› competition › publications › cpn › cpn19982.pdf · dg04/ competition policy NEWSLETTERAssociated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe will proceed at its own rate, depending

ContentsArticles1 Competition Policy in relation to the

Central and Eastern European Countries –Achievements and Challenges, by KarelVAN MIERT

10 The Economics of Verticals, by LucasPEEPERKORN

Documents18 Broadcasting of sports events and

Competition law

Opinion and Comments29 La politique de concurrence, une politique

en faveur de l’emploi, par Eric CUZIAT35 Commission practice concerning excessive

pricing in Telecommunications, by MarcelHAAG and Robert KLOTZ

38 Commentaire sur le jugement « Kali &Salz », par Francisco GONZÁLEZ

42 Comment on the « Sytraval » judgment, byAnsgar HELD

Anti-trust Rules45 Recent developments47 Recent important decisions59 Judgments59 Press releases

Mergers61 Recent developments, by Gudrun

SCHMIDT65 Recent important decisions, by Geraldine

Emberger and John Kemp72 Judgments72 Press releases

Liberalisation & state intervention76 Développements les plus récents, par

Angela BARDENHEWER 78 Press releases

State Aid79 Recent developments, by Adinda

SINNAEVE82 Recent important decisions, by Madeleine

TILMANS89 Judgments90 Press Releases

International92 Conférence sur le droit et la politique de

concurrence à Tunis les 1 et 2 avril 1998,by Jean-François PONS

Information Section93 DG IV Staff list95 Documentation

109 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

EC COMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

Competition Policy in relationto the Central and EasternEuropean Countries –Achievements and Challenges

by Karel Van Miert, Commissionerfor Competition

1. Introduction

At the European Council meeting inLuxembourg of 12 and 13 December1997 an historic decision was taken tolaunch the overall process ofenlargement of the European Union toinclude the ten Central and EastEuropean applicant States andCyprus. The enlargement process isseen as being comprehensive,inclusive and ongoing. Each of the tenAssociated Countries of Central andEastern Europe will proceed at itsown rate, depending on its degree ofpreparedness.

At the European Council inCopenhagen in June 1993 it wasdecided that accession would takeplace as soon as a country is able toassume the obligations of membershipby satisfying the economic andpolitical conditions. Membershiprequires that the candidate countryachieve stability of institutionsguaranteeing democracy, the rule oflaw, human rights and respect for andprotection of minorities. Theexistence of a functioning marketeconomy, as well as the capacity to

cope with competitive pressure andmarket forces within the Union; andthe ability to take on the obligationsof membership, including adherenceto the aims of political, economic andmonetary union, constitute furtherrequirements for membership.

Furthermore, the European Council inMadrid in December 1995 referred tothe need, in the context of the pre-accession strategy, to create theconditions for the gradual,harmonious integration of theapplicant countries through thedevelopment of the market economy,the adjustment of administrativestructures and the creation of a stableeconomic and monetary environment.

The effective application andenforcement of EC CompetitionPolicy within the enlargement processis crucial to the success of theEuropean integration model. Thecompletion of the Single Marketprogramme cannot be dissociatedfrom developments in the competitionfield. Without “the institution of asystem ensuring that competition inthe common market is not distorted”(Article 3g EC Treaty), the internalmarket would not be workable.Indeed, EC Competition Policy is oneof the pillars of the economicconstitution established by the ECTreaty, and is a fundamental part ofthe acquis communautaire.

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c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTER1998number 2June

Published three times a year by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

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2 Competition Policy Newsletter 1998 Number 2 June

The Europe Agreementstherefore stipulate that a majorprecondition for the AssociatedCountries’ economic integrationinto the Community is theapproximation of thosecountries’ existing and futurelegislation to that of theCommunity. Also, theCommission’s White Paper onthe preparation of the AssociatedCountries of Central andEastern Europe for integrationinto the internal market of theUnion noted that the introductionof competition policy in thesecountries and the effectiveenforcement thereof, must beconsidered as a precondition forthe opening of the wider internalmarket, and ultimately ofaccession to the Union.Moreover, effective enforcementrequires that the judicial system,the public administration and therelevant economic operatorshave a sufficient understandingof competition law and policy.

Most of the Central and EasternEuropean Countries (CEECs)have taken decisive steps inrelation to or have started theprocess of approximation oflegislation, institution buildingand enforcement on the basis ofthe obligations that are containedin the Europe Agreement.

The ongoing efforts toincorporate EC law (the “acquiscommunautaire”) into the legalorders of the CEECs, in the formof national competition laws,and to ensure that these laws areactually applied, is of paramountimportance. This will facilitatethe harmonious operation of

Community policies afteraccession.

Once the applicant Statesbecome Members of theEuropean Union, the competitionrules of the EC Treaty and thesecondary legislation (forexample block exemptionregulations), will becomedirectly applicable in the newmember countries. Theapproximation of legislation inthe pre-accession phase,therefore, gradually acquaintsthe CEECs with a Communitysystem which ensures thatcompetition in the commonmarket is not distorted.

Moreover, the current exercise ofapproximation of the nationallaws of the CEECs to EC law,contributes to the creation of aEuropean-wide network ofcompetition authorities, whichapply the same basic principlesof competition law. This shouldallow the effective decentralisedapplication of competition law inthe future enlarged Community.

2. The introduction of acompetition regime in theCEECs

Anti-trust policy has long beenacknowledged to be an effectivetool for regulating monopolypower, and for ensuring thatmarkets function properly. Thatthere are certain hard-core anti-competitive practices which theEuropean Commission and othercompetition enforcement agen-cies should seek to halt, isinternationally accepted. This is

evidenced by work in progresswithin the WTO and OECD1.

The introduction of acompetition policy is one of themajor challenges which theCEECs face in their transition tofully-fledged market economies.Other legal and institutionalmeasures are equally important.They include the restoration ofprivate ownership and propertyrights, the introduction ofcompany law and rules onbankruptcy and liquidation ofcompanies, and the adjustmentof the judicial system and publicadministration.

Transition entails certain needs.Restructuring is taking place inthe CEECs, to redress theimbalance between industry,services and agriculture. Theconcentration on basic outputs,rather than high-tech processesand on product differentiation, isan inheritance of centralplanning to be overcome. Theexistence of large “combinates”,whose size was not determinedby what the market will bear, is acommon feature of centrallyplanned economies.

This raises the question whatspecific role competition policyhas to play in this process of

1 The framework of the WTO Working

Group on trade and competition iscurrently being used to study issuesrelating to the interaction between tradeand competition, including anti-competitive practices. The OECDCommittee on Competition Law andPolicy agreed on the Draft OECDRecommendation on hard-core cartelsduring its meeting in Paris of20.02.1998.

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Competition Policy Newsletter 1998 Number 2 June 3

transition from centrally plannedeconomies to market economies.

Experience shows that while it istrue that liberalisation of prices,trade and foreign directinvestment are essential to createworkable markets andcompetition among firms, theyare not sufficient to ensureeffective competition. Tradeliberalisation has proved to beand, in certain cases, still is adifficult objective to beachieved. Moreover, foreignfirms have focused theirinvestments in the CEECs onfew firms in certain sectors withconsiderable market power andgovernments have been willingto grant these foreign investorsprotection from competition.Furthermore, many markets arestill local (such as distributionand retailing) and nationalmarkets are often segmentedfrom world markets due tonatural, economic or regulatorybarriers to entry.

Other deficiencies may furtherinhibit the development ofcompetition in the CEECs. Forexample, new firms may havelimited access to the necessarycredit facilities or to scarceresources, such as land anddistribution networks, whichoften continue to be allocated ina distorted manner, so as tofavour existing firms. It is clearthat competition rules andenforcement are necessary incountering such barriers to entry.

The development of competitionmay also be hampered by allkinds of direct or indirect

benefits or favours whichexisting monopolists receivefrom the State, such as grants,soft loans, state guarantees, taxreliefs, debt write-offs, the saleof public land below marketprice or preferential tariffs.

Another area of concern isprivatisation. Privatisationagencies, supported by thegovernment, the managementand the workforce, may wish tosell off public monopolies as awhole to maintain their dominantpositions after privatisation, inorder to increase revenues. Thisobviously conflicts with theinterest that consumers and newcompetitors may have in thebreaking-up of monopolist firmsto foster competition. Where thecompetition authority does nothave the power to blockprivatisations which wouldmerely result in the transfer of apublic monopoly to the privatesector, it should have sufficientpowers to ensure that themonopolist firm does not abuseits dominance to earn monopolyprofits.

There are further arguments forasserting that competition policyis crucial in the CEECs. Cartelsin the CEECs may be moredamaging, given the absence of acompetitive fringe to affect itsdecisions at the margin. Marketforeclosure may be morepronounced in transitioneconomies, given the smallnumber of firms on the market.The lack of vigorous competitionand fragile macro-economicconditions in some CEECs maybe further affected by unfettered

monopoly power in the privatesector, lack of control of stateaid, and discriminatory treatmentby state monopolies of acommercial character.

The experience of theCommission’s last 40 years’ ofenforcement of competitionpolicy provides a useful modelfor competition policy in theCEECs. However, it is equallyimportant to take intoconsideration the changingnature of market structures in theCEECs, as transition takes place.For example, the logic ofcompetition policy in relation tohigh-tech industries and highlyevolved distribution structures,clearly calls for a differentanalysis to that applicable toCEECs, which generally lackhigh-tech industries, or whichhave an under-developeddistribution network. We shouldtherefore take a pragmaticapproach to approximation,ensuring that competition policyin the CEECs is fully compatiblewith that in the EuropeanCommunity, and at the sametime taking into account theneeds of transition economies.

We believe that the currentinstitutional, substantive andprocedural framework governingrelationships between the ECand the CEECs is suited toachieving these goals.

3. The Legal Framework

The introduction of marketeconomies in Central andEastern Europe has led the

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Community to review its tradingrelations with the CEECs, and toconclude free trade agreementswith them. The principalinstrument is the EuropeAgreement, which provides anew framework for trade andrelated matters between theEuropean Communities and theirMember States, on the one hand,and each CEEC, on the otherhand, on a bilateral basis. EuropeAgreements with nine of the tenCEECs (Bulgaria, CzechRepublic, Estonia, Hungary,Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,Romania, Slovak Republic) arein force. The Interim Agreementwith Slovenia is in force, and theEurope Agreement withSlovenia is currently passingthrough the Communitylegislative process.

