DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION To appear in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich, eds., Innateness and the Structure of the Mind, Vol. II Most recent revisions: 8/19/04 – SPS A Framework for the Psychology of Norms * Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Stephen Stich “No concept is invoked more often by social scientists in the explanations of human behavior than ‘norm’.” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Humans are unique in the animal world in the extent to which their day-to-day behavior is governed by a complex set of rules and principles commonly called norms. Norms delimit the bounds of proper behavior in a host of domains, providing an invisible web of normative structure embracing virtually all aspects of social life. People also find many norms to be deeply meaningful. Norms give rise to powerful subjective feelings that, in the view of many, are an important part of what it is to be a human agent. Despite the vital role of norms in human lives and human behavior, and the central role they play in explanations in the social sciences, there has been very little systematic attention devoted to norms in cognitive science. Much existing * Our best estimate of the relative contributions of the authors is: Sripada 80%; Stich 20%. 1
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DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSIONTo appear in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich, eds., Innateness and the Structure of the Mind, Vol. IIMost recent revisions: 8/19/04 – SPS
A Framework for the Psychology of Norms*
Chandra Sekhar Sripada&
Stephen Stich
“No concept is invoked more often by social scientists in the explanations of human
behavior than ‘norm’.”
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
Humans are unique in the animal world in the extent to which their day-to-day
behavior is governed by a complex set of rules and principles commonly called norms.
Norms delimit the bounds of proper behavior in a host of domains, providing an invisible
web of normative structure embracing virtually all aspects of social life. People also find
many norms to be deeply meaningful. Norms give rise to powerful subjective feelings
that, in the view of many, are an important part of what it is to be a human agent. Despite
the vital role of norms in human lives and human behavior, and the central role they play
in explanations in the social sciences, there has been very little systematic attention
devoted to norms in cognitive science. Much existing research is partial and piecemeal,
making it difficult to know how individual findings cohere into a comprehensive picture.
Our goal in this essay is to offer an account of the psychological mechanisms and
processes underlying norms that integrates what is known and can serve as a framework
for future research.
Here’s a quick overview of how the paper is organized. In section 1, we’ll offer a
preliminary account of what norms are. Then, in sections 2 and 3, we’ll assemble an
array of facts about norms and the psychology that makes them possible, drawn from a
variety of disciplines. Though the distinction is not a sharp one, in section 2 we’ll focus
* Our best estimate of the relative contributions of the authors is: Sripada 80%; Stich 20%.
1
on social level facts, while in section 3 our focus will be on how norms affect individuals.
In section 4, we’ll offer a tentative hypothesis about the innate psychological architecture
subserving the acquisition and implementation of norms, and explain why we believe an
architecture like the one we propose can explain many of the facts assembled in sections
2 and 3. Section 5, the last and longest section, will focus on open questions – important
issues about the cognitive science of norms that our account, in section 4, does not
address. In some cases, we’ve left these issues open because little is known about them;
in other cases, more is known but crucial questions are still very much in dispute.
Though we are acutely aware that our account of the psychology of norms leaves many
important questions unanswered, we hope that the framework we provide will contribute
to future research by clarifying some of those questions and offering an overview of how
they are related.1
1. A preliminary characterization of norms
We’ll begin with an informal and provisional account of what we mean when we
talk of norms. As we use the term, a norm is a rule or principle that specifies actions
which are required, permissible or forbidden independently of any legal or social
institution. Of course, some norms are also recognized and enforced by social
institutions and laws, but the crucial point is that they needn’t be. To emphasize this fact,
we’ll sometimes say that norms have independent normativity. Closely linked to the
independent normativity of norms is the fact that people are motivated to comply with
norms in a way that differs from their motivation to comply with other kinds of social
rules. Very roughly, people are motivated to comply with norms as ultimate ends, rather
than as a means to other ends; we’ll refer to this type of motivation as intrinsic
1 One issue we won’t consider is how the psychological mechanisms we’ll posit might
have evolved. We believe that one of the advantages of the account we’ll offer is that
there is a plausible account of the evolution of these mechanisms. But the details make
for a long story which we will save for another occasion. (Sripada et al. in preparation).
2
motivation, and we’ll have much more to say about it in section 3. People can also be
motivated to comply with a norm for instrumental reasons, though intrinsic compliance
motivation adds a substantial additional motivational force. Violations of norms, when
they become known, typically engender punitive attitudes like anger, condemnation and
blame, directed at the norm violator, and these attitudes sometimes lead to punitive
behavior.
