A New Beat: Options for more accountable policing

8/14/2019 A New Beat: Options for more accountable policing

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ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountable

policingbyRickMuirandGuyLodge

June2008

ippr2008

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy

WWW.IPPR.ORG


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ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing

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ContentsContentsContentsContentsAboutippr 2Abouttheauthors 2Acknowledgements 2

Executivesummary 31.Thegenieisoutofthebottle 62.Theproblem 83.Optionsforreform 154.Strategyforreform 235.Conclusion 24References 25


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AboutipprAboutipprAboutipprAboutipprTheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.

Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible.Ourinternationalandmigrationteams,andclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhigh-qualityresearch.

ippr,3032SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RATel.:+44(0)2074706100E-mail:[email protected]:www.ippr.orgRegisteredCharityNo.:800065ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinJune2008.ippr2008

AbouttheauthorsAbouttheauthorsAbouttheauthorsAbouttheauthorsRickMuirisSeniorResearchFellowintheDemocracyandPowerteamatippr.HehasadoctorateinPoliticsfromtheUniversityofOxford,whereheworkedasadepartmentallecturerinLatinAmericanpolitics.Heworksacrossarangeofareasincludingidentity

andculture,democraticrenewal,communitycohesionandpublicservicereform.HispublicationsincludeThePowerofBelonging(withBenRogers),TheNewIdentityPoliticsandWhoRunsBritain?(withEmilyThornberryandIanKearns)inPoliticsforaNewGeneration:Theprogressivemoment(NickPearceandJuliaMargo[editors]).GuyLodgeisHeadoftheDemocracyandPowerteamatippr.Hespecialisesingovernanceandconstitutionalreformandhaspublishedwidelyinthisarea.HeisalsoaVisitingResearchFellowintheDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford.

AcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsAcknowledgements

WewouldliketothankTomGash,MikeKenny,AndyHull,CareyOppenheim,GeorginaKyriacou,LiamONeill,CatherineBithellandHollyAndrewfortheiradviceandsupport.WewouldalsoliketothankCableandWireless,LogicaandtheLocalGovernmentAssociationfortheirgeneroussupportinfundingipprsFutureofPolicingproject,withoutwhichitwouldnothavebeenpossible.Thefindingsofourresearch,however,areourownanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofourfundingpartners.


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ExecutivesummaryExecutivesummaryExecutivesummaryExecutivesummaryAllpublicorganisationsneedtobeheldtoaccountforthewaysinwhichtheycarryouttheirdutiesonourbehalf.Robustaccountabilitymechanismsensurethatorganisationsperformtoahighstandardandareresponsivetotheneedsofthepublictheyserve.

ThisreportarguesthatthepoliceserviceinEnglandandWalessuffersfromanaccountabilitydeficit.Atthenationallevelfragmentedgovernancemeansthatnoactorinthesystemhasthepowertoeffectivelyincentiviseperformanceimprovementordrivethroughchangeandreform.RecentattemptsbytheGovernmenttoincreasecontrolfromthecentrethroughtargetsettingandtop-downinitiativeshavehadlimitedsuccessandhavemadepolicingevenlessresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Atthelocallevelthereisnorealdemocraticaccountability:policeauthoritiesareweak,unaccountableandremote,whileelectedlocalgovernmenthasnoeffectivesayoverlocalpolicingpriorities.

Thisreportsetsouttheconsequencesofthislocalaccountabilitydeficitforpoliceperformanceandidentifiessixoptionsforreform.Ourargumentcomesinfourparts.1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle1.ThegenieisoutofthebottlePolicereformisnowamajorpriorityforallofthemainpoliticalparties.TheGovernmentisduetopublishagreenpaperonpolicereformthissummerandhasannouncedthatitwilllookatoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability.TheGovernmenthasnowconcededtwoimportantprinciples:thatthereisanaccountabilitydeficitatthelocallevelandthatpeopleshouldhavemoredemocraticcontrolover

policingprioritiesintheirarea.Thedemocraticgeniehasbeenletoutofthebottleinthepolicereformdebateanditwillbedifficultforanypartytoputitbackinagain.2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.TheproblemDespitesignificantincreasesinfunding,policeperformanceonkeyindicatorshasnotimproved.Thereisalsoclearevidencethatthepublicbelievethatthepolicehavebecomeunresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Thereareanumberoffactorsthataccountfortheseproblemsbutonecauseofbothistheaccountabilitydeficitthatexistswithinpolicing.Policeforcesareinsufficientlyaccountabletonationalpolicymakersbecauseoffragmentedgovernance.EffortstoincreaseforceaccountabilitytotheHomeOfficethroughcentraltargetshavenotraisedperformanceinkeyareasandhaveskewedlocalpolicingpriorities.Anevengreateraccountabilitydeficitexistsatthelocallevelwherepoliceauthoritiesareweakandremotefromthepublic,andwherethereisnoeffectiveroleforlocalgovernmentinsettinglocalpolicingstrategy.Asaresultthereareinsufficientpressurestodrivechangethroughthesystemandpoliceforcesareinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneeds.3.3.3.3.OptionsforreformOptionsforreformOptionsforreformOptionsforreformWeidentifytwoimportantwaysofimprovingresponsivenessandraisingperformance.1.Citizenfocusedpolicing1.Citizenfocusedpolicing1.Citizenfocusedpolicing1.Citizenfocusedpolicing

Therearemeasuresthatcanbetakentomakethestyleofpolicingmoreresponsiveandcitizen-focused.Theseincludethedevelopmentofacustomercarecultureinthepolice


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service,areductionintimespentonunnecessaryprocessesandpaperwork,embeddingneighbourhoodpolicingandprovidingresidentswithclearinformationaboutlocalcrimepatterns.2.Increasedlocalaccountability2.Increasedlocalaccountability2.Increasedlocalaccountability2.Increasedlocalaccountability

Whileitisnomagicbullet,makingdecision-makingmoreaccountabletocommunitiesiscrucialtodeliveringimprovedperformanceandmoreresponsivepolicing.Weidentifysixmainoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability.Itshouldbenotedthateachoftheseoptionswillonlybemeaningfuliftheycomewithsomepowersto:

setlocalpolicingpriorities allocatefinancialresourcesforpolicing havearoleintheappointmentofseniorpoliceofficers.

Thesesixoptionsare:

ForceForceForceForce----levelaccountabilitylevelaccountabilitylevelaccountabilitylevelaccountabilityOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOption1.Adirectlyelectedpolicecommissioner.Thisprovidesaclearanddirectmeansofholdingchiefconstablestoaccount,whichshouldhelpdrivethroughchangeandperformanceimprovement.However,holdingthepolicetoaccountattheforcelevelwouldstillleavedecision-makingatalevelremotefromlocalcircumstances.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Thismodelpreventspowerfrombecomingconcentratedinthehandsofonepersonbutsuffersfromlessvisibilityandremainsremotefromlocalneeds.SubSubSubSub----forcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountability

Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Thismodelwouldseecouncilsperformtherolescurrentlycarriedoutbypoliceauthorities.Councilleaderswouldsetbudgetsandprioritiesandappointlocalpolicecommanders.Thiswouldimprovedemocraticaccountability,deliverlocalresponsivenessandenablepolicingandcommunitysafetytobeeffectivelyjoined-up.Butitisaradicalstepthatwouldrequiremajororganisationalchangeandhavesignificantimplicationsfornationalpolicestructures.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Councilswouldapprovelocalpolicingstrategiesandretainthepolicepreceptelementofthecounciltaxenablingthemtopurchaseservicesfromthelocalpolice.Councilscouldalsobeconsultedontheappointmentofpolicecommanders.Thiswoulddelivergreaterlocalresponsivenessandjoined-upservicesbutmayriskcreatingconfusedlinesofaccountabilitybetweentheforceandBasicCommandUnit.Thisoptioncouldbecombinedwithreformingtherole,andimprovingtheeffectiveness,ofpoliceauthorities.Option5.ThemayoralmoOption5.ThemayoralmoOption5.ThemayoralmoOption5.Themayoralmodel.del.del.del.GovernmentcouldcombinepolicereformwithamovetorolloutdirectlyelectedmayorsacrossEngland.MayorscouldbegivensimilarpowerstothoseidentifiedinOptions3and4,butwouldprovideamuchclearerandmoreaccountablelocalvoicetosetpolicepriorities.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Thiswouldbuildonexistingcrimeanddisorderreduction

partnershipsbutbringaboutgreaterpublicinvolvementthroughdirectelections.


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However,itwouldseparatepolicingfromlocalgovernmentandwouldbetoothlesswithoutitsownresources.4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.StrategyforreformThesedifferentoptionseachhavetheirownmeritsandbringtheirownchallenges.

