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A Pairwise Key Pre- Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department of EECS Syracuse University
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A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Dec 19, 2015

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Page 1: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks

Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K.

VarshneyDepartment of EECSSyracuse University

Page 2: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Overview Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Key management problem in WSN. Existing solutions. Our solution. Security and performance analysis. Conclusion and future work.

Page 3: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Wireless Sensor Networks

DeploySensors

Page 4: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Securing WSN

DeploySensors

Secure Channels

Page 5: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Problem Description How can each pair of neighboring

nodes find a secret key? Pairwise: secret keys are unique

for each pair. Can be used for authentication.

Page 6: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Approaches Trusted-Server Schemes

Finding trusted servers is difficult. Public-Key Schemes

Expensive and infeasible for sensors. Key Pre-distribution Schemes

Page 7: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Goal: Loading Keys into sensor nodes prior to deployment, s.t. any two nodes can find a secret key between them after deployment

Challenges Security: nodes can be compromised Scalability: new nodes might be added later Memory/Energy efficiency Authentication: pairwise keys

Key Pre-distribution

Page 8: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Naïve Solutions Master-Key Approach

Memory efficient, but low security. Needs Tamper-Resistant Hardware.

Pair-wise Key Approach N-1 keys for each node (e.g.

N=10,000). Security is perfect. Need a lot of memory and cannot add

new nodes.

Page 9: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Eschenauer-Gligor Scheme

m keys (random)

m

AB

E

D

CKey Pool S

m

mm

• E.g., when |S| = 10,000, m=75, the local connectivity p = 0.50

• This scheme is further improved by Chan, Perrig, and Song (IEEE S&P 2003).

Page 10: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Our Goal Pairwise key pre-distribution

scheme. Use Blom Scheme.

Further improvement on performance and resilience. Use random key pre-distribution

scheme.

Page 11: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Blom Scheme Public matrix G Private matrix D (symmetric).

D G

+1 N

+1

+1

A G = (D G)T G = GT DT G = GT D G = (A G)T

Let A = (D G)T

Page 12: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Blom Scheme

X=

A = (D G)T G (D G)T G

i

j

i j

Kji

Kij

N

+1 NN

Node i carries:

Node j carries:

Page 13: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

G Matrix

To achieve -secure:Any +1 columns of G must be linearly independent.Vandermonde matrix has such a property.

1 1 1 1

s s2 s3 sN

s2 (s2)2 (s3)2 (sN)2

s (s2) (s3) (sN)

G =

Page 14: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Properties of Blom Scheme Blom’s Scheme

Network size is N Any pair of nodes can directly find a

secret key Tolerate compromise up to nodes Need to store +2 keys

Our next goal: increase without increasing the storage usage.

Page 15: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Multiple Space Scheme

(D2, G)

(D1, G)

(D, G)

Key-Space Pool

spaces

spaces

spaces

Two nodes can find a pairwiseKey if they carry a commonKey space!

Page 16: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

How to select and ? If the memory usage is m, the

security threshold (probablistic) m is

To improve the security, we need to increase /2.

However, such an increase affects the connectivity.

2 mm

Page 17: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Measure Local Connectivity

plocal = the probability that two neighboring nodescan find a common key.

!)!2())!((

)(

))(( 2

21

localp

Page 18: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Plocal for different and

Page 19: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Security Analysis Network Resilience:

When x nodes are compromised, how many other secure links are affected?

jxjx

j

xj

xc

)1())((

d)compromise are nodes |broken is Pr(

1

Page 20: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Resilience (p = 0.33, m=200)

Blom

Page 21: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Resilience (p = 0.50, m =200)

Blom

Page 22: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Other Analysis Communication overhead Computation overhead

Page 23: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Improvement:Using Two-hop Neighbors

= 7 = 2

= 31 = 2

Page 24: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Conclusion We have proposed a pairwise key

pre-distribution scheme for WSN. We analyzed security,

computational overhead, communication overhead.

Our scheme substantially improves the network resilience.

Page 25: A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.

Independent Discoveries The similar scheme is

independently discovered by two other groups: Liu and Ning from NC State (next

talk). Katz and his group from University of

Maryland.