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A Gadamerian Critique of KuhnsLinguistic Turn:
IncommensurabilityRevisitedAmani AlbedahVersion of record first
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Critique of Kuhns Linguistic Turn:Incommensurability Revisited,
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 20:3,
323-345
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International Studies in the Philosophy of ScienceVol. 20, No.
3, October 2006, pp. 323345
ISSN 02698595 (print)/ISSN 14699281 (online) 2006
Inter-University FoundationDOI: 10.1080/02698590600961000
A Gadamerian Critique of Kuhns Linguistic Turn:
Incommensurability RevisitedAmani AlbedahTaylor and Francis
LtdCISP_A_196008.sgm10.1080/02698590600961000International Studies
in the Philosophy of Science0269-8595 (print)/1469-9281
(online)Original Article2006Taylor & Francis203000000October
[email protected]
In this article, I discuss Gadamers hermeneutic account of
understanding as an alternativeto Kuhns incommensurability thesis.
After a brief account of Kuhns aesthetic account andarguments
against it, I argue that the linguistic account faces a paradox
that results fromKuhns objectivist account of understanding, and
his lack of historical reflexivity. The state-ment Languages are
incommensurable is not a unique view of language, and is
thussubject to contest by incommensurable readings. Resolving the
paradox requires an accountof incommensurability that is
self-referentially consistent, open-ended, and
historicallyreflexive whereby we recognize that our very interest
in incommensurability is historicallyconditioned. By meeting these
conditions, Gadamers account of historical understandingoffers a
middle ground between two extremes: on the one side is the claim
that understand-ing involves becoming a native of an
incommensurable language, and on the other side isthe rejection of
the prospect of understanding a contextually removed language
altogether.Gadamer is discussed as a mediator between Kuhns
epistemic and historical projects, andthus paves the way for a new
hermeneutics of science. The notions of traditional
horizon,historically effected consciousness, the universality of
interpretation, alienation, dialogicalopenness, and the fusion of
horizons are also discussed.
1. Introduction
Soon after its inception by Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, the
notion of incom-mensurability became one of the most fashionable
terms of contemporary academicculture.1 The notion, which denoted
the discontinuity or the communicative break-down between
contextually removed traditions, attracted devout supporters and
fierceadversaries alike. Supporters were mainly interested in the
possibility of understanding
Amani Albedah is an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Philosophy, Kuwait University.Correspondence to: Amani Albedah,
Department of Philosophy, Kuwait University, PO Box 13257,
71953,Kaifan, Kuwait. E-mail: [email protected]
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324 A. Albedah
that cuts right through communicative breakdown, whereas
adversaries thought thatthe thesis of incommensurability was
inherently inconsistent with any notion of under-standing and
sought to show that the thesis was either false or
self-refuting.
In this paper, I offer an analysis of Kuhns failed attempts to
bridge the apparent gapbetween incommensurability and
understanding. By drawing on the affinities betweenKuhn and
Hans-Georg Gadamer, I will show that Gadamerian hermeneutics
providesa more apt account of the process of understanding an alien
tradition. This accountfalls between two extremes: on the one side
are Kuhn and his supporters who claim thatunderstanding an
incommensurable worldview is equivalent to becoming a native oftwo
contextually removed languages; and on the other side are Kuhns
adversaries whoreject the possibility of understanding a
contextually removed language altogether. Bylocalizing
incommensurability and insisting that incommensurability amounts to
adeterminate radical difference between conceptual schemes, Kuhns
camp faces what Ishall call the paradox of incommensurability,
while his adversaries attack a straw manby assuming the total
absence of overlap between the two languages. Both extremes, Ishall
argue, share the presupposition that Gadamer places under attack;
namely, thatunderstanding (and recognizing the state of alienation)
is a mirroring of a static anddeterminate meaning.
A secondary aim of this paper is to show that despite the
divergence between them,Gadamer and the early Kuhn share a deeper
level of agreement than is usually assumed.Though they were
initiated into different philosophical traditions, they belong to
thesame historical era and share a main philosophical concern;
namely, to offer an accountof knowledge as linguistically,
historically, socially, and culturally constituted. Bothoppose
traditional analytic philosophy of science with its objectivist
project, and bothaim at showing that historical understanding is
deeply contextual. Having said that, itis important to keep in mind
that Kuhn was educated in the analytic tradition whichhe opposes
and, thus, offers an interesting case in point on the Gadamerian
analysis ofthe role that tradition plays in understanding. This
unfolds in Kuhns consistent shiftaway from the social towards the
abstract and reductive, a point that this paper willreveal by
tracking the development of the notion of incommensurability in
Kuhn andshowing what is at stake in each of Kuhns formulations.
The paper will run in two parts. The first part is devoted to
Kuhns account ofincommensurability, and it will be divided into
three sections. The first section willprovide a reading of the
aesthetic version of the thesis of incommensurability. Thesecond
section will present what many call Kuhns linguistic turn and show
what thisturn entails for the notion of incommensurability. In the
third section, I will showthat the linguistic reformulation of the
thesis fails at resolving the tension betweenincommensurability and
understanding because it commits Kuhn to an objectivistview of
understanding. This objectivism, I shall argue, produces a paradox
the resolu-tion of which requires both a successful account of the
state of communicative break-down and an abandonment of the nave
realism Kuhn seems to uphold abouthistorical data.
The second part will present the Gadamerian alternative which
will enable us toaccount for the compatibility of understanding and
incommensurability without
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thereby returning us to the impoverished objectivist view of
language. I shall argue thatGadamers account of understanding, as
always contextual and prejudicial, and oftraditional horizon as
being at once the enabling condition for understanding and
ahindrance thereof, enables us to resolve the paradox of
incommensurability. Thesecond part will be divided into two
sections. First, I will introduce the Gadamerianaccount of
understanding. Second, I shall show the implications of this
perspective forthe historiography of science, then show how
Gadamers account of the experience ofcommunicative breakdown
escapes the paradox of incommensurability.
2. Kuhns Account of Incommensurability
The generic definition of incommensurability for Kuhn hinges on
the famous notionof paradigm. A scientific paradigm is what defines
acceptable problems, standards, andtheories on the one hand, and
binds a scientific community by certain values, meta-physical
commitments and professional institutions on the other. Two
successive para-digms are therefore incommensurable in so far as
they function as distinct conceptualnetworks through which
scientists view the world. So distinct are these networks thatthey
cannot be said to oppose, contradict, or complement each other. By
this account,the accumulation of scientific knowledge, the
continuous perfectibility of scientificdata, and the whole notion
of coming closer to the true plan of the universe were radi-cally
shaken.
Under this generic statement of the thesis, Kuhn has at least
three formulations.2
First, is the initial formulation offered in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (hence-forth Structure); I shall call it the
aesthetic formulation. This version of the thesis usesthe visual
metaphor of gestalt switches. Second, is the linguistic formulation
Kuhnintroduced in response to what Kuhn thought were misreadings of
Structure. Thisversion hinges on local holism articulated in terms
of distinct lexicons and taxonomiccategories. Third is the
evolutionary formulation which can be found in Kuhns worksince
1990. This latter formulation attempts to account for the plurality
of world viewsin terms of evolutionary niches where
incommensurability plays a positive role in theprocess of
scientific specialization (Kuhn 1990, 1112; Kuhn 1991, 712; Kuhn
2000b,11620). The arguments in this paper pertain to the aesthetic
and the linguisticaccounts only.
