UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW FAULTY OF MODERN LANGUAGES INSTITUTE OF ENGLISH STUDIES Magdalena Wieczorek Humour as a Carrier of Meaning in Sitcom Discourse: A Data-Based Study from a Relevance-Theoretic Perspective This dissertation is presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD, written under the supervision of dr hab. Agnieszka Piskorska Warsaw 2021
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A Data-Based Study from a Relevance-Theoretic Perspect
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UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW
FAULTY OF MODERN LANGUAGES
INSTITUTE OF ENGLISH STUDIES
Magdalena Wieczorek
Humour as a Carrier of Meaning
in Sitcom Discourse: A Data-Based Study
from a Relevance-Theoretic Perspective
This dissertation is presented in partial fulfilment
1.2. Humour: its definitions, manifestations and the like ................................................................................ 20
1.2.1. Definitions and categories of humour ............................................................................................................. 21
1.2.2. Types of conversational humour ...................................................................................................................... 26
1.2.2.1. Focus on narrative forms .............................................................................................................. 27
Personal anecdotes .................................................................................................................................................. 28
Jointly produced narratives .................................................................................................................................... 29
1.2.2.2. Focus on the elements linguistic aggression/ impoliteness ........................................................ 29
1.2.2.3. Focus on formal structures ............................................................................................................ 32
1.2.4.1. Cue Theory .................................................................................................................................... 36
1.3. Families of humour theories ....................................................................................................................... 37
1.3.3.1. The concept of incongruity ........................................................................................................... 48
1.3.3.2. The resolution of incongruity ....................................................................................................... 52
1.4. Incongruity as bisociation ........................................................................................................................... 55
1.5. Incongruity resolution as a two-stage model ............................................................................................. 56
Application to situation comedy ................................................................................................................................ 58
1.6. Incongruity resolution as a catastrophe model .......................................................................................... 61
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 62
1.7. Incongruity as a script opposition/ overlap ............................................................................................... 64
1.7.1. Semantic Script Theory of Humour ................................................................................................................ 64
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 67
1.7.2. General Theory of Verbal Humour ................................................................................................................. 69
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 71
1.8. Incongruity as schema conflict ................................................................................................................... 74
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 76
1.9. Incongruity resolution as a graded salience hypothesis ............................................................................ 78
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 80
1.10. Incongruity resolution as a forced reinterpretation model........................................................................ 81
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 82
1.11. Incongruity resolution as the MGI/SCI schema ........................................................................................ 84
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 86
1.12. Incongruity resolution as a garden-path, red-light and crossroad mechanism ....................................... 87
Application to situation comedy ............................................................................................................................... 89
1.13. Criticism of incongruity and incongruity theories .................................................................................... 92
2.3. Relevance Theory ..................................................................................................................................... 106
2.3.2. Communication ................................................................................................................................................. 108
2.3.3. Inference and Comprehension ....................................................................................................................... 111
2.4. Humour in RT ........................................................................................................................................... 113
2.4.1. Yus’ Intersecting Circles Model ................................................................................................................... 114
2.4.2. Sociological/ cultural perspective ................................................................................................................. 121
Epistemic vigilance and the cultural spread ........................................................................................................... 125
Stereotypical information ........................................................................................................................................ 127
2.4.3. Relevance-theoretic analysis of sitcoms ...................................................................................................... 129
2.4.4. Metarepresentation and the Mind-Reading Ability .................................................................................. 130
2.4.5. Implicitness, Mutual Manifestness and Recipient’s Cognitive Environment..................................... 132
2.4.6. Intentionality and Metarepresentation: Three Modes of Interpretation ............................................... 134
2.4.7. Weak Communication and Cognitive Overload ....................................................................................... 138
2.4.8. Poetic Effects and Non-propositional Effects ............................................................................................ 140
3.2. Comedy and its genres ............................................................................................................................... 148
3.3.1. Characteristic features ...................................................................................................................................... 150
3.4. The origins and role of sitcoms ................................................................................................................. 152
3.5. The representation of the family ............................................................................................................... 154
4.2. Bergson’s (1905) humour as a social corrective ..................................................................................... 168
4.3. Martineau’s (1972) model of social functions ........................................................................................ 170
4.4. Ziv’s (1984) social goals .......................................................................................................................... 173
4.4.1. Social function ................................................................................................................................................... 174
4.6.2. Power ................................................................................................................................................................... 180
4.7. Zajdman’s (1995) humour as a face-threatening act .............................................................................. 183
4.8. Boxer and Cortés-Conde’s (1997) degrees of teasing ............................................................................ 184
4.9. Fredrickson’s (1998) broaden-and-build theory ..................................................................................... 186
4.10. Holmes and Marra’s (2002) subversive humour .................................................................................... 188
4.11. Meyer’s (2000) humour as a unifier and divider .................................................................................... 191
4.12. Martin’s (2007) psychological and interpersonal functions .................................................................. 194
4.12.1. Psychological function .................................................................................................................................. 195
4.12.2. Interpersonal function .................................................................................................................................... 195
4.13. Discussion and conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 196
Chapter V. Humour as a multifunctional strategy in the sitcom Modern Family
5.2. Cognition, relevance, incongruity and affect .......................................................................................... 201
5.3. Mockumentary style and sitcom aesthetics ............................................................................................. 202
5.3.1. The code of realism .......................................................................................................................................... 204
5.3.2. Scripted communication vs natural conversations .................................................................................... 205
5.4. Methodology and the subjectivity problem ............................................................................................. 207
5.5. Research hypotheses and questions ......................................................................................................... 210
5.5.1. About the cast of Modern Family ................................................................................................................. 212
5.5.2. About the sitcom and its stereotypical load ................................................................................................ 214
5.5.3. Non-linguistic incongruities and contrasts .................................................................................................. 217
5.5.4. The viewer as the main recipient ................................................................................................................... 219
5.6. The analysis ............................................................................................................................................... 220
5.7. The findings ............................................................................................................................................... 223
5.7.1. The functions conveyed by dint of humor ................................................................................................... 227
Disclosing character-specific information .......................................................................................................... 230
Soliciting support .................................................................................................................................................. 237
Social norm-related functions .............................................................................................................................. 250
Conveying social norms .................................................................................................................................. 251
Challenging social norms ................................................................................................................................ 252
Providing a puzzle ................................................................................................................................................ 260
A linguistic play ............................................................................................................................................... 260
A non-linguistic play ....................................................................................................................................... 263
Providing a cultural reference .............................................................................................................................. 264
Showing off ........................................................................................................................................................... 266
Conveying a serious message .............................................................................................................................. 268
Model, Yus’ (2003) MGI/SCI schema and Dynel’s (2012b) IR mechanisms. Then, their
theoretical potential to account for humour in sitcoms will be critically assessed, taking into
account that all of the presented theories have been primarily intended to account for jokes. As
will be shown, some of the IR theories echo the central proposal of Koestler’s (1964) bisociation
cognitive theory so his theory seems to be a reference point for the studies of many other
approaches. In addition, throughout the present chapter, I tend to offer examples of humour,
which Canestrari (2010) dubs off-stage humour – one that arises on the recipients’ layer and it
is very common in cinematic discourse. My data culled from Modern Family is no different in
this respect as there are few humorous interactions in which the fictional characters are amused
or entertained, apart from the viewers.
The concept of incongruity and its consequent resolution is treated as a necessary
mechanism, which underlies most, if not all, occurrences of humour. However, there are
additional factors which need to be coupled with incongruity to make it comic: surprise, the
comprehender’s playful mode and novelty of a stimulus. The reason for discussing other
elements is that these factors, together with incongruity, provide a broad picture of humour.
In addition to the three broad families of humour theories, Mills’ (2009) cue theory is
presented, viewed as the fourth theory of humour that is particularly valid to the study of
sitcoms. The Cue Theory, presented in Section 1.2.4.1., lays strong emphasis on
contextualisation cues, i.e. non-verbal behaviour, verbal message, prosodic and paralinguistic
clues, which introduce the play frame. These cues enable the production crew to place viewers
on the right humorous footing. The motivation behind developing this alternative humour
theory was that superiority, relief and incongruity approaches have originally been developed
to study jokes, which are short comic moments: “[s]itcom, however, is made up of many comic
moments1, alongside a whole host of other narrative and aesthetic factors, which means to
analyse the joke alone is to ignore the variety of tools the genre employs” (Mills 2009: 92).
1 In a similar vein, Zillmann (2000) believes that joke-telling in television sitcoms is composed of ‘miniatures’ –
humorous episodes which appear in quick succession.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 20 -
1.2. Humour: its definitions, manifestations and the like
The area of humour studies is vast and there have been many attempts to precisely define
humour and subcategorise its manifestations. Before presenting some definitions of humour,
we need to be aware of a number of factors affecting a lack of unitary definition. First, the
notion of humour is broad, as it comprises all instances of phenomena regarded as amusing,
laughable or funny (Attardo 2001b). The anthropologist Eichinger Ferro-Luzzi (1990) holds
that humour cannot be defined because it lacks essence, which is contrary to what Attardo
(1994) advocates, stating that there are essentialist theories of humour that aim to provide
necessary and sufficient conditions of humour. Second, researchers preoccupied with humour
studies offer their understanding of the phenomenon on the strength of their field of expertise.
In other words, the idea of what constitutes an amusing, laughable or humorous matter can be
differently understood by psychologists or sociologists. Third, there is no unifying criterion in
the treatment of humour and its adjacent terms like laughter, the comic, joke, wit, all of which
are sometimes used interchangeably (Keith-Spiegel 1972, Raskin 1985). Nevertheless, some
attempts at defining humour will be presented below.
There is an abundance of taxonomies of categories of conversational humour and humour
in general (for example, Raskin 1985, Ross 1998, Fry 1963, Nash 1985, Berger 1993, Norrick
1993, 2003; Attardo 2001a, Martin 2007, Dynel 2009b, Tsakona 2017). On the other hand,
according to Attardo (2001b) such taxonomies are of limited usefulness, since they are based
on different parameters, be it function, structure, or relevance to ongoing conversation. Also,
diversity in the means and situations in which humour may occur accounts for differences in
the categorisations, for example radio resorts to crack jokes and witticisms, television employs
a great deal of sitcoms, blooper shows, stand-up performances or political satire, while
newspapers print comic strips and cartoons (Martin 2007: 10). Norrick (2003) claims that it is
no use compiling an exhaustive and clear-cut classification of humour types since the groups
may overlap in natural conversation. Bearing certain restrictions in mind, a clarification is
required: some authors referred to humour in general terms, i.e. any occurrence that can be
potentially amusing to the recipient, encompassing for instance non-verbal humour. Hence,
Section 1.2.1. presents possible definitions and categories of humour as well as humour-related
notions. Section 1.2.2. concentrates on some classifications of the instances of conversational
humour.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 21 -
1.2.1. Definitions and categories of humour
First, this section delineates selected notions used in humour literature, such as conversational
humour, conversational joking/ telling, verbally expressed humour, verbalised humour, or
humour in interaction. Second, it lists possible classification of the types subsumed under the
term humour, ranging from verbal humour to situational humour to jokes. Third, it presents the
basic distinction between jokes and various manifestations of conversational humour, with close
attention devoted to the former, as the latter will be discussed in detail in the following section.
The term humour encompasses a range of linguistic and non-linguistics types, with the
latter communicated through body language or pictures (Norrick 2004, Dynel 2009b).
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, humour is “that quality of action, speech, or
writing which excites amusement; oddity, jocularity, facetiousness, comicality, fun” (Martin
2007: 5). The psychologist Harvey Mindess (1971: 21) conceptualises the notion in question as
“a frame of mind, a manner of perceiving and experiencing life. It is a kind of outlook, a peculiar
point of view, and one which has great therapeutic power” (in Raskin 1985: 7). The psychiatrist
William Fry (1963) equates humour with play, which is established by cues.
The term conversational humour (abbreviated as CH) can also be dubbed conversational
joking (Norrick 2003), situational humour (Fry 1963) or humour in interaction, which
underlines the interactional aspect of humorous encounters (Norrick and Chiaro 2009).
According to Dynel (2009a, 2009b), CH includes any humorous form in interaction, comprising
simple lexemes or phrasemes2, longer utterances and humorous exchanges integrated into non-
humorous discourse. Using simple terms, Hay (2000: 715) offers the definition of humour in
conversation as “anything the speaker intends to be funny”3. However, she cites Tannen’s
(1993: 166) studies, where it is claimed that “the “true” intention or motive of any utterance
cannot be determined from examination of linguistic form alone” since a sociological
component is also necessary. Kosińska (2008a: 25) suggests that CH is “any instance of humour
– activity with the intended perlocutionary effect of inducing laughter, occurring without
serious disruption of the natural flow of conversation”. Hence, CH is a blanket term for verbal
and non-verbal manifestations, performed impromptu or recalled verbatim (Dynel 2009b).
2 Lexemes and phrasemes (Mel’cˇuk 1995, in Dynel 2009b) are very short lexical constituents whose humorous effect
is mainly dependent upon creativity or a novel juxtaposition of elements which are assigned a unique semantic
meaning. The former type is dubbed neologisms, the humour of which is emergent in the course of morphological
processes. The latter type encompasses semantic phrasemes resting upon the odd connection of two unrelated words
and phrasemes comprising already existing phrases which are attributed a new meaning (Dynel 2009b). 3 This concise definition is particularly valid for my research given the fact that the sitcom Modern Family lacks
the laugh track and hence the data comprises the instances which are potentially funny for the viewers.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 22 -
There is also a difference between two speech activities: joke telling and conversational
joking. While the latter requires the initiation of the play frame which, in turn, operates upon in-
group knowledge, joke-telling “is a highly conventionalized and socially bound speech behavior”
(Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997: 277). These two may be introduced through cues, typically
introductory statements. In the case of joke telling, cues are formalised like “Have you heard the
one about...”. As regards conversational joking, there are too many cues to be listed since it is
upon communicator’s creativity how to signal a humorous message (Boxer and Cortés-Conde
1997, cf. Martin 2007).
Ritchie (2000, 2004) offers the terms verbally expressed humour (VEH) and verbalised
humour to denote units of humour, which are communicated solely through the linguistic
system, for example puns, humorous riddles, or amusing epigrams, as divergent from
humour, sarcasm, mocking) and formal structures (puns, allusions). It needs to be highlighted
6 The types gags, wisecracks and epigrams are succinctly described in Chapter III since these manifestations are
particularly relevant to sitcoms (see Section 3.2.)
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 27 -
that there is no intention to offer a strict and flawless systematisation of types of CH as this
would probably be an unattainable goal. The sole purpose of the classification presented below
is to offer a point of reference for my further analysis.
1.2.2.1. Focus on narrative forms
Under the heading of narrative forms of humour, we may find three forms, viz. witticisms,
personal anecdotes and jointly produced narratives. The reason for the choice of the name
‘narrative’ is that there is a narrative structure, i.e. some kind of a story, in these manifestations.
Moreover, it is claimed by Neale and Krutnik (1990) that the types like jokes, gags and
wisecracks (witticisms) are not always self-contained and easily dividable from the rest of
conversation but they require the narrative context.
Witticisms
A wisecrack, or witticism, is defined as a witty and clever remark, which can convey a biting
or ironic comment. This kind of humour manifestation is recurrent in sitcoms, as indicated in
Section 3.2. (Neale and Krutnik 1990). In the sitcom Modern Family, there are many instances
of witticisms incorporated into the fabric of fictional communication, which are local/
momentary and hence integral part of narrative contexts. There is one episode of Modern
Family, which is contingent on the use of witticisms and these form the main storyline of this
episode. Some of these wisecracks are repeated verbatim or in a slightly altered form in
subsequent episodes. In episode 2 titled “Schooled” (season 4), the witticisms are collected in
the book entitled Phil’s-osophy since these bright statements are made by the character named
Phil and are part of his personal philosophy:
(1) (a) Always look people in the eye. Even if they’re blind. Just say, “I’m looking you in the eye”.
(b) The most amazing things that can happen to a human being will happen to you if you just lower your
expectations.
(c) Never be afraid to reach for the stars because even if you fall, you’ll always be wearing a parent-chute.
(d) Take a lesson from parakeets. If you’re ever feeling lonely, just eat in front of a mirror.
(e) Success is 1% inspiration, 98% perspiration, and 2% attention to detail.
(f) You can tell a lot about a person from his biography.
(g) Watch a sunrise at least once a day.
(h) If you love something, set it free, unless it’s a tiger.
(i) When life gives you lemonade, make lemons. Life will be all like, “what?!”.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 28 -
Some of the witticisms presented above are uttered by Phil, while others are provided by the
members of his family glancing directly into the camera. Judging by an expression of disbelief
on their faces, they cannot glean the proper meaning behind those conversational episodes. Phil
is oblivious to the fact that his life lessons are not taken seriously by his family and that these
witticisms create humour on the part of viewers and possibly fictional characters. In general,
the humour is produced when witticisms state the obvious (Holmes and Marra 2002a), for
example it is general knowledge that a biography publishes (un)authorised information (1f) on
somebody’s life, while the sun rises and sets once a day (1g). There is a play on a phonological
level, viz. parachute vs parent-chute (1c) or there is a rephrasing of the existing proverbial
phrases, i.e. when life gives you lemons, make lemonade vs when life gives you lemonade, make
lemons (1i). Given their simplicity, some of these wisecracks may be regarded as being
accidentally irrelevant (Wilson 1999, 2005) since the viewer does not learn anything new, in
particular from those in (1f) and (1g).
Personal anecdotes
One of the ways to create rapport with other conversationalists is to tell a personal anecdote
about one’s own or someone else’s life, with the latter being less pompous (Norrick 1993).
Personal anecdotes “are told as true reports of funny events experienced by the teller” and
usually contain an explicit marker, such as “the funniest thing happened to me” or “I remember
when I was five or six” (Norrick 2003: 1339). As opposed to jokes, anecdotes are not disruptive
but are topically coherent and hence tightly interwoven into continuing conversation. For this
reason, the episode of storytelling requires actively involved participants who may eventually
become co-tellers and exchange their own experience. The most desirable hearer’s reaction is
laughter, which generally occurs at the end (Norrick 2003). However, anecdotes do not contain
a standard punchline, whose function is to test the audience’s understanding and thus laughter
may be invited right after the set-up part. In addition, Dynel (2009b) notes that a dramatic
anecdote may be turned into a humorous one to foster laughter, especially through the use of
colourful language, i.e. witty lexemes and phrasemes.
Swapping humorous stories helps collect social information about people involved in
conversation (Goffman 1959, in Norrick 1993), i.e. we may find out about norms and attitudes
about a certain topic, or what communicators have in common. Other functions include
projecting a positive self-image and expressing one’s sense of humour, which establish
sympathy and solidarity (Norrick 1993).
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 29 -
Jointly produced narratives
While hearers are expected to provide an evaluative comment in personal anecdotes, jointly
produced narratives do not invite any reaction (Norrick 1993). Another difference between the
two categories is that we may perceive an equal distribution of social power in a narrative
because any interactant is entitled to provide a part of their mutual story. Hence, a jointly produced
narration does not concern only a person who has the floor but others present during conversation.
Since the collective recollection of a story lacks any punchline, laughter may be prompted right
after the initiator’s turn. Moreover, speakers, after having produced the narrative, return to the
serious turn-taking interaction, while a personal anecdote invites hearer’s attention.
The function of a jointly produced narrative is not a test for comprehension but rather a
platform for conversationalists to promote solidarity via turning past events into mutual
experiences (Norrick 1993). Rapport is also maintained when every speaker recalls own personal
story, which helps to establish the common ground, for instance the type of films we like.
1.2.2.2. Focus on the elements linguistic aggression/ impoliteness
There are several linguistic types of conversational humour, some of which aim to deliver a
linguistic attack upon the addressee or oneself. An impolite communicative act in fictional
discourse leads to social disharmony and conflict among actors, which is captivating to the
audience. On the one hand, impoliteness can be aggressive but on the other, it can be
entertaining, depending on the speaker’s intention and hearer’s recognition (Culpeper 1996,
1998, 2005). Among aggressive humorous types, Norrick (1993, also Norrick and Spitz 2008)
enumerates sarcasm, mocking/ self-mocking and banter, whereas Dynel (2009b) mentions
banter, self-denigrating (self-mocking) humour, retorts, teasing and put-downs. There are types
of humour that can be described as humorously aggressive (affiliative humour) and genuinely
aggressive (disaffiliative humour), with the latter being unhumorous to the butt of the attack.
As for disaffiliative instances, it encompasses sarcasm, disparagement, putdowns, ridicule and
mockery (Dynel 2013a, 2013b; see Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann 2003).
Self-denigrating humour (self-directed, self-mocking) (Zillman and Stocking 1976,
Norrick 1993, Zajdman 1995, Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997, Dynel 2009b) is the one in which
the speaker puts himself/ herself in the position of the butt. It proves to be a useful tool in
vulnerable situations as a communicator shows that s/he can handle difficulties with
equanimity. Any instance of self-mockery may be understood either as self-teasing or self-
putdown, with the latter being a part of self-presentation politics (Zillman and Stocking 1976,
Dynel 2009b). Norrick (1993) believes that self-mocking performs the functions of informing
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 30 -
others of one’s sense of humour, which is a virtue in today’s world, and of ratifying group
values. In addition, it conveys the function of displaying individual social identity with a
bonding effect (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997), when the communicator voices concern for
hearer’s positive face, which is in fact the way to conceal the speaker’s feeling of superiority
(Zajdman 1995).
Putdown humour/ hostile humour is genuinely aggressive and is rarely regarded as
humorous by the target (Zillmann and Stocking 1976, Dynel 2009b). For instance, the turn You
must be an experiment in Artificial Stupidity (Dynel 2009b: 1294) is hardly amusing to the
addressee since it unambiguously issues a maximal face threat instead of reinforcing
cohesiveness (Zajdman 1995). On the other hand, studies conducted by Mateo and Yus (2000,
2013) show that insults may be used to convey a social bonding intention or to express
admiration. As regards putdowns in mass mediated discourse, a fictional character or a
television host intends to amuse another actor and more importantly, viewers, for the benefit of
whom fictional discourse is created. When a putdown is initiated in spontaneous conversation,
it may pass unnoticed or the communicator can explain that a remark is rather a tease, which is
not intended to inflict damage. Hence, to differentiate an instance of aggressive teasing from a
putdown is to acknowledge the speaker’s intention (Dynel 2009b). Moreover, given pre-
communicative categories, it is stated that men are inclined to tease others and produce
putdowns, while female more often engage in self-denigration (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997,
cf. Zillmann and Stocking 1976).
The concept teasing is problematic because of a myriad of pragmatic functions it performs
(Dynel 2009b), such as pretence of hostility coupled with friendliness, or face enhancement
covered by face threat (Sinkeviciute 2013). A tease is not designed to disclose true information
and hence it is oriented towards solidarity and positive relationship enhancement (Kotthoff
1996; cf. Sinkeviciute 2013). Boxer and Cortés-Conde (1997) offer a continuum of cases of
teasing enclosed within the joking frame, ranging from bonding to nipping to biting, which are
not mutually exclusive and thus the addressee needs to rely on non-verbal cues and
suprasegmentals to see whether an act is mitigated. Haugh (2016) offers a classification of
playful teasing into jocular mockery (a tease within the play frame in which the communicator
belittles the hearer) and jocular pretence (a tease overtly or covertly deceives the addressee into
seriousness of turn, which is then transformed into non-serious one), which differ in the design
of the act, occurrence of laughter and subsequent progression to a serious or humorous frame.
Banter can be delineated by Leech’s Principle of Banter, which states that the interactant,
in saying something untruthful and impolite, fosters solidarity with others. The notion is gradable,
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 31 -
that is “the more intimate the relationship, the less important it is to be polite” hence the more
hostile people are towards each other, the higher degree of social harmony (Leech 1983: 144).
Culpeper (1996, 1998) regards banter as mock impoliteness, aimed to promote social solidarity.
In fact, it is conceptually discrete from politeness or impoliteness and can be better viewed as
‘non-impoliteness’ (Haugh and Bousfield 2012). Haugh and Bousfield (2012: 1103) discriminate
between two-participant and multi-party communication in participants’ evaluation of an impolite
act, viz. in the former interactants “must evaluate the talk or conduct as non-impolite”, while in
the latter, “not all of the participants need necessarily evaluate the talk or conduct as non-
impolite”.
Sarcasm, or mock politeness, is employed for social disharmony. It is the polar extreme
to banter (mock impoliteness) as sarcastic remarks “remain surface realisations” (Culpeper
1996: 356; 2005). Culpeper’s (1996) idea of sarcasm is similar to Leech’s (1983: 82): “If you
must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn’t overtly conflict with the PP [M.W.:
Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark
indirectly, by way of implicature”. A close affinity between sarcasm and irony makes it difficult
to capture the conceptual difference between them and they may be conflated into one notion
of sarcastic irony: “a type of irony which inherently carries pejoration of the target” (Dynel
2016a: 220; 2014, Jorgensen 1996). The contrasting element is overt untruthfulness which
invariably characterises irony, but not necessarily sarcasm, which resides in an explicit or
implicit unfavourable evaluation conveyed by a witty remark (Dynel 2014).
Mocking, like sarcasm, is contingent upon genuine aggression7 and verbal attack upon the
target, which bifurcates into a mocking talk outside current interaction and a mocking talk within
the context of conversation (Norrick 1993). The first type can be exemplified by the
communicator’s purposeful alternation of the meaning and hence creating ambiguity, which is
opposite to what the interactant tries to convey. The second type encompasses instances in which
the speaker draws conversationalists’ attention to an inappropriate sentence structure or use of a
word. Both forms of mockery may be employed by speakers as a cohesive device to promote
rapport. In addition, Norrick (1994: 423) sees sarcasm and mockery as serving a dual function:
“aggression and solidarity – aggression in the message, attacking others for their foibles and
errors, and solidarity in the metamessage, including others in a playful relationship with increased
involvement”.
7 This type of CH can be seen as less aggressive when mockery is jointly produced (Norrick 1993).
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
- 32 -
1.2.2.3. Focus on formal structures
Humorous allusions
Instead of producing an ingenious novel utterance, the humorist may build the turn upon
humorous allusion, which includes distortions or quotations (Dynel 2009b). More specifically,
the former subtype operates on rephrasing of the original text and sometimes its meaning. Its
humour is based upon a deletion, substitution or addition, so that there is a part of a letter,
syllable or word incorporated into a model text. To illustrate, the original phrase The pot calling
the kettle black is transformed via word substitution into The pot calling the grass green. The
second type of allusion is based on recalling of authentic texts, especially those which belong
to popular culture, such as films, songs, books or advertising slogans (Dynel 2009b). Allusion
as a form of CH “has an obvious double humorous potential, first in its actual contribution to
the current context, and second by recalling to the original text for listeners in the know”
(Norrick 1993: 69-70), which can be coupled with wordplay or punning.
The presence of an unannounced intertextual reference in one’s utterance serves two
functions: it is a test for background cultural knowledge, which elicits laughter and hence builds
rapport among conversationalists (Norrick 1994, Dynel 2009b). Nash (1985: 79) adds the
following functions of an allusive remark: “to smooth over a difficulty, to ward off an attack,
to help the underdogged against the overbearing, to comment on society and manner”. As
regards the intertexuality, allusions are similar to parody (Norrick 1987, cf. Nash 1985).
However, allusions employ humorous texts in their own right and aim to praise the original text,
while parody mimics/ imitates the source text with an irreverent attitude towards it (Norrick
1987). It needs to be highlighted that not all allusions, or intertextual texts in general, are used for
humorous purposes (Norrick 1987, Ross 1998), whilst parody aims to produce humour.
Wordplay/ punning/ wordplay interaction
Sacks (1973, in Norrick 1993: 61) defines a pun as a humorous text evoking two contextually
appropriate interpretations derivable from an ambiguous word or phrase. Any wordplay calls
for suspension of the serious frame since it disrupts the ongoing conversation and the hearer
needs to accept a change of topic (Norrick 1993, 2003; Chiaro 1992), nevertheless it may work
well in serious conversation carrying a serious meaning concealed under the cloak of humour.
Puns are successfully delivered when they violate Giora’s (1991) relevance requirement so that
the speaker manipulates the hearer’s derivation of interpretations from the least to the most
relevant one.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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Norrick (1993) believes that wordplay may serve primary and secondary functions,
depending on the communicator’s intention. A primary function is when it is delivered as a
cohesive device used to cement personal relations, while secondary functions include the use
of puns as a means of opening/ ceasing conversation, filling awkward pauses or conferring a
topic change. Besides these functions, puns enhance solidarity via shared laughter elicited by
shared knowledge, work as a test for hearer’s sensitivity to taboo topics (and hence gather social
data on what is deemed funny by a specific person), help to manipulate the course of
conversation and serve a basis for further forms of wordplay.
1.2.3. Humorous frame
The meaning conveyed in humorous communication can be described by a psychological
construct of a play frame or joking/ humorous frame (Bateson 1972), within which interlocutors
are not committed to the truth of their contribution. The concept has been employed by a
number of authors claiming that conversational humour involves the establishment and
maintenance of the frame (Fry 1963; Goffman 1974; Norrick 1993, 2003; Zajdman 1995, Boxer
and Cortés-Conde 1997; Kotthoff 2006; Coates 2007; Dynel 2009a, 2011f; Norrick and Bubel
2009), which can also be dubbed keying8, footing9 or layering.
The concept of the frame has been proposed outside humour studies, being also dubbed
script, scenario or schema. Bednarek (2005), following Minsky’s (1975 [1980]) understanding,
concedes that the frame is a cognitive/ mental unit covering general information about a certain
situation: “a data-structure for representing stereotyped information” (Minsky 1977: 355, in
Bednarek 2005: 68610), for example going to a birthday party. As for the play frame, Bateson
(1972: 186) depicts the frame as a meta-communicative psychological concept and hence “[t]he
play of two individuals on a certain occasion would then be defined as the set of all messages
exchanged by them within a limited period of time...”. Interlocutors “frame” their utterances in a
8 Goffman (1974: 43-44) defines a key as “the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful
in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the
participants to be something quite else”. The process of keying requires a type of transformation in a frame, which
would be discarded as redundant otherwise. 9 Drawing upon the notion of ‘key’, Goffman (1981) comes up with ‘footing’ designated as “the alignment of an
individual to a particular utterance whether involving a production format, as in the case of a speaker, or solely a
participation status, as in the case of hearer” (Goffman 1981: 227). It is highlighted that a change in footing is just
“another way of talking about a change in our frame for events” (Goffman 1981: 128). The alternation of a footing
is conditioned by language expressions or paralinguistic language markers, for instance academic teachers giving
lectures speak in an official variation of Norwegian but if they want to encourage free discussion they alternate
their footing introducing a regional Norwegian dialect. 10 See an overview of different conceptualisations of the concept of a frame.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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playful or serious mode11, which in turn elicits a proper reaction on the hearer’s part with respect
to the established frame. The communicator introducing a play frame conveys the ‘metamessage’
that ‘this is a play’ and otherwise aggressive or derisive utterances would not be taken seriously.