Restrictive Agreements, Abusesof a Dominant Position, andState Aids

The Europe Agreements containthe main substantive competitionrules which apply where tradebetween the EC and a CEEC isaffected. The competition rulesfound in the Interim Agreementwith Slovenia are the same insubstance as those found in theEurope Agreements.Consequently, the following aredeemed to be incompatible withthe proper functioning of theAgreement, in so far as they mayaffect trade between theCommunity and a CEEC:

(i) all agreements betweenundertakings, decisions byassociations of undertakings andconcerted practices between

undertakings which have as theirobject or effect the prevention,restriction or distortion ofcompetition;

(ii) an abuse by one or moreundertakings of a dominantposition in the territories of theCommunity of or a CEEC as awhole or in a substantial partthereof;

(iii) any public aid which distortsor threatens to distortcompetition by favouring certainundertakings or the productionof certain goods.

The Europe Agreement makes itclear that these rules, and theprohibited conduct, are to beinterpreted in accordance withthe criteria arising from theapplication of Articles 85, 86and 92 of the EC Treaty.Furthermore, the decisionpractice of the Commission andthe case-law of the Court ofJustice will be relevant. Theprinciples contained in the blockexemption regulations in force inthe EC, and a de minimusprinciple below which theagreement will not fall foul ofthe competition rules relating torestrictive agreements, alsoapply.

A number of specific rules applyto the general rules set outabove. One specific ruleconcerns the regime for regionalaid. The Europe Agreementsstate that, during the first fiveyears after the entry into force ofthe Europe Agreement, anypublic aid granted by a CEECshall be assessed taking into

account the fact that that CEECshall be regarded as an areaidentical to those areas of theCommunity described in Article92(3)(a) EC Treaty (i.e. areaswhere the standard of living isabnormally low or where there isserious under-employment). Inpractical terms, any aid which isaimed at the economicdevelopment of a CEEC is notprohibited by the EuropeAgreement if it is granted inconformity with the Communityrules on regional aid underArticle 92(3)(a) EC Treaty.

The five year period for thisexceptional state aid regime hasexpired for certain CEECs.These CEECs have requestedthat the Association Councildecides on the extension of thisregime by a further period offive years.

Another special regime appliesto restructuring aid as regardsECSC steel products. Accordingto Protocol 2 to the EuropeAgreements, during the first fiveyears after the entry into force ofthe Agreement, and byderogation to the existing ECrules on state aid to the steelsector, the CEECs mayexceptionally grant public aid forrestructuring purposes undercertain conditions. There shouldfirst be a restructuringprogramme linked to a globalrationalisation and reduction ofcapacity. This programmeshould lead to the viability of thebenefiting firms under normalmarket conditions at the end ofthe restructuring period. Finally,the amount and intensity of such

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aid must be strictly limited towhat is absolutely necessary inorder to restore such viabilityand must progressively bereduced.

This five year period for coaland steel products has alsoexpired for certain CEECs,which have requested that thisperiod be extended by a furtherfive years. The AssociationCouncil has to decide on such anextension. The establishment ofa restructuring plan for the steelindustries of these individualCEECs, including details on theadjustment of capacities tomarket demand, the privatisationframework and aid matters, areessential in this context.

The Implementing Rules

According to the EuropeAgreements, the AssociationCouncil had to adopt thenecessary rules for theimplementation of thecompetition rules outlined abovewithin three years of the entryinto force of the Agreements.

The Association Council hasalready adopted rules for theapplication of the competitionrules applicable to undertakings(i.e. restrictive agreements andabuses of a dominant position)for Bulgaria, the CzechRepublic, Hungary, Poland andthe Slovak Republic. Identicalrules in relation to the otherCEECs are currently passingthrough the legislative process.

According to these ImplementingRules, cases are dealt with by the

European Commission on theEC side, and by the nationalcompetition authorities of eachCEEC on the side of eachCEEC. The competences of theEuropean Commission and thecompetition authorities of eachCEEC to deal with these casesare based on the existing rules ofthe respective legislation of theEC and each CEEC. Bothauthorities settle the cases inaccordance with their ownsubstantive rules.

The Implementing Rules forundertakings also containprocedures for co-operationbetween the Commission and thecompetition authorities of eachCEEC, procedures fornotification of cases to the otherParty, the exchange ofinformation, and consultation.

Also in the field of state aid,draft Implementing Rules havebeen prepared and agreed uponin principle between theEuropean Commission and theauthorities of the CEECs. Theprocess for the final adoption ofthe Implementing Rules by theAssociation Council isunderway.

The draft Implementing rulesfollow a two pillar system ofstate aid control. On the EC side,the Commission controls thecompatibility of state aid grantedby the EU Member States, withthe Europe Agreement, on thebasis of the existing EC rules onstate aid. On the side of eachCEEC, the national monitoringauthority is to monitor andreview existing and new public

aid granted by the same CEEC,on the basis of the samesubstantive rules. The draftImplementing Rules for state aidprovide for procedures forconsultation and problemsolving, rules on transparency(i.e. each CEEC is to draw upand thereafter update aninventory of its aid programmesand individual aid awards,established on the same basis asin the Community) and rules onmutual exchange of information.

The Community or a CEEC maytake appropriate measures afterconsultation within theAssociation Council, whereeither of them considers that aparticular practice isincompatible with thecompetition rules of the EuropeAgreement, and is notadequately dealt with under theimplementing rules, or in theabsence of such rules, and ifsuch practice causes or threatensto cause serious prejudice to theinterest of the other Party ormaterial injury to its domesticindustry. In the field of state aid,such measures must be adoptedin accordance with theprocedures and under theconditions laid down by theGATT.

The relevant provisions of theEurope Agreements and theImplementing rules are intendedto ensure that, already in the pre-accession phase, state aid controlis effective, whilst taking intoaccount the specific needs oftransition economies. TheImplementing Rules for state aidprovide for the Commission and

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the state aid monitoring authorityof each CEEC to work out, inaddition to the types of aidallowed in the Community, aSpecial Guidance on thecompatibility of aid designed tocombat the specific problems ofeach CEEC as it completestransition to a market economy.

However, the Special Guidanceshould not serve as a generalescape clause as regards thegranting of state aid to ailingindustries. The Special Guidanceshould only address problemsinherited from the past business-economic irrationalities imposedby the centrally plannedeconomies, i.e. transitionproblems, and will not cover aidmeasures aimed at development.The development problem iscovered by the existing rules onstate aid. In particular, theArticle 92(3)(a) EC Treatyregime referred to above leavesample room for granting aid fornew investments and expansions,for allowing temporary operatingaid and for increasing the levelof aid for various horizontalobjectives, such asenvironmental protection, R&D,SMEs etc.

Merger Control

Mergers are not directly referredto in the Europe Agreements.Neither are there any substantiverules on mergers in theImplementing Rules forundertakings. However, thecompetition authorities of aCEEC are entitled to expresstheir views in the course of theprocedure under the EC Merger

Regulation, where the mergerwill have a significant impact onthe economy of the CEECconcerned. The Commission willgive due consideration to thatview.

Public undertakings and Statemonopolies

Under the Europe Agreements,the Association Council mustensure that as from the third yearfollowing the entry into force ofeach Agreement, the rulesapplicable to public undertakingsand undertakings to whichspecial or exclusive rights havebeen granted, the principles ofArticle 90 EC Treaty arerespected.

Under the Europe Agreements,State monopolies of acommercial character are treatedin a similar way to the way theyare treated under Article 37 ECTreaty. Consequently, Statemonopolies of a commercialcharacter are to be progressivelyadjusted so as to ensure that by aspecified date, no discriminationregarding the conditions underwhich goods are procured andmarketed exists betweennationals of the Member Statesand of a CEEC.

Approximation

The Europe Agreements alsoprovide that a majorprecondition for the CEECs’economic integration into theCommunity is the approximationof that country’s existing andfuture national legislation to thatof the Community. According to

the Europe Agreements, theCEECs must use their bestendeavours to ensure that futurelegislation is compatible withCommunity legislation. Thiscovers anti-trust, merger control,State monopolies and publicundertakings, and state aid.

Approximation of legislation inthe context Europe Agreementsdoes not mean that the CEECsshould adopt all the details of theacquis communautaire in thefield of competition verbatim.However, the key elements ofEC Competition law, as set outin the White Paper must be takenover and implemented in theCEECs. Each country maydecide that particular forms oflaws or guidelines are the mostsuitable in its individualsituation, and which legalstructure provides the mostsuitable vehicle for itsmonitoring and enforcementauthorities.

It is, however, important tostress that the exercise is notconfined to the sole adoption oflaws and regulations, or theestablishment of the appropriateinstitutional structures. Theremust be a continued effort toensure the enforcement ofcompetition policy and to makecompetition policy widelyknown and accepted by alleconomic agents involved, i.e.by governments, companies andby the workforce.

Essentially, the White Paperfollows the logic that theappropriate administrative andjudicial machinery is required,

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for there to be effectiveapplication and enforcement ofthe principles found in EuropeanCommunity law. This isparticularly important when itcomes to competition and stateaid policy. Competitionauthorities in the CEECs must beendowed with a sufficient degreeof independence, and sufficientinvestigatory and enforcementpowers.

4. Achievements andChallenges

The establishment ofcompetition offices has takenplace relatively quickly andwithout too much controversy inthe CEECs. Most of the CEECshave also adopted basiccompetition laws taking over thecore elements of Articles 85 and86 of the EC Treaty and mergercontrol, as well as the necessaryenforcement powers, and theyare in the process of completingand refining the existinglegislative framework. This is agreat achievement.

However, the establishment of acompetition authority and acompetition law is only the firststep towards an effectivecompetition policy. A muchmore difficult task to fulfil is theeffective enforcement of the lawand application of the law by alleconomic operators. Thisrequires, first of all that thecompetition authority hassufficient qualified staff.Secondly, the competitionauthority needs to beindependent from political

interference. The political willmust also exist to grant thecompetition authorities of theCEECs real powers to enforcethe law. Competition authoritiesshould not only have far-reaching powers on paper, butalso the ability to enforcedecisions against enterprises,including public undertakings orbodies.

Another major problem has inthe past been the lack ofexpertise and knowledge ofcompetition law among the staffof the competition offices.Intensive training of staff istherefore essential and theCommission has done and stilldoes much in the way of trainingand technical assistance. TheCommission has organised jointtraining programmes for officialsof the competition offices of theCEECs, and it has started withsimilar training sessions forjudges. This should further thegeneral awareness among alleconomic operators aboutcompetition policy and theactivities of the competitionauthority, so as to create a truecompetition culture.

