A Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The "Politics" of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992-1993)

8/7/2019 A Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The "Politics" of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992-1993)

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PKSOI Papers

A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS

BY OTHER MEANS:THE POLITICS OF A PEACEKEEPING

MISSION IN CAMBODIA (1992-93)

Boraden Nhem

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PKSOI PAPER

A CONTINUATION OF POLITICSBY OTHER MEANS:

THE POLITICS OF A PEACEKEEPING MISSIONIN CAMBODIA (1992-93)

Boraden Nhem

February 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publicationsenjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas-sied information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre-sent ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers themto offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the in-terest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

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ISBN 1-58487-479-1


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FOREWORD

PKSOI is pleased to present this monograph byMr. Boraden Nhem. Mr. Nhem, a doctoral candidate,came to PKSOI to pursue his interest in peacekeeping.Particularly interested in the determining factors ofsuccess for peacekeeping missions, he has addresseda part of this with a fresh look at the United Nations(UN) Cambodian peacekeeping mission of 1992-93.

His interests are academic but also motivated by per-sonal experiencehis childhood was spent in someof the worst years of ghting among factions, theimplementation of the peacekeeping mission, and therebuilding of the Cambodian government and society.Although he lived through this history, he has not fall-en into the common trap of assuming his experience is

the whole picture. This author has the unique abilityto step back from his own life experience in order toinvestigate and make conclusions based upon the evi-dence he nds. He has done so in this paper.

Mr. Nhem has made a case that in past researchscholars have ordinarily addressed subjects such asmandates, spoiler management policy, and UN mis-sions as separate constructs and further have failed

to address local political factors. His new Cambodiancase study reveals a complex and interactive situationin which local political conditions were paramountand directly challenged the UN peacekeeping prin-ciple of neutrality. In fact, he observes that UN peace-keeping missions can be too tied to theory and doctrineand ignore reality. Instead, he argues for missions that

understand the inherent complexity of peacekeeping,recognize emerging realities, and adapt accordingly.


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This key observation can often be generalized to whatthe U.S. Army does as well.

STEPHEN T. SMITHColonel, U.S. ArmyDirector

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

BORADEN NHEM has conducted research atvarious research institutions in the eld of securitystudies including the RAND Corporation and theService Historique de la Dfense (the French militaryarchive maintained by the Ministry of Defense). He isan alumni of the Summer Workshop on Analysis ofMilitary Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) 2010,

organized by Columbia University, with Dr. StephenBiddle as one of the directing faculty. Mr. Nhem hasone publication forthcoming with Praeger SecurityInternational. The book will study the evolution ofthe Khmer Rouge from a mere terrorist organiza-tion to an insurgency, eventually taking power, andthen back to insurgency before its ultimate demise in

1998. His research interests include the use of forcein international politics and the question of war andpeace. Mr. Nhem holds a BA in Economics and Lawfrom the Royal University of Law and Economics inCambodia, a Matrise in Economics from UniversitLumire Lyon 2 in France, and a masters degree fromthe University of Delaware in the United States. Heis currently a Ph.D. candidate in political science and

strategic studies at the University of Delaware.


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SUMMARY

Since the establishment of the United Nations(UN) in 1945, 63 peacekeeping missions have beenauthorized by UN mandate. Some fell directly underthe UN, and others were conducted under UN au-thorization by lead nations. The mandates have beenjustied under UN Charter VI, Pacic Settlement ofDisputes, and Chapter VII, Action with Respect to

Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts ofAggression.1Regardless of intent, the UN record inpeacekeeping is one of mixed success. Numerous rea-sons for the failed or less than successful peacekeep-ing missions are offered: vague or weak mandates,conicting objectives, ambiguous rules of engagement(ROE), and unanticipated spoilers rank high among

these. This paper uses the UN Cambodian peacekeep-ing mission of 1992-93, considered a great success bymany, to examine the complexities involved in UNpeacekeeping missions and to illustrate the primacyof the political context in determining success.

Peacekeeping is a civil-military operation onthe UNs Spectrum of Peace and Security Activities.Whereas conict prevention uses structural or diplo-

matic measures to preclude conict within or amongstates, peacemaking applies measures, usually diplo-matic, to bring hostile parties to fruitful negotiations.Peacekeeping missions aim to prevent the resumptionof ghting by guaranteeing security for the parties ofthe conict until a foundation for resolving the conictand a sustainable peace is laid. It generally involves

the separation of forces, the laying down of arms bythe belligerents, the reintegration of the belligerentsinto society, and the facilitation of the resumption of


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a degree of normalcy within society. Recent conictswith their almost wanton disregard of human rights

and mistreatment of civilians have made the protec-tion of civilians a key component of the peace process.Peace enforcement is an operation where coercivemeasures, including the use of threat of military force,are used to restore international peace and security.Peace-building, the last component of the operationalspectrum, uses a range of measures to reduce the riskof a relapse into conict and is a long-term process fo-cused on a sustainable peace. While these operationsare distinct in doctrine, the measures and actions usedin application and issues confronted often appearsimilar. Nonetheless, the purpose of each operation isdistinct, even as all seek to create peace and stability.

While peacekeeping has evolved, it remains dis-tinct and useful as an operational concept along the

spectrum of peace and security activities. However,it is not without its conceptual liabilities. Historicallyand today, peacekeeping operations adhere to threebasic principles: (1) consent of the parties, (2) impar-tiality, and (3) nonuse of force except in self-defenseand more recently the defense of the mandate. Therst predicates the mission and its success on theconsent of the main parties to the conict and theircommitment to a political process and support of theUN force. The second argues that retaining consent isbased on implementing the mandate without favor orprejudice to any party. The last principle has evolvedfrom an absolute policy of no use of force except inself-defense to a more realistic reection of the autho-rization of the use of force to deter attempts to under-

mine the peace process with force and to protect ci-vilians. The Cambodian experience reveals how theseliabilities affect the progress of peace.


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The UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia be-tween 1992 and 1993 (the UN Transitional Authority

in Cambodia [UNTAC]) is an excellent precursor ofthe growing complexity of 21st century peacekeeping.While it has been studied before, there are two mainproblems with the literature and practice in peace-keeping operations that it highlights.

First, at the theoretical level, while a peacekeep-ing operation is a complex phenomenon with manydifferent variables involved, scholars in the past havetended to use mono-causal theories to explain the suc-cess and failure of peacekeeping missions. Works thataddress the complexities of the interactions among themany variables are quite rare. Moreover, the debatehas turned to what good mandates are and maintain-ing peace versus protection of civilians, rather thanhow to accomplish the overarching goal of all man-

dates which is a sustainable peace.Second, at the practical level, much attention has

been paid to the establishment of good guiding princi-ples and optimal ROE for peacekeepers, but much lessattention has been given to how political componentsof the mission should integrate with military compo-nents in the complex environment of peacekeeping.Integration is ad hoc, too often responding to eachnew problem, as opposed to shaping the situationproactively.

In Cambodia, UNTAC confronted the full com-plexity of peacekeeping as the Cold War mechanismsfor stability collapsed and the UN struggled withthe new order. All the variables and nuances of 21stcentury peacekeeping were present from vague man-

dates to spoilers and their patrons. Previous studies ofthe Cambodian peacekeeping mission have been too


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myopic and fail to address important matters contrib-uting to a valid assessment of whether or not UNTAC

met its mandates. Many of the works also differ intheir conclusions, and there is a need to integrate andcompare these efforts to gain a more comprehensiveunderstanding of the UNTAC missions strengths andweaknesses. Cambodia was largely a successful op-eration, and as a case study continues to provide im-portant insights as to what constitutes best practices inpeacekeeping missions.

UN peacekeeping missions always have exter-nal and internal political components. The situationin Cambodia at the time of the UN intervention wascomplicated and had been so for years. The conictingparties agreed to a UN peacekeeping mission becausethey recognized that they could not resolve the politi-cal paradox in which Cambodia found itself, and no

one was happy with the status quo. Foreign interven-tions had played a contributing role in Cambodiasturmoil, but the paradox was purely Cambodian. Ne-gotiations were necessary because no party by itselfcould successfully govern in Cambodia.

