A Long Term View on the Doha Round and the WTO

8/8/2019 A Long Term View on the Doha Round and the WTO

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A Long Term View on the

Doha Round and the WTO

Patrick A. Messerlin


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2007 The German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.

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A Long erm View on theDoha Round and the WO

Pck A. M1

Ic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1 A L Ppcv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 A W Rc B? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3 D N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4 Fx-p WO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Rc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1 P Ecc, Scc P, Dc Gp Ec M Scc P (GEM).


4/20


5/20

A Long erm View on the

Doha Round and the WO

bc c Gv b

p cc D R. Mv,

pby y cc p

q qy y . I

c, pp

p bck c b

pp c pp

ppcv.

Sc 1 c p: pcp

c. Sc 2 c

v p (PA) pc, b cc pc

. Sc 3 c ky

W Oz (WO)

pc, .., bc b bz

( c) pcy

xcp c. Sc 4 x

WO pc,

c x-p.

Introduction


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he German Marshall Fund o the United States

My D R v y k , WO

bp ,

p-D p La Belle Epoque.

1.1La Belle Epoque?

b 1 k cc c

. M bv p . B,

c ,

k cc pcv

b pc. A b

v c v by c , c

v (y vy c) c

pcvy.

.

F, pcvy py

b v y, xc Gv

I Ky R. xpc

ky cy. z G

A GA/WO

bp c ( vp

c bp)

pbper se.2 cc ,

Ky R, b GAbp,

jy vp b. Wy, ,

D R vc z

WO bp, y 25

b, y c,

C y pcp

Uy R? pb cy v

c , , q

bp z. Sc 4 pp

c c c p

WO S Uk.

Sc, pcvy Gv I y

xp: , pv q,

xc- c

2 Iy, c cc[G 2007].

c vy . Exp pcvy Ky R

c. Ky R

pv pc by b

bz xc --

q b

p [B 1986]. Hv, xp

q : bz

cp ( ) pcy

xcp. I c, Ky R b

xcp ccc

xcp . M xcp k

vp c, c v

GA , Jp

, c qcky b

y c vy xp . A

, Ky y b

xcp xy D

R y v.

Fy, b 1 c v

c D R. O c, b

c ypc. I pc, v

c (65pc) pvy Gv. Hv,

v , pcvy

xpc D R by

pcvy pc. I

, D R c pb

qcy b b

c , c , b

( Sc 3).

1.2 Domestic constraints

Pv R , b y v

. B, R b?

( ), b cpcy

WO b k c.

I pc, D c y

c.

A Longer Term Perspective

1


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I pp

cc v c pp

. B, b

by pbc p p, c

cy b pp p [GM F 2006]. I -

bz p v b.

Hv, vb yc vc

cp v -

p 50 y. Mv, y

cpx y. I y b c

U.S., b b v

pp C P ccy

(O) Lb Sc Dcc P

Ep (p, ,

v) k p. Fy, b pp

b k b. B , b by

y vc.

By c, c c c xp

ck p WO . Lp

q cpcy v , b

b p v ,

cpcy q b jy v py v c. b

2 jy py

c p c,

cc

c py GA/WO

pc. Gv j

b p , v y

cvc b. M p

c c ( x

y U.S. P; U.S. S

v-p ; c

cy v bc b EpC (EC) b EU

y, c.) py pb.

Table 1: A Productivity Indicator of the Rounds

Dates Length

()

Tariff

cuts2Round Productivity Number of Members

A G77

1 2 3 4 5 6

Gv-I 1947 8 26.0 39.0 19 7

Acy 1949 8 3.0 4.5 20 8

qy 1950-51 8 4.0 6.0 33 13

Gv-II 1955-56 16 3.0 2.3 35 14

D 1960-61 10 4.0 4.8 40 19

Ky 1963-67 42 37.0 10.6 74 44

ky 1974-79 74 33.0 5.4 84 51Uy 1986-94 91 38.0 5.0 125 88

D 2001-071 74 50.0 8.13 146 981 A Dcb 2007.2 Av c b .3 B S25 ( c) S10 (vp c) x.Sc: M M 2007. M 2007.


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Table 2: The Erosion of the Margins of Majority, 1950s2007

Highest peak Lowest level Average margins1

year margin1 year margin1 before 90 after 90

U.S.

