Page 1 of 30 A Homeric Challenge: The Purpose and Meaning of the Poetry Critique in Book 10 of Plato’s Republic Abstract This article defends and develops a dialectical interpretation of the book 10 poetry critique of Plato’s Republic. Socrates’ attack on Homer is argued to be ironic and designed to test Glaucon in various ways, and generate interest in the concept of imitation and Homeric poetry in the context of the psychology of the Republic. This article also shows how Socrates subtly indicates how a successful defense of Homer might proceed. By far the most controversial discussion on the topic of poetry in all of Plato’s dialogues is Socrates’ critique of imitative poetry in book 10 of the Republic. 1 Although many scholars have interpreted this section as an unambiguous rejection of Homer’s epics, 2 this line of interpretation typically relies on the assumption that is reasonable to 1 Socrates’ attitude towards Homer and poetry throughout the dialogues is perhaps the most perplexing and hotly disputed aspects of Plato’s writings. This article focuses only on the discussion of imitative poetry in book 10 of the Republic—which includes by far Socrates’ most critical comments about Homer and poetry in any of the dialogues. Hence, if Socrates’ criticism of Homer in Republic 10 is most plausibly interpreted as ironic praise of the poet, the implications for assessing Plato’s overall attitude towards Homer would be substantial. For an excellent general discussion of Plato and poetry, see Ferrari, 1989, 92-148. 2 For example, Moss 2007, 443 concludes: “Plato’s argument against poetry in Republic 10 is far more substantial than it first appears. He is not merely making the complaint that various influential poets happen to write ethically harmful poetry. Rather he has presented an argument, based on metaphysical and psychological theory, that only ethically harmful poetry – poetry that reflects and reinforces the flaws in popular morality – can compel us and move us with its portrayal of human affairs. Persuasive, pleasing, poikilon (multicolored) poetry has what beneficial but austere haploun (simple) poetry lacks: the power over ordinary people that makes poetry a matter of such concern to Plato in the first place, and the power over even a Plato or a Socrates that make them wish it could be redeemed.” For similar “mouthpiece” interpretations of the book 10 poetry critique see Janaway, 1995; Annas, 1981 335-344; Urmson, 1997; Nehemas, 1982; Popper 1962, 228n39.
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Page 1 of 30
A Homeric Challenge: The Purpose and Meaning of the Poetry Critique in Book 10
of Plato’s Republic
Abstract
This article defends and develops a dialectical interpretation of the book 10 poetrycritique of Plato’s Republic. Socrates’ attack on Homer is argued to be ironic anddesigned to test Glaucon in various ways, and generate interest in the concept of imitationand Homeric poetry in the context of the psychology of the Republic. This article alsoshows how Socrates subtly indicates how a successful defense of Homer might proceed.
By far the most controversial discussion on the topic of poetry in all of Plato’s
dialogues is Socrates’ critique of imitative poetry in book 10 of the Republic.1 Although
many scholars have interpreted this section as an unambiguous rejection of Homer’s
epics,2 this line of interpretation typically relies on the assumption that is reasonable to
1 Socrates’ attitude towards Homer and poetry throughout the dialogues is perhaps the most perplexing and hotly disputed aspects of Plato’s writings. This article focuses only on the discussion of imitative poetry in book 10 of the Republic—which includes by far Socrates’ most critical comments about Homer and poetry in any of the dialogues. Hence, if Socrates’ criticism of Homer in Republic 10 is most plausibly interpreted as ironic praise of the poet, the implications for assessing Plato’s overall attitude towards Homer would be substantial. For an excellent general discussion of Plato and poetry, see Ferrari, 1989, 92-148.
2 For example, Moss 2007, 443 concludes: “Plato’s argument against poetry in Republic 10 is far more substantial than it first appears. He is not merely making the complaint that various influential poets happen to write ethically harmful poetry. Rather he has presented an argument, based on metaphysical and psychological theory, that only ethically harmful poetry – poetry that reflects and reinforces the flaws in popular morality – can compel us and move us with its portrayal of human affairs. Persuasive, pleasing, poikilon (multicolored) poetry has what beneficial but austere haploun (simple) poetry lacks: the power over ordinary people that makes poetry a matter of such concern to Plato in the first place, and the power over even a Plato or a Socrates that make them wish it could be redeemed.” For similar “mouthpiece” interpretations of the book 10 poetry critique see Janaway, 1995; Annas, 1981 335-344; Urmson, 1997; Nehemas, 1982; Popper 1962, 228n39.
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interpret the book 10 poetry critique as a “proto-essay”3 in which Plato uses Socrates as a
“mouthpiece” to expresses his own sincere philosophical views on Homer’s poems.
Several details of the text, however, suggest that this assumption might be dubious, such
as Socrates’ indication at the outset of the poetry critique (599b) that there is an
“antidote” that would allow for one to hear poetry without ill effect; the irony that
Socrates seems to employ in a series of ad hominem criticisms against Homer (at 599d-
601a); and Socrates’ challenge (607c-d) for any lover of imitative poetry to come forward
and demonstrate how such poems can benefit the soul (rather than provide mere
entertainment).
In this article I argue that Socrates’ criticism of Homer and imitative poetry is best
understood as part of a dialectical strategy that he adopts in order to diagnose and correct
certain deficiencies that he recognizes in his interlocutor (Glaucon).4 I will argue that
Socrates proceeds the way he does in this section in order to test Glaucon’s understanding
of imitation (μίμησις), tragic poetry (especially Homer’s epic poems), and the nature of a
good and successful life. Furthermore, I will argue that in response to Glaucon’s failure
in each of these tests, Socrates attempts to remedy Glaucon’s condition by sowing
rhetorical “seeds” designed to pique his interest in the concept of imitation and Homeric
poetry (especially in light of the psychology of the Republic), as part of a broader effort
to encourage him to reconsider his problematic beliefs about the nature of a good and
successful life.