Thereisnoperfectsystemofpoliceaccountability.Twoconsiderationsinformourstrategyfordeliveringchange.First,theevidencebaseontherelationshipbetweenthedifferentreformoptionsandperformanceisthin,principallybecausetheyhavenotbeentestedintherealworld.Ministersarethereforewaryofmajorreformwhensuchchangefeelslikealeapinthedark.Second,therearesignificantregionalvariationswhichmeanthataonesizefitsallmodelisinappropriate.ForthesereasonswerecommendthattheGovernmentshouldfirstpilotbespokemodelsofpoliceaccountabilityindifferentareas.


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1.1.1.1.ThegenieisoutofthebottleThegenieisoutofthebottleThegenieisoutofthebottleThegenieisoutofthebottlePoliceaccountabilityisbackonthepoliticalagenda.InitsDraftLegislativeProgrammetheGovernmenthaspledgedtobringforwardanewPoliceReformBillthat,amongotherthings,willcreateaclearandpowerfulpublicvoicein[police]decision-making

throughdirectlyelectedrepresentatives(OfficeoftheLeaderoftheHouseofCommons2008:19).ThisrepresentsasignificantchangeinGovernmentpolicytowardspolicegovernance.UntilnowtheLabourGovernmenthasopposedplanstoallowdirectlyelectedrepresentativestooverseelocalpolicing,arguingthattheyriskpoliticisingpoliceworkandcouldleadtopolicingbeinginfluencedbycrudepopulistcalculations.WiththisnewpledgetheGovernmenthasconcededtwoimportantpoints:

Thatthereisalocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicing Thatlocalpeopleshouldhavemuchmoredirectdemocraticcontroloverthepolicyandprioritiesofthepoliceserviceintheirarea.

TheGovernmentspledgecouldbeinterpretedinanumberofdifferentwaysandwedonotyetknowwhatproposalswillemergeintheforthcomingpolicingGreenPaper.However,byfavouringdirectelection,theGovernmenthasletthedemocraticgenieoutofthebottleanditwillbeveryhardforpoliticiansofanypartytoputitbackinagain.ThisconcernwiththeaccountabilityofthepoliceservicehasemergedfromagrowingconcernthatpolicinginBritainhasbecomefartooremotefromtheneedsandprioritiesoflocalcommunities.BritishpoliticianshavelonglookedenviouslyacrosstheAtlantic

attheabilityofpowerfullocalmayors,likeNewYorksRudyGuiliani,torespondeffectivelytopublicconcernaboutcrimeandbringaboutimpressivereductionsincrimeratesthroughinnovativeactionatthelocallevel.OneofDavidCameronsearliestinitiativesasConservativeleaderwastosetupataskforceonpolicereform,headedbytheConservativeMPNickHerbert.Amongotherthings,thetaskforcereportcalledfortheintroductionofdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerstooverseethestrategyoflocalpoliceforcesandmoreeffectivelyholdchiefconstablestoaccount.TheGovernmentitselfhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedwiththequestionofpolice

reform.In2007,theformerHomeSecretary,JohnReid,commissionedHerMajestysChiefInspectorofConstabulary,SirRonnieFlanagan,toconductanindependentreviewofpolicing.Oneoftheaimsofthereviewwastoexplorehowlocalaccountabilitycouldbeenhanced.Flanaganreportedearlierthisyearand,withoutfavouringanyparticularoption,setoutanumberofpossiblereforms,rangingfromestablishingpolicecommissionersatforcelevelthroughtooptionsdesignedtogiveagreaterroletolocalauthorities.ThispaperisintendedtocontributetothedebateleadinguptothepublicationoftheGovernmentsgreenpaper.WhiletheGovernmenthasmadeitclearitintendstoconsultontheproposals,itappearsthatsomeformofdirectelectionatthepoliceforcelevelisitsfavouredoption.Wearguethatwhiletherearebenefitstobegainedfromdirectelectionattheforcelevel,alternativeandadditionaloptionsmustbeconsideredtoo.


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Mostimportantlytheroleoflocalgovernmentinholdingthepolicetoaccountshouldberevisited.WewelcometheGovernmentsdecisiontopublishanearlydraftoftheQueensSpeech.Wehopeitwillnowstickwiththespiritofthisprocessandgiveseriousconsiderationto

allofthedifferentoptionsavailableforimprovingpoliceaccountability.Thispapercomesinthreeparts:

1. Itarguesthatthereisanaccountabilitydeficitinpolicing,especiallyatthelocallevel,andshowsthatthisisanimportantfactorunderminingpoliceperformanceandresponsiveness.

2. Itsetsouttwowaysofimprovingpoliceperformanceandresponsiveness.First,therearechangesatthelevelofworkforcestructureandorganisationalculturetodelivermorecitizen-focusedpolicing.Second,therearechangestopolicegovernanceatthelocalleveltodelivergreateraccountability.Thepaperidentifiessixoptionsforincreasinglocal

accountabilityandsetsoutthepotentialbenefitsanddrawbacksofeach.3. Itbrieflysetsoutastrategyforachievingreforminthisareaand

recommendsthattheGovernmentfirstpilotsbespokemodelsofpoliceaccountabilityindifferentpartsofthecountry,ratherthanproceedingwithasinglenation-wideapproach.

ThispaperisthesecondoutputfromtheipprswiderprojectontheFutureofPolicing.ThefirstpaperfromthisprojectwaspublishedinFebruary2008andlookedatthemodernisationofthepoliceworkforce(seeTheNewBillbyTomGash).Thefinalreportfromtheprojectwillbepublishedlaterthisyearandwilladdressthewiderchallengeofhowtodeliverpolicereform.


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2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.TheproblemTheaccountabilitydeficitTheaccountabilitydeficitTheaccountabilitydeficitTheaccountabilitydeficitAllpublicorganisationsneedtobeheldtoaccountforthewaysinwhichtheycarryouttheirdutiesonourbehalf.Accountabilityensuresthatorganisationsperformtoahigh

standardandareresponsivetotheneedsofthepublictheyserve.ThepoliceserviceinEnglandandWalessuffersfromanaccountabilitydeficit.Atthenationallevelfragmentedgovernancemeansthatnoactorinthesystemhasthepowertoeffectivelyincentiviseperformanceimprovementordrivethroughchangeandreform.RecentattemptsbytheGovernmenttoincreasecontrolfromthecentrethroughtargetsettingandtop-downinitiativeshavehadlimitedsuccessandhavemadepolicingevenlessresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Atthelocallevelthereisnorealdemocraticaccountability:policeauthoritiesareweak,unaccountableandremote,whileelectedlocalgovernmenthasnoeffectivesayoverlocalpolicingpriorities.Inthissectionwearguethat:

thepoliceservicefacestwoimportantchallenges:thechallengeofimprovingits

performanceinreducingcrimeandthechallengeofbecomingmoreresponsivetotheordinarycitizen

thereareanumberoffactorsbehindpoorperformanceandalackofresponsiveness,includingissuesaroundworkforcemodernisationandorganisationalculture,butthelocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingplaysanimportantroleinbothandthereforeneedstobeaddressed.

TheperformancechallengeTheperformancechallengeTheperformancechallengeTheperformancechallengeAtfirstglance,itmightbereasonabletoaskwhypolicereformisrequiredatall.Overall

crime,asmeasuredbytheBritishCrimeSurvey,hasfallenby42percentsince1997andfearofcrimehasfallensignificantlyoverthesameperiod(Gash2008).However,mostoftherecentfallincrimecannotbeattributedtochangesinpolicing.MostcriminologistsandtheGovernmentsownStrategyUnitbelievethatthebulkofthefallinso-calledvolumecrimes(burglary,theftandnon-seriousviolentcrime)hasbeenduetoBritainsbuoyanteconomyinrecentyears,ratherthantheimpactofpolicework(Solomonetal2007,Pearce2007).Thatisnottosuggestthatthepolicedonothaveanimpactoncrimelevels,buttopointoutthatweneedtogobeyondheadlinecrimefigurestoassesspoliceperformance.

So,howwellarethepoliceperforming?Itisdifficulttofindholisticmeasuresofpoliceperformance,simplybecauseofthediverserangeoffunctionsthepoliceareexpectedtoperform.However,keycrimereductionindicatorsappeartoindicatethatperformancehaseitherremainedflatordecreasedinrecentyears.Detectionrates,forexample,fellbetween1998and2002andareonlyrecentlyapproaching1998levels,witharound24percentofrecordedcrimesbeingclearedupin2007comparedto29percentin1998/99(Walkeretal2006).Performanceonthisindicatorisalsopatchyacrossthecountry,withdetectionratesvaryingtoahighdegreebetweendifferentpoliceforces.Forinstance,detectionratesforviolenceagainstthepersonvaryfromjust26percentinonepoliceforceto59percentinanother(ibid).Detectionsperofficerarethesametodayastheywerein2001/02,buteachpolicedetectionin2007costthepublicpursemoreinrealtermsthanitdidin2000(Walkeret


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al2007).Oneexplanationforthisriseindetectioncostsmaybethatmuchoftheincreasedinvestmentinrecentyearshasgoneintoreassurancepolicing(theneighbourhoodpolicingprogramme),whichsomewithinthepoliceservicearguehasmoreimpactonthefearofcrimethanitdoesoncatchingcriminals.