In the same manner, Norrick (1993) believes that once an interactant starts wordplay, s/he
immediately initiates a playful mode, which enables others to continue the activity.
The establishment of the play frame is not a one-sided process resting upon the humorist
but a collaborative endeavour between speakers and hearers (Coates 2007). This joint activity
fosters solidarity and rapport among participants working within the humorous frame: “[s]uch
fine-tuning of understanding is the core of why the ability to participate in such joking is important
in the development of rapport” so that it is shown that they are finely tuned (Davies 2003: 1361)
(Hay 1995, Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997, Norrick 1993, Coates 2007). In the case of sitcom
discourse, the production crew’s primary goal is to elicit viewer’s humorous reaction (Mills 2005,
2009) but the negotiation of the humorous frame is also up to the audience who, by the very fact
of watching entertainment, agrees to join it.
Besides the discrimination between “play” and “nonplay” (Bateson 1972), Dynel (2018)
posits that the distinction between humorousness and seriousness should be abandoned as it is
rendered redundant in her model based on overt/ covert (un)truthfulness and her notions of
speaker-meaning-telic humour (humour that conveys meaning pertinent to the conversation)
and autotelic humour (for its own sake).
1.2.4. Contextualisation cues
The humorous frame and hence communicator’s playful intent can be signalled by
contextualisation cues. In conversational joking “creating the play frame is fundamental, since
the humor not only emerges in the situation itself but from the appropriate cues that make it a
laughing” (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997: 277). The very term of a cue was devised by
Gumperz (1982, 1992) to represent a series of linguistic and non-linguistic signs, which help
the hearer retrieve presuppositions and determine the speaker’s underlying intentions:
“contextualization cues include prosodic features such as stress and intonation, paralinguistic
features such as tempo and laughter, choice of code and particular lexical expressions”
(Gumperz 1992: 229; see also Gumperz 1982: 131, Holmes and Hay 1997: 132).
11 It is maintained that the interactants engaged in conversation need to know within which mode, either serious or
non-serious/humorous, the utterance should be considered, for the sake of unobstructed transmission of
information (Mulkay 1988).
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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Contextualisation cues are differently dubbed in literature: McGhee (1977) uses the term play
signals, Paulos (1980) speaks of metacues, Palmer (1987) names them paralinguistic markers
and Mulkay (1988) uses the notion of humorous cues.
As a cue, the humorist may choose to employ preface sequences (Sacks 1974), explicit
markers (Attardo 1994), standard prefaces (Norrick 2003), metalinguistic formulaic expressions
(Jodłowiec 2008), or formulaic introductions (Oring 2008), like “Did you hear the one about…?”,
“Stop me if you have heard this one…”, “Have you heard the latest?”, which explicitly mark the
beginning of conversational joking. A different type of cue is a catchphrase with which the
audience associates a particular televised programme, e.g. Good moaning in ‘Allo ‘Allo! (1982-
Forabosco 1992, 2008; Curcó 1995, 1996a, 1997). The hearer’s lack of recognition of humorous
incongruity can also be caused or prompted by his/ her obliviousness of the intention to amuse
(Suls 1972). From this proposal it follows that an individual should be apprised of the fact that
conversation enters into a non-serious mode and hence standard expectations of informativeness
are suspended for the audience’s benefit. Suls’ (1972) view that the precondition for humour is
the prior announcement is somehow contradictory with respect to fundamental premises imposed
on incongruity which should be novel, unexpected and surprising.
Forabosco (1992, 2008) explains the notion of incongruity as a cognitive construct whose
humorous potential is unlocked when a stimulus “diverts from the cognitive model of reference
(Forabosco 2008: 45)19. His understanding of the model20 is drawn upon an epistemological
sense as it “highlights the comparative and interpretative aspect: a model is a sort of preliminary
representation and minitheory which the subject uses in his relationship with reality”
(Forabosco 1992: 54). The cognitive model of reference consists of abstract concepts, which
are activated as soon as a stimulus is evaluated as incongruous by the model. A key attribute of
the model is its possible changes with experience, which may explain the fact why the same
joke may lead to a gale of laughter on some occasions, while on others a forced smile.
1.3.3.2. The resolution of incongruity
Inasmuch as the phenomenon of incongruity is a necessary condition for the appreciation of
humour, its sufficiency seems to be a bone of contention in literature. There are numerous
writings in which it is suggested that incongruity itself is enough to amuse the audience
(Nerhardt 1970, 1977; Rothbart 1973, 1976; Shultz and Horibe 1974), especially in children at
19 The definition of an incongruous stimulus offered in Forabosco’s article (1992) is altered with respect to the
verb used: differs is changed into diverts, given the etymology of these words. 20 The cognitive model of reference is differently dubbed frame, schema, daemon, schemata.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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an early developmental stage, who appreciate resolution-removed version of joke21. This
indicates that a young child, between 6-7 years of age (the preoperational stages in Piaget’s
terminology), is cognitively capable of enjoying pure incongruity (Shultz 1976) which is based
on “simple surprise” (Morreall 1987: 60).
As regards the stage of the resolution of incongruity, a number of studies demonstrate
that the recognition of humorous intention necessitates the second stage (e.g. Suls 1972, 1977,
here is lent to Suls’ two-stage model of incongruity resolution (summarised in Section 1.5.)
since its comprehension heuristics is analogous to the one proposed within the theory of
relevance. Attardo (1994) contends that the term of ‘resolution’ is nebulous as it presupposes
“dissolution” of incongruity, which, in fact, should linger. This claim is in accord with residual
incongruity 22 (2008: 50) proposed by Forabosco who states: “the final step is that of getting
the flavor of humor which is connected with the perception of a residual incongruity (or
nonsense)”. The description of incongruity as residual means that humorous effects arise when
some parts are not fully resolved and the tension created by incongruity should be pleasurable
(Mulkay 1988; Forabosco 1992, 2008). Moreover, it is argued that “resolution of incongruity
may not make the incongruity completely meaningful and may sometimes add new elements
of incongruity” (Rothbart and Pien 1977: 37). The importance of partial resolution has also
been stressed by Dynel (2012a), who believes that making incongruity fully congruous and
sensible would stop humorous arousal. The idea of residual/ congruent incongruity is differently
dubbed in humour studies. Ziv (1984) speaks of local logic, which is seen as appropriate in
certain contexts since it provides a partial explanation for inconsistencies: “We are accustomed
to logical thinking, and all of a sudden it does not work. Failing to solve a joke’s incongruity
by logic, we try the thought mode of local logic” (Ziv 1984: 96). Freud (1905, in Forabosco
1992) employs the term of sense in nonsense, while Maier (1932) limited logic, Attardo (1994)
suspension of disbelief, Ritchie (2014) internal logic, the notion of which suggests that every
joke has its own fictional world with its “within logic”.
Oring (1992, 2003) contends that humour revolves around the concept of appropriate
incongruity, which is understood as “an appropriate interrelationship of elements from domains
21 The appreciation of incongruity alone or incongruity together with its resolution is beyond the scope of this
work. It was just to illustrate that there are psychological and cognitive studies which are set out to substantiate
the claim that it is possible for an individual to appreciate incongruity itself. In other scientific experiments
designed to test the appreciation of incongruity-removed jokes and resolution-removed ones show that the subjects
aged 8 needed both incongruity and resolution phases to enjoy humour (Shultz 1972). Pien and Rothbart (1976)
state that children under 6 may already resolve easy incongruities. 22 This is what Forabosco in his 1992 article dubs congruent incongruity (1992: 59).
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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that are generally regarded as incongruous” (Oring 2003: 1). The notion presumes that some
tension between incongruous categories needs to remain and as a result, incongruity is not
resolved. Moreover, appropriate incongruity does not impose any order of recognition, which
is in force in IR models, i.e. incongruity followed by its resolution.
To preserve enjoyable tension accompanying incongruity, Ruch and Hehl (1998) call for
an expansion of the two-stage model of humour appreciation to include the third step: the meta-
level. It is aimed at individual’s realisation of having been fooled that his/ her process of
rationalising has been violated. Hence, this knowledge enables one to distinguish between a
standard activity of problem-solving and an act of humour processing.
Expounding on the problem with the resolution of humorous incongruity, Rothbart and
Pien (1977) distinguish two types of resolution: complete (incongruity encountered at the outset
is fully disambiguated), and incomplete (initial incongruity is not made meaningful). The
classes of resolution correspond to the two categories of incongruity: impossible and possible.
As the very names suggest, the former describes an unexpected stimulus which cannot be
framed with respect to the immediate context, while the latter denotes an unexpected but
possible incoherent situation (Rothbart and Pien 1977). In a similar vein, Attardo, Hempelmann
and Di Maio (2002) discern two types of incongruity in a humorous text: focal and background.
Focal incongruities are central to the punchline and its resolution since these play a role in the
hearer’s derivation of comic effects, whereas background incongruities do not prompt the
humorous outcome. However, it may be speculated that the second type may impart a particular
flavour to the humour of the text of a joke. Furthermore, humorous incongruities can be divided
into: completely backgrounded, backgrounded and foregrounded. The difference between the
first two levels is that completely backgrounded incongruities can be erased without the loss of
funniness since they do not induce a cognitive shift in the resolution phase: “foregrounded
incongruity would occur in the punch line, whereas backgrounded incongruity would occur in
the setup phase of the text” (Hempelmann and Attardo 2011: 136).
This line of reasoning is developed by Ritchie (2009: 9) who devises three degrees of
resolution: full resolution which aims to erase discrepancies completely so a person engages in
non-faulty logic; partial resolution presupposes the existence of residual incongruity which is
left unexplained, or which introduces new oddities; and null resolution is exemplified by the
cases of nonsense humour in which it is difficult to explain funniness of jokes.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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1.4. Incongruity as bisociation
The notion of bisociation, upon which the Bisociation Theory is built, has been coined by
Koestler (1964). Attardo (1994) claims that Koestler’s cognitive model has been used as a starting
point for semiotic theories of humour. The essence of the theory can be summarised as follows:
“The pattern underlying both stories [M.W.: jokes presented earlier] is the perceiving of a situation or idea,
L, in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference, M1 and M2. The event L, in which
the two intersect, is made vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were. While this unusual
situation lasts, L is not merely linked to one associative context, but bisociated with two” (Koestler 1964: 55).
Figure 1.1. The graphic representation of Koestler’s Bisociation Theory (1964: 55)
It is evident that bisociation (humorous incongruity) occurs when there is a juxtaposition of two
seemingly inconsistent situations, events or ideas. He further explicates that the shift in the
hearer’s train of thought should be abrupt and then “the emotive charge which the narrative
carried cannot be so transferred owing to its greater inertia and persistence; discarded by reason,
the tension finds its outlet in laughter” (Koestler 1964: 60). Norrick (1986, 1987) endorses
Koestler’s theory, claiming that the concept of bisociation encompasses various phenomena
inferring consequences reasoning from false premises missing link
coincidence parallelism Implicit parallelism
proportion ignoring the obvious false analogy
exaggeration field restriction Cratylism
meta-humour vicious circle referential ambiguity
conceptual domain mapping26
Table 1.3. List of all known LMs
25 The LM is one of the KRs that comes under severe criticism, for example for its misleading name since there is
no logic in any of the logical mechanisms (Davies 2011), for the pointless efforts to compile a list of LMs (Davies
2004, 2011), for the LMs being just cognitive structures (Brône and Feyaerts 2004), and for the fact that logical
mechanisms are not truly mechanisms (Oring 2011) (see Raskin 2011 for a point-by-point rebuttal of criticism
made by Oring 2011). 26 This LM was proposed in Attardo (2015) in his study of metaphors.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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There is no consensus on whether the GTVH should be classified as a variation of incongruity-
resolution theory. Interestingly, Attardo (1997) advocates a postulate that the GTVH can be
reduced to an incongruity-resolution model, in which script opposition correlates with the
incongruity stage and logical mechanism is equated with the resolution phase. Raskin, on the
contrary, does not agree with Attardo, claiming that the script opposition parameter is not the
reason why it is to be equated with IR models.
The GTVH has been applied to longer humorous texts, with Chłopicki (1987, 1997) being
the first to pursue this type of study. Attardo (2001a), so as to better explain the similarity
between jokes and longer texts, offers the term jabline applicable to the latter case, which
operates on the same basis as the punchline in the former. Jokes traditionally have only one
punchline, while longer texts may include several jablines which are not necessarily situated in
a pre-final or final position. Also, jablines are not disruptive, i.e. “they either are indispensable
to the development of the ‘plot’ or of the text, or they are not antagonistic to it” (Attardo 2001a:
83). Contrary to the punchline, the jabline is an optional element in a narrative, and hence
Attardo (2001a) introduces the concept of a plot with a humorous fabula – “the one in which
the central complication involves a humorous SO, but does not (necessarily) end in a punch line
and does not (necessarily) breach the narrative illusion” (Attardo 2001a: 98).
Application to situation comedy
One of the weak points of the GTVH is that, as the SSTH, it does not account for the role of the
audience. Attardo (2001a: 30) intends to propose “a (partial) theory of the speaker’s potential
production/ interpretation on the basis of their knowledge and skills”. As a result, the GTVH
marginalises both the role of the audience and the speaker’s part, focusing on the internal
structure of the text itself and its contribution to building comic effects (Attardo 2001a).
Certain limitations aside, the GTVH, as its name implies, is supposed to explain various
manifestations of verbal humour, not only jokes as it is the case of the SSTH. Some humorous
texts may be structurally similar to jokes, containing a punchline at the end, but there are texts
which are distinctly different, e.g. those comprising jabline(s) (Attardo 1994). Besides, this
theory might be expected to account for various linguistic levels, viz. pragmatic, textual
linguistic and narrativity, beyond the level of semantic tools (Attardo 1994).
There have been successful attempts to bridge the gap between the audience-less GTVH
and discourse analysis in the research into humour occurring in conversations (e.g.
Antonopoulou and Sifianou 2003). The one that deserves special attention is offered by
Archakis and Tsakona (2005) since it not only applies the GTVH to conversational narratives
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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conjoined with sociopragmatic studies, but it also concentrates on one of solidarity functions,
i.e. identity construction – which is pertinent to the present work. In particular, they argue that
it is feasible to apply Attardo and Raskin’s (1991) theory to recognise humorous texts and to
analyse conversational turns. Focusing on one of the KRs, viz. the Target, Archakis and
Tsakona (2005) demonstrate that humour can work in two simultaneous and discrepant ways:
as a means of critical appraisal or corrective design and as an index of positive politeness
strategy devised to foster solidarity and positive in-group feelings.
I would like now to present the dialogue from Modern Family, in which the GTVH is
used to explain the occurrence of humour on the part of the viewer. Following Archakis and
Tsakona’s (2005), the three jablines are marked in italics.
(6) Context: Jay, Mitchell’s father, volunteered to renovate Mitchell’s kitchen as part of passing time at
retirement. He hasn’t made rapid progress at all and Mitchell is somewhat impatient and wants to
hasten his dad.
Mitchell: Um, Dad, if this is too much for you.
Jay: Now, wait a second. You’re not here to fire me, are you?
Mitchell: What? No. Pfft! That’s a strong word.
Jay: I’ve done enough axing in my time to recognize the look. Just do it.
Mitchell: See, now, I was I was hoping this would be more of a conversation.
Jay: Never been much for confrontation. You weren’t engaged to a woman six months in law
school because you were good at dropping the hammer. Didn’t you guys get a cat together?
Mitchell: Okay, you know? Y... y... yes! You’re fired! Okay? You’re an incompetent man-diva. The
only thing you’ve ever built is a closet i.e. a box of air. So get out, and don’t let the door
hit you on your ample behind.
Jay: [after 3 seconds, smacks lips] Nicely done. Maybe an unnecessary shot at closets,
particularly from someone who was in one for 22 years but... (S09E05)
The first jabline dwells on the recollection of Mitchell’s adult life, i.e. personal anecdote in
Norrick’s (1993, 2003) terms. The analysis of this jabline in accordance with the six parameters
originated in the GTVH is provided below. The script opposition, being a necessary prerequisite
for humour, is based upon the fact that Mitchell is homosexual, yet he decided to be engaged
to a woman in order not to perform a decisive action and reveal the truth about his sexual
orientation.
SO: normal/ abnormal; Mitchell hid the truth about his sexual orientation for eight years / homosexual men
are not usually engaged to a woman for such a long time.
LM: faulty reasoning (Attardo and Raskin 1991: 304; Attardo, Hempelmann and Di Maio 2002: 18).
SI: Jay recalls Mitchell’s previous confrontational problems and draws parallel to the one in question.
TA: Mitchell.
NS: put-down humour (as interpreted by the viewer; Mitchell may interpret Jay’s turn as a mocking act).
LA: it may be speculated that the semantic meaning of the word “hammer” (in the phrase “drop the
hammer”) is used in connection to the renovation process in Mitchell’s kitchen.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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The script opposition in the second jabline is contingent upon the normal/ abnormal basis or
expected situation vs non-expected situation. Mitchell speaks of his father’s company
producing closets in terms of a product filled with air, which is not true given that air is gas.
Mitchell treats air as material used to make a piece of furniture. His intention is to clearly
undermine Jay’s business success.
SO: normal/ expected state of affairs vs abnormal/ unexpected state of affairs; setting up and running own
closet business is a difficult enterprise vs running own closet business is compared to producing boxes
of air, which is an uncomplicated enterprise
LM: parallelism: proportion
SI: Mitchell would like to undermine his father’s business success
TA: Jay
NS: put-down humour (as interpreted by the viewer)
LA: irrelevant
The script opposition in the last jabline rests upon the actual/ non-actual dichotomy since there
is a play between the literal and intended meaning of the phrase be in the closet.
SO: actual/ non-actual, Mitchell did not wish to tell everyone that he is a homosexual/ Mitchell was living
in the piece of furniture
LM: referential ambiguity
SI: Jay wants to underline that Mitchell did not want to come out of the closet, which bears resemblance to
Jay’s closet firm
TA: Mitchell
NS: put-down humour (as interpreted by the viewer)
LA: play between a literal and idiomatic sense of the phrase “to be in the closet”
It is undeniable, as the analysis of extract (6) exemplifies, that the GTVH is accurate to specify humour
in conversation since it goes beyond one knowledge resource of SO, as in the SSTH. The structural
organisation of fictional and natural communication reveals that humorous turns are deployed in any
position of the text and very frequently, there may be more than one humorous line.
Besides the overall structure of humorous texts characterised by the KRs, Attardo (2001a,
2002) describes connections among the jablines, for instance all the lines that relate to the same
object of ridicule are called strands. Then, a stack is a set of strands, a case in point being all
episodes of sitcoms. As regards the patterns of occurrence of jab/ punchlines, Attardo (2001a)
notes that texts with a bathtub placement (see Section 1.2.1.), e.g. sitcoms, usually accommodate
bridges, which are two or more jablines located at a larger distance (however, the notion of
distance is rather fuzzy and understudied), whereas combs occur in close proximity. In example
(6), all the jablines are combs since these are arranged almost one after another.
There are several suggestions for new knowledge resources, which would provide more
accurate tools for studying humour. Particularly, Thielemann (2011) claims that the GTVH
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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needs to include the “perspective or point of view” KR. Canestrari (2010) develops the theory
by adding the Meta-Knowledge Resource. She additionally discerns two groups of on- and off-
stage humour, depending on the presence of meta-communicative signals used to designate the
humorous frame. As for the orientation of the present work towards the recipient of sitcoms,
the point of interest is the latter type of humour since off-stage humour is solely aimed at
viewers and these instances are usually devoid of the Meta-Knowledge Resource. When the
Meta KR is absent, the humour can still be explained in terms of the SO and LM since humorous
intentions are marked with “internal indexes”, which are related to the presence of incongruity
and its subsequent resolution. Moreover, the lack of meta signals gives the recipient much
leeway to interpret a piece of discourse (Canestrari 2010, also Mills 2005). Another possible
development of the KRs is suggested by Tsakona (2013) who speaks of the context of humour
(CO), which would include sociocultural content affecting the production and interpretation of
a humorous stretch as well as metapragmatic information.
The additional KRs offered by Canestrari (2010) and Tsakona (2013) are relevant to my
project. The Meta KR is helpful to account for instances in which humour arises on the
recipient’s layer as well as the fictional layer. Despite the lack of the Meta KR in off-stage
humour (viewers’ level), there are still implicit meta signals rooted in the humorous genre of
sitcoms, which indicate that the primary aim is to amuse viewers. Hence, the presence of
genuine aggression on set is not interpreted by recipients as something threatening but rather
amusing given some implicit cuing (e.g. actors associated with the genre). The claim can also
be made that the production crew’s and viewers’ relations form an in-group, whereas viewers
and fictional characters can be both out-group and in-group, which can be placed on a
continuum of cases, reflecting viewer’s reception. In other words, the viewers may sometimes
feel offended, hence their status would be momentarily similar to that of an out-group. Humour
can be targeted at out-group relations, which implies the presence of in-group feelings (Boxer
and Cortés-Conde 1997, Archakis and Tsakona 2005). Tsakona’s (2013) CO KR is particularly
salient for the sitcom Modern Family since the viewer frequently needs to resort to extra-
linguistic/ cultural knowledge in order to find the turn humorous.
1.8. Incongruity as schema conflict
Norrick (1986, 1987) sets out to conflate the two theories, viz. bisociation with frame theories,
in order to ponder far-reaching implications for cognition. Specifically, the notion of
bisociation is explained in terms of schema conflict, with frame theory (Minsky 1975 [1980],
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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Schank and Abelson 1977) providing a cognitive grounding. As a starting point, Norrick (1986,
1987) adopts bisociation from Koestler’s (1964) theory and assigns a refined meaning: conflict
schema “which puts the theory of bisociation on sounder footing as a model of cognitive
processes” and “suggests (the possibility of) conflict resolution on some other level” (Norrick
1986: 230). It follows that some initial schema conflict arises at a lower level, which is made
congruent and hence leads to humorousness at a higher level. The view of ‘schema conflict’
and ‘conflict congruence’ is analogous to the incongruity and resolution phases, with the former
being necessary but insufficient to produce humour. Surprise consequent upon schema conflict
can lead to funniness (Norrick 1987).
As for the frame theory, it offers schemas (also, scripts, schemata) which are used to
organise human knowledge. These schemas can be construed as “arrays of relations between
variables that stand for agents, objects, instruments etc. The variables may be partially filled
with stereotypical ‘default’ values which correspond to customary everyday patterns of
knowledge and belief” (Norrick 1986: 229). The notion of a schema denoting ongoing activities
corresponds to the idea of a script, which denotes both spatial and temporal relations between
variables and between lower level schemas. The choice of a particular schema and subsidiary
script creates in the hearer/ reader certain expectations of what is going to happen next, which
relevant interpretation should be accepted as appropriate, and helps to evaluate participants in a
given situation.
His bisociation qua schema conflict is relevant to several manifestations of verbal humour
(retorts, puns, quips, one-liners, jokes, parody). Let us analyse joke in (7) quoted by Norrick
(1986: 239):
(7) An ancient, wizened man accosts a lady of the night and inquires as to her rates. She replies, ‘$5 on the
floor, $10 on the couch and $15 in bed’. As he hands the hooker $15, she remarks, ‘Okay, once in bed’,
to which he objects, ‘No, three times on the floor’.
Norrick (1986) explains that a few words of a story lead to the activation of schema(s)/ script(s),
which matches the situation (variables and their relations). The beginning of the text, i.e. man’s
wrinkled old face, woman’s pricing policy and his choice of the price, suggests that a man
would certainly opt for having an intercourse in bed. The punchline, i.e. man’s disapproval of
her proposal and eagerness of having an intercourse three times, conflicts with the schema in
force, which has been formulated by not only the hearer but also the prostitute. Norrick (1986)
posits that a higher level fit between the two conflicting schemas is consequent upon the $15
price which can be differently divided into one vs three sexual acts.
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Application to situation comedy
It seems alluring to equate the SSTH’s script oppositeness and Norrick’s schema conflict since
on the surface, these two approaches propound the same idea for incongruity creation and its
subsequent resolution, i.e. the text of a joke communicates two interpretations, with the
punchline facilitating the switch of interpretations. Attardo (1994) reckons that one cannot draw
a close analogy between the two incongruity resolution models as they differ with respect to
the primary objective: Raskin (1985) describes the occurrence of humour in formal terms,
whereas Norrick (1986, 1987) frames humour in descriptive terms. On the other hand, Norrick
(2001) believes that the SSTH is in accord with the view of incongruity as schema conflict and
more importantly, his bisociation qua schema conflict synthesises other models, for instance
Bergson’s, Freud’s or Fry’s.
The foundation of Norrick’s (1986) theory is the presence of lower-level conflict and
higher-level fit. The way he explains various verbalisations of humour (retorts, quips, one-liners
and jokes), it may be deduced that there appears incongruity on the lower level, which is made
congruous by the fit. Schema conflict arises when the punchline is delivered and suggests that
there needs to be a resolution. It cannot be overlooked that the explanation of humour with the
use of schema conflict echoes Suls’ (1972) and Raskin’s (1985) theories, which basically call
for the switch of interpretations at the stage of the punchline. Given this, there is no point in
repeating some fragments only changing the nomenclature relevant to any theory. Now I would
like to analyse extract (8) which does not resemble a bi-partite structure typical of jokes in order
to test whether these theories are versatile. In general, it would be argued here that a very short
conversation can introduce several schema conflicts.
(8) Context: The conversation below precedes the one presented in (6). Jay seems to be quite easy-going
given the fact that he has a considerable backlog of the renovation of the kitchen furniture. He enjoys
himself when he has a conversation with the constructors, recalling his business success.
Jay: [to the constructors] You got to remember, this was the ‘60s. Competition in the closet game
was fierce, everybody chasing after the next big storage idea. Historians remember this
period as the “space race.”
[Mitchell walks in]
Jay: Oh, Mitchell.
Mitchell: Uh, Dad? Uh, I would like to see the kitchen.
Jay: I’d like to think that drinking beer makes my hair grow back, but life ain’t fair.
Mitchell: Okay, uh, then w... we need to talk.
Jay: [to the constructors] You guys want to take it outside? I need a couple minutes with El Rojo.
Jay: [when the constructors left] Mm-hmm. Rojo means “red.”
Mitchell: I put things together quickly, unlike your workers, which is, uh, why I’m here. (S09E05)
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Jay’s first turn is amusing as it bases its humour upon a punning element “space race”, the
ambiguity of which should be perceived by the viewer. In Norrick’s (1986) terms, the phrase
“space race” brings about the schema conflict given the two possible readings, with at least one
apparent to Jay and the constructors. The first (literal) meaning of the phrase “space race” refers
to the closet industry, in which the word “space” is used in its metonymic relation to a closet.
The second (idiomatic) interpretation, which conflicts with the lower-level schema27, is based
upon the schema (script) which does not involve, as it rather contrasts with, the action of
constructing closets, being compared to the big time in the history when the USA and the Soviet
Union fought for the exploration of the universe. A few turns on, we can see another humorous
conversation in which Jay calls his son “El Rojo”, meaning “red” in Spanish, which is motivated
by Mitchell’s ginger hair colour. Moreover, Mitchell’s last line hinges upon the punning
element which also introduces the schema conflict: put things together quickly can be
understood as “deduce and infer from the given premises” or “literally assemble furniture”.
What I attempted to accentuate is that the three humorous turns (marked in italics) are
incorporated into the fabric of fictional conversation, each of which leads to schema conflict.
Now the question arises as to where to put the demarcation line between humorous turns which
appear in uninterrupted succession so as to enable the division into a lower-level and higher-
level schemas, which have been studied in isolation so far. In particular, there are two possible
paths of how to think about this problem. First, we can treat every humorous line as a separate
unit, as was done in the analysis of (8) and hence support the practical validity of IR theories to
the study of any conversational episode. Second, an incoming stimulus is being interpreted in
such as way that it provides the context (potentially) for the next stimulus.
To sum up the discussion on the IR models generated so far, almost none of the IR
theories has envisaged the analytical problem encountered in the study of conversational
humour since they were invented with jokes in mind. The only theory that seems to be working
well in the conversations resembling joke structure (we may clearly define the setting and the
punchline) and conversations comprising many humorous/ non-humorous lines is the GTVH
thanks to its notion of jabline. Hence, a claim can be made that in some conversational episodes,
the IR theories would fail to describe humour in all its complexity.
27 In the case of puns or punning elements, it is difficult to definitely pinpoint which interpretation is the one
created on the lower level and the other on the higher level.
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1.9. Incongruity resolution as a graded salience hypothesis
Giora28 (1991) concedes that her studies into the structure of jokes can be incorporated into the
incongruity theory, particularly Suls’ (1972, 1983) and Nerhardt’s (1977). Her proposals are
also relevant to jokes and irony (Giora 1991, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2011; Giora and Fein
1999a). Giora (1991) formulates the two prerequisites for a well-formed joke: first, it adheres
to the Relevance Requirement (it preserves the relevance of the last interpretation) and second,
it violates the Graded Informativeness Requirement (hence, fulfils the Marked Informativeness
Requirement) (the interpreter’s shift from the salient/ unmarked interpretation into the marked
one). The latter condition states that jokes should end with a markedly informative (almost
inaccessible) meaning. To illustrate the marked and unmarked bifurcation, let us analyse joke (9):
(9) “Did you take a bath?” a man asked his friend who has just returned from a resort place.
“No,” his friend replied, “only towels” / “is there one missing?” (Giora 1991: 472)
Joke (9) violates the Graded Informativeness Requirement as there is a gradual progress from
least to the most informative meaning. The phrase taking a bath in the sense of “stealing a bath”
is markedly informative because it is almost inaccessible, untypical and surprising, whereas the
sense of “taking a sun or mud bath” is unmarked and hence uninformative since it is almost
prototypical and easily accessible. The passage from the unmarked into marked member of a
given set needs to be abrupt so the latter meaning cancels the former (more on the requirement
see Giora 1988). Giora (1991) posits that linear ordering of the joke presupposes asymmetry
between the two senses of ambiguity, which are not simultaneously retrieved. In her parlance,
jokes employ “salience imbalance that invites the comprehender to process the most salient but
eventually incompatible meaning first... in order to dispense with it and activate a less salient but
congruent meaning” (Giora 2003: 168). Moreover, the meaning communicated by the
punchline must be cognitively distant from the initial part of a joke so that it shares as few
features as possible.
