed toprovide 6,000 village communities with access to infrastructure and governance support grants. Otherrestructured programs include the UPP and Support for Poor And Disadvantaged Areas Widow's children($7.8 million).

Post conflict reconstruction - The World Bank was one of only a few international organisations working ondevelopment programs in Aceh prior to the signing of the Helsinki peace accord on15 August 2005. TheWorld Bank has been working on the socialisation of the MoU between GAM and the Indonesiangovernment by creating 80,000 posters to familiarise communities with the MoU. It is also providingassistance in targeting reintegration benefits; to ensure that intended financial benefits from theGovernment reach GAM combatants, political prisoners and conflict victims and is monitoring incidents ofextortion.

Technical Assistance: In addition to its grants and loans, the bank has provided technical and analyticaladvisors, working with the BRR providing up to 45 international experts financed by grants. The Bank hasalso carried out a series of baseline studies on the impact of the tsunami, the relief effort and thereconstruction program to date. These include the Damage and Loss Assessment Report an assessmenttitled Conflict and Recovery in Aceh which examined the options for stabilizing the peace process throughdevelopment initiatives.

225

226

227

Table: Disbursements in 2005

Projects Disbursement inDecember 2005

World Bank Projects $7.20 million$17.20 million

MDF Projects $76.00 million$225.40 million

Grants, Donor Co-financed Projects $4.30 million$21.30 million

Total $87.50 million$263.90 million

Source: World Bank: Tsunami Recovery in Aceh and Nias, December 2005.

Total AmountCommitted to Date

Notes

47

1

2 This report does not address the relief, rehabilitation or

3

4 National Family Planning Coordination Agency,30

5 For further reading on the conflict in Aceh see: Kell, T.,The Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion, 1989 - 1992,(Publication No 74, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell ModernIndonesia Project, 1995); various reports by theInternational Crisis Group, Amnesty International andHuman Rights Watch; East-West Center reports,including Aspinall, E. and H. Crouch, The Aceh PeaceProcess: Why It Failed (Policy Studies 1, 2003), andSchultz, K., The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomyof a Separatist Organization (Policy Studies 2, 2003);McCulloch, L., Aceh: Then and Now (Minority RightsGroup, 2005); Reid,A. (ed), Verandah of Violence(Singapore University Press, forthcoming April 2006).

6 Data from United Nations Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), June 2005.

7 Data from Department of Urban Resettlement, BandaAceh, August 2005.

8 Bakornas PBP, Daily Update, 14 March 2005.9 BRR et al., Aceh and Nias, One Year After the Tsunami,

the Recovery Effort and Way Forward, December 2005.10 FAO/WFP Food Supply and Demand Assessment for

Aceh Province and Nias, 5 May 2005.11 Aceh Department of Agr icul ture, Communi ty

Empowerment Policy in NAD and Nias Post-Tsunami,27 September 2005.

12

13 I n d o n e s i a D e f e n s e D e p a r t m e n t N e w s ,14 January 2005.

14 Michael Elmquist, deputy to chief of UN OCHA,interviewed 26 January 2005.

15 Indonesian Armed Forces press release, TNI InformationCenter (Puspen), 17 January 2005.

16 UNDP, UNDP Releases Emergency Funds in Responseto Earthquakes and Tsunami in Asia. Crisis Preventionand Recovery Experts Deployed Throughout Region; UNto Launch Flash Appeal, 27 December 2004.

17 Alexander Downer, Australia's $10 Million for IndianOcean Disaster Relief, 27 December 2004

18 Catherine Skonhoft, Donor and NGO Relations Officer,UN OCHA and Daniel Nicol, Associate HumanitarianAffairs Officer, UN OCHA, interviewed 23 November 2005.

19 As reported by the EU, 9 June 2005.20 PR Newswire, 30 December 2004.21 ABC Australia, 19 March 2005; New York Times,

27 November 200522 World Bank, Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias,

Preliminary Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort SixMonths After the Tsunami, July 2005.

23 h t t p : / /www. t sunam ispec ia l envoy .o rg / coun t r y /indonesia.asp, accessed 10 December 2005.

24 Office of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy forTsunami Recovery, Tsunami Recovery: Taking Stocksafter 12 Months, 22 December 2005, p. 5.