Whiletherehasbeenanincreaseinthenumberofoffencesbroughttojustice(OBTJ),thishasnotbeenduetomorecrimesbeingclearedupandmoreoffendersbeingbroughtbeforethecourts.Rather,ithasbeenaconsequenceoftheintroductionofnewformsofdiscretionarypunishment,suchasPenaltyNoticesforDisorderandonthespotfines(Solomonetal2007,Gash2008).Incomparativeterms,officerperformancelookspoor:whereaspoliceofficersintheUSAmakeanaverageof21arrestsperyear,policeofficersinEnglandandWalesmakejustnine(LovedayandMcClory2007).So,despiteheadlinefallsincrimelevels,keymeasuresofpoliceperformancehavenot

improvedoverthelastdecade.Thisisdespiterecordincreasesinpublicspendingonthepoliceandpoliceofficernumbersstandingatanalltimehigh:spendingonthepolicehasincreasedby21percentinrealtermssince1997andmostofthismoneyhasbeenspentonmorepoliceofficers(up11percentorby14,000officersbetween1997and2007)(Solomonetal2007).Ifthepolicearetoreducecrimefurtherintheyearsaheadtheywillhavetodosoinaclimateofmuchtighterpublicspendingandmakebetteruseofthesamepotofresources.Theywill,inshort,havetodothingsdifferently.TheresponsivenesschallengeTheresponsivenesschallengeTheresponsivenesschallengeTheresponsivenesschallengeOpinionsurveysshowthatpublicsatisfactionwiththepoliceservicehasfallensincethe1980s,linkedtoaperceptionthatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetotheviewsandprioritiesoflocalcommunities.Weshouldnotethatthesefiguresprecedetherecentrolloutofthenewneighbourhoodpolicingteams,whoaretaskedwith,amongotherthings,raisingpublicconfidence.Theproportionofpeopleexpressingconfidenceinthepolice,althoughstillrelativelyhigh,fellfromover90percentin1982to75percentin2001/02(Rogers2004).Theproportionsayingthatthepolicedoagoodorexcellentjobfellfrom64percentin1996tojust48percentin2004/05(Allenetal2006).Satisfactionwiththepoliceisalsonegativelyrelatedtopersonalexperience.In2004/05,thosepeoplewhohadcontactwiththeirlocalpolicewithinthepreviousyearratedthemmorenegativelythanthosewhohadnothadcontact(51percentofthose

whohadnocontactratedthemtobegoodorexcellent,comparedtojust45percentofthosewithrecentcontact).Thisisnotsimplybecauseoffendersratethepolicenegatively.Peoplewhohavebeenvictimsofcrimeinthelastyearratethepolicelowerthanthosewhohavenotbeenavictimofcrimeinthelastyear(41percentofvictimsratedthemgoodorexcellentcomparedto52percentofnon-victims)(Herbert2007).Thesefindingscontrastwiththosefromotherpublicservices:forexample,directusersofschoolsandhospitalstendtoratethoseserviceshigherthanthepublicasawhole.Moreprolongedcontactwiththepoliceleadstomorenegativeattitudes:accordingtoone2005survey,while89percentofpeoplesaytheyaresatisfiedwithinitialcontact,only58percentsaytheyaresatisfiedwithfollowupcontact(Herbert2007).


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Decliningsatisfactionwiththepoliceisrelatedtoaperceiveddeclineintraditionalcommunitypolicingandthelossofbobbiesonthebeat.Whenaskedwhatthepoliceshoulddomoreof,59percentsaymorefootpatrols,followedby36percentsayingcommunitypolicing.Only26percentsaytheywantmorepatrolsbycarandjust19percentsaymorecrimedetection(FitzGeraldetal2002).A2007ICMpollfoundthat73

percentofthepublicfeltthatthepolicedonotspendenoughtimeoutonthebeat(Herbert2007).Relatedtothisisafallinsustainedcontactwithindividualofficers.Thesamesurveyfoundthat73percentofthepublicdidnotknowanyofthepoliceofficersintheirlocalareaandafurther13percentdidnotknowmany(ibid).RaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessRaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessRaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessRaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessWehavesetouttwosignificantchallengesforthepoliceservice:thechallengeofraisingpoliceperformanceinreducingcrimeandthechallengeofbeingresponsivetotheneedsofthecitizen.Inwhatfollowswearguethat,whileitisbynomeansamagicbullet,reducingthelocalaccountabilitydeficitiscriticaltotacklingbothofthesechallenges.

PerformanceandaccountabilityPerformanceandaccountabilityPerformanceandaccountabilityPerformanceandaccountabilityThereareanumberofwaystoenhancepoliceperformanceandthesearethesubjectofipprswiderreportonpolicereform,tobepublishedlaterintheyear.Thesemeasuresinclude:

modernisingthepoliceworkforce improvinginformationsystemsandprocesses reformingorganisationalstructurestoenhancecapacityatdifferentlevels changingorganisationalculture.

However,inadditiontothesemeasures,raisingperformancewillrequiresignificantchangesinthewaythepoliceserviceisgoverned,andthewaysinwhichthepoliceareheldtoaccount.Thisisbecauseeffectiveformsofaccountabilitycandriveupperformancebycreatingthenecessarypressurestoimprove.Undercurrentarrangements,however,thepolicearenoteffectivelyheldtoaccountateitherthelocalornationallevel.EnglandandWalescurrentlyhave43policeforces,eachheadedbyachiefconstable.Theseniormanagementofeachpoliceforceismadeupofachiefconstableandachiefofficerteamandisresponsiblefor:

settingtheforcebudget drawingupandimplementingthelocalpolicingplan monitoringandensuringcompliancewithnationalperformancetargets.

Underwhatisknownasthetripartitesystemofpolicegovernance,whichwasintroducedwiththe1964PoliceAct,achiefconstableisaccountablebothtolocalpoliceauthoritiesandtheHomeSecretary.However,neitheroftheselinesofaccountabilityfunctionseffectively.Welookatbothinturn.NationalaccountabilityandperformanceOnthefaceofitthepoweroftheHomeSecretarytoholdthepolicetoaccounthasincreasedsignificantlyinrecentyears.Indeedmanycommentatorshaveexpressed

concernaboutthedegreetowhichtheHomeOfficehasbecomedirectlyinvolvedinthedeliveryofpolicingatthelocallevel(Flanagan2008).However,whilethereisnodoubt


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thatthepowerofthecentrehasgrowninrecentyears,itisfarfromclearthatthishasdeliveredthemosteffectiveformofaccountability.TheHomeSecretaryhasthepowertocallonapoliceauthoritytosuspendorretireachiefconstableifheorshebelievesthechiefconstableisnotperformingdutiestothe

requiredstandard,butthispowerhasrarelybeenused.ItwasusedtwicebytheformerHomeSecretary,DavidBlunkett,inthecasesofPaulWhitehouseofSussexPoliceandDavidWestwoodofHumbersidePolice,butonlyfollowinghigh-profileinvestigationsintospecificcrimesthatuncoveredseriouspolicingfailures.Moreover,theHomeSecretarystillhastogettheagreementofthepoliceauthoritytoact.IntheWestwoodcase,HumbersidePoliceAuthorityinitiallyresistedtheHomeSecretaryscallforittosuspendtheChiefConstable,sothematterendedupincourt(thejudgeultimatelysidedwithBlunkett).Itis,perhaps,forthisreasonthattheGovernmentisrumouredtobeexploringgivingtheHomeSecretarythepowertodirectlydischargechiefconstables(TheTimes,25May2008).Reflectingonthetripartiterelationship,Blunkettquipped:theChiefConstablegetsallthepower,thePoliceAuthoritygetsallthemoneyandthe

HomeSecretarygetsalltheblame(BBCNewsOnline,2July2004).Intheabsenceofsuchhardlevers,centralGovernment,andparticularlytheLabourGovernmentsince1997,hassoughttoexercisegreaternationalcontrolthroughaperformancemanagementsystembasedongovernmenttargets.Whilethereisnodoubtthattheuseoftargetshasimprovedpoliceperformanceinsomeareas,andthatpoliceforceshavebecomemoreaccountabletoWhitehallasaresultoftheirintroduction,itisneverthelessincreasinglyclearthatthissystemprovidesacrudeandincreasinglyineffectivewayofmanagingpoliceperformance:

Centrallyimposedperformancetargetsareinflexibletochangingdemandsandneedsatalocallevel.Inarecentsurvey,71percentofBasicCommandUnit(BCU)commanderssaidthatnationalreportingrequirementswerehavinganegativeimpactonthequalityofpolicingintheirarea(LovedayandMcClory2007).NationaltargetsthatchangeinresponsetopoliticalprioritiesinWhitehallleavepoliceonthegroundunabletoremainfocusedonprioritiessetatthelocallevel.Ahigh41percentofBCUcommandersdisagreedwiththestatementthatstafffeelabletochallengethewaythingsaredone,showinghowinflexiblethecurrentsystemisfelttobe(ibid:19).OneBCUcommandertoldipprhowthebiggestrecentpublicconcerninhisareawasthenumberofyoungchildrendrivingmopedsinarecklessandanti-socialmanner.Despitethis,hefacedcounter-veilingpressurefromforceheadquarterstofocusonthosecrimesforwhichtherewerenationalperformancetargets.Thisisthe

familiarphenomenonofonlywhatgetsmeasuredgetsdone.