2.1. Aesthetic Version of the Thesis
According to Structure, incommensurability includes linguistic,
aesthetic, practical,conceptual, and ontological aspects, but
throughout the Structure, aesthetic and visualmetaphors are
stressed. Kuhn states there that a scientific revolution is a
displacementof the conceptual network through which scientists view
the world (Kuhn 1970, 102;emphasis added), and his understanding of
such a displacement is expounded byrecourse to gestalt experiments
in which visual interpretation plays the main role.Although
scientists committed to incommensurable paradigms may use much of
thesame vocabulary, apparatus, and experiments, each group uses
them within an entirely
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distinct conceptual network. In Structure, Kuhn describes the
different aspects ofincommensurability as displayed in times of
revolution,
the proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about
the list of prob-lems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve.
Their standards or their defini-tions of science are not the same.
[] Since new paradigms are born out of old ones,they ordinarily
incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both
conceptualand manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had
previously employed. But theyseldom employ these borrowed elements
in quite the traditional way. Within the newparadigm, old terms,
concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one withthe
other. [] communication across the revolutionary divide is
inevitably partial.[] the proponents of competing paradigms
practice their trades in different worlds.[] Practicing in
different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different
thingswhen they look from the same point in the same direction.
Again that is not to saythat they see what they please. Both are
looking at the world, and what they look athas not changed. But in
some areas they see different things, and they see them indifferent
relations to one to the other. That is why a law that cannot even
be demon-strated to one group of scientists may occasionally seem
intuitively obvious toanother. Equally, it is why before they can
hope to communicate fully, one group orthe other must experience
the conversion that we have been calling it a paradigmshift. Just
because it is a transition between incommensurables, the
transitionbetween competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a
time, forced by logic andneutral experience. Like the gestalt
switch, it must occur all at once (though notnecessarily in an
instant) or not at all. (Kuhn 1970, 150)
In order to understand an incommensurable paradigm (an older one
in historicalinvestigation and a new one in times of revolution), a
scientist (or a historiographer)has to undergo the same sudden
realization that one experiences in a gestalt switch, thathe sees
something he had not been able to see before. The gestalt switch,
then, servesmetaphorically to show how a certain object can be seen
and understood in differentways (Brown 1983, 20).3 Seeing in this
context must be taken in the Kantian sense inso far as perception
is not a matter of individual choice but is regulated by
commoncategories. But whereas, for Kant, phenomena conform to fixed
categories, phenomenahere lend themselves to various patterns of
arrangement (Kuhn 1991, 264; Kuhn 1993,331; Irzik and Grnberg
1998). Proponents of two incommensurable paradigms inev-itably use
incompatible patterns of arrangements of the shared set of elements
(be theyobservations, tools, measurements, terms, or theories).
This global incommensurabil-ity does not seem to be mitigated by
the qualification that only in some areas they seedifferent things,
because proponents of incommensurable paradigms would eventu-ally
practice their trades in different worlds (Kuhn 1970, 150). A
relatively small set ofterms are the locales of incommensurability
but they make for global incommensura-bility because they introduce
a sweeping rearrangement of the relations between theelements of
the shared background. The conceptualization of the relation
betweenlocal and global incommensurability will prove to be a
source of major difficulties forKuhn, but I shall return to this
shortly.4
The aesthetic analogy, though expressive of the relation between
a shared back-ground and global incommensurability, is not without
limitation. While the subject ofgestalt experiments appeals to an
external measure (the lines on the paper for example)
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against which he can switch back and forth between the multiple
interpretations of thelines, the scientist has no access to such
external criteria. The scientist has no recourseabove or beyond
what he sees with his eyes and instruments (Kuhn 1970, 114).
Thus,while the subject of the gestalt experiment may isolate the
lines as the subject matter ofinterpretation, the scientist can
only see an interpreted world. Lacking such externalmeasure, the
interpretive character of scientific knowledge is brought to the
fore, andcontextually removed scientists end up dealing with
entirely distinct phenomena whilegazing in the same direction from
the same point. Understanding the phenomena of anincommensurable
paradigm would then require more than an adjustment of onesgaze. It
seems to require that one learns all what the paradigm defines:
acceptable prob-lems, standards, theories, values, metaphysical
commitments, professional institu-tions, and world. But if one is
immersed in ones own paradigm, with no access tosomething like the
lines on the paper, how does this learning take place?
As mentioned above, already in Structure Kuhn tries to qualify
the thesis by allowingpartial communication between adherents of
incommensurable paradigms and local-izing the areas which they see
differently. Kuhn thinks that this much is needed in theway of a
shared background to facilitate the understanding of an
incommensurableparadigm. But the qualification here is rather vague
on several related questions, mostimportantly: how does this
understanding take place if shared terms fall within a newnetwork
of other terms and therefore acquire a new meaning, a different
sense of rele-vance to the theory, and so on? And what is the
epistemic status of the understandingthat results from the switch
into some distinct world? Does it mean acquiring some-thing like
the determinate perspective of the native? Or is it taken to be one
possibleinterpretation of the natives perspective? These questions
are important to pursuebecause although the general attitude in
Structure is hostile to objectivism in science, itremains
ambivalent towards the objectivity of historiography.
The weakness of Kuhns qualifications of the thesis in Structure
invited much criti-cism. Of this massive literature, Kuhn
identifies two lines of argument against theaesthetic account that
motivated the linguistic turn.5 The first argument states
thatincommensurability implies incomparability; this renders appeal
to arguments fromevidence as a basis of theory choice a futile
enterprise. Thus, this argument goes, ashared background must be
assumed which in turn falsifies the thesis of incommensu-rability
(Shapere 1966; Scheffler 1967, 8189; Davidson 1974, 520). A second
line ofargument holds that incommensurability implies an inability
to understand oldertheories in modern terms, but this is exactly
what a historiographer of science does inrestructuring older
theories. Thus, this camp holds, incommensurability cannot
bedefended (Davidson 1974, 1720; Kitcher 1978; Putnam 1981). If
either of these argu-ments is accepted, Kuhn must give up either
his historical project or his incommensu-rability thesis. In other
words, he must give up either the project or its
philosophicalbasis. Willing to give up neither, Kuhn continued to
reformulate the notion of incom-mensurability in the hope that it
would narrow the gap between his perspective as ahistorian and as a
philosopher.
The strength of the objections lies in pressing Kuhn to be clear
about the relationbetween global incommensurability (that
scientists practice their trades in different
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worlds), and local incommensurability (that there is substantive
overlap between para-digms that facilitates mutual understanding).
Closely related to this issue, Kuhn ispressed to make clear how
localizing the areas which scientists see differently makesfor
incommensurability and not, for example, a simple bridgeable
difference of opin-ion or opposition between closely related
perspectives. And finally, the objectionsinvite the reflexive move
from historiography to an account of the status of the
histo-riographers own understanding and whether it is an objective
reflection of the nativesstance, or merely one possible
interpretation of it.
Kuhn argues that both arguments rest on conflating
interpretation with mechanicaltranslation, whereas the
historiographers task is contextual interpretation rather
thanmechanical translation. Kuhn also attempts to show the
compatibility of incommen-surability and comparability by
introducing a theory of meaning that is supposed toenable a clearer
account of local incommensurability and allow for the
mutualunderstanding of contextually removed parties. This is what
many called Kuhnslinguistic turn.
