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CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting

Précis

The Soviet Union established itself as a threat to the West by its military occupation of Poland and other eastern European countries at the end of World War II and through the unsuccessful attempts by its armed proxies to capture Greece and South Korea. Its unceasing attempts to subvert governments throughout Western Europe and America, and later through the “wars of national liberation” cast a shadow over everyday life in the West. The massive Soviet nuclear weapon equipped armed forces stationed in central Europe stood behind its political offensives such as the Berlin Crises.

The West countered with the formation of NATO and the acceptance and rebuilding of West Germany. During the same period that the West welcomed West Germany into NATO the Soviets established through the Warsaw Treaty of May 1955 a formal military bloc of Communist nations. This study continues CIA’s effort to provide the public with a more detailed record of the intelligence derived from clandestine human sources that was provided to US policymakers and used to assess the political and military balances and confrontations in Central Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. Finished intelligence,1 based on human and technical sources, was the basis for personal briefings of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and other cabinet members, and for broader distribution through NIEs. It is the opinion of the authors that the information considerably aided US efforts to preserve the peace at a bearable cost. This study showcases the importance of clandestine source reporting to CIA’s analysis of the Warsaw Pact forces. This effort complements the CIA’s release of the “Caesar” series of studies2and other significant CIA documents in 2007; and

1 Finished Intelligence is the CIA term for the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available all source information. 2 The Caesar Studies are analytic monographs and reference aids produced by the DI through the 1950s to the mid-1970s. They provided in-depth research on Soviet internal politics primarily intended to give insight on select political and economic issues and CIA analytic thinking of the period.

releases by other IC agencies. It also complements ongoing projects, including those of the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution and NATO that reexamine the Cold War in light of newly available documentation released by several former members of the Warsaw Pact. The clandestine reports by the predecessor organizations of CIA’s current National Clandestine Service (NCS) are representative of those that at the time made especially valuable contributions to understanding the history, plans, and intentions of the Warsaw Pact. Many of these documents are being released for the first time. The clandestine source documents do not represent a complete record of contemporary intelligence collection. There was much information made available from émigrés and defectors as well as from imagery and SIGINT that was essential in the estimative process but is not the focus of this study. The study includes NIEs that CIA has previously released. It also includes finished intelligence documents produced by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), some previously released, and the clandestinely obtained information upon which those reports were largely based. The DI reports were selected in part because they were the detailed basis of CIA contributions to NIEs that focused on the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact. The DI finished intelligence reports also provided the background for future current intelligence. Appended to the study is a collection of declassified intelligence documents relating to the Warsaw Pact's military forces, operational planning, and capabilities. Although many of the documents were released in past years, new reviews have provided for the restoration of text previously redacted. All of the documents selected for this study are available on the attached DVD, on CIA’s website at http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections.asp or at [email protected] or the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) located at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.

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CIA Analysis of the w:U.s~w Pact: -------( The Importance of Clandestine Reporting /

AGENDA

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\_ '- \ I . \_tl 3:30pm- 3:35pm WELCOME AND OPENING REMARKS

3:35pm- 4:40pm INTELLIGENCE PANELS "ll>o-~....-;:

John Bird Co-author with Joan Bird

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Introduction to the Warsaw Pact Study

Alain C. Enthoven __... Intelligence and Planning, Programming and Budgeting in the Department of Defense

· Fonner Assistant Secretary of Defense for *-Systeins Analysis ) _..,..-

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h1telligence and Development of Militruy Doctrine, Strategy and Planning

Intelligence and Development of USAF Doctrine, Strategy and Planning

Break

4:50pm- 5:30_pm

Paul F. Gorman, General USA (Ret.) Fonner CINC Southern Comniand F01mer National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces

I Bany Watts F01merly of USAF 's CHECKMATE ana Director of Program Analysis in the Office of the Secretruy of Defense·

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SPEAKERS AND EDITORS

John J. Bird

John Bird, one of the authors of this study, had a 32 year career as an analyst of Soviet military issues at CIA. He has a Master of Arts in economics from the University of Washington and is a graduate of the National War College. In addition to his many assignments within the CIA, he served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose forces, Director of the Strategic Warning Staff and National Intelligence Officer for Warn­ing. He was chief of the Intelligence Community's monitoring authority for all US arms control treaties and agreements. He also served as the Intelligence Community's Senior Intelligence Representative to the Conference on Disarmament during the negotiations that resulted in the Chemical Weapons Treaty. Since his retirement from CIA in 1994 he has worked with the Naval War College designing and assessing war games, and for the Army Training and Doctrine Command designing and assessing their Army After Next series of war games. In addition he has undertaken projects for the Intelligence Community during the last several years.

Alain C Enthoven

Professor Enthoven' s distinguished career included being one of the principal developers of the modem planning, programming and budgeting system for the Department of Defense (DOD). He became the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, a position that formalized his continuing contribution to defense programming. In addition to rationalizing the DOD process the new system required a much more detailed fact based intelligence product. His writings on defense issues include: How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 (with K. Wayne Smith); Introduction to A Modem Design for Defense Decision, A McNa­mara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology, edited by S.A. Tucker, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; "Reason, Morality, and Defense Policy." America, 108: 14 and 15, April1963; "What Forces for NATO? and from Whom?" (with K Wayne Smith). Foreign Affairs, 48:1, October 1969; "The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in the Department of Defense: An Overview from Experience" (with K. Wayne Smith). In Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, Robert Haveman and Julius Margolis eds., Chicago, Markham, 1970; "U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?" Foreign Affairs, 53:3 April1975;