3 Sayre, 1992, 227; See also Sayre, 1995, 4.
4 In doing so, I will be further developing a line of exegesis previously developed by Planinc 2003, and Moes, 2011 by unpacking further details of Socrates’ testing of Glaucon, and also providing a detailed analysis of Socrates’ strategy to help remedy Glaucon’s condition.
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One of the major upshots of the forthcoming analysis is that it suggests that Plato
actually does not actually present Socrates in the Republic as hostile to Homer’s epic
poems after all. Rather, I will argue that Plato’s Socrates disapproves of the prevailing
interpretations of Homer that accompanied his status as “the poet who educated Greece”
(606e), and is ever weary of the dangers a shallow interpretation of Homer’s poems can
have on the souls of those brought up in the Hellenic culture of his day.5 However, rather
than attempt to directly explain the lessons of the Iliad and the Odyssey, I will contend
that Plato aims (through Socrates) to inspire his audience to meet a Homeric challenge—
and even provides a few ominous clues that show how this challenge can be met.6
I. The Context of the Book 10 Poetry Critique
In books 8 and 9 of the Republic, Socrates discusses with his interlocutors the
decline of the city/state he has developed, describing the various kinds of flawed
constitutions that exist amongst city/states (timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and
tyranny), along with the kinds of people who correspond to each of these city/states. By
the end of book 9, Glaucon has become convinced that the unjust tyrant is 729 times
more miserable than the just philosopher (587e); this suggests that the argument Socrates
developed based on the city/soul analogy was a resounding success insofar as it showed
Glaucon precisely what he expressed a desire to see in the beginning of book 2—that
5 All translations from Plato’s writings in this article are from Cooper ed. 1997, freely amended.
6 I suspect that Plato modeled this Homeric challenge on Agamemnon’s method of rousing the Achaeans to battle by means of suggesting the opposite (Il. ii 110-140), which leads (by way of Athena’s influence) to Odysseus taking the scepter and rousing the troops for battle. Plato seemedto have hoped to have inspired a bold reader to react likewise, and provide a spirited defense of Homer’s poems.
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justice is good to possess “for its own sake” (357c). This means that Glaucon now has a
way of understanding justice that would seems to provide the requisite motivation for
him to pursue justice at all costs without taking into consideration how a “reputation for
justice” might “bring him honor and rewards” (357d).
Having successfully reached this conclusion in book 9, Socrates returns to the
subject of poetry in book 10, where he provides what Roochnik 2003, 111 calls one of the
“great riddles” of the Republic, when he asks, “Why does Socrates abruptly and without
explanation return to the theme of poetry in book 10, and then proceed to change
drastically the terms of his earlier critique?” Earlier in the Republic, Socrates stated that
the city would permit a poet “who would imitate the speech of a decent person” (398b),
an assertion which seems to conflict with what he says at the beginning of book 10, when
he states that they were right in earlier not admitting “any [poetry] that is imitative”
(595a). Moreover, the context of the earlier critique was in the context of providing a
musical education for children, where Socrates’ guidelines for censorship seem
reasonable even by today’s standards.7
In the beginning of book 10, Socrates asserts that he sees the rightness of excluding
imitative poetry to be now “even clearer,” due to having “distinguished between the
separate parts of the soul” (595a). In response to Glaucon’s request for clarification,
Socrates says that “all such poetry is likely to distort the understanding (διανοίας) of
anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of what it is really like, as antidote to
7 For example, the first tale that Socrates bans from the guardian’s education program (378e-479a) is Hesiod’s tale of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus in the Theogany. A movie which graphically depicted such a castration would likely receive an R (or possibly X) rating by the Motion Picture Association of America.
to test Glaucon’s “understanding of the nature of poetic imitation.” Planinc argues that
Socrates makes Glaucon “ponder different kinds of couches and their relation to a couch
made by a god” in order to test his “familiarity with Homer’s beds.” According to
Planinc, “Plato’s presentation of the test is based on the scene of Penelope’s testing of
Odysseus, but he refigures the episode in the Odyssey as a comedy, reserving its dramatic
intimacy for the trope of Socrates’ relation to his silent, and amused, auditor.” Planinc
concludes that Glaucon “fails the bed test” insofar as he is exposed as a “man who would
censor Homer as someone with an inadequate understanding of the nature of poetic
imitation.”9 Indeed, it seems likely that if Glaucon had made the connection between the
discussion of the metaphysics of beds and images of beds and Homer’s inspired use of a
bed10 in the Odyssey, he might not be inclined to so readily agree with Socrates
characterization of him as a mere painter of words with no knowledge (or even right
opinion) of the subjects he writes about.
A synthesis of Plancinc’s and Moes’ respective explanations for Socrates’ choice of a
bed might shed light on what Socrates is up to in this section: Perhaps by choosing
examples of items that are both highly valuable to Glaucon and central to a mature
understanding of the Odyssey, Socrates is attempting to subtly influence Glaucon to think
of Homer’s use of a bed in the climactic moment of the Odyssey, which would likely
9 Planinc 2003, 122. Planinc notes that this casts Socrates into the role of an unworthy suitor.
10 The term for bed in the Odyssey is ε νήνὐ (Od. xxiii 179). Although one might argue that Socrates’ use of a different term counts against Planinc’s Homeric exegesis of this section, it is worth pointing out that for Socrates to have used the Homeric term would have made the connection between his example of the bed and Homer’s use of the concept painfully obvious, which would in effect compromise the ironic nature of the book 10 poetry critique by giving away too much. Cf. Vlastos, 1991, 22, “When Irony riddles it risks being misunderstood.”
cause him to resist Socrates’ criticism of him as a mere imitator. If Glaucon were to have
such an insight, it seems reasonable that he might develop loftier notions about the ideal
use of beds and tables than the hedonistic use he appears to currently envision. If this is
right, then Socrates is not merely testing Glaucon in this section, but is also attempting to
administer him a potential remedy—a remedy that will only work if Glaucon (eventually)
makes the connection himself, and realizes that Homer does much more than “paint” a
mere image of a bed.