In this context, anotherimportant aspect of training isthe Annual Conference of thecompetition authorities of theCEECs, responsible for anti-trustand state aid control, and theCompetition Directorate-Generalof the European Commission.This Conference, which, thisyear, took place in Bratislava on25-26 May, is extremely usefulfor exchanging views andexperience on approximation of

legislation and the enforcementof competition rules with andamongst the CEECs.

The main challenge for thecompetition authorities of theCEECs today is to appropriatelyallocate their resources inenforcing competition law, inorder to focus on the kinds ofconduct or transactions by firmswhich most seriously obstructthe proper working of themarkets. Due to high barriers toentry and the few number offirms in the market place,collusion between firms ormarket foreclosure is both morelikely to take place and moredamaging in the CEECs. Priorityshould therefore be given to suchcases which restrict entry to orexpansion of markets. Thecollusive habits of centralplanning make breaking upcartels a priority. Finally,liberalisation is a necessarycompliment to enforcement ofcompetition policy, as anti-trustpolicy cannot be successful inensuring that markets workproperly on its own.

With respect to liberalisation, itshould be recognised that inmost CEECs, the competitionauthorities have played animportant competition advocacyrole in ensuring that newlegislation complies with theprinciples underlying thecompetition rules, in particularas regards the regulated sectors,such as energy, telecommu-nications and transport.

However, leaving this aside, itwould seem that the competition

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authorities have devotedsubstantial resources tocomplaints from firms orconsumers in relation to abusesof dominance by the other partyto an agreement due to onerouscontract terms (typically,complaints in relation toextensive prices anddiscriminatory behaviour), ratherthan on hard-core restrictions ofcompetition, particularly cartels.

While the submission ofcomplaints against exploitativebehaviour of dominant firmsshows a certain level ofawareness of the existence ofcompetition law, this type ofcase should not take priorityover cases such as cartels,monopolistic acquisitions,exclusionary practices bydominant firms, or other caseswhich may have an impact onthe competitive structure of themarket. Obviously, thecompetition problems to besolved in such cases are not theeasiest to deal with, and theyrequire a certain amount ofexperience. For cartel cases, thenecessary investigative powersto collect evidence, including thepower to perform dawn raids,should be in place and should beused.

Finally, it is equally importantfor competition offices to imposesufficiently deterrent fines whereserious restrictions ofcompetition are at stake.

In addition to the abovediscussion on the anti-trust pillarof the competition rules, certainpoints need to be made in

relation to the state aid pillar ofthe competition rules in order toconsider where progress hasbeen made and where work stillneeds to be done.

The control of state aid is just asimportant as anti-trust policy inensuring that a level-playingfield on the market is created andmaintained. However, from theoutset, the introduction of stateaid control in the CEECs hasproven much more controversialand politically sensitive thananti-trust policy, the reasonbeing that state aid control goesto the heart of the role of theState, namely how governmentsuse public expenditure to supporttheir industry.

Although the state aid rules inthe Europe Agreements and thedraft Implementing Rulesconcerning state aid provideample possibilities to develop anaid policy consistent with theparticular problems of atransition economy, there hasbeen a general fear in the CEECsthat the introduction of state aidcontrol would lead to the closingdown of companies at a rapidpace, resulting in enormoussocio-economic problems whichwould be politicallyunacceptable and expensive.This is even more the case wherestate aid is closely linked to theprocess of transition.

For example, state aid is oftengranted in connection withprivatisation. State aid may alsobe involved in the financing ofthe restructuring necessary tomake companies commercially

viable. State aid may take theform of state guarantees, lowinterest loans, debt write-offs orother kinds of operating aid,simply to keep companies alive.Finally, state aid is often grantedthrough tax reliefs, tax arrears,social security contributionreliefs and other measures whichfind their origin partly in too laxa fiscal policy. This partly resultsfrom a habit of granting favoursto favourite state-ownedcompanies.

Nevertheless, it is not possible toimagine an internal marketwhere one Party is controllingthe granting of state aid to itsindustry, whereas the other doesnot do the same. There are alsoobvious public finance reasonsfor keeping state aids under strictcontrol.

In contrast to the anti-trust pillar,progress has been slow in theCEECs with respect to thecontrol of state aid. A lot ofwork remains to be done. Themost important objective todayis to create transparency in thegranting of state aid. Withouttransparency it is not possible toexamine whether existing aid inthe CEECs is compatible withthe Europe Agreements.Moreover, the rules on co-operation between the ECCommission and the CEECauthorities in the field of stateaid, as laid down in the draftImplementing rules on State aid,cannot be operational iftransparency is not established.

Therefore, as a matter ofurgency, the CEECs need to take

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the necessary steps to establishan aid inventory of all existingaid. This inventory mustencompass existing state aidgranted by all aid grantingauthorities, not only aid grantedthrough the State budget. Thismeans, in particular, that aidgranted by local or regionalauthorities, aid granted throughprivatisation funds, environmentfunds or other funds or bodiescontrolled by the state must beincluded in the inventory.Moreover, the aid inventoriesmust cover both direct andindirect aid measures, and itmust be updated on a continuousbasis as new measures areintroduced and existing aidmeasures are modified orabolished.

In parallel, it will be necessaryprogressively to review theidentified existing aid measuresand to modify or abolish thosemeasures which are notcompatible with the EuropeAgreement.

A second priority is the setting-up of a state aid monitoringauthority and a system ensuringthat monitoring is carried out inan effective manner. Most of theCEECs have now establishedsuch a national monitoringauthority. Some of them haveappointed a unit within theMinistry of Finance (Bulgaria,Czech Republic, Estonia,Hungary, Latvia, SlovakRepublic) or within the Ministryof Economy (Poland) as themonitoring authority, whileothers have given this

responsibility to the CompetitionOffice (Lithuania, Romania).

Currently, these monitoringauthorities do not yet receive, ona systematic basis, informationon all new aid granted in theircountry so as to enable them togive an opinion on thecompatibility of the proposed aidwith the Europe Agreement priorto it being granted. There can bemany reasons for this. Forexample, the lack of a clear legalframework identifying thepowers and responsibilities ofthe monitoring authority, thelack of sufficient and qualifiedstaff in the monitoring authority,the lack of the necessarypractical tools and procedures toimplement the monitoring or acombination of these and otherdeficiencies may explain whythese problems exist.

It is clear that the establishmentof a credible state aid controlcannot be achieved overnight.However, in order to fulfil theeconomic criteria for accessionto the European Union, and tomaintain confidence in currentand future trade relationsbetween the Community and theCEECs, it is important thatconcrete measures are taken toensure a progressive adjustmentof the system of state aid withina reasonable period of time.

On substance, the existing ECrules on state aid, the EuropeAgreements and the draftImplementing rules on State aid(including the envisaged SpecialGuidance designed to combatthe specific problems of CEECs

as they complete transition to amarket economy) should providea satisfactory framework fortackling any particular transitionproblems while maintaining alevel playing field. At the sametime, it is clear that certain aidmeasures cannot be acceptedeven in transition economies,such as export aid, or can onlybe accepted under very strict andtransparent conditions, such asoperating aid and aid to sensitivesectors.

5. Conclusion

The deficiencies which areoutlined above should not beseen as lessening the progress ofthe competition authorities in theCEECs over a time-span of only5 to 6 years. Achievements inthe field of anti-trust policy inparticular have been remarkable,and the competition authoritiesof the CEECs deserve enormouscredit for their pioneeringefforts.

On the other hand, a lot of workstill needs to be done, especiallyin the field of state aid control. Itis necessary to ensure that alloperators are working under thesame rules, and thus notenjoying any unfair advantagesover competitors operating in thesame market, as well as to createa climate of confidencecomparable to that which existsbetween EU Member States.

Enlargement is an historicprocess and has majorconsequences for the futureapplication and enforcement of

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EC Competition Policy. In anenlarged EU, the Commissionwill be empowered to apply ECCompetition law to all the newmembers. This creates enormouschallenges for anti-trustenforcement.

The screening process hasalready been launched, wherebythe implementation of the acquiscommunautaire is beingexamined and discussed with theCEECs on a multilateral andbilateral basis. Enlargementnegotiations themselves will not

be easy. However, we believethat an effective workingrelationship between theCommission and the competitionauthorities of the CEECs willhelp smooth this process.

1. Introduction

As recognised in the Green Paperon Vertical Restraints in ECCompetition Policy (GreenPaper), the economic analysis ofvertical agreements has in the pastbeen the subject of heated debatebetween economists.1 By the early1980’s the position had swungfrom regarding them as suspectfor competition, to a generalisedperception that they wereinnocuous for competition.Nowadays there is a newemerging consensus andeconomists are becoming morecautious in their assessment ofvertical agreements and lesswilling to make sweepinggeneralisations.

A first and central element of thisnew consensus is the importanceof market structure in determining

1 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC

Competition Policy, COM (96) 721 final,of 22.01.1997, point 54.

the impact of vertical agreementson competition. Economics tellsus that in the field of verticalrestraints competition concernscan only arise if there isinsufficient inter-brandcompetition, i.e. if there exists acertain degree of market power.On the one hand, the fiercerinter-brand competition, themore likely it is that verticalrestraints have no negative effector at least a net positive effect.On the other hand, the weakerinter-brand competition, themore likely it is that verticalrestraints have a net negativeeffect. This means that the samevertical restraint can havedifferent effects depending onthe market structure and on themarket power of the companyapplying the vertical restraint.

This of course raises thequestion of what is meant bymarket power? In economicsmarket power is usually defined

as the power to raise price abovethe competitive level (in theshort run marginal cost, in thelong run average total cost). Inother words that a firm bychanging its output hasperceptible influence on theprice at which it can sell and thatby charging a price above thecompetitive level it is able, atleast in the short term, to obtainsupra-normal profits. Mosteconomists would agree thatthere already exists marketpower below the level ofdominance as defined by theCourt of Justice. This view wasalso expressed in the GreenPaper, to indicate that verticalrestraints can harm competitionbelow the level of dominanceand therefore that Article 86 andmerger control will not sufficeand Article 85 needs to beapplied to vertical restraints.2

A second element of this newconsensus is that it is generallyrecognised that vertical restraintsare on average less harmful thanhorizontal competition restraintslike price fixing or marketsharing. The main reason fortreating a vertical restraint more 2 Green Paper, point 303.

