A Fourth Branch of Government? The Power of Bureaucracy: Strength Through Obscurity
Dec 17, 2015
A Fourth Branch of Government?
The Power of Bureaucracy: Strength Through Obscurity
I. Does Bureaucracy Matter? A Case Study
"FEMA is not going to hesitate at all in this storm. We are not going to sit back and make this a bureaucratic process. We are going to move fast, we are going to move quick, and we are going to do whatever it takes to help disaster victims." -FEMA Director Michael Brown, Aug. 28, 2005
"I don't think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees.“ – President Bush, September 1, 2005
"Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job." –President Bush, to FEMA director Michael Brown, while touring hurricane-ravaged Mississippi, Sept. 2, 2005
A. The Damage Done
5
RELATIVE COST BURDEN ON LOUISIANA CITIZENS DWARFS PREVIOUS DISASTERS
FEMA cost estimates for recent US disasters (2005$)
Affected population (Millions)
Cost/ capitaDisaster
FEMA cost estimate($ Millions)
Source:FEMA, US Census 2000, cost estimates adjusted for inflation using CPI
Katrina and Rita – Louisiana (2005) $37,100 4.5 $8,244 World Trade Center (2001) $8,140 19.0 $428 Northridge Earthquake (1994) $9,170 29.8 $308 Hurricane Andrew (1992) $2,500 12.9 $194 Hurricane Iniki (1992) $360 1.1 $329 Loma Prieta Earthquake (1989) $1,360 23.7 $57
State reported deaths fromHurricanes Katrina and RitaIdentified and unidentified victims (12/13/05)
207
AL
2
1,071*
LA MS
113
TX14FL
*1,094 less 23 non-storm related deaths
Source: Louisiana Department of Health and Human Services, ABC News
NEARLY 5x AS MANY LOUISIANANS WERE KILLED BY STORMS THAN ANY OTHER STATE’S CITIZENS
5.2x
Doesn’t account for 3,700 people
still missing
9.5x 77x 547x
B. The Role of Federal Bureaucrats
1. The Long, Long Run: Environmental and Development Policy
History That Contributed to Tragedy
• 1879: Congress authorized ACE to build levees to prevent Spring flooding
• Oil Industry and other development drained, dredged, and built channels and canals throughout wetlands and marshes
• Mississippi River was channeled to empty at continental shelf
Effects of Levees on Mississippi: in Missouri
Results
• New Orleans sank further below sea level as earlier sediments and deposits compacted and sank (no new sediments deposited)
• Mississippi Delta and Barrier Islands began to disappear – erosion and subsidence
• Wetlands and marshes were fragmented, ripped up, and destroyed, leading to recession of coastline
2. The Levees: The Army Corps of Engineers
New Orleans : Areas Below Sea Level
FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINAHURRICANE KATRINA
Army Corps of Army Corps of Engineers conducted Engineers conducted the equivalent of a forensic the equivalent of a forensic investigation at the levees and investigation at the levees and floodwalls of New Orleans, drilling floodwalls of New Orleans, drilling into the earth to examine the soil into the earth to examine the soil and reviewing the design of the and reviewing the design of the structure.structure.
LEARNING FROM HURRICANE LEARNING FROM HURRICANE KATRINAKATRINA
An Army Corps of Engineers document An Army Corps of Engineers document showed that a five-foot layer of peat lies showed that a five-foot layer of peat lies beneath the entire levee system. beneath the entire levee system.
The layer of peat played a major role in the The layer of peat played a major role in the failure, becoming soft and wet and moving failure, becoming soft and wet and moving as the water level rose during the hurricane.as the water level rose during the hurricane.
FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINAHURRICANE KATRINA
The floodwaters simply pushed the entire The floodwaters simply pushed the entire Levee structure out of its way, sliding it in a Levee structure out of its way, sliding it in a way that allowed the water to flow out of way that allowed the water to flow out of Lake Ponchartrain into New Orleans.Lake Ponchartrain into New Orleans.
FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINAHURRICANE KATRINA
The conclusion is that faulty design, The conclusion is that faulty design, inadequate construction, or some inadequate construction, or some combination of the two, are the likely combination of the two, are the likely causes of the breaching of the floodwalls causes of the breaching of the floodwalls along the 17th Street and London Avenue along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals.canals.
These two breaches were the source of These two breaches were the source of most of the flooding of New Orleans.most of the flooding of New Orleans.
CAUSES OF FAILURECAUSES OF FAILURE
Katrina’s storm surge Katrina’s storm surge overtopped overtopped some some levee sections.levee sections.
The cascade of water The cascade of water eroded soilseroded soils from from the base of the landward side of the levee, the base of the landward side of the levee, causing it to fail.causing it to fail.
CAUSES OF FAILURECAUSES OF FAILURE
In some levee sections, In some levee sections, water water percolated under the sheet percolated under the sheet pilingspilings through layers of peat, sand, and through layers of peat, sand, and clay and bubbled up on the other side.clay and bubbled up on the other side.
CAUSES OF FAILURECAUSES OF FAILURE
The percolation failures tended to occur The percolation failures tended to occur where the pilings were driven only 3-4 m where the pilings were driven only 3-4 m
((10 or 11 feet)10 or 11 feet) into the ground.into the ground. Where pilings were driven 8 m (Where pilings were driven 8 m (25 feet25 feet), ),
the levees kept the city safe.the levees kept the city safe.
CAUSES OF FAILURECAUSES OF FAILURE
Percolation failuresPercolation failures may have may have weakened other sections of the levee weakened other sections of the levee system that now appear to have survived system that now appear to have survived Katrina.Katrina.
CAUSES OF FAILURECAUSES OF FAILURE
The The junctions between different junctions between different kinds of levees kinds of levees often were “weak often were “weak spots.” spots.”
""If it's earth versus concrete, the If it's earth versus concrete, the earth will loseearth will lose.” .”
FLAWS IN CONSTRUCTION THAT FLAWS IN CONSTRUCTION THAT NEED TO BE FIXEDNEED TO BE FIXED
USE OF WEAK, POORLY COMPACTED USE OF WEAK, POORLY COMPACTED SOILSOIL
INADEQUATE NUMBER OF STEEL INADEQUATE NUMBER OF STEEL PILINGS TO ANCHOR FLOOD WALLS TO PILINGS TO ANCHOR FLOOD WALLS TO SUBSURFACE STRATASUBSURFACE STRATA
3. The Response: FEMA
Initial Warnings – Or CYA?
a. Pre-Katrina FEMA
1993-2000: FEMA transformed from Cold War civil defense organization (>50% of funds assigned to post-nuclear war missions) to disaster relief agency Northridge Quake-Response w/in 2 hours
with troops and rations. Rebuilt w/in a week. Hurricane Camille (2nd worst) - Red Cross set
up shelters for 85K before it hit. Cleared 11M tons of debris in months.
Hurricane Andrew: 5K troops deployed w/in 3 days.
b. 2002 Reorganization: Department of Homeland Security Impetus was a 9/11 Terrorist Attack;
Shift in focus to terrorism vs. natural disaster created personnel/expertise issues.
Created Additional Levels of Bureaucracy; Lack of a Clear Plan & FEMA Priority within
DHS; Delays in Navigating Chain of Commands; Lack of Coordination and Communication
between federal-state-local authorities.
c. FEMA failures during/after Katrina
Prior to the hurricane Little advance planning, stockpiling of necessaries (despite
commitment to pre-supply water, ice, generators medicine) Only 7 of 28 SAR teams dispatched – no personnel in N.O.
until after Katrina passes Most supplies allocated to states other than Louisiana
(esp. Alabama) After hurricane
FEMA waits for specific state/local requests instead of mounting searches, busing evacuees
Mismanagement of transportation and logistics (no buses, food for Superdome!)