We believe that norms, as we’ve characterized them, are an important and
theoretically useful subcategory of social rules, and that our characterization is broadly in
line with other accounts, both historical and more recent (see Durkheim, 1953 [1903];
Parsons, 1952; Petit, 1991; McAdams, 1997). However, it is worth emphasizing that our
account of norms is not intended as a conceptual analysis or an account of what the term
“norm” means to ordinary speakers. Nor do we offer our characterization of norms as a
formal definition. At best it gives a rough and ready way to pick out what we believe is a
theoretically interesting natural kind in the social sciences. If the framework for a
psychological theory of norms set out in section 4 is on the right track, then a better
account of the crucial features of norms can be expected to emerge as that theory is
elaborated. One of the components of our framework is a “norm data base,” and it is the
theory’s job to tell us what can and cannot end up in that database.
Though there are a substantial number of empirically well supported
generalizations about norms, those generalizations and the evidence for them are
scattered in the literatures of a number of different disciplines. In the next two sections,
we’ll assemble some of these generalizations and say a bit about the evidence for each.
We’ll begin with social level features of norms, and then turn to individual level facts
about the ways in which norms are acquired and how they influence behavior.
2. Some social level facts about norms
3
Norms are a cultural universal. The ethnographic database strongly suggests that
norms and sanctions for norm violations are universally present in all human societies
(Roberts, 1979; Brown, 1991; Sober and Wilson, 1998). Moreover, there is reason to
think that the universal presence of norms is very ancient. There is no evidence that
norms originated in some society and spread by contact to other societies in the relatively
recent past. Rather, norms are reliably present and are highly elaborated in all human
groups, including hunter-gatherer groups and groups that are culturally isolated. This is
just what we would expect on the hypothesis that norms are very ancient. All of this, we
think, suggests that there are innate psychological mechanisms specialized for the
acquisition and implementation of norms, since the existence of these mechanisms would
help explain the universal presence of norms in all human groups.
In addition to being present in all cultures, norms tend to be ubiquitous in the lives
of people in those cultures. They govern a vast array of activities, ranging from worship
to appropriate dress to disposing of the dead. And while some norms deal with matters
that seem to be of little importance, others regulate matters like status, mate choice, food
and sex that have a direct impact on people’s welfare and their reproductive success.
Although norms are present in all human groups, one of the most striking facts
about them is that the contents of the norms which prevail in different groups are quite
variable. Moreover, these differences follow a characteristic pattern in which there is
substantial homogeneity in the norms which prevail within groups and both
commonalities and differences in the norms which prevail across groups. We believe
that the distributional pattern of norms is an important source of evidence about the
psychological mechanisms that underlie them. For this reason, we’ll spend some time
discussing the issue in more detail.
In assessing the distribution of norms across human groups, one question that
immediately arises is: are there any norms which are universally present in all human
groups? The question must be handled with some care since many candidate norm
universals are problematic because they verge on being analytic – true in virtue of
4
meaning alone. For example “Murder is wrong” or “Theft is wrong” don’t count as
legitimate universals since, roughly speaking, “murder” simply means killing someone
else in a way which is not permissible, and “theft” simply means taking something from
another in a way which is not permissible. For this reason, it is important, wherever
possible, to frame the contents of norms in a non-normative vocabulary. While analytic
principles like “Murder is wrong” and “Theft is wrong” may be universals, the specific
rules that regulate the circumstances under which killing or taking an item in the
possession of another person is permitted are not so nearly uniform across groups.
With this caveat in mind, we return to the question of the distributional pattern of
norms across human groups. One important fact is that there is a pattern to be discerned;
norms are not indefinitely variable or randomly distributed across human groups. Rather,
there are certain kinds of norms which one sees again and again in almost all human
societies, though in order to discern these commonalities, one has to stay at a fairly high
level of generality. For example, most societies have rules that prohibit killing, physical
assault and incest (or sexual activity with one’s kin). Also, most societies have rules
promoting sharing, reciprocating, and helping, at least under some circumstances
(Cashdan, 1989). Most societies have rules regulating sexual behavior among various
members of society, and especially among adolescents (though the content of these rules
varies considerably) (Bourguignon and Greenbaum, 1973). And most societies have at
least some rules that promote egalitarianism and social equality. For example, in nearly
all hunter-gatherer groups, attempts by individuals to reap a disproportionate share of
resources, women or power are disapproved of sharply (Boehm, 1999). Examples like
these could be multiplied easily in domains such as social justice, kinship, marriage, and
many others.