25 Annual Work Report of Indonesian Department ofFinance, October 2004 - September 2005, 19 October2005, p 112.

26 Annual Work Report of Indonesia Financial Department,October 2004 - September 2005, 19 October 2005.

27 The programme planning and expenditure document iscalled a DIPA, and is designed by sectoral governmentworking units. The DIPA can be used as implementationdocument and a tool for control, reporting and evaluation,and as a document to support the government book-keeping activity.

28 Pieter Smidt, ADB Extended Mission Sumatra, interview16 December 2005

This report does not address the relief, rehabilitation orreconstruction efforts in Nias, North Sumatra.

reconstruction efforts in Nias, North Sumatra.All dollar figures are U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.Where national/community currencies are converted toU.S. dollars, exchange rates of 6 February 2006 are used.

September 2004.

Data from Secretariat Daerah Provinsi NAD,28 February 2005.

29 E u r o p e a n d i p l o m a t , J a k a r t a , i n t e r v i e w e d19 September 2005.

30 Sudirman Said, Deputy Head of Communications in BRR,quoted in , 31 October, 2005.

31 Pieter Smidt, ADB Extended Mission Sumatra,interviewed by telephone 16 December 2005.

32 T. Zainul Arifin Panglima Polem, head of Aceh'sagriculture department, interviewed 7 November 2005.

33 Ir. Razali Yahya, head, BPN Aceh branch, Banda Aceh,interviewed 5 December 2005.

34 Safriza Sofyan and Geumala Yatim, MDTF, interviewed26 November 2005.

35 Enacted by Presidential Decree No. 1/2005, issued2 March 2005.

36 "Natural Disaster Recovery in Nanggroe AcehDarussalam and North Sumatra," National DevelopmentPlanning Agency (BAPPENAS),17 January 2005, p. 25.

37

3839

.40

41 BRR, BRR Concept for Principles of Transparency andAccountability, 22 November 2005.

42

43.

44 .45 .46

.47

.48

.49

.50

51.

5253 .

55 Adli Abdullah, interviewed 8 November 2005.56 Panglima Laot Annual Meeting, "Panglima Laot Strategic

Planning 2005-2015," December 2005, Recommendationsno. 4, 9-12.

57 Abdul Manaf, fisherman in Langkak, Nagan Raya,interviewed 13 December 2005.

58 Dr. Rusmundar, Director, RSUZA, interviewed 13 July 2005.59 ADB, JBIC, World Bank, Connecting East Asia: A New

Framework For Infrastructure, 2005.60 Azhari, training facilitator of the Aceh KDP, interviewed

12 January 2006.61 MDTFANS Press Release, Jakarta, 5 August 2005.62 Group discussion with local KDP facilitators in Baitussalam,

16 August 2005.63 KDP facilitator in Baitussalam who requested anonymity,

interviewed 1 December 2005.64 Zulfian Ahmad, Aceh Jaya, interviewed

5 September 2005.65 , Cadek, interviewed 2 January 2006.66 M. Nur, villager in Cadek, interviewed 2 January 2006.67 Group coordinator of U Seunelhue, Lhok Nga, interviewed

15 September 2005.68 Tambah Nur Asih, child centre in Reusak, Samatiga,

interviewed 27 December 2005.69 As witnessed by several villagers.70 Interview with Fardawati, Matang Bangka, 7 January 2006.71 Khairuni, Matang Bangka, interviewed 7 January 2006.

Serambi Indonesia

Bupati,

Kepala desa

54 Adli Abdullah, Secretary, Panglima Laot, interviewed6 December 2005.

By December year on year inflation rate in Aceh ofaround 23%.Interview, Meuraxa, 27 October 2005.Official from the EC Delegation, Jakarta, interviewed 24November 2005Pieter Smidt, Head of ADB Extended Mission Sumatra,interviewed 16 December 2005.