Hundreds of firefighters delayed by days of community relations/sexual harassment training
FEMA requests non-response by other state/local agencies (!), fails to use available military resources
II. Key Features of the Federal Bureaucracy
A. History: Created by the New Deal
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
4000000
45000001
81
6
18
51
18
71
19
01
19
21
19
31
19
41
19
45
19
51
19
71
19
81
19
85
19
95
20
01
# of Employees
B. Orientation: Dominated by Defense
627400207900
152200141500
9880068800
10750065700
4000029800
1640017200103004600
0 200000 400000 600000 800000
Defense
Vet Affairs
Treasury
Justice
Ag
Interior
Trans
HHS
Commerce
State
Energy
Labor
HUD
Ed
Civilians
C. Size: Smaller than State/Local Bureaucracies
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Federal
State
Local
Number in Millions2002
D. Composition: Highest Ranks Filled By White Males
0102030405060708090
100
GS 1-4
GS 5-8
GS 9-1
2
GS 13-
15
Execu
tive
Hispanics
AfricanAmericans
Women
Men
2001
E. Organization
1. Key Dimension: Access to President2. Order:
a. White House Staff – Greatest Access (Informal Power)
b. Executive Office of the President (EOP) – Direct Access, Especially by Key Agencies
c. Cabinet – No longer a decision-making body. Access to President declining.
d. Independent Agencies and Government Corporations – Limited Access But Substantial Autonomy
Overview: The Executive Branch
The White House Staff: Informal Power
Overview: The Executive Branch
The President
Council ofEconomic Advisors
National EconomicCouncil
Domestic PolicyCouncil
Council onEnvironmenta
lQuality
National SecurityCouncil
Office ofAdministration
Office of Management And Budget
Office of Faith-BasedAnd Community
Relations
Office ofNational AIDS
Policy
White HouseOffice
Office of ScienceAnd
Technology Policy
Office of the UnitedStates Trade
Representative
Office of theVice President
Office of NationalDrug Control Policy
2005
The EOP: First Line of Policy-Making
THE EOP: Recent Trends
Pres. Campaign
Capitol HillExec. BranchExec. BranchMost Common
Experience
29101026% Home State
11883% Minorities
2829145% Women
45454345Average Age
Bush II
2001
N=65
Clinton
1993
N=72
Bush
1989
N=50
Reagan
1981
N=61
Overview: The Executive Branch
Overview: The Executive Branch
The Outer Rim: Other Bureaucracies Independent executive agencies
Report directly to the president and are not under a cabinet secretary.
Placed outside departments for political reasons including the president wanting to keep a closer eye on them or avoid interference, increase their effectiveness or make them more prestigious.
Independent regulatory commissions Designed to be independent. Bipartisan with fixed terms. Can do things that would be politically unpopular (and thus
very hard for the President and Congress to do). Government corporations
When Congress puts the government in the business of providing services a private corporation might usually provide
Often created when the services aren’t being provided and aren’t likely to be without government involvement
Independent Agencies and Government Corporations
III. How Much Autonomy Do Bureaucrats Have?
A. The Principal-Agent Problem1. Problem: Need for people (principals) to
delegate some tasks to others (agents), but they may have own agendas
2. Solution: Incentives to make agent’s interest identical to principal’s interest
3. Difficulties:a. Individual accountability promotes backstabbing
rather than teamworkb. Team accountability promotes free-ridingc. Agents have more expertise than principalsd. Agents are assigned multiple tasks – rewarding
one leads to poorer performance in other areas
4. Implications
a. Key to autonomy: Who is the principal?
b. Multiple principals (e.g. President and Congress) increase bureaucratic autonomy
c. Larger gap in expertise between principal and agent increases autonomy
B. History
1. Early Republic: Emphasis on respectability, individual incentives, long-term service
2. Jacksonian Era: Spoils system, emphasis on rotation and brief service. Intended to democratize system but leads to corruption and patronage.
3. The Rise of Bureaucratization
a. Bureaucratization solved problems of spoils system. Specialization and clearly defined jobs could be
mastered more quickly. Hierarchies more closely monitored and controlled
subordinate officers. Record keeping was meticulous. Government became more impersonal. And red tape was born.
b. New Problems: Civil Service and Delegation• How do you keep an agent faithful? How do you avoid
“agency loss” or “capture” by “natives?” Career bureaucrats develop their own personal and
institutional interests, and often act on them. Can become non-responsive to citizens and elected
officials. Difficult to “punish” such behavior. Agents become experts in their policy domains.