The Economics of Verticals

Luc Peeperkorn, DG IV-A-1

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leniently than a horizontalrestraint lies in the fact that thelatter may concern an agreementbetween competitors producingsubstitute goods/services whilethe former concerns anagreement between a supplierand a buyer of a particularproduct/service. In horizontalsituations the exercise of marketpower by one firm (higher priceof its product) will benefit itscompetitors. This may providean incentive to competitors toinduce each other to behave anti-competitively. In verticalsituations the product of the oneis the input for the other. Thismeans that the exercise ofmarket power by either the up-stream or down-stream companywould normally hurt the demandfor the product of the other. Thecompanies involved in theagreement may therefore have anincentive to prevent the exerciseof market power by the other (socalled self policing character ofvertical restraints).

However, this self-restrainingcharacter should not be over-estimated. When a company hasno market power it can only tryto increase its profits byoptimising its manufacturing anddistribution processes, with orwithout the help of verticalagreements. However, when itdoes have market power it canalso try to increase its profits atthe expense of its directcompetitors by raising their costsand at the expense of itsbuyers/consumers by trying toappropriate some of theirsurplus. This can happen whenthe up-stream and down-stream

company share the extra profitsor when one of the two imposesthe vertical restraint and therebyappropriates all the extra profits.

In this article I will not go intothe question when is inter-brandcompetition weak and when ismarket power present. This canonly be assessed on a case bycase basis. One could onlyobserve that, as most marketsare rather competitive, in manyinstances vertical restraints areunlikely to have significantnegative effects. A largemajority of actual verticalagreements are thereforeunlikely to be of interest from acompetition policy point ofview.

The success of any future policywill depend on it being able toprovide a sufficiently wide andwell defined safe harbour toexclude this large majority ofagreements from competitionpolicy scrutiny. In addition itssuccess will depend on thepredictability and clarity ofpolicy towards agreements thatare outside the defined safeharbour. It is in this light that inthis article an economicclassification of verticalrestraints is presented. Thisclassification is based on themain negative effects that mayresult from the different verticalrestraints. It also describes thepositive effects linked to verticalrestraints. Finally it draws somegeneral conclusions.

The final formulation of policywill of course not only dependon the economics of vertical

restraints. It will also and mostimportantly be determined by thechoice of policy objectives, theeffects on enforcement costs, theeffects on legal certainty forindustry etc. For example, theassessment of a resale restrictionmay be very different when notonly the protection ofcompetition but also the goal ofmarket integration is considered.However, these issues are alsonot covered in this article as itconcentrates on the economicclassification of verticalrestraints.

2. The negative effects

2.1. Individual verticalrestraints

To analyse the possible negativeeffects it is appropriate to dividevertical agreements into fourgroups: an exclusive distributiongroup, a single branding group, aresale price maintenance groupand a market partitioning group.The vertical restraints withineach group (as opposed tobetween these groups) seem tohave similar negative effects oncompetition.

Before describing the fourgroups a number of generalpoints need to be made. Firstly,the analysis applies to bothgoods and services, althoughcertain restraints are mainly usedin the distribution of goods. Thisis why throughout this text theterm good(s) means both good(s)and service(s) unless otherwisestated. Secondly, verticalagreements can be concluded for

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intermediate and final goods andservices. Unless otherwise statedthe analysis and arguments in thetext apply to all levels of tradeand the neutral terms supplierand buyer are used. When only aspecific level is implicated this isindicated. Thirdly, the termino-logy used may confuse some asit at times differs from thecurrent legal definitions. Theclassification is based upon whatcould be described as the basiccomponents of vertical restraints.In practice many verticalagreements make use of morethan one of these components.To give an example, exclusivedistribution is usually limitingthe number of buyers thesupplier can sell to and at thesame time limiting the areawhere the buyers can be active.The first component may lead toforeclosure of other buyers whilethe second component may leadto price discrimination.

Exclusive distribution group

Under the heading of exclusivedistribution come thoseagreements/components thathave as their main element thatthe manufacturer is selling onlyto one or a limited number ofbuyers. This may be to restrictthe number of buyers for aparticular territory or group ofcustomers, or to restrict the kindof buyers. The group comprisesexclusive distribution andexclusive customer allocation asthe supplier is limiting its salesto only one buyer for a certainterritory or class of customers. Italso comprises exclusive supplyand quantity forcing on the

supplier, where an obligation orincentive scheme agreedbetween the supplier and thebuyer makes the former to sellon a particular market only ormainly to one buyer. Forexample, when a manufacturerpays a shelf allowance to aretailer it will be in its interest toconcentrate its sales with thisretailer so as to spread the costof the allowance. Lastly, thisgroup comprises selectivedistribution, where the condi-tions imposed on or agreed withthe selected dealers may limittheir number.

There are two main effects oncompetition: (1) certain buyerswithin that market can no longerbuy from this particular supplier,i.e. it leads to foreclosure ofcertain buyers, and (2) as far asthe distribution of final goods isconcerned, since less distributorswill offer this good it will alsolead to reduced intra-brandcompetition. In the case of wideexclusive territories or customerallocation the result may be totalelimination of intra-brandcompetition. When the exclusivedistribution type of agreement isused rather selectively, that isnot many stores can carry theproduct, it also leads to less in-store competition and reducedinter-brand competition.

Single branding group

Under the heading of singlebranding come thoseagreements/components thathave as their main element thatthe buyer is induced toconcentrate his orders for a

particular type of good with onesupplier. The group comprisesnon-compete and quantityforcing on the buyer, where anobligation or incentive schemeagreed between the supplier andthe buyer makes the latterpurchase its requirements for aparticular good or service and itssubstitutes only or mainly fromone supplier.

There are two main effects oncompetition: (1) other suppliersin that market cannot sell to theparticular buyers, i.e. foreclosureof certain suppliers, and (2) asfar as the distribution of finalgoods is concerned, theparticular retailers will only sellone brand, therefore there will beno in-store competition in theirshops. Both effects may lead to areduction in inter-brandcompetition.

The reduction in inter-brandcompetition may be mitigated bystronger ex-ante competitionbetween suppliers to obtain thesingle branding contracts, but thelonger the duration the morelikely it will be that this effectwill not be strong enough tofully compensate for the lack ofinter-brand competition.

Resale price maintenance group

Under the heading of resale pricemaintenance come thoseagreements/components thathave as their main element thatthe buyer is obliged or inducedto resell not below a certainprice, at a certain price or notabove a certain price. This groupcomprises minimum, fixed,

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maximum and recommendedresale prices. Maximum andrecommended resale prices,although in theory unlikely tohave negative effects, may workas fixed RPM. As RPM relatesto the resale price it is mainlyrelevant for the distribution offinal goods.

There are two main effects ofminimum and fixed RPM oncompetition: (1) the distributorscan no longer compete on pricefor that brand, leading to a totalelimination of intra-brand pricecompetition, and (2) there isincreased transparency on priceand responsibility for pricechanges, making horizontalcollusion between manufacturerseasier, at least in concentratedmarkets. The reduction in intra-brand competition may, as itleads to less downward pressureon the price for the particulargood, have as an indirect effect areduced level of inter-brandcompetition.

Market partitioning group

Under the heading of marketpartitioning come what mayappear at first sight amiscellaneous group ofagreements/components but thathave as their main element thatthe buyer is restricted in where iteither sources or resells aparticular good. This groupcomprises exclusive purchasing,territorial sales restrictions,customer sales restrictions, after-market sales restrictions,prohibitions of resale and tying.The main effect on competitionis a reduction of intra-brand

competition that may help thesupplier or the buyer (in case ofafter-market sales restrictions) topartition the market and thushinder market integration. Thismay facilitate pricediscrimination. Tying is slightlythe odd one out. Its main effectis that the buyers may pay ahigher price for the tied goodthan they would otherwise dobut it may also lead toforeclosure of other suppliersand reduced inter-brandcompetition in the market of thetied good.

2.2 Combinations of verticalrestraints

The next question to beconsidered is whether acombination of different verticalrestraints increases the negativeeffects. In the Green Paper arather prominent place is givento the argument that certaincombinations of verticalrestraints are better forcompetition than their use inisolation from each other3.Although this may occasionallybe the case, it does not appear tobe the general rule. In generalthe opposite seems true, acombination usually aggravatesthe possible negative effects.

For example, a combination ofone of the restraints of the singlebranding group with one of theexclusive distribution groupcombines a reduction of inter-brand competition with areduction of intra-brandcompetition. In the case of final

3 Green Paper, point 67.

goods a market is created withlocal brand monopolists withoutin-store competition. Also, toforeclosure at manufacturer levelis added foreclosure at the retaillevel. This means that not onlymay it be difficult for amanufacturer to sell a new brandas stores are tied, but also thatnew entrants to the retail marketmay have difficulty obtainingsome of the leading brands. Thisresults in a situation where itmay be both difficult to findoutlets and unprofitable to set upnew outlets.

Another example is thecombination of one of therestraints of the exclusivedistribution group with one ofthe RPM group. To the reductionof intra-brand competition of thefirst is added the elimination ofintra-brand price competition ofthe second. This quickly leads toa total elimination of intra-brandcompetition. This elimination ofintra-brand competition may alsohelp to sustain collusivetendencies betweenmanufacturers facilitated byRPM. In general, thiscombination does also not makesense from an efficiency point ofview as both protect the marginof the retailer. One of theserestraints would normally sufficeto overcome, for example, a freerider problem between retailers.

Lastly, a combination of one ofthe restraints of the singlebranding group with one of theRPM group may combine areduction of inter-brandcompetition resulting from a lackof in-store competition with a

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facilitation of collusivebehaviour between themanufacturers induced by RPM.Collusive behaviour maybecome easier as the lack of in-store competition takes awaysome of the competitivepressure. In addition thereduction of inter-brandcompetition is combined with aloss of intra-brand pricecompetition resulting from RPM.

A number of combinations mayhowever be viewed morepositively, where it can beargued that one of the verticalrestraints limits the possiblenegative effects of the other. Inthe combination of exclusivedistribution with maximum RPMthe latter restraint may help thesupplier to limit possible priceincreases the buyer may want toimplement under the protectionof the territorial exclusivityobtained. The same reasoningcan be applied to thecombination of selectivedistribution and maximum RPM.Also the combination ofexclusive distribution withquantity forcing on the buyermay work in the same way as thelatter may prevent the distributorfrom raising his prices.

There are three combinationsthat are particularly negativefrom a market integrationperspective: (1) territorial salesrestriction combined withselective distribution at the samelevel of distribution, (2)exclusive distribution combinedwith exclusive purchasing, and(3) selective distributioncombined with exclusive

purchasing. These combinationshelp to make a distributionsystem more watertight bymaking arbitrage, either by finalcustomers or by distributors,more difficult if not impossible.