Dr.Suprayoga Hadi, MSP, Directorate for Special andBackward Areas Development, Deputy for LocalAutonomy and Regional Development of Bappenas,interviewed 20 September 2005.BRR, BRR Concept for Principles of Transparency andAccountability, 22 November 2005.BRR data, December 2005Informal discussion with IOM, 19 July 2005Senior staff member, Aceh Institute, interviewed 16December 2005Humam Hamid, interviewed by telephone 1 December2005Humam Hamid, interviewed by telephone 24 November2005Joe Leitman, manager, Multi Donor Trust Fund,interviewed 24 November 2005Individuals surveyed included representatives from theAceh Institute, the director of Forum Rakyat, FlowerAceh, the General Secretary of Panglima Laot, and theChairman of the Ulama Consultative Council (MPU).Representative of the Aceh Institute, an Aceh based thinktank, interviewed 8 December 2005Muslim Ibrahim, MPU, interviewed 8 December 2005.Humam Hamid, interviewed by 1 December 2005

48

72 Mia Salim, AIPRD Public Affairs Officer, Jakarta, interviewed24 November 2005.

73 Salmia, Gampong Baru, interviewed 27 December 2005.74 ILO official, interviewed 28 September 2005.75 .76

.77

78.

79 Dicky Arisandi, head of Tongko, Ulee Lhue,interviewed 20 December, 2005.

80 Dr Nasruddin, , West Aceh, interviewed22 December 2005.

81 Christophe Legrand, Director of Care, Aceh, interviewed18 December 2005.

82

.83 .84 .85

.86 .87 Amron Hamdi, UNDP, interviewed by telephone

23 December 2005.88 Amirullah, Head of Lampineung village, Baiussalam,

interviewed 5 August 2005.89 George Conway, UNDP Programme Specialist, interviewed

23 November 2005.90 ECHO funding ended in September 2005, but was vital to

seeing the centres established.91 Data from Child Center managed by Muhamadiyah in

Kaway XVI and Samatiga, West Aceh, November 2005.92 i owner, interviewed 12 December 2005.

94 FAO, FAO/WFP Food Supply And Demand AssessmentFor Aceh Province and Nias Island (Indonesia),22 December 2005.

95 As presented by Mercy Corps at the LivelihoodsRecoveryWorking Group (LRWG)meeting,October27,2005.

96 Rahmad, villager in Kembang Tanjung, interviewed1 December 2005.

97 World Vision Programme Officer, Jakarta, interviewed24 November 2005.

98 MDTFANS Reconstruction of Aceh Land AdministrationSystem project document.

99 World Bank, Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias:Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort. Brief for theCoordination Forum Aceh and Nias, October 2005, p. 80.

100 Interview with Mawardi Nurdin, Banda Aceh,18 December 2005.

101 Dicky Arsiandi, interviewed 19 December, 2005.102 We do not reveal the name of the organisation that

funded Yayasan PAPAN using private donations, as it isnot the intention here to bring shame on any oneorganisation. There are in fact several who face similarproblems; this is but one example.

103 PAPAN had enlisted the help of another local NGO,Yayasan Annisa to work in two of the villages.Interestingly, there was less local hostility toward Annisathan to PAPAN.

104 Zulyadi Miska, Director of PAPAN, interviewed9 December 2005.

105 OCHA's financial tracking system, http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx, updated on 21 November 2005.

106 Abdul Manaf, a fisherman from Langkak village, NaganRaya, interviewed 13 December 2005.

107 Annemarie Cunningham, ACTED, interviewed14 November 2005.

108 Sulaiman Thoha, Panglima Laot in Nagan Raya,interviewed 5 January 2006.

109 Mike Daniels, Area Coordinator, ACTED, interviewed bytelephone 15 December 2005.

110 Head of boat makers for ACTED boats, Fajri, in KualaTadu, interviewed 13 December 2005.

111 Boat maker, Kuala Tadu, interviewed 13 December 2005.

Dusun

Bupati

Warung kop

Walikota,

93 Rosiati, interviewed 20 December 2005.

Dicky Arisandi, interviewed 20 December, 2005Rasminta Sembiring SH, lawyer, interviewed 1 November2005Simon Fields, UNDP Team Leader, interviewed 26 October2005.Mia Salim, AusAID, Jakarta, interviewed 24 November2005

The Indonesian environmental group Walhi has reportedthat from 2002 to 2005, there were almost 800 incidentsof river flooding in Aceh.Simon Fields, UNDP, interviewed 26 October 2005The interviewee prefers to remain anonymousInterview with Afrida Nursanti, UNDP engineer, 8 August2005UNDP official, interviewed 18 November 2005