In hindsight, some of the difculties and failuresof the operation could have been foreseen with amore careful consideration of the external and inter-nal context. In this regard, no theoretical or doctrinalconstruct should ignore the emerging realities on theground and must adapt to the new circumstances. Inits revelation of the complex and interactive nature andcentrality of local political conditions, the Cambodiancase study suggests a number of important premisesfor future peacekeeping doctrine to consider.


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ENDNOTES SUMMARY

1. Charter of the United Nations,

United Nations Peacekeep-ing Operations: Principles and Guidelines, New York: United Na-tions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006, pp. 13-14,available from www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.

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A CONTINUATION OF POLITICSBY OTHER MEANS:

THE POLITICS OF A PEACEKEEPING MISSIONIN CAMBODIA (1992-93)

INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of the United Nations(UN) in 1945, 63 peacekeeping missions have been au-thorized by UN mandate. Some fell directly under theUN, and others were conducted under UN authoriza-tion by lead nations. The mandates have been justiedunder the UN Charters Chapter VI, Pacic Settle-ment of Disputes, and Chapter VII, Action with Re-spect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,and Acts of Aggression.1The protection of civiliansis an inherent component of the UN Charter found-

ed in the Human Rights Declaration, but it is only inmore recent years that it has been elevated to a majorcomponent of peacekeeping. Regardless of intent, theUN record in peacekeeping is one of mixed success.Numerous reasons for the failed or less than success-ful peacekeeping missions are offered: vague or weakmandates, conicting objectives, ambiguous rules ofengagement (ROE), and unanticipated spoilers rankhigh among these. This paper uses the UN Cambo-dian peacekeeping mission of 1992-93, considered agreat success by many, to examine the complexitiesinvolved in UN peacekeeping missions and to illus-trate the primacy of the political context in determin-ing success.


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THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PEACEKEEPINGMISSION

Peacekeeping is a civil-military operation onthe UNs Spectrum of Peace and Security Activities.Whereas conict preventionuses structural or diplo-matic measures to preclude conict within or amongstates and peacemaking applies measures, usuallydiplomatic, to bring hostile parties to fruitful negotia-tions, peacekeeping missionsaim to prevent the re-sumption of ghting by guaranteeing security for par-ties to the conict until a foundation for resolving thereasons for the conict and a sustainable peace is laid.It generally involves the separation of forces, the lay-ing down of arms by the belligerents, the reintegrationof the belligerents into society, and the facilitation ofthe resumption of a degree of normalcy within society.

Recent conicts, with their almost wanton disregardof human rights and mistreatment of civilians, havemade the protection of civilians a key component ofthe peace process. Peace enforcementis an operationwhere coercive measures, including military force,are used to restore international peace and security.Peace-building, the last component of the operationalspectrum, uses a range of measures to reduce the riskof a relapse into conict and is a long-term process fo-cused on a sustainable peace. While these operationsare distinct in doctrine, the measures and actions usedin application and the issues confronted often appearsimilar. Nonetheless, the purpose of each operation isdistinct even as all seek to create peace and stability.2Figure 1 illustrates these operations and components.


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Figure 1. UN Spectrum of Peace and Security

Operations.

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping operations wereconsidered to be essentially military in character andfocused on the tasks of (1) observation, monitoring,and reporting; (2) supervision of ceasere agreementsand support of the verifying mechanisms; and (3) act-ing as a buffer between forces and as a condence-building measure. Today, the scope has broadenedsignicantly and includes multidimensional func-tions:

Create a secure and stable environment whilestrengthening the states ability to provide se-curity, with full respect for the rule of law andhuman rights;

Facilitate the political process by promotingdialogue and reconciliation, and supportingthe establishment of legitimate and effectiveinstitutions of governance;


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Provide a framework ensuring that all UN andother international actors pursue their activi-

ties at the country-level in a coherent and coor-dinated manner.3

While peacekeeping has evolved, it remains dis-tinct and useful as an operational concept along thespectrum of peace and security activities. However,it is not without its conceptual liabilities. Histori-cally and today, peacekeeping operations adhere tothree basic principles: (1) consent of the parties, (2)impartiality, and (3) nonuse of force except in self-defenseand, more recently, defense of the mandate.The rst predicates the mission and its success on theconsent of the main parties to the conict and theircommitment to a political process and support of theUN force. The second argues that retaining consent is

based on implementing the mandate without favor orprejudice to any party. The last principle has evolvedfrom an absolute policy of no use of force except in selfdefense to a more realistic position, which authorizesthe use of force to deter attempts to undermine thepeace process and to protect civilians.

Yet key questions of strategic importance remainin regards to these principles and their application inthe complex real world. What is the role of civilianleadership? What constitutes consent and how doesit manifest itself? Does retreat from consent in actionsor stated policy of one of the major parties end themission? What are the implications of the lack of con-sent of lesser parties to the conict or others who seekadvantages out of the conict for the UN operation?

What does impartiality mean? Does impartiality im-ply neutrality? If not, how can you prove impartiality?What is the role of force and how do you control it?


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Can peace actually be kept without some willingnessto proactively enforce the mandateand is the de-

fense of the mandate sufcient enough to facilitatethe movement toward a sustainable peace? Or stateddifferently, does every peacekeeping mission have aninherent potential to transition to a peace enforcementmission, and if so, should that transition process beconsidered prior to committing to the peacekeepingmission? Last, but not least, when should a peacekeep-ing mission end? This paper seeks to provide insightsin answer to these questions.

Four dimensions serve as a useful framework forunderstanding UN policy in peacekeeping operations:mandates, civil-military integration, ROE, and spoilerpolicy. Not surprisingly, these four components centeron the major issues associated with successful peace-keeping. Even though these four components interact

with each other to determine the outcome of a peace-keeping mission, they have invariably been addressedseparately in previous literature. As a result, mostcritiques focus on one dimension of the peacekeepingmission at a time and fail to fully appreciate the in-congruities and synergies inherent in the interactionamong the four.

The Mandate.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate is per-haps the most important component of a peacekeep-ing mission. It sets the objectives, responsibilities, andspecic tasks for the peacekeepers. It both empowersthe peacekeepers and limits what they can do. The

mandate establishes the legitimacy of the mission inthe eyes of international and local actors. It is a negoti-


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ated document that, by its nature, must be acceptableto the members of the UNSC and the major parties to

the conict. Since such operations deploy in supportof a cease-re or peace agreement, they are obviouslyreective of the nature and content of the agreementby the parties to the conict. Less obvious, but no lessimportant, mandates are also shaped by broader de-bates ongoing in the international environment. Thesemay include social issues such as gender rights or chil-dren and armed conict,4but also may be inuencedby the regional and global ideological and power in-terests of others. Getting an agreement on a mandateis not easy and its implementation is even more dif-cult because everyones circumstances change overtime. Consequently, the interpretation of objectivesand responsibilities and what tasks are appropriate issubject to continuing debate. In implementation, the

legitimacy and credibility afforded the mission by themandate are critical.

In theory, it is quite simple. The mission needs tobe empowered by the international community andaccepted by the conicting parties to be successful.The mandate must emphasize agreement of the par-ties and impartiality of the peacekeepers in order toobtain the consent of the various parties to the conict;and said impartiality, it is assumed, will keep all theparties happy. However, impartiality in the face of thereality confronted once on the ground is much morecomplicated.

It is imperative that the parties to the conict be-lieve that the peacekeepers have the backing of the in-ternational community, and both the capabilities and

will to implement the mandate impartially. In peace-keeping operations, these beliefs allow the ghting tostop, and demobilization to occur. In a situation where


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two or more parties seek to disarm, the questions ofwho will disarm, when, and how, is paramount since

the last to be armed may seek obvious advantagesaclassic security dilemma.5 Without condence in thelegitimacy, credibility, and impartiality of the peace-keepers, the major parties to the conict can seldomaccept the risk of laying down their arms. Of these,impartiality may be the most difcult to sustain.