While there is no doubt that there are certain high-level commonalities in the
norms that prevail across groups, as one looks at norms in more detail it is clear that there
is tremendous variability in the specific rules one finds in different groups. Consider, for
example, norms dealing with harms. While some kind of harm norm or other is found in
virtually all human groups, the specific harm norms that prevail across groups are quite
5
variable. In some simple societies, almost all harm-causing behaviors are strongly
prohibited. Among the Semai, an aboriginal people of the Malaysian rainforest, for
example, hitting and fighting, as well as more mundane behaviors such as insulting or
slandering are all impermissible, and Semai groups have among the lowest levels of
violence of any human societies (Robarchek and Robarchek, 1992). But other groups
permit a much wider spectrum of harm harm-causing behaviors. In groups such as the
Yanomano of South America, the use of violence to settle conflicts is permitted (and
indeed extremely common), and displays of fighting bravado are prized rather than
condemned (Chagnon, 1992). Among the Yanomano, mortality due to intra- and inter-
tribe conflict is extremely high, and some ethnographers have suggested that the level of
mortality due to violence found among the Yanomano is not at all uncommon in simple
societies (Keeley, 1996). In addition to variability in the kinds of harm and level of harm
which are permitted, harm norms also differ with respect to the class of individuals that a
person is permitted to harm. Many groups draw a sharp distinction between harms
committed against individuals within one’s own community and individuals outside the
group (though many groups do not draw such a sharp distinction) (LeVine and Campbell,
1972). Moreover, some societies permit some kinds of violence directed against women,
children, animals, and also certain marginalized subgroups or castes (Edgerton, 1992).
The variability in harm norms is also evidenced by the manner in which they change over
time. The philosopher Shaun Nichols (2004, ch. 7) provides a fascinating description of
the gradual change in harm norms in Western societies over the last 400 years.
Incest prohibitions are another case in which high-level commonalities are found
in conjunction with variability at the level of specific rules. It appears that almost all
societies have norms prohibiting sexual intercourse between members of the nuclear
family (we’ll call these nearly universal rules core incest prohibitions). But incest
prohibitions almost always extend beyond this core. In particular, incest prohibitions
almost always extend to other kinds of sexual activity, and they almost always extend
beyond just the nuclear family; they prohibit sexual activity with at least some members
of one’s non-nuclear kin. But the details of how incest prohibitions extend beyond core
incest prohibitions are, as numerous studies have revealed, tremendously variable
6
(Murdock, 1949). For example, at one extreme are exogamous groups, in which
marriage with anyone within one’s own tribal unit is considered incestuous, though the
offense is seldom seen as being of the same level of severity as intercourse within one’s
nuclear family.
Another feature of the distributional pattern of norms is that while most groups
have some rule or other that falls under certain high-level themes, generalizations about
commonalities in the norms found across groups typically have exceptions. For example,
the incest prohibition is sometimes cited as the best example of a norm which is a
universal feature of all human groups. And while it is true that core incest prohibitions
can be found in virtually all groups, even this generalization may not be exceptionless.
There is good evidence that brother-sister marriage (including sexual relations) occurred
with some frequency in Egypt during the Roman period, and was practiced openly and
unabashedly. In addition, brother-sister marriage is known to have occurred in a number
of royal lineages, including those of Egypt, Hawaii and the Inca empire (Durham, 1991).
To sum up, we’ve identified three key features of the distributional pattern of
norms. First, norms tend to cluster under certain general themes. Second, the specific
rules that fall under these general themes are quite variable, though clearly thematically
connected. And third, there are typically at least some exceptions which diverge from the
general trend.
3. Some individual level facts about norms
We turn now to some facts about how norms emerge within individuals, and how
individuals are affected by the norms they acquire. There is excellent evidence indicating
that norms exhibit a reliable pattern of ontogenesis. Regardless of their biological
heritage, almost everyone (excepting those with serious psychological deficits) acquires
the norms that prevail in the local cultural group in a highly reliable way. In no human
group is it the case that some individuals reliably acquire the prevailing norms while
7
many others don’t. Also it appears that all individuals acquire at least some norms of
their group relatively early in life. All normal children appear to have knowledge of rules
of a distinctly normative type between 3 and 5 years of age, and can distinguish these
normative rules from other social rules (Turiel, 1983; Nucci, 2001). Also, some
competences associated with norms, such as the ability to reason about normative rules
and rule violations appears very early. Denise Cummins has shown that children as
young as 3-4 perform substantially better on deontic rule reasoning tasks than they do on
similar indicative reasoning tasks (Cummins, 1996).
Further evidence about the ontogenesis of norms comes from a major cross-
cultural study in which Henrich and his colleagues investigated norms of cooperation and
fairness in fifteen small scale societies using standard experimental game paradigms.
(We’ll discuss these games more fully below.) While this study found considerable
diversity in the norms of cooperation and fairness prevailing in these societies, it also
found that much of the cross-cultural variation in norms among adults was already
present by the time subjects reach the age of nine, and it persists thereafter (Henrich et
al., 2001). In another cross-cultural experimental study, Shweder and his colleagues
examined moral norms in children and adults in Hyde Park, Illinois and Bhubaneswar,
India (Shweder et al., 1987). As in the Henrich et al. study, there were lots of differences
in the norms that prevailed in the two communities, and most of the differences were
already established by the time subjects reached the age of seven.
Perhaps the most striking (and most overlooked) feature of norms is that they
have powerful motivation effects on the people who hold them. Philosophers have long
emphasized that from a subjective perspective, moral norms present themselves with a
unique kind of subjective authority which differs from standard instrumental motivation.