112 Abdul Manaf, boat recipient in Kuala Tadu, interviewed14 December 2005.

113 Article 2.2 of MoU between ACTED and three boatsrecipients, signed 10 December 2005. (Translated fromthe Bahasa Indonesia version)

114 Hanafiah, boat maker, Matang Baroh village, Tanah Pasirinterviewed 6 October 2005.

115 Silvia Dian Anggoro, EU project officer, interviewed29 November 2005.

116 Participant, interviewed 10 January 2006.117 Lai la Juary , Yayasan Matahar i , in terv iewed

7 September, 2005.118 MDTF News Flash, 20 January 2006.119 Zaini, Head of Assessment Institute for Agriculture

Technology (BPTP), interviewed 27 October 2005.120 T. Zainul Arifin Panglima Polem, head of Aceh's

Department of Agriculture, interviewed 15 September 2005.121 Lukman, head of programmes, West Aceh Department

of Agriculture, interviewed 17 November 2005.122 A senior official in Aceh Jaya, interviewed 18 October 2005.123 Abigail Wilson, Information Manager, interviewed

22 July 2005.124 Discussions with programme managers of Save the

Children UK and IOM in Banda Aceh, July 2005.125 Data from Matahari, December 2005.126 Director of large funding agency, Jakarta, interviewed

19 September, 2005.127 Mike Daniels, Area Coordinator, ACTED, interviewed by

telephone 15 December 2005.128 Rusli, Head of Fosoma, interviewed 1 December 2005.129 Civil service salaries are set to increase to a minimum of

Rp 1 million ($108) per month in 2006.130 Informal discussion with World Vision staff, 22 October 2005.131 Ridwan Nyak Ben, district secretary of West Aceh,

interviewed 25 September 2005.132 Akhirudin Majudin, GERAK's coordinator, interviewed

2 December 2005.133 Adli Abdullah, Secretary of Panglima Laot, interviewed

6 December 2005.134 Adli Abdullah, Secretary of Panglima Laot, interviewed

8 November 2005.135 CARE Indonesia, Jakarta, interviewed 15 September 2005.136 Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan (SKSHH),

meaning a certificate giving permission to transport wood.137 Queensland Government, Ministerial Media Statement,

21 July 2005.138 Beattie,P.,"Queensland Government A$3 Million Buys

770 Temporary Homes For Tsunami Victims," 22 July2005.

139 Official from Office of the Premier, QueenslandGovernment, interviewed 16 September 2005.

140 Queensland government-funded houses for civil servantsare located in four areas in: 14 houses in Geuce for theDepartment of Transmigration; 76 houses in Blang Bintangfor the Department of Transport; 56 units in Lambaro forthe police; 12 houses in Ulee Kareng for members of thelocal Department of Agriculture. (As of December 2005)

141 Beneficiary, Ulee Kareng, interviewed 12 December 2005.142 Nina Rosiana, IOM Project Officer, interviewed

8 August 2005.143 Official, Office of the Premier, Queensland Government,

interviewed by telephone 15 December 2005.144 Ibu Chairaini, Head of Aceh's Department of Urban

Resettlement, interviewed 5 August 2005.145 Eye on Aceh and Down To Earth, Aceh: Logging a Conflict

Zone, October 2004.146 One environmental group has in fact estimated that 80%

of the timber on sale in Indonesia as a whole has beenlogged illegally. Environmental Investigation Agency,interviewed September 2004.

147 Environmental groups such as Walhi, Skephi, Down toEarth, Leuser International Foundation and many othersconcur that military and police are involved in illegallogging, a fact that is acknowledged by some localgovernment officials.

148 Ministry of Forestry Decree, SK.268/VI-BPHA/2005.149 Quoted in , 1 December 2005.150 Republic of Indonesia, Master Plan for the Rehabilitation

and Reconstruction for the Region and People of

Serambi Indonesia

49

183 Munazir, village office staff, interviewed 27 December2005.

184 Head of Yayasan Lamjabat , in terv iewed 19December 2005.

185 Data from Samudra, 8 February 2005.186 Zainuddin, staff at Samudra sub-district office,

interviewed 9 November 2005.187 .188189190 ICASERD, Food And Labor Market Analysis Monitoring

System in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Province,Final Report July 2005.