Although impartiality is a very simple concept, itsapplication is not so simple. There are several schoolsof thought on how one should understand impartial-ity. First, according to one view, as reected in thecurrent UN doctrine, impartiality while difcult isachievable and necessary. It maintains the consentand cooperation of the parties. Any lack of impartial-ity, or even the perception of such, undermines thelegitimacy and credibility of the mission. In this view,

the goal is even-handedness to preclude becomingor being perceived as one of the belligerents. Whilethis latest doctrine argues for impartiality, it is not anargument for neutrality with regards to the mandate.Impartiality suggests unbiased intervention to enforcethe mandate, whereas neutrality would imply nonin-tervention in local affairs regardless of the mandate.Apart from the legitimacy and credibility issues, thisview reects the belief that it is hard for peacekeepersto pick the right sidea priori.6As a result, it advo-cates that peacekeepers place a premium on impartial-ity.

A second school of thought dismisses impartialityas an appropriate principle for peacekeepers, mainlybecause its advocates believe impartiality does little

to resolve a conict.7Political scientist Richard Bettsargues that impartiality, combined with only limitedmilitary actions, is a recipe for disaster. In Betts judg-


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ment, a counterproductive tension exists between im-partiality concerns and active intervention in peace-

keeping. On the one hand, being impartial entailssome limited intervention in cases where a party tothe conict seeks to gain fraudulent advantage. Onthe other hand, if such interventions are unnaturallylimited by impartially concerns, then they would lacksufcient force and credibility to encourage local ac-tors to favor peaceful resolution. Logically, in thesecircumstances, parties to the conict would constantlytest peacekeepers to gain advantages, knowing thatsuch actions will not be signicantly punished. Bettsadvocates allowing peacekeepers to take over every-thing; then, since they control everything, they mightbe able to impartially resolve the conict. However,such an unlimited intervention might be better seen ascloser to peace enforcement than peacekeeping on the

spectrum of peace and security activities.8

Another school of thought considers impartiality

as being subjective. Although the ofcial UN doc-trine fully embraces impartiality, many practitioners,including some Special Representatives of the Secre-tary-General (SRSG), view impartiality more practi-cally. Doctrinally, every SRSG is expected to achieveimpartiality, but, in practice, impartiality is difcultto attain. As one former SRSG lamented, sometimes,impartiality is in the eyes of the beholder: if you dowhat he wants, then you are impartial; if you do not,then you are biased and not to be trusted.9Efforts tobe impartial are open to subjective interpretation andoften intentionally misconstrued by the various par-ties for political purposes. Some measures are openly

challenged to test the SRSG, while others are oftenmanipulated to increase the apparent legitimacy of acertain actors policy by suggesting that the SRSGs re-


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sponse, or failure to respond, is an act of endorsementfor certain actors activities or statements. In such

cases, although the offending actors positions are de-monstrably untrue, it is still difcult for the SRSG toovercome their consequences once they have playedout in the public arena.10

Mandates are political documents that are productsof what the international community, represented bythe UNSC and the parties to the conict, can agree onwith regards to objectives, responsibilities, and specif-ic tasks for the peacekeepers. The mandate establishesthe framework in which the mission can work, but italso creates the parameters in which the parties to theconict and spoilers may maneuver. Peacekeeping asan operational concept is predicated on the principlesof consent of the parties, and impartiality. If consent isnot sufciently sincere by the parties throughout the

operation, peacekeeping is inherently problematic. Ina similar manner, the subjectivity of impartiality andits susceptibility to manipulation challenge its valid-ity as an operational concept. Logically, then, peaceenforcement may appear a better option for interven-tion. Yet, enforcement poses its own problems. It isharder to get political consensus for such interven-tion, and it is more difcult to get troop and resourcecommitments from UN members. In addition, calls forpeace enforcement, except for the most adverse situa-tions, challenge the unity of the UN and the validity ofthe UNSC with uncomfortable questions in regard tosovereignty and legitimacy. As a result, the UN relieson consent and impartiality as principles that allow itto act as guarantor of security as opposed to a peace

enforcer; but the tensions implicit in these principlesmake the selection of mission leadership crucial.


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Civil-Military Integration.

In the post-Cold War environment, peacekeepingis more multidimensional. Peacekeeping operationsconfront numerous problems with roots in socio-economic and cultural issues, as well as political andmilitary ones. Usually these problems occur simulta-neously and are interrelated, hence requiring a mul-tidimensional integrated approach and solution.11Effective leadership is critical in deciding how to ap-proach these complex civil-military operations, andeven more so in conducting an ongoing operation.Yet, civil-military relations are often strained and thesource of discord.

Some of the difculty can be attributed to the scopeof the undertaking and typical issues of interagencycoordination and planning. Organizational, cultural,

and practice differences between the military and oth-er governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs) are well documented.In addition, the international composition of UN op-erations adds a layer of complexity to planning over-all and the specic details of operations. It is fair toconclude that although the SRSG is supposed to be incharge of all UN components, in practice the SRSGsoverarching role is tentative at best in such a complexenvironment. Nonetheless, effective leadership at thetop is the key to successful peace operations.

Most SRSGs lament that, even though on paperthey are head of the mission, they have to spend aninordinate amount of time in overseeing the militarycomponent. The task is complicated by the fact that

the UN does not actually own any military forces and,no matter the issue, military commanders tend to lookto their own governments for political guidance and


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conrmation of UN directives. Sometimes missionsare disrupted by these dual channels of command,

as in the case of a contributing country withdrawingits military forces following a scandalous allegationby a UN Liberian operation commander who neverconsulted the SRSG.12 The symbiotic relationship ofa military unit or member and its/his nation-state isa powerful bond that cannot be easily broken and isalways at play in UN peace operations.

The Use of Force and Rules of Engagement.

Peacekeepers deploy to facilitate the end of a con-ict and to allay its potential resurgence, not to par-ticipate in the ghting. To uphold the mandate, whichusually stipulates impartiality, peacekeepers militaryactions are logically constrained. Peacekeeping dif-

fers from conventional warfare in that in conventionalwar, the aim is to impose your will on the adversary bydefeating his military. In order to do this, the militaryforce is the primary instrument, and it achieves politi-cal objectives by its actual or threatened use of force.If the objectives are important enough, the force usedis limited only by the capabilities at hand. In peace-keeping, the role of UN military forces is to help theparties of a conict reach a negotiated peace. UN mili-tary forces help create the conditions that keep com-bative forces separated, allow the consenting partiesto adhere to the agreed conditions of the mandate, andencourage a consensus for a sustained peace. Peace-keeping missions pose two sizable issues for the useof force. First, most of the military forces the UN relies

on are forces of member countries that are primarilytrained in conventional warfare, and whose militarycultural core is conventional combat. Second, in an


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environment of consent and impartiality, the wronguse of force by peacekeeperstoo little, too much, too

biased, too freely, or simply wronglydestroys thetrust and condence among the belligerents requiredfor success.

The UN principle for the use of force is nonuse offorce except in self-defense and defense of the man-date.13 The crucial questions are: When should forcebe applied, what level of force should be applied, andhow can this level be controlled? Ultimately, answersto these questions lead to ROE that inform militarycommanders and soldiers what they can do.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter denes conditionsunder which the UN can use force to safeguard inter-national peace and security.14The wording of ChapterVII is purposefully broad and general enough to pro-vide exibility in its application so as to be relevant

in unforeseen circumstances and keep implementa-tion decisions within the contemporary political envi-ronment. Consequently, the provisions on the use offorce represent principles that could be agreed on ingeneral, but they are not specic regarding doctrine,tactics, or ROE. Without such specicity, doctrine andtactics are left to the discretion of the eld command-ers, who tend to have greater preparation in conduct-ing conventional warfare. Moreover, in the interna-tional complexity of the designation of commandersand forces in the UN environment, it is possible thatthe commanders may be of a different nationality andcome from differing organizational cultures than theunits subordinate to them. Furthermore, since politi-cal expediency often creates a need to rotate the se-

nior military command positions among contribut-ing states, use of force can also be complicated by thechange of commanders.