We believe that this philosophical intuition reflects a deep empirical truth about the
psychology of norms, and we refer to the type of motivation associated with norms as
intrinsic motivation. Our claim is that people are disposed to comply with norms even
when there is little prospect for instrumental gain, future reciprocation or enhanced
reputation, and when the chance of being detected for failing to comply with the norm is
8
very small. The claim we are making must be treated with care, however. At any given
time, a person may be subject to multiple sources of motivation. So in some cases in
which people are intrinsically motivated to comply with a norm, they may also be
instrumentally motivated to comply with the norm. In other cases in which people are
intrinsically motivated to comply with norms, they may nonetheless fail to comply for
instrumental reasons. So our claim is not that people always follow norms or that when
they follow norms, they do so only because of intrinsic motivation. Rather, our claim is
that humans display an independent intrinsic source of motivation for norm compliance,
and thus that people are motivated to comply with norms over and above (and to a
substantial degree over and above), what would be predicted from instrumental reasons
alone.
There is an implication of our claims about intrinsic motivation that is worth
emphasizing. Many norms, though by no means all, direct individuals to behave
unselfishly. More precisely, many norms direct individuals to behave in ways that are
contrary to what would in fact maximize satisfaction of their selfish preferences. Thus, in
saying that people are intrinsically motivated to comply with norms, we are committed to
the claim that people are motivated to comply in a way that frequently leads them to
behave genuinely unselfishly. While philosophers have taken the claim that people are
intrinsically motivated to comply with norms to be obvious and platitudinous, economic
theorists and evolutionary-minded scientists have often argued that such behavior is very
implausible from the perspective of selfish rationality (see Downs, 1957; Barash, 1979, p.
135 and 167). We believe the arguments used by these theorists are deeply flawed. But a
full rebuttal would take us far from the current topic, and here we instead emphasize that
the claim that people are intrinsically motivated to follow norms has substantial direct
empirical justification.
Some of this evidence comes from anthropology and sociology. A central
principle of these disciplines is that people internalize the norms of their group.
According to the internalization hypothesis, individuals exhibit a characteristic style of
motivation in which the individual intrinsically values compliance with moral rules even
9
when there is no possibility of sanction from an external source (Durkheim, 1968 [1912];
Scott, 1971). Internalization is invoked to explain a seemingly obvious and ubiquitous
fact: having been taught to comply with the moral rules of their group, people exhibit a
life-long pattern of highly reliable compliance with the rule. Furthermore, this pattern of
compliance does not seem to depend on overt coercion, or even the threat of coercion, at
each particular instance in which compliance is displayed. Consistent with the
internalization hypothesis, the ethnographic record routinely reports that people view
norms as being distinctive because of their absoluteness, their authority and the manner in
which people regard them as deeply meaningful (see Edel and Edel, 2000). These
features of norms suggest that norm compliance is based on something over and above
instrumental motivation.
Closer to home, the economist Robert Frank has pointed out a number of cases of
norm compliance in day to day life which are not plausibly viewed as the product of
instrumental rationality (Frank, 1988). His examples include tipping at a highway
restaurant which one will never revisit, jumping in a river to save a drowning person,
refraining from littering on a lonely beach, returning a lost wallet containing a substantial
amount of cash, and many others.
Though descriptive data of this sort is compelling enough, a problem for those
who wish to defend the claim that people intrinsically comply with norms is that it is easy
for skeptics to concoct a selfish instrumental motive for what superficially appears to be
intrinsic compliance behavior. For this reason, experimental data that can distinguish the
competing hypotheses is crucial. The social psychologist C. Daniel Batson has, over the
course of a number of years, extensively studied the motivational structure of helping
behavior using a number of ingenious experimental paradigms. Batson finds that helping
behavior is best accounted for on the hypothesis that people promote the welfare of others
as an ultimate end (especially when their empathy is engaged), and not on alternative
hypotheses that treat helping as instrumental towards ulterior benefits such as future
reciprocation, or gaining social approval (Batson, 1991). There is now a large literature
10
in sociology and social psychology which reaches a similar conclusion. Reviewing this
literature, Pilliavin and Charng note:
There appears to be a paradigm shift away from the earlier position that
behavior that appears to be altruistic must, under closer scrutiny, be
revealed as reflecting egoistic motives. Rather, theory and data now being
advanced are more compatible with the view that true altruism - acting
with the goal of benefiting another - does exist and is part of human nature
(Pilliavin and Charng, 1990, p. 27).
But perhaps the most compelling data indicating that people follow norms as
ultimate ends comes from experimental economics, where people’s motivations to
comply with norms of fairness and reciprocity can be precisely detected and quantified.