2.2. Linguistic Turn
In this account, all talk of paradigms, gestalt switches, and an
overarching globalincommensurability is replaced by talk of speech
communities, partial changes ofmeaning, and local
incommensurability. Incommensurability now takes place, notbetween
paradigms or whole theories, but between a small subset of
inter-definedterms. Members of a speech community share a
structured vocabulary of kind-termswhich represents a taxonomy of
natural kinds (Kuhn 1983a, 68283; Kuhn 1991, 45).Kind-terms are
those taxonomic terms which have two properties: they are
lexicallyidentified by taking the indefinite article, and the
relations between them are governedby the no-overlap principle
(Kuhn 1991, 4). The last formulation of this principlestates that
only terms which belong to the same contrast set are prohibited
fromoverlapping in membership. Male and horse may overlap but not
horse andcow (Kuhn 1993, 319).
Most kind terms are learned as members of some contrast set
(Kuhn 1993, 317).Theoretical terms are defined by laws that connect
them together and with other kindterms. While members of a speech
community define kind terms the same way, theymay nevertheless have
compatible but dissimilar exemplars for these
kind-terms.Incommensurability in this case is redefined as the
violation of the no-overlap princi-ple, or the referring of a kind
term to referents denied by the taxonomy of the othertheory.
Communicative breakdown is now described as follows:
Applied to the conceptual vocabulary deployed in and around a
scientific theory, theterm incommensurability functions
metaphorically. The phrase no commonmeasure becomes no common
language. The claim that two theories are incom-mensurable is then
the claim that there is no language, neutral or otherwise,
intowhich both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be
translated without residueor loss. No more in its metaphorical than
its literal form does incommensurabilityimply incomparability, and
much for the same reason. Most of the terms common to
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 329
the two theories function the same way in both; their meanings,
whatever those maybe, are preserved; their translation is simply
homophonic. Only for a small subgroupof (usually interdefined)
terms and for sentences containing them do problems
oftranslatability arise. [] The terms that preserve their meanings
across a theorychange provide a sufficient basis for the discussion
of differences and for compari-sons relevant to theory choice. They
even provide [], a basis from which the mean-ings of
incommensurable terms can be explored. (Kuhn 1983, 67071)
Incommensurability here becomes the failure of
statement-for-statement correlationbetween two theories. This takes
place when the corresponding language communitiesdo not share a
homology of lexical structure, referring expressions and a
taxonomicsystem. Where we fail to translate, for absence of common
kind terms, or for the viola-tion of the no-overlap condition,
contextual interpretation is needed to save the day.
The move towards local holism is intended to expand the shared
backgroundbetween rival paradigms in the hope of rendering the
process of understanding anincommensurable paradigm clearer than it
had been in Structure. Here, the histori-ographer is allowed ample
access to a shared background through which he maycome to
understand locales of incommensurability. Note that the locales of
incom-mensurability no longer prompt a large-scale rearrangement of
the shared back-ground; shared terms preserve their meanings across
theory change. This shift isquite significant and, as I will show
in the next section, is quite destructive of thenotion of
incommensurability itself. The historiographer is now faced with a
poten-tially recognizable theory that only requires a bit of
imaginative historical sense. Butin this process of understanding,
the historiographer does not translate the oldertheory into the
modern one, but he learns the older theory as one learns a
secondlanguage: as a whole.
Appealing to second-language acquisition as a model for
interpretive success ismeant to overcome the ethnocentricity that
results from understanding as translation:Kuhn asks how I can
understand the other without turning them into I, or worse yet,a
failed approximation at I. Kuhns answer is: By turning the I into
the other, bylearning how to speak and think like the other (Kuhn
1970, 204).
In learning a second language, one has to acquire the meaning of
its terms in aprocess of contextual interpretation (Kuhn 1983,
67677). The success of the interpre-tive task is marked by our
ability to identify the referents of the terms in question,
thelexical structures of the target language, the categories of its
taxonomic system, andfinally, to understand how the whole theory
made sense to its followers. Interpretivesuccess, then, entails
understanding how the world of the followers of the theory
inquestion was constituted, to render it transparent. However,
understanding in this caseproduces not an enrichment of the source
language but bilingualism. Bilingualism isinevitable in this case,
Kuhn holds, because: if the members of a language
communityencounter a dog thats also a cat (or more realistically, a
creature like the duck-billedplatypus), they cannot just enrich the
set of category terms but must instead redesign apart of the
taxonomy (Kuhn 1991, 4). Although this partial redesigning need not
entaillarge-scale changes, it remains incompatible with the source
language and cannot behomogenized with it. Languages will continue
to be separated in these areas, and no
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330 A. Albedah
bridging is structurally possible. Only individual interpreters
can cross the divide, andonly by becoming members of the target
speech community.
Despite his denial of the possibility that one language could
ultimately containanother by enriching its expressive capacities,
Kuhn insists that bilingualism does notpreclude comparability. Kuhn
holds that incommensurable magnitudes can becompared to any
required degree of approximation (Kuhn 1983, 670). For example,one
can say that the square root of 2 (an irrational number) is greater
than 1.4 and lessthan 1.5 (rational numbers).6 Comparing
incommensurable theories can then proceedaccording to the level of
disparity of the relevant terms. Where locals of
incommensu-rability are absent, comparison can take place by the
immediate comparison of theempirical consequences of the two
theories, and the shared vocabulary can support thistask despite
the distinct conceptual patterns. Where the historiographer is
faced withlocals of incommensurability, they need to learn the new
vocabulary in its historicalcontext as a second language is
learned. But although understanding in this case stillprecludes
statement for statement translation into modern terms and
thereforeprecludes statement for statement comparisons, appeal to
global criteria of compara-bility can still be made. Theories in
this case may be compared according to externalvalues like
simplicity, accuracy, fruitfulness, and predictive power
(Hoyningen-Huene1990, 48990). This way, Kuhn thinks, both arguments
against him are resolved. Onthe one hand, incommensurability does
not preclude a shared background and thecomparability of theories,
and on the other hand understanding locales of incommen-surability
does not entail translating them into modern language. Though
thisapproach has been subjected to much scrutiny, some of its
devastating consequencesare yet to be shown. I shall turn to this
task in the following section.
2.3. Difficulties in the Linguistic Account
I will first outline the main problems that face Kuhns
linguistic account of incommen-surability. Focusing on a main
Kuhnian premise, that there may be a final reading ofhistorical
material, I shall proceed by rejecting the prospect of going native
and thedistinction between translation and interpretation as Kuhn
envisions it, and I shalloffer an analysis of what I call the
paradox of incommensurability. Second, I turn to abrief account of
adequacy requirements that enable an account of
incommensurabilityto escape the objections raised against Kuhn.
Three main problems can be spotted in the linguistic account of
incommensurabil-ity. First, the earlier problem of the standpoint
of the historiographer becomes morepressing.7 The
oversimplification of the notion of language acquisition for a
personwho is already a member of a language game dissolves the
distinction between thenative and the interpreter in an important
respect. As a member of a language game, aperson had already
acquired the world view that was handed down in this
language.Learning a second language, then, takes place within the
world view of the sourcelanguage. Sankey argues that learning a
second language requires no mediation by thesource language,
pointing to the fact that children acquire their mother
tonguedirectly, not by translating from one language to another,
and on evidence suggesting
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that bilingualsdefined as those who are equally competent in two
languagesrequire no translation back and forth between two
languages because neither languagemerits the status of home
language (Sankey 1991, 418).
But like the linguistic Kuhn, Sankey commits two errors
regarding a sourcelanguage. While I agree with Sankey that learning
the source language does not involvetranslation into a prior
language, it acquires the status of source language by virtue
ofthis very trait. An independent argument is needed to establish
that second languageacquisition is not distinct from native
linguistic conditioning. Sankey also seems toconflate mediation
with translation, while mediation is a rich process that may also
besubstantive or structural.