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Historical problems with the use of force andthe changing conditions of a post-Cold War interna-

tional order have resulted in recent codifying of UNpeacekeeping doctrine. A capstone doctrine manual,United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles andGuidelines, adds the phrase defense of the mandateto the traditional self-defense-only mentality of UNpeacekeeping. Recognizing the inherent weakness inregards to use of force in traditional peacekeeping, itadvocates robust peacekeeping, which is the sameas traditional peacekeeping, except the proactive useof force is allowed in defense of the mandate.15

Consequently, the use of all necessary means ispermitted at the tactical levelto deter spoilers or de-feat other attempts to undermine the peace process.Such use of force must be authorized by the UNSCand with consent of major parties to the conict, sug-

gesting that some marginal groups rights of consentare ignored. Robust peacekeeping is different frompeace enforcement in that the latter allows force to beused with no consent from any parties to the conict,and may be applied to anyone challenging UN author-ity. Yet a dilemma remains: This capstone documentstresses that peacekeeping by the UN is never intend-ed to be an enforcement mechanism.16Logically, then,the use of force, even under defense of the mandate,must take into consideration even more carefully lo-cal factors and politics. Additionally, the expandedprinciple makes getting the appropriate ROE rightand overcoming the inherent national cultural andorganizational differences among UN forces evenmore important. While self-defense has a more com-

mon military heritage, defense of the mandate invitesmultiple interpretations of ROE and new challenges incommand and resourcing at all levels.


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This interpretation problem reveals itself whenchallenges to the peace operations mandate surface.

The main task of peacekeepers is to provide reassur-ance for the consenting parties to a conict who areconfronted by security dilemmas and uncertainty dur-ing the transition period to a stable peace. An underly-ing assumption of peacekeeping is that the pursuit ofpeace is genuine. When this assumption is challengedby any actor, whether one of the consenting parties ornot, four doctrinal options are available to peacekeep-ers in dealing with the challenge: nonuse of force (mil-itary observers), restricted use of force, necessary useof force, and forceful response. To complicate mattersfurther, two among the four possibilities are, in them-selves, ambiguous: What is considered restricted, andwhen is an action necessary? Vague mandates andpoor or convoluted leadership practices contribute to

the problem because they invite spoiler challenges,increasing the volatility of the peacekeeping environ-ment.

The international debate on protection of civiliansin armed conict also inuences the use of force bypeacekeepers. In the past, in many cases, peacekeeperswere ambivalent regarding their mission when civil-ians were under imminent and actual threat of physi-cal violence. Most peacekeepers prized the principleof impartiality so highor found it so convenient orconfusingthat they refused to get involved in situa-tions where violence appeared like local ghting. In abizarre example from 1994, U.S. Soldiers stood idly bywhile the former members of the Haitian military beatpeople up for cheering at the arrival of U.S. forces.17

In much more grim cases, such as the Ituri Incidence,the UN Organization and Stabilization Mission in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) mission


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in the Congo, and the Rwanda Genocide, peacekeep-ers failed to act to protect civilians when the need was

obvious. Most, if not all, military peacekeepers in theseincidents tell the same story, saying they could not in-tervene unless they were shot at. Today, protection ofcivilians is a specic consideration in the developmentof the mandate.18

The obvious reason UN doctrine does not list typesof ROE for specic conditions is that each peacekeep-ing operations conditions are unique and evolve asthe operation progresses. Hence, it is impossible togeneralize about a unique set of ROE. It is possible tolist ROE in mandates based on a pre-mission assess-ment, but, as conditions change, such mandated ROEmay become hamstringing as opposed to helpful.ROE need to be a living set of rules that are applicableand responsive to the existing circumstances and can

evolve with them. An informed collaboration amongthe senior military commander and the SRSG offersthe best hope, but such a solution depends on clearauthorities, superior leadership on the part of both,and the subordination of personalities and nationalproclivities at all levels.

Spoilers.

Left to themselves, the vagueness in mandates, thestrain of civil-military relations, and the ambiguitiesof ROE in an atmosphere of genuine consent and im-partiality might nevertheless achieve a lasting peacein a reasonable manner. In the Cold War stability, asemi-peace was sometimes imposed by the superpow-

ers, or, as was more often the case, hostilities were sus-pended indenitely under the rubric of UN peace op-erations to sustain global stability. However, such an


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idyllic environment is not possible today. Challengersabound in todays peace operations environments,

and how to deal with these spoilers of the peace pro-cess is a major consideration of policy.

In a classic study of such spoilers, Stephen JohnStedman denes spoilers as leaders and parties whobelieve that peace emerging from negotiations threat-ens their power, worldview, and interests, and useviolence to undermine attempts to achieve it.19Suchpersons or groups may or may not be part of the con-senting parties, and any consent may or may not havebeen genuine at the time the UN mandate was negoti-ated. Spoilers may be motivated by their own internalinterests, but they may also be motivated by exter-nal patrons. He argues that there are different typesof spoilers who can be categorized and understoodbased on whether their objectives are total, limited, or

greedy.20

The differing objectives, he argues, create dif-ferent behaviors and require different solutions. Totalspoilers have non-negotiable goals such as impositionof a radical ideology or radically changing an existingsociety. Such total spoilers cannot be negotiated withand must be excluded from or marginalized withinthe peace process. Limited spoilers have limited goalssuch as the redress of grievances or other measures ofsocial justice. They do not demand the radical changeof society, nor are they driven by a radical ideology.Nevertheless, they may use radical means to achievetheir objectives. Stedman maintains that they can beaccommodated within the peace process if their de-mands, which are acceptable in contrast to those oftotal spoilers, are addressed. Finally, greedy spoilers

lie between these two extremes and their goals canexpand or contract based on their cost-benet calcula-tions. These latter spoilers, Stedman reasons, can be


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forced into the peace process by understanding andmanipulating their calculations.21

Spoilers play important, and often destructive,roles in the peace process. Dealing with spoilers re-quires complex decisionmaking and an understandingof the nature of the groups, their motivation, ideology,objectives, and how and with what resources they arepursuing them. The most useful way of looking atStedmans contribution is to use his typology as ideal-types to help understand and discuss what the roleof spoilers in the peace process is and how to counteror use it in successful peacekeeping. As spoilers posi-tions will vary along the way, they require constantassessment and evaluation that leads to appropriatesolutions for a particular context.

The Complexity of the Peacekeeping Mission in

Cambodia.

The UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia be-tween 1992 and 1993, the UN Transitional Authorityin Cambodia (UNTAC), was an excellent precursor ofthe growing complexity of 21st century peacekeeping.While it has been studied before, there are two mainproblems with the literature and practice in peace-keeping operations that it highlights.

First, at the theoretical level, although peacekeep-ing operations are complex phenomena with manydifferent variables involved, scholars in the past havetended to use mono-causal theories to explain the suc-cess and failure of peacekeeping missions. Works thataddress the complexities of the interaction among the

many variables are quite rare. Moreover, the debatehas turned to what good mandates are, and main-taining peace versus protection of civilians, ratherthan how to accomplish the overarching goal of all


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mandates which is a sustainable peace. Second, at thepractical level, much attention has been paid to the es-

tablishment of good guiding principles and optimalROE for peacekeepers, but much less attention hasbeen given to how political components of the mis-sion should integrate with military components in thecomplex environment of peacekeeping. Integration isad hoc, too often responding to each new problem, asopposed to shaping the situation proactively.

The UNTAC confronted the full complexity ofpeacekeeping as the Cold War mechanisms for sta-bility collapsed, and the UN struggled with the neworder. All the variables and nuances of 21st centurypeacekeeping were present from vague mandates tospoilers and their patrons. Previous studies of theCambodian peacekeeping mission have been toomyopic, and have failed to address important matters

contributing to a valid assessment of whether or notthe UNTAC met its mandates. Many of the works alsodiffer in their conclusions, and there is a need to inte-grate and compare these efforts to gain a more com-prehensive understanding of the UNTAC missionsstrengths and weaknesses. Cambodia was largely asuccessful operation, and, as a case study, continuesto provide important insights as to what constitutesbest practices in peacekeeping missions.

THE CAMBODIAN CIVIL WAR IN OVERVIEW

Background of the Conict.

Cambodia gained independence from France in

1953. As a young king installed as a puppet by theFrench, Prince Norodom Sihanouk sought freedomfrom colonial rule and a constitutional monarchy.