3. The positive effects

It is said that in a number ofsituations the usual arm’s lengthdealings between manufacturerand retailer, detailing only priceand quantity of a certaintransaction, lead to a sub-optimallevel of investments and sales.The following generalisations canbe made about this:

1) The first and main reason whythis (i.e. a sub-optimal level ofinvestments and sales) issupposed to happen is theexistence of some form of freerider problem. The person whomakes an effort may not beable to appropriate all thebenefits his or her effortengenders and may thereforebe inclined to invest sub-optimally. This may be theresult of free riding by oneretailer on the promotionefforts of another retailer.Exclusive distribution orsimilar restrictions or RPMmay be helpful in avoidingsuch free riding. Free ridingcan also occur betweenmanufacturers where oneinvests in promotion in theshops for its brand, therebyalso attracting customers forits competitors. Non-competetype restraints can help toovercome this.

For there to be a problem thereneeds to be a real free riderissue, something that is notalways so obvious. Free ridingbetween retailers can onlyoccur on pre-sales services andnot on after-sales services. Thegood needs to be relativelynew or technically complex asthe customer otherwise mayvery well know what he wantsfrom past purchases. And thegood must be of a reasonablyhigh value as it is otherwisenot attractive for a customer togo to one shop for informationand to another to buy. On topof this, when all theseconditions are fulfilled it mustnot be practical for themanufacturer to agree with theretailers effective servicerequirements concerning thepre-sales services.4

Free riding betweenmanufacturers is also limitedby rather strict conditions. Itcan be the case that amanufacturer who invests inpromotion of his own productis also increasing demand forhis competitors products. Avertical restraint may howevernot be helpful in addressingsuch a free rider problem.When for example advertisingin the (national) media leads ingeneral to extra demand withall outlets a vertical restraintwill not help. Only in case thepromotion leads to extra

4 The standard argument against

contractability of service requirements isthat the costs of monitoring and thecontract costs may be prohibitive for themanufacturer in case of a large number ofsmall retailers.

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demand via certain retailoutlets, for example becausethese outlets are carrying thepromotion, a non-competetype of agreement may helpcapture the full benefits. Inaddition, such free riding canonly occur on pre-salesservice, it must not be possibleto make the promotion brandspecific and it is only likely forrelatively new and complexproducts as customers mayotherwise know very wellwhat they want already.5

2) A second general point thatneeds to be made concerns thepossible divergence betweenwhat is privately efficient andefficient from a totalwelfare/consumer point ofview. What is privatelyefficient is not always good fortotal welfare. To go back tothe free riding betweenretailers or betweenmanufacturers. Let’s suppose areal free rider problem existsand sales can be expanded byinducing more pre-salesservices although this wouldalso lead to higher prices.When these extra services arevalued equally by the majorityof consumers this may verywell lead to higher totalwelfare. But when the infra-marginal consumers (that isthose who are already buyingat the current price/servicelevel) know what they wantand do not appreciate the extraservice, they only suffer from

5 Promotion that only creates image

without there being real extra quality hasdoubtful welfare effects and does notneed to be protected.

the higher price, especially ifthere is insufficient inter-brandcompetition. It may beprivately efficient to increasethe service level to attractmore marginal consumers andthereby increase sales, buttotal welfare may nonethelesssuffer.

3) A special form of free riding isthe certification free riderargument. The hypothesis isthat certain retailers perform avaluable service by identifying"good" products. The fact thatthese retailers sell a certainproduct signifies to theconsumer that it is a good buy.This hypothesis maysometimes be useful forexplaining the introduction ofnew products. New andcomplex products are firststocked by high quality, highmargin stores where they arebought by avant-gardeconsumers. Gradually itsreputation becomesestablished and demand growsenough for it to be soldthrough low price chains. Ifthe manufacturer can notinitially limit its sales to thepremium stores, it runs the riskof being delisted and theproduct introduction may fail.If this is true, a problemanalogous to invention patentprotection exists. It may benecessary to providetemporary protection againstprice discounters to help theintroduction of the product.However, a period ofprotection which is too longmay only delay the productmoving into the mature, price

competitive stages of its lifecycle, to the disadvantage ofconsumers. This means, atbest, that there may be areason to allow for a limitedduration a restriction of theexclusive distribution or RPMkind; - enough to guaranteeintroduction, but not so long asto unduly delay large scaledissemination.

4) Yet another special form offree riding is the so-called'hold-up' problem. Sometimesthere are specific investmentsto be made by either thesupplier or the buyer, such asin special equipment ortraining. In such a case, afterthe investments have beenmade the investor becomes toa certain extent prisoner to theother side. The balance ofpower will shift. In fear of thisthe necessary investments maynot be made, unless ex-antesupply arrangements can befixed. The investor fears thatthe other side will free ride onits investment. However, as inthe free riding examplebetween retailers, there are anumber of conditions whichhave to be met before such arisk is real. Firstly, theinvestment must be sunk andspecific to deal with that otherparty only. Secondly, it mustbe a long-term investmentwhich is not recouped in theshort run. And thirdly, theinvestment must beasymmetric; i.e. one investsmore than the other. Onlywhen these conditions are metcan there be a real reason tohave a vertical restraint for a

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limited duration, of the non-compete type when theinvestment is made by thesupplier and of the exclusivedistribution or exclusivesupply type when theinvestment is made by thebuyer.

5) The last reason for sub-optimal sales, also discussed inthe Green Paper, that shouldbe mentioned, is the problemof 'double marginalisation'. Incase both the manufacturerand the retailer have marketpower each will set its priceabove marginal cost. Theyboth add their margin thatexceeds the one that wouldexist under competition. Thismay result in a final price thateven exceeds the monopolyprice an integrated companywould charge, to the detrimentof their collective profits andconsumers. In this, arguablyrather hypothetical case,quantity forcing on the buyeror maximum RPM could helpthe manufacturer bring theprice down to joint profitmaximising level.

6) In the economic literature it isexplained that there is a largemeasure of substitutabilitybetween the different verticalrestraints. This means that thesame inefficiency problem canbe solved by different verticalrestraints. For example, asexplained above, the problemof free riding between retailersor the certification free riderproblem can be solved bymeans of exclusivedistribution or fixed or

minimum RPM. This is ofimportance as the negativeeffects on competition maydiffer between the variousvertical restraints. This plays arole when indispensability isdiscussed under Article 85(3).As RPM is generallyconsidered to be lessacceptable from a competitionpoint of view this may be areason only to allow exclusivedistribution or other lessserious restraints and notRPM.

4. Differentiation betweenvertical restraints

A last question to be consideredis whether some restraints aremore or less harmful thanothers? To answer this questionboth negative and positiveeffects need to be considered. Itmay be a problem that somevertical restraints that may bemost effective to solve a certainfree rider problem may also havethe most serious negative effects.In addition the answer willdepend on the goals beingpursued by competition policy. Itis therefore not possible toanswer this question solely onthe basis of the economicsinvolved. I will therefore justdraw the attention to somegeneral rules that can beformulated.

As a first general rule, it can besaid that exclusive agreementsare generally worse forcompetition than non-exclusiveagreements. Exclusive agree-ments make, by the express

language of the contracts or theirpractical effects, one party fulfilall or practically all itsrequirements from another party.For example, a non-competeobligation makes that the buyerpurchases only one brand, whilequantity forcing may leave thebuyer scope to purchasecompeting goods. The degree offoreclosure is therefore different,while often the efficiencies areremarkably similar.

A second general rule,applicable to all four groups, canbe formulated: restraints agreedfor intermediate goods are ingeneral less harmful thanrestraints affecting thedistribution of final goods. At anintermediate level both thesupplier and the buyer areusually professional andknowledgeable. This makes apossible loss of intra-brandcompetition less importantbecause it stimulatesspecialisation which leads tocomparative advantages.

A third general rule, alsoapplicable to all four groups, canbe formulated: the possiblenegative effects of verticalrestraints are reinforced whennot just one supplier with itsbuyers practices a certainvertical restraint but when alsoother suppliers and their buyersorganise their trade in a similarway. These so called cumulativeeffects can be a problem in anumber of sectors. To make avalid assessment of the effects ofsuch a cumulation of verticalagreements requires a sectorwide investigation and overview.

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Within the RPM group, fixedand minimum price maintenanceare evidently the seriousrestraints. Maximum andrecommended prices, whenreally maximum orrecommended, are clearly muchless and possibly not at allrestrictive.

Within the market partitioninggroup, which assumes a marketintegration objective, restrictionof resale and after-market salesrestrictions seem the worst asthey allow market partitioningwithout clear possibleefficiencies. Tying is in generalconsidered a somewhat lessserious restriction. It concernsthe possible extension of marketpower from one market intoanother. Possible efficiencyarguments (“need to assure the

buyer uses the right sort of inputfor the fragile machine we soldhim as breakdowns may hurt ourproducts image” or “jointdelivery is cost saving”) may belimited. Exclusive purchasing isthe least serious restrictionwithin this group.

5. Conclusion

On the one hand economics tellsus that it is only when inter-brand competition is reducedthat it may be necessary for acompetition authority tointervene against verticalrestrictions. It is only in suchconditions that it may have toreduce the restrictions on inter-or intra-brand competition whichmay result from verticalagreements.

On the other hand economicsalso tells us that verticalagreements are often necessaryto realise efficiencies and mayhelp firms to enter new markets.

At the same time rather strictconditions have to be met beforeone can actually speak of a realfree rider problem that justifiesthe imposition of verticalrestrictions. The case is strongestfor vertical restrictions of alimited duration which help theintroduction of new complexproducts.

This leads to the conclusion thatin situations where the partieshave (considerable) marketpower a case by case approach iswarranted for verticalrestrictions.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of thisdocument1 is to develop anupdated approach to theapplication of competitionlaw to issues arising in thebroadcasting of sports eventsin response to the rapidchanges that are taking place.Over the last few years sportsbroadcasting has become avery important areaeconomically. Sportsprogrammes, and certainsports in particular, are a keyingredient for broadcastersand have driven thedevelopment of pay-TV.With increased deregulationand the introduction of newbroadcasting technology,broadcasting services aregoing through continuous andrapid development withmajor consequences such asan increase in channels andcapacity. Digital technology,pay-TV and pay-per-viewservices, providing additionalbroadcasting time andcapacity, offer to viewerswho are prepared to pay forthe services, increasingopportunities to view agrowing number of sports,

1 This was prepared in consultation of

Member State competition authorities

either on theme channels oron an event-by-event basis.The new services potentiallyoffer improved picturequality, a choice ofperspective of the event andthe opportunity to watch theprogrammes when the viewerwishes to. The importance ofsports programming tobroadcasters is demonstratedin the corresponding growthof competition (and price) forthe acquisition of sportsbroadcasting rights. In thecontext of the new services,broadcasting of sports eventscan no longer be viewed interms of a mix ofprogrammes.