In the remainder of book 10, Socrates appears to be acting to correct at least three
dianoetic deficiencies he notices in Glaucon: (1) a shallow understanding and
disinterested attitude in both the concept of imitation and the content of Homer’s epics
(as evidenced by his ready agreement with Socrates’ metaphysical argument); (2) a
preoccupation with how he is perceived by others (as evidenced by his expressed fear of
being made to look foolish by Socrates); and (3) a shallow and hedonistic view of what
constitutes a good life (as evidenced by the value he places on luxurious items, such as
couches and tables).11
III. The Knowledge Argument: Socrates’ Ad Hominem Assault on Homer and Hesiod
After developing the painting analogy, Socrates next provides a series of five ad
hominem arguments designed to show that Homer is like a painter insofar he did not have
knowledge of “warfare, generalship, city government, and people’s education” (599c),
11 This suggests that the higher studies outlined by Socrates in book 7 (arithmetic, geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmony) might be unpacked by incorporating the study of Homer’s epics, an in depth analysis of the concept of imitation, and the relation of pleasure and pain to the good. If this is right, mastery of the studies of book 7 would seem equivalent to mastery of the material Socrates discusses at length in books 8-10.
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but rather was “third removed from the truth about virtue” (599d). Beck shows that all
five of these criticisms can be applied to either Plato or Socrates.12 In order to appreciate
the ironic nature of this line of criticism, it is only necessary to consider Socrates’ final
argument, where he compares Homer and Hesiod to the sophists Prodicus and Protagoras
(600c-e):
But, Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate people and make
them better, if he’d known about these things and not merely about how to
imitate them, wouldn’t he have had many companions and been loved and
honored by them? Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, and a great
many others are able to convince anyone who associates with them in
private that he wouldn’t be able to manage is household or city unless they
themselves supervise his education, and they are so intensely loved
because of this wisdom of theirs that their disciples do everything but
carry them around on their shoulders. So do you suppose that, if Homer
had been able to benefit people and make them more virtuous, his
companions would have allowed either him or Hesiod to wander around as
rhapsodes? Instead, wouldn’t they have clung tighter to them than to gold
and compelled them to live with them in their homes, or, if they failed to
12 Beck’s comments are printed in Moes, 2011, 13n34. All five of these ad hominem arguments seem to depend on the assumption that the poems of Homer and Hesiod don’t count as “fine deeds” left behind as “memorials of themselves” that render the authors worthy of “the subject of a eulogy [rather] than the author of one (599b).” Socrates makes it abundantly clear in books 2, 3, and 10, these authors’ poems have been extraordinary influential on the culture of his day. What needs to be determined is whether or not the details of the text indicate that Socrates and Plato really believe Homer and Hesiod to be nothing more than mere superficial imitators that reflect no valuable insight into the nature of mankind.
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persuade them to do so, wouldn’t they have followed them wherever they
went until they had received sufficient education?
Rather than even considering the content of the texts produced by these two great
poets, Socrates suggests that they are not worth studying because if these authors knew
anything about the subject matters on which they write, they would have had a lot of
followers who would persuade them to stop living as wandering rhapsodes, but to instead
open up a school to teach them virtue! Yet Socrates never opened up a school, and never
received payment for his services, so this criticism would seem to apply to him as well.
Beck argues that this criticism is actually a veiled compliment for Homer and Hesiod,
since “the sophists were popular precisely because they were skilled at studying,
magnifying, and manipulation public opinion,” while those “who do imitate ‘the divine
form and image’ are neglected and misunderstood.” Glaucon’s response, however,
appears to be whole-hearted agreement, which suggests that he considers fame and
popularity (and the willingness of people to pay someone money) to be accurate
measures of whether or not one has knowledge of human excellence.13 Glaucon,
therefore, appears to have failed yet another of Socrates’ tests: he judged Homer and
Hesiod to be less likely than sophists such as Prodicus and Protagoras to possess
13 Moes 2011, 3n7 makes a similar point about Ion: “The real center of attraction for Ion is not a god but the audience who can bring him money and fame.” I’m not convinced that Glaucon believes in these principles as whole-heartedly as does Ion. Rather, I believe that Socrates’ rhetorical strategy in this section involves eliciting Glaucon’s agreement with various problematicarguments, and then providing him with both motivation and requisite hints that might lead him to reconsider these arguments in later reflections. Socrates gets little resistance from Glaucon to any of these arguments largely due to his being tired near the end of a very long discussion, as well as his having been shown by Socrates precisely what he wanted to see—that a just man really is truly better off than an unjust man. Nevertheless, Glaucon’s ready agreement with the notion that fame and money are reliable standards of success is problematic in that it suggests that, at the very least, he does not find them to be especially troubling standards.
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knowledge of great importance on account of their reputation of being mere wandering
rhapsodes, rather than highly paid so-called teachers of virtue.
Socrates’ use of knowledge of a basis for literary criticism raises a key issue: what
kind of painting of a bed would a master bed-maker paint? A key distinction between the
carpenter and the painter is that the painter looks to a mere appearance of a bed in making
his painting of the bed, whereas the carpenter looks to the form of the bed. As Moss 2007,
419 notes, “the appearance of a bed – what the painter paints – is nearly as far ‘removed
from truth’ as the painting of a bed: both are mere images of the particular bed (and
therefore copies of copies of the Form).” Moss, however, does not consider the
possibility that Homer might be akin to a master carpenter who also paints a bed, or what
such a painting would look like if made by one with knowledge of the form of the bed.