The idea of markedness and salience is developed in the Graded Salience Hypothesis
(Giora 1997, 1999, 2003), which, as its name implies, is hinged upon an ordered sequence of
interpretations:
28 A similar, yet independent, approach to jokes based on the notion of informativeness, which is supplemented
with the idea of ‘accessibility’, ‘salience’ and ‘parallelism’, has been provided by De Palma and Weiner (1992)
and Weiner (1996, 1997).
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“more salient meanings – coded meaning foremost on our mind due to conventionality, frequency, familiarity
or prototypicality are accessed faster than and reach sufficient levels of activation before less salient ones.
According to the graded salience hypothesis, then, coded meanings would be accessed upon encounter,
regardless of contextual information or authorial intent. Coded meanings of low salience, however, may not
reach sufficient levels of activation to be visible in a context biased toward the more salient meaning of the
word.” (Giora 2003: 10)
It is held that although supportive and strong contextual information may influence or even
speed up the formulation of appropriate (less salient) meanings, it would not obstruct more
salient meanings (Giora 1999, 2002, 2003, 2011): “salient meaning would not be bypassed;
Rather, they are activated first, rejected as the intended meaning and reinterpreted in
consistency with the Principle of Relevance” (Giora 1998: 85).
In spite of the fact that the first salient interpretation is inappropriate, it is not suppressed or
deleted because it should not interfere with the highly accessible interpretation of the punchline
– this claim is developed within in the retention/ suppression theory (Giora 2003, Giora and Fein
1999b). Those meanings which are conducive to the comprehension are retained, whereas those
which are not relevant are almost instantly discarded. On the other hand, reinterpretation of salient
meanings coupled with their suppression may obstruct the process of joke interpretation and
hence prolong the time needed for its comprehension. When ambiguity is not eliminated
(suppressed) but sustains, the resulting outcome is a witty, not humorous, interpretation (Giora
1991).
At first glance, it may be hypothesised that Giora’s (1999, 2003) salience and Sperber
and Wilson’s (1986 [1995]) relevance theory are akin. Within the graded salience hypothesis,
it is held that a salient meaning can be compatible with contextual information because it is
accessed automatically or it may be incompatible because it does not merge with the context.
In the case of contextually incompatible meanings, the interpretation is either retained, when it
is instrumental or not intrusive, or suppressed. Relevance Theory (RT) (for summary see
Section 2.3.) underlines the significance of context which determines the accessibility of
interpretations. The relevance of meanings is graded in accordance with their accessibility, i.e.
they should lead to the emergence of many cognitive effects at lowest mental effort. To
recapitulate, Giora believes that a salient (coded, stored) meaning is always derived first,
whereas Sperber and Wilson state that the hearer accepts the first interpretation which satisfies
the balance of cognitive effects and effort. Hence, the notion of salience is indifferent to
relevance (Giora 1998).
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Application to situation comedy
It is suggested that the Graded Salience Hypothesis can be applied to humorous texts dependent
upon covert ambiguity to enable the switch from the unmarked/ salient to marked/ less salient
interpretations. Besides the bedrock for Giora’s theory (1991, 1998, 2003), she makes certain
claims which, in my opinion, are relevant to the study of sitcom discourse. Moreover, it would
be interesting to demonstrate how the salience hypothesis differs from the relevance-theoretic
approach since the two approaches employ the notions of salience and relevance, which in lay
users’ terms are very similar. Below an example of on-stage humour (Canestrari 2010) from
Modern Family is provided with a view to employing Giora’s Relevance and Marked
Informativeness Requirements.
(10) Context: Manny (Jay’s stepson) has just found out that Luke (Jay’s grandson) intends to run for the
school president. Manny and Jay are in the kitchen.
Manny: Hey, Jay, do you need to julienne any vegetables?
Jay: What?
Manny: If so, you can use the knife your grandson jammed in my back.
Jay: Well, that was worth the journey. (S08E03)
A humorous narrative strategy employs the question-answer riddle (Chiaro 1992) in which
Manny asks a seemingly stupid question, Jay looks confused and then Manny offers an
unpredictable answer. More specifically, on the basis of Manny’s trivial question, the first
salient, unmarked interpretation (that is closely related to the encoded meaning of words) is that
Manny makes an assumption that Jay, who is in the kitchen, wants to prepare something to eat
with the use of a julienne knife. Giora (1991, 2003) claims that the context does not precondition
the derivation of any interpretation, which is different from an RT view (Sperber and Wilson
[1986] 1995)29. It is hard to envisage that a different physical context, for instance in which Jay
is in the office or at the supermarket, would lead to another interpretational possibility, which is
an argument in favour of RT’s dynamic view of context construction. Either way, this is the only
interpretation that the recipient may derive, which is strengthened by the context. A punchline-
like line is Manny’s reply that Jay can julienne vegetables with the proverbial knife that Luke
plunged into his back – this is a marked interpretation. As a result of the analysis, it can be
argued that the riddle incorporated into communication conforms to the Marked Informativeness
Requirement (an abrupt shift of interpretations). Jay’s last turn is an indicator of appreciation, in
29 In her book, Giora (2003) speaks of the predictive context which may facilitate and accelerate the recovery of a
markedly informative interpretation, however, in no way does it obstruct the coded meaning.
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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which the word “journey” implicates that processing of Manny’s reference to the knife that he
has in back took a great deal of Jay’s mental effort. What can also be noticed is that none of the
interpretations is bypassed, discarded or suppressed. The humorous interpretation just needs to be
in force in order to cancel the uninformative meaning, which is preserved by the suppression theory.
In my opinion, the saliency-based model has the theoretical potential to explain humour
built into the carefully weaved web of longer conversations. In the case of sitcoms, humorous
effects are expected and hence no information can be disclosed too early to avoid the danger of
humour falling short. Given that, it is crucial for a salient meaning to be given at the right time.
1.10. Incongruity resolution as a forced reinterpretation model
Originally dubbed the surprise/ sudden disambiguation model, Ritchie’s (1999, 2002, 2004,
2006, 2009) forced reinterpretation (FR) model fits neatly into the main tenets of Suls’ (1972)
IR model and, by extension, it converges with the comprehension heuristic within RT30.
Nevertheless, if we were to compare the two models, their objectives are quite different. The
IR model aims to construe the type of humorous incongruity, whereas the FR model pertains to
the delivery of humour and the comprehender’s process of interpretation (Ritchie 1999).
Ritchie’s view on the resolution of incongruity supports a bi-partite division of the text of a
joke into the set-up and punchline. It is argued that a joke communicates two interpretations on
the set-up stage, with one being more plausible and salient and thus accepted by the audience.
The punchline contradicts the initial choice, generates incongruity and forces the hearer to
reinterpret:
“The set-up has two different interpretations, but one is much more obvious to the audience, who does not
become aware of the other meaning. The meaning of the punchline conflicts with this obvious
interpretation, but is compatible with, and even evokes, the other, hitherto hidden, meaning. The meaning
of the punchline can be integrated with the hidden meaning to form a consistent interpretation which differs
from the first obvious interpretation” (Ritchie 2004: 59)
Ritchie (2002) makes a disclaimer that his FR model is confined to humorous texts which are
dependent upon some sort of ambiguity (e.g. homophony, polysemy). Within this account, there
are four important aspects: the first (more obvious) interpretation of the set-up part, the second
(hidden) interpretation of the set-up, the meaning of the punchline and an interpretation formed
by integrating the meaning of the punchline with the hidden meaning (Ritchie 1999: 79; 2002:
30 Yus (2016) believes that the FR model is pertinent to the cognitive construction of situations (his make-sense
frames).
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48; 2004: 61). Additionally, there are six properties germane to humour: obviousness, conflict,
compatibility, comparison/ contrast, inappropriateness, and absurdity, some of which are
necessary for humour to arise. Obviousness describes the situation in which the obvious
interpretation from the set-up is more easily noticeable than the hidden one, which is formulated
at the punchline delivery. The feature of compatibility, best understood as discourse coherence,
characterises the meaning of the second part of the text as consistent with the covert meaning.
The three remaining relationships of conflict, comparison/ contrast and inappropriateness
are subsumed under the heading of ‘incongruity’ in humour literature. Ritchie (2002) highlights
the fact that the notion of conflict should not be understood as logical inconsistence or semantic
clash. It is rather the trait of the punchline that conflicts with the easily accessible (first)
interpretation, which in turn signals the demand for reinterpretation. There are two
manifestations of conflict: it contrasts the punchline with either the obvious or predicted
meaning of the set-up. Moreover, the obvious and hidden interpretations need to bear a
contrastive relationship or clash. Also, related to the punchline is the idea of inappropriateness,
which shows that the hitherto hidden meaning is inherently odd, abnormal, eccentric, or
generally flouts socially acceptable norms, which would lead to taboo or absurdity.
Comparing the notions proposed within the FR theory with those rooted in the SSTH
(Section 1.7.1.) and Giora’s model of graded salience, it appears that Raskin’s script opposition
corresponds to Ritchie’s comparison and inappropriateness relationships. Moreover, Giora’s
(1991) notion of markedness deals with the conflict, obviousness, and possibly comparison
properties. The question can be posed about the usefulness of Ritchie’s parameters, i.e. whether
they can truly describe humour more accurately or they introduce unnecessary complexity.
Application to situation comedy
Ritchie’s Forced Reinterpretation Model provides another descriptive framework for the
creation of incongruity, its position in a humorous text and its resolution. The footing for the
model is the presence of two interpretations at the set-up stage, with only one discernible
initially and the other apparent at the punchline level. Not every joke follows this pattern, in
particular puns or one-liners, which force the hearer to access two interpretations
simultaneously, not to mention longer conversations in which, as already noted, there is more
than one humorous line serving the function of a punchline. It is, however, not to imply that the
FR workings have no theoretical capability whatsoever, for instance in conversation (11).
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(11) Context: Cameron and Mitchell decided to help one of the footballers, Dwight, in Cameron’s team to
stay at their home as his family is transferred to another corner in the world. Now Mitchell is watching
the game in the stand.
The woman: I just want to say…I love what you’re doing.
Mitchell: Well, thank you. I...I wear this sweater with these trousers a lot. When you’re high-
waisted, it is very difficult finding pieces that work together, so
The man: Yeah, you look really nice, but what she means is it’s great that you’re letting Dwight
live with you. (S08E02)
As opposed to Suls (1972), Ritchie (2004: 94) does generate the discussion on how the
punchline is recognised: “it does not make sense (CONFLICTS) with the current (most
OBVIOUS) interpretation of the preceding text”. In other words, it must lead to discourse
incoherence – the line that discontinues the expected flow. In the analysis of extract (11),
attention is confined to the misunderstanding emerging on the fictional layer, which is the
source of amusement on the viewer’s layer. The set-up part, i.e. the woman’s remark, contains
the word WHAT which has two referents: the things that Mitchell wears vs the things that
Cameron and Mitchell do for Dwight. The subsequent part of the conversation, with Mitchell’s
turn treated as the punchline, reveals that Mitchell derives the former interpretation, whereas
the couple aims at the latter meaning. Clearly, there is a conflict between the viewer’s predicted
meaning (the couple praising Mitchell) and the one derived by Mitchell, which is crucial to the
FR model.
In extract (12), the FR’s methodology does not suffice to aptly describe the occurrence of
humour in which the initial part of the conversation should invite the recovery of two meanings:
(12) Context: Haley, who is the dumb one in the Dunphy family, comes with her boyfriend Arvin, an
astrophysics professor, to dinner. Her very intelligent sister Alex with her dumb boyfriend are also
present.
Haley: Mom, Dad, this is Arvin.
Claire: Hello, Arvin. It’s a pleasure to meet you.
Phil: Yes, you are the first TED Talkin’ science superstar we’ve ever had in our house.
Claire: Mm-hmm.
Arvin: Well, as long as I’m a “superstar” and not a supernova.
[Phil and Claire are laughing heartedly]
Alex: You don’t even know what you’re laughing at.
Claire: I get it.
Phil: I got it more.
A firefighter: I don’t get it, but, uh, you sound like Austin Powers, man. (S09E17)
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The conversation does not resemble a joke pattern since we cannot find the setting
communicating two divergent meanings. The punchline – the line passing on humorous effects
on the recipient’s and fictional layer – is the one delivered by Arvin who speaks of “superstar”
and “supernova”, the common denominator of which is the word “super”. That is, he prefers to
be a “superstar” but not a supernova (a star that explodes). In other words, the recipient first
derives the meaning of the star as a well-known person, which needs to be reinterpreted along
polysemous networks (“superstar” is a hyperonym of “supernova”), in order to reach the
interpretation of the star as the one in the sky (supernova). Nevertheless, the humour in this
conversation hinges upon wordplay and hence it is difficult to state which interpretation is
reached initially since the construction of context is dynamic. Furthermore, the turns that
precede Arvin’s line do not constitute the initial part in Ritchie’s (2004) sense, which would
reverse the meaning gleaned by Phil, Claire and the third party, bringing about the hitherto
hidden interpretation.
1.11. Incongruity resolution as the MGI/SCI schema
The incongruity-resolution model has been successfully grafted on the theory of relevance
because both theories focus on cognitive processes during the hearer’s retrieval of the intended
meaning. Yus (2003, 2004, 2008) offers à la-Suls’ (1972, 1983) IR model, claiming that an
individual is guided by the principle of relevance in order to derive the speaker’s interpretation.
Moreover, Yus endorses a two-part structure of a joke: the multiple- graded interpretation part
of a joke (MGI) and the single covert interpretation part of a joke (SCI) 31.
A relevance-theoretic process of incongruity resolution is as follows: when the hearer is
presented with the initial part of the text (the MGI part), s/he needs to formulate the first highly
accessible interpretation which satisfies the balance between mental effort and cognitive effects
(see Section 2.3.1.). At this point, the speaker has managed to fool his/ her interlocutor into
accepting the highly accessible interpretation and is convinced that other meanings would not
be available. On the delivery of the punchline (the SCI part), the communicator creates a
cognitive dissonance (incongruity) with a different set of assumptions not matching the initial
meaning. In other words, the speaker humorously foregrounds the second less accessible but
31 The multiple-graded interpretations part of a joke (MGI for short) is a term first used by Yus (2003: 1309) to
denote this part of a joke from which the hearer is likely to derive the first accessible interpretation which is likely
but eventually incorrect. The single covert interpretation part of a joke is a term used by Yus (2003: 1309) to
describe this part of a joke from which the addressee is likely to derive unlikely but finally the correct
interpretation.
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finally relevant interpretation. So as to derive the intended meaning, a surprised hearer should
follow the path of least effort to achieve a large number of effects in order to reconcile the two
parts of the joke. In this line of argument, the humorous effect is achieved because incongruity
was solved by finding the coherent interpretation (Yus 2003). The MGI/SCI schema indicates
that interpretations are graded in accordance with their accessibility with the MGI part of a joke
communicating possibly a range of (weakly communicated) meanings (Jodłowiec 1991a,
1991b).
Coupled with the MGI/ SCI parts of a joke, there are two types of intentions: covert and
overt. The former intention is focused on communicating an irrelevant but finally correct
interpretation, while the latter concerns conveying a highly accessible interpretation which
would be later invalidated and replaced with the meaning formulated on the basis of following
chunks of discourse. The transition from the overt interpretation to the covert one enables the
extraction of humorous effects. Consider joke (13) illustrating the MGI/SCI schema:
(13) [MGI] When his wife died, old Sam Kleinbell, the distinguished jurist, decided to retire and join
his friends, Mike and Kathy O’Connor, in Key Biscayne. Taking Kleinbell under their wing, the
O’Connors were pleased with his rapid adjustment to life in the sun. Years went by. One day
Kleinbell announced to his old friends that he was going to marry a twenty-one-year-old waitress.
“Sam, you’ve only known her for a few weeks.” cautioned Mike, “and consider the risks. You’re
almost eighty-five. At this point sex could be fatal!” [MGI]. [SCI] Kleinbell shrugged
philosophically “If she dies, she dies” [SCI]. (Streiker 1998:108)
Overt interpretation in the MGI: Mike warns old Kleinbell not to marry a twenty-one-year old waitress
as he is almost eighty-five and having sex can be fatal to him
Covert unlikely interpretation fitting the MGI/SCI: Old Kleinball is convinced that his friend Mike is
talking about the possibility of fatal sex to his new wife but not to him
What is crucial for the present discussion is the combination of the three requirements needed
for humour (Yus 2003: 1313-1316): the resolution of incongruous on-going interpretations, the
realisation of having been fooled by the communicator, and a positive interaction of the joke
with the addressee’s cognitive environment. The first requirement refers to the hearer’s innate
capacity to minimise any incongruity in the world, which is afforded by the Cognitive Principle
of Relevance. The second condition characterises the interlocutor’s eagerness to spend more
mental effort in exchange for cognitive humorous effects as soon as s/he has been fooled into
selecting the first interpretation, which at first seems to be irrelevant, blatantly untrue or senseless.
The last prerequisite deals with the hearer’s appreciation of the content of the joke, which would
make him/ her ready to process it. There are many positive/ negative constraints which may hinder
the successful humorous outcome: suitability of the hearer’s background knowledge and beliefs,
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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interlocutor’s gender, sense of humour, relationship between interlocutors, group size, hearer’s
mood, and speaker’s traits and performance (Yus 2016: 54-59).
Application to situation comedy
As any theory of incongruity resolution, the MGI/ SCI interface was originally devised with
short discourse units (a.k.a. jokes) in mind. This comprehension pattern is particularly visible
in jokes in which an explicit interpretation is questioned by the humorist and the hearer/ reader
discovers another foregrounded (less salient at first) reading in the punchline (Yus 2008).
Moreover, this schema is more limited in the scope than Suls’ (1972) and Ritchie’s patterns
(2004) since in theory, these account for humorous effects in “not only jokes in which
incongruity arises from a multiplicity of interpretations of the initial part of the joke, but also
jokes in which the incongruity is not based upon this multiplicity” (Yus 2008: 144).
Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise that his view on the resolution of incongruity is
salient to sitcom discourse. That is to say, even though it is argued that Yus’s schema accounts
for ambiguity-based humorous turns, Yus (2004) showed that the MGI/ SCI interface can prove
to be applicable to stand-up routines which incorporate jokes. In my opinion, incongruity is not
only apparent in the exploitation of relevance-theoretic enrichment processes but it also occurs,
for instance, when an individual’s mental storage of representations clashes with public
representations produced by the production crew (see Section 2.4.1.). Let us analyse extract
(14) presented earlier (Section 1.5.) to see the difference, if any, between Yus’ and Suls’
conceptualisations. For the sake of convenience, I will repeat the dialogue below.
(14) Context: Gloria and Jay are in their kitchen. Jay is planning to play golf when Gloria asks him to help
Manny fix the fan in Manny’s room. In order to kill two birds with one stone, Jay finds a compromise
solution – hiring a Colombian handyman.
Gloria: [MGI→Nooo. You’re supposed to do it with him. It’s important that we teach him how to do
things for himself. In my culture, men take great pride in doing physical labour. MGI] Jay: [SCI→ I know. That’s why I hire people from your culture SCI] Gloria: You’re too funny. I’m gonna share that one with my next husband when we’re spending all
your money. (S01E02)
In the extract, I have marked the division of the fictional dialogue into the multiple-graded
interpretations part of a text and the single-covert interpretation part. As may be noticed in the
analysis of the dialogue (14), humour may but does not have to involve inferential steps leading
to the recovery of explicit content, such as reducing or resolving ambiguity, working out
referential ambivalences or filling in illocutionary indeterminacies. The manipulation of
inferential steps leading to the recovery of implicature is also recognised in Yus’ (2003, 2008,
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2016) model of the MGI/ SCI pattern. In relevance-theoretic terms, the MGI part of the dialogue
(14) communicates the first highly salient interpretation that true men are those who are hard-
working and more importantly, those who are manual workers (including Colombian people
and possibly Jay if he would agree to help Manny). The reading based on Gloria’s words forms
the implicated premise for further process of understanding. The SCI part conveys the
implicated conclusion that true men have a lot of money and are able to pay for hard work of
others. As pointed out earlier, Gloria’s last turn would remain largely unexplained by the IR
models or can be treated as the punchline for the next step of comprehension.
1.12. Incongruity resolution as a garden-path, red-light
and crossroad mechanism
Dynel (2012b) claims that a relevance-theoretic framework is insufficient to explain some of
the ways in which humorous effects are created. Consequently, she proposes a three-fold IR
categorisation of jokes, paying attention to the incremental/ linear/ on-line processing with the
differences between incongruity emergence and incongruity resolution (Dynel 2009a, 2012a,
2012b). The taxonomy includes the following mechanisms: garden-path, red-light and
crossroad. It is claimed that some jokes may operate upon the two mechanisms at the same time,
e.g. the garden path mechanism, which contains covert ambiguity at the set-up stage, is coupled
with the crossroads mechanism, which entails incomprehensibility of the initial part of a joke.
The garden-path32 mechanism is similar to other conceptualisations of IR comprehension
process: the set-up brings about covert ambiguity with only one highly accessible interpretation
being accessed effortlessly, while the punchline renders any earlier inferences gratuitous and
prompts the hearer to backtrack. The task of the punchline is to elicit a hidden meaning, reveal
ambiguity and cancel the first interpretation. Also, it is the final part of a joke, which forces the
process of reinterpretation of the initial part. Dynel (2012a) contends that covert ambiguity may
be of two types: semantic and pragmatic. Semantic (often lexical) ambiguity is exemplified by
homonymy, polysemy or homophony. The setting is pragmatically ambiguous when the first
salient meaning results from Grice’s (1975, 1978) generalised conversational implicature or
Levinson’s (2000) presumptive meaning.
(15) Women are like Angels…always up in the air and harping about something. (Dynel 2012a: 11)
32 The notion ‘garden path’ appears in the writings of many: Hockett (1972 [1977]), Yamaguchi (1988), Attardo
and Raskin (1991), Attardo, Hempelmann and Di Maio (2002).
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The funniness of one-line joke (15) resides in the simile of ‘women’ and ‘angels’, implying that
females possess some characteristic features of angles: they are fragile and benevolent. The
salient interpretation from the initial part is cancelled by the punchline which forces the switch.
The hearer needs to reprocess the two covertly ambiguous features, which are fostered in the
second part of the one-liner: women can fly and play the harp or women are omnipresent and are
babbling on about. This is what is observed by Dolitsky (1992: 35): “The humorous effect comes
upon the listener’s realization and acceptance of the fact that s/he has been led down the garden
path. (…) In humor, listeners are lured into accepting presuppositions that are later disclosed as
unfounded.”
The crossroads mechanism is conditioned by the element of incomprehensibility in the
set-up part, which makes the hearer unable to make any inferences, to decide which
comprehension path to take or to detect any default alternatives. The setting contains central
incongruity which can be resolved just only in the punchline, which may introduce another
incongruity resolving the one present in the set-up. It is important to note that the punchline
does not need to be consistent with the setting.
(16) Some people’s brains are like the prison system…not enough cells per person. (Dynel 2012a: 14)
The crossroads mechanism is quite frequent in one-liners and riddles, however it may also
operate in longer jokes. In the one-line joke above (16), the hearer is presented with the setting
which contains a metaphorical comparison of human brains and the prison system. S/he may
have problems to fully interpret this chunk, i.e. to find relation between the two phenomena.
The second part of a joke provides the hearer with necessary information to resolve incongruity
emergent in the first part. Particularly, the individual needs to access the interpretation of cell
understood as “the smallest part of a living thing” or “a small room in a prison or police station
where prisoners are kept”.
The red-light mechanism capitalises on the hearer’s encounter of a surprising red-light
punchline which directs the comprehension process to a place which has not been foreseen.
There is no ambiguity in the setting and the surprising element is induced by the punchline. The
second part of a joke introduces incongruity which is seen as such in comparison to the setting
and then it is made congruous.
(17) Two attorneys were walking out of a pub and a beautiful young lady walks by. One attorney turns to
his associate and comments “Boy, I would like to fuck her!” The other attorney replies “Out of what?”
(Dynel 2012a: 16).
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The setting in (17) provides the hearer with the casual meeting of two friends at a pub. The
punchline is marked by the second attorney’s turn which seems to be meaningless in
comparison to the first interlocutor’s remark. In particular, the second interactant derived an
unintended taboo meaning of the phrase fuck her, which is highly stereotypical given the
context of two friends meeting in the bar. It may be speculated that joke (17) can be regarded
as “garden-path” given covert ambiguity with the two meanings being communicated (one in
the setting and another in the punchline), however, the first interpretation is not rejected as
being irrelevant. It is rather the acknowledgement that the communicator in the joke has drawn
erroneous inferences, which results in humour in the comprehender.
Application to situation comedy
A valuable asset of Dynel’s classification, which may be crucial to the explanation of comic
effects in sitcoms, is a difference in the roles assigned to the development of incongruity and
its resolution. The differentiation between the garden-path mechanism and the other two
mechanisms seems to be particularly promising as the previously discussed models provided
suitable tools for accounting for ambiguity-based humour, whereas the potential of the
crossroad mechanism was not recognised (when humour results from misunderstanding).
The garden-path mechanism is the one in which ambiguity occurs at the initial stage, the
preliminary inferencing of which is invalidated by the punchline. Conversational unit (18) can
be compared to a three-part joke, which is composed of three parallel actions with the last one
(punchline) bringing about humour (Attardo 1994), such as jokes about an Englishman,
a Scotsman and an Irishman. Parallelism in extract (18) is exemplified with the three
prohibitions the fathers want to impose upon Lily but after any prohibition, they find a reason
to lift it. The first salient meaning is that Cameron and Mitchell reject any idea to punish Lily
because of their plans but they are still eager to punish her. Their turn raise certain expectations
in the viewer that they would finally agree on how to ground Lily. The second meaning
communicated by Cam’s and Mitch’s turns is that Lily would not be punished because of their
too busy entertainment schedule. In excerpt (19), the default interpretation is that Manny implies
that he had sex with his girlfriend as there were two sweet brown things his girlfriend had the
chance to devour (there is an implicit reference to Manny’s darker complexion), one of which
was a chocolate-soufflé bake-off. The second interpretation invalidates this inference since she
tasted the cookies baked by Manny.
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(18) Context: It’s the April Fool’s Day. Lily, Mitchell and Cameron are in shopping centre when Lily decides
to play a trick on Cameron and puts a bra, which has a security tag, into his bag, which activates an anti-
shoplifting gate. When they get out of the shop, Mitchell scolds Lily for doing this.
Mitchell: A fight at school, and now a shoplifting prank? If you wanted to rebel, why don’t you just
put a pink streak in your hair?
Lily: I told you, I don’t want one.
Mitchell: But you would look so cute.
Cameron: Okay, well, whatever this phase is, I’m not a fan.
Mitchell: I blame us. We’ve been far too permissive.
Cameron: Agreed. You are grounded for one month, Missy!
Mitchell: [hushed voice] We got the Cirque du Soleil tickets.
Cameron: Except for Cirque du Soleil!
Mitchell: [hushed voice] And the Disneyland trip.
Cameron: And for Disneyland! But you are not going to Christina’s slumber party tonight no matter
how much…
Mitchell: [hushed voice] We have reservations at Cactus.
Cameron: Okay, Christina’s slumber party is the last one for a while. (S09E18)
(19) Context: Jay gives lecture to Manny about women. In particular, he underlines the fact that women like
when a man outwits any opponent.
Manny: My girlfriend Karen was pretty frisky the other night after her ex showed up, and I bested
him in a chocolate-soufflé bake-off. I don’t need to tell you my soufflé wasn’t the only sweet
brown dish she devoured that night.
Jay: Because?
Manny: I also made molasses cookies.
Jay: I’ve learned to ask the second question. (S09E18)
As regards the cross-road mechanism, Dynel (2012a) argues that it is quite transparent in
short humorous forms, like riddles or one-line jokes. Given this, it is more challenging to detect
a puzzling or incomprehensible element in a longer conversation, which is deemed incongruous
by the punchline. It needs to be borne in mind that when we extrapolate joke-driven workings
onto the study of conversational data, certain revisions or adjustments are required. In excerpt
(20), the “make-believe” incomprehensibility arises on the part of Jay (fictional character) who
makes a pretence of mishearing what Manny has just said, i.e. he has developed IBS (Irritable
Bowel Syndrome; a condition of the digestive system developed in the course of long-term stress,
etc.) when his mother threw out a collection of magazines aimed at theatregoers. In particular,
Jay replaces IBS with a less serious illness, the flu, and the magazine Playbills is changed into
Playboy. Unlike many teenagers at his age, Manny is a sensitive boy uninterested in looking at
half-naked women. This incomprehensibility constitutes the central incongruity, which does not
disturb the coherence of the conversation but poses a puzzle for the viewer and possibly Manny.
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The humour in the conversation in (20) is contingent upon the recovery of implicature on the
basis of Manny’s getting IBS because of Gloria’s throwing his Playbills and Jay’s wish that it
was the flu caused by throwing out Playboys that Jay believes that Manny is too sensitive and he
wishes that Manny is interested in things associated with men. The humour in the conversation
in (21) is based on Mitchell’s and Lily’s beliefs that they are reading the notes that were intended
for them (the viewer is aware that they labour under a misapprehension).
(20) Context: Manny and Jay complain together about Gloria’s irritating behaviour, in particular that her
personal “pride” does not allow her to acknowledge that she might make a mistake.
Manny: She never admits when she’s wrong.
Jay: Thank you. I was beginning to think I was the crazy one.
Manny: Yeah, she’ll do that to you. I got IBS when she refused to admit that she threw out my
collection of Playbills.
Jay: I’m gonna pretend you said “the flu” and Playboys and move on. (S09E03)
(21) Context: Cameron and Lily have started unpacking gifts from Cameron’s grandmother who recently
passed away.
Lily: “Enjoy all my old lipstick, you big sissy.” Why did she call me a sissy?
Cameron: I … She doesn’t
[Mitchell enters]
Mitchell: Oh! We’re opening Grams’ gifts, huh?
(…)
Mitchell: “When Cam first brought you here, I thought I’d never get used to you. I was raised to
hate your kind. But seeing how happy you make my grandson, I couldn’t help but come
to care for you.” (…) “Who else but you should inherit my beloved Oriental fan? I hope
it don’t make you homesick.” [takes the fan out of the box] (S08E01)
Extract (21) is more transparent with respect to an obscure element arising in the setting. Lily
encounters “cognitive obstacle” when she is called “a sissy”, which makes her unable to draw
reasonable inference from the assumptions she stores in mind. When Mitchell reads his note
about being given an Oriental fan, Lily may resolve incongruity given her Vietnamese ancestry.
