-
A CRAFTSMAN AND HIS HANDMAIDEN.
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS
JAN OPSOMER
Demiurgy is not the most debated topic in Plotinus scholarship.
Scholars who care to talk about it mostly confine themselves to the
claim that Plo-
tinus equates the demiurge with intellect.' Yet not even this
identification seems to be certain. It has also been suggested that
Plotinus' demiurge is to be identified with the intellect of the
world souP Recently, D. Montet has
published an article in which she offers what is the most
detailed and bal-anced account of the status of the demiurge to
date.'
There may be a good reason for this general lack of interest. It
is widely
acknowledged that the figure of the divine craftsman is far from
central to Plotinus' thought 4 Plotinus rejects a vulgar
understanding of the demiurge
as a craftsman involved in practical deliberation.' But even if
one does away
with the demiurge's blatantly mythological features there
remains some-
thing problematic about him, as F.M. Schroeder (1992, p. 36)
observes:
1he story implies some kind of mediation between intelligible
and sen-
sible reality, even if literally there is no figure such as the
Demiurge who
would perform this function. Such mediation, as it employs the
Form as
an instrument of production, tends to obscure its intrinsic
value.
This is a fundamental problem indeed: are not the Forms in
themselves
sufficient for their own causal agency and does not the Demiurge
become
entirely superfluous76
1 E.g., Matter 1964, p. 86; Charrue 1993, p. 133. 2 Gerson 1994,
p. s6. 3 Montet 2000. 4 Cf. Theiler 1957, col. 703 ("!m Grunde
interessiert ihn das Demiurgproblem
gegeniiber dem Drama des innerseelischen Aufstieges nicht"};
Gcrson 1994, p. 56 (the demiurge is "a vestigial organ in the body
of Platonic thought") and p. 57 ("Plo-tinus is unlikely to have
considered the radical surgery to Platonism involved in removing
the demiurge").
5 Cf. Schroeder 1992, p. 36; Charrue 1993, p. 132; Bnsson 1999,
p. 93; 95; Montet 2000, p. 220-223.
6 Cf. Schroeder 1992, p. 109: "[ ... ] it contains its
relationship to us and our rela-tionship to it internally. It
contains our iconic attributes in the manner appropriate to an
original or pattern [ ... ].1here could be no more radical
elimination of the De-miurge considered as an external agent of
creation from the thought of Plotinus."
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68 )AN OPSOMER
As D. O'Meara has pointed out, Plotinus' philosophy is situated
at the
meeting point of two traditions and two models by which the
origin of the
world is explained, the model whereby o1der is imparted onto a
pre-ex-isting chaos, and the derivation model. 1he first is the
demiurgic model of the Timaeus, the second stems from
Neopythagorean sources and ul-timately from the Academy and the
unwritten doctrines (for our present purposes it does not matter
whether their attribution to Plato is justified or not). Plotinus
dearly favoured the derivation model, so that the demiurge became a
rather sorry
Nach dem Model! des ln-Ordnung-Bringens, also dem Modell des
De-miurgen, des Handwerkers, gibt es im Grunde genommen am Anfang
zwei entgegengesetzte Komponente: Vernunft unci Unordnung. Nach dem
Modell der Ableitung gibt es aber am Anfang nur das Eine, wovon das
Bose schlieBlich wird. Das demiurgische Mo-del! gehort zum
traditionellen Schulplatonismus, der die Deutung des Timaios als
Grundlage hat; das Ableitungsmodell stammt eh er vom
ma-thernatisierenden Neupythagorismus, der zum pythagoreisierenden
Pla-tonisrnus der Akadernie und zu Platons sogenannter
"ungeschriebener Lehre" zurllckhihrt. Beide Modelle tauchen bei
Plotin auf, obwohl er eigentlich das AbleitungsmodeU radikal
einsetzen will und dadurch das
demiurgische Model! unterdruckt.7
The demiurge, then, is a remnant from a different time, whose
systemic redundancy can only lead to trouble. For Plotinus did not
see himself as the
builder of a new system, but as a faithful interpreter of Plato;
and it cannot
be denied that Plato talks a lot about demiurges, not only in
the Timaeus."
Precisely with regard to demiurgy Plotinus emphasises the
ancient roots of his views, He does so most explicitly in Enn. 5,1,
after the summary of his doctrine of the Good (the One), intellect,
and soul, according to which the lower principles derive from the
higher. Plotinus calls intellect "cause" and "demiurge", and
accordingly uses the expression "father of the cause" and" father
of intellect" for the One. 1hen follows a strong assertion of the
ancient provenance of these terms:
7 O'Meara 1997, p 43 (italics DD'M.). See also O'Meara, 1993, p.
76: "1lms, in IlL 8, Plotinus definitively replaces the artisanal
mode of world-making with a process of contemplative derivation:
the world derives from soul in the same way that soul derives from
intellect and intellect from the One."
8 Neschke-Hentschke 2ooo, p. xvm-xxY 9 Cf injm.
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DEM!URGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS
And these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to
the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what
we have said in this discussion has been anmterpretation of them
(wi1c;; 8e vllv A.6yous /:;lJYTp:a
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70 JAN OPSOMER
any real distinctions within the primary hypostases. So he
equated the de-
miurge with intellect, but transferred as many of his activities
as he could
to the soul. This solution was not new either. As the most
direct influence on Plotinus the Gnostics have been suggested," but
also the Stoic active
principle comes to mind, which was called, besides many other
things,
both demiurge and world soul. 15 The idea, however, is still
older. Already
in the Epinomis the highest kind of soul, which possesses
intelligence (982B5), is said to be the only thing suitable to
mole! and craft (rr::\cct-rnv
Kai OT]f!lOUpyEtV, 981B8). A close parallel is Plutarch, who
clearly attributes
demiurgic functions to the world soul, without making soul the
demiurge.' 6
This can be seen in the fourth Quaestio Platomca,' 7 where soul,
once it partakes of intellect and becomes a true world soul, starts
shaping body
and being its demiurge (EDT]~LlOUpyn, 1003A). It can do so only
because the
god has imparted something of himself- intellection - to the
soul (cf. Quaest. Flat. 2,2, wolC). Intellect remains the
undisputed demiurge, but it acts through the soul. TI1e demiurge
structures the body of the world, but does so through the world
soul; hence to say that "the maker and father"
created the cosmic body is almost equivalent to saying that the
world soul
structured the cosmic body (Quaest. Flat. 4, J003A, De an.
procr. I016F-
1017A). Tellingly, the very last word of the treatise on the
composition of the
world soul1s 8taKEKOG!J.T]KEV, said of the soul (De an. procr.
103oc).'"
Plotinus did not express himself as clearly as one would have
wished about
the nature of the demiurge. 111is is shown by an ancient debate,
reported to
'4 Ratzinger 1959, coi. 1226, Hadot 19\19, p. 222-223 [=
Annuaire de l'Ecole Pra-
tique des Hautes Etudes (V' Section), 1975-76, p. 76-77]. For
Plotinus' criticism of the Gnostics, cf. inf"ra.
15 Cf. Diog. Laerl. 7,88; 7,134-136; Cleanthes (svF 1 537: Hymn
to Zeus); Philod. De pi et. col. 11 (= svF II 1076 = DG 545b12-2o).