Presumably the latter painting would depict the bed being used in a way that best
facilitates in viewers insight into the form of the bed (perhaps by creatively representing
its ideal use and function), rather than merely imitating the appearance of a bed. Thus, if
Homer’s poems do not seem to represent mere appearances of the activities of gods and
men, but rather depict them in a way that best facilitates in its readers or hearers insight
into the ideal activity of gods and men, then there is nothing in the painter/maker/form
illustration that suggests that Homer could not have had knowledge of the subject matters
that benefit humankind most. Socrates suggests such a possibility himself when he
indicates that if Homer was “even second” removed from the truth (and therefore
analogous to the carpenter) he would be “capable of knowing what ways of life make
people better in private or in public” (599d).
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Socrates next distinguishes between a user, maker, and painter, arguing that the
makers of the artifacts used by horsemen and flute-players (such as reigns and bits and
flutes) must have a right opinion about these things, having been informed by the users of
these items (601c-e). The painter, on the other hand, Socrates says “has neither
knowledge nor right opinion about whether the things he makes are fine or bad” (602a).
Again, there’s nothing preventing a maker or user from composing a painting that is not a
mere appearance of a flute-players’ flute or a horseman’s reigns and bit. Thus, Socrates’
conclusion that an “imitator has no worthwhile knowledge of anything he imitates”
(602b) applies only to painters or poets who merely imitate the appearances they see in
an unreflective manner, without having either right opinion or knowledge of the things
that they depict. Thus, unless one is convinced by Socrates’ series of seemingly ironic ad
hominem arguments, there is no reason at this point to conclude that Socrates (or Plato)
believes that these criticisms apply to Homer.
IV. Diagnosis and Remedy: The Psychological Critique 1
Socrates next continues with his testing of Glaucon (presumably in order to
formulate an accurate diagnosis of his condition as possible), but also attempts to remedy
for Glaucon’s condition by introducing a series of re-orientating insights14 that illuminate
the relationship between poetry and the psychology of the Republic. Socrates develops
14 Miller, 1986, 6-7, identifies three dialectical stages that repeat themselves in the dialogues: First, Socrates elicits the view of his interlocutor, followed by a refutation of that view, and then a“re-orientating insight” designed to “show the path through the aporia.” In book 10 of the Republic, however, Socrates is operating much more covertly than in Miller’s first two stages. After proceeding to elicit agreement from a disinterested (and likely mentally exhausted) Glauconto an absurd series of proposals regarding Homer and tragic poetry, Socrates doesn’t bother refuting these proposals, but instead provides a several hints that suggest they are problematic, followed by a series of re-orientating insights into the nature of poetry and psychology that provide Glaucon with the conceptual resources to eventually refute this shallow view of Homer himself.
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the analogy between painting and poetry into a psychological critique of imitative poetry,
arguing that imitations, such as images seen in water (602c) and images that painters
paint (602d), are capable of deceiving us by consorting “with a part of us that is far from
reason” (603b). Socrates then extends this critique from including “things we see” to the
imitations “we hear—the ones we call poetry” (603b). He then explains just what it is that
imitative poetry imitates (603c):
We say that imitative poetry imitates human beings acting voluntarily or
under compulsion, who believe that, as a result of these actions, they are
doing either well or badly and who experience either pleasure or pain in
all this. Does it imitate anything apart from this?
Having identified (at least partially) what it is that imitative poetry imitates, Socrates
gets to the heart of a psychological danger he seems to sincerely be concerned about in
respect to poetry, reminding Glaucon of how they had earlier discussed how if a “decent
man” happened to “lose his son or other prized-possession,”15 he would “bear it more
easily than the other sorts of people” (603e). Socrates notes how such a man would no
doubt grieve, but would do so less in public than in private (604a), and how in resisting to
“venture to say and do lots of things that he’d be ashamed to be heard saying or seen
doing,” it would be “reason and law that tells him to resist his pain, while experience of it
tells him to give in” (604a-b). Thus, Socrates concludes that the presence of “two
opposite inclinations in a person in relation to the same thing at the same time” suggests
15 The reference to the loss of a son would likely bring to mind Priam’s excessive mourning of Hector in the Iliad; the loss of a prized possession likely refers to Achilles’ reaction to Agamemnon’s taking of Briseis, and also foreshadows Socrates’ later use (in the myth of Er) of Homer’s portrayal of Ajax’s mental anguish in Hades (Od. xi 542-568) on account of losing the Arms of Achilles to Odysseus.