By substantive mediation I mean that a source language is
acquired with substantivecontent (be it physical, moral, aesthetic,
social, or psychological, to name only a fewpossibilities) that
comprises a world view and mediates the successful learning of a
targetlanguage. Mediation may also be structural, namely
grammatical, syntactic, or seman-tic, where the influence of a
source language on the acquisition of a second language iswell
documented as the phenomenon of transfer or interference.8
Furthermore, asQuine (and common sense experience) has shown, at
least in the initial phases of learn-ing a second language,
mediation does involve translation. Granted that it is not of
themechanical type that Kuhn had in mind, it still contradicts
Sankeys assumption
The mediating character of the source language suggests that the
outcome of second-language learning is indeterminate in principle.9
This remains the case even whenincommensurability is localized;
interconnected with every other aspect of the theory,locales of
incommensurability are open to an indefinite number of patterns of
arrange-ment according to which an indefinite number of
interpretations of the whole theorycan be said to exist.10 This is
why Kuhns appeal for second-language acquisition as ifit happens
without any prior initiation renders his claim more objectivistic
than hispositivist adversaries. For now, we may claim to have
understood an older theoryobjectively, trans-historically,
trans-culturally, and trans-contextually.
In an attempt to save Kuhns going native approach from the
consequences of thisobjection, Tresch (2001, 314) suggests that in
hermeneutic understanding, one movesin stages along a continuum
between ones familiar worldview and an alien one andsuggests that
the endpoint of that continuum, that of going native is the merely
idealalthough logically necessary point from which to understand
both of these objects.Tresch distinguishes between attempts to
understand historical and contemporarycultures as, respectively,
approximating the ideal to a limited degree, and approximat-ing the
ideal to the highest degree. The distinction, claims Tresch, rests
on the degreeto which the actual community involved is practically
accessible. Where one maybecome a validated member of the target
community, both ones familiar phenomenalworld and the alien
phenomenal world emerge as subjects of study. While there can beno
guarantee that either could be studied objectively each would
appear in somesense objectified from the point of view of the
other. This, Tresch holds, enables theresearcher to engage in a
double-pincered phenomenology of ways of constructingreality
(Tresch 2001, 315). The researcher can thus view their own culture
as an alien,enriching his view of it and coming to terms with how
others view it.
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What Tresch calls going native is really only going back home.
For here again, thesecond language cannot be held on a par with the
source language. Given that ourinterest in the second language
remains, according to Tresch, highly ethnocentric,when objectified
from the point of view of the source language, the second
languageseems to be at a greater disadvantage. Tresch redefines
going native from possessingequal linguistic conditioning to
approximating an ideal from a prejudiced perspectiveand for
ethnocentric purposes. Thus, while paying attention to the
consequences oflinguistic (or paradigmatic) conditioning has been
the most celebrated contributionof Structure to the philosophy of
science, the linguistic turn has ironically under-mined this
contribution by suggesting that by a simple act of will, one could
jumpship and become a native of another language. Thus, the
standpoint of the historiog-rapher remains a point of contest
against Kuhn because of the indeterminacy ofinterpretation.
The second difficulty with Kuhns linguistic account is closely
related to the first. Thevery distinction between translation and
interpretation rests on an objectivist illusion.Recall that this is
the distinction which supports the argument for local
incommensu-rability. Translatable terms, it seems, are those for
which there is a match in ourlanguage, while incommensurable terms
are those that require interpretation. Thisfurther step is
required, it seems, because we cannot find in our language a way
toaccount for the subject matter. Interpreted terms can only be
added to our languagein a special category, but they may not be
homogenized with it or incorporated withinit. Thus, while
interpretation involves understanding that is unadulterated by our
first-language world view, translation involves a matching of a
fixed and final meaning.11
The claim to interpretive transparency that is involved in Kuhns
notion of transla-tion requires an account of the historiographers
ability to escape the hermeneuticcircle. Not only does Kuhn lack
such an account, he does not seem to think it is rele-vant. In the
absence of obvious anomalies, the historiographers task seems to be
read-ing off the structure of historical process as it really is
with no interpretivecontribution on the historiographers part.
Needless to say, no further complicationsseem relevant to Kuhn in
re-presenting his material to an audience. In re-presentation,the
original text undergoes a double distanciation once at the
interpretation of thehistoriographer and once again at the
interpretation of the recipients of this re-presen-tation. Thus,
indeterminacy of meaning is not only relevant to obvious locale of
incom-mensurability; it is also involved in the act of translation
where Kuhn seems to thinkwe are merely matching words.
If this argument is accepted, two of Kuhns celebrated
contributions to the philoso-phy of science are questioned: his
epistemological project, which involves subvertingthe ethnocentrism
and objectivism of traditional philosophy of science, and his
histor-ical project, which somehow objectively abstracts a
structure of scientific revolutionsfrom history.12
The third difficulty which is derived from both arguments above
is that the judge-ment on whether the relevant subsets of terms are
translatable always takes place fromwithin the current tradition.
This means that the judgement that the terms of onelanguage are
untranslatable into the other itself hinges on current linguistic
practice,
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available historical material, methodological fashion, personal
virtues, etc. If one grantsthis, then one must submit that whether
translation is possible is itself a matter of inter-pretation.13
This hardly seems like a significant finding, but if these
arguments areaccepted, they produce a paradox. The paradox is that
our claim that two paradigms(or theories or subsets of theoretical
terms) are incommensurable, not being a uniquereading of history,
is subject to contest by opposing (maybe incommensurable)
inter-pretations. Thus, what Kuhn views as incommensurable theories
may be viewed byother historiographers as complementary, opposing,
or otherwise substantively accu-mulative. The whole thesis is;
therefore, subject to self-refutation. There is little doubtthat
localizing incommensurability, at least in part, was motivated by
Kuhns need toincrease the areas of partial communication so as to
avoid the risk of self-refutation.However, as shown above, the
attempt fails for two reasons: it lacks reflexivity, and itdoes not
offer a convincing argument for the distinction between local and
globalincommensurability.
A radical alternative to Kuhns resolution of the paradox
requires a stronger mitiga-tion of the notion of
incommensurability. Rather than viewing it as a structural
prob-lematic, we may take the incompatibility of world views to be
a result of a technical ormethodological failing on our part. By
such an account, differences between concep-tual schemes may not
amount to much more than a difference of opinion that may beeasily
overcome by dialogical convergence. No special linguistic
competence isrequired beyond ones ability to articulate clear
conceptions in ones own language.Supported by a realist streak,
such a position would usually suggest that diligentlinguistic
analysis and the avoidance of vagueness and equivocation can save
the day.Not only has this position failed to provide a persuasive
argument throughout thetwentieth century, but much of our intuitive
and commonsense experience, not tomention the findings of science
studies, counteract it. Despite our best efforts at clarityand
methodological rigour, communication sometimes seems to be
impossible with-out some special kind of effort at
understanding.
Resolving the paradox of incommensurability must, therefore,
account for commu-nicative breakdown while avoiding the objections
raised against Kuhn. To achievethis, an account needs to satisfy at
least three adequacy requirements: it must be self-referentially
consistent; it must be open-ended; and finally, it must be
historicallyreflexive.