Assessingpoliceperformancebyaverynarrowlydefinedsetofcrimereductionoutputshascreatedperverseincentivesontheground.Forexample,whiletheGovernmenthasmetitstargettoincreasethenumberofoffencesbroughttojustice,thishasbeenachievedlargelybyincreasingthenumberofpeoplethathavebeencautionedforrelativelyminoroffencesandbecausethepolicehavemadeuseofnewsummarypowerstopunishpeopleonthespot,againforrelativelyminormatters(Solomonetal2007).Ratherthanfocusingonthemostharmfulcrimes,thepolicehavetargetedyouthsforpettyoffencessimplytomeettheirperformancetargets,effectivelypickingthelowhangingfruit

insteadoftacklingthecrimesthatreallymattertopeople.


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Noneofthismeansthatnationalaccountabilityinitselfisundesirableonthecontrary,insomeareasitiscrucial.Forinstance,therewillalwaysbetheneedforsomecentralgovernmenttargetstoensurethatminimumfloorstandardsaremet.Beyondtargetsthereisaclearroleformuchgreaternationalcoordinationwhenitcomestotacklingseriousandorganisedcrimeandcounter-terrorism.Anotherexamplewouldbeinthe

areaofdevelopingstandardinformationsystemsandprocessesacrossthepoliceservice.Currentlyforcestendtohavetheirowndatabasesanddeveloptheirowntechnologicalsolutions,aproblemthatleadstopoorinformationsharingandduplicationofresources.Workforcemodernisationisalsoanareathatwouldbenefitfrombeingdrivennationally.Intheseimportantareasdevelopingnation-widesolutionsrequiresnationalleadershipand,therefore,greaternationalpoliticalaccountability.WheretheGovernmenthasgonewrongisinseekingtoholdpoliceforcestoaccountnationallyforlocalcommunitypolicingmatters,whichfromthepointofviewofresponsivenessarebetterdesignedandheldaccountableatthelocallevel.

LocalaccountabilityandperformanceIfnationalaccountabilityisconfusedandineffective,localaccountabilityisalmostnon-existent.Policeauthorities,madeupoflocalcouncillors,magistratesandotherappointedfigures,lackrealpoweroverpolicechiefs.Whiletheyhavethepowertoappointanddischargeachiefconstable,theycanonlydosowiththeapprovaloftheHomeSecretary.Inreality,veryfewchiefconstableshaveeverbeendischargedbytheirpoliceauthoritiesforunsatisfactoryperformance.Policeauthoritiesalsohaveverylittleimpactonpolicingprioritiesintheirarea.Undertheill-defineddoctrineofoperationalindependence(craftedpreciselytokeepthepolicefreefrompoliticalcontrol)policeauthoritiesmainlyleavestrategicpolicingdecisionsandthedevelopmentoflocalplansandbudgetstotheirchiefconstables.Policeauthoritiesprovideforaveryweaklinkbetweenthepoliceandlocalcommunities.Theyarenotdirectlyelected,sotheirabilitytoincreasepartofthelocalcounciltaxthroughthepolicingpreceptraisesseriouslegitimacyquestions.Moreover,theindirectlyelectedmembersofpoliceauthoritiesareoftennotleadingmembersofthelocalauthoritiesthatappointthemandtheycovergeographicallydispersedareas,whichmeanstheyareremotefromtheviewsoflocalresidents(LovedayandMcClory2007).Asfarasthepublicisconcernedtheyarebarelyvisible.AccordingtofocusgroupscarriedoutfortheHomeOfficein2003,hardlyanyparticipatingmembersofthepublichadheardofpoliceauthoritiesorwereawareoftheroletheyplayedin

theoreticallyholdingthepolicetoaccount(Docking2003).So,wehaveanaccountabilitydeficitatboththenationalandlocallevels,makingitdifficulttodrivechangeandincentiviseperformanceimprovementthroughthesystem.Atthelocallevel,accountabilityisweakbecausepoliceauthoritiesareremoteandlacklegitimacy.Atthenationallevel,theHomeOfficehassoughttoincreaseaccountabilitythroughaperformancemanagementsystemthathasimpededeffectivepolicing.Worryingly,thereisaviciouscycleatplay.IntheabsenceofanyeffectivelocalaccountabilityitisHomeOfficeministerswhoareheldresponsibleforthequalityofpolicingatboththenationalandlocallevel.Knowingtheywillbeblamedwhenthings

gowrong,ministersareencouragedtotrytoenhancepoliceperformanceusingleversliketarget-setting,whichaswehaveseenhavelimited,andevenperverse,impactson


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policing.Butbyintervening,ministersreinforcetheviewthattheyare,indeed,responsibleforallaspectsofpolicing,whichlocksthemintoaviciouscycleinwhichtheyhavetotrytomanagelocalpoliceperformancecentrally.Breakingthiscycleiscrucialtoimprovingpolicing,andstrengtheninglocalaccountabilityiscriticaltothat.

ResponsivenessandaccountabilityResponsivenessandaccountabilityResponsivenessandaccountabilityResponsivenessandaccountabilityThereareanumberoffactorslyingbehindthewidelysharedviewthatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetothecitizeninthewaytheygoabouttheirwork.ChangingpolicerolesTherewereanumberofchangestopolicerolesandfunctionsinthesecondhalfofthe20thcentury,eachofwhichreducedtheday-to-daycontactbetweenthepoliceandthepublic:

Therewasareducedemphasisoncrimepreventionbystreetpatrol(bobbiesonthebeat)andagreateremphasisoncatchingcriminalsbyresponding(usuallybycar)tocallsfromthepublic.In1967,policeforcesintroducedanewsystemofUnitBeatPolicing,whichessentiallytookofficersoffwalkingpatrolsandputthemintovehicles.Thesecoveredwiderareasandmeanttheycouldrespondmorerapidlytourgentincidentsasandwhentheyoccurred.However,thisnewfirebrigadeservicemeantthatthepolicehadmuchlessday-to-daycontactwiththegeneralpublicandmeantthatthereassuringfigureoftheBritishbobbyonregularfootpatrolwaslost.WeshouldnotethattherecentintroductionofneighbourhoodpolicingbytheGovernmentismeantspecificallytorestorethiskindofDixonofDockGreenpolicing.

Therewasagreaterandnecessaryemphasisondetectivework,whichreinforcedtheshiftawayfromdeterrence-orientatedfootpatrols.Agrowing

numberofofficerswentintoCriminalInvestigationDepartments(CID),alongsideanumberofotherspecialistcrimedetectionunits,suchasseriouscrimesquadsanddrugssquads(Maguire2003).

Theprimaryobjectiveofpolicingshiftedtofightingcrime,whichreducedtheamountoftimepolicededicatedtotheirbroaderservicefunction.Theswitchfromfoottomotorisedpatrolswaspartlyresponsibleforthisconstableswerenolongerfamiliarfigureswalkingthestreets,abletohelpcitizenswithgeneralenquiries.

Risingpublicexpectations

Thepolicefacethechallengeofrisingpublicexpectations,asdoallpublicservices.Deferencetoauthorityhasdeclinedandtrustinallpublicinstitutions,includingthepolice,hasfallen.Inaddition,weareamuchmoreaffluentsocietyinwhichcitizensexpecthighstandardsasconsumersofgoodsandservices,includingthoseprovidedbythestate.Inordertomeetpublicexpectations,publicservicescannotstandstill:evenifthequalityoftheservicesuppliedbythepolicehadremainedthesameoverthelast40years,thepolicewouldhaveneededtouptheirgame.LackofacustomercareculturePublicsatisfactionwiththepoliceamongwitnessesandvictimsislowerthanamongthegeneralpublic,indicatingthatdirectcontactwiththepoliceleadstoincreasingly

negativeviewsoftheirperformance.Thisislikelytobeduetoalackofacustomercarecultureinthepoliceforce,itselfrootedinalackofworkforcemodernisation(seeGash


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2008).TheBritishCrimeSurveyhasfoundthatnearlyafifthofadultscouldrecallbeingreallyannoyedwithapoliceofficerinthelastfiveyears,and43percentofthosesaidthiswasduetotheofficersmanner(Docking2003).FocusgroupsconductedfortheHomeOfficehighlightedmanyinstancesofpoliceofficersbeingrudeorabruptoraskingwhatweredeemedtobeunnecessaryquestions(ibid).