P (EV) 1984 97.6 2000 50.5 78.2 58.1

P (Pp) 1972 61.8 2000 49.7 55.3 51.9

S 1965 68.0 2007 50.0 57.3 53.6

H 1965 67.8 2001 50.9 59.2 54.3

Fc

P (1-) 1969 65.7 1974 43.0 56.5 50.0

P (2-) 2002 82.2 1974 50.8 54.0 67.4P (/)2 1965 44.7 2002 19.9 36.8 20.4

Gy

B () 1957 61.2 2002 50.0 54.7 52.8

V (/)2 1983 48.8 2005 34.5 44.9 39.8

UK

P () 1997 71.7 1974 50.3 55.7 65.6

V (/)2 1955 49.7 2005 35.2 44.4 40.21 W v, pc v c.2 W v, pc v xp.Sc: M 2007.


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Wk v v PA, pcy y py

pc p (c

p, .. EC ky, U.S.

A).

2.1 Comparing apples and oranges

y v PA k c

c b j

WO 1960 211

2006. Sc p c xy

c , y vy p

y PA, b

b. I , c

PA b .

Hv,

v c WO c

pp. F,

y - PA c

-Ep

cpc y Ep b

S Mk. Ay by

EC ccy c by

Ep c k EC c EC Mb S

b cc, Ep F

Ac (EFA) c, ky,

Bk c. F vy PA by

EC, PA by

Ep c.

Sc, c b PA p

WO c, p, c WO

bp. D by

c b PA 2006

b 50.

L b , WO c

b b p

. A PA c 1995

b. By c, c

1960 y R y R vc.

qv x b, 15. A b

c PA b

21 y 1960 cp

b 50 y. O c, y c

c per se, b

p b WO

c, pc c

pc.

2.2 Trade diversion and preference erosion

F c, b c

c-b v jy c

c b y c. B

c y 10 pc k

p cc b 1983 2003,

cp 65 pc bz,

25 pc WO-b bz

[W Bk 2005].

Sc p pc p

p-1990 b, c y vv

c c p

(-v , MFN, ). H pc ( c

b MFN p )

bc c c by

c pc c c

c, cy

pc .

MFN (p)

b y b.

c b (cp )

c pc p

p, pc b

by pc , c c

k b cp.

Sc 1980, y c v

MFN , c k

v ( , cy,

A World Race to Bilaterals?

2


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b). Wy, , c cc b? I y py c

c c c 1980 v

. y cv pp, b,

( WO , y b c b

cp c

p). y v c

v pc. M py, vc

v y pc,

b cv

cv p-

1990 b : pc.

S , b c 1995

vv c ( pc cy

) c v b

c cvy PA b

[Fb 2003, B 2007], b by

q M

b U.S. EC WO Cc M, y

b vc b k

bz j b.

Hv, c EC pp [2006]

b 24 c (

by Cc

pck) y p p. I

c c c, b 3

p v pc

b c,

pcy EC, , x, C. Av (pp b)

p

c . k

p y pc

vy , v -cpv y

pcc - b ( c

Table 3: Selected Indicators for the Trading Partners to be Involved in Bilaterals

Under Negotiations or Under Consideration by Seven Selected WTO members

Numberof

partners

Market size Average

industrial tariffb

Regulatory rankingc

c

USD

PPP

USD

c

b

cc

b

-

ppy

pc-

vpp b

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Sp 12 90.6 81.2 5.7 9.0 40.0 68.9 43.5 42.3 41.0

C 9 81.6 77.7 6.4 10.3 43.2 77.8 49.4 45.5 45.1

K 11 49.1 57.4 7.3 13.3 43.3 85.3 57.6 39.8 40.4

Jp 18 13.4 16.4 7.5 20.0 53.5 58.3 54.8 60.6 56.6

USA 14 14.9 16.5 8.8 21.3 54.1 69.7 52.2 64.7 44.2

C 12 10.4 17.0 10.1 25.5 83.1 96.4 83.5 76.1 47.2

EC 24 23.4 44.2 10.3 17.8 71.1 125.6 91.2 61.8 64.8 GDP ( USD, 2004) GDP.b WO P.c D B 2007. C EC.

Sc: M 2007b.


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b, cc), vc ( b) v

( ppy pc v).

Sc b j pb.

pc c, pcy c

D R. Wy

p b p pc k

cy xp kp c

xp ? Sc,

c b v bc ( b

bc pc c) y qcky b c

p c

( v c). I , y

c c pc

p j ( c

pc ). b

y c pp p

b [B 1995] c c

c c.


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he German Marshall Fund o the United States10

Cy pp Ky R, D R bz

xcp bc S

Uk ( cy p, Sc 4)

q c b.

3.1 The negotiations in manufacturing (NAMA)

2005 H K M

p pv pc -

c k cc (NAMA) by p

S b

c.3 , NAMA

(Ep)b cy k

bv 15 pc. Sc

k cc . I

pk c bc

c by c xp

pc c p

c. I c vy cy

k cc c k

c xp. c

v

b cy [Wb 2006] p

, D R y p ( Sc

4). F, b q,

k xcp p

pcb pb

c D A.