For an account to be self-referentially consistent, it must
describe communicativebreakdown by acceptable premises that do not
contradict the very conclusions that arelegitimately drawn from
them. Kuhn violates this constraint when, as pointed outabove, he
argues for the interpretive step involved in understanding while
arguing thatthere are final readings of historical material. This
is what is referred to above as theparadox of incommensurability.
To be open-ended, an account of communicativebreakdown must allow
that the state of communicative breakdown may be re-described as a
state of communicative success. In other words, it must allow that
thedescription of a particular state of communicative breakdown is
one among manypossible descriptions of the states of affairs and is
not unique. Kuhn founds every oneof the premises examined above on
the violation of this condition, namely, that there
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is objective meaning, that understanding entails going native,
that translation withoutresidue is possible, and finally that the
untranslatability of some terms is not a context-specific
judgement. As for historical reflexivity, an adequate account of
communicativebreakdown must allow for its own situatedness to be at
once a contributing factor tocommunicative breakdown and a
condition of communicative success. That is, it mustrealize that
historical conditioning involves being interested in certain
aspects of thetext but that this fertile by-product of historical
conditioning is accompanied by ahistorical blindness or
indifference to other aspects of the same text. Thus, our
interestin incommensurability itself must be viewed as historically
conditioned.
In the following section, I will show how Gadamerian
hermeneutics satisfies theseconditions and offers us a more apt
account of the compatibility of understanding
andincommensurability.
3. Gadamerian Hermeneutics
This part is divided into two sections. In the first section, I
offer a reading of Gadame-rian hermeneutics highlighting such key
notions as traditional horizon, historicallyeffected consciousness,
the universality of interpretation, alienation, dialogical
open-ness, and the fusion of horizons. I will also attend to a
common interpretive error thatrestricts Gadamerian hermeneutics to
the Geisteswissenschaften to the total exclusion ofthe natural
sciences. In the second section, I shall give a brief account of
what aGadamerian hermeneutics of science can offer as a corrective
to Kuhn. Then, I willshow how Gadamers account of the experience of
communicative breakdown escapesthe paradox of
incommensurability.
3.1. Gadamerian Account of Understanding
Gadamer thinks that aesthetic experience is the exemplary
hermeneutic experiencewhere the interplay between the object of
experience, the context of understanding,and understanding as a
historical and linguistic event display a peculiar sort of
unitywhereby the truth of the work of art, the context of
understanding, and the understand-ing subject itself cannot be
considered in isolation from one another. I will unpack thisconcept
by offering an account of six interrelated Gadamerian notions:
traditionalhorizon, historically effected consciousness, the
universality of interpretation, alien-ation as the experience of
communicative breakdown, dialogical openness, and thefusion of
horizons.
Like the early Kuhn, Gadamer appeals to a visual metaphor to
elucidate the paradox-ical boundedness and open-endedness of the
context of understanding, Gadamer callsit traditional horizon.
Historically and linguistically individuated, a horizon definesthe
prejudices and pre-understandings with which enquiry begins; it is
at once themedium through which understanding takes place, and its
end product. But unlikeKuhns paradigms or taxonomic systems, the
context of understanding is neither rigidnor absolute. The visual
metaphor must be taken here in the stronger sense. Our
visualhorizon is essential to having a visual experience, but it is
always changing as a result of
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the things we encounter in this experience. Think for a moment
of how certain aspectsof our visual field are more highlighted than
others, and how our attention is directedto certain objects rather
than others. By the same token, visual experiences which lieoutside
this field, and others which lie within it, may not be considered
at all. Whatevermay be seen can only be seen from within this
visual field, for it would be absurd tospeak of a possible visual
experience without ones visual field.
The directing role of the visual field does not fixate our gaze
in the same directionand on the same objects. Inherent in visual
experience is the realization that the objectswill make new sense
under new light. For example, by extending ones visual field, orby
assuming new points of focus, new objects will come alive, new
relations among theobjects which have already been taken into
consideration will be revealed, and newquestions about interpretive
possibilities become intrinsic aspects of the
experience.Analogically, what characterizes traditional horizon is
continuous motion, or continu-ous interplay between its limiting
and enabling roles. The metaphor then shows, first,that no
understanding shall take place without any particular horizon and,
second, thatthis horizon is in continuous motion.
The limiting and enabling roles of traditional horizon show that
hermeneutic expe-rience always expresses what Gadamer calls the
historically effected consciousness.History operates through the
act of understanding by supplying the conditions of thepossibility
of understanding, and the contextual limits of this understanding
as well(Gadamer 1994, 34179). To elucidate this point, one may
analytically distinguishbetween a positive and negative effect for
history in interpretation. The positive effectlies in supplying the
conditions of the possibility of understanding, of going beyond
thesubject matter, namely, by projecting the relevant questions
that the text is supposed toanswer, the standards of acceptable
interpretation, the operative universals in thisparticular act of
understanding, and so on. The negative effect lies in providing
contex-tual limitations to what may be considered here and now, and
thus disables the histo-rian from inserting or eliminating aspects
of the hermeneutic experience at whim. Bythis account, different
people will see different things when they look at the sameobjects
from within different traditional horizons because each
interpretation is histor-ically situated. It is important to note
here that the awareness of these effects does noteliminate them,
for they can neither be fully articulated nor brought under
reflectiveevaluation all at once. But the awareness of these
effects enables the reflexivity of under-standing in so far as it
is aware of its finitude and open-endedness.
Given the central role of historical effect, understanding a
subject matter forGadamer is not the revealing of some final,
unique, or objective meaning. Rather, hethinks that in every
understanding, we bring the prejudices and pre-understandings ofour
horizon into play and reveal a meaning in the subject matter (be it
a text, thing, orperson) that both we and the subject matter have a
share in it. Just as seeing is acreative process whereby it is
always a seeing as, understanding is intrinsically andthoroughly
constructive and contextual. All understanding involves this
hermeneuticelement and is subject to hermeneutic reflection. It
follows from the universality ofinterpretation that understanding
is necessarily open-ended and plural. It is open-ended because what
a native of one language understands of a certain text is
always
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partial, prejudicial, and finite. It is the experience of this
finitude that motivates open-ness to other interpretations. By the
same token, understanding is plural because tradi-tional horizons
are differentiated by virtue of what is handed down in their
respectivelanguages, and these promote differentiated readings of
the text (Gadamer 1976b, 16).Recalling the visual metaphor, the
finitude of the visual field highlights both the possi-bility of
going beyond this particular visual experience (by extending
horizon, divertingfocus from certain objects, shifting perspective,
and so on), and the possibility thatthere are other visual fields
from which different visual experiences may result. Thisimplies
that at each attempt at seeing, there is a different visual
experience.
Guarding this contextualism against accusations of radical
relativism, Gadamerpoints to the limitations of the visual
analogy:
In every world view the existence of the world-in-itself is
intended. It is the whole towhich linguistically schematized
experience refers. The multiplicity of worldviewsdoes not involve
any relativization of the world. Rather, what the world is is
notdifferent from the views in which it presents itself. The
relationship is the same in theperception of things. Seen
phenomenologically, the thing-in-itself is, as Husserl hasshown,
nothing but the continuity with which the various perceptual
perspectiveson objects shade into one another. [] In the same way
as with perception we canspeak of the linguistic shadings that the
world undergoes in different language-worlds. But there remains a
characteristic difference: every shading of the object ofperception
is exclusively distinct from every other, and each helps
co-constitute thething-in-itself as the continuum of these
nuanceswhereas, in the case of the shad-ings of verbal world views,
each one potentially contains every other one within iti.e. each
world view can be extended into every other. It can understand
andcomprehend, from within itself, the view of the world presented
in anotherlanguage. (Gadamer 1994, 44748; emphasis added)
Here, Gadamer reconciles the multiplicity of languages,
traditional horizons, orhermeneutic experiences with the
possibility of mutual understanding by holding thatlanguages are
not self-contained units, but are open-ended in such a way that in
prin-ciple enables each to account for the others perspective. The
analogy with Husserlsphenomenology of perception is revealing of
two important aspects of Gadamersposition on relativism. First, is
drawing our attention to the whole that is intended inthe
multiplicity of verbal experiences. Languages are individuations of
a universal;thus, they are essentially compatible and open-ended.