See also Kramer 1964, p. 296, n. 407; Van den Berg 2001, p. 259;
Reydams-Schils 1999, p. 42-51; 55-56.
'' O'Meara 1993, p. 71-72, refers to Alcinous, Didaskalikos,
chapter 14. In that text however, the soul is only spoken of as the
product of the demiurge: although the soul is uncreated, Alcinous
says, in a way the demiurge can also be said to make the soul,
insofar as he wakes it up and turns it and its intellect toward
him. There is no mention, however, of the soul carrying out the job
of the demiurge (in chapters 15 and 16 the "generated gods" come
into play, and they do part of the work, pre-cisely as it is said
in the Timaeus.). The verbs "to make, to produce" (bllfllOUpyi:w,
rrotw) are said only of the god.
17 Cf. Cherniss 1976, p. 48-49, note d. '' Other important texts
on the transmission of demiurgic activity are De
facie 30, 945A {soul is molded by intellect and in turn molds
the body: ~ 1 ~IUXTJ 1U1!0UflEVT] flEV D!!O 10U vou 1U1!0Ucra bE 10
crmrta) and De Pyth. or. 21, 404BC (soul an instrument of god,
whose function it is to conform as exactly as possible to the
purpose of the agent that employs it; it is unable, however, to
preserve god's purpose in the form it had in its creator,
uncontaminated, unaffected and fault-less).
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DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS 71
us by Proclus, about Plotinus' legacy. Before examining
Plotinus' own pro-
nouncements on the demiurge and speculating about possible
reasons for the doctrinal ambiguities or for what could be veiled
expressions ot a view
that is in itself clear, let us first take a look at this
ancient debate.
Proclus on Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus (in Tim.
1,3os,16-309,13) If we are to believe Proclus, Plotinus held the
v1ew that the demiurge is two-fold: one demiurge belongs to the
intelligible realm, the other IS the ruler
of Lhe universe. Somewhat surprisingly maybe, 19 Prod us praises
this view,
because, as he explains, "the cosmic intellect, too, is somehow
a demiurge of the whole universe".20
The part of Plotinus' theory that is apparently uncontroversial
is that about the demiurge in the intelligible. "Intelligible" of
course refers to the
entire realm between the One and the soul. The entire
intelligible is in-
deed one-many, that is, one intellect that encompasses all the
intelligibles (1,305,22-29). Therefore one may just as well call it
an intellect. This expla-nation is supposed to vindicate Plotinus'
views about the intelligible demi-
urge: so far Proclus agrees with Plotinus, since for Proclus,
too, the universal
demiurge is situated in the intelligible realm. Contrary to
Plotinus, Proclus
assigns the demiurge to a well-defined spot within the
multi-layered realm
of the intelligible world. Plotinus, who does not accept a
multiplicity of hy-
postases within the intelligible, al least locates the demiurge
in the right realm and considers him an intellect. Plotinus'
intelligible realm is, as Pro-
clus elucidates, where the true heaven is, and the reign of
Kronos 2 ' and the
Zeus-lntellect (6 L'.ito
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72 TAN OPSOMER
Prod us' indulgence towards Plotinus is remarkable. Even what he
is sup-
posed, or alleged, to have said about the lower demiurge - the
more con-
troversial23 bit- meets with Proclus' cautious approval. He
links Plotinus'
view of the cosmic intellect to Aristotle, who considered this
to be the first
intel!ece4 and called it heinzarmene and Zeus. lhe reference is
actually to the end of the De rnundo,25 where the author indeed
extols the merits of Zeus, the son of Kronos, who is the cause of
all the goods in the universe,
and calls him destiny and fate, among other things. In the De
mundo pas-sage there is moreover a reference to the famous Orphic
fragment about
Zeus as the beginning, middle and end of everything. and a
quotation from Plato's Laws (715e8-716az), where the same Orphic
fragment is cited.
But what does Proclus mean when he talks about Plotinus' two
demi-
urgic intellects? What are the "encosmic intellect" and the
intellect that is the "transcendent father and maker"? To
understand the last expression
is not the problem: the broader context of the passage is
Timaeus 28c3-5. where Plato points out the difficulty of finding
the father and maker of this universe and the sheer impossibility
to communicate his nature to others. What this passage is about,
then, is the figure that Proclus calls the uni-
versal demiurge. This is whom he means by the expression
"transcendent maker and father". In other words, Proclus' claim is
that Plotinus identi-
ties the demiurge of the Timaeus with the hypostasis intellect.
It is less dear, to what Prod us' second claim amounts, namely that
Plotinus' second demiurge is the cosmic ("encosmic") intellect.
Again, what this means in
Proclus' system is not important tor our present purposes.26 lhe
question is rather whether such an cosmic demiurgic inte!Iect can
be found in the system of Plotinus.
Proclus' account of Plotinus' views on the demiurge is part of a
larger
section, in wh1ch he discusses not only the views of Plotinus,
but also the
interpretations they received by Porphyry and Iamblichus. It is
highly prob-
in P!Jil. 133. Opsomer 2000, p. 118. Plotinus sees in this
passage a reference to intel lect and soul, that are both entitled
to the name Zeus, the one as the demiurge, the other as the
governing principle of the world: 4.4 j28], 9-10 (discussed
below).
23 As is suggested by nwc;, 1. 29. H See also in Tim. 1,404,79.
2
' Ps.-Anst. De mundo 401a12-b29. Proclus may be the only ancient
author who has ever expressed his doubts about the authorship of
the De mundo. Cf in Tim. 3,272,20-21: iilc; nou tpTJOl n:6./l.tv
'Aptcr'tO'tEATJ
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS
able that the latter's commentary on the Timaeus was Proclus'
source for the entire section!7 'The details of the dispute among
his students may help us to get a better grasp of what exactly is
at issue
Porphyry, who thought that his account was in perfect conformity
with
Plotinus', is said to have regarded the hypercosmic soul as the
derniurge,
and to have equated the intellect belonging to th1s soul with
the paradigm used by the demiurge (the cdrw~
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74 JAN OPSOMER
parently Porphyry's demiurge is an unparticipated or hypercosmic
soul,
whereas the higher demiurge, i.e. intellect, is actually the
paradigm.
W. Deuse (1977) lms examined Porphyry's conception of the
demiurge more closely and concludes that Proclus has hardly done
justice to Por-
phyry's theory. Only a drastic simplification could have led to
the reproach that Porphyry posited a straightforward equation of
the demiurge with the
world soul, and thus banished the demiurge from the realm of
intellect.30
Actually, in other contexts (at 1,394,2-9 and 395,11-12) Proclus
implies that Porphyry equates the demiurge with intellect.31 1his
is moreover confirmed
by other sources." Deuse explains that for Porphyry there was no
great
divide between the realms of soul and intellect. 'Ihe
identification of the demiurge with soul does not automatically
imply that he is denied an intel-
lective existence.'" For Porphyry, the paradigm, i.e. the
intelligible living being (a'iYrosc?JOv), is the intellect of the
hypercosmic soul. This soul, i.e. the demiurge, is always turned
towards its intellect (1tcr"tpan1:cn). The demi-
urgic function of the hypercosm1c soul depends on its intimate
connection to intellect, Porphyry understands demiurgy as a steady
gliding down and self-development of intellect, that in his lowest
manifestation becomes the
transcendent soul, creator of the world of becoming and
division." Iambli-clms and Proclus could only understand this
"dynamic continuum", says
30 Dillon 1969, p. 67, argues the opposite: it is Porphyry who
tends to simplify, not Proclus reporting on the latter's
doctrines.