2. While these developmentsmay indicate a potentiallyhighly competitive market,concerns have been expressedabout the consequences onthe television landscape ofthe EU of current practices inthe buying, selling andexploitation of broadcastingrights to sports rights. Thereis now a need for theCommission to examine thesepractices, many of whichhave not been consideredcontentious in the past, and todraw up a generalcompetition policy approachto their assessment. Some

Member States have alreadyinitiated actions under theirdomestic competition rules.

3. Broadcasting of sports eventsis becoming more and morecross-border or international.Television viewers in oneMember State areincreasingly able to see notonly the most importantinternational championshipsbut national championshipsfrom other countries.International player andmanagement mobility hasgenerated more interest insports events taking place inother Member States. TheCommission will have toapply the competition rulesmore and more to horizontaland vertical arrangementsrelating to the broadcastingrights to sports events.

4. It may be helpful, whenconsidering whether anagreement affects tradebetween Member States, toconsider the following:

• television programmes arereceived and seen in a secondMember State - this is not initself sufficient to makecommunity law applicable;

• if clubs or teams in oneMember State make anagreement amongst them-selves to fix prices forbroadcasts of their sportingevents, such an agreementwould probably not besufficient to make Article 85of the EC Treaty applicable.It would be applicable if the

Broadcasting of Sports events andCompetition law

An orientation document from the Commission’sServices

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teams involved came frommore than one country, forexample, for the World Cup;

• there will probably be aneffect on trade betweenMember States if a vendor ofrights has sold or is likely tosell to a buyer in anotherMember State;

• if the buyer of the rights islikely to sublicense in otherMember States, there willusually be an effect on tradebetween Member States.

5. Similar issues arise underCommunity competition lawand national competition lawwhen assessing agreementsand complaints. A commonapproach to analysing thecompetition problems wouldoffer a degree of certainty tothose concludingbroadcasting contracts. It ishowever not possible toprovide an answer to eachproblem, which could then beapplied in each Member Stateor by the Commission tocross-border cases. The facts,and viewers’ preferences forsports, will be different ineach Member State. Thesolution in one Member Statemay be different to thesolution in another MemberState. The effect on tradebetween Member States ofnational arrangements willalso differ.

6. Many of the issues identifiedin the following chapters areoften inter-related and socannot be considered in

isolation. This analysis is byno means exhaustive andother issues may arise indifferent circumstances in thefuture.

7. Exclusivity is an acceptedcommercial practice in thebroadcasting sector. Itguarantees the value of aprogramme, and isparticularly important in thecase of sports, as a broadcastof a sports event is valuablefor only a very short time.Exclusivity for limitedperiods should not in itselfraise competition concerns.However, competitionproblems may arise.Duration, quantity andupstream and downstreammarket power need to beexamined in order to assesswhether the exclusivityseriously restrictscompetition. A longer periodof exclusivity may beappropriate in certaincircumstances, for example,for the broadcasting of theOlympic Games, which occurevery four years.

8. Exclusivity has also beenquestioned on grounds notrelated to competition law, inparticular, where it isexercised by pay-TVoperators. Article 3A of thenew “television withoutfrontiers” Directive, is animportant measure addressingexclusive broadcasting rightsto sports events which wasintroduced to ensure thatMember States are able, atthe national level, to protect

the right to information andto provide for wide access bythe public to televisioncoverage of events of majorimportance for society.2

9. Competition rules are neutralwith respect to different typesof broadcasters and do notprovide a legal basis forfavouring one category overanother. The Court of FirstInstance (in the EBUEurovision judgment) hasstated that, unless Article90(2) applies, theCommission would not bejustified in giving apreference to televisionstations merely because theyhave a public service role, orto publicly owned stations, orto those financed fromofficially-collected licencefees.

10.Fundamental to considerationof any competition policyimplications is the issue ofwho owns the broadcastingrights to sports events, aswitnessed by recent courtcases in the Netherlands3 and

2 For aspects other than those related to

competition law, see the Communicationfrom Mr Oreja to the Commissionentitled “Exclusive Rights for TVBroadcasting of Major (sports) Events”(SEC(97) 174 final.

3 The High Court of Amsterdam verdict of8 November 1996 (on Feyenoord'sappeal against the President of theUtrecht court's previous verdict) was thatthe television rights in principle belongto the home team and that the statutes ofthe KNVB are too general to beinterpreted as an assignment of thebroadcasting rights to the KNVB.

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Germany4 concerning rightsto national football games.

11. Many sports have nowentered the realms of themarket economy. Theircommercial activities areoperated as businesses. Theincome received from thesale of broadcasting rights istransforming the sportsworld and widening the gulfbetween amateurs andprofessionals. As with anymarket, commercialpractices fall under thescrutiny of the competitionrules. Not only competitionamong participants in aparticular sport may beaffected by commercialpractices but competitionamong broadcasters mayalso be affected.

12. Apart from commercialconsiderations affectingcompetition, regard mayalso be had for genuineobjectives based on otherconsiderations applicable tosport because of its intrinsiccharacteristics andimportance to society :“Maintaining a balancebetween clubs by preservinga certain degree of equalityand uncertainty as toresults” and “encouraging

4 Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof 11

December 1997 in case DeutscherFußball-Bund, UFA Film and ISPR vBundeskartellamt took the view thatteams are the natural owners of thebroadcasting rights in the games inquestion, but left open the question ofwhether associations may also have aclaim to ownership in differentcircumstances.

the training of youngplayers” - were twolegitimate objectivesrecognised in the Judgmentof the Court in the Bosmancase5.

13. In the light of these generalconsiderations, this papernow turns to the main legalissues which arise, or mayarise, under Communitylaw, firstly concerning theprovisions for thebroadcasting rights to majorsports events under Article3A of the new “televisionwithout frontiers” Directive,then with respect toCommunity competitionlaw.

I. Priority for free-accesstelevision for the coverageof major sports events

1. There are advantages forviewers if important sportsrights are broadcast by free-access television, so thatconsumers are not obliged tomake additional payments fordecoders, receiving equip-ment or cable subscription toview such events, inparticular, those in whichtheir compatriot sports menand women take part ininternational events.

2. More generally, concern hasarisen, with the growth anddevelopment of pay-TV, thatviewers are being deniedfree-access to important

5 C-415/93, 15 December 1995

national events because largesubscription broadcastershave been buying up thoserights to develop their ownservices. It is said that somesporting events are of suchnational or heritageimportance, that they reflectcommon identity and value,so that broad free accessshould be given to them. Thecomplaints are from "publicinterest" or "nationalheritage" concern, rather thanon competition grounds, anda regulatory approach wouldbe necessary to achieve thedesired result.

3. As confirmed by theEurovision judgment6,competition rules are neutralwith respect to different typesof broadcasting and inprinciple, do not provide alegal base for favouring onecategory of broadcaster overothers.

4. Further to an amendment bythe European Parliament, thedirective modifying directive89/552/EEC7 ("televisionwithout frontiers") includes anew Article 3A. Thepurpose of this Article isexplained in recital 18, whichreads as follows:

6 Joined Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-

543/93 and T-546/93, judgement of theCourt of First Instance of 11 July 1996

7 Directive 97/36/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council of 30 June1997 amending Council Directive89/552/EEC on the co-ordination ofcertain provisions laid down by law,regulation or administrative action inMember States concerning the pursuit oftelevision broadcasting activities (OJ NoL202/60 of 30.7.1997)

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“Whereas it is essential thatMember States should be ableto take measures to protectthe right to information andto ensure wide access by thepublic to television coverageof national or non-nationalevents of major importancefor society, such as theOlympic Games, the footballWorld Cup and the Europeanfootball Championship;whereas to this end MemberStates retain the right to takemeasures compatible withCommunity law aimed atregulating the exercise bybroadcasters under theirjurisdiction of exclusivebroadcasting rights to suchevents”.

5. Article 3A paragraph 3stipulates, moreover, thatMember States shall ensurethat broadcasters under theirjurisdiction do not exercisethe exclusive rightspurchased by thosebroadcasters in such a waythat a substantial proportionof the public in anotherMember State is deprived ofthe possibility of followingevents, which are designatedby that other Member State,on free television. Accordingto information supplied to theCommission by nationaldelegations to the ContactCommittee set up by theDirective, a large majority ofMember States intends tonotify their measures takenunder Article 3A paragraph 1in the course of 1998. AllMember States have

indicated timetables fortransposition of Article 3Aparagraph 3 by the deadlinerequired by the Directive, i.e.30 December 1998.

6. The procedure laid down inArticle 3A paragraph 2requires the Member States tonotify their measures and theCommission to verify theircompatibility withCommunity law within aperiod of three months. TheCommission must seek theopinion of the Committeeestablished by the Directive.Measures taken by MemberStates in order to guaranteethe availability of coverage ofcertain events must be inaccordance inter alia withArticle 90 of the Treaty.

II. The relevant market insports broadcasting cases

1. The correct definition of therelevant market will becrucial to the assessment ofcases concerning the issuesreferred to below. In thecurrent climate of quicklyevolving broadcasting tech-nology and means ofdistribution, in particular, thedevelopment of pay-TV andpay-per-view, the nature andscope of the markets, whichare relevant, are changing.The geographic market also isbecoming more and moreinternational as more cross-border broadcasts of sportsare offered.

2. With the emergence andgrowing importance of

dedicated subscriptiontelevision sports channelsover the last five years, themarket seems to be evolvingin such a way that it will beno longer possible to define itas for sport programmes ingeneral, but for some specificsports, for example, forfootball or for Formula 1motor racing. Standardmarket definitions may notapply in all Member States.The markets are notnecessarily the same in allMember States, as nationalpreferences differ from Stateto State.