But second, he reminds us to sethim apart from Husserls
objectivism. Understanding cannot be the grasping of anyone thing
in itself as an ideal entity independent of any linguistic
context.14 The keyphrase in the passage above is within itself. In
trying to understand the worldview ofa contextually removed
language, our own language works at once as a barrier
tounderstanding and as a facilitator thereof. It is a barrier in so
far as it directs our atten-tion away from certain aspects of the
text, aspects that may have central concern forothers. On the other
hand, it is a facilitator to understanding in so far as it focuses
ourattention on aspects of the text that produce our particular
understanding of it,aspects to which others may be indifferent.
This context carries within itself tacit stan-dards of
acceptability and rationality according to which interpretations
are debatedand evaluated.15
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The attempt to understand, or to learn a second language,
therefore, takes placefrom within our initial context, the
prejudices and preconceptions of which may notbe bracketed. In
learning a second language, there is a subject matter to be
communi-cated, a matter that we feel directed towards by means of
our traditional horizon buteludes us because it frustrates our
expectations and does not quite fit with our pre-understandings.
This sense of alienation from the other is at the heart of
Kuhnsnotion of incommensurability. The other (as alien) presents us
with the challengethat our expectations or preconceptions about the
subject matter do not obtain.Gadamer thinks that the attempt to
render once more the alien familiar requires ourwillingness to
surrender to the others superiority, or to the truth of their
claims.Understanding, thus, incurs changes in our traditional
horizon, in the stock of ourtraditional prejudices. Without such
willingness, or what Gadamer calls dialogicalopenness,
communicative breakdown is inevitable. By redefining
communicativebreakdown as the lack of dialogical openness, the
notion is made to refer to thehermeneutic attitude of the
historiographer and, as such, provides a reflexiveperspective from
which Kuhns reductive account of incommensurability may
beproductively evaluated.16
A central aspect of dialogical openness, of understanding in
general, is the anticipa-tion of completion. Viewed as a whole, the
text must be assumed to enjoy internalunity. Such unity does not
negate the possibility of internal contradictions,
discontinu-ities, or open-endedness, for these could only be seen
in light of an assumption ofunity.17 Partial experience of a text
always takes place in light of a pre-understandingwhich is
projected onto the whole/unit. As interpretation proceeds, the
understandingof the whole would in turn bring the parts under new
light revising their initial mean-ing. Individual traditional
prejudices are then accepted as productive, or rejected
asnon-productive of fruitful interpretations, but the whole
tradition may not become asubject of controversy all at once.
Gadamer articulates this process in terms of the ques-tion/answer
dialectic, where the initial meaning of a text is assumed to be an
answer tothe question that interpretation must uncover (Gadamer
1994, 26770). The tradi-tional horizon of the interpreter, or the
source language in Kuhns jargon, would thensupply the presumed
question, the pre-understandings with which interpretation isbegun,
the standards of revisability and acceptability, the standards of
internal consis-tency and unity, and so on.
Trying to understand the other would, therefore, require some
accommodation onour part. Rendering the alien familiar may take
place from an indefinite number ofviewpoints, all of which require
expanding our traditional horizon in unexpected ways,ways that do
not lend themselves to methodological prescriptions. Like the
suddenrealization in the gestalt switch, rendering the alien
familiar happens all at once, guidedby our traditional horizons.
This process does not, as with Kuhns view, transpose theI into the
Thou; rather, it expands the limits of our own language and our own
hori-zons, and this is what Gadamer calls the fusion of horizons
(Gadamer 1994, 306307).By this account, there is no final meaning
to be grasped, no end product to be reportedas an objective
documentation of a theory of historical progress, but endlessly
revisableunderstanding, and an ever expanding horizon. Once the
finitude and the plurality of
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understanding are acknowledged, and radical relativism
eliminated by highlighting theopen-endedness of languages, dialogue
becomes the model for enquiry. Dialogue forGadamer is then the
mutual enrichment of the perspectives of partners in conversa-tion.
Going back to the visual metaphor, this may be done by adjusting
ones visualfield farther along the edges, or bringing to the fore
objects that one had been ignoringin the background, or
establishing new relations among objects that were not taken tobe
connected in any meaningful sense.
Some object, alongside Kuhn, to the claim that the scientific
language of a certaintheory may be enriched indefinitely. For
example, Sankey (1991, 422) argues that natu-ral languages have
indefinite expressive capacities but that special languages are
limitedin this regard because they cannot accept terms that refer
to entities which are deniedby the relevant theory.18 Two points
are to be made in response.
The first response is that nothing in principle bars a language
from representingsomething it actually or potentially denies. While
an anthropologist might deny thatthe term ghost refers to an
existing entity at all, it may well serve an expressive func-tion
in their language. The cost at which this claim may be surrendered
is to lose theability to recognize anomalies. If our language lacks
expressive capacities beyondadmissible entities, then it seems
necessary that the natural world always conforms toour
expectations. An anomaly, by definition, is something that
frustrates our expecta-tions; it frustrates the categories through
which we view the world. Recognizing ananomaly, then, must require
that scientific languages retain within them the capacityto
recognize otherness.19 But recognizing otherness, such as a term
for which there isnot a mechanical translation (to borrow a Kuhnian
favourite) does require that we areat least capable of an initial
description of that term.
The second response to the arguments against the openness of
scientific languages isthat it works only where a scientific
language is conceived as a closed system of termstightly connected
by rigid designation and clearly defined laws. Only then would
thelanguage prohibit importing new concepts. In his strongest
statement about the rigid-ity of scientific languages, Kuhn denies
that they are such closed systems. From theexample cited above
(Kuhn 1991, 4), perfecting taxonomic categories happens gradu-ally
whereby a group that encounters a creature not allowed by its
current taxonomicstructure redesigns that part of the taxonomy so
that it would fit this creature. As aresult of surrendering global
incommensurability (granting for the sake of argumentthat it is
possible), the perfecting of the taxonomic categories and the
redesign of therelevant part of the taxonomy need not involve
radical change; it may well be a part ofwhat Kuhn had called normal
science, the puzzle-solving activity of the relative scien-tific
community. Thus, even on Kuhns terms, languages may not be
considered asclosed systems.
This conclusion is further served by recalling thatcontra the
later Kuhnthere ismore to a scientific language than a taxonomic
structure. A scientific language handsdown a tradition of
practices, values, aspirations, and political and
psychologicalcommitments, among other things. Thus, enrichment of a
scientific language may takeplace via any of these aspects of a
scientific tradition and may or may not induce large-scale changes
in the theory.