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that “he must also have two parts,” and only one of these parts is “ready to obey the law
wherever it leads” (604b). Socrates lists four points that the law has to offer on this matter
(604c):
1. It isn’t clear whether or not such things will ultimately turn out to be good or bad
in the end.2. It doesn’t make the future any better by taking such things too hard.3. Human affairs don’t matter all that much.4. Grief prevents deliberation, the very thing that we need to “accept what happened
[…] and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best.”16
Socrates stresses that one “mustn’t hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and
wailing like children when they trip,” but instead “we should always accustom our souls
to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right,
replacing lamentation with cure” (604c-d). He then explains how a “rational and quiet”
person who is effective at healing themselves in this way is not easy to imitate, in
comparison with “this excitable character” who admits of “many multicolored imitations”
16 Telemachus offers perhaps even better advice in this respect to his mother in the Odyssey. In response to her asking the minstrel Phemios to stop singing about the disastrous “Homecoming ofthe Achaean’s” (Od. i 378), calling it a “bitter tale that wears my heart away” (Od i 392), Telemachus tells Penelope: “Mother, why do you grudge our own dear minstrel joy of song, wherever his thought may lead? Poets are not to blame, but Zeus who gives what fate he pleases to adventurous men. Here is no reason for reproof: to sing the news of the Danaans! Men like besta song that rings like morning on the ear. But your must nerve yourself and try to listen. Odysseuswas not the only one at Troy never to know the day of his homecoming. Others, how many others, lost their lives!” Penelope reacts to her son’s advice by withdrawing in wonder with “her son’s clear wisdom echoing in her mind,” only to weep for Odysseus until Athena casts “sweet sleep on her eyes (Od. i 408-414). I would find it surprising if Plato had not given Telemachus’ defense of Phemios’ song to his mother consideration in writing this section of the Republic, especially considering that he has Socrates cite this passage earlier in the Republic, where he argues against a potential misinterpretation of this passage as indicating support for a “new way of singing” (424b) that defies the laws established for music in books 2 and 3. This suggests that Socrates regards the passage, properly interpreted, to support the ‘old’ and presumably right way of singing that is rooted in the law.
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(604d-e). He then claims that the imitative poet must be related to the excitable and
multicolored character “if he’s to attain a good reputation with the majority of the people”
(605a). Socrates then concludes (1) that a popular poet must be like a (mere) painter,
since such poetry must appeal to the part of the soul that is “inferior rather than to the
best part” (605a); and (2) that the “imitative poet puts a bad constitution in the soul of
each individual by making images that are far removed from the truth and by gratifying
the irrational part” (605b-c).
Socrates does not suggest the possibility that a poem might “attain a good reputation
with the majority of the people” while also providing beneficial moral, political, or
spiritual content. Is it really reasonable to believe that an author such as Plato wasn’t
aware of this possibility? Or that he didn’t believe that a clever, inspired, and creative
painter might paint something that conveys much more than a mere appearance? If not,
these details seem best understood in terms of Socrates continuing to test Glaucon,
providing him an opportunity to resist the ridiculous claim that the content of Homer’s
epics can be explained by the poet merely telling the masses what they want to hear.
V. Administering the Antidote: The Psychological Critique 2 ‘
Having diagnosed Glaucon as having a shallow understanding of imitation, poetry,
and a successful life, Socrates continues to attempt to remedy his condition with his
account of “the most serious charge” against imitative poetry. Socrates claims that, save
for a few, imitative poetry is “able to corrupt even decent people” (605c) by bringing
satisfaction to the part of the soul “that hungers and for the satisfaction of weeping and
wailing (606a),” while also causing the part “that is best by nature” to relax its guard over
the “lamenting part,” since “it hasn’t been adequately educated by reason or habit (606a).
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The significance of this qualifying remark should not be overlooked—the reason that
imitative poetry is problematic, according to Socrates, lies in the poor education of all but
a few of its hearers/readers. Socrates makes this clear, when he concludes (606b):
I suppose that only a few are able to figure out that the enjoyment of other
people’s sufferings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the
pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others,
won’t be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer.
Socrates here suggests that in pitying someone such as Achilles or Oedipus when
their fortunes take a turn for the worse, we run the risk of sowing the seeds to overly
indulge in self-pity when similar personal tragedies happen to us. At the same time,
however, he again mentions an elite group of people who are well aware of the profound
effect that imitative poetry can have on the soul, and thus are presumably capable of
hearing or reading it without corrupting themselves. Furthermore, Socrates tells Glaucon
precisely what it is that these people “are able to figure out”—the pity that poetry inspires
its listeners/readers to feel for characters who excessively mourn can lead one to emulate
such behavior later on. Socrates, therefore, suggests that as long as Glaucon is able to
remember this ‘inside information’ when he hears any poem, he will experience no harm.
However, even if possession of this ‘inside information’ permits one to safely
indulge in all kinds of poetry, there remains the further question of whether or not certain
poems are beneficial for educational purposes. An affirmative answer to this question can
be grounded in the ability of good poets to cultivate in their readers or hearers the ability
to experience love and friendship with one another. Socrates indirectly states that
successful poets (such as Homer) have just this ability, although he only mentions a
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potentially negative consequence of this phenomenon. That is, the argument behind
Socrates’ “most serious charge” relies on the premise that poetry has the ability to cause
people to feel pity for others; this implies that it is a potentially valuable resource for
cultivating in people the ability to feel pity, empathy and compassion towards those who
suffer. Imitative poetry, on Socrates’ argument, is only problematic insofar as one comes
to experience the psychologically unhealthy pleasure that accompanies excessive
lamentation and other problematic behavior.17
Socrates also applies the same argument to laughter, suggesting that there are jokes
that we “would be ashamed to tell” but that we “very much enjoy hearing and don’t
detest as something evil in comic plays or in private” (606c). Thus, Socrates concludes
that by indulging in comic poetry, one “will be led into becoming a figure of fun” where
one’s “own affairs are concerned” (607c). However, Socrates critique of comedy seems to
refer to plays in which humor is provided through characters who display outlandish
buffoonery (such as in Aristophanes’ plays); it is not clear that this critique would extend
to the highbrow ironic humor we see in the dialogues.18
Socrates adds that “sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains” are all things
that poetry “nurtures and waters” and “establishes as rulers in us when they ought to
17 Socrates further develops the re-orientating insights of the psychological critique in the remainder of book 10, in which he argues that the soul is immortal, and suggests that we are living our current lives because of choices made before we were born. To the degree that a poem reflects insights that coheres well with these themes, it would seem that the poem is useful; Socrates’ view in the Republic seems to be that Homer’s psychological insights were highly valuable, but that his cosmology and metaphysics needed to be enhanced with certain Orphic principles, including the immortality and transmigration of the soul, both of which are explored inthe remainder of book 10.