AmorediversepopulationSurveysandfocusgroupscontinuetoshowthatpeoplefromminorityethniccommunitiesbelievethatthepolicediscriminateagainstandstereotypepeoplefromblackandminorityethnic(BME)groups.Anumberofindependentinquirieshaveraisedseriousconcernsaboutthetreatmentofminoritycommunitiesbythepolice.ThemostprominentrecentinquirywastheMacPhersonReportintothemurderoftheblackteenagerStephenLawrence,whichconcludedthattheMetropolitanPoliceServicewasinstitutionallyracist.Sincethentherehavebeenimprovementsacrossthecountry:hatecrimehasreceivedamuchgreaterpriority(racistcrimeinLondonhasbeencutsignificantly,forexample)andtherehasbeenasustainedefforttorecruitmorepolice

officersfromBMEgroups.Thepoliceneedtocontinuethisworkandensurethattheyareequallyresponsivetotheconcernsofdifferentcommunities.ThepolicehavebecomedecreasinglyaccountabletolocalcommunitiesOnefinalandsignificantreasonforthissensethatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetolocalcommunities,isthelocalaccountabilitydeficit.Originally,Britainspoliceservicewashighlydecentralised:madeupofhundredsofsmallpoliceforcesaccountabletolocalauthoritiesthroughtheirelectedwatchcommittees.However,overthecourseofthe19thand20thcenturies,nationalgovernmentintroducedanumberofchangesthatcutthelinksbetweenelectedlocalgovernmentandthepolice:

Policingwasnotmadeastatutorydutyoflocalgovernmentwhencountycouncilswereestablishedin1888

Forcesincreasinglyreceivedtheirfundingdirectlyfromcentralgovernment Chiefconstablesweredeclaredtobeaccountabletothelawratherthanlocal

politicians

In1964thenewtripartitesystemofpolicegovernancewassetup,ongroundsofreducingpolicecorruption.

(Williams2003)Underthetripartitesystem,43policeforceswereestablished(cutfromtheprevious

106),withchiefconstablesbeingaccountabletolargerpoliceauthoritiesandtheHomeOffice.After1964,thepowerofchiefconstablestocontrolforcefinanceswasincreasedand,morerecently,theestablishmentofcentralperformancetargetshaseffectivelymadechiefconstablesmoreaccountabletotheHomeOfficethantotheirlocalpoliceauthorities(LovedayandMcClory2007).Andaswehaveseen,policeauthorities,ascurrentlyconstituted,donotprovideaneffectivelinktothepublic.Underthissystemthereisnoformalstructurethroughwhichlocalcommunitiescansettheprioritiesforthelocalpolicingthatthey,toasignificantextent,payfor.Inthenextsectionwesetoutsomeofthewayswemightchangethis.


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3.Optionsforreform3.Optionsforreform3.Optionsforreform3.OptionsforreformWehavearguedthatthepolicearecurrentlyunder-performingonanumberofkeycrime-reductionindicatorsandthattheyareinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Thereareanumberoffactorslyingbehindthesechallenges,butwe

havearguedthattheaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingisanimportantdeterminantofboth.Therelationshipbetweenthecentreandthepoliceiscurrentlydysfunctionalandrequiresreform.Therelationshipbetweenlocalpoliceforcesandthecommunitiestheyserveisalsobrokenanditistimetointroducenewwaysofholdingthepolicetoaccountlocally.Itisthislatterchallengewithwhichweareconcernedhere(wewillreturntotheissueofnationalaccountabilityandleadershipinourfinalreport).Inthissectionwesetoutanumberofoptionsforreformthatwouldputthecitizen,onceagain,attheheartofpolicing.Theseoptionsfallundertwoverygeneralheadings:

Changestothewaypolicingisdoneday-to-daythatwouldmaketheservicemoreresponsivetoandfocusedontheconcernsofthecitizen.

Changestodecision-makingstructuresthatwouldmakethepolicemoreaccountabletolocalcommunitiesinthesettingofstrategicpriorities.

CitizenCitizenCitizenCitizen----focusedpolicingfocusedpolicingfocusedpolicingfocusedpolicingThereareanumberofreformsthatcouldbeundertakentotacklepublicdissatisfactionwithpoliceperformanceandmakepolicingmorecitizen-focusedthatdonotrequirechangestotheformalproceduresforholdingthepolicetoaccount.Weoutlinethesebelow.However,itisourbeliefthatthesereforms,tobetrulyeffective,wouldneedtobeaccompaniedbywiderreformstopolicegovernance.Weturntothewayswemightdothatinthefinalsectionofthispaper.

Developmentofcustomercare,interDevelopmentofcustomercare,interDevelopmentofcustomercare,interDevelopmentofcustomercare,inter----personalandcommunicationskpersonalandcommunicationskpersonalandcommunicationskpersonalandcommunicationskillsillsillsillsPublicconfidenceinthepoliceisdrivenlargelybycontactandcommunicationwithitsoffices.So,forexample,93percentofwitnessestreatedinacourteousmanneraresatisfiedwiththepolice,comparedto27percentforthosewhoarenottreatedinsuchamanner(Flanagan2008).Improvingcustomercarerequiresextensiveworkforcemodernisation.Muchgreaterspecialisationofroleswithinthepoliceserviceisadvocatedelsewherebyippr.Thiswouldallowconstableswhoenjoytheinterfacewiththepublictospecialiseinoutwardfacingroles.Morecivilianspecialistscouldalsobeemployedtocarryouttasks,suchasvictimsupport,anddealingwithreportsfromthepublic(Gash2008).Inevitably,promotingacustomercareculturethroughoutthepoliceservicewillrequireimprovedtrainingforconstablesmoregenerallyandthepromotionofawidercultureofprofessionaldevelopmentthroughoutthepoliceservice,sothatmanagersareequippedtopromotethesekindsofskillsamongtheirofficers(ibid).

LesstimespentonpaperworkLesstimespentonpaperworkLesstimespentonpaperworkLesstimespentonpaperworkHomeOfficeresearchshowsthat,onaverage,officersspendalmostasmuchtimeinthestationasoutofitandlessthanafifthoftheirtimeonthebeat.Fourteenpercentoftheirtimeisspentonpatrol,while19percentisspentonpaperwork.InvestmentinITsystemsandnewhardware,suchasmobilehandsets(asrecentlyannouncedbytheGovernment),plusgreateruseofcivilianstafftocarryoutadministrativetasksandareductioninsomereportingrequirements,couldfreeupmoretimetobespentonthebeat.Ofcourse,anyreductionsinunnecessarypaperworkneedtobecarefullyweighed

upagainsttheneedtorecordmonitoringinformation:forexample,thereremain


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concernsaboutthedisproportionateuseofstopandsearchagainstpeoplefromminoritygroups(Flanagan2008).NeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicinghasnowbeenrolledoutacrossEnglandandWalesanditsmain

aimistoputmorebobbiesonthebeat.Itinvolvesvisiblefootpatrols,communityengagementandaproblem-solvingapproachtocrimeanddisorder,withofficersseekingtopreventcrimeslocallybyworkinginpartnershipwithlocalpeopleandotheragencies.Whileitistooearlytoassessthesuccessofthisnewapproachhere,ithasbeenfoundtodeliverimpressiveresultsinanumberofothercontexts.InChicago,asimilarcommunitypolicingapproachhasresultedinsignificantincreasesinpublicsatisfaction,reducedcrimerates(fasterthantheUSnationalaverage)andreducedfearofcrime(SkoganandSteiner2004).InBritain,reassurancepolicingalongtheselineswasfoundinanumberofpilotareastoleadtoreducedfearofcrime,higherlevelsofpublicsatisfaction,higherlevelsofofficerfamiliarityandreducedperceptionsofanti-socialbehaviour(Tuffinetal2006).