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As a leader in the independence movement, PrinceSihanouk became an enduring and controversial g-

urehead of Cambodian politics. In 1955, he abdicatedhis throne in favor of his father and became Head ofState where he thought the real power lay. On his fa-thers death 5 years later, he reclaimed the throne butkept the title of prince and head of state for which hewas thereafter known. Although much revered by hispeople, Prince Sihanouks role as head of Cambodianpolitics coupled with a policy of international neutral-ity at a time when the Vietnam War escalated workedagainst him. On March 17, 1970, while Prince Siha-nouk was out of the country, Prime Minister Lon Noland a right-wing cabal with American support carriedout a military coup which abolished the monarchyand proclaimed the Khmer Republic (see Figure 2).22

Figure 2. Sequence of Main Events.


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Forced out of Cambodian politics, Prince Sihanouk

sought allies to assist him in a return to power. Hefound his support in China and in an uneasy alliancewith the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian communistparty, which was once his bitter enemy. As a resultof Sihanouks popularity and the constant bombing ofCambodia by the U.S. Air Force, wave after wave ofpeasants joined the Khmer Rouge.23 After 5 years ofghting a losing war, the Khmer Republic fell in 1975.Although the Khmer Rouge beneted immeasurablyfrom Prince Sihanouks popularity, they never trustedhim, and their leader had his own plans for Cambo-dia. The Princes popularity among the people was aconstant threat to these plans. After they took power,the Khmer Rouge conferred upon Prince Sihanouk thenominal title of Chief of State but gave him no real

power and conned the Prince in his palace. As such,he gave the regime legitimacy; however, he did notparticipate in actual governance. Such harsh treat-ment added to the mistrust between the Prince andthe Khmer Rouge leadership.24

The Khmer Rouges real leader, Saloth Sar, alsoknown in the Cambodian communist party as brothernumber one, is internationally recognized by his infa-mous name, Pol Pot.25Consolidating his power withinthe Cambodian Communist Party, he embarked on acampaign to deurbanize Cambodian society immedi-ately after the Khmer Rouge took over Phnom Penh,the capital of Cambodia. Building a cult followingaround himself, killing perhaps as many as two mil-lion people, he ultimately created the conditions that

would topple his short-lived and cruel regime. Withits historical anti-Vietnamese ideology and its use ofthe fear of group extinction, the Khmer Rouge startedthe conict with Vietnam in 1978. Small skirmishes


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and raids were conducted against Vietnamese bordertowns and the Khmer Rouge was never shy about

massacring Vietnamese civilians. Small battles occa-sionally broke out between the Khmer Rouge and theVietnamese Army.26

In 1978, Pol Pot ordered a purge of the CommunistParty members in the Eastern Zone, where anti-Viet-namese campaigns were routinely conducted againstpotential collaborators with the Vietnamese commu-nists. Many commanders in the eastern zone werekilled during the purge and others ed to Vietnam. InDecember 1978, the Vietnamese army, along with ele-ments of the former Eastern Zone commanders whohad ed Pol Pots purge the previous year, respondedto the Khmer Rouge attacks with a large-scale armoredoperation. The operation ousted the Khmer Rougeon January 7, 1979, but Pol Pot and remnants of his

followers survived and escaped. Fighting alongsidethe Vietnamese main units were cadres of the formerEastern Zone commands who had survived the purge.Vietnam then installed a government that mainly con-sisted of these cadres. Along with some former of-cials under Prince Sihanouks regime, they became themain leadership elements of the new Peoples Demo-cratic Republic of Kampuchea (PDRK). Following theJanuary 1979 victory, the United States and its alliesrefused to allow the new Vietnamese-backed govern-ment to be seated in the UN and in a strange, darktwist of fate, the Khmer Rouge retained the seat.27

Equally bizarre, the Vietnamese attempted a com-mando operation to rescue Prince Sihanouk in hopesof lending the new government legitimacy with the

people; however, the attempt failed and the Princewas evacuated to China shortly before Phnom Penhfell. He would later emerge to challenge the PDRK.


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After the defeat in 1979, the Khmer Rouge retreated tothe jungle-clad northern part of the country and con-

tinued to resist the Vietnamese presence. Despite theKhmer Rouges past intrigues and atrocities, PrinceSihanouk persisted in his belief that the Vietnamesepresence was the greater threat to Cambodian inde-pendence. Prince Sihanouk was willing to work withthe Khmer Rouge once again, but this time he had hisown movement and army called the Front Unis Na-tional pour un Cambodge Indpendant, Neutre, Pacifque,Et Coopratif (National United Front for CambodianIndependence, Neutral, Peaceful, and Free [FUNCIN-PEC]). Other small movements also emerged, the mostsignicant of which was the Khmer Peoples NationalLiberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann, a formerprime minister under Prince Sihanouk. The UnitedStates continued to oppose the Vietnamese occupation

and provided aid to those opposing the Vietnamesepresence. The resulting conict is known as the thirdIndochinese Conict.28

From 1979 to 1989, these factions fought each otherto a stalemate. The most powerful army among thebelligerents was that of the Phnom Penh government,which received weapons and training from other so-cialist countries. The PDRK also possessed a large andefcient civilian bureaucracy and struggled to rebuildCambodia in the middle of a war and amidst interna-tional opposition (economic sanctions were imposedby Western countries, supported by the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], as a measure toforce Vietnam to leave Cambodia), but PDRK PrimeMinister Hun Sen realized that the war could not be

ended by military means alone, and believed talkswith Prince Sihanouk would be necessary to nd a sus-tainable peace. As a gesture of renouncing the social-


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ist ideology, the PDRK changed its name to the Stateof Cambodia (SOC) just prior to the start of the peace

negotiations. Hun Sen and his allies organized as theCambodian Peoples Party (CPP). Negotiations beganin 1987, culminating in the Agreements on a Compre-hensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conict,signed in Paris on October 23, 1991. This agreementwas the foundation of the UNTACs mandate forpeacekeeping in Cambodia. As an interim measure, anadvance mission, the UN Advance Mission in Cambo-dia (UNAMIC) was established immediately after thesigning of the Agreements in October 1991.29

The UNTAC Arrives and Departs.

UN Security Council Resolution 745 (1992), creat-ing the UNTAC, was approved on February 28, 1992.

The UNTAC became operational by absorbing thepersonnel and resources of the UNAMIC. In some re-spects, the UNTACs mandate was typical of other UNmandates of the time, and was signed by all partiesto the Cambodian conict before the UNTAC missionbegan. The conicting parties agreed to (1) cease theghting, (2) allow the UNTAC to act as the securityguarantor of all parties, and (3) disarm their soldiersand send them into cantonment areas monitored bythe UNTAC during the transition period. However,in expansive new initiatives, civilian aspects of themandate provided that the UNTAC would also as-sume control of ve ministries: economic and nance,defense, interior and the national police, foreign rela-tions, and information (formerly the ministry of pro-

paganda). These civil provisions were to ensure a neu-tral environment for the election and, in particular, toprevent the SOC from using the state apparatus to


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unduly inuence the election. As a further part of themandate, the UNTAC was tasked to ensure the repa-

triation of refugees and provide humanitarian relief.A Supreme National Council (SNC), which includedmembers from all the conicting parties, was to act asthe repository of Cambodian sovereignty:

. . . the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC)was the unique legitimate body and source of author-ity in which, throughout the transitional period, the

sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodiaare enshrined. SNC, which was made up of the fourCambodian factions, delegated to the United Nationsall powers necessary to ensure the implementationof the Agreements.30

The UNTAC was led by a civilian diplomat, Yasu-shi Akashi, who acted as the Special Representative of

the Secretary General (SRSG). The senior military lead-er and head of the military component was an Austra-lian, Lieutenant General John Sanderson. Dependingon how and when you count, the UNTAC consistedof 15,900 military members, 3,600 civilian police, 2,000UN civilians, 450 other UN volunteers, and numerouslocally hired personnel to serve as staff and interpret-ers. Over 1.5 billion dollars, mostly in salaries, wouldbe spent.31Not surprisingly, where you sit determineshow successful you believe the UNTAC was in meet-ing its goals. It was the largest peacekeeping missionin UN history.