191 FAO/WFP Special Report on Food Supply And DemandAssessment for Aceh Province and Nias Island(Indonesia), 22 December 2005.

192 Pieter Smidt, head of ADB Extended Mission Sumatra,interviewed 18 November 2005.

193 Rizal Matondang, Project Manager, ADB, interviewed14 November 2005.

194 Pieter Smidt, Head of ADB Extended Mission forSumatra, interviewed by telephone 16 December 2005.

195 Interview with AIPRD official who requested anonymity,Banda Aceh, 5 July 2005.

196 Interview with local KDP facilitator, 21 November 2005.197 Interview with Asnawi, of Cadek,

19 October 2005.198 The office in Kajhu village was in fact inaugurated by

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on8 December 2005, the same day as the Ulee Lheue port.

199 Ismail, head of Cot Paya village, interviewed19 December 2005.

200 Discussion with several villagers in Cadek village,19 December 2005.

201 Discussions with vi l lagers of Cadek vi l lage,19 December 2005.

202 Village head, Cadek village, Baitussalam, interviewed26 December 2005.

203 Yayasan Lamjabat, interviewed 25 October, 2004204 Mawardi Nurdin, Banda Aceh, interviewed

18 December 2005.205 Owner, Alan Teknik , Simeulu interviewed

19 December 2005.206 Village head, Cadek village, Baitussalam, interviewed

26 December 2005.207 Marwan, District Secretary, Aceh Jaya, interview

5 September 2005.208 Housing committee member, Blang Oi, 12 December 2005.209 IOM official, during discussion about housing problem in

Meuraxa, 18 September 2005.210 MDTFANS, Financial status as of 19 January 2006, from

http://mdtfans.org/finance.html211 MDTFANS, Project overview, active projects, 14 February

2006. http://mdtfans.org/projects.html212 ADB, From Disaster to Reconstruction, a Report on ADB

Response's to the Asian Tsunami, 14 December 2005,p9.

213 As of 5 February 2006 http://www.adb.org/Tsunami/214 ETESP is divided into 5 sector groupings and 12 sectors ,

which is livelihood (agriculture, fishery, and micro andsmall enterprises), social service (health and education),community infrastructure (rural water supply andsanitation, housing, and irrigation), physical infrastructure(spatial planning and environmental management, roadand bridges, and power), fiduciary governance (fiduciaryoversight).

215 ADB. Indonesia: Tsunami Summary, 17 October 2005.h t t p : / / w w w . a d b . o r g / m e d i a / A r t i c l e s / 2 0 0 5 /6618_ tsunami_ impac t_ Indones ia /de fau l t .asp?RegistrationID=guest

216 ADB, Progress Report Indonesia: ADB's EmergencyAssistance Program for Aceh and North Sumatra, 30March 2005, h t tp : / /www.adb.o rg /Documents /Reports/Tsunami/aceh-nsumatra.pdf.

217 As of 20 December 2005. http://www.adb.org/media/Articles/2005/6618_tsunami_impact_Indonesia/default.asp?RegistrationID=guest.

218 ETESP was approved on 11 April 2005, which a grant a

camat

kepala desa

Walikota

panglong

Villagers of Latiung, interviewed 22 December 2005Darmili, interviewed 19 Decemner 2005.Interview with Nurhayati, Tanah Pasir, 12 October 2005.

Bupati Simeulu,

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias Islands, NorthSumatra. Detail Book, Environment and Mineral ResourcesCentre, April 2005.

151 European Commission, Tsunami Indicative Programme,Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, 23 May 2005. C(2005)1490.

152 Ibnu Abbas, Head of Department Forestry in Simeulu,interviewed 30 December 2005. The peace negotiationsthat were part of the CoHA agreement collapsed on 18 May2003, and at midnight that day martial law was imposed.For one year during martial law, the military was givencontrol of the local government apparatus.