31 Deuse 1977, p. 239-241. 32 See his Philosophos Historia (fr.
221F Smith contra Jul. 8, 271a, 916B3-
15), where he ascribes the theory of three hypostases to Plato:
the highest god or the good; the demiurge or Nous; and the world
soul. This text clearly echoes Enn. 5,1 [10], 8. Cf. Segonds 1982,
p. 191, n. 1. 1l1is account is in accordance with his ex-planation
in the commentary on the Oracles, where the demiurge is equated
with the Chaldean olr:; n:KEtva (fr. 365F Smith Lydus De mens.
no,18-zs), who is only second, after the highest good. In TIEpt
ayaJ\.~&~rov Porphyry calls Zeus, Le. the demmrge. the mtellect
of the world (fr. 354F,s Smith), and says that the demmrgic
intellect is the king of the world (354F,57 Smith Euseb. Praep. ev.
3,82-9,9). In De philosophia ex oraculis, however, he apparently
took the position that the demi-urge is the god. Probably this text
stems from an earlier stage of his career, possibly from before he
met Plotinus. Cf. Hadot 1965, p. 133-134: Waszink 1965, p. 57 (and
see the discussion p. 82-83). 1l1is last view was also current
among some middle Platonists. Seen. 12..
Deuse 1977, p. :q.8: "Wiihrend Porphyrios das Verhaltnis der
iiberweltlichen Seele zu ihrem Geist als eine sehr enge Verbindung
beider Hypostasen sieht, betont Proklos stark die Verschiedenheit
der Hypostasenbereiche." Id., p. 249: "Durch-schlagend lief5 sich
nun die Identifizierung der Seele mit dem Demiurgen kriti-sieren,
war sie doch m it dem geistigen Sein des Demiurgen unvereinbar";
see also Smith 1987, p. 729~730; Zambon 2002, p. 160-161.
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DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS
Deuse (1977, p. in terms of their own rigid hypostases. However,
for Porphyry there is no contradiction between talking of the
demiurge as a soul and as an intellect; it is just that at the end
of the demiurgic process we find the soul taking over matter and
imposing order on it. Deuse gives the following reconstruction of
the self-development of intellect. First there
is a triadic development starting with Being, characterized by
subject/ob~ ject identity, via Life (thought going outside to look
at itself), to the act of
thinking, also called the "first intellect". These three moments
correspond to the triadic structure remaining~ procession-return.
'l11e first intellect
forms the starting point of a further triadic development, again
in accord~ ance with the moments of remaining, procession and
return: thought is at rest within itself, Forms proceed, and
intellect turns back toward itself.
This last is that of the transcendent soul, that is also called
the second intellect. 'l11is double development of intellect could
be represented as follows:
(1) f.l.OVTJ (2) rrp6ooo
-
IAN OPSOMER
d1Us, says Pmclus, just like Plotinus declares the whole
intelligible realm to
be the demiurge:
But after him (Porphyry) the divine Iamblichus, attacking the
theory of
Porphyry at length, and condemning it as being un-Plotinian, in
giving his own theology, denominates the whole intelligible kosmos
as the de-
miurge, being in agreement himself, to judge at least by what he
writes,
with Plotinus. At any rate, he says in his Comrnentaries: "Real
Being and the beginning of things that come to be and the
intelligible paradigms of the kosmos, which we term the
intelligible kosrnos, and such causes
as we declare to pre-exist all things in Nature, all these
things the Demi urge-God whom we are now seeking gathers into one
and holds within himself." (in Tim. 1,307,14-25 Iambi. In Tin1. fr.
34, trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified)
Proclus will argue that lamblichus' words lend themselves to two
different interpretations. But let us first analyse the literal
citation for ourselves. The first part of the sentence contains a
series of expressions, that can be under-stood as referring to the
same reality:
(al) "real being" (1:1lY OY1:(1)S oucriav), Le. intelligible
being;
(a2) "the beginning of things that come to be" (Kai nov
yryvo~u'vffiv apxi1v), presumably identical with (a1) or at least
part of it;
(a3) "the intelligible paradigms of the world" (Kat
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DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO Pl.OTINUS 77
(b) All of these (talYC(Y. navta)
(b1) are "gathered into one" (E:v hi cruA.A.apwv) by the
demimge,
(b2) who holds them within or more literally, subsumes them
"under" tam:ov EXEt)37 - himself.
Now one could understand (b) as meaning that the demiurge
completely
coincides with the realities named in so that he is the entire
intelligible
realm and there would be no intelligible realm outside of him.
If this is what Iamblichus means,38 he is wrong, says Proclus: the
demiurge shmdd not be said to coincide with the entire realm
between the soul and the One
(1,308,6-8).
Another reading is however possible. For Iamblichus says that
the demi-urge gathers the realities mentioned in (a) into one and
holds them within himself (b1-2). This could mean that originally
they have an existence out side the demiurge, and then are
internalised by the demiurge so that they come to exist also in
him. This is mdeed the other reading that Proclus has in mind:
If what damblichus> means by these words is that in lhe
demiurge, too, everything "real being" as well as "the intelligible
world" - exists in a
demiurgic manner, he agrees with himself and with Orpheus who
says that "ali these lie in the body of the great Zeus."
(1,307,26-31).
Proclus assesses this view as unprob!ematic: "of course each of
tlw gods is all, but each in a different manner, the one in a
demiurgic way, the other
in a contaming manner." (1,308,3-6). On this reading, lamblichus
would be applying the Neoplatonic principle according to which
everything is in eve-rything, but in each according to its proper
nature-"9 In other words. the
a reading: (a!) in itself refers no more to the intelligible
living bemg than it does to the Forms. 1he expression in (as) is
left out of the picture by Dillon. It may be a reference to the
intelligible Forms, or to an entity such as the ralional formative
principles {::\oyot), that, from the intelligible word. come down
to us.
Cf. Festugiere 1954, IV, p. 122, n. "Cf. Dillon1969, p. 6g: "It
might seem that for the Demiurge 'to contain within
himself' the whole noetic world need not imply identity with it,
but Proc!us is quite clear, in the preceding passage (nana TOV
vmrrov K6cqwv anoKaA!:t: li1j-flt01.lpy6v), that that is what
lamblichus meant." [ think that Proclus is willing to entertain the
two readings, but takes the "identity" reading as the most obvious
while allowing for the possibility of a more benevolent
interpretation.