The red-light mechanism is the easiest to detect in my corpus since the production crew
would like to surprise the viewers by deflecting the comprehension process to the path that the
recipient has not been able to predict at the beginning (Dynel 2012a). This technique is not
confined to short humorous texts but it may be teased out in scripted conversations.
(22) Context: It’s the Halloween Day so children and those who feel young at heart are fully entitled to make
harmless pranks. The children in the neighbourhood wrapped toilet paper around Phil’s trees in the front
yard. Phil decided to pay back and drives to the neighbours’ house.
[Phil is at the gate and taps the entryphone]
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Carol: Who is it?
Phil: [low-pitched voice] Special delivery from UPS.
[Phil talks into the camera]
Phil: [normal voice] United Prank Service. I went to the history books for this one, all the way back
to the first practical joke – the Trojan Horse. Only I swapped out silly string for broad swords
and laughter for murder. (S09E05)
The conversation between Carol and Phil on the entryphone leads the viewer into the current
situation in which Phil wants to deliver a package to his neighbour on behalf of UPS. There are
two premises which should fuel the recipient’s suspicion: Phil is not a worker of UPS (United
Parcel Service) and his soft voice implies the intention of deceitful behaviour. The meaning of
the red-light punchline is contingent upon pragmatic ambiguity so that the viewer needs to
assign a new meaning to the acronym UPS, being deciphered as United Prank Service. A similar
instance of a red-light mechanism can be traced down in the following conversation (23)
between Claire and Alex, in which Claire’s turn contains a surprising incongruous punchline
which reverses the viewer’s expectations. The recipient may predict that since Alex provides
her mother with a good piece of advice and is referred to as her “moral compass” (Claire
employs irony to communicate that she does not want to listen to her), Claire would act
accordingly:
(23) Context: Claire boasts about finishing the 10K race. The problem is that she took the shortcut. She
begs Alex for help since Claire was asked by his father to show the picture of her running next to the
Pritchett’s Closets.
Alex: There’s not gonna be any footage of you running past Pritchett’s Closets because you cut two
miles out of a six-mile race. Better tell Grandpa you didn’t win.
Claire: Oh, you are my moral compass. Which is why I don’t want to talk to you for the rest of the
day. (S09E07)
1.13. Criticism of incongruity and incongruity theories
As already mentioned above, the concept of incongruity may not be sufficient to explain
humour since it needs to be coupled with other phenomena like surprise, novelty and a playful
frame of mind. Rothbart (1977: 91) rightly observes that “precise definitions of both incongruity
and resolution will be necessary in order for progress to occur”. It seems that the original
versions of IR models, proposed by Suls (1983) or Shultz (1976), and their more recent
developments lack a unifying formal conceptualisation of what accounts for these two pivotal
notions (Latta 1999). A comparison of several IR theories reveals that many incongruity-based
frameworks have little in common. Specifically, they vary with respect to the scope of the
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theory, sequentiality of events, location and routes of incongruity, extent and facets of
resolution (Ritchie 2009). Gibbs (1989: 249) disputes the claim that there needs to be a passage
from the first to the second meaning in order to resolve the incongruous part: “it is the shifting
of speaker’s intentions through which a joke gets to its humor, not in the shift from a “literal”
to “secondary” meaning in the text”.
Eichinger Ferro-Luzzi (1990) expresses criticism against the concept of incongruity and
its role in the production of humour in jokes. First, she claims that what people consider as
incongruous is their subjective assessment. The communicator who deploys an incongruous
humorous material cannot be sure whether it has been found incongruous also by the hearer.
Second, many jokes are structured in such a way that some parts are incongruous, while some
are not. This is why incongruity alone cannot account for the chunks that do not contain any
discrepancy or inappropriateness in their model of reference. Also, there are alliterative jokes,
which are not based upon ambiguity, and these create humorous effects in the course of
heightened congruity.
Latta (1999) carries out a thorough appraisal of incongruity theories, stating that some, if
not all, models are in fact not incongruity-based because they assign a slight theoretical role to
the perception of incongruity in the humour process. It is rather a cognitive shift which is a
carrier for humorous meanings. He contends that some jokes are truly contingent upon
incongruity, but it is a fraction of humorous texts. Second, IR models presuppose that the hearer
needs to be in the right (humorous) mood to be entertained, which is incompatible with the view
of incongruity as a structural concept – not the one which is tied to one’s emotional state. Third,
incongruity theorists do not explain how the perception of incongruity invokes laughter and
how the hearer can find incongruity laughable. A similar objection is lodged by Veale (2004:
425), for whom it is not incongruity but social collaboration between the speaker and hearer,
which is vital for humour: “What is needed is not a logical mechanism as such, or a logic of
oppositions, but a social logic that allows a theory to ground the interpretation in the specific
concerns and prejudices of the listener as a social agent”.
Instead of underestimating the importance of incongruity, Cundall (2007) calls for the
extension of the concept of incongruity with the joke-transaction, based upon Cohen’s studies
(1999, in Cundall 2007). It is believed that the entertainment of humour is a social matter since
the perception of incongruity and affective shift consequent upon it is not enough for the
emergence of humour. Cundall (2007) bases his argument on the social aspect of laughter which
cues others to find the intention humorous. The presence of jokes in conversation is treated as
an invitation for other conversationalists to share the same perspective or take on a situation.
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In joining the humorous play, the interactants bolster their intimacy, solidarity and a sense of
community and belonging. This communal activity indicates that people have in common some
cognitive and affective similarities in order to enjoy a light-hearted environment.
1.14. Conclusions
This chapter aimed to achieve two principal objectives. The first part attempted to present
possible definitions of humour and its related terms, such as conversational humour or verbally
expressed humour, as well as to categorise humorous manifestations with respect to three
groups: narrative forms, linguistic aggression/ impoliteness and formal structures. These types
may equally appear in the form of collections of humour texts or may be incorporated into
naturally produced or scripted communication (Dynel 2009b). The second part offered a
summary of three families of humour theories (superiority, relief, incongruity), with special
attention to incongruity-resolution models, which is motivated by the fact that they are in accord
with a relevance-theoretic view. Attardo (2001a) asserts that even though IR theories have
generally been illustrated with jokes, they are relevant to conversational jokes occurring in
different contexts, be it stand-up routines, joke-telling contests and conversations. The reason
why there was such a detailed presentation of different views on the perception of incongruity
and resolution was to assess their viability to the research into situation comedies. In view of
the fact that these workings provide diversified descriptions of incongruity and other concurrent
factors, it is profitable to have a broader account of humour production and/ or comprehension.
The author is aware that there are other existing humour theories, however, for the sake of
space, some constraints needed to be put.
As regards humour in sitcoms, superiority theories would explain fictional characters’
and/ or TV recipients’ feeling of dominance over the target of a joke, while relief theories centre
on, for example, sexual or racist humour. In other words, superiority-based approaches
concentrate on the relationship between the viewer and the production crew, whereas relief/
release theories are one-sided since they study the hearer’s response. As this chapter testifies,
incongruity theories carry a universal explanatory power to deal with humour mechanisms,
amusement and humorousness in sitcoms. In incongruity theories, humour is explained in terms
of a relation between two incompatible stimuli or divergent expectations, which is also a key
to sitcoms. For viewers to be entertained, they need to be taken by surprise. Sitcom is edited in
a certain way to draw recipients’ attention to the ‘reveal’ to make them simultaneously spot
linguistic incongruity which can be aided with visual one. Mills (2009: 86) recalls the episode
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The Trial from One Foot in the Grave (1990-2000; BBC1), in which the actor asks the
employees at the gardening centre to ship and leave the yucca plant “in the downstairs toilet”,
which introduces linguistic ambiguity in the word toilet that gives rise to two possible
meanings: “room containing a toilet’ and “a large bowl in a toilet”. The viewer would probably
understand the word toilet as a room since people do not usually plant a tree in a toilet bowl.
To facilitate the humorous interpretation, the recipient is shown a plant in the bowl. The element
of incongruity coincides with surprise, which in turn is connected to timing33 – the right moment
two incongruities become apparent (Mills 2009).
Incongruity theories demonstrate that comedies are related to social norms since the
audience needs to possess basic knowledge concerning socially acceptable patterns of conduct
in order to laugh at their diversions and deviances. For this reason, sitcom may be viewed as
offensive since it pictures an unconventional or abnormal course of action. For the audience
flocking in front of TV, an artificially constructed world in sitcoms is amusing because it serves
as a form of escape from mundane everyday life (Mills 2009).
Sitcoms do not differ from other forms of humour in which incongruity is amusing when
it hinges upon surprise resulting from our expectations being undermined, i.e. humorousness
revolves around setting up linguistic and narrative expectations and then confounding them.
For instance, a viewer is presented a scene which is not connected to the ongoing narrative –
the procedure which is regularly employed in Family Guy. This is what falls under Kant’s and
Schopenhauer’s versions of incongruity that should make our expectations fall short.
Not all incongruities are humorous, for example discovering a cobra in a fridge can hardly
produce laughter (Morreall 1983). Incongruity in mass mediated communication has a potential
to amuse when it is surprising and, more importantly, when a viewer is cued, via laugh track,
editing style, sound effects, cuts or stings of music, to interpret a piece of discourse in a
predetermined way. While horror films or thrillers promote the interpretation of incongruity as
frightening, sitcoms encourage to be understood as a piece of entertainment (Mills 2009).
An example which illustrates that a humorous dialogue can be studied within the IR is
the type of humour which I dub inclusive-exclusive dialogue monologue34 (Wieczorek 2017).
It can be defined as an instance that is humorous to the viewer, in which fictional characters are
33 Norrick (2001: 256) states that the notion of timing is not stable since “[t]he overall tempo of the performance,
the ebb and flow of given and new information highlighted by repetition and formulaic phrasing along with
rhythms of hesitation and more fluent passages all co-determine timing”. 34 The exclusive-inclusive dichotomy is dependent upon the viewer’s recognition of humorous intention which is
connected to the two communicative layers in fictional communication. Inclusive humour is the one which arises
on the two levels, while exclusive humour solely emerges on the fictional characters’ level (Wieczorek 2017).
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excluded from amusement due to the fact that they have a different dialogue with each other
and another dialogue with the viewer. This type of humour is quite common in my data since
there are many “interviews” that fictional characters hold with the recipients in order to confess
something crucial:
(24) Context: Cameron and Mitchell discuss taking care of Lily, i.e. who is going to stay at home with
her. When they are talking to each other, Mitchell pretends to like staying at home, while Cameron
makes Mitchell believe that he likes working. Their true feelings are revealed in monologues.
Cameron: So, you gonna... you gonna call him?
Mitchell: I don’t know. I mean, you know, I sort of promised myself and you that I’d take a little
time off, and...
Cameron: And you are loving your time off.
Mitchell: Totally.
[Mitchell speaks alone in front of the camera]
Mitchell: I am losing my mind. As much as I love Lily, which is, you know, more than life itself...
I am... whoo... not cut out to be a stay-at-home dad. No, but it’s Cameron’s turn. It’s
Cameron’s turn to be out in the world interacting with other grown-ups while I get to
stay at home and-and plot the death of Dora the Explorer. (…)
[A traditional dialogue between Cameron and Mitchell continues]
Mitchell: So, I don’t know. Should I... Should I call him?
Cameron: I don’t know. Maybe just to get your dad off your back.
Mitchell: Yeah. Yeah.
Cameron: I mean, because the last thing I want for you is to take a job right now. Mmm. I am
loving our life.
[Cameron speaks alone in front of the camera]
Cameron: I am in a really dark space. Being away from my Lily is literally torture.
[weeping] And I can’t pressure Mitchell, but I really, really, really just want him
to get a job so I can go back to being a stay-at-home dad/trophy wife! (S01E20)
The incorporation of two types communication in which a monologue is interwoven into a
dialogue shows that incongruity is perceived and resolved only on the recipients’ layer. In other
words, what is communicated in dialogues, i.e. an explicit division of parental duties which are
assigned to Cameron because Mitchell now becomes responsible for supporting the family
financially, is incompatible with the meaning communicated in monologues.
In addition, when it comes to the application of the IR models into sitcoms, the attempt
was made to show that a great deal of humour intertwined into longer conversations can be
studied in accordance to the predetermined lines (as argued by the authors of the models), i.e.
the setting and the punchline. These are the humorous instances which resemble the structural
design of jokes consisting of two parts. Nonetheless, there are many conversational episodes
which do not follow this pattern and hence they pose a serious problem to the theories. There
was one theory whose application did not cause a methodological problem, which is Attardo
Chapter I. Overview of Theories of Humour
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and Raskin’s (1991) GTVH governed by the six KRs and their possible extensions. The
GTVH’s most helpful conceptual tool was the notion of the jabline, enabling to navigate several
humorous turns which appear in a short span of time.
The main focus of the present work is to show not only that relevance-theoretic
mechanisms facilitate the recovery of the humorous interpretation but also that through their
implementation, the viewers assess the content of sitcoms, which may clash with their cognitive
environment, and thus may lead to the extraction of additional information. Given this, there
are a number of functions communicated by dint of humour, which surpass pure enjoyment.
A linguistic analysis of sitcom discourse may also reveal the social impact of serious and/or
humorous meanings upon the viewers. In other words, the recipients may watch sitcoms only
for the sake of entertainment but there are still other reasons why they decide to lounge on the
sofa and watch this particular format. One of the possible reasons is that a sitcom positively
affects and corresponds to one’s individual mental representations (Sperber 1996). Besides
propositional meanings gleaned by the audience, there is a whole gamut of non-propositional
effects, such as emotions that arise in the course of interpretation. As for the IR models, none
of these possesses in their repertoire theoretical or conceptual tools to denote additional effects.
It may partly be explained by the fact that the models were devised with the intention to describe
jokes, which were collected from various sources, be it websites, collections of jokes, which
may be devoid of the social context.
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C h a p t e r I I
Humour in Relevance Theory
Alex Dunphy: Dumb guys go for dumb girls and smart guys go for dumb girls.
What do smart girls get?
Phil Dunphy: Cats, mostly.
Modern Family (S02E09)
2.1. Introduction
The present chapter seeks to attain two major objectives. First of all, it thoroughly summarises
the core theoretical assumptions of Relevance Theory in order to place my analysis of the
sitcom humour on the proper footing. Secondly and more importantly, it presents and examines
the relevance-theoretic workings of the study of humour. Special attention is devoted to these
tools that lend credence to the occurrence of humorous effects on the part of sitcom
comprehenders. Granted that the main emphasis of the present work is concentrated on
delineating a myriad of cognitive effects entertained by telecinematic viewers, one of the most
powerful notions to explain this fact is weak communication that forms the basis for the
emergence of cognitive overload (Jodłowiec 1991a, 2008, Piskorska and Jodłowiec 2018).
The chapter is structured around three parts. The first part (Section 2.2.) contains the
introduction to the discussion of Relevance Theory by outlining Grice’s central proposals on
communication. This is motivated by the fact that relevance theoreticians believe that
“[r]elevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail one of Grice’s central
claims” (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 607). Both RT and Grice reckon that communication is an
inferential enterprise. The Gricean view on communication is followed by the application of
the conversational maxims to the explanation of humorous effects (Section 2.2.1.), which
illuminates that humour violates the conversational maxim(s) or even the Cooperative Principle.
Section 2.2.2. contains the delineation of Raskin’s approach that verifies the theoretical aptness
of Grice’s maxims to the study of humour, postulating the humour maxims and the non-bona-
fide communication. To balance the discussion, there are some critical remarks concerning some
postulates on the application of the maxims to humour in Section 2.2.3. Next, an interesting
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approach to Grice’s model offered by Yamaguchi (1988) is summarised, which attests that the
CP is observed in humour.
The second part of the chapter is dedicated to an overview of Relevance Theory with the
intention to describe the assumptions concerning cognition (Section 2.3.1.), communication
(Section 2.3.2.) as well as inference and comprehension (Section 2.3.3.). In general, this part
endeavours to furnish the theoretical information on the interdependence between the
relevance-orientated approach and the analysis of humour.
The third part concerns the relevance workings of humour as well as the tools that are
conducive to humour in the sitcom discourse. First, Yus’ (2013a, 2013b) Intersecting Circles
Model is described in Section 2.4.1., the types of which are exemplified with the extracts from
Modern Family. This classification helps to demonstrate that different pieces of information,
viz. utterance interpretation and cultural as well as make-sense frames, are combined to develop
a comprehensive picture on the analysis of humour. Second, given the fact that humour in
sitcoms is dependent upon various stereotypes, it is shown how a sociological/ cultural
perspective can be extrapolated on the study of language with a special emphasis on the process
of metarepresentation of cultural beliefs, epistemic vigilance, the spread of cultural information
and stereotypical information. In general, this work validates the claim that sitcom humour is
subsumable to Relevance Theory, despite the fact that academic scholarship on this topic is
scant (Section 2.4.3.). Third, various relevance-theoretic concepts are abstracted, which have a
significant bearing on the research into humour. More specifically, Section 2.4.4. sets out to
present the notions of metarepresentation and the mind-reading ability to clarify the
interactant’s recognition of the communicator’s underlying intentions. The next section
elucidates the notions of implicitness, mutual manifestness and cognitive environment, which
are connected to sitcom discourse, as they gloss upon the conversationalist’s formulation and
evaluation of the hypothesis concerning the (un)intended meaning. Then I proceed to detail
Sperber’s (1994) modes of interpretation, which are conditioned upon the development of
human intelligence and more importantly, which can be used to explain one’s recovery of a
humorous interpretation or lack of thereof. The last two sections depict the notions of weak
communication, cognitive overload (Section 2.4.7.) and poetic and non-propositional effects
(2.4.8.), which may prove to be effective to characterise the totality of meanings gleaned by the
audience of sitcom discourse.
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2.2. Preliminary remarks: Grice’s CP and maxims35
The present section is devoted to the summary of Grice’s central claims concerning
communication and their relevance to the study of humour. Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s
models of communication are inferential, and thus lay emphasis on the importance of intentions,
i.e. their expression by the communicators and attribution by the comprehenders. The questions
will be addressed whether Grice’s framework is suitable for analysing humour and if yes,
whether it requires any revisions.
Grice (1975 [1989]) formulated the principle that governs conversational exchanges,
based on the assumption that human beings are rational. Those expectations are articulated
under the Cooperative Principle and its subservient categories: the Category of Quality,
Quantity, Relation and Manner. Speakers are generally believed to be cooperative rational
communicators in their efforts to make their conversational contributions as successful as
possible in order to be understood (Grice 1975 [1989]: 45). The Category of Quantity states
that communicators are required to be as informative as they can be but not more than what is
necessary for conversation. The Category of Quality assumes that communicators are expected
to be truthful and say something for which they have adequate evidence. The Category of
Relation preserves the relevance of one’s contribution, that is stick to the topic of a
conversation. The Category of Manner states that communicators convey information in an
economic manner, which means that one should avoid obscurity and ambiguity of expressions.
The Cooperative Principle (CP): Make your conversational contribution such as it is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged
(Grice 1975 [1989]: 45)
The Category of Quality
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
The Category of Quantity
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
The Category of Relation
1. Be relevant.
35 Grice, being an ordinary language philosopher, made an invaluable contribution to the growth of linguistic
pragmatics. This section places emphasis on his seminal lecture “Logic and Conversation”, more specifically the
CP and its categories. The reason why the Gricean postulates are summarised in the present thesis is that both RT
and Grice opt for the inferential account of human communication.
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The Category of Manner
Supermaxim: Be perspicuous
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
3. Be brief.
4. Be orderly.
There are several ways in which the maxims are not fulfilled, some of which may result in the
derivation of conversational implicatures by the hearer/ reader, being the focal point of his
theory. First, maxims can be violated, which means that the communicator covertly and
unostentatiously fails to fulfil them and hence in certain situations, s/he will be liable to deceive
other interactants. Second, the speaker may opt out of observing the maxims or CP and s/he
may overtly note that s/he is unwilling to be cooperative, for example by saying I cannot say
more, my lips are sealed. Third, there may also be cases of a maxim clash, frequently between
the first maxim of Quantity and the second maxim of Quality. Fourth, the most interesting case
from the point of view pragmatics is when the maxims are flouted but still the CP is observed,
which means that the communicator deliberately and overtly exploits one or more of the
maxims, in this way activating the process of extracting an implicature.
The proposals on the viability of Grice’s theory can be divided into two main trends: neo-
Gricean pragmatics that draws upon original proposals and post-Gricean pragmatics that is not
built upon Grice in a strict sense but gives rise to a new revised model, such as Relevance
Theory, which will be discussed in detail below.
2.2.1. Application to humour
Grice’s account of communication governed by the Cooperative Principle and maxims has been
applied to the study of verbal humour36 with special attention to jokes (Raskin 1985, Attardo
1990, 1993, 1994: Chapter 9; Raskin and Attardo 1994; Alexander 1997; Mooney 2004; Dynel
2008, 2009a).
Attardo (1990, 1993, 199437, 2017) claims that a vast majority of jokes violate maxims
or even the CP in the first reading as “they fail to conform to their ‘recommendations’” (Attardo
1990: 355). When the hearer processes the text of a joke on the literal level, as any other text
without humorous intent, s/he is covertly deceived by the communicator. The reason why it is
violation, not merely flouting, that creates humour is that there is “no ulterior interpretation of
36 See Goatly (2012: 228-233) for the discussion of various humorous texts, which flout Grice’s categories. 37 It needs to be underlined that Attardo and Raskin were not first researchers who evinced interest in the relation
between jokes and Grice’s lectures (see Attardo 1994: 272 for an overview).
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the text that can salvage it from the violation of the maxim” (Attardo 1993: 543). The rationale
for such an argument is that the violation of maxim(s) is associated with the speaker’s deceitful
behaviour to mislead the hearer into believing that normal (non-humorous) information has
been produced and hence a ‘usual’ process of understanding should be followed. The hearer is
oblivious to the fact that the interlocutor has decided not to fulfil a maxim to create a special
humorous effect upon him/ her. Discarding a text because of its ill-formedness is socially
undesirable since the CP presumes cooperativeness, meaningfulness and relevance to the
hearer. Therefore, according to Attardo (1990), jokes are cooperative texts and the
communicator’s subversive acts (maxim non-fulfilment) acquire a social status38.
Van Raemdonck (1986: 62-63, in Attardo 1990: 359-360) argues that whenever jokes
violate the maxims of quality, quantity or manner39, the maxim of relevance is violated as well.
In other words, when the communicator’s contribution is not truthful, exhaustive or organised,
it is not relevant to the hearer. Attardo (1990) posits that both maxims of quantity and relation
can be not abided by in jokes, with the former being crucial to implicit information. Contrary
to these views, the study conducted by Norrick (1993: 36)40 shows that gendered jokes do not
always flout the relevance maxim as their presence in conversations triggers telling another
gender joke, which is topically connected to the previous one. As for shaggy-dog stories, they
violate the maxim of quantity since they offer a surplus of information, while puns violate the
manner maxims given their inherent ambiguity (Attardo 1993). Similarly, Alexander (1997: 69)
argues that jokes chiefly break the maxim of manner since comic effects result from intentional
ambiguity. Norrick (1993: 24) also believes that conversational joking is often employed as a
topic changer, disrupting the natural flow of conversation and thus it breaks the relation maxim.
2.2.2. Non-bona-fide mode of communication
Raskin (1985: 100-104) puts forth the non-bona-fide (NBF) mode of communication in an
attempt to circumvent the paradox about the view of humorous texts as violations, which are
still cooperative. In humorous communication, jokes retain their communicative status since
they impart information through their “presuppositional basis, rather than their illocutionary
38 Attardo (1994: 271-286) defends the view that the non-cooperative nature of jokes can still be considered
cooperative when violation is only mentioned (not performed) (see Section 2.2.4.). 39 Nash (1985: 117-119) coins four notions of runabout, skid, backhander and googly/ spitball, which stand for
the type of text flouting of maxim of quantity, relation, quality and manner (also quantity), accordingly. 40 Oring (2003: 95-96) shows the way in which jokes are relevant to the current conversation.
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value, through metamessages and suppressions of the violation” (Attardo 1993: 537). The NBF
communication is governed by a separate set of humour maxims:
Maxim of Quantity: Give exactly as much information as is necessary for the joke.
Maxim of Quality: Say only what is compatible with the world of the joke.
Maxim of Relation: Say only what is relevant to the joke.
Maxim of Manner: Tell the joke efficiently. (Raskin 1985: 103)
It follows from these humour maxims that the hearer does not expect the proposition to be true,
informative or relevant. The bona-fide communication is deliberately and consciously
abandoned when the speaker’s intention to make his/ her audience laugh is recognised. The
reason why interactants engage in the non-bona-fide mode is that humour seems to be socially
acceptable right after abandoning serious conversation (Raskin and Attardo 1994).
The NBF has been proposed in opposition to the bona-fide (information- or fact-
conveyance) mode, which is governed by the Cooperative Principle. In bona-fide
communication, the hearer processes an utterance presuming that the speaker is committed to
the truth and relevance of his/ her contribution:
“Bona-fide communication is governed by the ‘co-operative principle’ introduced by Grice (1975).
According to this principle, the speaker is committed to the truth and relevance of his text, the hearer is
aware of this commitment and perceives the uttered text as true and relevant by virtue of his recognition of
the speaker’s commitment to its truth and relevance.” (Raskin 1985: 100-101)
Trying to show the usefulness of the non-bona-fide mode, Raskin and Attardo (1994) concede
that the bona-fide communication is only applicable to the literal uses of language, excluding
various figures of speech, which, in Grice’s account, arise out of floutings and lead to the
subsequent extraction of implicatures. Moreover, Raskin (1985) believes that the humour mode
is instantly impelled when ordinary discourse does not create effects the speaker intends to
produce, claiming that joking is “a much more socially acceptable form of behavior than, for
instance, lying...” (Raskin 1985: 101).
To sum up Attardo’s and Raskin’s views, they reckon that the position of humour within
the Gricean framework falls outside its scope and they opt for the NBF mode in which the CP
does not apply. Attardo (1990, 1993, 1994) acknowledges the fact that humour violates the
maxim(s), which in Grice’s terms, would be treated as uncooperative behaviour.
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2.2.3. Criticism of Attardo’s and Raskin’s stance
The validity of the humour maxims has been accepted at face value and reverberate through
many scientific writings, which have been critically assessed by some scientists (Oring 2003,
Dynel 2008, 2018). What I would like to do here is to demonstrate a few critical comments that
I find compelling, which are in favour of abandoning an additional mode of communication.
Mooney (2004) puts forward the idea that the term ‘violation’ should be replaced with
‘non-fulfilment’, being an umbrella term encompassing the acts of communication in which the
interlocutor does not adhere to the maxims. Dynel (2008, 2009a, 2018), endorsing the neo-
Gricean perspective, goes as far as to claim that the studies designed to merge humorous
discourse into Grice’s theory are doomed to failure since the philosopher employed the term of
violation inconsistently. In her opinion, Attardo’s (1990, 1993) view that jokes should be seen
a case of maxim violation is ill-advised on the grounds that, as explained in the Gricean lectures,
violation is a deliberate breach of one of the maxims, which is concealed from the hearer. In
this way, a humorous verbalisation aims to deceive the audience and hence any jocular text is
equated with covert lies, i.e. the audience cannot draw proper inferences. For Attardo, violation
involves non-fulfilment of one maxim while others are obeyed, thus, it is evident that he uses
‘violation’ and ‘flouting’ synonymously. When a humorist disobeys one of the maxims for
jocular effects, it cannot be perceived in terms of violation (Jodłowiec 1991a, Dynel 2008).
What can also clarify the occurrence of humour through maxim flouting is cooperative
rationality that is central to Grice’s philosophy. A humorous episode cannot be communicated
without the hearer’s awareness of this intention.
Dynel (2009a) holds that not even once in Grice’s lectures do we come across the term ‘bona-
fide’ used in the same sense as Raskin (1985) tries to ascribe, i.e. as being guided by the CP. In fact,
Grice (1989) made the reference to bona-fide as a non-technical notion, which lacks strictly
delineated boundaries. Second, Raskin (1985) shows a close affinity between Grice’s CP-centred
mode and his humour-governed CP (Raskin 1985: 103, also found in Raskin and Attardo 1994):
“Just as bona-fide communications can fail if the speaker does not have full control of maxims [Gricean],
humor fails if the maxims [Raskinian] are not abided by. Similarly, the hearer can fail the speaker in bona-
fide communication even if the speaker does everything right and the hearer of the joke can fail to get it
even if the speaker provides all the necessary ingredients and follows all the maxims.”
For Raskin (1985), it is axiomatic that whenever the bona-fide communication fails to be in
force, the non-bona fide is implemented. Understood in this way, there are only two types of
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communication, i.e. information-conveying and humorous, where there is no room for lying,
irony, metaphorical utterances, etc. (Dynel 2008).
Raskin seems to anticipate the criticism of NBF communication and advances a rebuttal
against it: maxims “do not really provide an explicit account of the semantic mechanisms of
humor” (Raskin 1985: 103-104). Moreover, the bona-fide mode should not be extended to
include the non-bona-fide since the same text may require two analyses (Raskin and Attardo
1994). Furthermore, Dynel (2008, 2018; also Oring 2003) criticises the proposal of NBF and
maxim violation, which seem to be unnecessary complication, as jocular texts can be
accommodated within the neo-Gricean scholarship. Despite the fact that humour often draws
upon illogical or absurd relationships, the most important feature of communication is
conversational rationality (Dynel 2008) that also refers to comic texts.
According to Dynel (2018: 78), humour may flout, observe or violate the maxim(s),
which “cuts across the truthfulness-untruthfulness division, being in various relationships with
Grice’s first maxim of Quality”. For instance, humorous irony is premised on overt
untruthfulness, whereas humorous deception is based on covert untruthfulness. In lieu of the
bona and non-bona-fide dichotomy, Dynel (2018) puts forward the autotelic and speaker-
meaning-telic humour dichotomy, where the former term refers to humour uttered for its own
sake, whilst the latter denotes humour that conveys the meaning that conversationalists find
crucial to the ongoing conversation.