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While Gadamer agrees that our traditional horizons are limited
and finite at a partic-ular point in time, he insists that they are
open-ended in principle and may potentiallycontain all other
languages. The difference in perspective between Gadamer and Kuhnon
this matter is fairly significant. While they both agree that
different languages relateto different domains of experience, they
disagree about the kind of abyss that separatesthem. For Kuhn, the
other can only be known by being owned, by jumping out of onesskin
and into someone elses. But for Gadamer, enriching our traditional
horizonstakes place within a dialogical mode of enquiry. Only by
ongoing dialogue with other-ness can we attempt reinterpretations
of ourselves and of the other. The other bringsthe subject matter
to bear, makes clear the distance, and displays the alienation
withwhich we are challenged. Trying to understand the other in the
objectified mode,thinking that there is a determinate meaning to be
grasped is not only a bad epistemicstrategy but is morally dubious.
For Gadamer, the I cannot become a Thou; weremain ethnocentric and
self-involved, and thus must remind ourselves of ourconstant need
to be open to the otherness of the other (Gadamer 1994, 396).
Ratherthan being a shortcoming of historical understanding, this
realization makes for ahistorically reflexive historiographer.
Reflexivity in this context is not equivalent tointerpretive
transparency but guards against sweeping objectivist illusions. I
shallreturn to the implications of this perspective for the
historiography of science in thenext section, but first I must
address a common misreading of Gadamers position onthe scope of
hermeneutic reflection.
It is commonly thought that the scope of Gadamerian hermeneutics
is limited to thehuman sciences to the exclusion of natural
science. References are often made to theantithesis between Truth
and Method that Gadamers most celebrated title suggests. Iargue
that while, in his early writings, Gadamer may have had a rather
nave concept ofnatural scientific methodology, and of the
demarcation between natural and humansciences, he stated very
clearly that natural science falls within the scope of
hermeneu-tical reflection. Gadamer writes:
In the realm of the natural sciences, also, in my opinion, in
the theory of knowledgeone cannot avoid the hermeneutical criticism
that the given cannot be separatedfrom understanding. Even in all
protocol-formulating procedures, even in so-calledperception
itself, the hermeneutic understanding of something-as-something is
stilloperative. (Gadamer 2001, 42)
This remark indicates that natural science and scientific
methodology are intrinsicallyinterpretive. The antithesis intended
in Truth and Method is that between the objectiv-istic
methodological attitude of the natural sciences, and the
hermeneutic attitude thatGadamer wishes to promote. More
specifically, it is the antithesis between the self-understanding
of natural science (as objective knowledge), and the universality
ofhermeneutics (Gadamer 1976a, 2627). Given the claim that all
understanding islinguistic, and therefore interpretive, scientific
language cannot be excluded from thehermeneutic attitude on pains
of self-contradiction (Gadamer 1994, 450). It must beconceded,
though, that some of Gadamers remarks about scientific methodology
andthe demarcation between natural and human sciences stand in
contradiction to hisgeneral philosophical position (Gadamer 1994,
28385).
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3.2. Escaping the Paradox of Incommensurability
The most significant Gadamerian corrective is bridging the gap
between Kuhns philo-sophical project and his historical project.
Recall that Kuhns work is marked by a splitbetween these two
projects. On the one hand, the historical project is an exercise
inhermeneutic understanding, but on the other hand, the
philosophical project isrestricted to a moment in hermeneutic
experience; namely, the moment of alienation.The Gadamerian
perspective bridges the gap by acknowledging alienation as a
momentin hermeneutic experience while denying it centre stage
(Gadamer 1976b, 15).
The Gadamerian account of communicative breakdown hinges on the
hermeneuticattitude of understanding. When we adopt the attitude of
openness to the others claimto truth, the attitude of risking some
of our operative prejudices, alienation may beovercome, but once we
desert the hermeneutic attitude of openness, communicativebreakdown
results. Overcoming alienation is possible because languages are
potentiallycompatible. Rather than trivializing our commonsense
experience of radical difference,Gadamer provides us with better
tools to understand it. Gadamer re-conceptualizesradical difference
in terms of the perceived radical difference thereby refuting
theinherent linguistic or logical gap between two languages. I
shall elaborate on thisdistinction in what follows.
As has been argued above, the notions of alien, or other, do not
denote somethingentirely removed from our language. Practices we
call radically different may be thoseof which we cannot make sense,
do not accept, or actively reject. While none of theseinstances
entails that the practice falls outside the boundaries of our
language, they doindicate a sense of alienation.20 The success of
the attempt to overcome this alienationis contingent upon our
willingness to be open to change. Methodologically, thisdictates
that we continue to adjust our initial reading of the matter until
we can makesense of it in a continuous interplay between the whole
and the parts; between the alienand the familiar; and between the
question and the answer. Given that understandingan alien practice,
whether or not we accept it, always carries a considerable risking
ofthe preconceptions and pre-understandings that are handed down in
our language,over-emphasizing difference often compensates for our
lack of openness and flexibil-ity. In the game of understanding,
the players failure to understand is their failurerather than the
failure of the game.
Thus, when interpretation assumes an interpretive scheme whereby
no allowance ismade for change, because it assumes for itself a
position of historical/epistemic superi-ority, it seems only
inevitable to write the story of incommensurable scientific
theories,or that of a discontinuous history. While a Gadamerian
perspective might allow forviewing two static scientific theories
as taxonomic systems with radically incompatiblecategories, it
neither generalizes this interpretive pattern into a theory of
science noraccepts the pattern as the only (or most productive)
interpretive pattern for under-standing this particular subject
matter.
Adopting a Gadamerian historiography of science also addresses
the extent to whichscience is contextualized (Gadamer 1994, 559).
It extends hermeneutic reflectionbeyond the history of successive
scientific theories, into the actual methodology of
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natural science. To be sure, Gadamer does not undertake this
task in any seriousmanner, but his later remarks point in this
direction.21 The success of a scientist,Gadamer holds, is not
restricted to the mechanical replication of a method but to
thekinds of interpretive judgements a scientist makes in
understanding and applying themethod (Gadamer 1976b, 11). These
judgements, which form the central contributionof the scientist,
must then be brought under hermeneutic reflection. Kuhn
restrictedhis historiography to the structural study of scientific
theories and to some extent to thecommunities that these theories
lead, but gave no special attention to the methodologyof science as
an interpretive practice.
In addition to the correctives mentioned above, the Gadamerian
perspectivedefended here satisfies the adequacy requirements set in
Section 2.3. First, the accountis self-referentially consistent
because it establishes the universality of hermeneuticsand rejects
Kuhns claim that there are final readings of historical material.
Second, itis open-ended because it provides a more elastic account
of communicative breakdownwhereby the particular case in point may
be described as a moment of communicativebreakdown from one
perspective, and as a moment of communicative success from
theother. It also assigns the responsibility for such success to
the historiographer and hiswillingness to be open to the other.
This is significant for the history of science becauseit opens up
the structural reading of history to a multitude of histories each
being itselfa shading of the whole that is intended without thereby
reducing languages to oneanother. From one particular perspective,
two theories may appear to be incommen-surable and discontinuous,
and from another accumulative and linear. The interpre-tive
standards in the one case may borrow from a distinct experience of
the world thanthe other.
Third is the reflexivity requirement. Gadamer holds the
principle of effective historyto be a central notion in his
philosophical hermeneutics. This notion allows us tosee, for
example, that the historical interest in the alien is a modern
concern and thatthe move from the multiplicity of horizons to
cultural solipsism is not inevitable.Historically effected
consciousness may be identified, for example, in the
positivistsinterest in understanding the superiority of scientific
method, or the linear progress ofscientific theories, whereas it
may be identified in the early 1960s in the interest insubduing the
authority of scientific method, and in showing the discontinuity
ofhistorical eras, scientific theories, or cultural practices. In
either case, there is an oper-ative prejudice guiding the
interpretation of scientific history.22
Whereas this view shows that the history of science is
intrinsically contextual, that itis woven within the psychological,
moral, political, economic, and social horizon of aparticular
tradition, Kuhns account stripped it of hermeneutic significance
andreduced it to an analysis of scientific taxonomies.23 The turn
to hermeneutics wouldthen indicate a move a way from the reductive
into the richer and thicker account ofscience.