39 El. 1heol. 103, p. 92, 13; Porph. Sent. 10.
-
/AN OPSOMER
demiurge would not have to fill the entire intelligible realm. A
possibility
would be that he occupies a specific spot within the
intelligible, in which
case Iamblichus' view would indeed be compatible with Proclus',
although his words remain very general and vague40 Pro cl us
continues by saying that
elsewhere Iamblichus has expressed himself in less general terms
and with greater precision. He then cites another text by his
predecessor, in which
can be found an improved version of his views on the demiurge,
that is
much closer, and maybe even identical, to Proclus' own theory.
But this does not concern us here.41
For the purpose of the comparison with Plotinus, let us accept
the first, less favourable, reading of the passage from Iamblichus'
Commentaries, ac-
cording to which the demiurge coincides with the entire
intelligible world.
Proclus appears to believe that this is what lamblichus really
meant when he wrote his Commentary,42 for this is how Proclus first
presents Iambli-chus' view, adding that the latter was in agreement
with Plotinus.43 The
alternative reading is as it were offered out of courtesy
towards his pred-ecessor.
From Proclus' report of the controversy between Porphyry and
lambli-
clms it thus appears that Proclus agrees with Iamblichus that
Plotinus has
the true demiurge coincide with intellect (i.e. with the entire
intelligible realm). Apart from the true demiurge, there is mention
of a lower clemiurge,
who is immanent in the world. Proclus identifies this immanent
demiurge as the intellect of the world soul. Porphyry allegedly
conceives of this lower
demiurge not as the intellect of this soul, but as a soul - an
unforgivable heresy according to Proclus. Porphyry's higher
demiurge would then be the
intellect of this soul, which he calls the "intelligible living
being". In other
words, Porphyry demotes the demiurge to the level of soul and
the para-
digm to that of intellect."
Proclus' reason for sympathising with Plotinus and attacking
Porphyry
may be that he considers the first's mistakes to be less impious
than those
40 Dillon 1987, p. 890, argues for a reading that roughly
corresponds with the second interpretation outlined above:
lamblichus is taken to state that the creator of the world should
have under his control all the forces of the intelligible world. As
he is an intellect himself, he can only create the intelligence of
intelligent beings. It must be left to Life to create life and to
Being to be responsible for the mere being of things.
41 See Opsomer 2001a. 42 See also Deuse 1977, p. 261-262. 43
1,307,17-19. 44 See also 1,308,18: v iiAAO\~ aKpl~E
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS 79
of the second. He understands Plotinus' "second demiurge" as
identical with his own second demiurgic monad (the encosmic
demiurge, the intel-lect of the world), and the first as his own
true demiurge. Because Plotinus
refuses to acknowledge any real distinctions within the realm of
intellect,
this demiurge is at the same time the paradigm. This is not so
bad, because
the paradigm is not deprived of the dignity that is owed to the
intelligible.
Porphyry's paradigm, on the contrary, is, according to Proclus,
intellective,
not intelligible, and his demiurge is psychic, not intellective.
And that is a double impiety.
On Deuse's reconstruction of Porphyry's doctrine of the
clemiurge, this
criticism is not fully justified. Porphyry is much closer to
Plotinus" 6 than is suggested by Iamblichus' criticism as we know
it through Proclus. His de-
miurge in a sense coincides with the realm of intellect, and
when Porphyry
calls the transcendent soul a demiurge, his justification is
that this soul, as he sees things, is inextricably linked to
intellect to the point of being intel-lective. This is of course
unacceptable for Prod us, who wants to have soul and intellect to
be clearly separated entities.""~ Porphyry's demiurge is, how-ever,
first and foremost an intellect. Moreover, as we will see shortly,
Por-
phyry has good reasons for claiming Plotinian authority for the
attribution
of demiurgic functions to a higher soul, or to the intellect of
such a soul.
A twofold demiurgy: Enn. 4,4 [28] Proclus' own notion of an
immanent, "encosmic" demiurgic intellect,
bringing to completion the work of the transcendent demiurge, is
partially
based on his mterpretation of Phil. 3001-3, where a kingly
intellect and a kingly soul are mentioned. When he refers to what
he things is Plotinus'
second demiurge as the "Zeus-lntellect" (d. infra) he may be
thinking of
this passage and Plotinus' interpretation of it.
46 Plotinus, too, has demarcation problems, although he kept
soul and intellect separate: Schwyzer 1944, p. 98; Blumenthal1974;
D'Ancona Costa 1999, p. 69.
" In his De anima lamblichus accuses Porphyry of blurring the
lines between soul and intellect: "according to his doctnne, the
soul differs in no way from intel-lect and the gods and the
superior classes, at least in respect to its substance in gen-eral"
(ap. Stob. 1,365.15-17). D'Ancona Costa (1999, p. 70-2.) points to
a passage that could have led Porphyry to the assumption that the
line between soul and intellect is blurred: Enn. 4,7,13 could be
read as saying that soul is intellect plus desire (soul as an
"orectic" intellect), as ifPlotinus did not distinguish sharply
between soul and intellect. The same passage can also - indeed:
slumld- be read, however, as saying that after intellect comes
soul, which has desire. Thus, as D'Ancona Costa shows, on close
reading the passage is consistent with the separation of soul and
intellect proclaimed elsewhere.
-
So IAN OPSOMER
Plotinus quotes the Philebus passage in the second part of the
treatise Difficulties about the soul (4A !28], 9), Just before he
introduces the notion
of a double kosmopoietic principle. l shall shmv that this text
provides evi-dence both for Prod us' claim that the intellect of
the world soul is Plotinus' "second demiurge", and for the
allegedly incompatible view, ascribed to
Porphyry, that it is the world soul itself This is a strong
indication Enn. 4,4 was as least as important for the whole debate
as Enn. 3,9 [13]. 1, Plotinus' exegesis of Tim. 39E7, which is
usually held to have led to the diverging in-terpretations of
Plotinus' own views.""
The distinction between two types of productiOn corresponding to
two principles of production is introduced to clarify certain
issues con-cerning the soul's mode of cognition and activity. In
the earlier sections of
the text, mention was made of certain activities of the soul
that had to do with production and, in a sense, demiurgy. These
were as it were taken for granted. At 4,3 [27], 6, the question was
simply why our souls do not make the universe, whereas the world
soul does (7te1tOt11Kt: KOO"IJ.OV, 6,2; 6,7: "it has [always] made
the world"), The answer is partly that the world soul has remained
closer to soul as a whole (the hypostasis soul) and contemplates
intellect as a whole, whereas individual souls contemplate their
own intel-
lects. Later on, Plotinus says that the world was being ordered
(hoto)
by a formative rational principle (a 'AoyocJ of the soul, since
the soul has the power to set in order according to rational
principles ('A6yot, 4,3 [27],
10,10-ll), an activity that is again called 'making'. 'Ihis,
however, it does not
do according to a principle brought from without (4,3 [:;n].
10,14-15). Soul has production, and in particular the capacity to
make body be alive, as a function proper to itself. It exercises
this function by imparting a rational
principle (/coyoc;), which is a copy of the logos that soul
contains in itself (10,37-40).49 This, it is stressed, is not done
from outside, but by nature as an internal fashioning power. 5
48 Cf. Festugiere I!, 1967, p. 159 n. 2; Dillon 1969; Opsomer
2001a. 49 Cf. Fattal 1998, p. "Il [i.e. logos] sert la plupart du
temps d'intermediaire
entre le sensible et !'intelligible a travers le rapport
dynamique qu'il instaure entre les hypostases elles-memes d'une
part et entre les hypostases et le monde sensible d'autre part En
fait, un tellogos ne peut etre une hypostase
so On this passage, see Brisson, 1999, p. 97103, summarising (p.