There is now abundant evidence that in experimental games subjects cooperate at levels
far higher than instrumental rationality alone would predict. For example, subjects
routinely cooperate in one-time only anonymous prisoner’s dilemma games (Marwell and
Ames, 1981). In such games, choosing to cooperate is the “fair” thing to do, but
choosing defect will earn the subject a higher payoff, regardless of what the other person
chooses. Furthermore, these results are obtained even when subjects are explicitly told
that they will play the game only once, and their identity will remain anonymous. The
fact that subjects still routinely choose to cooperate suggests that that they are complying
with norms of fairness and reciprocity as an ultimate end, rather than pursuing what
would satisfy their selfish preferences. There are a large number of other kinds of games,
such as public goods games, the ultimatum game, the centipede game and others in which
similar results have been obtained (see Thaler, 1992, especially chapters 2 and 3 for a
review).
In addition to emphasizing the intrinsic nature of motivations to comply with
moral norms, philosophers have also recognized the intrinsic nature of motivation to
punish norm violations. Kant, famously, was a retributivist who held that punishment for
violations of moral norms is a moral duty and is intrinsically valuable, and a substantial
11
number of other philosophers have endorsed the retributivist position (Kant, 1972 [1887]
pp. 102-107; see Ezorsky, 1972, ch. 2, section 2). Other philosophers associated with
distinct moral traditions have also recognized the important role of duties to punish in the
moral domain. Mill, for example, maintains that moral violations are the ones that we
feel that society ought to punish (Mill, 1979 [1863], ch. 5). And a number of other
philosophers have advanced similar claims (Gibbard, 1990, ch. 3; Moore, 1987). Here
again, we believe that these philosophical intuitions reflect a deep descriptive truth.
Before discussing the empirical literature on intrinsic motivation to punish, it’s
worth re-emphasizing some of the caveats made earlier. In claiming that people are
intrinsically motivated to punish norm violations, we are not claiming that these
motivations always translate into punitive behaviors. Human motivations are multi-
faceted and complex, and people with intrinsic motivations to punish a norm violator may
also have instrumental motivations not to punish. Thus motivations to punish serve to
raise the probability of punitive behaviors, though they needn’t translate into punitive
behaviors in every instance. Furthermore, we are not claiming that every norm violation
generates intrinsic motivations to punish. Rather, our claim is that norm violations that
have the appropriate salience and severity generate motivations to punish. So while there
is a reliable connection between norm violations and motivations to punish, this
connection need not be realized in every occurrence of a norm violation.
There is a large anthropological and sociological literature attesting to the fact that
norm violations elicit both punitive emotions like anger and outrage, and punitive
behaviors like criticism, condemnation, avoidance, exclusion or even physical harm,
from most people within a society, and that these attitudes and behaviors are directed at
rule violators (Roberts, 1979; Sober and Wilson, 1998). Furthermore, many social
scientists have explicitly noted that punishment for norm violation, of this informal type,
is universally present in all societies. For example, ostracism is a human universal
(Brown, 1991), gossip and criticism are human universals (Dunbar, 1997; Wilson et al.,
2000), and in all human groups, systems of sanctions, which utilize ostracism and gossip,
12
as well as other informal sanctions, are applied to those who violate moral norms
(Boehm, 1999; Black, 1998).
But here again it might be argued that, though there is ample evidence that people
are disposed to punish norm violators, they do so for strictly selfish instrumental reasons.
For example, people may punish to send a message to the violator, which produces a
selfish gain for the punisher because the violator is deterred from repeating the offense.
However, there is good evidence that motivations to punish are often truly intrinsic, and
that punishment is not inflicted for selfish instrumental reasons alone.
One particularly striking finding is reported in Haidt and Sabatini (unpublished).
In this study, subjects were shown films in which a normative transgression occurs.
Subjects, who were offered various alternatives endings, preferred endings in which the
perpetrators of the transgression are made to suffer, know the suffering is repayment for
the transgression and suffer in a way that involves public humiliation. More revealingly
though, subjects were also offered an alternative ending in which the perpetrator realizes
what he did was wrong, shows genuine remorse and grows personally as a result.
Subjects’ rejection of this ending suggests that their motivation to punish is not based on
selfish instrumental ends, such as avoiding being harmed by the perpetrator in the future.
Rather, they appear to be motivated by intrinsic motivations to punish the violator.
The most powerful evidence for intrinsic motivation to punish norm violations
comes from experimental economics. Since the early 1990’s there has been a surge of
interest in experimental economics in studying people’s motivations to punish in
controlled laboratory conditions. A large number of studies show that in various
experimental situations and experimental games people will punish others – at
substantial costs to themselves – for violations of normative rules or a normative
conception of fairness. This data is particularly powerful because it permits quantitative
measures of the extent to which motivations to punish are unselfish and instrumentally
irrational.