On June 13, 1992, it was decided that 200,000 Cam-bodian soldiers of the different factions would be dis-armed and relocated into 52 cantonment facilities.32By

September 1992, however, the UNTAC had managedto collect only 50,000 weapons, of which about 42,368came from the Phnom Penh government of the SOC.33


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As late as March 1993, only 55,000 troops had enteredthe cantonments, and the SRSG ordered the disar-

mament program suspended since it was failing toachieve its purpose. Most of the troops in cantonmentcame from the SOC and continuation would have dis-advantaged them in the negotiations and in the eld.The limited success left signicant arms and men avail-able to the conicting parties. For example, the KhmerRouge, which consisted of only seven or eight percentof the population, nonetheless had an armed strengthof 10,000-15,000 and controlled 15 percent of the totalarea of Cambodia.34As a result of UNTAC operations,the other factions controlled a less signicant territoryand much less efcient armies, but Prince SihanouksFUNCINPEC could count on a potentially high levelof the populations support because of his popularity.

Most observers, political or academic, consider the

mission very successful. Yet, issues remain. The mis-sion never successfully disarmed the Khmer Rouge,and this led to later political violence. Consentingparties felt unfairly treated. The massive introductionof foreign troops had a disastrous effect on the localculture and introduced social issues of prostitutionand HIV/AIDS. The Cambodian people also despisedmany UNTAC workers who widely patronized pros-titution in a culturally conservative country.35

However, the UNTAC did get something right.One thing that is frequently used by commentatorswho think the UNTAC mission was a success was therepatriation of refugees.36The civil war in Cambodiahad displaced hundreds of thousands, if not mil-lions, of people. Although the number decreased over

time, the UNTAC did bring back many refugees fromcamps along the Cambodian-Thai border and success-fully relocated them. This improved the livelihood


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of these people and ended the predatory practices oflocal warlords who reigned over the refugees camps

during the war.Not surprisingly, another success of the UNTAC

was the election, although it marginalized the KhmerRouge. The Cambodian people had not participated ina true election since the 1970 coup. A signicant suc-cess that the UNTAC can claim is the development of ademocratic and civic culture. The UNTAC maintaineda radio station which informed the people about dem-ocratic issues and about the electoral process.37Evenmore obscure, and often forgotten by many commen-tators, is the fact that many important human rightsNGOs today trace their origins back to the UNTACmission in Cambodia. Its success lends credence to therole of NGOs and civil society more generally in thestill emerging global order.

Over four million Cambodians participated in the1993 elections. Of the 120 seats in the legislature, theFUNCINPEC won 58 seats, the CPP 51, the KPNLF 10,and the Moulinaka party won 1 seat. Because the con-stitution called for a two-thirds majority for a partyto form a government, some scheme of power-sharinghad to be made. Elements within the CPP protested theelection results and threatened to secede unless theirpower-sharing demands were met. However, this mayhave been a political maneuver since most of the CPP,including Prime Minister Hun Sen, did not participatein such actions and instead were predisposed to nego-tiate in order to end the crisis.38The negotiations thatensued, mediated by Prince Sihanouk and Akashi,produced a complex power-sharing system. It created

a constitutional monarchy, and the rst country tohave a dual prime minister system as a result of thecompromise between the CPP and the FUNCINPEC.


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Prince Sihanouk was proclaimed the king, and PrinceRanariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Hun Sen (CPP) served

as rst and second prime minister, respectively. TheUNTACs mandate ended in September 1993 with thepromulgation of the Constitution for the Kingdom ofCambodia and the formation of the new Government.However, the various military forces tended to remainsupportive of the conicting parties as opposed to thenew state.

The Aftermath.

The Khmer Rouge was left outside the nal politi-cal solution and cut off from external aid. This strat-egy was called the Departing Train strategy: theKhmer Rouge was warned by Akashi that if they didnot jump on board, the train would leave without

them, and the Khmer Rouge would be isolated. Fromtheir stronghold in the northwest, the remnants of theKhmer Rouge continued to act as spoilers in the poli-tics of Cambodia until Pol Pots death in 1998. How-ever, immediately after the 1993 election, moderatefactions began to split from Pol Pot and opened secretnegotiations with both sides of the coalition govern-ment. In less than a year after the new governmentwas formed, it was divided once again along factionallines, and the Khmer Rouge became more importantthan ever, seeking advantage by allying themselveswith one or the other of the ruling factions.

Beginning in 1996, the CPP received intelligencereports that Khmer Rouge soldiers were secretly beingtransported from the border area to the capital city,

nding shelters in the barracks controlled by ofcersloyal to the FUNCINPEC. Prince Rannaridh had madeclear in speeches on many occasions that he wished to


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redress the balance of power in the governmentto claim the power he believed the UN-sponsored

elections had given his party, as opposed to the com-promised solution negotiated by Akashi and PrinceSihanouck which favored the CPP because of their en-trenched positions from previous governance of SOC.The Prince was also caught illegally importing arms,mainly consisting of anti-tank weapons, apparently inan attempt to gain parity with the CPP which main-tained armor supremacy in its loyal forces.

Finally, in 1997, major ghting broke out betweena Khmer Rouge/FUNCINPEC coalition and the CPPforces. The event, which lasted for 2 days (July 5-6,1997), has been wrongly labeled a coup dtat bymany journalists since the second Prime Minister,Hun Sen, emerged victorious. However, it was morea struggle caused by the unsettled Khmer Rouge and

unresolved issues left by UNTAC. Both sides (the CPPand the FUNCINPEC-Khmer Rouge) had faced off ina series of small skirmishes days or even weeks beforethe alleged coup. Everyone understood that ghtingwas inevitable between the two major factions mak-ing up the new government. With open ghting, HunSen and the CPP forces quickly defeated Prince Ran-naridhs FUNCINPEC and their Khmer Rouge allies.The swiftness of that victory prevented Cambodiafrom plunging into another prolonged civil war. ThePrince left Phnom Penh for Paris a few days before theevent and remained there until the election in 1998.The CPP won a majority in the 1998 and the subse-quent 2003 and 2008 elections, both of the latter weredeclared free and fair by international observers. At

present, the CPP holds a two-thirds majority, eventhough the constitution was amended so that a newgovernment could be formed by a 51 percent majority.


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After the events of July 1997, Prime Minister HunSen and the CPP decided to reintegrate former Khmer

Rouge members back into Cambodian society andpolitics using what he called a win-win strategythat guaranteed security for low and mid-rank formerKhmer Rouge ghters, guaranteed previous employ-ment, and prohibited the seizure of properties of de-fectors. However, the Cambodian government agreedto a transnational tribunal to try and hold account-able the former highest-ranking leaders of the KhmerRouge for the earlier atrocities under Pol Pot. A viablepeace was achieved in 1998, after a bloody ght andan averted prolonged civil war5 years after the UN-TAC left.

Today, in accordance with the 1993 Constitution,Cambodia is a constitutional democracy with a rep-resentative parliament, a prime minister who is head

of government, and a king who is head of state. Theprime minister is appointed by the king on the adviceand with the approval of the national assembly. In Oc-tober 2004, a special nine-member panel selected KingNorodom Sihamoni to serve after a surprise abdica-tion by Norodom Sihanouk. Hun Sen, as prime minis-ter, and Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the then Nation-al Assembly speaker, both endorsed the selection asmembers of the panel. Cambodia still suffers from theeffects of the long conict, but with aid provided byits allies and the industry of its own people, a brighterfuture is sure to continue.

ANALYSIS: BETWEEN POLITICS ANDPROCEDURES

The Cambodian case study offers important in-sights in regard to the theory, doctrine, and practiceof peacekeeping. It points a nger at the crux of the


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peacekeeping challengending the balance in poli-tics and procedures that gets at underlying causes

of conict and turns an agreed upon lull in ghtingamong the conicting parties into a lasting peace. Inexamining it objectively as one of only a few suc-cessful operations, new lessons are discerned andperhaps contribute to better ways of conducting theseimportant operations.

The Importance of Context.