2.2.4. Yamaguchi’s Character-Did-It Hypothesis
An alternative proposal that posits keeping the CP has been put forth by Yamaguchi (1988),
who expounds on the claim that jokes are a form of cooperative discourse, which involve the
deceptive violation of Grice’s maxims. This phenomenon is described within the Character-
Did-It Hypothesis, which is dependent upon the two conditions:
i. One of the characters in a joke is free to violate the maxims of conversation in order to produce the
essential ambiguity of the joke
ii. The narrator must avoid violation of the maxims. When for some reason the maxims are to be violated
in the narrator’s own report of the event, either the narrator needs to pass on the responsibility for the
violation to one of the characters, or at least to minimize the narrator’s own responsibility for the
violation in one way or another (Yamaguchi 1988: 327)
It is maintained that the conversational maxims are freely violated by one of the characters in a
joke, and hence s/he shoulders responsibility for producing essential ambiguity in the build-up,
being a prerequisite for garden-path jokes. Even though it is the humorist (narrator) who
actually utters the text and violates the maxims, s/he does not disobey the maxims on the same
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level as characters within a story. Thus, there are different roles assigned to characters in the
fictional world, who are entitled to violate the maxims, and the conversationalists in the real
world. The narrator may choose to either delegate responsibility upon the character or to
minimise his/ her own responsibility, which can be done through viewpoint projection, evasion
or backgrounding (Yamaguchi 1988: 330-335). The uncooperative humorous use of language
is salvaged because violation is overtly mentioned. This view is pivoted on Sperber and
Wilson’s (1981, see Wilson and Sperber 1992) mention theory of irony.
Moreover, it is also assumed that the recipient and narrator are engaged in a cooperative
enterprise. As a result of his study, Yamaguchi (1988: 336) speaks of the micro and macro
levels of communication. The micro layer refers to communication occurring in the fictional
world, whereas the macro layer constitutes conversation between the encoder (writer or
speaker) and decoder (reader or hearer). It is the micro layer on which maxim violation is
enacted and the only reason why it happens is the creation of humorous ambiguity.
Yamaguchi (1988) claims that the violation of the maxims of quality, quantity and
relation is conductive to garden-path jokes. The second submaxim of Quantity as well as third
and fourth submaxims of Manner are not usually violated for the sake of humour since these do
not have the potential to induce ambiguity.
Attardo (1993, 1994) critically revisits mention theories dividing them into a strong
version, exemplified by Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) account in which utterances implicitly
mention another, and a weak version, epitomised by Yamaguchi’s (1988) hypothesis in which
utterances explicitly mention another. Attardo refers to the ‘implicit mention’ view (unbeknown
to the hearer) as ‘zero mention’. Sperber and Wilson’s version is ‘stronger’ with respect to the
scope of mentioning, ranging from explicit to implicit, whereas Yamaguchi’s version is
‘weaker’ since it is solely restricted to an explicit mention.
2.3. Relevance Theory
Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) was proposed over three decades ago in the publication entitled
Relevance: Communication and Cognition by Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]). It is still one of
the most powerful pragmatic theories, which has psychological cognitive underpinnings. Wilson
and Sperber (2004) argue that RT is commonly associated with a reconceptualisation of two Grice’s
claims: first, an indispensible feature of both verbal and non-verbal communication is the
production and identification of intentions and second, the very act of conveying utterance directs
the hearer’s cognitive processes towards the recovery of the speaker’s meaning. Since RT maintains
that human communication and cognition are relevance-oriented, its fundamental tenets are to be
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divided into those referring to cognition and those concerning communication. These two sets of
assumptions are discussed in the following sections (2.3.1 and 2.3.2.). Moreover, essential
proposals concerning inference and comprehension are summarised in Section 2.3.3. Next, the
employment of RT to the study of humour is discussed in Section 2.4.
2.3.1. Cognition
This subsection summarises the RT view on human cognition. Its focal point is the First (or
Cognitive) Principle of Relevance41, which states that “[h]uman cognition tends to be geared to
the maximization of relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 260). It follows from the
principle that people have an innate capacity to allocate cognitive resources so as to attend to
information that has the potential of being relevant in some way. The notion of relevance42 is
defined as the property of “external stimuli (e.g. utterances, actions) or internal representations
(e.g. thoughts, memories) which provide input to cognitive processes” (Sperber and Wilson
2002: 14). That is to say, a stimulus is regarded as relevant when the interpreter acquires some
cognitive benefits when processing it (Wilson and Sperber 2002). More specifically, a stimulus
is assessed as relevant when it yields positive cognitive effects, which are worthwhile inputs to
our representation of the world. Hence, attention is allocated to stimuli which are more relevant
than others. There are three types of cognitive effects: strengthening, abandonment or revision
of existing assumptions, and contextual implication, which is derived from the input and the
context (Wilson and Sperber 2004).
Relevance is not only a classificatory but also comparative concept (Sperber and Wilson
1986 [1995]: 152-153). There are two determinants of relevance: cognitive effects deducible
from processing of an input and mental effort expended on obtaining these effects, both of
which are non-representational phenomena of the cognitive system:
Relevance of an input to an individual:
a) Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the
greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
b) Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input
to the individual at that time. (Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]: 153; Wilson and Sperber 2004: 609)
41 In the first edition of Relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 158) offer the principle of relevance, which reads:
“Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance”. In the Postface
to the book, the main aim of which was to revise some claims, the authors put forth the two principles of relevance,
which replace the single principle. 42 Relevance is a technical term to denote a non-representational property of mental process (Sperber and Wilson
1986 [1995]).
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Besides the notion of relevance, Wilson (1999, 2005) offers two complementary notions
of accidental relevance and accidental irrelevance. The former is explained in the following
manner: an “utterance is accidentally relevant when the first interpretation that seems relevant
enough to the hearer is not the intended one” (Wilson 1999: 138). This idea squarely converges
with Sperber’s (1994) interpretative strategy of naïve optimism (Section 2.4.6.). Accidental
irrelevance occurs when the speaker provides the hearer with information that the latter already
stores, a case in point being told, for instance one’s name – unless the hearer suffers from
amnesia, this piece of information does not improve one’s knowledge.
Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]) explain our tendency to maximise relevance, that is
how human beings aim to obtain the massive amount of cognitive outcomes for the least mental
effort, in two steps. First, it is a human automatic biological mechanism to choose the best variant
of a certain phenomenon and at the same time, disregard other unbeneficial variants, i.e. to achieve
a balance between costs and benefits. Second, people are genetically programmed to aim at
maximal cognitive efficiency, which means that their cognitive system articulates and allocates
resources to increase the chance of processing the most relevant information in an optimised way.
2.3.2. Communication
RT is consistent with post-Gricean pragmatics, which revisits the Gricean maxims and offers a
more cognitive orientation. Relevance theoreticians, following in Grice’s footsteps, argue in
favour of the inferential model of communication, hence breaking with the coded view
(Shannon and Weaver 1949 [1964], Saussure 1959 [2011], Jacobson 1960), which explains
utterances in terms of signals that encode the meaning that interlocutors wish to communicate.
The major criticism voiced against the traditional model is that the semantic content of sentence
vastly underdetermines the speaker’s meaning (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]; Carston 1988,
2002; Wilson and Sperber 1993, 2004; Wilson 1999; Sperber and Wilson 2002; Recanati 2004;
Jodłowiec 2015). In order to bridge the gap between a linguistic form/ decoded meaning and a
speaker-intended meaning (including explicit and implicit components), Sperber and Wilson
(1986 [1995]) advance the inferential communicative model, according to which utterances are
understood as coded pieces of evidence about the intended message. Hence, comprehension is
not a simple process of decoding but a process of decoding and inferencing on the basis of the
speaker’s evidence: “the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding is just one of the inputs to an
inferential process which yields an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning” (Wilson and Sperber
2002: 600).
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Sperber and Wilson’s model concerns ostensive-inferential communication. i.e. overt and
intentional communication defined as follows: “the communicator produces a stimulus which
makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by
means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions”
(Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 63). In other words, it is the communicator who is involved
in the act of ostension, whereas the recipient is engaged in the process of inference. An ostensive
stimulus is constructed and conveyed to grab the interactant’s attention and focus it on the
speaker’s intention. It has the potential of raising precise and predictable expectations of being
relevant, which is not created by other stimuli.
RT holds that any utterance (ostensive stimulus) is presumed to be relevant, i.e. it is
automatically and spontaneously attended to and processed, whether it actually turns out to be
so or not. In other words, utterances convey a presumption of optimal relevance. This assertion
forms the basis for the Second (or Communicative) Principle of Relevance:
Communicative Principle of Relevance:
Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance. (Sperber and Wilson 1986
[1995]: 158; Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612)
Presumption of optimal relevance:
(a) The ostensive stimulus is worth the audience’s processing effort.
(b) It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and preferences.” (Sperber and
Wilson 1986 [1995]: 268; Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612)
As for clause (a) of the presumption, the processing effort required to understand an ostensive
stimulus is worth the audience’s while since the stimulus is more relevant than other competing
stimuli that the communicator could have chosen. In other words, “the level of effort needed to
reconstruct the intended interpretation is treated as given, and the presumption is that the effect
will be high enough for the overall relevance of the stimulus to be at or above the lower limit”
(Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612). According to clause (b), it is in the communicator’s interest
to offer the most relevant and easily understandable stimulus – weighted against his/ her
preferences and capacities – whose processing leads to the derivation of not only immediate
cognitive effects, which the interlocutor wants to achieve, but also further cognitive effects
(Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]; Wilson and Sperber 2004; Wilson 1999).
It is maintained that human communication is an act which aims to modify the cognitive
environment of others. The modification is possible when an item of new information is added,
or a new stimulus is provided “by a diffuse increase in the saliency or plausibility of a whole
range of assumptions, yielding what will be subjectively experienced as an impression”
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(Sperber and Wilson 2012a: 87). The cognitive environment is defined as “a set of facts that are
manifest to him”43 (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 39). As a result, one’s cognitive
environment consists of not only assumptions already stored in mind as probably true but also
those which are likely to be held as true – even mistaken assumptions can be accepted as true
when they are well-evidenced. Crucial to the notion of the environment is the term manifestness.
A fact is manifest to an individual when it is capable of being perceived or inferred, i.e. when a
person is able to non-demonstratively infer it. Manifestness is a gradable notion since assumptions
may be more or less manifest. Hence, there is a strong correlation between the communicator’s act
of manifesting and the interpreter’s act of entertaining of an assumption: “manifest assumptions
which are more likely to be entertained are more manifest” (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 39).
The difference between being manifest and being more manifest lies in one’s immediate physical
environment and cognitive predispositions. Moreover, it is worth underlining that the notion of
(mutual) manifesteness is weaker than that of (mutual) knowledge, whereas some fact can be
manifest without an individual’s knowing it (in a strong view, the interactant needs to have a
mental representation of a fact in order to have a knowledge of it, Sperber and Wilson 1986
[1995]; Wilson 1999).
When the same set of assumptions is manifest to two individuals, the point at which their
cognitive environments meet is called a mutual cognitive environment. Sperber and Wilson
(1986 [1995]: 45) further explicate that “[w]hen a cognitive environment we share with other
people is mutual, we have evidence about what is mutually manifest to all of us”. Even though
we have concrete evidence of what is mutually manifest to people in our physical environment,
it is not required that each assumption, being a part of that mutual cognitive environment, has to
be identically represented and accepted as true by each participant in a communicative situation.
Ostensive-inferential communication is explained in terms of two types of intentions: the
informative intention and the communicative one, which read as follows:
a) Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986[1995]: 58)
b) Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the
communicator has this informative intention. (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 61)
When the communicator conveys something, s/he signals that s/he has the informative
intention. When s/he wants to inform his/ her interlocutors that s/he has that particular
43 A few pages earlier in the book, Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]: 46) explain the cognitive environment as
“a set of assumptions which the individual is capable of mentally representing and accepting as true”.
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informative intention in mind, s/he has the communicative intention. In Grice’s paradigm, there
are also layers of the recovery of the utterer’s meaning (associated with non-natural meaning
abbreviated as meaningNN): the communicator intends to provoke a belief on the part of the
comprehender to make him/ her recognise this particular belief (Grice 1957: 384). The view on
intentionality was revised in the following manner: the speaker wishes to elicit a particular
response that needs to be recognised by the comprehender, which is crucial for the fulfilment of
this intention (Grice 1989: 92). In addition, Grice believes that communicator’s (illocutionary)
intentions are reflexive, which means that the speaker’s intention is to cause a psychological
state with the use of the hearer’s recognition of intentions. In RT, for truly overt communication
to occur, the informative intention needs to be made mutually manifest to the communicator and
audience with the use of an ostensive stimulus, which grabs audience’s attention and provides
direct evidence to the speaker’s intention44 (Wilson and Sperber 1993, 2004).
2.3.3. Inference and Comprehension
RT holds that utterance interpretation is a non-demonstrative inferential process, which “as
spontaneously performed by humans, might be less a logical process than a form of suitably
constrained guesswork” (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 69). It follows that communication
is not a fail-safe process and thus there is no guarantee that utterance is interpreted as the
communicator intends. Comprehension was initially understood as a ‘global’ process, with
“free access to all conceptual information in memory” (ibid.: 65). Later, Sperber and Wilson
(2002) (also, Wilson 2005, Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004) revisit their claims about the
global/ local process and speak in favour of a dedicated comprehension module which
incorporates specialised principles and mechanisms.
An utterance is characterised as “a linguistically-coded piece of evidence” (Sperber and
Wilson 2002: 3), which points to the communicator’s intentions. It is believed that utterance
comprehension comes in two stages, viz. linguistic decoding and inference: “a modular
decoding phase is seen as providing input to a central inferential phase in which a linguistically
encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to construct a hypothesis about the
speaker’s informative intention” (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 1). These pragmatic inferential
processes are adopted to enrich a logical form into a fully-fledged proposition. In particular,
there may be some ambiguities to resolve, referential ambivalences to fill in, illocutionary
44 However, Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]: 64) acknowledge the fact that unintentional communication is also
feasible when the communicator provides evidence for the informative intention but disregards the communicative one.
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indeterminacies to remove, or metaphors and ironies to interpret. The interactant needs to
employ contextual assumptions in order to obtain a contextually enriched meaning. In so doing
s/he follows the comprehension heuristic procedure formulated as follows:
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure
a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses
(disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned) (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 613).
In interpreting an utterance, there may be a number of possible candidates (interpretations) with
potentially the same amount of cognitive effects. However, it is the criterion of the presumption
of optimal relevance, which conditions the hearer’s choice. Since the communicator is
presumed to offer the ostensive stimulus which can be easily understood, the audience stops the
process of comprehension at the interpretation which is obtained at lowest cost possible. Wilson
and Sperber (2004: 613) specify the comprehension process by distinguishing three subtasks:
Subtasks in the overall comprehension process45:
a) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (in relevance-theoretic terms,
EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment
processes.
b) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (IMPLICATED
PREMISES).
c) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (IMPLICATED
CONCLUSIONS)
It needs to be accentuated that the retrieval of explicit meaning, appropriate contextual
information and implicit meaning is not ordered sequentially but rather all three subtasks run
in parallel: “implicated conclusions must be deducible from explicatures together with an
appropriate set of contextual assumptions” (Sperber and Wilson 2012b: 14). In RT, this is
dubbed the mutual parallel adjustment. RT pictures communication as an online process, in
which one’s search for the speaker’s interpretation is constrained not only by the presumption
of relevance but also individual expectations about potential relevance of the utterance. All of
these may warrant hypotheses about explicatures and implicatures via backward inference
(Sperber and Wilson 1997a, 2008; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004; see Mazzone 2015, 2018).
The dedicated comprehension module tests the hypotheses concerning the implicit and/ or
explicit meanings and chooses the optimally relevant interpretation.
On the RT account, the derivation of both explicitly and implicitly communicated content
involves inferential processes. It is argued that explicitness is a matter of degree, depending on
45 The exploitation of some of interpretive stages in order to induce humorous effect on the part of the recipient is
presented in Section 2.4.1)
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the level of indeterminacy and hence, the interpreter’s pragmatic inference. An explicature is
stronger when the decoding phase greatly contributes to the resulting interpretation, whereas it
is weaker when the process of inferencing takes a relatively bigger share (Sperber and Wilson
1986 [1995]; Wilson and Sperber 2004; Carston 2004). Implicatures, on the other hand, are
described as those propositions which are not communicated explicitly and can be divided into
implicated premises and implicated conclusions. Premises are those assumptions which form
the context consisting of information retrieved from the memory or created on the basis of
assumption schemas. These premises facilitate the recovery of the relevant interpretation.
Implicated conclusions are formed from premises and the explicit content (Sperber and Wilson
1986 [1995])46. Like explicatures, implicatures can be stronger or weaker. Strong implicatures
are propositions, the recovery of which is indispensible to construct the relevant interpretations,
and hence the interactant is strongly encouraged to derive them, whereas weak implicatures
may not be necessary for the overall interpretation. Some inferences may also be drawn on the
interpreter’s sole responsibility. One utterance may give rise to a number of weak implicatures
(Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]; Wilson and Sperber 2004; see Section 2.4.7 on the role of
weak implicatures in the entertainment of humour as well as Section 2.4.8. on non-propositional
effects). Within weak communication, interlocutors may intend to create a certain impression
on the recipient’s part. It needs to be highlighted that impression is a specific type of a cognitive
effect, defined as “a change in the manifestness of an array of propositions which all bear on
our understanding the same phenomenon” Sperber and Wilson (2015: 138). It follows that the
communication of the speaker’s determinate meaning and of impression are at opposite poles,
whilst cases placed in-between form a continuum (Sperber and Wilson 2012a).
2.4. Humour in RT
RT is a wide-ranging framework which is applicable to a number of communicative
phenomena, for example humour, irony, metaphor, translation and interpreting, language
acquisition, second language teaching, media discourse and Internet communication,
(im)politeness and phatic communication47, etc. As for the research into humour, it has been
adopted to the analyses of jokes (Yus 2003, 2008, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2016, 2017b;
46 This is how Sperber and Wilson explain the hearer’s performance of a three-task comprehension process. One
cannot help but have an impression that the process of going through the construction of explicatures, implicated
premises and conclusions is in fact incremental and sequential. 47 Consult Yus’s comprehensive online bibliography service of literature on Relevance Theory, which is regularly
updated: https://personal.ua.es/francisco.yus/rt.html. References can be sorted according to thematic sections or
humorous texts exemplified by novels (Larkin Galiñanes 2000), conversational humour
(Kosińska 2008a, 2008b; Piskorska 2016) and humour elicited in audio described context
(Martínez-Sierra 2009).
What can be noticed is that the research into humour on the strength of Sperber and
Wilson’s theory has stimulated many scientists. Among the bulk of potential benefits that one
can entertain when investigating humour in accordance with RT’s lines is the fact that the theory
is not detached from other linguistic approaches and models, especially IR accounts that can be
employed to study any occurrence of humour. Second, RT pays scientific attention to the
comprehender’s inferential processes, which can be exploited by interlocutors to interweave
humour in the fabric of longer conversations. It is precisely valid for the research into sitcom
discourse as we may study the strategies employed by the production crew, who aim to devise
humorous units in such a way as to induce a jocular response on the audience’s part.
Accordingly, since the relevance-based approach subscribes to IR models, it connects the IR
workings with pragmatic processes to give rise to a broad picture of human communication.
Third, besides a linguistic perspective, RT enables a comprehensive analysis of cultural
knowledge which has an impact upon the totality of meanings. As has already been underlined,
the present work does not aim to undertake a sociological analysis, nevertheless it makes
references to the cultural context.
2.4.1. Yus’ Intersecting Circles Model
In this section, I would like to show that Yus’ Intersecting Circles Model can be used to explain
humour in sitcom discourse and thus there is no need to put forth additional mechanisms or
concepts. A considerable asset of his design is the joint functioning of the three elements:
pragmatic processes, cultural information and make-sense frames, which can more precisely
describe the humour in a sitcom unit. Yus’ Model is one of the several templates for joke
analysis, the most important part of which is inferential processes followed by the recipient.
Early work on humour within RT put forth various classifications of jokes. The earliest
version was proposed by Jodłowiec (1991a, 1991b)48 who champions a two-fold categorisation
into ambiguity jokes and implicit import ones. Then, Curcó (1995, 1996a, 1997) offers the
taxonomy with three types, viz. the entertainment of contradictory propositional content, the
treatment of foreground assumptions as if they were in the background and a clash between the
48 The reason why I mention other taxonomies is to show that Yus’s (2013a, 2013b) Intersecting Circles Model is
not the earliest to date.
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expectations of the way in which upcoming material will achieve relevance and the way in
which it actually does49. Other four classifications have been advanced by Yus in 2003, 2008,
2012b and 2013a, 2013b. In the 2003 taxonomy, it was shown how the communicator can
exploit the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedures (extraction of a logical form,
ambiguity resolution, reference assignment, enrichment, implicature) in order to achieve
humorous effects on the part of the hearer. Subsequently, Yus (2008) advanced a four-group
classification: explicit interpretation questioned (this type corresponds to the whole
classification from 2003), explicit interpretation clashing with contextual assumptions,
implicated premises and conclusions at work and targeting background encyclopaedic
assumptions50. The 2012b categorisation can be represented graphically as follows, in which
there is a basic division into intentional and unintentional humour, with the former being the
point of attention for pragmatics:
Figure 2.1. A relevance-theoretic classification of jokes (Yus 2012b: 274)
49 Curcó’s classification has been criticised on the ground that it attempted to present a classification of humorous
texts but then she employed witty quotations and epigrams (Dynel 2012b). Moreover, it has been claimed that
these mechanisms are relevant to non-humorous texts and these do not constitute a fully-fledged list of all possible
logical mechanisms in humour (Piskorska 2005). 50 This grouping of jokes has been critically revised since it lacks a unifying criterion and the types are not mutually
There are fictional interactions whose humour depends upon the construction of make-sense
frame(s), which can create little or no cognitive dissonance. In extract (4), throughout Claire’s
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phone conversation with Phil, she is petting Phil’s dad’s dog. The viewer is required to activate
two make-sense frames simultaneously, either of which would relate to a different conversation
between Claire and Phil or Claire and Phil’s dad. In particular, the make-sense frame “big
troubles” relevant to the Claire-Phil conversation concerns the information about Phil’s running
into serious troubles and hence not being allowed to sleep in their bedroom. A divergent make-
sense frame “big dog” is constructed on the basis of the meaning gleaned by Phil’s father: “big”
refers to the size of the dog, whilst “no sleeping in the bedroom” is a restriction imposed upon
the dog.
(4) Context: Phil’s dad arrived to Phil and Claire’s and to make things worse, he brought the dog. Phil
has forgotten to inform Claire about his impending visit. When Phil’s dad appears on their doorstep,
Claire tries to conceal her mixed feelings. She decides to phone him in order to hear the explanation.
Phil [on the phone] Am I in trouble?
Claire: Oh, really, really big.
Phil: Okay, I’m a little scared. How bad is this?
Claire: Oh, well... We have a new rule... no sleeping in the bedroom. (S01E21)
Humour type 5: cultural frame and utterance interpretation
Humour in sitcoms can be induced by the combination of a cultural frame and the exploitation
of an interpretive path. The family conversation (5) requires the recipient’s activation of the
cultural frame that encompasses stereotypical information about a very sensual woman (Gloria)
who is married to a much older man for the sake of financial stability and safety. There is also
phonetic similarity between the two phrases “coal digger” and “gold digger”, which give rise
to two different interpretations: Gloria exploits her looks to get money from her rich husband
and Gloria is a mine worker. The latter meaning gets invalidated on the strength of the viewer’s
background assumption that Gloria is not a manual worker recruited in a mine. The recipient’s
familiarity with the cultural frame about the relationship between a pretty woman and a rich
man as well as the fact that Gloria fits into stereotypical thinking are decisive factors in deriving
the humorous interpretation.
(5) Context: All family members are gathered at Jay and Gloria’s house. Earlier same day, Manny and
Luke had a fight in school. Phil gets inquisitive about the reason behind their school scuffle. Manny
poked fun at Luke for having the same second breakfast every day.
Luke: I made fun of him because his mom used to dig coal.
Gloria: What?
Manny: He said you were a coal digger.
Phil: Okay, I think we can move on.
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Gloria: Who said I was a coal digger?
Luke: That’s what my mom told me.
Alex: What’s a coal digger?
Phil: Sweetheart, he heard it wrong. It’s “gold digger”. (S01E05)
Humour type 6: cultural frame
Humour can be dependent upon the recipient’s construction of cultural frames. It will be
demonstrated in the analytical chapter that there is an abundance of humorous turns in which the
viewer needs to resort to cultural/ sociological information. In a nutshell, the recipient of the
sitcom under analysis needs to frequently construct the cultural frame in conversations held by
Mitchell and Cameron, whose sexual orientation is overtly manifested, or Gloria, whose
Colombian origin or thick accent is underlined. In extract below (6), the recipient is supposed to
formulate two cultural frames, which give rise to two interpretations: “the Colombians as blue-
collar workers” and “Jay as an older husband who is going to die soon, leaving Gloria with big
money”.
(6) Context: Gloria and Jay are in their kitchen. Jay is planning to play golf when Gloria asks him to help
Manny fix the fan in Manny’s room. Jay is determined to go to a golf club so he suggests taking a
Colombian handyman.
Gloria: Nooo. You’re supposed to do it with him. It’s important that we teach him how to do things
for himself. In my culture, men take great pride in doing physical labour.
Jay: I know. That’s why I hire people from your culture.
Gloria: You’re too funny. I’m gonna share that one with my next husband when we’re spending all
your money. (S01E02)
Humour type 7: utterance interpretation
It is also possible for the production crew to exploit the recipient’s relevance-seeking inferential
procedures, as predicted within RT (Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]), so as to maximise
humorous effects (Yus 2003, 2008, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2016). The interactions may include
polysemy, ambiguity or the interplay between the explicit and implicit meanings. In
conversation (7), the viewer encounters the ambiguous term Supremes that may have several
meanings, with no definite candidate for the interpretation: “being the singer in an American
singing group” or “being the part of the bar”. The main reason for leaving the recipient clueless
about the intended interpretation is to create the oscillating effect where the comprehender
“ends up swinging back and forth between two conflicting interpretations of one linguistic form
without being able to abandon either” (Solska 2017: 204).
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(7) Context: Mitchell has just been asked for legal advice by his father and he is flabbergasted at this fact.
Cameron: Well, Mitchell is an amazing lawyer. Oh. My dream for him is that one day he’ll be on
the Supreme Court.
Mitchell: Why, Cam?
Cameron: So at parties I can tell everyone my partner is one of the Supremes. (S01E14)
To sum up, although a qualitative analysis is intended as part of my study, humour type 5 and
6 seem to be the most widely represented categories of humour in the sitcom Modern Family.
As a result, the sitcom frequently creates amusement by hinging upon stereotypical information,
which can be conjoined with the exploitation of an interpretive path. In fact, any member of the
Pritchett-Dunphy-Tucker clan is pictured as a stereotypical character of some sort: a young
woman married to a wealthy man (Gloria), a well-off man who thinks that it is not money he
earns that attracts women (Jay), a typical homosexual couple (Mitchell and Cameron), a
housewife who decides to go back to work after a decade of raising children (Claire), a pretty
dumb real estate agent (Phil), etc. (see Section 5.5.3.)
2.4.2. Sociological/ cultural perspective52
Humorous utterances in sitcoms, like in other types of natural and scripted communication, are
determined by cultural and social53 context (Oring 1992, Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997,
Kuipers 2008). Various linguistic models of communication, especially those relating to mass-
mediated discourse, do not take into consideration socio-cultural aspects given their lack of
uniformity. However, there are some socio-pragmatic studies into humour, in particular into
jokes with a view to showing a change in gender tendencies (Kotthoff 2000, Crawford 2003,
Thielemann 2011) or targeting an ethnic group (Popescu 2011). A number of researchers
corroborated the theoretical potential of the inferential processes in the interpreter’s recovery
of a humorous meaning. The strand of research relevant to the present analysis is the one
initiated, among others, by Yus (2013a, 2013b) who underlines the import of encyclopaedic
information about social and cultural context, which can be stored in the recipients’ mind. This
research is relevant in the context of the study of sitcoms, the comic effects of which often
dwell on society-based stereotypes. In other words, humour does not only consist in linguistic
means but also cultural phenomena, which in turn encompasses psychological aspects. It is vital
52 One of the critical claims levelled at RT is that it lacks the connection of its research programme into sociological
studies. In fact, Sperber, a social scientist, wrote alone or in collaboration with other scientists, a series of articles
on culture and society (these can be accessed on Sperber’s personal website http://www.dan.sperber.fr/). 53 Sperber (1996) argues that there is no difference between social and cultural phenomena. In this work,
irrespective of contrasting factors, the author follows in Sperber’s (1996) footsteps.
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for the current research to incorporate Sperber and Wilson’s (1986 [1995]) cognitive model of
communication into socio-cultural phenomena to demonstrate that humour is used to fulfil a
number of communicative functions, for instance challenging stereotypical information.
One of the keys to the understanding of sitcom humour lies in the relationship between
linguistic means of inducing humour and the viewer’s (sub)conscious awareness of
sociological/ cultural conditions. Nevertheless, when the viewer does not know some of the
stereotypical information used to perform functions other than amusement, his/ her formulation
of the humorous interpretation should be not hampered. That is to say, it is believed that the
derivation of additional cognitive effects, which are communicated by dint of humour
consequent upon weak communication, are treated as independent of a humorous intention. On
the other hand, when humour bases its comic effects upon the knowledge of a certain stereotype,
which the viewer lacks, humorous communication would not be established. This perspective
on the functions performed with the use of humour converges with the one adopted by Piskorska
and Jodłowiec (2018), who believe that both universal and culture-dependent assumptions can
be combined in jokes to spark off the cognitive overload effect (Section 2.4.7.).
Sperber and Wilson (1997b) defend RT from criticism against its alleged inability to deal
with social phenomena, claiming that human communication carries crucial social implications.
They define culture as those enduring representations which can be promptly discerned by other
individuals. Sperber and Claidière (2008: 283) claim that culture is better viewed as a “property
that human mental representations and practices exhibit to a varying degree rather than as a
type or a subclass of these representations and practices”.
According to RT, human beings have the storage of different conceptual representations
in mind, some of which are accessible for a longer period of time, whilst others are relevant
only on a particular occasion (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]). There are three types of
representations: public, mental and abstract (Wilson 1999), with the first two playing a role in
the transmission of cultural information (Sperber 1996). Mental representations take the form
of beliefs, intentions and preferences, which exist in the mind of one person. Public
representations include signals, utterances, texts or pictures, which can be disseminated on a
larger audience. As a result, mental representations are “internal to the information-processing
device”, whereas public representations are “external to the device and which the device can
process as inputs” (Sperber 1996: 61). In other words, mental representations emanate from
accessing their public versions, which are themselves derivatives of mental counterparts.