153 CARE contract Agreement No. 020 - CII-SML/VIII/05.154 CARE programme supervisor, interviewed 10 October 2005.155 As confirmed by follow-up investigation.156 Official from the Department of Forestry, Banda Aceh,

interviewed 16 December 2005.157 George Soraya, Shelter coordinator, MDTF, interviewed

by telephone 21 December 2005.158 Lukman (not his real name), wood processor in

Lampanah Leungah, interviewed 2 January 2006.159 Michael Savins, interviewed 27 December 2005.160 M. Isa Johan, Head of Matang Bangka, interviewed

13 December 2005.161 Cor De Wolf, GAA, interviewed by telephone

2 December 2005.162 The identity of this cannot be revealed as it

would compromise the position of the researcher whoseinvestigations in the area are ongoing. It is used hereonly to illustrate how the illegal logging system works.

163 owner, interviewed 18 December 2005.164 The exact location of the , and the First Sergeant's

name cannot be revealed for security reasons.165 owner, interviewed 18 December 2005.166 Nurdin (not his real name), owner,

Lhokseumawe. As in the case of the inSyamtalira, the exact location cannot be revealed here asit might compromise the security of the researcher whocontinues to work in the area.

167 owner, North Aceh, interviewed 15December 2005.

168 Priya Gujadhur, Reporting and Information office ofUNFAO, interviewed 27 December 2005.

169 Panglima Laot Annual Meeting, "Panglima Laot StrategicP l a n n i n g 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 1 5 , " D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 5 ,Recommendations no. 4, 9-12.

170 For further information on the impact of the tsunami onthe fishery sector, and donor response see Asia-PacificFisheries Commission, Impacts of the Tsunami onFisheries, Aquaculture and Coastal Livelihoods inIndonesia, March 2005, found at http://www.apfic.org/modules/xfsection/article.php?articleid=15. A series ofFAO reports on the fishery sector in Aceh athttp://www.fao.org/fi/eims_search/advanced_s_result.a s p ? p r o g n a m e = 2 4 & t i t l e = F A O % 2 0 S i t u a t i o n %20Reports+and+Regional+or+summary&sortorder=7&form_c =AND&lang=en

171 ECHO's aid decision for ACTED is ECHO/-AS/BUD/2005/02030 and ECHO's decision for TGH is ECHO/-AS/BUD/2005/02020.

172 Amir, beneficiary of TGH boats in Lhok Nga, interviewed12 December 2005.

173 Agam, Mon Iken village, Lhok Nga, interviewed12 December 2005.

174 AIPRD official who requested anonymity, interviewed5 July 2005.

175 Oxfam staff, Banda Aceh, interviewed 12 August 2005.176 Junaidi Abda, Blang Krueng village chief, interviewed

19 October 2005.177 As discussed with Stuart, Oxfam shelter staff at community

meetings.178 Confidential correspondence, 12 December 2005.179 Victor Bottini, World Bank, Aceh, interviewed by

telephone, 7 December 2005.180 Joe Leitman, Manager of MDTF, interviewed

24 November 2005.181 Sudirman Said, Deputy of BRR Communications

Department, The Jakarta Post, 1 November 2005.182 Staff of Sub Directorate of Foreign Loans and Grants at

Department of Finance, interviewed 13 December 2005

panglong

PanglongPolsek

Panglongpanglong

panglong

Panglong

50

agreement between Indonesia government and ADB.219 Australia's Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.

Report for the period ending 30 November 2005: 3.220 AusAID, AIPRD FAQs: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/

hottopics/aiprd/faq.cfm Q.2, accessed 5 February 2006.221 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/aiprd/faq.cfm222 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/aiprd/faq.cfm223 h t t p : / / e u r o p a . e u . i n t / c o m m / e c h o / w h a t s n e w /

tsunami_country_fr .htm; "Aceh: Commission'scontribution to the peace process and post-Tsunamireconstruction." MEMO/05/310 - Brussels, 9 September2005.http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/indonesia/news/memo05_310.htm#2#2

224 European Commission Directorate-General forHumanitarian Aid (ECHO). ECHO Aid Strategy 2005.22 December 2004. http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/other_files/strategy/2005/strategy2005.doc

225 World Bank: Indonesia Fact Sheet, December 2005.h t tp : / /web.wor ldbank.org /WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/0, ,contentMDK:20738359~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:226301,00.html

226 World Bank, Tsunami Recovery in Indonesia's Aceh andNias, December 2005

227 Ibid.