101): 'Tunivers est une ceuvre d'art qui n'est pas prodUJte de
l'exterieur par un artisan, comme s'il l'avait ete par le demiurge
du Timee, mais qui est produit de l'interieur par cette puissance
organisatrice qu'est la Nature." This, however, is not the whole
story, as Brisson himself makes very clear: soul receives its
creative power from intellect.
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTJNUS
The notion of a twofold agency tor the production of the world
comes up in a long section in which Plotinus discusses the question
whether the more elevated kinds of souls, such as the world soul,
and even Zeusl1imself,
have memory, and also whether they deliberate and calculate (4.4
[28j, 6-q). 1l1e answer is negative, but cannot of course be
ascertained before all pos-sible objections are met. Plotinus
argues that even for practical activities it is not necessary to
store in memory particulars perceived by the senses, "unless one is
engaged in the practical management of something, since the
particulars are included in the knowledge of the whole" (4.4 [28],
8,4-7).
Even Zeus, "who sets all things in order and administers and
directs them forever" (4,4 [28], and who has "a kingly soul and a
kingly intellect"
the reference to the Philebus does not need memory, and this
despite the fact that he has foreknowledge of all the heavenly
cycles. Indeed, does he not calculate them? After all. he is the
wisest craftsman (iitUtLoupyoc; crocpriYcaTo
-
82 fAN OPSOMER
tivity IS superior to that of our individual souls). Obviously,
the demiurge must be intellect, but this is not said explicitly.
The characteristic that Plo-
tinus highlights is that he possesses an unchanging and timeless
life, in which there is no before and after (9,4-5). A being for
which there is no time, cannot have memory. TI1at much is clear.
But what about Zeus in the
other sense, the ruling principle of; and in, the universe, the
world soul or the "life of the world"? 52
First I would like to point out that it is not entirely clear
what exactly IS meant to be the second principle. At first things
seem simple: we speak of the first ordering principle as the
demiurge, of the second as the "soul of the all" (10,2), and
likewise (Kat) with Zeus: in the first sense we mean the demiurge,
in the second, "that which rules the universe" (10,4). The ob-vious
conclusion is that the soul of the all is the ruling principle of
the uni-verse. Then Plotinus says that "the life of the universe
contains within itself its ruling principle" (10,7). TI1is could be
more or less equivalent to saying that the universe contains within
it a soul, which is its ruling principle, but could just as well
mean that the soul, which is the life of the universe, has
itself a ruling principle.53 TI1e "life of the umverse" is said
to be in no need of deliberation, as things have already been
discovered and ordered, not in the sense that the things that are
becoming have actually been set in order
(ou "Cax8v'La), but rather that order ('La~u;) has already been
established or determined. This order 1s the producing cause of the
order in the world of becoming ('Lo 8 nowuv au"Ca 1] "Ca~u;,
10,11). This is the activity of soul
which depends on "an abiding/intermediate thinking (lppOVll
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS
the soul is attached could again either be the transcendent
intellect (the
demiurge), or the intellect of the soul itself, which could then
considered to
be the true second demiurge (rather than the soul itself).'" The
soulunvary-
ingly looks at this thinking, for its activity is one, and the
soul is one (only
if it stopped looking, would it be perplexed). "For the ruling
principle is
one, always dominant, and not somelimes dominated." 55 The most
natural
reading of this last sentence would be to take the expression
"the ruling
principle" as referring to the "one soul" mentioned in the
previous sentence
(cf. yap), but again it cannot be excluded that Plotinus wants
to say that the
soul is one, because its ruling principle - whether this be a
transcendent or an immanent intellect - is always dominating.56 If
this is the case, the soul would again be distinguished from a
"ruling principle". The same am-
biguity obtains when he further on mentions a thinking (
-
84 )AN OPSOMER
may have played on the ambiguity of to hegemonoun (the ruler of
the world, or the ruler of the soul) and phronesis (the thinking
soul, or the thinking
to which the soul is attached). An unbiased reading of the text
- one that does not start from the need to hypostasise aspects or
functions of the soul - would probably lead to Porphyry's
conclusion, that from 4,4,10 onwards
Plotinus speaks of the thinking soul as the second ordering
principle. I take it that its thinking (.:pp6vll
-
DEM!URGY ACCORDING TO PLOTJNUS 8s
constitutes a multiplicity, but insofar it is one living being.
lt is not a gov-ernment over parts, but over a whole (11,1-2).61
cfl1.e care of the soul for the world should not be compared to
that of a doctor, wlw approaches the pa-tient from the outside, but
to the workings of nature, happenmg from the inside and without
deliberation (11,2-7). What deliberation, calculation or
memory could there be when intelligent thinking (
-
86 )AN OPSOMEH
come from outside). lhe soul, then, needs nothing but its own
thinking, which is nothing different from itself.64
That may be a nice thought but not one that is unproblematic.
Plotinus' world soul comes to resemble intellect very closely when
deliberation is de-
nwd to it.65 lhe only difference seems to be that its activity,
although
one and unvarymg, takes place in time. Its thinking already has
timeless, i.e. intellective features. Deliberating will be left to
the souls that have a still more partial nature. For them, things
do approach them from outside, but
for the soul of the all there is nothing outside. In Plato's
Timaeus, however, the description of the world soul's epistemic
activities does seem to involve a succession, more specifically
when they concern the sensible: whenever
the circle of the Different encounters something perceptible,
firm and true
opinions and beliefs come about (37B6-8).66 'These opinions are
firm, which
I take to mean that they cannot be shaken, not that they are
always the same and unvarying.67
If it is not the thinking (qJp6Vll
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTlNUS
principle itself. Intellect, then, possesses, and the soul of
the all receives from it for ever and has always received, and this
is its life, and what ap-pears at each successive time is its
consciousness as it thinks: and that which is reflected from it
into matter is nature, in which, or indeed, be-
fore it, the real beings come to a stop. (13,13-21)
The hierarchy of kosmopoiests is rather more complex than it
would appear at first sight. For every link of the chain Plotinus
emphasises the transmis-
sion of activity and power, and the unchanging, and in that
sense neces-
sary, character of the entire process. The world soul completely
escapes the turmoil: whereas nature still acts (rro10ucro.) on
matter and is afl'ected by it
(nacrxou
-
BB TAN OPSOMER
however, remains: the only thing that seems to distinguish the
soul from
mtellect"1 is that the soul generates time, not eternity, and
that is the case
only because the thwgs it generates are not eternal, but
encompassed by time. In its productive capacity the soul is very
much like intellect: all the rational formative principles
(logoi)72 are inside it together and simultane-ously; it is only in
the products that they are no together (16,5-9). In other words. it
is the multiplicity and succession in the products that makes the
difference. But then one should be entitled to ask, whence this
multiplicity originates. In a sense, Plotinus is wrestling with a
problem that is very similar to Lhe oue with which Proclus saw
himself confronted.73
L Bnsson and other commentators were right to stress the fact
that Plo-tinus wanted to get rid of the artisanal metaphors.