Sperber (1993, 1996) proposes an epidemiological view of the spread of cultural
representations, which means that communication is prompted by two mechanisms: the first is
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a process of turning mental representations into public ones and the second is an operation of
converting public representations into mental ones:
“(…) first transformed by the communicator into public representations, and then re-transformed by the
audience into mental representations. A very small proportion of these communicated representations get
communicated repeatedly. Through communication (or, in other cases, through imitation), some
representations spread out in a human population, and may end up being instantiated in every member of
the population for several generations. Such widespread and enduring representations are paradigmatic
cases of cultural representations” (Sperber 1996: 25)
Cultural representations are a subset of mental and cultural representations, which can
undergo constant revision when they are spread, but they can also reach a considerable level of
stability. In Sperber’s (1996) parlance, sitcoms are regarded as a public production which, as
any ostensive stimulus, aim to modify the viewer’s cognitive environment by, for instance,
strengthening or revision of old assumptions. In particular, the viewer constructs mental
representations in his/ her mind based on public representations produced by fictional
characters’ monologues and dialogues, which were retransformed from mental representations
originating in the scriptwriters’ mind. McKeown (2017) states that in the case of humour, the
increased mental effort is compensated with positive socio-cognitive effects, which are seen as
improvements in one’s system of representations having a social value.
Within RT, it is believed that those representations which are transmitted on a number of
social encounters and which are not greatly modified (are stable) become part of culture
(Sperber 1996, Sperber et al. 2010). Since interpretations are defined as one’s own
representations of representations of others, different audiences may hold similar or divergent
assumptions in mind, which differ with respect to the level of their relevance to the organism
(Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]: 161). In particular, the audience may entertain a set of
representations given their intuitive and reflective beliefs (Sperber 1996, 1997). Intuitive
concepts are constructed in the course of “spontaneous and unconscious inference from
perception” (Sperber 1997: 77) or communication. These beliefs are generally concrete and
reliable and they are stored as commonsense concepts about the world. Intuitive beliefs form a
fundamental category of cognition (they are quite superficial and descriptive), and hence they
are held as inputs to further inferential processes. Reflective concepts arise because of human
beings’ metarepresentational ability to metarepresent attitudes and intentions of others since
these require the validating context. Reflective beliefs contribute to the development and
transmission of cultural assumptions, irrespective of whether they are fully or partially
understood. It is possible for some representations to reach the level of intuitive beliefs and then
after interaction, they become reflective ones, and vice versa. The former case can be illustrated
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with the situation when a person has an intuitive idea of the concept of “weight”, which was
later differentiated from the concept of “mass” and then one holds a reflective belief concerning
weight. The latter case can be exemplified with the situation when a child is consciously taught
the difference between even and odd numbers, while a grown-up has an intuitive idea of these
numbers.
In the case of sitcoms, it is the production crew (associated with fictional characters) who
are seen as the validating context or an authority figure that is responsible for fostering a number
of reflective beliefs on the part of the audience. Consequently, these representations may
become the candidates for the viewer’s cultural knowledge. Sperber (1996) maintains that the
transmission of reflective beliefs is a visible social process, which is made consciously and
deliberately as these beliefs are held consciously. To illustrate the communication of reflective
beliefs, I would like to present one of Yus’ (2002, 2005) examples of a stand-up monologue in
which the comedian is granted authority to plot the course of his/ her performance, for example
when the audience is entitled to provide a response. Among the validating sources, Sperber
(1996) mentions parents and teachers, which Yus (2004: 337) complements with “the barrage
of information from mass media discourses”. In extract (8), David Allen challenges the
authority of his parents whose influence on the child’s creation of stereotypical assumptions
about sex roles is joked about:
(8) One of the main changes in today’s society is our attitude to what we could call the stereotype of the sexes...
or the role that sex plays. If you actually think back to your childhood... We had very distinctive lives... My
mother was a great believer in what we could call sexual differences. I was four years of age... I would walk
with my mother down the street... my mother would say things like “David, walk on the outside”. I’d go
“What do you mean?”. “Walk on the outside of me”. “Why mummy?”. “It leaves your sword arm free”
[audience laughs]. “What are you talking about? I don’t have a sword!” [audience laughs]. “No, but in the
days, years ago, when men did have swords, some men might want to attack the female, so the male would
walk on the outside of the female so he can get out his sword and fight that person... See? That’s why you
walk on the outside”. “But... but... I don’t have a sword!” [audience laughs]. “No! But you protect
mummy!!... You protect!!... male!!... you’re a male!! You’re the stronger of the two!! Males are the hunters!
The providers! Females stay at home, and make a home and a nest and keep it warm for the... [mimics the
What is also crucial in studying cultural phenomena is that it is impossible to draw the
dividing line between those representations which belong to one’s privately held storage and
those which are treated as cultural information circulating within society. Sperber and Claidière
(2008) claim that these two types of information should be arranged on a continuum of cases
since mind-internal representations can be combined from private and social inputs. Moreover,
the content of cultural representations needs to attain the level of stability through
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communicating the same information or sharing the commonly held belief (Sperber and
Hirschfeld 2007, see Sperber and Wilson 1997a).
Epistemic vigilance and the cultural spread
From the speakers’ perspective, the principal purpose of communication is not only to be
understood but also to be believed, whilst from the recipients’ perspective, some mechanism is
required to protect themselves from deception. This mechanism is dubbed epistemic vigilance.
Human beings are endowed with this specialised faculty in the mind, which is explained as
one’s cognitive attentiveness operating when there is the risk of inadvertent or deliberate
misinformation (Sperber et al. 201054, Mazzarella 201355). It is a universal mental ability, which
is not confined to the processing of cultural metarepresentations but it is conductive to the
explanation of how information circulates in a social group. It is further explained that vigilance
is not opposite to trusting but to blind trusting56. Mascaro and Sperber (2009) enumerate three
aspects of the capacity of being vigilant: moral/ affective (attending to malevolence), epistemic
(attending to false information) and mind-reading (attending to one’s intention to deceive).
More importantly, they claim that the epistemic ability cannot exist without the mind-reading
one (but not vice versa). The discussion on social mechanisms of epistemic vigilance in culture
needs to be complemented with the study of epistemic vigilance towards the source of the
communicated information and the content.
The case is quite simple when cultural ideas are dispersed along the chains of transmission
from a single authority (Sperber 1996), whom others strongly believe, and hence the mechanism
of epistemic vigilance is exercised in face-to-face communication (Sperber et al. 2010). More
important to the analysis of sitcoms is when the viewer does not know the source of local or
cultural information. Hardly can we image the situation in which the recipient ponders about
whether it is the production crew or fictional characters, who are epistemic authorities of
cultural beliefs. In the case of mass-mediated communication, the source of information is
always the producer, so in sitcoms it is the production crew who constructs fictional
conversations. As for fictional characters’ role in the spread, it is the case that they air views
54 This article contains section Epistemic Vigilance on a Population Scale. The postulates it contains are not restricted
to the social transmission of cultural metarepresentations but are relevant to the spread of any type of information. 55 It is worth underlining that Mazzarella (2013) calls for the extension of the mechanisms of epistemic vigilance.
It is argued that epistemic vigilance is exercised when there is a risk of not only misinformation but also
misinterpretation. 56 Epistemic vigilance is a different type of mechanism from the guru effect since the guru effect can be equated
with blind believing/ trusting. In other words, we believe that our mental gurus are benevolent and competent
interactants and thus we blindly rely on information provided by them (Sperber 2005 [2010]).
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held by scriptwriters with which they do not necessarily agree. Sperber et al. (2010) reckon that
the answer to how epistemic vigilance operates on a population scale is the reliability and
trustworthiness (i.e. his/ her benevolence and competence) of the source, which goes with
reputation, i.e. opinion about a communicator. One’s trust in others is allocated on the basis of
the situation, interlocutors and topic of conversation. These three components have direct
influence upon the viewer’s epistemic trust in the production crew. Given dedicated and
constant viewership of sitcoms, the recipients are believed to accept what they are said and
agree with, for instance cultural load. Fiction, like real-life interactions, can influence our
picture of the world and our processing of information that “leak” through the TV screen. In
general, the viewers’ epistemic vigilance in sitcoms works in exactly the same way as in natural
communication. A piece of entertainment, however, may relax one’s attentiveness since the
production crew does not intend to use deliberate deceit.
The viewer’s vigilance is also targeted at the content of information. Since all fictional
communication in sitcoms is treated as newly incoming stimuli, its believability is assessed on
the basis of background knowledge. Sperber et al. (2010: 375) enumerate three possibilities of
what can be done with new information:
i. If the source is not regarded as reliable, the new information can simply be rejected as untrue, and
therefore irrelevant.
ii. If the source is regarded as quite authoritative and the background beliefs which conflict with what the
source has told us are not held with much conviction, these beliefs can be directly corrected.
iii. If you are confident about both the source and your own beliefs, then some belief revision is
unavoidable.
As regards communication in sitcoms, the most reasonable steps taken by the viewer is the
second and third. The first option is not, in my opinion, devised with sitcom (or film) discourse
in mind because the reason why viewers are attracted to a particular piece of entertainment is
that they regard dialogues/ monologues amusing and thus worth the processing effort. Although
the recipient applies a different approach to analysing fictional events than to real-life events,
s/he does not reject fiction because of its unbelievability as fictional discourse presumes some
realism (see Section 5.3.1.). When it comes to the two subsequent reactions to the source of
newly acquired information presented above, the recipient can be fully or quite confident about
the reliability of the production crew/ fictional characters. Some cultural or general beliefs can
undergo the process of revision since the viewer’s epistemic commitment is sometimes stronger
than one’s personal beliefs. A case in point can be the homosexual couple, Mitchell and
Cameron, who are positively pictured in the sitcom, and this portrayal can meet with scepticism,
acceptance or rejection from the recipient. In this case, the authority of Cameron and Mitchell
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may act as a positive verifier as to the acceptance of information, which may trigger the viewer’s
updating of stereotypical information57.
The recipient’s epistemic involvement in communication, i.e. one’s fondness to put
mental effort in order to interpret an utterance, can acquire a social status and is not necessarily
linked to the source and content of message: “the content of the ideas matters less to you than
who you share with, since they may help define group identities” (Sperber et al. 2010). It is this
feeling of belonging, solidarity or bonding (Hay 2000) and being part of community that seems
appealing to the audience who watches a sitcom or takes part in a stand-up performance. Yus
(2002) refers to communal laughter, which is shared by the audience in the same physical
environment of the theatre, being an indicator of the fact that the same set of assumptions is
mutually manifest to them.
Stereotypical information
Granted that humorous effects frequently reside in the audience’s accessing, strengthening or
challenging stereotypical information concerning gender roles, ethnicity, race, blondes,
politicians or lawyers, this section sketches how RT may approach the analysis of humorous
units, which are contingent upon stereotypes.
Yus (2002, 2004, 2005) investigates the social side of humour in stand-up performances,
the postulates of which are relevant to sitcoms. There are two categories of cultural beliefs:
stereotype consistent and stereotype inconsistent, which may produce different variations of
humour. In particular, there are four elements which need to be taken into account: 1)
comedian’s input is (in)consistent, 2) audience’s intuitive representations are stereotype
(in)consistent, 3) audience’s reflective representations are stereotype (in)consistent, 4)
audience’s metarepresentational cultural representations are stereotype (in)consistent. These
distinctions interact with another basic classification of cultural representations, which can be
divided into private beliefs and metarepresented cultural beliefs (Yus 2002, 2004, 2005).
Private beliefs are those acquired intuitively, via perception and inference, or reflectively, via
communication (Sperber’s intuitive and reflective beliefs). Metarepresented cultural
representations are those which members of a specific culture regard as commonly held by a
group. It follows from the stereotype-consistent and inconsistent bifurcation that the content of
the audience’s and the comedian’s storage of cultural information can be overlapping or
disparate, or even the recipients and the interlocutor can have parallel representations about the
57 Instead of approving of new cultural information, which clashes with personal storage of representations,
Sperber et al. (2010: 375) claim that the viewer may also “reduce [his/ her] confidence in the source or [his/ her]
confidence in [his/ her] less entrenched beliefs”.
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same concept (Yus 2002). This claim is particularly viable to sitcoms since the viewer can find
the dialogue humorous, even though s/he does not endorse the stereotype. In other words, there
is a dividing line between private beliefs and metarepresented cultural beliefs. The audience
may own individually held representations which are different from those maintained by
society. Pilkington (2000) speaks of culturally endorsed emotions – the ones that every
individual in a culture or society is assumed to experience concerning a stereotype.
As Sperber and Wilson (1997a) believe, what an individual mentally holds can be
relatively stable or person-specific, and such assumptions can converge with those distributed
within culture or society. More importantly, new or idiosyncratic assumptions may achieve the
level of stabilisation through communication, hence it is a social matter. In the case of sitcoms,
it is quite tangible since the production crew (associated with fictional characters) is the
validating context (authoritative figure) and their beliefs may be accepted as true by the
audience and then become stabilised in the audience’s mental storage.
Yus (2004, 2016) underlines the fact that public enjoyment in the audience during a stand-
up performance results from the individual’s realisation that his/ her private cultural
representations actually circulate within culture or society. It is this collective recognition which
is surprising to the audience and hence leads to amusement. The same is true about comedy.
Granted that what the production crew communicates conveys the potential of being humorous
or amusing, the viewer can also acknowledge the fact that some of the private representations
achieve the level of collectivity.
Strengthening or challenging cultural information seems to be one of the most frequent
sources of humour in stand-up comedies (Yus 2002). At this point it may be far-fetched to claim
that all sitcoms aim to bolster or challenge stereotypical information, which would be among
one of the most common humorous mechanisms, however, the sitcom Modern Family often
bases its comicality on stereotypes. The strengthening of personal representations occurs when
an assumption is made mutually manifest by the comedian during the show. The challenging
of personal beliefs is defined as the act of making mutually manifest an assumption collectively
held by many people, which is not the same as the one aired by the interlocutor. In the case of
challenging, there is the shift from the collective or comedian’s personal assumptions to the
audience’s, whereas in the case of strengthening, the process is reverse (from personal to
collective storage) (Yus 2005). Exploiting a cultural stereotype may also encompass cases in
which the audience is pointed out that some stereotypes exist. There is another mechanism
hinged upon stereotypical assumptions, i.e. when these are refined or improved. When the
production crew questions existing cultural stereotypes, this act is subsumed under the process
of strengthening of metarepresented cultural beliefs (Yus 2002, 2005). Whether it is a stand-up
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performance, sitcom or spoof, the analyst scrutinising comedy discourse can never be sure
whether a piece of discourse strengthens, challenges or refines one’s cultural representations
since the relevance of any stimulus is assessed against individual background knowledge.
The idea that the audience may trust and accept the validity of argument by the production
crew in sitcoms can also be approached in terms of the guru effect58 (Sperber [2005] 2010).
This concept underlines the role of authority and argumentation in the sense that we strongly
believe in what an intellectual guru states and that it is relevant and worth the mental effort,
even if an utterance is communicated in an obscure and opaque manner. Authority is understood
as a social relationship, which works in parallel with reputation (competence and reliability)
established in the course of repeated communicative acts. When the production crew aims to
question the audience’s personal stereotypical information, s/he may assume that his/ her
authoritative position suffices for a sitcom recipient to believe in its validity. An additional
effect upon believing in the truthfulness of guru’s reasoning is that the recipient becomes a part
of authority, which has intellectual and social implications. That is to say, the individual
supporting claims made by the guru has the feeling of being cognitively capable of
understanding a complex idea.
2.4.3. Relevance-theoretic analysis of sitcoms
There is a wealth of television series and serials but the study of sitcoms within RT has been
given scant attention, not to mention that RT has not been employed to investigate functions of
humour in sitcoms. One of the reasons why the research into situation comedy has been
marginalised may be that the genre itself belongs to popular culture, which in turn was regarded
as undeserving scientific scrutiny (Neale and Krutnik 1990, Mills 2005, 2009). In previous
sections, I tried to point to the affinity between postulates concerning sitcom studies and other
humour manifestations investigated from an RT point of view, more specifically stand-up
performances and jokes. It has been shown that findings specific to other genres can also be
applied to sitcom studies.
As regards sitcoms in RT, this topic has not been exhaustively studied apart from two
such contributions, which will be discussed to show the analytical path taken by the researchers.
The two articles include Hu (2012, 2013) and Ma and Jiang (2013), both of which make no
attempt to specify accessing humorous effects by the viewer. The length of these articles
amounts to five to seven pages, which do not perform comprehensive analyses of humour in
58 It only refers to honest gurus who do not intend to be deceitful.
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sitcoms. According to Hu (2012)59, humour results from interplay between the maximally and
optimally relevant interpretations in a given context. In my opinion, it follows the pattern set
by Curcó’s studies (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Section 2.4.5.), in which it is suggested that the
entertainment of incongruity arises from the clash between two competing interpretations, as
well as by Yus’ (2003), where it is argued that humour resides in accessing a highly relevant
but incorrect interpretation, which is replaced with a highly irrelevant but finally correct one.
On the other hand, Ma and Jiang (2013) believe that RT’s cognitive account needs to be
integrated with Verschueren’s Adaptation Theory since the latter provides conceptual tools to
explicate social and cultural background, which determines a particular choice of interpretation.
The result of their study is that humour resides in the clash between optimal and maximal
relevance (same as in Hu 2012), the derivation of weak effects (nevertheless, the authors do not
refer to the notions ‘implicit effect’ or ‘implicature’), the clash between contextual assumptions
and optimal relevance and the ambiguity on different levels (sound structure, lexicon, sentence
proposition). On a critical note, Ma and Jiang (2013) do not make reference to the importance
of social or cultural contexts determining the viewer’s selection of the optimally relevant
meaning.
2.4.4. Metarepresentation and the Mind-Reading Ability
The present section demonstrates the way in which interlocutors are able to predict how
utterance is to be interpreted by the comprehender in order to devise a stimulus that would
create intended cognitive effects. RT sees verbal communication as a metapsychological mind-
reading activity, which is performed intuitively and unreflectively. The ability to communicate,
i.e. construct one’s meaning and evaluate the speaker’s meaning, is executed by a dedicated
comprehension module, which belongs to a suite of theory of mind mechanisms. Sperber and
Wilson (2002) corroborate that one way of explaining the speaker’s recognition of co-
conversationalists’ intentions is through “a ‘theory of mind’ dedicated to the attribution of
mental states on the basis of their behaviour” (Sperber and Wilson 2002: 4). In an RT view, the
concept of the module is more loose than the Fodorian (1983, in Sperber and Wilson 2002)
sense to denote “domain- or task-specific autonomous computational mechanism” (ibid.: 9; also
Sperber 1996). Hence, the module is a specialised mental mechanism operating at the level of
unconsciousness in order to recognise the communicator’s intentions.
59 The author gives the brief RT analyses of the two examples taken from The Big Bang Theory, while the rest of
the article is devoted to Grice’s account, i.e. how flouting of the maxims can lead to humour – the research which
has already been performed by Attardo (1990, 1993, 1994) and Dynel (2008).
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The mind-reading ability comes in handy to explain how it is possible for humans to
foster social relationship in natural or fictional communication. Since it is not feasible to
literally see what is going through one’s mind, the interactant may act upon the mental states
of other communicators by predicting some features of a stimulus: the one that would attract
others’ attention, the one which would induce the hearer’s search for relevant background
information and the one which would enable the recipient to make inferences (Sperber and
Wilson 2002). All these three components are taken into consideration by the production crew.
The role of the mind-reading module has been underlined by Yus (2004, 2003, 2013a,
2016), as being essential to predict inferential stages the hearer is likely to go through in order
to exploit them humorously. It is argued that in the case of jokes or stand-up performances, the
communicator can anticipate how an utterance will be interpreted, what inferential steps will
be followed to enrich the incoming information into a fully contextualised material, which
inferences will be drawn, which make-sense or cultural frames will be constructed.
McKeown (2017) claims that humour poses an ostensive challenge, the presence of which
informs recipients that they are challenged to spend more mental effort in return for
entertainment. Moreover, a humorous unit promotes mind-reading abilities to communicators,
which “creates a desire to socially bond with the humorous person” (McKeown 2017: 628).
Hence, humour is seen as a sign of displaying affiliation and the humorist’s mind-reading
abilities are exercised when s/he provides others with relevant information that is loaded with
social currency.
What Sperber and Wilson (2002) advocate is that the process of mind-reading is carried
out automatically and unconsciously in spontaneously produced communication. In my
opinion, this ability can be used by the producers, scriptwriters, directors, etc. to induce a
humorous response on the viewers’ part. That is to say, the production crew devising fictional
dialogues employs his/ her mentalising abilities in a conscious way. It means that they make
conscious predictions concerning the way in which scripted conversations are to be received by
the audience. To rephrase, scriptwriters of any mass-mediated communication deliberately try
to steer the recipients’ train of thought in order to presume that humorous episodes are
recognised in accordance with their intention. Nonetheless, in the case of weak implicatures the
speaker can never fully predict which meanings are gleaned by the audience.
The mind-reading capacity can be seen as a sub-module of metarepresentational abilities,
defined as the ability to represent representations, i.e. a lower-order representation, which may
encompass thoughts, utterances, or propositions, embedded within a higher-order
representation (Wilson 1999). A lower-order representation may take the form of the public
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representation (e.g. utterance), the mental representation (e.g. thought), or the abstract
representation (e.g. sentences, propositions) (Wilson 1999, 2000). In other words, the act of
metarepresentation enables human beings to consider their own and other interactants’
thoughts. The other two types of metarepresentation include the pragmatic (or
metacommunicative) ability to regard utterances and overt communicative episodes, and the
argumentative (or metalogical) ability to apply one’s epistemic vigilance (Wilson 2009; see
Section “Epistemic vigilance and the cultural spread”). Sperber and Wilson (2002) claim that
the standard mind-reading act comprises only one level, whereas metarepresentation requires
several levels in inference-based communication (as shown in Section 2.4.6.).
2.4.5. Implicitness, Mutual Manifestness and Recipient’s Cognitive Environment
RT holds that communication and comprehension are inferential, which consist in a
metapsychological endeavour of the formulation and evaluation of a hypothesis concerning the
interactant’s meaning (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995], Wilson and Sperber 2012). In order to
make the informative intention attributable, the communicator needs to make mutually manifest
to both the speaker and the recipient that s/he wants to communicate (that s/he has the
communicative intention). The fact that the intention needs to be made mutually manifest in
order to establish communication is one of the basic tenets in RT. Many relevance theoreticians
concerned with humour either explicitly or implicitly refer to this postulate.
Curcó (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) underlines the role of implicitness, mutual
manifestness, metarepresentation and incongruity in verbal humour. Based on the notion of
implicitness, three mechanisms are proposed, which are explained in terms of forms of the
perception of incongruity and include: 1) the entertainment of contradictory propositional
content, 2) the treatment of foreground assumptions as if they were in the background, 3) a
clash between the expectations of the way in which upcoming material will achieve relevance
and the way it actually does. The third mechanism may work on its own or may originate from
the first two mechanisms. In general, humour resides in accessing two clashing propositions:
the strongly implicated premise, dubbed the key assumption, and the assumptions derived from
the context, termed the target assumption. The two assumptions divide one’s cognitive
environment into two relevance search fields (Curcó 1995, 1996a). Piskorska (2005) reckons
that Curcó, by no means, provides a fully-fledged list of logical mechanisms, while Dynel
(2012b) believes that the mechanisms can be narrowed down to one mechanism in which two
interpretations are in a clash.
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The viewer’s cognitive environment is much wider than that of fictional characters’ since
the recipient of film/ sitcom discourse has access to a wider context. In other words, a set of
assumptions made mutually manifest to the viewers by the production crew is broader than
what is mutually manifest among fictional characters. The production crew is believed to
predict which information can be easily accessed by the audience and which information can
interact with audience’s personal cognitive environment, although a full overlap with the
recipient’s environment is never attainable (Yus 2004). Moreover, Yus (2016) comes up with
the notion of narrowed mutual cognitive environment which is “made up of assumptions which
are very salient or prominent, and which are almost unconsciously activated due to frequent
interactions with the interlocutor, where this information has repeatedly been mentioned or
commented upon” (ibid.: 205). This is exactly what happens in sitcoms. Throughout regular
“meetings” with actors, viewers learn the type of humour that can be expected. A wide
knowledge concerning fictional characters, their portrayal, habits and frequency of joking as
well as non-verbal cues used for humour can save a lot of the viewer’s mental effort. Moreover,
the viewer who happens to watch one episode in the middle of an ongoing season would not be
able to access all mutually manifest assumptions and hence some humorous intentions may pass
unnoticed. As regards the viewer’s failure to be amused, the responsibility for this cannot be
allocated on the part of the production crew who may fail to make certain information more
relevant than others because it was in his/ her own preferences and abilities to provide the most
relevant stimulus. It is a recipient who has failed to pay attention to certain highly relevant
assumptions. Irrespective of the fact that Curcó exemplifies her claims with witticisms and
funny aphorisms, her research is also relevant to sitcoms. Let us analyse extract (9) where there
is a clear overlap between two propositional forms:
(9) Context: Phil boasts about his sales achievements.
Phil: You don’t get to be district salesman of the year without thinking inside the box. [knowing that
the recipient may ponder] That’s right. I said “inside”. You know why? ‘Cause while
everyone’s chasing each other around outside the box, you know what the box is? [tapping on
his head60] Empty. (S04E05)
What the recipient who regularly watches the sitcom knows about Phil is that he is eager to
surprise the recipient with a witty remark, very frequently stating or reversing the obvious,
which puts him in the target position. In Curcó’s nomenclature (1996a, 1996b, 1997), the key
60 Phil’s non-verbal behaviour may also positively influence or boost one’s enjoyment since he utters the word
“empty” and points to his head, which may also be understood as Phil’s being stupid. The character is certainly
oblivious to the meaning that was implicated.
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assumption derived from Phil’s monologue is that one should think outside the box, which
clashes with the target assumption that comprises the interpretation that one should look for a
solution to a problem or a good idea inside the box. The main reason why I believe that the
strongly implicated conclusion (key assumption) is formulated on the basis of the phrase outside
the box is that Phil knows that the recipient may wonder whether or not he has made a slip of
the tongue. Hence, instead of stating the correct phrase outside the box, he delivers a new phrase
inside the box, which grabs the recipient’s attention. Curcó (1996a) claims that before the key
assumption is derived by the recipient, the target assumption is treated as a piece of weakly
implicated information.
Based on the RT view of irony as an echoic use (Wilson and Sperber 2012), Curcó (1996a,
1996b, 1997) asserts that much intentional humour “consists in implicitly expressing an attitude
of disengagement towards an attributable assumption which is made strongly mutually manifest
by the implicit import of an utterance” (Curcó 1996a: 1). It seems sometimes indispensible for
the comprehension of humorous communication to identify the communicator’s tacit
propositional attitude of dissociating from the target assumption. Granted that dialogues
delivered by actors are devised by scriptwriters, the production crew can tacitly distance
themselves from an attributable assumption made mutually manifest by fictional characters.
The same applies to a variety of functions fulfilled by dint of humour. The production crew
takes advantage of actors who are made responsible for mental representations created in
recipients’ mind and thus, viewers attribute the meaning to characters.
2.4.6. Intentionality and Metarepresentation: Three Modes of Interpretation
The essence of human communication, be it verbal or non-verbal, is the production and
recognition of the communicator’s intention on the basis of evidence. This line of research was
initiated, among others, by Grice (1975, 1989). Within RT, the attribution of interactants’
intentions is a matter of satisfying one’s expectations of relevance, which can vary from quite
simple to more complex. Sperber (1994) advances three strategies of interpretation61, viz. naive
optimism, cautious optimism and sophisticated understanding, each of which demands from the
hearer an additional layer of metarepresentation. A difference between three paths of
61 Sperber’s (1994) strategies of comprehension should be viewed as ‘modes’ of understanding since they are
proposed with reference to the development of human intelligence. The naive optimism strategy is typically
employed by small children as they have problems with the understanding of ironic or metaphorical utterances.
It happens that adults make simple errors in comprehension, which is an indicator of their following the naive
strategy. As soon as people understand each other perfectly fine, this means that they employ a more advanced
path of interpretation. Hence, complex inferencing, i.e. cautious optimism and sophisticated understanding, is
achieved by adults (see Wilson 1999).
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comprehension lies in how much benevolence and competence the hearer ascribes to the
communicator, which coincides with his/ her engagement of a higher metarepresentational tier.
Grafting these modes of comprehension onto the research into sitcoms can yield some
relevant results in explaining humorous effects. First of all, we cannot expect the viewer to take
up the position of a naive or cautious understander since the intended humorous interpretation
of a fictional dialogue would fall short62. In other words, a humorous talk would be interpreted
on the basis of the first meaning, which is usually invalidated, and its perlocutionary effect,
even if made manifest, would fall flat. Secondly, Sperber’s (1994) technique of sophisticated
understanding is also pertinent to the explanation of functions that a humorous unit is intended
to convey, the fulfilment of which requires an extra layer of metarepresentational abilities.
The naive optimism strategy is the one in which the hearer remains at the low level of
metarepresentation and hence looks for the most easily accessible relevance. The communicator
is believed to be both competent and benevolent, which means that s/he will not mislead or
make his/ her audience misinterpret utterances. In other words, a recipient uncritically accepts
the first interpretation that comes his/ her mind as the production crew knows what is relevant
for his/ her audience. The conclusion of an inference is the second-degree meta-representational
attribution of a first-degree informative intention.
In the second higher strategy, a cautiously optimistic audience believes that the
communicator is benevolent, but not necessarily competent. As a result, the speaker may fail to
make the intended interpretation more relevant than others since the possible meanings of
utterance are graded in terms of accessibility. Following the path of least effort, a naive hearer
stops the comprehension process at the first meaning that seems relevant and attributes it to the
speaker. A cautious hearer stops at the interpretation that the speaker might have believed would
be relevant enough (Sperber 1994). The cautious optimism strategy is useful to prevent the case
of accidental relevance and accidental irrelevance (Wilson 1999, see Section 2.3.1.).
In the sophisticated understanding strategy, the communicator may be neither benevolent
nor competent but intends to seem as one. The hearer attributes the interpretation to the speaker,
which s/he might have thought would seem relevant enough to his/ her audience. Since the
recipient’s communicative competence involves the fourth-order metarepresentations, s/he can
glean the most complex meaning. The interactant’s informative intention may fail when the
recipient does not believe in the truthfulness of the contribution but the communicative
intention is still recognised (Sperber 1994). Moreover, as noted above in passing, a
62 In my earlier research into jokes (Biegajło 2013, 2014), it has been argued that following the naïve optimism
strategy is tantamount to accessing the literal sense of the punchline, whereas the cautious optimism path would
save humorous cognitive enjoyment from misfiring.