13
To illustrate the pattern of results in the literature, we’ll describe a study by Fehr
and Gachter (2002). In this study, 240 subjects played a public goods game in groups of
four. Each member of the group was given 20 monetary units (MUs) and could either
invest in a group project or keep the money for himself. For each unit invested, each of
the four group members received four tenths of an MU back. If a subject chose not to
invest, he kept the full one unit. Given these payoffs, if all the subjects invest fully, each
receives 32 units. If all subjects choose not to invest, each receives 20 units. Of course,
if one subject chooses not to invest, but the others invest fully, the “free riding” subject
receives the highest payoff, 44 MUs. Thus, the public goods game sets up a conflict
between collective benefit and selfish interest.
Fehr and Gachter studied behavior in the public goods game under two condition
– a “punishment” condition and a “no punishment” condition. In the punishment
condition, after each period of the game (a period consisted of one round of investment),
subjects were informed of others’ contributions and given an opportunity to punish any
other player. Punishment costs 1 MU for the punisher and subtracts 3 MUs from the
punished person’s payoffs. Thus punishment is a costly act, but it creates an even more
substantial harm for the person being punished. Fehr and Gachter changed the
composition of the group after each period, and ran the game for six total periods.
Subjects did not know the identity of the members of the group in which they were
placed (and all participants knew this fact), so a person could not personally benefit from
the act of punishing, nor could a person build a reputation for contributing or punishing.
Thus, to the extent that punishment deterred free riding, the deterrence benefit was
enjoyed by others. In the no-punishment condition, subjects played an identical game but
for the fact that there was no opportunity to punish (Fehr and Gachter, 2002).
The results of this study were quite striking because they seem to violate a
number of canons of self-interested economic rationality. First of all, Fehr and Gachter
found that subjects in the no punishment condition invested at much higher levels than
self-interested rationality predicts, consistent with our previous claim that people follow
norms of fairness as ultimate ends. Additionally, in the punishment condition, Fehr and
14
Gachter found that subjects punished, punished reliably and punished severely. In the six
periods of the experiment, 84.3% of subjects punished at least once, and 34.3% punished
more than five times during the six periods. Since subjects know that they switch groups
after every period and that their identity remained anonymous after every switch, their
motivations to punish cannot be explained in terms of selfish rationality.
A number of more recent studies have shown an even more striking result. In
various experimental situations and games, people will punish others at some cost to
themselves even if they are merely observers of violations of normative rules or some
normative conception of fairness, and they themselves are not directly affected by the
norm violation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Carpenter et al., forthcoming). In a way, the
existence of “third-party punishment” of this sort is actually fairly obvious and
unsurprising (though it is very surprising from the standpoint of selfish rationality). Our
everyday experience with human beings in a social context reveals that norm violations
elicit powerful feelings of outrage from third parties who aren’t directly harmed by the
violation. In our view, the existence of third party punishment of this sort shows, rather
decisively, that punishment is not performed for mere instrumentally selfish reasons, but
rather is performed for intrinsic reasons.
One final point to make about punitive motivation is that, while children are given
instruction (or at least some kind of social input) with respect to the contents of the norms
of their social group, they are seldom, if ever, given input about the need to punish
violations of norms. Thus it is remarkable that children who acquire normative rules
systematically exhibit punitive attitudes toward those who violate the rules without
having been taught to exhibit these punitive attitudes. For example, children who learn
that hitting babies is wrong, do not need to be taught that one should exhibit anger,
hostility and other punitive attitudes towards those who hit babies (Edwards, 1987).
4. The psychological architecture subserving norms
15
In this section we briefly sketch a theory about the psychological mechanisms
underlying the acquisition and implementation of norms. The theory posits two closely
linked innate mechanisms, one responsible for norm acquisition, the other for norm
implementation. The function of the acquisition mechanism is to identify behavioral cues
indicating that a norm prevails in the local cultural environment, to infer the content of
that norm, and to pass information about the content of the norm on to the
implementation system, where it is stored and used. The acquisition mechanism, we
maintain, begins to operate quite early in development, and its operation is both
automatic and involuntary. People do not need to turn it on and they cannot turn it off –
though it may be the case that the acquisition mechanism gradually turns itself off starting
at some point after adolescence. The implementation mechanism performs a suite of
functions including maintaining a data base of normative rules acquired by the
acquisition mechanism, generating intrinsic motivation to comply with those rule as
ultimate ends, detecting violations of the rules and generating intrinsic motivation to
punish rule violators. Figure 1 is a “boxological” rendition of the mechanisms we’re
positing.