Aswellasmorevisiblelocalfootpatrols,neighbourhoodpolicinginvolvesnewwaysofempoweringthepublictoholdthepolicetoaccount.Forexample,aspartofthisnewprogramme,theGovernmenthaslaunchedaNationalPolicingPledgewhichprovideseveryareawithasetofstandardstheycanexpectandthatcanbeusedtoscrutinizetheirlocalpolicingteam.Moreover,therehasbeenthelaunchofSaferNeighbourhoodPanelstoensurethatlocalpeopleareconsultedonpolicingprioritiesandlocalresidentscanusethenewCommunityCallforActiontotriggeractiononissueslikeanti-socialbehaviour.Thepriorityforforcesshouldbetoembedneighbourhoodpolicingand,inparticular,topreventcompetingprioritiescorrodingitovertime.InformationInformationInformationInformationEnsuringthatresidentshavestatisticalinformationoncrimelevelsshouldimprovetheanswerabilityoflocalforcesfortheirperformanceandmayhelpreducetheperceptiongapbetweenthefearofcrimeandactuallevelsofcrime(Flanagan2007,Duffyetal2008).Someforceshaveusednewtechnologytomapoutwherecrimehotspotsare,forexample,andthenewmayorofLondonBorisJohnsonhaspromisedtomakesuchcrimemapsavailabletothepublic.Toconcludethissectionwenotethatmanyoftheunderlyingcausesofdecliningsatisfactionwiththepolice(thelackofacustomercareculture,thedeclineoffoot

patrolsandademandformorecommunitypolicing)arerootedinworkforceandorganisationalculturequestions.Weargue,however,thatweareunlikelytowitnessafundamentalshiftinresponsivenessandperformanceunlessweaddressthefactthatpolicegovernanceisfragmentedandthatlocalaccountabilityisextremelyweak.Whilelinesofaccountabilityareweakandfragmented,stakeholderswillnotbeabletoholdchiefconstablestoaccountforperformance.Whileresourceallocationandstrategicpolicingdecisionscontinuetobemadeatforcelevel,alignedlargelytotargetssetinWhitehall,policingwillcontinuetoignorethespecificneedsoflocalneighbourhoodsandforce-levelprioritiesarelikelytotakeprecedenceovercommunitypolicingpriorities.Itisforthesereasonsthatchangestostrategicgovernanceare

requiredandthatthelocalaccountabilitydeficitmustbetackled.


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IncreasinglocalaccountabilityIncreasinglocalaccountabilityIncreasinglocalaccountabilityIncreasinglocalaccountabilityInthissectionweexploresixdifferentoptionsforenhancingtheaccountabilityofthepoliceserviceatthelocallevel.Thesecanbedistinguishedbetweenthosebringinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevel,andthosewhichenhanceaccountabilityatthelevelofthebasiccommandunit,themainoperatingunitforthedeliveryofcommunity

policing.Theimportantissueofneighbourhoodaccountabilityhasbeenbrieflyexploredabove(weshallsaymoreaboutthisinourfinalreport).Inthispaperwedonotargueinfavourofonesingleoptionforincreasingtheaccountabilityofthepolicetolocalpeoplebutrathersetoutthebenefitsandchallengesthatcomewitheach.Weshouldnotethatwhetheranyofthesemodelscangenuinelyholdthepolicetoaccountdependsonthedegreetowhichtheyhavethepowertodothreethings:

Setpolicepriorities Controlallorpartofthepolicebudget Appointandappraisechiefpoliceofficersorlocalpolicecommanders.

IftheGovernmentistointroducenewelectedbodiestoholdthepolicetoaccountthenitmustensurethattheyaregiventhenecessarypowers,forinstanceoverresourcesandpriority-setting,tocarryoutthisfunction.Ifthecentredeprivesthemofthesepowersthenlocalaccountabilitywillbenofurtheradvanced.Weshouldnotethatsomecommentatorsareconcernedthatincreasinglocalaccountabilityriskspoliticisingpolicing(seeFlanagan2008).Inevitably,givingagreaterroletoelectedrepresentativesmeansthatpolicingprioritieswouldbesubjecttothepressuresofpoliticalcontestation.However,therealdangersofpoliticisationwouldcomeifelectedfiguresweretakingday-to-daypolicingdecisions,whichmaywellopen

policinguptocorruptionandpartisanbias.Onthecontraryunderalloftheoptionsbelowthedoctrineofoperationalindependenceisleftintact:thedirectlyorindirectlyelectedrepresentativessetthepolicyframework,whichisthenappliedonaday-to-dayoperationalbasisbythechiefconstable.ThisisnomorepoliticalthanthecurrentsystemunderwhichnationalprioritiesaresetbytheHomeOffice,alsoheadedbyelectedpoliticians.ForcelevelaccountabilityForcelevelaccountabilityForcelevelaccountabilityForcelevelaccountabilityOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOnerelativelysimplewayofintroducinggreateraccountabilityofthepolicetolocalcommunitieswouldbetoelectapersonorbodytooverseetheirwork.Thishasthebenefitsofsimplicity:itwouldcreateasinglelineofaccountabilityfromthechiefconstablewhomakesthestrategicdecisionsfortheforcetoapersonorbodyelectedbylocalpeople.TheConservativePartysPoliceReformTaskforceconcludedthatthebestwayofdoingthiswouldbetoabolishpoliceauthoritiesandintroduceadirectly-electedpolicecommissionerforeveryforce.Thecommissionerwould:

Appointthechiefconstable Setpolicingpriorities Approvetheforcebudget.


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Thereareanumberofadvantagestothismodel.Thecombinationofaclearelectoralmandatewitheffectivepowerstoholdthechiefconstabletoaccountcouldsignificantlyhelptransformpoliceperformance.Moreover,givingthesepowerstoasinglevisibleleaderwouldensurethepublicknowwhoisresponsibleforpolicingandholdthemtoaccountaccordingly.Thismightalsohelptopersuadecentralgovernmenttoletgoof

itscurrentlyhighlyprescriptiveperformancemanagementframework.Thisisbecauseministersneedtobeassuredthatoncetheyletgo,thebuckwillstopwiththecommissionerandnotgetpassedbacktotheminWhitehall.TherearealreadysignsthattheintroductionofanelectedmayorinLondon,forexample,evenwithoutfullresponsibilitiesforsettingpolicepriorities,hasmeantthatresponsibilityfordealingwithissuessuchasrisingknifeandguncrimeisatleastseenassharedbetweenthemayor,theMetropolitanPoliceCommissionerandtheHomeOffice.Therearesomedrawbackstothecommissionermodel,althoughtheyarenot

insurmountable.First,weknowthatpoliceauthoritiesastheystandarebarelyvisibletothepublic.Democratisinganexistingtierofgovernanceofwhichmostofthepopulationareunawarerisksgeneratingverylowlevelsofinterestandparticipation.Second,theproblemwithintroducinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevel,whichcoverslargeanddiverseareas,isthatthislevelistoodistantfromthedistinctiveneedsoflocalneighbourhoods.Weknowthatpeopletendtobemostconcernedaboutcrimeintheirownstreetorlocaltowncentre:votingforaforcecommissionerwouldnotenablelocalpeopletohaveasayonhowtheirimmediatelocalcommunityispoliced.Inotherwordsthisoptionmightstruggletodeliveramorelocallyresponsiveformofpolicing.Third,thereareconcernsaboutthenarrownessoftherolesfocus.Havingasinglecrime-focusedpositiondoesriskseparatingpolicingoutfromotherrelatedservices,inparticularthecommunitysafetyworkcarriedoutbylocalgovernmentbutalsothewiderworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystem.Thisrunsagainstthegrainofjoined-upservicedelivery,whichmostseniorpoliceofficersandpolicymakersbelieveisessentialtoreducingcrime(LovedayandMcClory2007).Havinganelectionsolelyfocusedoncrimealsoposestheriskofencouragingpopulistcampaigns,leadingtoanarmsraceinhardlinelawandorderinitiatives,cutofffromanymoreconsideredprocessofdeliberationastotheireffectiveness.Bycontrast,moreholisticelections(formayorsandcouncillors,forexample)mighthelptakesomeofthe

heatoutoflawandorderdebate.Thisisastrongargumentforenhancingtheroleoflocalgovernmentinpolicing,whichwediscussindetailbelow.Fourth,thereareconcernsthatthismodelwouldputtoomuchpowerinthehandsofoneperson.Awayofmitigatingthiswouldbetoensurethatanelectedpolicecommissionerweresubjecttoastrongdegreeofdemocraticscrutiny.Onemightthereforedecidetoretainapoliceauthoritytoscrutinisethecommissionersdecisions.Ifwedidthis,however,wewouldhavetoenhancethelegitimacyandqualityofpoliceauthoritymembership.TodothistheGovernmentcouldrequirethatthemembersontheauthorityshouldbetheleadersorthecommunitysafetyportfolioholdersfromthe

differentlocalauthoritieswithintheforcearea.Thiswouldensurethatthecommissionerwerescrutinisedbyseniorandpowerfullocalpoliticalfigures.Thisdeals


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withacommoncriticismofpoliceauthoritiesastheycurrentlystand,whichisthatmanyoftheirelectedmembersdonotcarrythepoliticalweightnordotheyhavetherightskillstoholdthepoliceeffectivelytoaccount.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority

Onewayofensuringthatpowerisnotconcentratedinthehandsofasingleindividualwouldbetoholddirectelectionsforthewholepoliceauthority.Directelectionwouldenhancethedemocraticaccountabilityofpoliceauthoritiesandprovideimpetusforimprovingpoliceperformance.Itmightalsoprovideforalessremoteformofaccountabilityifeachofthememberswereelectedforageographicalareawithintheforcesboundaries.Ifthishappened,localpeoplewouldhaveageographicallyrootedrepresentativewhowouldbetterunderstandspecificlocalneedsthanacommissionerfortheentireforce.However,afullyelectedpoliceauthoritybringswithititsownproblems.Thismodelprovidesformuchlessaccountabilitythanthepolicecommissionermodelbecausethe

authoritysmemberswouldinevitablybelessvisibletothepublic.Indeedelectingthewholepoliceauthoritymaysimplyservetoconfusethepublicoverwhoisincharge.Moreover,whereasanelectionforasinglepostmightattractlocalattentionandgeneratepoliticalinterest,holdinganewsetofelectionsforademocraticbodyataremotelevelwouldverylikelyresultinconsiderableapathyandalowturnout.Anelectedpoliceauthoritywithrepresentativesfordifferentareaswithintheforcemightalsoleadtoasituationofclashingmandates,forexamplebetweenthepoliceauthorityrepresentativeandalocalcouncilleaderforthesamearea.Thisriskscomplicatinglinesofaccountabilityforpolicecommandersontheground.SubSubSubSub----forcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityOnecriticismofintroducinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevelisthatthisremainstooremotefromresidentsverylocalconcernsaroundcrimeanddisorder.Inadditiontolookingatforce-levelgovernance,then,itisvitalthataccountabilityisalsoaddressedatamorelocallevel.Thiswouldgenerallybethelevelofthebasiccommandunit(BCU).Option3.GivelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicingTherearetwomainadvantagesofgivingfirsttier(districtorunitary)localauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicingfunctions:

Asthemainestablisheddemocraticbodyatthelocalleveltheycanprovidethebenefitsoflegitimacyandaccountabilitywithouttheneedforadditional

elections. Becausesomuchlocalauthorityworkiscrucialtopreventingandreducingcrime

anddisorder,givingcouncilsagreaterroleopensupthescopeformorejoined-upinterventionsontheground.

Underthismodeloperationalcontrolfordeliveringcommunitypolicing(todealwithso-calledlevel1issuessuchasburglary,theft,violenceandanti-socialbehaviour)wouldpasstotheBCUcommander.Policeauthoritieswouldbeabolishedandfundingforlevel1functionswouldgotothelocalauthority.Thelocalauthoritywouldbegiventhelegalpowertosetthepolicingprioritiesfortheirlocalcommander,justasnowpoliceauthoritieshavethepowertoapproveorotherwisethechiefconstablesstrategicplan.

Thelocalcouncilleadercouldbegiventhepowertoappointthelocalpolicecommander.


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Thisisaradicalplanthatwouldgenuinelydelivermuchmorelocallytailoredandaccountablepolicingofthekindwelackatpresent.However,itwouldrequiretheorganisationaltransformationofpolicing.Forcescouldcontinuetoexistunderthismodelbuttheywouldbelimitedtoprovidingprotectiveservicestodealwithserious

crimesandcross-borderissues,aswellasprovidingbackroomandadministrativesupportforlocalcommunitypolicingunits(humanresourcesfunctions,forexample).Infactitislikelythatashifttothismorelocalisedmodelwouldputtheexistenceofthecurrent43forcestructureinseriousdoubt.Strippedoftheircommunitypolicingfunctionstherationalefor43forcesisextremelyweakandtheargumentsformovingtolargerregionalforcesorevenanationalseriouscrimeforcesuchastheAmericanFBIwouldlookirresistible(seeHerbert2007andOConnor2005).Weshouldalsonotethatempoweringlocalgovernmentwillnotonitsownresolvetheaccountabilityproblem,especiallygivenlowturnoutsinmanylocalelections.Forthisreason,workatthislevelshouldbebuttressedbyneighbourhoodlevelengagementas

well.Option4.GivelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicingAlessradicaloptionwouldbetoincreasetheaccountabilityoflocalpolicecommanderstolocalauthorities.Asafirststeplocalauthoritiescouldbegiventhelegalpowertoagreelocalpolicingprioritieswiththechiefconstable,throughthelocalpolicecommanderfortheirarea.Thiswouldtaketheformofalocalpolicingplanthatbothsideswouldhavetoapprove,ensuringthattherewasbalancestruckbetweenlevel1communitypolicingneedsandotherpriorities.Tounderpinthesepowerswithresources,thelocalauthoritycouldretainthepoliceprecept:thepartofthecounciltaxitcurrentlycollectsandpassestothepoliceauthority.Althoughtheproportionofthepolicebudgetmadeupbythepreceptvariesaroundthecountry,thiswouldmeanthatthelocalauthoritywouldhavethepowertocommissionsomecommunitysafetyservicesfromthepolice(oreven,iftheysochose,anotherprovider).Becausetheauthoritycouldchoosetospendsomeofthepreceptfundingonotherinitiatives(morecrimepreventionwork,forinstance)itwouldintroduceanelementofcontestability,withthepolicehavingtoprovetheywereprovidingvalueformoney.Ifthecurrentforce/BCUstructureistoberetaineditwouldnotmakesensetogivelocalcouncilleaderssolecontrolovertheappointmentoflocalBCUcommanderssincethiswouldbreakthechainofcommandbetweenthechiefconstableandtheBCU.

Insteadotheroptionswouldneedtobeconsidered.Ataminimumthechiefconstableshouldconsultthecouncilleader(assomealreadydo)ontheappointmentofthelocalcommander.Thecouncilcouldalsoplayaroleinappraisingthecommandersperformance.Othermoreradicalmeasuresmightincludesomerolefortheleaderorotherseniormembersofthelocalauthorityinappointingthecommander,suchasbyholdingasubsequentconfirmationhearing.Thelocalauthoritymightalsobegiventhepowertoexpressavoteofnoconfidenceinthelocalcommander,witharequirementonthechiefconstabletoappointareplacement.Thereare,however,somechallengestobeovercometomakethisenhancedlocalgovernmentoptionviable.Firstofall,introducinggreateraccountabilityatthislevel

makesthemostsenseifthereisgreatermanagerialandresourcedelegationdowntotheBCUfromforceHQ.


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Thereisalsothechallengeofcreatingmultiplelinesofaccountability.WhereasunderthecurrentsystemitisclearwhoBCUcommandersareaccountableto(chiefconstables),underthissystemtheywouldbeaccountabletoboththechiefconstableandthelocalauthority.However,whileanultimatelineofaccountabilityisnecessary

(essentiallywhohiresandfires),BCUcommandersalreadyhavetodealwithmultiplelinesofaccountability.TheyhavetoworkbothtoforceleveltargetsandtotheirLocalAreaAgreementtargetsagreedwiththerestoftheLocalStrategicPartnershipandtheGovernment.Indeedinmanyotherareasofpublicservices,notleastlocalgovernmentitself,serviceprovidersaretosomeextentaccountabletobothlocalandnationalmasters.ThemostimportantthingistoensurethatasinglepolicingplancanbeagreedforeachBCUthatincorporatesbothforcelevelprioritiesandlocalprioritiesasexpressedbythelocalcouncil.Afurtherconsequenceofthismodelisthatitwoulddemandamorerefinedroleforthepoliceauthority.Withthedecisiontosetlocalpolicingprioritiestransferredtolocal

authorities,thepoliceauthoritiescouldinsteadconcentrateoninfluencingforcestrategyandholdingthechiefconstabletoaccount.Option5.Themayoralmodel1ElsewhereipprhasarguedthatdirectlyelectedmayorsshouldbeintroducedacrossEngland(seeKennyandLodge2008).Byvirtueofbeingdirectlyelected,mayorsensuregreaterpoliticalaccountabilitythanisachievedundertheordinarycouncilmodel.Mayorstendtobewellknown,enablingthemtodevelopaconnectionwithlocalvotersthatindirectlyelectedcouncilleadersoftenfailtodo.AsurveyconductedintheLondonBoroughofNewham,forexample,revealedthat67percentofresidentscouldidentifySirRobinWalesastheirmayor.AndastheLondonelectioncampaignproved,mayoralelectionscangalvaniseandreinvigoratepoliticaldebateinameaningfulway.Mayorshaveprovedcapableleaders,havingoverseenanimprovementintheperformanceoftheircouncils.TheintroductionofamayorinHackney,forinstance,hascoincidedwithacompleteturnaroundintheLondonboroughsfortunes.MayorshavealsopushedthrougharangeofinnovativepoliciessuchasthecongestionchargeinLondon.WehavealreadyseenoneexampleofanelectedmayortakingaprominentroleinpolicinginthecaseofLondon.AlthoughtheLondonmayordoesnothavethepowertohireorfiretheMetropolitanPoliceCommissioner(thisremainstheresponsibilityoftheMetropolitanPoliceAuthorityandtheHomeSecretary),themayorsetsthepolicebudget.InrecentyearsthisenabledtheformermayorKenLivingstonetousehiselementofthecounciltaxtofundamajorroll-outofneighbourhoodpolicingacross

London,muchearlierthanintherestofthecountry.So,introducingmoredirectlyelectedmayorscouldbringconsiderablebenefitsfromtheperspectiveofenhancingtheaccountabilityandperformanceofdemocraticlocalgovernment.Givingmayorscontrolorgreaterinfluenceoverpolicingprioritiesfortheirlocalareas,assetoutinoptions3and4,couldalsobringconsiderablebenefits.Aswiththecaseforgivingdistrictandunitarylocalgovernmentagreaterroleinpolicing,adoptingamayoralmodelwouldmeantherewasnoneedforadditionalelections,riskingvoterfatigue,anditwouldalsohelpensurejoined-upworkingoncommunitysafety.