18 Such as Socrates’ counter-offer to the sentence of death in the Apology (36e), when he argues that he should instead receive “free meals in the Prytaneum.”
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wither and be ruled” (607d). He then expresses agreement with the consensus view that
Homer is “the most poetic of the tragedians, and the first amongst them,” but then asserts
that “hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people are the only poetry we can admit
into our city” (606e-607a). This latter comment sets the stage for a defense of Homer’s
poems in terms of one (or both) of these two criteria, or perhaps in terms of a third
criterion.19 Socrates confirms that he would indeed be very pleased to see some such
defense, when he suggests that “such poetry should return from exile when it has
successfully defended itself” (607d). He suggests that poets might make such a defense in
“lyric”, but also extends the challenge to non-poet lovers of poetry “to speak in prose on
its behalf and to show that it not only gives pleasure but is beneficial both to constitutions
and to human life.” Thus, Socrates ends the book 10 poetry critique with an explicit offer
for someone to take up a Homeric challenge, and appears to have already provided
several hints (largely in the form of easily refutable arguments) as to how such a
challenge can be met.
VI. Training the Lion: Socrates’ Portrayal of Ajax in the Myth of Er
Shortly after banning Homer from the ‘beautiful city’, Socrates makes use of several
Homeric characters in the myth of Er, which seems to call into question the suggestion
that Socrates finds no potentially valuable philosophical material in Homer’s epics. At
one point, Socrates presents what seems to be the final take-home lesson of the Republic
19 A successful defense of Homer would then require either showing how the Iliad and the Odyssey are either hymns to the gods and/or eulogies to good people, or arguing that these tales are worth studying in spite of being neither. My analysis focuses on the latter approach, although it is worth noting that Socrates also seems to have suggested that these works could be understood as hymns to the gods when he earlier acknowledged that Homer’s stories about the gods might have an allegorical meaning (378d). Furthermore, Socrates adaptation of Penelope’s bed test seems to be a tacit acknowledgement the Odyssey does indeed provide a eulogy of at least one good person—Penelope (and perhaps Odysseus too).
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(618b-619b), in which he stresses the importance of learning as much as possible about
the soul and human nature. He then presents a number of characters from Homer’s epics
making somewhat comical choices in choosing their next lives, including three of the
heroes from the Iliad, Ajax, Agamemnon, and Odysseus, and also Thersites (the agitator).
Socrates provides two ominous clues in his account of the soul of Ajax choosing his
next life (619a-b) that suggest he approves of Homer’s portrayal of Ajax. The first clue is
Ajax choosing the life of a lion, which Socrates describes as driven by his unwillingness
to become a man once again, due to the deep psychological trauma he experienced in the
aftermath of losing the Armor of Achilles to Odysseus (619a-b).20 This choice connects
Ajax with Socrates’ earlier representation of the spirited part of the soul (θυμός) as a lion
in book 9 (588d). The second clue is Socrates’ naming of Ajax as the 20 th to choose—the
only distinct number he assigns to any of the returning souls.21 By linking Ajax with the
number 20, Socrates suggests a connection between the level of development he reached
in his earthly life, and the level of development the 20 year-olds have reached in the
education program that Socrates develops in the Republic. The cumulative force of these
two hints suggests that Socrates “riffs” on Homer’s Ajax, further developing Homer’s
portrayal of him by connecting him with a man ruled by θυμός—a purely timocratic man
20 See Od. xi 640-70.
21 Socrates does describe an unnamed soul choosing first—and making the poorest choice of all (619b-c). He also identifies the soul of Agamemnon as choosing directly after Ajax, allowing himto be identified as the 21st to choose (which perhaps signifies Agamemnon is highly similar to Ajax, but slightly more philosophically developed). Socrates also describes Odysseus as choosinglast (although we are not told what number this is), Thersites choosing near the end, and Atlanta (and by implication Epeius) choosing somewhere near the middle. It seems highly unlikely that Socrates’ assignment of a specific number to only Ajax was an arbitrary decision, and even more unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that Ajax’s number is identical to the age that qualified students begin advanced philosophical training in Socrates’ education program.
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—and connecting him with a distinction stage of maturity in the philosopher king’s
education program.
Socrates’ emphasis on Ajax in this context can be well explained as part of a strategy
to draw Glaucon’s attention to the extreme madness he could eventually suffer if he
continues to overvalue fame.22 Glaucon was earlier described by Adeimantus as the kind
of man who is akin to Socrates’ description of the constitution of the timocratic city
insofar as his “love of victory” is concerned (548d). Socrates grants that Glaucon matches
this aspect of the description, but then asserts that the timocrat is “more obstinate, and
less well trained in music and poetry” (549e) than Glaucon. The mention of “a few rare
exceptions” to the rule that imitative poetry is able to corrupt even decent people would
seemingly motivate one who is both highly competitive and reasonably well trained in
music and poetry to become such a rare person, especially if they consider Homer’s epic
poems to be especially pleasurable. By mentioning the existence of people who are not
corrupted by such poetry at the beginning (595b) and end (605c) of the critique, Socrates
seems to be trying to funnel Glaucon’s competitive nature towards the desire to be one of
the few who possess the antidote that prevents poetry from corrupting one’s διάνοια.