3. When defining the relevantmarket, demand substitutionis not to be viewedexclusively from theviewpoint of the finalconsumer, since some of theavailable services are notoffered to the final consumer.In connection with rights totelevise sports events, avariety of services can beprovided:

• owners of broadcastingrights to sports events sellthe rights to broadcasters orto sports rights agencies;

• the rights can be exclusiveor non-exclusive, for live ordeferred transmission, or forhighlights;

• a rights owner orbroadcaster may subcon-tract the production of thesignal;

• sports rights agencies sellrights to broadcasters;

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• companies wishing toassociate their brand with aparticular sport, particularlyif it receives televisionexposure, sponsor compe-titions, organisers of sportsevents, clubs, teams orindividuals;

• broadcasters and/or adver-tising brokers selladvertising time or sponsor-ship to companies who wantexposure on televisionduring sports programmes;

• broadcasters owning sportsprogrammes, or owners ofthe rights or their agents,license other broadcasters tobroadcast the programmes;

• broadcasters can contractwith cable companies oroperators of other means oftransmissions to broadcasttheir channels and sportsprogrammes;

• cable companies providetelevision to householders;

• broadcasters transmit sportsprogrammes to viewers;

• viewers may exercise achoice by subscribing to adedicated sports broad-casting service (rather thanchoosing from a variety ofentertainment programmeson traditional advertising orlicence fee fundedtelevision).

4. Some sports events are moreimportant, and attract theattention of more viewers,than others. A survey in theUK for the BBC on sport ontelevision indicated that 92%of viewers were interested inwatching one or more of the

major sports events ontelevision8. For reallyimportant events, there is nosatisfactory substitute for livecoverage (viewers' interest inmost events is short-lived).There is little substitutabilitybetween sports for fans. Forfootball supporters, televisioncoverage of athletics or golfis not a satisfactorysubstitute. There may belittle substitutability betweendifferent sports for sponsors,whose investment can be vitalfor the viability of a sport.For broadcasters some sportsgenerate more income fromadvertising revenue orsubscription than others.There may be an element ofprestige in broadcastingcertain major sports. Forthem, the importance andinterest of a sports event to alarge number of viewersdetermines whether othersports programmes are asatisfactory substitute.Football, the Olympic Gamesand Formula One racing arethe most popular televisedsports events world-wide.

5. There is a market for sportsrights, whether sold orlicensed, and this market maybe further sub-divided intothe market for rights tospecific sports. Broadcastingrights may be for live or

8 Convergence within the media industry,

and between media, informationtechnology and/or telecommunications -Prospective for competition andcompetition policy - Report to DGIVprepared by London Economics

deferred full coverage of anentire event, for extracts andfor highlights. The value anduse of each type of rightdiffers for broadcasters. Theconditions of competition forthe various types ofbroadcaster need to be takeninto consideration. Condi-tions for traditionalincumbents - terrestrial and/or free-access broad-casters,offering a general programmemix, who are dependent onlicence fee or advertisingrevenue for their funding, arelikely to be different fromthose for the emerging newbroadcasting services, pay-TV and pay-per-view, whichinclude dedicated sportschannels and which aredependent upon viewers’subscription fees. A largerproportion of theprogramming of the newservices consists of sports. Inthe context of sponsors,television advertisers or pay-TV, these factors suggest thatit is necessary to define themarkets more narrowly, asthose for coverage ofimportant events in aparticular sport.

6. In the Netherlands, theDecision of the Ministry forEconomic Affairs in theKNVB/collective selling ofhighlights to football gamescase, the decision defines aseparate market for footballbroadcasting rights9.

7. In any event, the guidelinesset out in the Commission

9 Decision of 23 December 1997

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Notice on Market Definition10

should be referred to whenconsidering definition of therelevant market.

III. Exclusivity

1. The sale of exclusive rights tobroadcast sports events is anaccepted commercialpractice. For sportsorganisers, the sale ofexclusive rights is a way ofensuring the maximum short-term profitability of the eventorganised, the price paid forthe exclusivity by onebroadcaster probably beinghigher than the sum of theamounts which would be paidby several broadcasters fornon-exclusive rights.

2. For the broadcaster, sportsprogrammes are consideredas particularly suited toattracting a large number ofviewers. For them, it can besaid that exclusivityrepresents :

• the only way to guarantee thevalue of a given sportsprogramme;

• the broadcasting companymay get more value from therights if it can sub-license tocompetitors;

• a way to build up audience, inthe short as well as in thelong term (consolidation ofaudience base, fosteringloyalty, improvement ofimage);

10 OJ C 372, 9 December 1997

• a substantial increase inadvertising or sponsorshiprevenue as sportsprogrammes are a means oftargeting a specific audience,often in large numbers;

• a degree of prestige in beingthe only broadcaster showinga particularly popular sport;

• for pay-TV channels,exclusivity of rights to verypopular sports events isfundamental in order toattract new subscribers; this isespecially true for sportstheme channels: persuadingviewers with specialisedtastes to pay for specialisedchannels is the only way thatmany such channels could befinanced, since the number ofinterested viewers would betoo small to attract enoughadvertising revenue; it mayalso be vital to re-coupinvestment in infrastructure;

• the revenue may be neededby a broadcasting companywhich wants to invest incable, decoders and/orsatellites.

3. Despite the very largeamounts paid by broadcastersfor exclusive rights to themost popular sporting events,the purchases are stillprofitable as long as theacquisition price isoutweighed by advertising orsponsorship revenue orsubscription fees. Differenttypes of broadcasters, asdefined by their method offinancing (licence-fee,advertising revenue,subscription etc) are be

subject to differingconstraints upon their abilityto bid for sports rights.

4. In the CODITEL IIdecision11, the ECJ held thatexclusive licences ofperforming rights did not perse infringe Article 85(1),even though they conferredabsolute territorial protectionand might preventtransmission into aneighbouring State. TheAdvocate General hadobserved that sinceperforming rights affect thesupply of services rather thangoods and the doctrine ofexhaustion was excluded byCoditel I, such exclusivelicences would conferabsolute territorial protection.The ECJ concluded that theexercise of those rights maycome within the prohibitionof Article 85(1) where, regardhaving been had to thespecific characteristics of thatmarket, there are economic orlegal circumstances the effectof which is to restrictdistribution to an appreciabledegree. Certain parallelscould be drawn with thegranting of exclusive licencesfor broadcasting rights tosports events, which concernallowing a third party accessto land or property or to theparticipants for filmingpurposes.

5. Agreements for exclusivitymay fall within the scope ofArticle 85(1) if they lead to

11 Case 262/81

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foreclosure. Duration shouldnot be excessive in length orscope. It is not possible tostate what the maximumduration should be, as muchwill depend on individualcircumstances. The effects ofan exclusive licence willdepend on market definition.The market power of theseller and the acquirer andwhether the downstreammarket is likely to beforeclosed need to beassessed. The cumulativeeffect of the acquisition of theright may strengthen analready strong position of abroadcaster because it adds toan already attractive portfolioof sports rights. The existenceof a sublicensing policycannot, in itself, alter theneed for an individualexemption in circumstanceswhere exclusivity is caughtunder Article 85(1).

6. Under current practices, theexclusivity granted can varysignificantly. It can apply tothe live broadcasting of anentire event; to a deferredtransmission of an entireevent, or for short clips foruse in sports programmes.(For the purposes of newsreporting, it is the generalpractice, often enshrined innational legislation, for shortclips of an event to be madeavailable to all broadcasterson a non-exclusive basis). Itcan also be limited toexploitation by any of thedifferent broadcastingmodalities - in the clearbroadcasting, pay-TV or pay-

per-view. Exclusivity for allmeans of exploitation can begranted to a single operator,who either exploits some ofthe rights himself andwithdraws the remainderfrom the market, or who isprepared to sub-licence otherbroadcasters on a live,deferred or highlight basis,according to the differentmodalities. Alternatively, theright to broadcast throughonly one modality can begranted only to one operator.Exclusivity can also begranted to a number ofoperators each exploiting aparticular modality. Themore forms of exclusiveexploitation that are grantedto other broadcasters for aparticular right or rights themore the strength of eachform of exclusivity is diluted,because there is an element ofcompetition for viewersbetween the variousmodalities.

7. There are circumstanceswhen a long period ofexclusivity may be justified,for example to assist a newentrant becoming establishedin the market (the “newentrant” rationale) and inparticular, a new entrantintroducing new andexpensive technology whoneeds a long period ofexclusivity in order to recoverlarge investment costs.“Introducing these newtechnologies may requireexclusive access to particularforms of sufficientlyattractive content in order to

drive penetration andconsumer investment intonew reception equipment”12.When considering theintroduction of commerciallynew, high-risk and potentiallypro-competitive services asjustification for the grantingof an exemption for a longperiod of exclusivity, abalancing needs to be carriedout under Article 85(3). Thisis particularly relevant whenthe party is already powerfulor the partners to anagreement or a joint ventureare already part of large,powerful groups.

IV. Collective selling

1. The broadcasting rights tomatches or competitions areoften marketed centrally, orsold in exclusive bundledform, by a league orassociation representing theclubs or participants. At thenational level, this practicehas been challenged undernational cartel law bycompetition authorities inThe Netherlands13, the UK14

12 Convergence within the media industry,

and between media, information andtechnology and/or telecommunications -Prospective for competition andcompetition policy - Report to DG IVprepared by London Economics

13 The Ministry for Economic Affairs tookthe view on 6 November 1996 that thecollective selling by the KNVB to Sport7 of the broadcasting rights to matcheswas a cartel. On 28 December 1997 theMinistry issued a decision that thecollective selling of highlights of soccergames was a restriction of competitionbut gave it a temporary and transitionalexemption, on the basis of public interest

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and most recently inGermany15, where theBundesgerichtshof concludedthat the central marketing ofbroadcasting rights toEuropean Cup footballmatches by the nationalfootball association was acartel for which exemptionwas not justified. If thereexists an inter-state tradeeffect, it will be necessary toexamine whether thecollective selling of rights tobroadcasting matches or toseries of events orcompetitions results is anagreement restrictive ofcompetition contrary toArticle 85(1) of the ECTreaty and the Commissionwill have to examine whetherthe criteria for exemptioncould nevertheless be met bythe arrangements.

2. Before considering thequestion of the applicabilityof Community competitionlaw, the ownership of rightsneeds to be taken intoaccount as there is a dangerthat commercial agreementsmay collapse in a disputeabout ownership, as has beenwitnessed in the Netherlands.The question of who ownsthe rights to broadcast anygiven event (or series of

considerations, in order not to disrupt themarket.

14 Hearing of the Restrictive PracticesCourt in January 1999 of the collectiveselling by the Premier League ofbroadcasting rights to the clubs’ matches

15 Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof 11December 1997 in case DeutscherFußball-Bund, UFA Film and ISPR vBundeskartellamt

events) is not one which canbe answered by competitionlaw. It is a question governedby the applicable nationallaw. The Commission notesthe tendency which isemerging in national courtcases concerning football toconclude that the footballclubs are the primary ownersof the broadcasting rights tofootball matches in the casesexamined by the courts.