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sophisticated understander is capable of unconscious recognition of information that is
communicated by dint of humour. This postulate can be further extended to claim that the
viewer needs to entertain a fifth-order metarepresentation when the production crew wishes
sitcom viewers to become aware of a plethora of functions that a humorous episode can
perform, such as advising. Let us have a look at the extract from Modern Family to exemplify
the three modes of comprehension:
(10) Context: Phil boasts about being an expert of a teenage language.
Phil: I’m the cool dad. That’s... That’s my thang. I’m hip. I... I surf the Web. I text: “LOL” – Laugh
Out Loud. “OMG” – Oh My God. “WTF” – Why The Face. Um, you know, I know all the
dances to High School Musical, so... (S01E01)
Starting from the simplest interpretation pattern, a naively optimistic viewer does not ponder
about humour when identifying the intended meaning. The recipient makes the presumption
that Phil conveys a relevant piece of information and to meet this end, he has used the best
stimulus possible. The first interpretation that comes to the viewer’s mind is that Phil is really
a superb parent as he deploys quite convicting arguments for that, i.e. being able to surf the
Internet, use texting abbreviations and Internet acronyms, typically known to young people,
and dance to the romantic comedy musical television film. Even if such a viewer was familiar
with the standard reading of the abbreviation “WTF”, s/he could form a hypothesis that an
alternative reading – the one used by Phil – also exists.
Next, a cautiously optimistic viewer recognises the fact that Phil has not provided the best
stimulus and thus his competence can be questioned. Granted that the first interpretation does not
seem plausible, the viewer needs to evaluate the meaning with respect to his/ her knowledge about
the world. A cautious hearer becomes aware of the clash between the proper (relevant) and improper
(less relevant) reading of the abbreviation of WTF as “Why the Face” vs “What the Fuck”, which
is intended to generate humour. As a result, s/he reaches the interpretation that Phil does not really
know teenage language. Moreover, it can be argued that when a fan-recipient (Wieczorek 2018)
analyses this dialogue, s/he accesses more meanings, for instance that Phil usually says something
awkward. Sperber (1994) reckons that even though a cautious recipient employs an extra layer of
metarepresentations, s/he may not cope with the complexity of communication. On the strength
of the analysis of example (10), a claim can be ventured that sitcom humour is more standardised
so that conversational units can be understood by mass audience.
A sophisticated understander is cognisant of not only the play between the two possible
interpretations of the acronym WTF but also of the fact that the production crew purposefully
manipulates the reception of humour. The most interesting case given the objective of the
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present work is when the recipient engages in interpretation, which is slower and relatively
more conscious than comprehension (see Wilson 2018), to search for additional cognitive
effects achieved with the use of humour. In my opinion, it is only possible when the hearer is
eager to employ the fifth order of metarepresentational abilities. There is a whole bunch of
functions fulfilled on the part of the viewer, all of which are communicated in terms of weak
implicatures (see Piskorska and Jodłowiec 2018):
1) The monologue makes fun of people who are not teenage language-savvy.
2) It is quite entertaining when parents do their best to follow the way teenagers speak or dress.
3) It shows that adults are not able to keep up with a constant change in teenage language.
4) What parents think is fabulous may not be funny to teenagers, e.g. the knowledge of the dances to High
School Musical.
5) Teenagers often make fun of their parents, the testimony of which is Phil’s certainty of the proper
decoding of WTF.
The graphical representation of the viewer’s metarepresentational ability, who consciously
analyses fictional dialogues in order to tease out all the information delivered with the use of
humour is given below:
The production crew intends
the viewer to believe
that the production crew intends
the viewer to believe
that by saying that WTF can be deciphered as “Why the Face”
the production crew shows that adults may not be able to
keep up with the constantly changing language mastered by
teenagers63
Figure 2.2. The description of the viewer’s metarepresentation when some functions of humour are accessed
in the form of weakly communicated information (on the basis of Sperber 1994: 195)
In Sperber’s (1994) parlance, the first-order metarepresentation is the informative intention. On
the basis of Figure 2.2., it can be noticed that the first-order metarepresentation consists of the set
of weakly communicated implicatures. The actual content of this set may vary across recipients
and may also include implicatures such as, “Phil’s children make fun of him as they did provide
him with the incorrect meaning of WTF” or “Phil wishes to appear younger than he really is”.
When the audience is receptive to infer not only the production crew’s intended humorous
interpretation but also other weakly intended information, s/he needs to entertain a complex level
of metarepresentations. Sperber (1994; also Curcó 1995, 1997 (Chapter 7)) believes that fully-
fledged communicative competence is established when the communicator is able to entertain at
least a third order, while the recipient is able to entertain at least a fourth-order
63 In Sperber’s (1994) explanation of different layers of metarepresentation, he does not refer to the fifth order but
this possibility is not precluded.
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metarepresentational attribution of the communicative intention. This is also pertinent to sitcom
discourse since the derivation of the humorous meaning requires a fourth layer, as indicated in
Figure 2.2. This is also what Curcó (1995: 42) advocates that “[e]mbedding the contradictory
propositions in metarepresentations of lower degrees than those needed for verbal humour and
wit results in a variety of different effects, relative to the metarepresentational orders involved”.
To sum up, a naive recipient does not have access to humorous communication, not to
mention weak implicatures that are extracted on the basis of a humorous unit. The main reason
why the recipient stops at the first meaning that seems relevant is that a fictional character is an
honest guru, the authority of whom suffices to accept valid arguments (Sperber 2005 [2010]). In
other words, a piece of sitcom discourse is analysed as an ordinary unit (i.e. the one without a
humorous intention). A cautious hearer has the intellectual ability to access humour given the fact
that the recipient undermines the production’s crew competence and thus does not accept the
initial interpretation. In this case, one’s epistemic vigilance may help to trigger recipient’s more
advanced inferential processes and hence lead to humour (Padilla Cruz 2012). Without a doubt,
a sophisticated understander can fully glean humorous intentions but also additional weakly
manifest information.
2.4.7. Weak Communication and Cognitive Overload
A plausible explanation of a humorous response elicited on the part of the recipient is advanced
in terms of weak communication (Jodłowiec 1991a, 1991b, 2008, 2015; Piskorska and Jodłowiec
2018). More specifically, it is argued that humour in verbal jokes emerges when the punchline
makes manifest or more manifest a wide array of weakly communicated assumptions, the mental
state of which is termed cognitive overload (Jodłowiec 2008). Never do these weak implicatures
achieve the status of being full mental representations hence, humorous effects are derived at the
subrepresentational level. This is the reason why many recipients of a humorous story may find
it challenging to articulate why something has been funny or amusing. In addition, accessing
weak assumptions is largely individualistic and depends upon a number of different factors, such
as cultural background or personal experience (Jodłowiec 1991a, 2008), which is labelled
contextual constraints by Yus (2016) (see Section 2.4.8.).
The cognitive overload effect is put forth to explicate the punchline effect so, in theory, it
should account for humorous effects only in jokes, where there is a clear-cut structure into the
setting and the punchline. Moreover, in Jodłowiec’s writings, theoretical claims are exemplified
with jokes in which the punchline occupies the final position (cf. Attardo 1997), which is not
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always the case in humorous episodes in sitcoms64. It is not to undermine the explanatory power
of the cognitive overload effect. Quite the contrary, in my opinion, the mental state which is
created in the recipient’s mind when a plethora of weak assumptions is communicated is the same
in the case of jokes and other discourse units, such as fictional discourse. It needs to be highlighted
that not every piece of discourse communicating weak assumptions is equally humorous. Only
these units can potentially evoke humour when the simultaneity of weakly manifest assumptions
occurs leading to the overload. More importantly, the cognitive overload is particularly salient to
explain different communicative functions delivered with the use of humour (Piskorska 2016),
which is pursued in the present work. It is maintained here that a vast number of functions are
achieved with the use of humour on the part of the television viewer. These functions make
manifest various propositional meanings in a weak way and none of them are capable of
becoming fully-fledged representations. To show how the cognitive overload effect works in
practice, let us consider the extract from Modern Family:
(11) Context: Phil meets a well-known weatherman on the news, which makes Phil very excited. Rainer,
a weatherman, finds out that Phil is a real estate agent and tries to find a common language.
Rainer: You know, I think you sold my neighbor’s house, Doris Jacobs.
Phil: [trying to recall] Uh, white, mid-century, big back porch?
Rainer: That’s her. (S08E04)
Analysing the structure of this dialogue, it seems evident that the fictional humorous unit may
be similar to that in jokes, i.e. Rainer’s last turn is the punchline, i.e. the axis of humour, which
brings about incongruity and forces the viewer to backtrack in order to find the relevant
interpretation. Rainer’s and Phil’s initial turns can be interpreted as a usual conversation about
their mutual acquaintance, Doris Jacobs, and more specifically the house that she bought. Phil
tries to recall the front of the property that he sold to Doris: white, built or designed in mid-
century, with a big porch behind the house. Rainer decides to humorously switch the referent for
Phil’s description from the description of the estate to the description of the woman. The process
of reference assignment is exploited for the sake of humour not only on the fictional character’s
level but also the recipient’s level (see Section 3.6. on the participatory framework, and Yus
(2003) on the humorist’s exploitation of hearer’s interpretive processes). Besides the explicature
formed on the basis of Rainer’s last turn that Phil’s description fits both the house and the buyer
of that house, the viewer can access a number of implicatures which are manifest in a very weak
64 Norrick (1993) argues that jokes are very different from jokes appearing in conversation given the latter need to
be thematically connected to the on-going discourse.
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way. These assumptions are constructed on the basis of background information that the recipient
accesses at the time of watching the sitcom, some of which may converge or contradict the ones
recovered by a different individual. Let me underline that these weak implicatures are listed with
a view to enumerating propositional meanings communicated by dint humour on the part of the
recipient:
- in a stereotypical men’s talk, women are described in terms of objects
- it is typical of some men that they ridicule women and hence show their power
- by drawing attention to the way in which men talk, the production crew may wish to alter undesirable
behaviour in which women are treated as an object of affection and nothing more (see Bergson 1905
[2010])
- humour can be used to establish the common ground
2.4.8. Poetic Effects and Non-propositional Effects
This section serves two aims. First, the notion of poetic effects within RT is discussed with
reference to literary texts which often contain poetic/ creative metaphors (Sperber and Wilson
1986 [1995], 2008; Wilson and Sperber 2004; Wilson 2011, 2018; Furlong 1995; Pilkington
1989, 1994, 2000; Vande Wiele 2016) and aphorisms (Jodłowiec 2015). Second, its viability is
assessed against the data culled from the sitcom Modern Family, which also aims to induce
certain emotions, sensations or aesthetic effects with the use of humour. It is believed that the
phenomenon of poetic effects complements the discussion on the fulfilment of different
functions by means of weak communication. As a result, the very performance of functions
occurs at a subrepresentational level, i.e. without recipients’ full mental awareness. In this way,
we may show how sitcoms are relevant to their viewers, that is they are intended to create positive
cognitive effects. Like literary works, sitcoms require from the audience to recognise not only the
production crew’s communicative and informative intentions but also delve into a broader goal
of communication: to draw intuitive inferences to fulfil expectations of relevance (Wilson 2011).
The notion of poetic effects denotes non-propositional effects65, which are construed in
the hearer’s search for an optimally relevant interpretation on the basis of accessing a wide
range of weak implicatures (Sperber and Wilson 2008) or on the basis of construction of a new
ad hoc concept (Pilkington 1994, 2000). Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]: 224) suggest that
non-propositional effects should be studied in the same manner as propositional effects66:
65 One of the reasons why non-propositional effects are not included in the studies of verbal communication is that
these lack a propositional content, which makes them very slippery. 66 Nevertheless, Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]: 57), few pages earlier, claim that: “No one has any clear idea
how inference might operate in non-propositional objects: say, over images, impressions or emotions”.
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“How do poetic effects affect the mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer? They do not add
entirely new assumptions which are strongly manifest in this environment. Instead, they marginally increase
the manifestness of a great many weakly manifest assumptions. In other words, poetic effects create
common impressions rather than common knowledge. Utterances with poetic effects can be used precisely
to create this sense of apparently affective rather than cognitive mutuality.”
What Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]) state is that the primary objective of poetic effects is
to generate affective response in the form of weak implicatures. Moeschler (2009) believes that
emotive effects and propositional ones are connected in such a way that the former may block
explicit and implicit propositional effects, which in turn has an impact upon emotional states.
In other words, the manner in which utterance is delivered may influence or hinder eventual
relevance.
A pragmatic theory should be able to describe our affective experience which is crucial
to poetic effects (Pilkington 1994, 2000). Yus (2016, 2017a, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) believes that
emotions, feelings and impressions are non-propositional effects resulting in the process of
interpretation, which bifurcate into positive and negative non-propositional effects. The
difference between them is whether a non-propositional effect positively or negatively
influences the accessing of cognitive propositional effects and hence adds to the eventual
relevance or irrelevance of an output. This positive-negative division can be incorporated into
the relevance-theoretic effect-effort trade-off:
the cognitive effects generated from the interpretation of an utterance
[+] the existence of positive contextual constraints
[+] the generation of positive non-propositional effects
SHOULD EXCEED…
the mental effort needed to process this utterance
[+] the existence of negative contextual constraints
[+] the generation of negative non-propositional effects (Yus 2016: 16)
Moreover, Yus (2016) coins the term positive/ negative contextual constraints to refer to “non-
propositional qualities of the interaction that underlie communication and hence constrain the
successful outcome of the speaker’s humorous intent” (ibid.: xvii). It is suggested that non-
propositional effects emerge during the process of comprehension, while constraints, which are
also of non-propositional quality, guide communicative episodes and hence may inhibit the
attribution of humorous intentions. There are many negative constraints and negative non-
propositional effects, which may hinder or impede successful humorous communication, among
others: suitability of the topic for joking, hearer’s background knowledge and beliefs, the
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interlocutor’s sex, one’s sense of humour, relationship between interlocutors, group size, hearer’s
mood, culture and ethnicity, the communicator’s traits and performance (Yus 2016, 2018b)67.
Moreover, non-propositional effects are divided into two types: those which are
intentionally communicated in the course of interaction (dubbed affective attitude, Yus 2018a)
and those which are not intentional but leak from the communicative episode (dubbed affective
effects, Yus 2018a) (Yus 2017a, 2018a, 2018b). The latter can serve an explanation of why
interlocutors engage in humorous communication which is mostly uninformative. Hence,
accessing non-humorous and/ or humorous effects of non-propositional quality compensates
for the lack of relevance or turns an irrelevant content into relevant one (Yus 2018a).
Within RT, it is suggested that fiction can generate internal and/ or external expectations
of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1987; Wilson 2011, 2018): the former “arise in the context
of the preceding text and guide the interpretation of subsequent text”, while the latter create
“lasting cognitive effects on belief and assumptions about the actual world that the reader has
independently of the text” (Wilson 2018: 202). In my opinion, some genres are intended to
produce a vast array of externally relevant assumptions, for example universal knowledge about
human behaviour, people’s functioning in society, etc., whereas other genres aim to produce a
few assumptions that are not widely accessible. For instance, when the comprehender reads or
watches a detective story/ film, s/he does not only want to find out who the murderer is but also
what conditions/ inclines people towards becoming a villain. Consequently, there is no piece of
fictional discourse that is devoid of externally obtained assumptions since there are always other
factors that attract viewers/ readers to devour fiction.
Wilson (2018) notes that fictional genres, such as romantic or detective novels, are
produced as a form of entertainment and hence are mostly internally relevant to a recipient.
However, Wilson (2011, 2018) claims that other fiction genres can lead to accessing positive
effects which are externally relevant in the actual world. The key to this is to acknowledge two
levels of communication: the lower level is contingent upon fictional events, whereas the higher
level is based on displaying this world to the reader as if these events were possible to happen
in real-life situations (Sperber and Wilson 1987). The lower-higher level distinction is in accord
with the two communicative layers pertinent to fictional discourse discussed in Section 3.6.
Focusing on the studies of sitcom discourse, I believe that internal and external relevance work
in parallel. On the one hand, viewers adjust or enrich certain assumptions about fictional
characters on the basis of previous encounters, which strengthen or invalidate the recipient’s
67 Inasmuch as Yus (2016) is right to claim that there are many factors which may condition the hearer’s recovery
of humorous interpretation, these constraints are difficult to be predicted in the case of fictional communication.
That is to say, the production crew cannot possibility collect all the beliefs that the viewers may hold.
Chapter II. Humour in Relevance Theory
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view about a character, while on the other, fictional events do not always differ from real
situations and hence can contribute to one’s understanding of real life via a fictional situation.
This internal-external interplay is epitomised below (12):
(12) Context: Claire and Phil have an argument over who is a better parent.
Claire: ...You think I smother our child?
Phil: No, Honey, it’s not your fault, “mother” is part of the word. You never hear of anyone being
sfathered to death. (S01E18)
Phil’s coinage of the phrase to sfather to death is first analysed on the basis of the existing
phrase to smother to death which helps the viewer to interpret the new expression. In other
words, Phil communicates an indeterminate meaning of to sfather to death contingent upon the
conventionalised determinate meaning of to smother to death (cf. Vande Wiele (2016)).
Moreover, it achieves internal relevance when the recipient adjusts his/ her interpretation on
the strength of prior encounters with Phil and Claire. The background information which is
made mutually manifest is that Phil is laid-back, whereas Claire is overprotective towards
children. These internal expectations arise in the lower-level communication. How does this
humorous conversation achieve external relevance? It is created by the higher-level
communication so that the viewer tests the usability of fictional information in the real world,
which takes the form of explicature and implicature, for example, it shows a way of coping with
a contextual problem (the one which arises in the course of interaction, Hay (2000)), i.e. the
recipient learns the lesson of passing on a critical remark in a mild humorous way. Moreover,
externally relevant assumptions foster interpersonal relationship between the recipients and the
production crew (Wilson 2011, 2018).
These non-propositional effects are said to introduce small changes in individual’s
cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]). If we regard poetic effects through
the lens of various functions fulfilled in sitcom discourse, we would get the answer of how the
viewer creates certain impressions, attitudes and emotions. Wilson (2011, 2018) argues that
there are two cases in which the affective function is carried out by reading literature, and the
same applies to fictional communication. First, the production crew aims to evoke humorous
mood so that it would be easier for the recipient to derive a vast array of weakly communicated
assumptions. That is, example (12) may communicate the following weak implicatures: the
reason why fathers do not reduce child’s freedom is that there is not an appropriate phrase in
the English lexicon; the viewer’s knowledge about Phil is reinforced that he can be linguistically
inventive; it strengthens the myth that mothers are overprotective. The second case concerns
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the lower-higher level distinction: the production crew aims to amuse the viewers on the lower
level, whilst they also induce a particular affective response on the higher level.
In general, humorous utterances, as any other case of ostensive-inferential
communication, convey a set of assumptions along a continuum from fully determinate, semi-
determinate to indeterminate (see Pilkington 1989, 2000). The communication between Claire
and Phil (12) is quite determinate since Phil’s communicative intention is made mutually
manifest when he provides the relevance of the newly-coined expression to the ongoing
discussion. However, the vast range of weak implicatures, which fulfil a number of different
functions, are only marginally manifest and hence they do not have to be entertained by the
viewer (Furlong 1995). There are fictional dialogues or monologues, which are more
indeterminate since the communicator does not produce firm evidence as to his/ her intention.
Hence, the recipient needs to claim responsibility for drawing inferences:
(13) Context: Mitchell is asked by his father about legal advice, which makes him happy.
Cameron: Well, Mitchell is an amazing lawyer. Oh. My dream for him is that one day he’ll be on
the Supreme Court.
Mitchell: Why, Cam?
Cameron: So at parties I can tell everyone my partner is one of the Supremes. (S01E14)
Cameron aims to make a humorous remark which should be amusing to Mitchell and the
viewers (the actors are talking directly into the camera and hence have more intimate
relationship with the viewers), which can be judged by his cheerful smile. There are many weak
implicatures which are communicated through the word Supremes:
(13a) Cameron wishes Mitchell to become the singer in an American singing group called The Supremes
(13b) Cameron wants Mitchell to become the part of the bar
(13c) Cameron would like Mitchell to obtain a higher social status, i.e. to be supreme
There is no hint in the dialogue, which would navigate the recipient which meaning is intended
by the production crew and Cameron. Nevertheless, it does not disrupt the viewer’s comic
enjoyment. As regards external relevance, the dialogue can be used to convey the message that
people find pleasure in boasting about anything that their partners do/ have achieved,
irrespective of having no particular reason.
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2.5. Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to summarise the main proposals of RT and bring into
focus those concepts that can thoroughly delineate the occurrence of humorous effects on the
part of telecinematic recipients. In order to achieve the goal, the assumptions concerning human
communication, cognition, inference and comprehension are characterised, which encompass,
among others, the Communicative and Cognitive Principles of Relevance, presumption of
optimal relevance, informative and communicative intentions and comprehension heuristic.
This helps the reader who is not acquainted with the theory to understand the theoretical
machinery of RT. The subsequent part of the chapter brings to the fore the RT notions pertinent
to sitcom discourse to show possible ways of deriving comic effects by the comprehender.
In particular, Yus’ (2013a, 2013b) ICM proves to be relevant in the light of the analysis
of humour in sitcom as it puts forth the conjunction of three threads of information, i.e. make-
sense frames, cultural information and inferential processes of comprehension. As will be
exemplified, the path of interpretation is an initial step in the recovery of the speaker’s meaning
as its activation helps to gain cognitive effects: not only humorous ones but also those that are
(un)intentionally communicated by the production crew.
One of the criticism voiced against RT is that the theory sidelines the sociological
dimension. Sperber and Wilson (1997b) reckon that “as a theory of communication, relevance
theory is a theory of a type of social phenomenon” (ibid.: 145), which is further validated by
Sperber’s collection of articles on culture. Sperber, being a social scientist, offers a detailed
account of how cultural information is spread within society, conceptualising a number of
useful terms, such as mental, public and cultural representations as well as intuitive and
reflective beliefs. His studies are complemented with Yus’s (2002, 2004, 2005) proposal of
private and metarepresented cultural beliefs. The recipients’ storage of beliefs can be predicted
given the mind-reading ability, which is particularly crucial to the production crew of mass-
mediated communication since s/he must predict the assumptions (and thus cognitive
environment) that the recipients would possibly attend to during the watching event.
Consequently, the communicators, i.e. mainly scriptwriters, can tailor and modulate the
fictional character’ dialogues so that an exact set of evidence is offered.
Furthermore, it will be shown in the analytical chapter that the notion of weak
communication would best account for a host of possible meanings conveyed by means of
humour. It would also explain why every, some or few of the functions are fulfilled on the
recipients’ part. Given the premise that various effects communicated by dint of humour are
Chapter II. Humour in Relevance Theory
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made manifest in a weak manner, the very fictional dialogue may lead to the cognitive overload
effect, where none of the assumptions becomes fully represented in the recipients’ mind. It is
corroborated by Wilson and Carston (2019: 37):
“in weaker forms of communication, where the goal is not to achieve exact duplication of thoughts,
communicator and addressee(s) may end up entertaining different members of the array of propositions
made manifest by an utterance without this constituting a failure of communication”
It will be demonstrated in the analysis of the sitcom data that RT has a number of useful tools
in its theoretical repertoire that can provide a detailed account of not only humorous
interpretation but also other meanings that the diversified audience can access.
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C h a p t e r I I I
Comedy Discourse
Claire:“Family is a gift you receive every day”
Modern Family (S08E21)
Gloria:“Family is family. Whether it’s the one you start out with,
the one you end up with, or the family you gain along the way”
Modern Family (S03E10)
3.1. Introduction
The main aim of the chapter is to draft the broader context for the qualitative analysis
undertaken in the work, which would facilitate the understanding of the nature of the sitcom
data. This chapter is divided into two main parts. First, the workings of comedy are discussed
with a view to explicating what type of discourse it is. Special attention will be devoted to one
of its forms, i.e. sitcoms, given the fact that my exemplification data is collected from the sitcom
Modern Family. Section 3.2. succinctly summarises the modes and types of comedy in order to
help the reader navigate the place that situation comedy occupies with respect to different
genres. Section 3.3. offers a few introductory remarks concerning possible conceptualisations
of the genre of sitcom. Its subsection 3.3.1. characterises distinguishing features of sitcoms,
such as canned laughter (or lack of thereof), shooting style, scheduling as well as the process
of hybridisation that is quite frequent in the case of new situation comedies. In section 3.4.
careful attention is directed at the social dimension of the genre and the origins and role that
sitcoms play in the audience’s life are investigated. The last section of this part of the chapter
touches upon the issue of the representation of the family unit on screen and how it has evolved.
This is motivated by the fact that Modern Family is a family sitcom, being one of the most
frequent types of sitcoms. Also, the idea of family can receive a more global understanding to
denote any unit in which people are closely related to each other, such as workplace (Feuer
2001, Hartley 2001).
Second, the chapter also elucidates the participation framework that is central to the study
of any fictional communication. This framework transcends the speaker-hearer dyad to call for
the duality of communicative layers, i.e. fictional and collective senders’. In subsection 3.6.1.
various types of participants on the two levels are described. Section 3.6.1.1. constitutes the
Chapter III. Comedy Discourse
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focal part of the chapter as it addresses the role and position of the viewer in fictional discourse
as well as the audience design. It needs to be highlighted that different scientists advocate and
assign various roles to a televisual recipient, ranging from a passive overhearer to an active
recipient or metarecipient.
3.2. Comedy and its genres
As indicated in the Introduction, this section presents the workings of comedy discourse. It is
Aristotle who first considered structural aspects of comedy:
“Comedy is… imitation of more loathsome things, albeit not in regard to all that is evil, yet it is the
ridiculous side of what is ugly. It is indeed ridiculous whatever error and vice that is painless and harmless,
like the comic mask is ridiculous, deformed but cause of no pain” (Savorelli 2010: 22).
Neale and Krutnik (1990) advocate the claim that comedy68 is an aesthetic notion comprising
a variety of forms and modes. While slapstick, parody and satire are comedy modes, sitcoms,
wisecracks, jokes, gags, comic events/ moments are considered forms of comedy. Deriving
from the Aristotelian tradition, Neale and Krutnik (1990) underline two factors of comedy:
creation of laughter (local and momentary) and a happy ending (which is also a key
characteristic to melodrama).
As for comedy modes69, parody is contingent upon aesthetic conventions, which is used
to mock and attack through the imitation of an original work (Neale and Krutnik 1990, Palmer
2005). It may also be regarded as a “human behaviour which is enacted in various ways, through
gesturing, writing or speaking” (Rossen-Knill and Henry 1997: 720). The same mocking
function, however with a more insistent manner, is performed by satire which depends upon
social conventions, where the most often ridiculed are political and religious institutions and
their representatives (Berger 1997; on political satire see Wagg 1992). The third comedy mode,
slapstick, is chiefly associated with silent gag-films (Neale and Krutnik 1990), the most
distinctive feature being a number of exaggerated pratfalls which are often seen as dangerous.
As for comedy genres, these share certain factors, i.e. dependence upon an element of
surprise (created through arousing and undermining expectations) and feature of being a self-
contained product that may become a part of narrative context. A wisecrack70, also dubbed
68 A term similar to comedy is comic which refers to one generic criterion, such as character or event (Neale and
Krutnik 1990). 69 I do not aim to provide a detailed description of all the modes and forms of comedy. The purpose of a short
overview is to demonstrate where sitcom is situated on the map of comedy discourse. 70 A wisecrack is similar to a quip and epigram (Dynel 2009b). Conversational witticisms are quips “which occur
in response to various nonlinguistic situations” (Norrick 1986: 234) but not to other utterances. An epigram is a
Chapter III. Comedy Discourse
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witticism, is “a bright, smart, witty or sarcastic remark” (Neale and Krutnik 1990: 47), which is
context-dependent and hence needs to be incorporated into a larger chunk of text. In form,
wisecracks mirror one-line jokes but the former communicate a meaning outside the humorous
frame and are intrinsically ingenious (Dynel 2009b). A gag is a visual and physical humorous
action, which is unpredictable and unexpected and thus humorous to the viewer (Neale and
Krutnik 1990). Gags are often not accompanied by a verbal message.
3.3. Sitcom discourse71
Sitcoms are a subgenre of comedy discourse. It is also an important phenomenon belonging to
popular culture, which may partly explain the fact why these have sparked avid interest in the
domains of sociology and culture (Horton 1991, Jones 1992, Davis 1993, Marc [1989] 1997,
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term sitcom first appeared in print in
1964. The word itself is an abbreviated version for the more official one, i.e. situation comedy,
which is dated back to the 1950s – the time when this genre experienced a growing surge in
popularity, with broadcasting one of the most widely recognised and influential American
sitcoms titled I Love Lucy (1951-1957; CBS). Situation72 comedy should be dubbed comic
drama or narrative comedy to fully describe its format, however given their serious sounding
unsuitable for promotional reasons, it has become just sitcom (Marc 2005). Television sitcom
is modelled on radio sitcom, the prime time of which was in the 1930s and 1940s in the USA.
Some radio sitcoms were successfully turned into television ones, while others lost their
humorous effects when changed into another medium. In turn, radio sitcoms were developed
from different genres of entertainment, such as vaudeville and music hall sketches (Neale and
Krutnik 1990).
witty remark on a group of individuals as opposed to wisecracks which concern a particular individual (Esar 1952,
in Dynel 2009b). 71 This section summarises the workings of not only sitcoms but also fictional discourse since the latter are general
and thus are applicable to any fictitious communication. 72 The reason why there is the adjective situation is that every episode of sitcom presents a pressing problem which
is resolved, bringing the situation into reconciliation: “episode = familiar status quo→ ritual error→ ritual lesson
learned→ familiar status quo” (Marc [1989] 1997: 90; also Linder 2005). The presence of situation is salient from
the narrative perspective as it forms a frame where “all manner of gags, one-liners, warm moments, physical
comedy and ideological conflicts” are deployed (Feuer 2001: 69-70).
Chapter III. Comedy Discourse
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It seems that sitcom depends upon regularity in terms of not only characters, locations
and situations but also structure of each episode, all of which aim to ensure continuity. An episode
is a complete piece of work so that the audience is first clashed with some disruption which is
minimised or stabilised at the end. More importantly, picturing stable environments with familiar
characters generates a loyal audience, which in turn establishes rapport between viewers and actors
(Neale and Krutnik 1990; Mills 2005, 2009), which can be materialised via laughter (Glenn 2003).