Plotinus wished to keep his demiurge free of the toils of
deliberation and memory, and saw himself forced to transmit some of
the demiurgic powers and the actual work to the world souL
Unfortunately, it does not end there and then. Plotinus finds
himself on a slippery slope: in order to preserve the blessed
status of the world soul he now sees himself forced to deny
deliberation to the soul as welL He tries to make the soul's
activity as timeless as possible, and can only posit, not
satisfactorily explain, the transition to the temporal
succession,
to which the things created are subjected. Ultimately, the
transition has to do with the difference between the universal
character of the soul and the divisiOn among particular beings. In
this sense. the situation our individual souls74 find themselves in
has more affinity with that of particular bodies than with that of
the world souL Surely Plotinus is not short of arguments explaining
why that is not the case. The more fundamental problem is the
perspectivism: the thinking soul is unchanging from the perspective
of na-ture, but not from the perspective of intellect.
"In 3,8 [3o], 6 Plotinus tries a different approach: "soul, too,
was rational prin-ciple and a sort of mtellect, but an intellect
seeing something else. For it is not full, but has something
wanting in relation to what comes before it"
72 On the function of logos ancllogoi in Plotinns' philosophy,
Fattal1998. " Cf. Opsomer 2000, p. 129130 and n. ns, p. 141.
Plotinus tries to explain the
transition from simultaneity to succession in an interesting
way: priority in this case does not consist in giving orders
through speaking (A.yco). The ordering prin ciple does not give
orders, in the sense that it would say "this after that". Instead
it JUSt makes this after that. Speaking would involve looking at
the arrangement and then enunciatmg it. This presupposes a
distinction between the arranging and the arrangement. But in this
case the arranging principle is the primary ar rangement (see also
4,4 [28], 10,10-11). It is not form and matter, but pure form. 1he
distinction between form and matter appears only in its products
(16,11-20).
"Cf. 4.4 17
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT!NUS 89
Whereas in the Timaeus the demiurge is said to calculate and
delib-erate, Neoplatonists cry out in nnison that this is not to be
understood literally. In this Plotinus is no different from later
Platonists: the world soul, handmaiden of intellect, wl 11 relieve
the latter of actual work. The problem, for all Neoplatonists, is
to determine where things start to lit-erally. As we have already
seen, the world soul is the next to be declared unchanging in its
essence: it transcends the toils of this world and rules .,HmHcc:lv
thanks to its handmaiden. nature. For this blessed life of the
world soul there is clear textual evidence in the Tinzaeus.75 Yet
to say its knowledge is timeless may be stretching the
evidence.
Production at the lower levels: Enu. 3,8 [30], 2,3 [52], and 4,8
[6] With nature, at last, we seem to have found a principle that
actually does some real work. But even that is denied. As Plotinus
says in Ennead 3.8 [3o], On nature and its contemplatwn, nature is
a maker, but does not use hands or feet or instruments (also 5,8
[31j, 7,10-12.). \Xlhereas this may seem obvious,76 the following
remark may be less so: Plotmus also claims that nature's production
is effortless, and moreover, unmoving, as nature is a form
(3,8,2)?7 Nature is itself a logos and creates the in plants and
animals. These rational principles, that are situated in the
visible shapes, are no longer alive nor able to produce something
else. But the formative principle that is nature is alive, yet
motionless, and it "makes in that which comes into being". \Xlhat
it makes are the logoi that are immanent in vis-ible things.78
Nature does not it does not search, but possesses and makes. Nature
even has a ldnd of contemplation, albeit a very weak one, and its
making can therefore be considered the outcome of its
contempla-
tive At the end of Enn. 3,8, the One is described as that which
makes and
generates intellect. Plotinus actually uses the words notqTi]';
and yEvv1wo:c;
" Tin1. 34B8; 36E4. 76 Actually this constitutes a reply to an
Epicurean criticism of the Timneus: see
Cic. De nat. dem: 1,19. Annstrong 1967, p. 363 n. 2. 77 The
argument in favour of an unmoved principle, combined with the idea
that
such a principle must be unmoved throughout may be loosely based
upon Arist. Plzys. 8,5 (which does not mean that Plotinus' nature
is equivalent to Aristotle's first mover).
78 3,8 [30], 2.,27-34
79 3,8 [30], 3,12-23; 4,16-21; 27; 30. At 4.4 [28], 13,7
Plotinus denies that nature has any knowledge.
-
90 /AN OPSOMER
(11,37-38), but not demiurge.80 We have "makers" from the One
all the way down to nature, and all agents in the production line
produce motionlessly and without effort. From the perspective of
the Tirnaeus this is surprising: what happened to the
recalcitrance, disorder, and chance'?
'TI1is aspect is addressed at the end of the late treatise
Wlhether the stars
are causes (2,3 [sz]). From section 16 onwards, Plotinus asks
himself what it means to say that the soul administers the world
according to reason. He admits that the soul can never rest as
after a job accomplished: its product is in need of continuous
correction (16,31-36). The larger context explains this change in
emphasis: since Plotinus is combating the view that stars are evil
agents, he has to deal with those things that do not run so
smoothly. There is no contradiction with earlier texts, as he does
not say that the soul toils or suffers from its JOb. The soul
produces, using logoi. But are these its thoughts and does it then
produce by mere thought? Ultimately the work gets done in the mode
proper to nature (qYUCl'tK&
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS 91
takes come m at the level of nature.82 Nature, the lowest image
of soul, is the lowest maker (notT]ci]
-
92 !AN OPSOMER
]lnEp ouv vo\h; vo\Jcrw; tlleac; t(l} 6 llcrnv otat n i.'vacrt
Kai
ooat. KaOop{i, ' wtaumc; Kat tOCfO:Utac; Ol!':VOllOT] OELV Kai
't60c CJXf.tV
P!otinus starts off the discussion with a ioose quotation of
these words:
Intellect (vouc;), Plato says, sees the Ideas existing in the
Living-Being-that-Is. 1hen, he says, the demiurge planned (cha
lltvm1011, (PTlcriv,
o llT]fHOupy6c;) that what intellect sees in the
Living-Being-that-Is, this muverse too should have. (1,1-3)
By mserting an explicit reference to the demiurge in the second
half of his paraphrase, Plotinus makes it look as if the planning
demmrge is different
from the seeing intellect. This is exactly what will lead to the
main contro-versy. Plotinus' analysis starts with the apparent
independent existence of the forms, prior to their being seen.