If the arguments presented here are accepted, the philosophy and
the historiographyof science must recover the centrality of their
hermeneutic dimension by redirectingtheir driving questions and
re-envisioning their relationship. The split between theepistemic
questions that motivate traditional philosophy of science, and the
historical
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342 A. Albedah
questions that motivate the historiography of science overlooks
the interpretive char-acter of all understanding. But given the
Gadamerian perspective defended here, theperipheral position of the
historical in relation to the epistemic, as typically depicted
inthe relation between the case study and the abstract principle,
is no longer defensible.The recovering of the hermeneutic dimension
of science, then, requires a merging ofthe historical and the
epistemic. This merger paves the path for a new hermeneutics
ofscience and opens up new possibilities for rethinking what is
questionable in science.
Acknowledgements
An earlier sketch of this paper was presented at the 12th
International Congress ofLogic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, August, 2003. I would like to thank theparticipants of the
conference who were most generous with their questions and
objec-tions. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of
the anonymous referees ofISPS for their insightful and helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
Notes
[1] For an account of the origin of the idea in Feyerabend, see
Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene(1997). For a comparison between Kuhns
conception of incommensurability and that ofFeyerabend, see
Hoyningen-Huene (2000).
[2] For excellent reviews of the development of Kuhns
incommensurability thesis, see Chen(1997), Hoyningen-Huene (1990),
Sankey (1993), and Buchwald and Smith (1997).
[3] A different line of interpretation suggests that the gestalt
metaphor equivocates betweentwo senses of the word experience: an
epistemological sense that involves the organiza-tional role of
language, and a physiological sense which pertains to the causal
processinvolved in perception (Malone 1993, 8183). Malone suggests
that the problem of incom-mensurability pertains to the epistemic
not the physiological sense of experience, sinceobservations are
not theory-laden in the sense that undermines objectivity. The
argumentbegs the question, since it needs to show rather than
assume that observations are nottheory-laden.
[4] For a detailed look at the distinction between global and
local incommensurability, seeSimmons (1994, 12021). Simmons
suggests that local incommensurability excludes
globalincommensurability because of the substantive overlap between
the rival theories. But itremains unclear how changes in local
areas do not induce large-scale changes. Chen (1990)discusses this
difficulty.
[5] Whether Kuhns interpretation of these arguments is fair is
an interesting question, but it willnot be pursued here.
[6] See Sharrock and Read (2002, 14143), for a detailed account
of the mathematical origin ofthe concept.
[7] Hoyningen-Huene (1990, 49192) raises this issue against Kuhn
and argues that a generaltheory of world constitution requires that
the historiographer brackets all elementsfrom their own particular
world, but that such bracketing is impossible on pains of
self-contradiction.
[8] For a thorough survey of recent research on the phenomenon
of transfer and the differentways in which a source language
influences the learning of a target language, see Odlin
(2005).Odlin suggests that empirical research done over the last
decade on Second Language Acquisi-tion seems to give significant
credence to theories of conceptual relativity whereby the
under-standing of the target language is mediated by the source
language.
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[9] Against Quines claim for multiple possible interpretations
(Quine, 1987), Kuhn (1990, 300)suggests that in cases of
communicative breakdown, there are usually none at all. These
casesKuhn suggests are the ones that require conscious contextual
interpretation where a uniquemeaning is uncovered.
[10] This argument shows that Kuhns account of local
incommensurability can only be acceptedat the cost of denying the
interconnectedness of theoretical terms.
[11] Hesse anticipates this objection when she suggests that
Kuhns distinction between translationand interpretation is not as
sharp as he makes it. Hesse thinks that communication
betweenlanguages adopting different taxonomies need not assume an
identity of shared taxonomy; asufficient intersection between the
relevant taxonomies would do (Hesse 1983, 708).
[12] For passages in Structure against the ethnocentric attitude
of tradition historiography ofscience and of science textbooks, see
Kuhn (1970, 126, 138, 140). In later writings, Kuhnseems to think
that he can establish his philosophical position a priori without
appealing tothe historical record. See especially Kuhn (2000b).
[13] To be sure, Kuhn is aware that many translations of the
same text may exist (see, for example,Kuhn 2000a, 164) but does not
seem to be aware of the significance of this claim for first-order
statements like no translation exists for term x, nor to
second-order statements likethere is a structure to scientific
theories.
[14] For a wonderful exposition of Gadamers ontology of language
as anti-objectivist, seeKertscher (2002, 13549). It must be noted,
though, that Kertschers opposition betweentruth and tradition
misses the very point of the contextualism Gadamer espouses. This
will beexamined below.
[15] For empirical research on how this is displayed in learning
a second language, see Odlin (2005).[16] While cognizant of the
narrow range of Kuhns linguistic account of incommensurability,
Buchwald and Smith (1997, 375) dismiss the problem as a matter
of scope of interest ratherthan a defect in the account. I submit
that Fullers diagnosis of the narrowness of the accountas
symptomatic of the Cold War eras turn away from the politics of
knowledge productionprovides a better ground for understanding
Kuhns linguistic turn (Fuller 2000, 532).
[17] See Warnke (1987, 8291). I disagree with Warnkes assessment
that Gadamer is conservative.But lacking the space for a detailed
argument, I shall just assert that viewed in relation to anaive
radical revisionism that seems to believe that one can break free
of all tradition;Gadamers position may be viewed as a reflexive
revisionist.
[18] In a stronger argument that includes natural languages,
Kuhn (1999, 36) argues that enrichinga source language by adding
categories it flatly denies would make for a
self-contradictorylanguage that will perish along with its users.
The major error Kuhn commits here is conflat-ing enrichment with
the acceptance of categories, but with the taxonomic account of
languagethat Kuhn supports such conflation seems necessary.
[19] To be sure, Structure (Kuhn 1970, 5291) describes the ways
in which a scientific communityidentifies and deals with
anomalies.
[20] A classic example of this is the psychoanalytic notion of
projection where otherness is reviledfor mirroring ones own flaws.
This is a case where alienation (from the other and fromoneself) is
not a result of a linguistic incompatibility but a result of our
unwillingness to makethe concessions that understanding requires of
us.
[21] For example, Gadamer (2001, 4) states that
the question whether there is also a hermeneutics appropriate to
the natural sciences needs tobe taken seriously. In the philosophy
of science since Thomas Kuhn this point has been widelydiscussed. I
think this is above all because natural scientific methods do not
show us how toapply the results of scientific work to the practice
of living life in a rational way.
[22] Fuller (2000, 532) suggests that Kuhns neglect of his own
historicity has significantlycontributed to the death of
philosophical history, and managed to reverse the attention
awayfrom the politics of knowledge production in the philosophy of
science.
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344 A. Albedah
[23] For a concise account of the historical and biographical
bearings of this move, see Fuller(2003, especially chapters 2 and
6). Fullers account shows that Kuhns consistent move awayfrom the
social towards the reductive is a case in which the effect of
tradition (here the tradi-tion in which Kuhn was initiated into
philosophy) is displayed.
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