UN peacekeeping missions always have exter-nal and internal political components. The situationin Cambodia at the time of the UN intervention wascomplicated and had been so for years. The conict-ing parties agreed to a UN peacekeeping mission be-cause they recognized that they could not resolve the

political paradox Cambodia found itself in, and noone was happy with the status quo. U.S., Vietnamese,and Chinese interventions had all played a contribut-ing role in Cambodias turmoil, but the paradox waspurely Cambodian. Negotiations were necessary be-cause no party by itself could successfully govern inCambodia. The Khmer Rouge possessed sufcient ter-ritory and military power to challenge the peace andstability the SOC-controlled government sought, butnot enough to overthrow the government. The SOCwas governing effectively in the majority of Cambo-dia, but the presence of the Khmer Rouge still poseda severe threat to peace. Prince Sihanouk, more thananyone else, was symbolic of Cambodian sovereigntyand enjoyed a legitimacy bestowed by the population,

but lacked both sufcient military power and govern-ing infrastructure. Had any one party had sufcientmilitary power, governing competence, and legitima-


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cy, the conict would have been settled with no UNpeacekeeping mission necessary.

As a result of their history, deep mistrust existed be-tween the Khmer Rouge and the SOC on the one hand,and between the Khmer Rouge and the FUNCINPEC(Prince Sihanouks movement) on the other hand.Given this history, it is difcult to imagine how trust-building measures could dispel such mistrust. Afterall, many SOC high-ranking ofcials, including PrimeMinister Hun Sen and the then President of the StateCouncil, Heng Samrin, barely escaped the EasternZone massacres ordered by Pol Pot. Nor could theKhmer Rouge, with their ideology rooted in anti-Vietnam propaganda, easily ignore the Vietnamesesupport of the SOC. Prince Sihanouk was imprisonedin his own palace in Phnom Penh between 1975 and1979. It should be no surprise that he created his own

movement and was determined not to be fooled bythe Khmer Rouge the second time around. In comingto the peace table, the SOC and the FUNCINPEC (butalso the KPLNF) had decided that political settlementwas preferable to ghting, while the Khmer Rougejumped on board, albeit reluctantly, hoping to takepart in any sharing of power. Given all this, it wassimply inconceivable that the Khmer Rouge would beaccepted by the other two main parties.

Other states interests were also at play. Externally,the mandate and stafng of the UNTAC were a politi-cal process that played out within the UN forums, butwere guided by the national interests of the participat-ing decisionmakers states. The intertwined historiesof the United States, Vietnam, and China complicat-

ed the situation. The United States and China wereconcerned about Vietnamese inuence in any futureCambodian government, and the United States ulti-


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mately adamantly opposed Pol Pots participation.39These external interests are evident in the UN debates,

the structure of the mandate, and the makeup of thesupporting military forces. Consequently, the appealof subordinate military leaders back to their respec-tive national authorities and the continued U.S. op-position to any Vietnamese involvement could havebeen anticipated. Since they were political in natureand foreseeable, it suggests that UN authorities couldhave addressed them better in advance and enhancedpolitical authority and support for the mission. Oncethe peacekeeping charter was agreed upon among theconicting parties and within the UN Security Coun-cil, national interests of the participating states in theoperation came into play. With the arrival of the UN-TAC in Cambodia, it became an integral part of theplay of local politics. In this latter regard, the SRSG

must synchronize the mandate with local context inorder to achieve success.It is local context that largelydetermines the national players and the choices avail-able to them. For example, the SRSG must considerthe roles and objectives of spoilers based on this con-text instead of theoretical denitions.

It was in this complicated strategic context thatthe Paris Peace Agreement was reached and the char-ter written. In hindsight, some of the difculties andfailures of the operation, as identied herein, couldhave been foreseen with a more careful considerationof the external and internal context. In this regard, alesson of the Cambodian case study is: Formulationof a peacekeeping mandate must be founded with anin depth comprehension of external and internal po-

litical conditions. Of the two, local political conditionsmore directly affect mission success and the mandatemust accommodate all the conicting parties without


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allowing any one party, or internal or external actor,to dictate what constitutes mission success or to con-

strain the mandate in such a manner that it cannotadapt to changing conditions.

The Role of Leadership.

The UN peacekeeping force was invited intoCambodian to help Cambodians resolve their long-standing internal power struggles. While a return toghting always loomed as an option, the underly-ing causes of the conict were politicalhow politi-cal power was to be shared when differing factionspossessed dominant military power, control of thebureaucracy of government, and legitimacy amongthe population, and when each lacked some degree oflegitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

The agreement to accept and implement a UN peace-keeping mission and pursue negotiations conrms theprimacy of the political component in this UN opera-tion. The immediate issues of governance in Cambo-dia confronting the peacekeepers also suggest that thepeacekeeping mission should be viewed primarily asa political mission rather than a military one. Hence,in peacekeeping, the military is essential, but its pur-pose is to facilitate a political activity and resolution.Thepoliticsof peacekeeping is the key to a successfuloutcome. Consequently, the SRSG is the best-placedinternational representative who can address the im-mediate causes of conict and facilitate resolution ofthe underlying causes. Cambodias experience illus-trates the issues that stem from the inadequate atten-

tion that has been paid to the role of this importantactor.

As the Senior Representative of the Secretary Gen-eral, the SRSG is formally in charge of the entire peace-


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keeping mission. However, UN doctrine and policy inregard to the SRSGs roles and authority is ambigu-

ous, and, in light of UN politics, perhaps purposelyso. The practical consequences of this lack of clarity isthat SRSGs are often not condent about their role andauthority, and subordinates often challenge, ignore,or work around the SRSGs directives and guidance.As a result, an SRSG spends an inordinate amount oftime trying to gain and maintain control over his vari-ous sub-components. Without a clear declaration of,and support for, SRSG authority, most subordinatecomponents at times view the SRSGs authority asproforma. Akashi may not have been the best SRSG everand made his errors in Cambodia, but he did act as thesenior in-country authority and grasped the primacyof a political solution.

Just how you get to a solution is the primary prob-

lem to be solved by the SRSG. Akashi expressed thecomplexity and difculty of the SRSG leadership taskin an article written in 1994:

Based on my 560 days in Cambodia, I can say em-phatically that, with the right combination of external(global and regional) and internal forces and the in-stitutional mechanisms to harmonize and focus neces-

sary support for the attainment of common objectives,even the most intractable situation can in due coursebe resolved. However, there is no magic formula forachieving this other than persistence, determination,exibility, collective consultation and action, profes-sional dedication and the time-honored commonsense on the part of all concerned.40

How well did Akashi do? As the SRSG, as arguedabove, he was responsible for everything the UNTACdid in Cambodia. While much of the following is de-veloped in greater detail elsewhere to illustrate criti-


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cal points of analysis, as a summary, his achievementswere a mixed bag. The UNTAC enjoyed a number of

successes in solving immediate problems such as hu-manitarian aid and refugee repatriation. It ultimatelyfostered a democratic culture in Cambodia, althoughelections were only conducted through the margin-alization of the Khmer Rouge, one of the consentingparties to UN intervention. However, on other issues,such as the disarmament of armed factions to ensurea safe political environment before the elections, theUNTAC failed. In addition, the UNTAC introducednew issues. The UNTACs presence, for all its good,competed unfairly for workers and created a degreeof ination. The UNTAC staff members who patron-ized prostitution and other questionable businessesconveyed the image of a culturally-corrupted foreignorganization. Ironically, this image coincided with the

Khmer Rouge propaganda of a biased and corruptWestern intervention. As prostitution and relatedcrimes ourished, the UNTACs senior leadershipseemed unwilling to address the problem. Althoughmost Cambodians resented such moral laxity, luckilyfor the UNTAC, Cambodian culture has no proclivityfor enforcing cultural morals with force. However, thelesson is clear: UN peacekeeping forces should adhereto standards of conduct that reinforce their validity asopposed to detracting from it.

Given the underlying causes of the conict, Akashican be credited for contributing to success, even if notdirectly, especially given the fact that he was willingto place more emphasis on solving the problem thanon some abstract notion of impartiality in the face of

political realities. As will be explained later, he did nothesitate to marginalize the Khmer Rouge (a signatoryof the Paris Peace Accord) in favor of other parties who


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seemed to want to move ahead. On the one hand, theresolution to the conict may have been prolonged by

his expediency in this matter. Nonetheless, ultimatelythe UN intervention and Akashi's leadership resultedin a government that was legitimate, effective, andacceptable to both the Cambodian people and the in-ternational community, likely resulting in less loss oflife than would have been possible otherwise.41On theother hand, as this case study analysis reveals, muchmore could have been done to facilitate an earlier con-ict resolution.