The cluster of mechanisms we’ve sketched provides what we think is a plausible
first pass at explaining many of the facts assembled in the previous two sections. The
innate component dedicated to norm acquisition explains the fact that norms are
universally present, that people acquire the norms of their own group, and that norm
acquisition follows a reliable pattern of ontogenesis which starts quite early in life. The
innate execution component explains why people are intrinsically motivated to comply
with norms and intrinsically motivated to punish norm violators; it also explains why
children manifest punitive attitudes toward norm violators without having been taught to
do so. Of course, positing mechanisms that perform the functions we’ve described is
only the first step in theory building. Nonetheless, for two quite different reasons, we
think it is an important step. First, it makes substantive claims about innate mechanisms
subserving the acquisition and implementation of norms, and it is hard to see how the
facts we’ve assembled in sections 2 and 3 could be explained without positing innate
psychological mechanisms that perform the functions we’ve sketched. Second, while our
16
boxology raises more questions than it answers, it also provides a systematic framework
in which those questions can be addressed. In the section that follows, we’ll discuss
some of the questions which we think our theoretical framework brings into sharper
focus. But before getting on to that we should emphasize that the psychological
mechanisms we’ve described are only part of what will inevitably be a much more
complicated account of the way in which the mind deals with normative rules. Some of
those further complications will be noted in section 5.
FIGURE 3A sketch of the mechanisms underlying the acquisition and implementation of norms that
includes various proposals about the role of explicit reasoning in moral judgment and moral belief formation. Solid lines indicate links that we take to be well supported by evidence; dotted lines
indicate more speculative links.
other emotion triggers
5.6 Innate Constraints and Biases
On the theory we’ve sketched, the function of the norm acquisition mechanism is
to identify norms in the surrounding cultural environment, infer their content and pass
that information along to the implementation component. One way to gain a deeper
understanding of the norm acquisition process – and of the pattern of distribution of
norms across cultures – is to explore the ways in which the acquisition system may be
innately constrained or biased. As a backdrop for thinking about these matters, we’ve
found it useful to consider a null hypothesis which claims that the acquisition system
exhibits no constraints or biases, and that it will acquire all and only those norms that are
present in the child’s cultural environment.3 We’ve dubbed this “the Pac Man thesis,”
inspired by the video game character that gobbles up everything it gets close to. If the
Pac Man thesis is true, then the norm acquisition system is equally unselective and
unconstrained.
There are, however, at least four ways in which the Pac Man thesis might turn out to be
false, and each of these corresponds to a distinct type of constraint or bias on norm
acquisition.
Perhaps the most obvious way for the Pac Man thesis to be mistaken is for some
normative rules to be innate. Though there is a large philosophical literature debating the
best interpretation of innateness claims in psychology (Cowie, 1999; Griffiths, 2002;
Samuels, 2002), for our purposes we can consider a normative rule to be innate if various
genetic and developmental factors make it the case that the rule would emerge in the
norm database in a wide range of environmental conditions, even if (as a result of some
extraordinary set of circumstances) the child’s “cultural parents” – the people she
encounters during the norm acquisition process – do not have the norm in their norm data
3 Though we’ll usually describe the norm acquirer as a “child” this is just a stylistic
convenience – “norm acquirer” is a singularly awkward term. Whether and when the
norm acquisition system shuts down, or slows down, as people mature, are open
questions.
30
base. If there were innate norms of this sort then they would almost certainly be cultural
universals. Barring extraordinary circumstances, we should expect to find them in all
human groups. However, as we noted in section 2, the ethnographic and historical
evidence does not support the existence of such exceptionless universals. So, while there
is still much to be learned, we’re inclined to think that the available evidence does not
support the existence of innate norms.
Another way in which the Pac Man thesis might be false is that there might be an
innately restricted set of possibilities from which all norms must be drawn during the
course of acquisition. One way to unpack the idea of an innately restricted space of
possibilities is by analogy with Noam Chomsky’s principles and parameters approach to
language learning (Chomsky, 1988). According to Chomsky, the language faculty is
associated with a set of parameters that can be set in various permissible ways. The
child’s linguistic experience serves to “toggle” the parameters associated with the
language faculty, thus accounting for important aspects of the child’s mature language
competence. The parameters implicitly define the class of humanly learnable languages,
so if a child were to be confronted with a language outside this class the child would not
learn it. A number of theorists have proposed that a broadly Chomskian principles and
parameters model might provide a useful way to understand moral norm acquisition, and
also serves to explain how norm variability is compatible with the existence of universal
innate constraints (Stich, 1993; Mikhail et al., 1998; Harman, 1999; Nichols in press;
Dwyer this volume) and recent experimental work by Marc Hauser and his colleagues
suggests that there might indeed be universal constraints of a broadly Chomskian sort in
the domain of harm norms (Hauser et al. unpublished).
But there are other ways to understand the idea that norm acquisition is
constrained by an innately restricted set of possibilities, which appear to be importantly
distinct from the Chomskian principles and parameters model. For example, Alan Paige
Fiske has proposed that there are four relational models that structure all human social
exchanges: communal sharing, equality matching, authority ranking and market pricing
(Fiske, 1991). Fiske argues that the diversity of social arrangements and relationships
31
found across human groups can ultimately be understood in terms of the operation of
these four relational models. Also, Richard Shweder and his colleagues have maintained
that moral systems in all human societies are structured under one of the so-called “big
three” families: community, authority and divinity (Shweder et al., 1998). Paul Rozin
and his colleagues expand on this idea with the proposal that each member of the big
three family of moralities has an associated emotion that plays a primary role in
mediating people’s moral reactions – these emotions being contempt, anger and disgust,
respectively (Rozin et al., 1999). Though the ideas proposed by Fiske, Shweder et al. and
Rozin et al. are intriguing, it is not clear whether they are best understood as positing
innate structures that serve to constrain or otherwise limit the space of moral norms that
can be acquired, or whether they positing some other kinds of psychological structures.