'TI1at what contemplates them, is intel-lect; the forms and the
"real living being" are to be called intelligible. Though intellect
and the intelligible may be different from each other, they
cannot
really be separate, so Plotinus argues. Intellect and
intelligible are actually
one dvm U!l(flW), and can be distinguished in thought alone
(8uxtpou-!1EVa 8 'TI V01lOEl, 1,12-13). "For Plato does not say
that what it sees is in something absolutely different, but in it,
m that it has the intelligible object in itself" (1,14-15). If
intellect were different from the intelligible, it would be
looking, not at reality, as the real Forms would exist elsewhere,
but at mere images of reality (ref1ections of reality in the
intellect, 1,8-9)," Fortunately, they are not different entities:
the intelligible is nothing but intellect at rest, in unity and
quietness, remaining in itself, whereas the seeing intellect is an
activity proceeding from the former.88 By thinking intellect at
rest, the seeing intellect is the intellect of that intellect. Yet
one can also say that the seeing intellect is intellect and
intelligible in another way, by imitation (1,15-
:.n). 'D1is seeing intellect is the same that "planned" to make
in this universe what it "sees" in the intelligible (Touw ouv crn
'tO litaV0119Ev, & EKEi f.V tq)/i 't(\l KOO)H:J,)
1tOtfjcrm,
"4,8 [6], 2,19-38; 8,13-16. Cf. O'Meara 1993, p, 73. Near the
end of the text Plo-linus admits that even for the higher soul
contact with the world is unavoidabh: (7,31-32),
86 For a full discussion of Plotinus' argument, see O'Brien
1993, p. 5-27. 87 Cf Montet 2000, p. 220. Cf. D'Ancona 2003, p.
156-157, 160. 88 Here we dearly have the first two terms of the
triad remaining procession-
reversion.
-
DEM!UHGY ACCOHD!NG TO PLOT!NUS 93
Then however, Plotinus retracts this identiflcation,
grammatically ob-vious"9 as .it may be:
Plato seems, nevertheless, to be making, obscurely, the planning
prin-
ciple ('to owvoou~tevov) something other than those two.
(1,23-24)
Instead of having just two aspects of intellect, the intellect
at rest and the
seeing activity proceeding from it, we now have a third
pnnciple, that which
plans. Plotinus informs us that some think that these three90
the livmg being-that-is, intellect, and the planner are one.
As Plotinus has already discussed the first two, he now focuses
on that which plans to construct and make and to divide in parts
the things seen by the intellect in the Living Being. Its
activities are explicated as plan-
ning (i'n
-
94 JAN OPSOMER
is true of planning. 1his "planning"," deliberating" or"
discursive thinking"
is not the work of intellect, but of soul, for soul has a
divided activity in a
divided nature (a free interpretation of Tim. 35A).94 Il is
remarkable and not untypical of either Plotinus or other
Platonists, to name discursive thought as the activity proper to
soul when it comes to distinguishing it from intel-lect, but to
deny this of the (world) soul, when its divine nature needs to
be
stressed. This text gives some support to Porphyry's claim that
Plotinus consid-
ered the world soul as a second demiurge, especially since
Plotlnus in his initial paraphrase of the Ilmaeus passage supplies
the word" demiurge" as the grammatical subject of the "planning",
and concludes his interpreta-
tion with the suggestion that it is soul who does the planning.
It is often assumed that Porphyry based his whole interpretation on
this text, or per-haps on unpublished discussions with his master
on the very same pas-sage."" I think, however, that he combined the
views expressed in 3,9,1 with other texts of Plotinus, more
particularly with the discussions reported in the Enn. 4,4,
Difficulties about the soul II. For it is there that Plotinus says
literally that the kosmopoiesis is twofold and discusses the soul
as a maker - but reserves the term" demiurge" for intellect. There
too Plotinus stresses the transcendence of the world soul - which
may be why Porphyry char-acterises the soul-demiurge as an
unparticipated souL" 7 lamblichus' and Proclus' condemnation of
Porphyry's views as un-Piotinian appears to be unjustified for Lhe
most part. In answer to Proclus exclaiming "show me a
passage in which Piotinus makes the soul the demiurge!" 98
Porphyl'y could simply have referred to Enn. 3,9,1.99 Only if
Porphyry had maintained, which I take to be unlikely, that soul
according to Plotinus is the true demiurge, he would have made a
claim that disregards Plotinus' insistence on the view that
intellect is the real demiurge.100
"'' Plotlnus adds that Plato says that division belongs to the
third and is the third. 1his is an oblique reference to the three
Kings of the second Letter, in which the soul takes the third
place. Cf. Saffrey - \1\festerink 1974, p. xxx V XLIX.
'" Discursive thought is attributed to the soul, including the
world soul, in a number of texts. See, e.g., 5,1, [w], 3,13; 4,16
(intellect does not think by seeking but by having); 4,19-21
(contrary to intellect, the soul thinks one after the other); 7.42
(the offspnng of intellect, i.e. soul, is 1:0
1\t.avooil[lEvov).
'"Cf. Dillon 1969, p. 63, n. 1. 97 Pace Dillon 1969, p. 68. "'
Prod in Tim. 1,307AS '
9 See also n. 115. '0 Cf. n. 116.
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT!NUS 95
Ennead 3,9 [13], 1 was not Plotinus' last word on Tim. 39E.ln
the antiGnostic treatise 2,9 [33], which is given the sub-title""
Against those who say that the demiurge of the ttfltl'erse is eFil
and that the world is evil, he comes btlck
to this passage. Plotinus argues against the view that a fallen
soul creates the world, and against the general idea that the
origin of the world and the
world self are eviL He begins by clearly setting out the number
and the na-ture of the principles from which this world flows:
intellect IS unchanging; it is what it is, resting in stable,
unmoved activity(02 without any sort of
decline, imitating its father (the One) as much as it the
universal
soul is continuously contemplating intellect, "receives from
there and gives to what comes after it, and is always illuminated
as it illuminates." \vhile
managing body it remains itself untroubled (a:rrpant6v(l)c;),104
for its gov-ernment is not the result of discursive thinking (otK K
1havoim;J nor does
it have to set anything right (because things did not have a
chance to go wrong).105 Demiurgy is not due to a being that turns
from one thing to the
other and changes106 Crucial for Plotinus' argument is that the
world soul does not produce as a result of a downward inclination,
but on the contrary through its steady contemplation of
intellect.
If it declined, it was obviously because it had forgotten the
mtelligible realities; but if it forgot them, how is it the
craftsman of the world'! For what is the source of its making, if
not what it saw in the mtelligible world? (2,9 [33],
What is produced by the higher realities is produced tor ever,
because these
principles give necessarily, because of what they are; and the
fact that they
produce is good!"" Ihe higher principles are three in number,
and should
101 Porph., Vita Plot. 24,5657 See also 3,2 [.p), 1,9. 102 2,9
[33), 1,29.; 8,21-25.