Considering how sitcoms differ in aesthetics and forms, Mills (2009) identifies two types
of realist/ naturalist situation comedies. Both groups are devoid of laugh track, as they are
intended to appear to reflect real events. The first type comprises sitcoms that can be a mixture
of a drama and/ or documentary-like style. As a result, these reject the theatrical origins of
sitcoms and position the TV recipient in the role of a witness of real events through actors’
speaking directly into the camera, which is the essence of mock-documentaries (see Section
5.3.). The second, drama-like aesthetics adopts a realist approach according to the conventions
of soap opera and social realism. As regards its form, it may resemble the former type of
sitcoms, nevertheless it is not shot in a mock-documentary style and as a result, the fourth wall
is maintained (see Section 5.3.). In addition, there are two identifying criteria of these sitcoms:
a large number of shooting locations and humour resulting from repetition, instead of single
humorous events (jokes).
3.3.1. Characteristic features
The genre of television73 sitcom adheres to well-established conventions which arouse certain
expectations in the audience. These conventions can be described in terms of distinctive features
that are more or less universal: setting (picturing a recurrent set of participants in two or three
familiar places), aesthetics (audience’s awareness of watching fiction) and narrative
(repetitious events) (Mintz 1985, in Mills 2009: 28; see Neale and Krutnik 1990). To the list of
79 In this section, I draw much attention to Dynel’s (2011d, 2011e) participation framework to preserve
systematicity, however, let me note that this model is not the first which promotes the duality in fictional discourse.
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Dynel80 (2011e) subdivides participants on the fictional characters’ level into ratified and
unratified. Ratified participants, also dubbed conversationalists, interlocutors or interactants,
are further categorised into the speaker and ratified hearers/ listeners. They are fully entitled
to verbalise their thoughts and feelings as well as take notice of what is going on among fictional
characters, i.e. they may assign and express the meaning. The speaker is best defined as a person
whose turn is in progress, while the group of ratified hearers bifurcates into the addressee and
the third party. The addressee is the one who, by dint of verbal or visual stimulus, is ratified to
work out the meaning, while the third party is a blanket term to denote any person of whose
presence other individuals are aware and hence they are licensed to draw inferences. The
subsequent group of participants on the fictional layer is unratified participants (also called
unratified hearers/ overhearers) epitomised by bystanders and eavesdroppers. To differentiate
between the two categories, the communicator is cognisant of bystanders’ aural proximity and
their ability to interpret a communicative act but s/he is entirely unaware of eavesdroppers’
presence, which converges with Goffman’s (1981) and Clark and Schaefer’s (1992) realisation
of the two types of overhearers. On the other hand, Clark (1996) maintains that there are some
positions between overhearers and eavesdroppers, which are unidentified.
The second communicative level encompasses various types of viewers who are labelled
recipients (Dynel 2011e). It is for the sake of recipients that the collective sender (production crew)
devises fictional interactions. A novel type of viewer is the metarecipient (Dynel 2011e) who is
more observant and competent than a traditional viewer and whose aim is to pass more perceptive
comments and implications. Quite apart from appreciating humour, the metarecipient may be
concerned with the techniques deployed by the production crew to elicit a humorous response.
As for sitcom discourse, the epitome of the metarecipient is a humour scholar who demonstrates
a substantial level of academic knowledge and hence uncovers the mystery behind humour.
3.6.1.1. Audience design and the position of the viewer
This section is devoted to the conceptualisation of the audience/ recipient design which is
centred upon the position of the recipient of fictitious communication. There are quite a few
approaches to the role of the audience, which are summarised with a view to enhancing a
conceptual understanding of how the production team tailors cinematic communication and
how the viewers are believed to process that communication. A proviso needs to be made that
80 Bell (1984) offers four audience roles: addressee (known, ratified, addressed), auditor (knows, ratified,
unaddressed), overhearer (known, unratified, unaddressed) and eavesdropper (unknown, unratified, unaddressed),
which are graded according to the distance to the speaker, with the addressee being the closest.
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some of the frameworks explicitly mention TV recipients, whilst others only show the direction
in which the audience can be situated on the telecinematic layer. In short, Bubel (2008) believes
that every fictional unit is designed for an overhearer (implied spectator) whose conjuring
process is facilitated by means of the same language or code. Bell (1984) calls a TV viewer a
referee, the absent third party, whose importance is immense to the communicator as the referee
influences the speech of the speaker. According to Clark and Carlson (1992) and Clark and
Schaefer (1992), a sitcom recipient would be either an addressee or overhearer. In Dynel’s
parlance, the viewer is a recipient (or metarecipient) on the collective sender’s layer. The last
approach towards recipients is their active viewership, which describes the assignment and re-
assignment of roles by the interlocutors. Given the fact that the current study aims to present a
vast array of functions fulfilled by dint of humorous interactions, it is the recipient’s perspective
and collective sender’s intention, which are vital. As will be demonstrated, the participatory
role of the TV viewer has remained unsettled in literature.
Any televised or spontaneous discourse is devised with the viewer, recipient, or even
overhearer (Clark 1992) in mind. The idea of hearer-oriented talk is clarified by the
phenomenon of recipient design (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), also dubbed audience
design (Bell 1984, 1991 2001; Clark and Schaefer 1992), or overhearer design (Bubel 2006,
2008). The recipient design deals with “a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a
conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to
the particular other(s) who are co-participants” (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 727).
Bell (1984, 1991, 2001) characterises two dimensions of a speaker’s style, i.e. responsive
and initiative, which are explained in terms of audience design and referee design respectively.
The former style design is the communicator’s response to the language (or dialect) of the
audience provoked by extralinguistic factors, both inter- (social) and intra-(stylistic) speaker.
The audience design is complemented with the referee design which is identified by the
initiative style. It can be best described as the speaker’s redefinition of style due to the non-
physical presence of the third party (referees) (Bell 1984, 1991). In sitcom discourse, as in
media communication, the referee is a TV viewer whose preferences and speech style are of
primary importance. It may happen that the style of the speaker (production crew) and the
audience is divergent, however it is only short-term since the referee chooses to converge with
the style of other communicators instead of leaving the floor. The very fact of adjusting the
style is an indicator of building solidarity between interactants.
In the case of the presence of other participants besides the speaker and the addressee,
Clark and Carlson (1992) argue that the communicator simultaneously performs two
illocutionary acts: the traditional one intended for the addressee (promises, apologies) and the
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informative one intended for others. In the course of role assignment, the speaker designs his/
her utterance differently for various participants. It is advisable to divide the audience design
into the participation design, addressee design and overhearer design, all of which depend on
physical arrangement, gestures or linguistic content of the talk (Clark and Carlson 1992: 222).
A disparity in roles is connected to different responsibilities and intentions towards co-
conversationalists. The addressee is the main interactant since the communicator is expected to
obey the principle of responsibility by which the addressee keeps track of all intentionally produced
utterances and then gleans the meaning. On the other hand, the overhearer can only conjecture, not
recognise, what is intended and make inferences on the basis of vague evidence. The speaker can
take the attitudes of indifference, disclosure, concealment or disguisement, none of which guarantee
proper attribution of intentions (Clark and Schaefer 1992). Bubel (2008) believes that it is the
communicator’s disclosure which is pertinent to fictional discourse since the speaker wishes an
overhearer to retrieve relevant information on the basis of assumed shared knowledge.
The audience can also be conceived as an overhearer in Goffman’s sense, whose role is
similar to that in naturally occurring communication (Bubel 2008, Kozloff 2000), that is s/he is
(un)deliberately granted an unratified status so that utterances “are eternally sealed off from the
audience, belonging entirely to a self-enclosed, make-believe realm” (Goffman 1981: 139).
Having the theatre audience in mind, Goffman widened the scope to include imagined
recipients (TV viewers or radio listeners) (ibid.: 138), who may listen to onscreen dialogues
and make inferences. Even though Bubel (2008) believes that interactants wish an overhearer
to understand the talk, there are two dire consequences of this conceptualisation. The audience
is assumed to claim no conversational responsibility and at the same time they are expected to
glean the meaning on the basis of little common ground shared with ratified individuals. An
even bigger obstacle is the lack of co-construction or negotiation of meaning among the
participants as Duranti contends (1986: 243-244, in Bubel 2008: 58):
“…interpretation (of texts, sounds etc.) is not a passive activity whereby the audience is just trying to figure
out what the author meant to communicate. Rather, it is a way of making sense of what someone said (or
wrote or drew) by linking it to a word or context that the audience can make sense of”
Irrespective of diverse participatory statuses, Bubel (2006, 2008) depicts the viewer in
cinematic discourse as an overhearer who operates in similar terms as an overhearer in natural
conversations. The TV recipient occupies the place on the continuum between the eavesdropper
and bystander, given the fact that the interactants may be aware of being overheard by
eavesdroppers, while the latter are oblivious to the speakers’ recognition (Clark 1996). The
overhearer design is the one tailored for an implied spectator sitting in front of the TV screen.
Chapter III. Comedy Discourse
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It is claimed that any film discourse is constructed with the approximate evaluation of
overhearers’ world knowledge and knowledge concerning fictional interactions. The appraisal
of a viewer’s knowledge is indirect and hence valuable information needs to be made available,
which may be thought of as excessive for ratified participants. It is challenging to establish the
common ground between the production crew and viewers as each chunk of fictional utterance
requires an active process of interpretation and any recipient may construct quite a different
meaning. The graphical realisation of the overhearer design is presented below (Figure 3.3).
At every step of comprehension, the viewer matches his/ her existing knowledge
structures with a fictional conversation and hence s/he is able to reproduce the common ground
between the actors and hence glean meaning. These structures consist of knowledge about the
world and information gathered from previous encounters with the characters (Bubel 2008).
Figure 3.3. A model of film discourse (Bubel 2006: 57; 2008: 68)
Other scholars claim that the viewer takes on the privileged position of the recipient on
the collective sender’s layer (Dynel 2010a, 2011e; Holly and Baldauf 2002 in Bubel 2008: 62),
with the possibility of an advanced standpoint of the metarecipient. In addition, the audience
may enjoy different statuses, albeit not simultaneously, as they are actively engaged in the co-
construction of the meaning (Neale and Krutnik 1990, Brock 2015, Wieczorek 2016, Messerli
2017a), which is mainly achieved by the camera work and production techniques. The intention
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of the production crew to alter the viewers’ stance accentuates their dynamic role in the
reception (Goffman 1981). Brock (2015) puts forth three roles for the sitcom viewer: overhearer
(with or without audience laughter), fictional character (any interactant on the fictional layer)
and the targeted overhearers. The change of the role results in transcending the fictional layer,
which may be accomplished via camera work:
“As the camera is mostly ignored and rarely addressed but tolerated, the camera (and microphone) position
along with the characters’ ignoring the camera construct a participation slot which resembles the position
of a natural overhearer and which becomes the main (fictitious) identification point for the real TV viewer
to slip into” (Brock 2015: 32-33)
Figure 3.4 shows the standard production framework for most sitcoms in which the recipient is
an overhearer given the fact that the camera is ignored by the fictional characters. Figure 3.5.
depicts sitcoms with studio audience whose genuine reactions are included in the show. Thus,
the audience in the studio is grated a similar perspective as TV recipients and well as their
reactions/ noises are included in the totality of sound mix that can be entertained by TV viewers:
Fig. 3.4. The framework for TV comedies
(Brock 2015: 34) Fig. 3.5. The framework with live studio audience
(Brock 2015: 36)
The viewer may also be assigned the fictional character position given the point-of-view (POV)
shots. The viewer’s perspective is achieved through holding the camera in front of the face of
other conversationalists (see Figure 3.6.). As a result, s/he can become one of many characters
in the scene when the actors communicate or are being directed to. Nonetheless, if the camera
is positioned in the place of an eavesdropper, the same positioning is assumed to the TV
recipient. Finally, the viewer can cross the fictional/ real border and become a recipient at whom
the collective sender and fictional characters direct attention. In fact, this pattern shows how a
general constellation can be slightly modified (see Figure 3.7).
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Fig. 3.6. The viewer as many fictional characters
(Brock 2015: 37) Fig. 3.7. The viewer is addressed by the collective
sender (Brock 2015: 39)
Brock’s (2015) research finding is partly validated in my research, which supports the claim
concerning the negotiation of the viewer’s roles in the sitcom Modern Family. I believe that
there are three positions that the recipient is granted: ratified listener (on the recipient’s level),
an overhearer on the fictional layer (as s/he may be excluded from amusement given the fact
that humour depends upon culture-specific information) and an overhearer switched into a
recipient (when the fictional characters direct their utterances at the viewer). The participatory
roles are defined and redefined with respect to collective sender’s intention (Wieczorek 2016).
3.7. Conclusions
This chapter has been intended to serve two principal aims. First of all, it has discussed general
considerations on the conceptualisation of sitcom, viz. its characteristic features, origin, as well
as how a family unit is represented in this genre and the role it plays in social life. All these
pieces of information would familiarise the reader with the specificity of sitcom as well as draw
a broader picture of how this discourse is conceived in relevant literature.
The second part of the chapter has attempted to expound on the participatory model that
lies at the root of a linguistic inquiry into fictional discourse. Much as there are a host of
different participants occupying the two communicative levels, i.e. diegetic (fictional) and non-
diegetic (natural), the recipient is in the centre of attention as it is for his/ her pleasure that
sitcoms are produced. Irrespective of whether the viewer’s role is assumed to be more static or
dynamic in the design, the most crucial element is the construction of fictional conversations.
As Brock (2015) illuminates, the nature of communication, for instance with live studio
audience, conditions how the role of the audience gets defined and re-defined. This is also valid
for the discourse in Modern Family, which is clarified in Chapter V.
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C h a p t e r I V
Functions of conversational humour
Manny: My girlfriend Karen was pretty frisky the other night after her ex showed up, and I bested him in a chocolate-soufflé bake-off. I don’t need to tell you my soufflé
wasn’t the only sweet brown dish she devoured that night. Jay: Because?
Manny: I also made molasses cookies.
Jay: I’ve learned to ask the second question.
Modern Family (S09E18)
4.1. Introduction
The principal purpose of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with a rich variety of
classifications of functions carried out by dint of humour. This functional view on humour as
expounded in the literature is particularly relevant to the last step of my dissertation and the main
point of interest, which is the qualitative analysis of the functions of humour in the sitcom Modern
Family. More specifically, attention will be devoted to a propositional content of fictional
humorous message in order to draw a broad picture of information gleaned by the audience.
In spite of the wealth of the classifications of functions of humour, these conceptualisations
are extremely varied and bring about sometimes divergent views. Therefore, the functional
studies of humour can be divided into three broad categories, which are by no means clear-cut:
1) general classifications of all functions that the researcher can enumerate on the basis of corpora
or his/ her predictions (Ziv 1984; Graham, Papa and Brooks 1992; Hay 1995, 2000, Martin 2007,
Kosińska 2008a), 2) research into two or more functions, for example, subversive or transgressive
social integration via disparagement (Martineau 1972), controlling and setting boundaries (Hay
1995, 2000), defusing or exerting social control (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997, Martin 2007),
reducing power (Holmes 2000), establishing group norms or undermining power relations
(Meyer 2000, Holmes and Marra 2002a).
As this overview has aimed to show, humour is a complex, multifunctional and
multifarious phenomenon, the initiation of which facilitates accomplishing several
communicative purposes on different layers, for instance social, psychological and pragmatic.
Although some of the classifications are theoretical and hence not supported by natural or
fictional discourse, their validity was tested when some extracts from my data were applied
throughout the chapter. The functional research is by no means limited to the overview
presented here but it furnishes ample ground for further scrutiny. More importantly, there is no
research into fictitious discourse, which would reveal that other individuals besides co-
conversationalists, e.g. eavesdroppers or third party, and more importantly, viewers of fictional
discourse, (see Section 3.6.), derive something beyond pleasure consequent upon humour. In that
research, we need to take two aspects into consideration: the communicator’s goal in the
production of a humorous line and the audience’s recovery of humorous and/ or non-humorous
import.
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C h ap t e r V
Humour as a multifunctional strategy in the sitcom
Modern Family
Frank Dunphy: 80% of comedy is surprise. The other 20% is wordplay
Modern Family (S08E19)
5.1. Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated that humour studies abound in functionalist accounts and
more importantly, that humour serves multifarious ‘serious’ functions which transcend pure
enjoyment (Norrick 2010). Savorelli (2010) claims that regarding humorous discourse in terms
of its amusement is reductive and erroneous. Above all, humour research and its functional
conception are a serious matter through and through as the humorous mode is not always
“without serious intent or devoid of serious implications” (Mulkay 1988: 30).
For a number of compelling and legitimate reasons it is vital to work on the effects-based
studies. Graham, Papa, Brooks (1992) corroborate that studying functions of humour in
interpersonal communication provides a better understanding of ulterior motives behind the
initiation of humorous talk. Meyer (2000: 310) attests that a functional analysis “will clarify
understanding of its use in messages”, while Martin (2007) contends that this line of research
illuminates the intricate and multifunctional nature of humour. The author of the present thesis
endorses these rational justifications as they fit neatly into the study of fictional discourse. In
particular, a researcher can improve linguistic knowledge concerning the way in which the
production crew devises scripted conversations so that the intended effects are derived by the
viewer. This type of research will enable drawing more detailed conclusions regarding the
fictional character’s linguistic and non-linguistic means to attain a variety of goals, which may
sometimes be divergent. As the title of the thesis reads Humour as a Carrier of Meaning in
Sitcom Discourse, it aims to unravel what types of message the TV recipient receives when
watching a piece of ready-made conversations.
Chapter V. Humour as a multifunctional strategy in the sitcom Modern Family
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With the wisdom of hindsight, the proper footing has been prepared to undertake the
qualitative functional analysis whose objective is to tease out a number of functions, which are
performed by dint of humour as a discursive strategy. As shown in Chapter IV, there has not
appeared an empirical and comprehensive study into the language of sitcom humour
characterised in terms of a multifunctional tool. The present research draws upon Sperber and
Wilson’s (1986 [1995]) RT, the aptness of which lies in the explanatory power of its conceptual
tools and thus in saliency to humorous discourse. The exemplification data is collected from
the American sitcom Modern Family, which has retained immense popularity for more than ten
years (nevertheless, the producers announced the eleventh season is the last). It needs to be
highlighted that the present thesis ventures a linguistic, particularly pragmatic, analysis, which
necessarily makes reference to social and cultural aspects crucial to demonstrate the whole
gamut of meanings. Nevertheless, it does not pursue to conduct a sociological scrutiny,
therefore the excerpts from the sitcom are used for illustrative purposes (as Bednarek 2010). In
RT’s parlance, humorous interactions are classified as a type of ostensive inferential
communication, which does not warrant additional requirements or supplementary mechanisms
(Yus 2003, 2016). Exercising humour in televisual discourse offers the sitcom production team
a powerful tool to carry an extensive range of propositional and non-propositional meanings,
both of which are typically communicated by means of weak implicatures, which can bring
about the cognitive overload effect at the subrepresentational level (Jodłowiec 2015, Piskorska
and Jodłowiec 2018). The analysis takes the perspective assumed by lay language analysts
(Bubel 2011), i.e. the audience, which necessarily needs to resort to the fictional communicative
layer. That is, the meaning and intentions constructed by the TV viewers are predicated on the
fictional characters’ interactions. However, the reception of humour may greatly vary
depending on the communicative layer since whilst the viewers can find some units amusing,
the same conversational episodes would be marked as hostile by the characters.
The present analysis will demonstrate that humour can be a carrier not only for enjoyment
but also for sharing, criticising or relieving tension. The cornerstone for this research project is
the fact that relevance-theoretic pragmatic mechanisms would explain the recipients’
processing of the message in the most salient way. Moreover, it will show how it is feasible for
the recipient to go beyond amusement and discover what lies beneath humour. In other words,
the whole gamut of different, often weak, implications are explored by means of the
comprehension procedure (Piskorska 2016). It is worth noting that the very linguistic form
enables the initiator of the message to communicate a number of implications, which cannot be
communicated otherwise given emergent properties recovered in the specific context
(Piskorska 2016).
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My analysis indicates that there are twenty one functions carried out by dint of humour,
which are teased out on the basis of a careful analysis of the extracts collected from the sitcom.
The functions are divided into those which aim to enhance solidarity (affiliative humour), those
which are anchored in impoliteness (disaffiliative humour) and those which provide cognitive
benefits (psychological functions). In addition, these functions are determined along the same
criteria: their performance in conversation, i.e. whether they are used with a view to boosting
positive affiliation, inflicting a face damage/ threat or enhancing cognitive repertoire. This
effects-based classification is a result of top-down and bottom-up methodological perspectives
towards the analysis of the data. Whilst the former lays the theoretical foundation that is treated
as a point of reference for the proper “handling” of the data, the latter provides an empirical
picture of theoretical assumptions. Binsted and Ritchie (2001) reckon that these two extreme
procedures should be conjoined in order to undertake comprehensive research: “[o]ne cannot
devise a general theory (top-down) without at least keeping an eye on the data, and one cannot
work on particular data (bottom-up) without assuming (perhaps implicitly) at least some
theoretical basis” (ibid.: 280). A similar approach is adopted in the present work since the
analysis is the outcome of a careful scrutiny of the literature and the data. In other words, the
results are not detached from what was proposed in earlier studies.
The idea that humorous discourse can serve the meaning that transcends the viewer’s
sheer enjoyment can be detected in many humour-oriented contributions, which is sometimes
tacitly acknowledged. In most of the cases, these are, alas, passing remarks which are not
addressed at greater length since the humorous interpretation was in the centre of attention.
“The cognitive experience of humor has characteristic underlying physiological (arousal) changes and overt
behavioral reactions (smiling and laughter) associated with it, but these are by-products of humor. Social,
motivational, and other psychodynamic factors closely linked to humor...are considered to serve only as
modifiers and sources of enrichment...” (McGhee 1979: 43).
“humour differs from serious discourse requiring at least a duality of meaning, and often a multiplicity of
opposing meanings” (Mulkay 1988: 30)
“Conversations consists, very roughly, of sequences of utterances among two or more people; with each
utterance, the speaker performs one or more illocutionary acts directed at addressees” (Clark and Carlson
1992: 217)
“The broader expression “the pleasure of humor” is to be understood to encompass the fundamental
pleasure and, in addition, “the secondary pleasure of humor,” or “secondary pleasure”: all pleasure of any
other sort which is associated closely with the humor process in a particular case or limited class of cases.
Secondary pleasure includes, for instance, pleasure at the inventiveness of a storyteller, gratification at the
wounding of an enemy, the perception of a child as adorable, the consolation of wisdom, or pleasure at the
beauty of an utterance or passage of writing to the extent that it is associated closely with this or that humor
process. It is to be noted, however, that “secondary” does not mean weaker.” (Latta 1999: 43; italics is
mine)
Chapter V. Humour as a multifunctional strategy in the sitcom Modern Family
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“In any joke or humorous situation, there is an invitation for the hearer to come closer to my outlook or
take on a situation.” (Cohen 1999, in Cundall 2007: 208)
“The pleasures offered by sitcom performance are not only those involved in the momentary enjoyment of
jokes” (Mills 2005: 90)
“it [prioritising the genre’s entertainment] ignores other possible pleasures associated with comedy’s
humour” (Mills 2005: 136)
“American sitcom has been a carrier of discourses on very sensitive cultural and social matters: from racism
to war, from intergenerational clashes to sexual identity” (Savorelli 2010: 176)
“humour may transgress the walls of the second container [the fictional layer- M.W.] or the height of the
stage, and depend upon the audience’s ability to perceive not just humour in the diegetic world, but also
the container or the stage in or on which it occurs. This second type of humour requires awareness of the
constructedness of the fictional artefact (but not necessarily the manner in which it is constructed)”
(Messerli 2017a: 16-17; italics is mine)
5.2. Cognition, relevance, incongruity and affect
Throughout the previous chapters I have dealt with a number of crucial approaches and issues,
which would make the present analysis comprehensive. First, the approaches to and models of
incongruity and resolution consequent upon humorous enjoyment are central to the explanation
of any occurrence of humour and thus these lay the firm foundation for the research into sitcom
discourse. Second, RT provides conceptual tools to study humorous episodes, which contribute
to the investigation of different weak effects offered to the viewer via the fictional character’s
turns. Third, attention is turned to the functions of humour conceptualised in literature, which
helps to set the proper course to the analysis. These three perspectives form the three pillars of
the whole thesis, deployed to accomplish the objective of the analysis, viz. delineation of
propositional meanings conveyed by means of humour.
It is important to underline the fact that incongruity models can detail the cognitive
processes going through the recipient’s mind while analysing conversational humour. This is
particularly relevant to humour in the sitcom, which takes the form of extended sequences that
lack a clear-cut setting-punchline division. It is advisable to take into account the other two
families of humour theories, viz. superiority and relief, in order to yield a profound insight into
the occurrence of humour. As Raskin (1985), Graham, Papa and Brooks (1992) as well as
Martin (2007) maintain, the three families of humour theories “characterize the complex
phenomenon of humor from very different angles and do not at all contradict each other – rather
they seem to supplement each other quite nicely” (Raskin 1985: 40). The incongruity,
superiority and relief workings are essential as they provide a comprehensive perspective of all
the effects the audience is intended to derive.
Chapter V. Humour as a multifunctional strategy in the sitcom Modern Family
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5.3. Mockumentary style and sitcom aesthetics
This section explicates the aesthetics of mockumentary (a blend of mock and documentary),
which is motivated by the fact that Modern Family is said to be shot in a mockumentary style.
Moreover, it is advocated here that this very style has direct influence upon the functions that
are served on the viewers’ part.
Mockumentary can be defined as a type of discourse that can refer to the aesthetics of
fiction: “mockumentary appropriates styles not only from the codes and conventions of
documentary proper but from the full spectrum of nonfiction media” (Hight 2012: 73). It is
connected to breaking the so-called fourth wall89 in order to convey an impression that what is
being watched is the denotation of real events. It can especially be pinpointed in the instances
where actors look directly into the eye of the camera as in new sitcoms (Mills 2009), or where
performers address the audience directly as in stand-up routines. Christopher Lloyd, a creator
of Modern Family, claims that adopting a documentary-like approach “gives audiences a
voyeur’s perspective on a family” (Smith 2010). Mills (2009: 128) reckons that such aesthetics
“resolutely rejects the theatrical nature of sitcom, abandoning the laugh track and offering a
visual style which positions the viewer as an observer of everyday behaviour”. One of the
negative effects of mockumentary is that the removal of the laugh tract entails the loss of
collective experience that the hearer gains while laughing together with the studio audience
(Mills 2005). This may be the reason why the producers of Modern Family resort to the use of
confessions into the camera as part of a compensation scheme so that viewers have an
impression that they are not alone in front of the TV set.
Overall, three basic types of communication can be observed in the sitcom under analysis:
regular conversations among interlocutors who do not pay heed to the camera (purely fictional
discourse), the interview sequence uttered into the camera90 (reality-like discourse), and in-
between cases where there are regular conversations and suddenly one of the characters peeps
into the camera (mixed fiction-reality discourse). The turns delivered in front of the camera
provide the viewers with an opportunity to learn a hidden agenda, true feelings and thoughts91.
The TV recipient is sanctioned this exclusive privilege and is constantly invited to join their
fictional world. The documentary-like shooting style alters the viewer’s position into one close
89 The fourth wall is the one that the viewers cannot see as it is the place where the camera is placed to film the events. 90 To be more precise, the fictional characters sometimes look somewhere close to the eye of the camera as if there
were a person with whom they talk, however, it does not have any practical implications for my academic analysis. 91 There are many inclusive-exclusive instances in which the viewers are included in the the entertainment of
humour, while some of the interlocutors are excluded from a real course of action (Wieczorek 2016).
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to a co-conversationalist as the fictional characters display their awareness that they are
videotaped (Mills 2005). Moreover, the documentary aesthetics blurs the line between what is
fictional and what is real (Roscoe and Hight 2001). I would like to air the claim that these candid
“interviews” or confessions produce more cognitive effects on the part of the viewer, which
would not be otherwise made manifest. To rephrase, when a recipient is directly addressed and
offered, for instance a piece of advice, as in face-to-face conversation, it may have a greater
impact upon him/ her than in communication in which s/he is the third party.
Given the fact that there are instances of traditional fictional communication, Modern
Family still adheres to the three-headed monster way of shooting (see 3.3.1.) (in short, one
camera films the general shot of the scene, the other two focus on specific things crucial to the
ongoing conversation, Mills 2005). Being omnipresent, the TV recipient is aware of all the
issues or details, many of which fictional characters are not conversant with. The discrepancy
between recipients’ knowledge and fictional interactants’ knowledge gives rise to humorous
effects, especially in confessions uttered into the camera. The viewer’s greater awareness can
be studied within superiority approaches since s/he demonstrates “intellectual mastery over
misinformed, unaware and unintelligent characters” (Hobbes 1914, in Mills 2005: 63).
The documentary shooting style has both an advantage and disadvantage. The severe
disadvantage is that the characters when looking into the camera may seem to show their
behaviour in a more positive light, i.e. simply conceal true feelings (Mills 2005). An advantage
is that when the actor is alone with the camera, s/he airs his/ her views more openly (but there
may be a clash between attempt to be truthful and deceitful), which creates the bond with the
viewer. A number of confessions may make the recipient unable to laugh at a fictional character
with whom s/he has created friendly relationships.
In traditional sitcoms with genre-specific cues the viewers know what type of
entertainment is being watched and thus what type of humour is expected. In new comedy, such
as Modern Family, The Office (2005-2013; NBC) or Curb your Enthusiasm (2000-2020; HBO)
(which do not employ documentary-like aesthetics), however, the recipient can just be
entertained by the compound of cues from realistic and fictional discourses (Mills 2005). What
makes the viewers entertained is their feeling of security of laughing at someone’s misfortunes
while being home (Mills 2005).
The last issue connected to the shooting style is the construct of space in Modern Family.
Savorelli (2010) contends that the couch is a space-defining component in American sitcoms,
being the place around which any important event revolves. This is also true for the sitcom
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under analysis since direct conversations (into the camera) take place on the cosy couches or
chairs situated in the drawing rooms of the Pritchett-Tucker-Dunphy clan houses.
5.3.1. The code of realism
An associated issue with the mockumenatry aesthetics is the notion of the code of realism,
which concerns “[t]he imitation of reality...typically achieved with the help of specific filmic
conventions” (Bubel 2006: 43). These techniques include editing (with no sudden transition
from one scene to another), camera work (can be hand-held to vest authenticity) or diegetic