1Herewefocusondirectly-electedmayorsatlocalauthoritylevel.Wedonotexploretheoptionofcity-regionalmayorsthoughrecognisethattheymaywellbeanappropriatereformoptionforsomeareas.


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However,whatthemayoralmodelwouldaddisamuchclearerlineofaccountability:themayorwouldbemuchmorevisiblethanacouncilleader,wouldpossessapersonalmandatethatcouldnotbeignoredandwouldlikelyengagethepublictoamuchgreaterdegreeinsettingpolicingprioritiesbyvirtueoftheirhigherprofile.Aswitha

directlyelectedcommissioneratforcelevel,havingaclearlyaccountableindividualatlocallevelwhothepublicknowisinchargeandthatthebuckstopswiththemandnotWhitehallministersmightalsopersuadecentralgovernmenttogiveupseekingtomicro-managepolicingfromthecentre.Forthesereasonswebelievethatmayorswouldencouragethecentretodevolvepowersandfunctiontothelocalityinawaythattheyarecurrentlyreluctanttodo.IndeedwenotethatwhenitcomestopolicingtheGovernmentappearsmoreinterestedindemocratisingpoliceauthoritiesthanitdoesinempoweringlocalauthoritieswithagreatersayoverpolicing.Hadmoremayorsbeeninplacewebelievethatthecentrewouldbemorewillingtoconsidergoingdownthelocalgovernmentroute.Wetherefore

recommendthattheGovernmentconsidercombiningpolicereformwiththeintroductionofdirectly-electedmayors.However,weshouldnotethatamayoralmodelwouldsufferfromsomeoftheshortcomingsofthetwootherlocalgovernmentoptionsdiscussedabove:aradicalmovetogivemayorscompletecontrolovercommunitypolicingwouldleadtomajororganisationalupheaval,andalessradicaldevolutionofpowersmightleadtomultipleandconfusedlinesofaccountability.Option6.AlocalpoliceboardCrimeandDisorderReductionPartnerships(CDRPs)alreadyexistaspartnershipbodiesatboroughanddistrictlevel.Theycurrentlyhaveadutytoreflecttheviewsoflocalresidentsinsettingcommunitysafetypriorities,althoughtherealityisthattheyare(likepoliceauthorities)barelyvisibletothepublic.ItmightbepossibletoincreaselocalcommunityinputbyhavingdirectelectionsforpartoftheCDRPmembership.MoreradicallytheycouldbetransformedintowhollyelectedLocalPoliceBoards.Essentiallythesewouldbepoliceauthoritiesatamuchlessremoteandmorelocallevel.However,thefactisthatCDRPsarecurrentlymoreinvisibletothepublicthanpoliceauthoritiesare.Democratisingthistierofgovernancemaygeneratelittleinterestandtheelectionsarelikelytosufferfromalowturnout.Thisisespeciallylikelyifthebodies

weregivenfewpowers:onlyrealpowerinareassuchasappointments,budgetsandprioritysettingwouldpreventthemfrombecomingtalkingshops.However,evenifelectedpolicingboardsormoredemocraticCDRPsweregivensuchpowersthisoptionwouldestablishaparallelstructuretodealwithcommunitysafetyissues,detachedfromtheexistingworkoflocalgovernment.Fromtheperspectiveofjoint-workingandaproblem-focusedapproachtocrimeitmightbebettertooptforoneofthelocalgovernmentoptionssetoutabove.


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4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.StrategyforreformPolicereformhasalwaysbeendifficult,withcountlessreportssupportingchangebeinglefttogatherdustovertheyears(Gash2008).ProposalsforworkforcemodernisationhavetypicallyfallenfoulofoppositionfromthePoliceFederation,whileproposalsto

changeorganisationalstructures(suchasforcemergers)havetypicallyrunintooppositionfrompolicechiefs.Butonereasonwhyitissodifficulttoadvancereformintheareaofaccountabilityissimplybecausetheevidencebaseisverythin.Thereissomeinternationalevidencethatwecanlearnfrom.LovedayandReid,forexample,pointtotheabilityofamorelocallyaccountablesystemintheUnitedStatestomeetgrowingpublicconcernaboutcrimethroughnewlocallyinitiatedpoliciessuchastheCompstatdatacollectionandpolicemanagementsysteminNewYork.TheycontrastthiswiththehighlycentralisedandmuchmorerigidFrenchpoliceforcewhichhasstruggledtoinnovateortomovequicklyenoughtoassuagepublicanxietyaboutcrime(LovedayandReid2003).

However,thereisinsufficientevidenceonhowdifferentlocalaccountabilitymodelsmightaffectpolicingperformanceinaUKcontext.Ministersarethereforewaryofmajorchangewhensuchchangefeelslikealeapinthedark.Itwouldbebetterthereforetopilotanumberofdifferentoptionsbeforerollingoutasingleapproachacrossthewholecountry.Thereisalsoastrongcaseforbespokesolutionstailoredtotheneedsofdifferentareas.So,forexample,amayoralmodelmightbebestsuitedtoalargetownorcitylikeBirminghamorLiverpool,whereasanelectedforcecommissionermodelmightworkbetterinasmallerruralforce,suchasWarwickshire.Withitsmayoralsystem,theLondonMetropolitanPoliceServicealready

hasadegreeofdirectpoliticalaccountabilityattheforcelevelthatmostforceslackandshouldenhancethatmodelratherthanadoptsomethingentirelynew.TheGovernmentshouldthereforepilotthemodelofaccountabilitythatismostappropriatetotheparticulargovernancearrangementsinindividuallocalities.Aspartofanydeal,theycouldoffergreaterlocalautonomyandfewercentraltargets.Oncethosepilotshavebeenevaluated,policeforcesandlocalauthoritiesaroundthecountrycouldbeaskedtochoosefromanumberofoptionsforenhancinglocalaccountability.


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5.5.5.5.ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionThisreporthasexploredhowwemightachieveamorelocallyaccountablepoliceserviceinEnglandandWales.Itcomesatanearlystageinourresearchintothesequestionsanditsconclusionsarethereforetentative.

However,therearesomeconclusionswecandrawatthisstage.

Despitefallingcrimerates,policeperformancestillneedstoimproveandthepolicecontinuetobeinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.

Thereareanumberofthingsthatneedtobedonetoimprovepoliceperformance,includingworkforcemodernisationandreformstooperationalstructures.Thereareanumberofwaysofincreasingresponsiveness,suchasbyembeddingneighbourhoodpolicingandcreatingacustomercarecultureinthepoliceservice.However,addressingthelocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingiscrucialtodeliveringbothbetterperformanceandgreaterresponsiveness.

Therearearangeofdifferentoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability,whichvaryinthebenefitstheybringandthechallengestheypose.TheGovernmentshouldgiveseriousconsiderationtothemall.Whilesome,suchasdirectelectionsattheforcelevel,bringclearlinesofdemocraticaccountabilityatamorestrategiclevel,theyalsotendtoretaindecision-makingataremotedistancefromlocaltownsandneighbourhoods.Others,suchasgivinglocalauthoritiesamuchgreaterrole,provideformorelocalresponsiveness,butmayintroducemorecomplexlinesofaccountability.Thereisnoperfectsystemandtherearesomecleartrade-offs:choicesneedtobemadedependingontheobjectivesthatareprioritised.

Whateveroptionischosen,itwillbemeaninglessunlessgenuinepowersaredevolvedtosetpolicingpriorities,controlbudgetsandinfluenceseniorappointments.Electingnewbodieswithnoneofthesepowerswilltakeusnofurtherforwardandwillnotbetakenseriouslybythepublic.

Werecognisethattheevidencebaseinthisarearemainsthinandthatdifferentoptionsmaybebettersuitedtodifferentlocalareas.WerecommendthattheGovernmentpilotaccountabilitymodelsfirstandthenrolloutbespokesolutionsindifferentpartsofthecountry.Whateverparticularmodelslocalareasadopt,itisclearthattacklingtheaccountabilitydeficitisessentialifwearetodeliverthekindofresponsiveandeffectivepolicinglocalcommunitieswant.


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BBCNewsOnline(2004)Analysis:ControlofPolicing,Friday2JulyDockingM(2003)PublicPerceptionsofPoliceAccountabilityandDecision-makingLondon:HomeOfficeDuffyB,WakeR,BurrowsTandBremmerP(2007)ClosingtheGaps.CrimeandPublicPerceptionsLondon:Ipsos-MoriFitzGeraldM,HoughM,JospehIandQureshiT(2002)PolicingforLondonDevon:WillanPublishing

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A New Beat: Options for more accountable policing

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