-
)AN OPSOMER
not be multiplied (3,1,1,12-2,2); 1his is one of the reasons why
Plotinus ob-jects to the Gnostics' interpretation of Tim. J9:
And the making a plurality in the intelligible world, being, and
intellect, and the maker different from intellect, and soul, is
taken from the words
in the Timaeus: for Plato says, "1he maker of this universe
thought that it should contain all the forms that intelligence
discerns contained in the living being that truly is." But they did
not understand, and took it to mean that there is one mind which
contains in it in repose all reali-ties, and another mind different
from it which contemplates them, and another which plans but often
they have soul as the maker instead of the planning mind- and they
think that this is the maker according to Plato, being a long way
from knowing who the maker is. (2,9 [33], 6,14-24)
1he Gnostics whose views Plotinus is here discussing obviously
read Plato. They, too, discerned three entities in Tim. 397-9:
either three intellects
a possibility not mentioned in 3,9,1 or two intellects and a
souL Just like he did in 3,9,1, but this time in stronger terms,
Plotinus rejects the no-tion of a real distinction between an
intellect at rest and an intellect that
would somehow be in motion.109 \Vhat he finds offensive is not
so much
the fact itself that the Gnostics attribute a demiurgic function
to a soul (the alternative version, that of three intellects, is
equally objectionable), but
rather that they make soul the demiurge; but even worse is the
fact that they think this soul is subjected to passions, and
creates after some fall (6,55-62; 7,11-14). Moreover the Gnostics
are mistaken in their view that there was a
temporal beginning to the making, and that the maker of the
world made things in succession and is himself subject to change.no
Against his oppo-nents Plotinus emphasises that "the image has to
exist, necessarily, not as the result of thought and
contrivance."111 The Gnostic account of demiurgy is rather careless
about details and lacks consistency. T11ey tend to multiply
the number of principles involved and remain vague about precise
relations among them. 1his, however, should not concern us
here.112
'""See also 2,9 (33), 1,26-27; and 5,9 [s), 9,6-8 (intellect is
identical with the para-digm, to which refers the expression ev
t{il o tcrn ~(i)ov, taken trom Tim. 398).
l!O 2,9 [33], 8,25-111 2,9 1331. 8,20-21. 112 Cf. Brehier 1924,
p. 105-107; Rolotf 1970, p. 18
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS 97
Plotinus' "Makers" Plotinus does not seem to reject the notion
of the world soul that is demiur-gically active- although he
usually reserves the tetm "demiurge" for intei-
lect and calls soul a "maker" instead. As we have seen, Plotinus
in 4.4 [28] first distinguishes between two principles of
kosmopoiesis, the first being
the demiurge, the second the world soul. Both are called Zeus.
Then Plo-tinus differentiates various stages of kosmopoiesis within
the realm of soul, most importantly betweer1 the world soul and
r1ature. 'TI1e activity of both world soul and nature is called
Jtmi:v, yet both are motionless, as can be concluded from 3,8 [30].
What Plotinus wants to deny is the idea of the soul as the real
demiurge, acting on its own initiative, having turned away from the
steady contemplation of intellect and relying instead on
deliberation.
T11is concern becomes very clear in the classic text on the
three hypos-tases, Enn. 5,1 [w]. In order to make the soul aware of
its divine origins, it should remind itself of its own works. Soul
makes all things alive, breathing life into them. T11e soul of the
all orders the world (2,5-6), is present every-where and
assimilates itself to its father, who begat it in its unity and
uni-versality (2,37-38). T11e father of soul, of whom soul is the
image, is intellect (3,7; 20-21). In "the myths about the gods",
intellect is called Kronos (4,9; 7,33), which is why soul, its
offspring, is Zeus (7,36-37). Before Zeus is born,
Kronos contains everything within himself, and in this way is
full and in-tellect in satiety (7,34-35). Intellect is the "cause"
or "craftsman". Above in-tellect thrones the One, that in a sense
generates intellect (7,5). 'TI1e One is therefore called "the
father of the cause" (8,4-8). In other words, of the
three principles, who all generate an offspring, the One and
intellect are both called fathers;m intellect is the true demiurge,
but the soul too pro-duces.114
T11is is confirmed by other passages: the soul is assigned a
demiurgic function,115 but ultimately it is intellect that is the
true demiurge.l!6 lhe world is created by intellect through the
intermediary of the soul. Whether that gives us the right to call
the soul a demiurge is of no great concern.
113 Cf. Montet 2000, p. 214: "la relation de paternite [.--)
illustre en effet aussi bien le rapport du Premier a ce qui le suit
que la relation de !'Intellect a ce qui de-pend de lui."
"" 'lhe term maker is sometimes also used of the One. Cf. n. 8o_
115 In addition to the passages examined in the text. one could
refer to 2,4 [12],
10,35 (the soul imposing forms); 2,9 (33], 18,16; 5,1 [w],
10,28; s.8 [31), 2,31-32. 116 2,1 [40], s,s-6 (the world soul
follows upon the demiurge); 2,3 [52], 18,15; 5,1
[10], 8,s; 5.9 [s], 3,2526 (vouv 1t0t1111\V ovuoc; Ked
01Htl0Upy6v): 5.19-21. In 2,4 [n]. 7,2-9 Anaxagoras' vouc; is
described as being the demmrge.
-
fAN OPSOMER
What IS much more important for Plotinus is that we realise that
the soul
can have this function only because of its uninterrupted
contemplation of
intellect. The act of creation is single and constitutes a
whole. It involves no deliberating, calculating or planning.
Without temporal beginning, crea-tion happens instantaneouslyn7
What Plotinus criticizes is not so much the Timaeus, as too
literal an interpretation of this dialogue. Of course one should
not believe that gods use hands and feet, but neither that they
plan and calculate. The entire ac-count of the demiurge should be
taken metaphorically: no deliberation was involved at any stage.118
Timaeus' account has the status of a 'hypothesis', in that for the
sake of exposition god is said to generate and make things in
succession and as a result of deliberation, whereas in reality they
are
contained eternally in the spiritual realm; their coming to be
is likewise perpetual and not a matter of this after that119 'l11e
creation of the world
does not take place in time, nor does it happen in steps.
Plotinus was well aware of the fact that the Timaeus is a
dialogue that can easily be misunderstood.120 As D. O'Meara (1993,
p. 73) has pointed
out, this problem had been exacerbated by the Gnostic belief
that an im-
perfect (i.e. evil) world was produced by an imperfect cosmic
demiurge. The Gnostic reading of the Timaeus, claims Plotinus, is a
perverse one. 1he problem, however, lies deeper. L. Brisson and F.
Schroeder have already drawn the attentiOn to the fact that the
demiurgic model does not make a good combination with a derivation
system. Plotinus was aware of this
difficulty, and tried to soften the problem by stressing the
transcendence of the spiritual principles. They produce in an
immobile way, thanks to the powers they receive from the
proximately higher leveL The transcendence
of each principle is saved at the cost of the lower entities,
and th1s procedure
117 s.s [18], 7,1-17. na Evidently this is true for intellect as
welL See, in addition to 4A !28], 10,4.'6
(cf supra), 3,2 [47], 1,34
-
DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT I NUS 99
is repeated down to the level of nature. 'TI1is does not make
the problem go away, however. At best, it is pushed out of
sight.
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ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE
Series 1
XXXIV
The De Wulf-Mansion Centre deals with research in Ancient and
Medieval Philosophy at the Philosophy Institute of the Catholic
University of Leuven (K. U. Leuven),
Kardmaa! Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium).
-
PLATONS TIMAIOS
ALS GRUNDTEXT DER KOSMOI.OGIE
IN SPATANTIKE, J\11TTELALTER
UND RENAISSANCE
PLATO'S TIMAEUS
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF COSl\tlOLOGY
IN LATE ANTIQUITY, THE MIDDLE AGES
AND RENAISSANCE
Edited by Thomas LEINKAUF and Carlos STEEL
LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2005