15 pc q S cc

y 25 (S 25) b bz

p

c ( S cc c b

vp c). H

xcp c ( xcp

c)? p p c

bound c (300

pc) applied (50 pc). A

3 T bc S = [/(+)] , p- , c c-c ( S cfc). T S cfc y .

S 60 jb. xcp c c S 60 pc

b p (y, 5 pc). Cc

c xb v b

6.7 14.7 pc, x b

50 pc (b y y p

b b 30 pc).

3.2 The negotiations in agriculture

I p c NAMA, D

v c y cpc

b 4. c c S

negotiatingc (y q 16 c

S ). F economic

p v, y

, c pv

. F domestic p v,

cy , c EC

pp, 49.9 pc b c

27.4 pc, 50.1 pc

b c 25 pc, c c

cc b vv.

F 1 c ,

cb p C

WO Ac C [Ap 30, 2007]. A

cp b c b

(EC) (U.S.) b

k cc vp c. C

y cc

c p b. F c v c

b , F 1 c cv

v S . A S 60 c EC

pp p-D bc

cy c U.S. pp p-

D c. A S 40 c U.S.

pp, b pc c EC p

c . Fy, v

S 404 c vy c

4 T v by = /( + )1/ pc cfc ( b ) c c , c b pc pp cc c. T v F 1 S40 pc cfc 1.4.

The Doha Negotiations

3


13/20


Doha Round and the WO11

b by EC pp

vy c b by U.S.

pp .

S ppc pb.

py . D v

c b .

B c ppx S cv by

ppp .

c pb c . I bc c by S

cv ( c

, c ) pcy

b? Myb , z

c .

c y

foodpc ( q

) farm

pc (y q). p

k, v p

c c cc ,

c ()

pc by ( ) .

I, EC c

( cc WO b k

cc) cc pc.

EC pp p-D average

10.7 pc pc, cp

16.9 pc pc , p-

D maximum 43.7 105.7 pc,

pcvy.5 A p. I cy

v c p

5 T EC pc pc D R b p pc ( c , y, c), vy p (y) q-b pc (ccb, k, c).

Table 4: Tabled Proposals on Farm Tariff Cuts, 2005

EC proposal G20 proposal U.S. proposal

c(%)

c

(%)

c(%)

1 2 3 4 5 6

c b p vp c

>90% 60 >75% 75 >60% 85-90

60-90% 50 50-75% 65 40-60% 75-85

30-60% 45 20-50% 55 20-40% 65-75

0-30% 35 0-20% 45 0-20% 55-65

c b p vp c

b >130% 40 >130% 40 >60% []

80-130% 35 80-130% 35 40-60% []

30-80% 30 30-80% 30 20-40% []

b 0-30% 25


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cp Ep pc

-c c pc.

b , xcp

b p? S , D v b

b pv c xcp

D R.

p xcp -

q (RQ). W , y

p bc RQ (ck

c, y --

q , q , q)[M 2007]. A y RQ -

farmersppcv c

y y cy

b b c .

A , ppc

NAMA ( , ppx

S S cc

xcp) pb. F

c, cc b x S

60 S 70 Ep

b c EC pp.

M, c p y 220

, c py ppxy

850 c pcy

b, cz

v y Ep

pc. I c cx, bc

c EC pp c

,

cv v, even EC ppcv.

I cc, p

ky c

p D R

cpcy c, cpby

v b k cc Ac

NAMA c.

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

110.0

0.0 44.1 88.2 132.4 176.5 220.6 264.7 308.8

EC tiered formula

Swiss60 formula

Swiss40 formula

VariantSwiss40 formula

US tiered formula

Post-Doha

tariffs

(percent)

Pre-Doha tariffs (percent)

Figure 1: Assessing the Tiered Formulas for Tariff Cuts: The EC Case

US tieredformula

EC tieredformula

Swiss40

VariantSwiss40

Swiss60


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I p ccy WOprocess c .

F c, by vk S

Rp [2004], c c

institutions. c

pc p p c v

b p p, y

vy . Hv, pc bc

cpcv y, c b c

b WO pcp. I ,

y pb c c ccy.

4.1 Shooting for shorter rounds

Hv kp

c. B j by

cvc , c p

pbc p. B

c b j c

. c pc

c, c U.S. c pc,

67 y

k pc c c

U.S. P.

p b ppcv. L

cc c

b p 1520 y

. Sc q

bz c k 20 y

. q c b,

v c. F c,

Ep b y v

S 25 ( ), c c by

S 15, c D R y b y

p by 2025 b.