A third way for the Pac Man Thesis to be false would be as a result of the
operation of what we call “Sperberian biases,” which we name after anthropologist Dan
Sperber who has probably done more than any one else to emphasize their importance
(Sperber, 1996). The Pac Man Thesis maintains that a child will always end up with an
accurate copy of the norms of her cultural parents. But since no transmission process is
error free, this sort of flawless copying is at best an idealization. Sometimes copying
errors are random, but there are a variety of ways in which copying processes can give
rise to systematic errors. For example, some sorts of normative rules may be more or less
“attractive” due to the way they interact with one’s preferences, aversions, emotions and
other elements of one’s psychology. For these same reasons, or for other reasons, some
normative rules might be easier to detect (i.e. they may be more salient), easier to infer,
or easier to remember, store, or recall. The transmission process will be influenced
systematically by all these factors. When copying errors change less attractive rules into
more attractive ones, the new rules will be more likely to be retained and transmitted, but
when copying errors change more attractive rules into less attractive ones, the new rules
will be more likely to be eliminated. It is these systematic processes affecting norm
transmission that we call “Sperberian biases”. Sperberian biases are typically weak.
They need not play a role in every instance of transmission from a cultural parent to a
child, and often they will affect very few. Nevertheless, when their effects are summated
32
over populations and over time, they generate a fairly strong population-level force which
can have the effect of changing the distribution of norms in the direction favored by the
Sperberian bias.
We can illustrate the operation of Sperberian biases by considering an example.
Shaun Nichols has proposed that disgust acts as a Sperberian bias in the cultural
transmission of etiquette norms (Nichols, 2002). According to Nichols, disgust generates
this bias by making certain kinds of etiquette rules more salient and more easily stored
and recalled, and he marshals some intriguing evidence for these claims. Using data from
16th century etiquette manuals from Northern Europe, Nichols shows that etiquette rules
whose violation engenders disgust are more likely to be part of contemporary etiquette
codes than rules that fail to implicate disgust. This finding suggests that the cumulative
operation of disgust as a bias on the transmission of etiquette rules has had the long-term
effect of shifting the distribution of etiquette rules over time in the direction favored by
the bias. In the same way that disgust might engender a Sperberian bias in the case of
etiquette norms, it’s plausible that other cognitive structures, including various beliefs,
preferences, aversions and emotions, might engender Sperberian biases in the cultural
transmission of other sorts of norms. We are inclined to think that the cross-cultural
distribution pattern of norms described in section 2 suggests that Sperberian biases have
played a very powerful role in the transmission and evolution of norms. But making the
case for this conjecture is a substantial project that will have to wait for another occasion.
(See Sripada et al. in preparation.)
A final way in which the Pac Man thesis might be mistaken turns on the operation
of biases of a very different sort. Thus far we have been tacitly assuming that the cultural
parents to whom a child is exposed all share the same norms. But obviously this is not
always the case. Often a child will be exposed to cultural parents who have themselves
internalized significantly different norms. When this happens, the norm acquisition
mechanism may utilize various selection principles, or model selection biases, in order to
determine which cultural parent to copy. Various selection principles have been
described in the literature (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). These include a prestige bias
33
leading the acquisition system to focus on a high prestige person as a model, and age
and/or gender biases that might, for example, focus the system on a model of the same
sex who is slightly older. Alternatively, the acquisition system might rely on a
conformity bias, adopting the cultural variant which is the most common. There is some
evidence for age and gender biases in the transmission of norms (Harris, 1998), and lots
of evidence for prestige and conformity biases in the transmission of other cultural
variants (Henrich and Gil-white, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998)
. But how, exactly, this aspect of norm acquisition works is very much an open question.
Conclusion
Norms exert a powerful and pervasive influence on human behavior and human
culture. Thus, the psychology of norms deserves to be a central topic of investigation in
cognitive science. Our goal in this essay has been to provide a systematic framework for
this endeavor. We’ve sketched the broad contours of a cluster of psychological
mechanisms that can, we think, begin to explain some of the important facts about norms
that have been recounted in various disciplines. Against the backdrop of the
psychological architecture we’ve proposed, we’ve assembled a collection of open
questions that the cognitive science of norms will have to address in the future. Clearly,
in the study of the psychological processes that subserve norms, there is lots of work still
to do. We will be very well satisfied indeed if our efforts provide a useful framework for
organizing and integrating this work.
34
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