Following his engagement with national security issues, he became deeply involved in the health care industry and its problems. He has written extensively on health care issues including: "Consumer Choice Health Plan: A National Health Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector," (in two parts) New England Journal of Medicine 298 (12 and 13) March 23 and 30, 1978; "Cutting Cost Without Cutting the Quality of Care." Shattuck lecture before the Annual Meeting of the Massachusetts Medical Society, Boston, May 24, 1978; published in The New England Journal ofMedicine, June 1, 1978; "Consumer-Centered vs. Job-Centered Health Insurance." In Harvard Business Review, 57:1, January-February 1979; Health Plan: The Only Practical Solution to the Soaring Cost of Medical Care, Addison-Wesley, May 1980: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy (in two parts)" (with Richard Kronick). New England Journal of Medicine 320 (1 and 2); 29-37 and 94-101 (January 5 and 12) 1989;

Professor Enthoven holds a B.A. in economics from Stanford University (1952), aM. Phil. in economics from Oxford University (1954) and a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1956). He is currently the Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Management (Emeritus) at Stanford University.

Paul F.·Gorman, General USA (Ret.)

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General Gonnan has been the CINC of US Southern Command, Director ofPlans-and,Policy for the Chainnan JCS, National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, Commander 8th Infantry Division, the first Deputy Chief of Staff for Training in the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command. It is said thathe\is the Godfather of many of the training developments that marked the training revolution

1ofthe Azmy of the 1970s

and 1980s, including the adoption of the After Action Review, ana the creation of the revolutionary National Training Center. He was the author of numerous studies and articles aimed at improving Army training practices,

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as well as, studies and contributions leading to advancing new army doctrine. In addition, related to his serv,ice I

as the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, he authored or managed the creation of-1~veraJ._ important intelligence documents, for one of which he received the Sherman Kent Award for outstanding contributions to intelligence.

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General Gonnan led soldiers in combat in two wars, as a platoon leader in Korea and as a battalion and brigade commander in Vietnam. He served as a member of the Unite States delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris. His decorations include the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Flying Cross, The Legjon of Merit, the Purple Heart, the Silver Star and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Mega!. ·v __... General Gonnan is a graduate of the US Miiitary Academy at West Point. He has master's degree in Public Yl~KoJ~ Administration from Harvard University, and is a graduate of the National War College. _ --=.----~

Major General John R. Landry, USA (Retired) National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues

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General John Landry was named National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues December 1993 after a distinguished 32-year career in the US Army. . . General Landry served as a cavalry troop commander with the 11th Annored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam , where he led his unit in a number of actions winning the Silver Star and Bronze Star. Foil owing successful battalion and brigade-level commands, he was promoted to brigadier general in'the)ate 1980s, and deployed to Operation DESERT STORM in 1990 with VII Corps, where he held the position of Corps Chief of Staff, assisting the corps commander in leading the largest allied armored formation in combat since ;world War II. After his service in Iraq , General Landry was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary ,of the Army for Reserve Affairs, a position he held until late 1993.

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Barry D. Watts

Barry Watts was the head ofthe Office ofProgram Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 2001-2002. From 1986, when he retired from the U.S. Air Force, until 2001 He worked in Northrop's (later Northrop Grumman's) Analysis Center, which he directed from 1997 to 2001. During his Air Force career (1965-1986), Mr. Watts flew a combat tour in F-4s with the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon in Thailand (1967-1968), served in F-4 units based in Japan and Okinawa (1968-1972), taught logic and philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy (1974-1978), had two tours in the Office ofNet Assessment (1978-1981, 1985-1986), and was a critical member (later head) of the Red Team in the Air Staffs Project Checkmate (1981-1985).

Mr. Watts has written on a wide variety of military topics, including Effects and Effectiveness, Vol. IT, Part 2 of the Gulf War Airpower Survey (1993, with Thomas Keaney) and Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (National Defense University, revised ed. 2004). His CSBA monographs include: The Defense Industrial Base (2011, with Todd Harrison); The Revolution in Military Affairs (2011); Regaining Strategic Competence (2008, with Andrew Krepinevich); The Case for Long-Range Strike (2008); The Past and Future of the Defense Industrial Base (2008); U.S. Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence: Problems and Opportunities (2008); Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks (2007); U.S. Fighter Modernization (2007, with Steve Kosiak); Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and Options (2005); and The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (2001).

Mr. Watts holds a B.S. in mathematics from the U.S. Air Force Academy (1965) and an M.A. in philosophy from the University ofPittsburgh (1974). From 2006 until 2011, he taught as an adjunct professor in Georgetown University ' s security studies program. He is now a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic & Budget Assessments (CSBA)

Joan B. Bird

Joan Bird, one of the co-editors of this study, had a 29 year career at CIA as a senior analyst of Soviet issues, including Soviet space activities, Soviet policies on potential space weapons, and arms control of space and defense issues. She is a graduate of West Virginia University and spent three years at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of Naval War College developing ways to incorporate intelligence, space, communications and information operations in their studies and wargames. In addition to 25 years as an analyst, she spent 3 years as the senior intelligence representative on the Defense and Space negotiating team and a year supporting the US delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament on arms control for space. Since retirement in 1997 she has worked for the Naval War College working with the players and assessors ofinformation Operations in the Naval War College War Games, and for the Army Training and Doctrine Command assessing the information operations play of their Army after Next Series of war games. She is a co-author of several historical studies for the Historical Collections Division of CIA.