4.2 The WTO should focus on its core

business: market access

WO c k cc

vc b b by

c, , v b b.

c vb Sp 2003 Cc M

vy c c cc.

c k cc

j by c c

v k cc

cc. B, p by

c v cc v

vp c [L 2002]. Dvp

c v b

c , pcy

v. A v vc yc, p 70 pc c

c GDP y

WO b. I , py

b c k cc.

b y pc

k cc v

WO. y b cz by

WO c, c

cy c .

B, c c,

(c IMF Bk I

S v k)

c v.

4.3 Market access in goods: Peeling

the Onion

S bjcv

c . I WO cc

- k c

pc. c v, b

vc pp . F c,

Uy R y

bz cp ( b 1) b bz ppcv v

b p

p pp.

I, -? I pc,

D R ( pbby cc)

Flexi-plining the WTO

4


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vy pc. y ( cb b pp )

vp c. p

b vy v b

v c v x pp

c. A b c v

b q.

P py pc q

bz ( S

py) -

xcp ( p

pcb S cc).Hv, xcp

p p b b c.

A bz

y b pc b p p

pcb xcp. Sc ppc

v cx bc

pc b, b c

b p by p

b cb

q .

4.4 Market access in services: plurilaterals

and the coalitions of the willing

Op k vc q

p y k q

p-cpv y .

cy bc y c

yc pc c c c

vy c

. WO b

pc b c c c

b vc.

A H K M, D v p c

WO pc vc y

k p

k c p

k c-by-c b. I y

p cy b (pp), WO b- p

cp b b y-

.

M q cv vc. A

b y b y p

b , b

vy q v p

pby z

x b.

4.5 Re-interpreting the single undertaking

principle: positive discrimination

pv p S

Uk pcp vy WO b

. pcp p

Uy R, cy p

k

c. A , c p

.

y , c c p

bck. I y cp pb by WO bp

by k WO pc vb

b by b

bz. I pc yc

xp WO k

p WO b

b v pcc WO b:

L Dvp C (LDC), N

F Ip Dvp C (NFIDC),

S Vb Ec, C

Pc, Rcy Acc Mb, c.

A k , cc, y j WO y. S p WO

b jy LDC ; y WO

b p p

NFIDC, c. Sc v c

y cy.


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WO c. E, cc p S Uk

pv b p cp

c p, k p xp

via v c

WO. O S Uk pcp

v b -p y pc

c c p. I ppcv,

b ccv cb

p , b py. B

c, WO pc b c pvy

by p k v p

, y-

. -p S

Uk pcp cy c

v p c c c

p p WO pc.


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B, Rb E., 1986. cpc .

Aussenwirtschaft, 41(H II/III): 379-94.

B, C., 2007. U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing

Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism.

M, Ac Ep I,

W, DC.

B, J, 1995. U.S. Pcy:

I F A, B

J A O. K, ., The Dangerous

Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements, Ac

Ep I, W, D.C.

Ep C, 2006. Global Europe:

Competing in the World. Staff Working Document.

Ocb 4 SEC(2006)1230. p://.p.

Fb, R.E., 2003. Pc Ecy

U S F A. The

World Economy 26(7): 1019-40.

G M F, 2006. Perspectives on Trade

and Poverty Reduction. A survey of Public Opinion.

W, DC.

G, , 2007. Saving the Doha Round:

The Need for Political Leadership. Sv D

R Dv Dvp, N D.

L, S, 2002.Market Access Issues and the

WTO: An Overview, Hk, B., M, A.

E, P., E, Dvp,

WO: A Hbk. W Bk,

W, DC.

M, W, 2007. Tariff-cuts and flexibilities in the

presence of tariff rate quotas. M, Ap 6. W Bk, W, DC.

M, W, P. M, 2007. Why is it sodifficult? M, Gp Ec M

Scc P (GEM), P, Fc, W

Bk, W.

M, Pck, 2007. How Much Further

Can the WTO Go? Developed Countries Issues.

Pcy M C (CEPR K

I). F Gp Ec

M Scc P (GEM) p://.

cc-p.

M, Pck A., 2007b.Assessing the EC Trade

Policy in Goods: The Case of the Doha Negotiations.

ECIPE (Ep I I

Pc Ecy) B. Db

p://.cp.

S Rp, 2004. The Future of the WTO

Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New

Millenium, W Oz, Gv.

Wb, Mc, 2006. Business and Trade

Liberalization. A ECIPE Lc

Cc, Nvb 7, 2006. ECIPE (Ep

I I Pc Ecy) B

W Bk, 2005. Global Economic Prospects 2005:

Trade, Regionalism and Development. W

Bk, W, D.C.

W Oz, C, C

Ac, 2007. Communication, Ap 30.

W Oz, Gv.

References


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A Long Term View on the Doha Round and the WTO

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