The case study also reveals the importance of thequality and roles of the leadership within the con-icting parties. Pol Pot as a leader was not equal tothe task of providing good governance to Cambodiawhen in power (a gross understatement of his geno-cidal regime, but nonetheless true), nor able to nd an

effective role in power sharing. All of the other leaderswere able to participate in negotiations and reconciletheir political differences. In the end, they rose to thenational challenge and found political solutions for ef-fective governance.

In regard to peacekeeping operations leadership,the Cambodian case study reinforces the doctrinalprecept that peacekeeping seeks a political solution.As the on ground political representative of the UN,the SRSG is the senior ofcial with directive author-ity over all mission organizations and personnel. TheSRSG must be empowered to construe the articles ofthe UN mandate with the evolving local context aslong as it is within the parameters of the mandatespurpose and meaning.


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A Spoiler Perspective.

The UNTACs policy for containing spoilers isprobably the policy that is most under researched,misunderstood, and controversial. Yet the UNTACowed much of its success to how it addressed spoilerissues. There were many spoilers in the Cambodianpeace process; in fact, depending on the precisenessof your denition, virtually all of the conict partieswere spoilers at some point. If we accept Stedmanscore denition, namely that the spoiler is an actorwhose goal is to undermine the peace process, then allthree main parties (the Khmer Rouge, the FUNCIN-PEC, and the SOC) can be classied as such, depend-ing on the period one is talking about. In contrast tothe conventional perspective, this case study suggeststhat peacekeepers might better operate from the per-

spective that spoilers are a matter of degree, and theirgoals change over time. From this perspective, theFUNCINPECs and the SOCs actions seemed morelike political maneuvers than actions designed to un-dermine the peace process. The Khmer Rouge, on theother hand, pursued a spoiler role when it becameclear no one truly wanted to get involved with the for-mer genocidal regime.

The Khmer Rouge.

The Khmer Rouge was ideally suited to play therole of a spoiler. It was the main ghting force in theinsurgency against the SOC. Ideologically motivated,the Khmer Rouge fought to drive out Vietnamese in-

uence. In contrast, many of the other guerilla forcessuccumbed to personal greed, and their activities be-came more about lucrative smuggling operations than


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ghting. Nonetheless, however strong they were, theKhmer Rouge had no basis whatsoever to claim politi-

cal legitimacy in a nal settlement of the conict dueto their past atrocities. However, as part of PrinceSihanouk's umbrella movement they garnered someinternational recognition and support for their opera-tions because of the Princes legitimacy and the U.S.refusal to recognize the SOC.

Stedman classies the Khmer Rouge as a spoilerwith total goals, meaning that they cannot be incorpo-rated into the peace process, and must, consequently,be marginalized. However, the evidence better sug-gests that the Khmer Rouge was initially more thanambivalent about the political process, and it is moreprobable that they did seek a chance to get involved inthe elections. One has to bear in mind that the KhmerRouge was a signatory of the Paris Peace Agreement

(albeit, with Chinese support), while a total spoilerwould more likely have just stayed out.

More signicant of the intention of the KhmerRouge to get involved in the political process werethe attempts of their representatives, Khieu Samphanand Son Sen, to integrate the Khmer Rouge ofcial of-ce in Phnom Pen. However, on November 27, 1991,the two men were attacked in their villa by hundreds,or even thousands, of people seeking retribution forthe genocide committed under the Khmer Rouge re-gime. The mob cornered and briey assaulted themin a room before the police (from the SOC) intervenedand evacuated them to safety in an armored car. Manycritical commentators suspect the SOC was behind theevent, although it could not have been hard to nd

a genuinely angry mob to attack representatives of aregime that had committed unbelievable atrocities forover 3 years. At the time, neither Prince Sihanouk norAkashi issued any condemnation, or even heavy criti-


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cism, of the event. Given their past relationship withthe Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk and the SOC both

had reasons to see the Khmer Rouge intimidated outof participating in the election. Akashis response wasanother matter.42

Moreover, before the attack, Pol Pot, the real lead-er of the Khmer Rouge, designed a plan called 1000Villages, providing for the Khmer Rouge to consoli-date control over a sizable portion of the populationin order to gain leverage in the post-election powersharing.43 Such evidence strongly indicates an inten-tion to participate in the election process. However,anyone in the Khmer Rouge would have interpretedthe attack as a strong message from the other partiesdirected at excluding the Khmer Rouge from the elec-tions. Reports also abound, especially from the U.S.Department of State, that some foreign governments

(including the U.S. Government) explicitly opposedincluding the Khmer Rouge in the election processwithout some form of trial for the atrocities.44 TheKhmer Rouge apparently calculated that participatingin the election would be impractical or unfruitful andconcluded it would be better to wait until one of theother two main parties needed their support. In thecomplex local politics of Cambodia, the Khmer Rougewas soon proven right.

For its part, the UNTAC did little to bring theKhmer Rouge on board, although, in terms of fairnessto all signatories, it (the UNTAC) might have chosento do so. Impartiality, it seems, can be violated bywhat you choose not to do, as well as what you chooseto do. The insight here is instructive: the Khmer Rouge

was not a total spoiler, as Stedman concludes, and wasno longer united by Pol Pots ideology. Many in theKhmer Rouge apparently had long since relinquishedtheir ideology, and in the peace process were ask-


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ing for some share of power in the new government,understandable given their military power. A better

paradigm for understanding the Khmer Rouge mighthave been as a greedy or even limited-goals spoiler.However, this was not how it was viewed. Whetherthe past history, some kind of underlying path-depen-dency, the immediate political context, or poor judg-ment are the culprits, the UNTAC, the internationalcommunity, and the other parties to the conict foundit impossible to include the Khmer Rouge. 45 Sted-mans framework, while useful for understanding thespoiler phenomena, fails to develop the full contextand potential in regard to Khmer Rouge at this criticaltime and in over-stereotyping any party to the con-ict, decisionmakers can severely constrain the poten-tial options available for dealing with spoilers. Shortlythereafter, the Khmer Rouge was overtaken by the

ow of events and became a spoiler that behaved asone with total goals.46

In Cambodia, the marginalization policy pursuedby Akashi created a problem because it paradoxicallymade the Khmer Rouge more important: Their mili-tary could signicantly endanger the balance of pow-er of the new coalition government by simply allyingwith any faction. Instead of resolving the problem, theDeparting Train policy simply defers it to a later datewhen peacekeepers are no longer there to keep thepeace.47

Prince Sihanouk and the SOC.

An examination of these actors raises further ques-

tions in the conceptual construct for understandingspoilers because their actions contradict simpliedclassication. Classications matter because suchdenitions often determine the policies that will be


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pursued by the presumably unbiased peacekeepers.Spoiler behavior and practical political maneuver are dis-

tinct, even though political maneuver is inherent to spoilerbehavior. Motivation matters in assessing behavior andpolitical maneuver must be treated differently from spoil-ing behavior by the peacekeeper or opportunities will bemissed and unnecessary complications created.In the caseof these two actors, the maneuvers were not aimedat undermining the peace process; in fact, their goalswould be served if, and only if, the peace process con-tinued.48Yet, to ensure inuence in the political pro-cess, their demands needed to be accompanied by acredible threat that would potentially undermine thepeace process. In essence, something that would putthem in the spoiler category if the conventional deni-tions were applied.

Prince Sihanouk often announced that he would

vacate his seat in the SNC for health reasons, only tocome back and say that he would hold on to his seat.49This political maneuver inevitably happened whenev-er there was a seemingly irreconcilable disagreementwith another party, especially with the Khmer Rouge,or foreign governments. Legitimacy was what thePrince brought to the SNC, and without the Princespresence the political process would grind to a halt.Yes, he could act as a spoiler if he chose, but, in fact,his maneuvers facilitated progress. The Prince hadneither the intention of, nor was the FUNCINPECsinterests served in, undermining the peace process, aswas made clear

A Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The "Politics" of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992-1993)

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