Their actions are often shielded from outside oversight (hidden action).
Civil servants have access to information that is not available to the public or to other branches of government
They may not be willing to share this information if it goes against their goals (hidden information)
C. Agency Capture1. Iron Triangles (a.k.a. Subgovernments)
Bureaucracy
Tobacco Division of the Department of
Agriculture
Congressional Subcommittees
Subcommittee of the House and Senate
Agriculture Committees
Interest Groups
Tobacco lobby, including both farmers and
manufacturers
Info about industry
Legislation affecting tobacco farmers and other members of
the industry
Approve higher budget
requests
Informatio
n
Help with
consti
tuent
complaints
Rulings on tobacco
production and prices
Information about
industry
Support for agencies
budget request
Campaign Contributions
2. Clientele Agencies
a. Directed by law to foster and promote the interests of a particular group or segment of American society
b. Clients organize to support the agency, thus leading to the “iron triangle”
Example: Reagan promised to dismantle the Departments of Energy and Education. Why wasn’t he successful?
3. Capture Theory
a. Thesis: agencies are captured and controlled by the very interests they’re supposed to regulate.
b. Reasons:i. Weak agencies vulnerable to political
pressureii. Special interest groups more powerful
than general interest groupsiii. Underfunded/overworked agencies rely on
cooperation for success, regulated industries for key information
D. “Marrying the Natives”
Once-loyal officials sometimes become agents of their departments. Bureaucratic culture: persistent, patterned way of
thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within the organization.
Bureaucrats imbued with their agency’s culture come to dislike interference from outsiders
More likely in final years of Presidential term – officials’ future careers depend on personal success
IV. Bureaucratic Decision-Making: What do they do with autonomy?
A. Bureaucratic Politics
1. Organizations shape preferences: “Where you stand depends on where you sit”
2. Individuals use informal power to fight organizational constraints: “Who you know…” determines “pull”
3. Best predictor of bureaucratic decision is weighted median “voter” among stakeholders (bargaining produces coalitions)
B. Pathologies of Bureaucracy
1. Clientelism: serving interest groups behind program
2. Parochialism: concentration on getting the agency’s job done (blind to trade-offs)
B. Pathologies of Bureaucracy
3. Incrementalism: slow implementation of new programs
4. Arbitrariness: use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (regularized procedures) for efficiency
5. Satisficing: Choosing “good enough” rather than pursuing perfection
B. Pathologies of Bureaucracy
6. Imperialism: expanding agency operations and taking on more responsibilities
7. Acheson’s Rule: A memorandum is written not to inform the reader but to protect the writer
8. 51-49 principle: Decisions appear to be based on overconfidence (incentive to misrepresent 51% certainty as 100% for bargaining purposes)
9. Groupthink: Hierarchic groups reinforce conformity, produce poor decisions
V. Controlling the Fourth Branch
A. Redundancy: Praiseworthy?
General finding: When two or more bureaucracies assigned same task, competition between them increases efficiency!
Cost is unnecessary duplication of effort. (Save $ = Slower, Less Satisfying Results)
B. The Power of Procedural Rules
The amended US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 requires pharmaceutical companies to prove that a drug is safe and efficacious before marketing it.
The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 requires that the EPA must prove that a new chemical is hazardous to human health or the environment before regulating it.
Result: few new drugs are approved and virtually no chemicals have been proven hazardous.
C. Which branch exercises most control?
1. Consensus: Congress controls most effectively through parallel committee system
2. Political appointees more likely to be controlled by President (loyal to President instead of organization’s budget)
3. Judicial review limited (Chevron deference) except where agencies act as courts (i.e. immigration judges)
VI. How Do Bureaucrats Influence the President?
A. Institutionalized EOP constrains President – textbook (Chapter 9)
B. How can Presidents de-institutionalize EOP?
1. Political criteria for technocrats and scientists
2. Reduce staff for Congress-mandated sections
C. How do Presidents use the EOP and Cabinet?
(next lecture: Making Foreign and Domestic Policy)