Furthermore, just before offering the opportunity for poets and/or poetry lovers to
offer a defense of Homer’s poems, Socrates encourages Glaucon to reflect on the “charm
of the pleasure-giving Muse, especially when you [Glaucon] study her through the eyes
of Homer” (607c). Thus, Socrates not only warns Glaucon about the dangers of Homer’s
22 Perhaps the first sign that Glaucon overvalues fame is his desire to see that justice is beneficial“for its own sake,” rather than how a “reputation for justice” might bring him “honor and rewards” (357c-d). This suggests that Glaucon has (at the very least) considered covertly practicing injustice himself. Socrates succeeds in showing Glaucon what injustice looks like inside the soul of the unjust—extremely miserable.
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poems, but also attempts to impassion him to want to study Homer by appealing to his
competitive nature and emphasizing how highly pleasurable it can be to enjoy Homer’s
poems. Socrates presumably proceeds this way in the hope that these rhetorical seeds will
eventually compel Glaucon to study the Iliad and the Odyssey on a more profound level
than his peers.23
Further evidence that this is what Socrates is up to can be found by considering that,
although he banishes Homer from the ‘beautiful city,’ Socrates does not advise Glaucon
to abstain from Homer’s poems, but rather to “repeat the argument we have just now put
forward like an incantation so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that
childish passion for poetry which the majority of people have” (608a). Thus, Socrates’
goal seems to be to have Glaucon remember this argument when he reads or listens to the
Iliad and Odyssey, or any other poetic work. Yet this argument also includes the mention
of a few rare people who possess a key piece of ‘inside information’ that allows them to
enjoy Homer without being corrupted by it; an oblique reference to the bed of Odysseus
(the knowledge of which Penelope uses as a test to protect herself from an impersonator
of her true husband); a series of suspicious ad hominem attacks on Homer (and Hesiod)
that seem to reflect a problematic approach to success on Glaucon’s part; and an
impassioned offer to lovers of Homer to come forward and defend the study of his poems
as “beneficial both to constitutions and to human life” (607d).
23 Of course, Socrates ultimate goal is not for Glaucon to merely become an astute reader of Homer, but for him to incorporate the valuable lessons he learns in Homer into his own understanding of what constitutes a truly good and successful life. Socrates’ indirect approach with Glaucon, as well his description of him as well trained in music and poetry, suggests that he believes Glaucon has the ability to become one of the rare people who understand Homer on a profound level, should he become passionately interested in doing so.
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Thus, by encouraging Glaucon to “chant” this argument while listening to the Iliad
or the Odyssey, Socrates appears to be steering him towards having the desire to become
one of the few who can hear these poems without corrupting his soul, which then might
encourage him to reconsider these arguments, and eventually come forward and provide
Homer with a proper defense.24 In doing so, Glaucon would presumably eventually learn
to read Homer for the benefit of his soul. If this analysis is correct, Socrates provides the
groundwork for such a defense by hinting in the myth of Er that Homer’s characters have
been “painted” by someone with keen insight into the nature of the soul, and who is well
aware of the distinction between real and apparent human excellence.
VII. A Socratic Defense of Homer’s Epics
The above exegesis implies that Socrates is rather impressed by Homer’s portrayal of
Ajax, insofar as he tacitly acknowledges that he exemplifies a type of madness that is
characteristic of a paradigmatic timocratic man.25 In doing so, Socrates implicitly
suggests that the contents of the Iliad and the Odyssey reflect some (significant) degree of
insight into human nature.26 If this is right, then Socrates’ treatment of Ajax suggests he
24 Socrates’ ominous omission of the spirited part of the soul (θυμός) in the psychological critique could be due to a strategy to attempt to subtly influence Glaucon on the level of θυμός without confusing the issue by directly contrasting it with the appetitive part ( πιθυμία); it is also ἐlikely yet another (failed) test to see if Glaucon remembers the tripartite account of books 3 and 4.
25 The synoptic studies, which begin at the age of 20 (537b-c), would then seem to be (amongst other things) a remedy for an unhealthy obsession with fame.
26 Given these clues regarding Ajax, there is reason to think that Socrates’ treatment of other Homeric characters in the myth of Er reflects a similar appreciation for Homer’s insight into human nature. Odysseus seems to make the best choice in picking his next life, choosing a “the life of a private individual who did his own work” (620c), having thrown off all ambition due to his toils on earth. Interestingly, although Odysseus’ choice reflects Socrates’ description of the small number of true philosophers who “lead a quiet life and do their own work” (496d), it’s not
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sees Homer as a valuable resource for the “calculation, measurement, or weighing”
(602d) of different kinds of souls, and how they function in various circumstances; this
suggests that Socrates slyly indicates in book 10 that Homer’s epics are indeed a
potentially valuable resource for strengthening the rational part of the soul, and therefore
beneficial to mature readers who seek a better understanding of human nature. This
follows because by suggesting that Homer has provided a paradigmatic timocratic man in
his characterization of Ajax, Socrates seems to be suggesting that in portraying Ajax in
the afterlife as still unable to overcome his “indignation” and “pride” (Od. xi 670),
Homer has shown keen insight into the type of severe psychological breakdown a
timocratic man might suffer if he fails to achieve the honor and recognition from others
that he so fervently desires. Thus, Socrates seems to be suggesting that insofar as the
Iliad and the Odyssey reflect such keen insight into human nature, they are precious
resources for the study of the human psyche. At the same time, Socrates also seems to be
indicating that if read shallowly (which seems to largely have been the case in the time of
Socrates and Plato), these texts are indeed sources of danger for those who live their lives
according to them.
Due to the prevailing interpretation of the poetry critique as a proto-essay, several
ironic moments in book 10 have been widely overlooked, including Socrates’ oblique
reference to the bed of Odysseus and Penelope, a series of highly dubious ad hominem
critiques against Homer, and the fact that much of Plato’s dialogues (including the
clear that he in fact chose wisely, since his choice might not reflect the ability to “know how to choose the mean in such lives and how to avoid either of the extremes” (619a). That is, by choosing such a life of simplicity Odysseus’ choice might not provide him with an opportunity to develop a robust understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, Socrates seems to be suggesting that Odysseus learned something from his experiences in the Iliad and the Odyssey, which suggests that Socrates finds Homer’s Odysseus to be a character well worth studying.
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Republic) contain hot-headed irrational characters that Socrates appears to be ban from
the poems of the ideal city in book 10. The above exegesis has the advantage of providing
a plausible explanation for these details, as well as other curiosities (such as Socrates’
almost repetitive use of the word μίμησις throughout the book 10 poetry critique) in
terms of a dialectical strategy that Socrates pursues with Glaucon at the end of a very
long (and memorable) discussion.
An ultimately favorable assessment of Homer by Socrates in book 10 also explains
the heavy presence of Homeric quotations, allusions, and paraphrases in the Republic,27
as well as the dialogues as a whole, where (according to Clay 2011) the Homeric poems
are quoted a total of 225 times. Clay, moreover, notes that some of these quotations
“introduce a ‘submerged context’ into the Platonic dialogue where they are cited.” Clay
argues that in order to recognize these submerged contexts, “Plato's reader must know
Homer as well as did Plato.” This suggests that Plato did not intend to discourage his
audience from studying Homer; rather, it suggests that he expected his most astute
readers to thoroughly study Homer’s epics. Socrates’ treatment of several characters from
the Iliad in the myth of Er seems to provide a clear case of one such submerged context,28
which alone seems sufficient to refute the notion that Plato wanted his readers to utterly
disregard Homer.
Planinc’s more controversial suggestion that Socrates obliquely refers to the bed of
Odysseus and Penelope in book 10, if plausible, suggests that Plato’s Socrates saw much
more value in Homer’s poetry than is commonly assumed. At the very least, it seems
27 According to Lake 2011, p. 4 Plato cites Homer 93 times in the Republic.
28 The life-pattern choices Socrates describes these characters making would little sense to a reader unfamiliar with Homer’s treatment of these characters.
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clear that Plato did not write the Republic with the goal of dissuading his most astute
readers from studying Homer altogether; rather, he seems to have wanted to encourage
his readers to study Homer’s epics on a more profound level than most of his
contemporaries did—similar to the way in which he likely hoped his more astute readers
might approach his own writings.
VIII. Plato’s Reaction to Bad Interpretations of the Republic
As Clay, 2011 also notes, while Plato has received a significant degree of criticism
for Socrates’ treatment of Homer in the Republic, it seemed to have little effect on (or
may have even increased) Homer’s popularity over the years. In the 20th century, the
Republic was heavily criticized by many scholars (most notably Popper) for promoting
problematic ideas such as totalitarianism, eugenics, incest, and infanticide, all of which
Socrates appears to endorse in the second wave of book 5 (457c-471b). This line of
criticism seems reasonable if indeed the city/state outlined by Socrates in the Republic
reflects a sincere and direct exposition of Plato’s political philosophy. However, this line
of interpretation that has been challenged,29 and seems to depend upon interpreting the
Republic as a “proto-essay” on political philosophy.
Curiously, Plato has Socrates’ provide what seems to be a grossly inadequate
summary of the Republic in the Timaeus (17c-19a); Rossetti 2011, 359 notes that this
“bad summary” seems to encourage readers to ignore everything in the Republic that
29 Annas, 2000, Rosen, 2005, and Strauss, 1964 argue against interpreting the city/state as a serious political proposal. Probably the strongest evidence in support of their view is Socrates’ assertion that it doesn’t matter if the city comes into existence (592b) and the fact that he only develops the city/state after Glaucon rejects (372d) his first proposal of a “healthy” non-luxurioussimple city. The controversial material in book 5 has been well-explained by Fendt and Rozema, 1998, 63-71. Roochnik, 2003, and Moes, 1996 provide insightful explanations of various details of the Republic as part of a dialectical strategy that Socrates takes with his interlocutors.
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comes after book 5. But why would Plato want to invite shallow criticism of the Republic
based on an interpretation wholly centered on the controversial proposals in books 2-5?
Although Rossetti could be right when suggests that Plato avoided widespread criticism
because of “the great amount of ‘honey’ he lavished in every page of his dialogues, and
his prestige,” the presence of such a bad summary in the Timaeus strongly suggests that
Plato expected many readers—even a learned Pythagorean such as Timaeus30—might
interpret the Republic as a mere political treatise, and have little interest in the rest of the
dialogue.31
Plato’s willingness as an author to accept the possibility that the Republic might be
read shallowly and invite criticism upon the author reflects an approach to writing in
which the work’s educational benefits are prioritized over the author’s desire to be
universally loved by his audience—a move Plato perhaps made so that he too might
avoid eventually succumbing to the madness of Ajax. According to Schindler 2008, 165
the “final expression for the desire for goodness” in the Republic is the “dispossession of
the self for the sake of the good of the whole.” Plato’s willingness to write the Republic in
such a way as to invite robust criticism of the author is highly consistent with the actions
of a philosopher king who does not measure the success of his rule in terms of fame and
recognition. This suggests that the controversial features of the Republic—not the least of
30 Timaeus affirms that Socrates has omitted nothing from this summary (19b).
31 It is not clear whether Plato was aware of this possibility when he wrote the “bad summary” ofthe Republic in the Timaeus, or whether he wrote it after witnessing such a reception (such as perhaps Aristotle and other students at the academy). In either case, Plato could have easily cleared things up if he wanted to do so—he was clearly not bothered by the possibility that the Republic would be read shallowly and be widely misunderstood.
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which is the book 10 poetry critique—are expressions of the author’s most profound and
sincere desire for the good.
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