3. As ever larger sums are paidfor exclusive rights, it islikely that disputes aboutownership and the exercise ofthose rights will increase.Leagues or associations atboth the national andinternational level areincreasingly assuming thecontrol and sale ofbroadcasting rights toindividual events or matchesby change to theirconstitutions or rules. Thequestion of who owns therights has to be determinedunder national law. Criteriaunder national law fordetermining ownership ofbroadcasting rights aredifferent in different MemberStates. Ownership can bebased on variousconsiderations, such as theownership of land, “the arenarights” or who takes thecommercial risk in staging anevent. Circumstances relatingto the organisational structureof each sport will have abearing on determiningownership; these are likely tobe different for team sportssuch as football and rugby;

series in which a number ofteams or individuals competeat several locations; andevents where there is oneorganiser but where a numberof individuals take part, suchas marathons, or tennistournaments. It may benecessary for rightsbelonging to a number ofcontributors to the sport to betransferred to the organiserresponsible for the game orcompetition.

4. When considering collectiveselling or “central marketing”arrangements, it may berelevant to recall:

• the competitive situation ineach circumstance has to beevaluated, in order to avoidapproving cartel-likearrangements which could becontrary to Article 85(1),particularly when theparticipants are capable ofconcluding their owncontracts with broadcasters;

• those assuming responsibilityfor selling the rights onbehalf of individualparticipants or events mayenjoy a position of marketpower, either already held asa result of a regulatory orsupervisory function, orgained as a result of theacquisition of a large numberof rights. If the acquisition,exercise or exploitation ofthose rights is abused, Article86 is likely to be applicable;

• the conditions forinternational events may be

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different to those for nationalevents;

• collective selling ofbroadcasting rights entailsproviding a bundle of rights,which may or may not becapable of being competitorsto each other. The productmay therefore be different toa product supplied by a singlerights holder.

5. Up until now, collectiveselling of broadcasting rightsby national leagues has beenleft by the Commission to bedealt with under nationalcompetition law. Noagreements for collectiveselling had been notified tothe Commission, and it wasnot clear whether there was asignificant effect on tradebetween Member Statesarising from some of thearrangements which havebeen made so far.

6. The Commission is currentlyexamining collective sellingarrangements for interna-tional motor sports.

7. If a competition authoritydoes not permit collectiveselling of sports rights fornational events, a greaternumber of separate rights willbe available to broadcasters.Collective selling or centralmarketing can be the sourceof other competition issuesrelated to the broadcasting ofsports events.

8. Collective selling arrange-ments, if they cannot beshown not to be a restriction

of competition, are likely toaffect the functioning of themarket, because they permitonly periodic transactions,restrict output and bundle theproducts offered. Collectiveselling can facilitate otherrestrictive practices, such asgranting a long duration ofexclusivity, givingpreferential treatment to oneset of rights at the expense ofanother, or the denying of therights to other broadcasters. Itcould result in the hinderingof the development of othersports or participants in thesport, which as aconsequence of preferentialtreatment for some classes ofparticipants, were not able toobtain satisfactory televisionexposure or attract sponsors.Such restrictions on outputcould in turn slow down thedevelopment of newbroadcasting technologies atthe national and cross-borderlevels. The terms of theagreements will affect theprice broadcasters are willingto pay for the rights.Whether the resultingrestraints on competition areindispensable to thefunctioning of the marketwould depend on all thecircumstances.

9. Before it could be saidwhether such arrangementsfulfil the criteria forexemption under Article85(3), a thoroughexamination is required, first,of the extent of anyrestrictions of competitionunder Article 85(1) that arise

for the individual partiesconcerned. Such restrictiveagreements must meet thefour criteria for exemption ofArticle 85(3). The fulfilmentof these criteria should not bebased on purely commercialconsiderations. The specialcharacteristics of the sport inquestion have to be taken intoaccount. These could include,for example, the need toensure “solidarity” betweenweaker and strongerparticipants or the training ofyoung players, which couldonly be achieved throughredistribution of revenuefrom the sale of broadcastingrights. Such aims would haveto be a genuine and materialpart of the objectives andones which could not beachievable under lessrestrictive arrangements.

V. Sublicensing

1. If an agreement involvingexclusivity for rights givesthe parties the possibility ofeliminating competition inrespect of a substantial part ofthe products or services inquestion, a possible remedycould be to require them toshare with third parties therights or advantages theyhave obtained. This may beparticularly relevant when theowner of important rights isalso their exploiter in avertical joint venture with abroadcaster. Sublicensingcould therefore be necessaryin order to comply with Art.85(3)(b) as a means of

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reducing the anti-competitiveaffect of exclusivity or ofjoint buying of sports rights.For certain events, such as theOlympics, sublicensing maybe the only fair andcompetitive way to deal withexclusivity. Beforeconsidering arrangements forsublicensing undercompetition law, it shouldfirst be established whetherthe exclusivity is justified.

2. Sublicensing should not beregarded as a solution to allthe competition issues whicharise. In most cases it will benecessary and sufficient todeal with, for example,exclusivity which is of anexcessive duration or scope.To be effective, the value ofsublicensing will depend onthe terms on whichsublicenses are granted.These should be known, asfar as possible, in advance,because the value of theexclusive rights to thecompany obtaining themdepends on any duty tosublicence which it mayhave. The terms ofsublicences should betransparent. They should benon-discriminatory asbetween licensees in eachcategory. Where the price ofthe sublicences isunregulated, this may resultin prices at monopoly levelsand it is not desirable for acompetition authority toallow the broadcaster toobtain exclusive rights andthen charge otherbroadcasters monopoly

prices. Another adverseconsequence could be that ofexcluding small-scale entry."Terms" must deal withpayment, access to uneditedmaterial, embargoes on livetransmission or ontransmission at popular times,and subject matter (interestand importance of the gamesor events sublicensed). Thereshould be provision forsettlement of disputes. Theremay be different categories ofsublicences. The advantagesobtained by the parties incomparison with thesublicense must beproportionate, so thatsublicences are of real valueto the licensees : the ownerof the exclusive rights maynot keep all the valuablerights for itself.

3. The Commission will notnormally fix the terms ofsublicences, and may not findit easy to ensure that theterms are reasonable. Insummary, encouragingsublicensing is not by itselfeither a satisfactory or aconvenient way of solving thecompetition problems ofsports broadcasting.

VI. Collective purchasing bybroadcasting companies

1. Broadcasting companiessometimes join together toacquire the right to broadcastsports events. Whether thiskind of collective buying fallsunder Article 85(1), and inwhat circumstances it fulfils

the requirements of Article85(3), depends on all thecircumstances. For example,whether such arrangementsare anti-competitive willdepend, inter alia, on whetherthe parties are found to beimportant competitors with astrong position in the relevantmarket, and the scope andduration of the exclusiverights purchased. Inparticular, collectivepurchasing will not raisecompetition problems if noone member of the groupalone would have theresources to bid successfullyfor any of the rights inquestion, or where a numberof small broadcasters cometogether which each,individually, have nopossibility of acquiring therights in question.

2. Where collective purchasingis caught under Article 85(1),exemption can be envisagedif its purpose is pro-competitive, for example, bymaintaining a broadcastingsector with limited resourcesfacing the big fourbroadcasters, BSkyB, CanalPlus, Bertelsmann and Kirch,on the market for theprocurement of broadcastingrights, or for events of majornational public importance,such as the Olympic Games.

3. The removal of joint sellingarrangements will minimisethe need for collectivepurchasing.

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* * *

This paper only intends to laydown some broad lines identifiedto date for the application ofcompetition law in a sector in

which the structure andeconomics are very complex andwhich is the subject ofcontinuous and very rapiddevelopments. Practice inrelation to Articles 85 and 86

will be developed by theCommission on a case-by-casebasis.

4 May 1998

OPINION AND COMMENTSIn this section DG IV officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It is important to recognisethat the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. They have not beenadopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied uon as a statement of the Commission’sor DG IV’s views.


Introduction

Au Conseil européenextraordinaire sur l’emploi,premier sommet européenentièrement consacré à ce sujet,qui s’est tenu à Luxembourg les20 et 21 novembre 1997, lesÉtats membres ont abouti à unaccord sur des “lignesdirectrices” pour renforcerl’action de l’Union européenneen faveur de l’emploi. Il apparaîtclairement à la lecture de cesorientations que la lutte pourl’emploi est multiforme etqu’elle nécessite une multi-thérapie. Toutes les politiques dela Commission sont enconséquence mobilisées. Plu-sieurs des axes définis par ces“lignes directrices” intéressentdirectement la politique deconcurrence: soit de façonimplicite lorsque par exemple ilest question de l’outil decroissance que constitue “unmarché intérieur performant”auquel contribuent activementles politiques de décloison-nement des marchés oud’allègement des chargesadministratives pour les Petiteset Moyennes Entreprises, soit defaçon explicite comme dans cettesection intitulée “Les politiquescommunautaires au service del’emploi” au nombre desquellesfigure la concurrence. Lesommet de Luxembourg assigne

clairement un rôle en matièred’emploi à la politique deconcurrence, principalementdans le domaine des aides d’état.Le paragraphe 27 des “lignesdirectrices” affirme en effet qu’ilconvient de “s’orienter vers desrégimes d’aides qui favorisentl’efficacité économique etl’emploi sans pour autantentraîner des distortions deconcurrence”.

Le champ d’action de lapolitique de concurrence enfaveur de l’emploi est beaucoupplus étendu que celui que leslignes directrices lui attribuent.Certes, la résolution du problèmedu chômage implique unflorilège de solutions diverses etcomplexes. Toutefois, lapolitique de concurrence a unrôle non négligeable à jouer danscet objectif de soutien àl’emploi. En effet, par l’appuiqu’elle apporte à la croissance,liée au niveau de compétitivitédes marchés qu’elle s’efforce derendre plus ouverts, par sacontribution active aumouvement de libéralisation desindustries de réseaux, par sesactions en direction des petites etmoyennes entreprises, de larecherche et de l’innovation,mais aussi au travers de sonactivité de contrôle en matièred’aides d’état, la politique deconcurrence reste l’une des

politiques majeures de laCommission qui puisse au mieuxcontribuer à améliorer lasituation de l’emploi en Europe.

1. Le champ d’action de lapolitique de concurrence enfaveur de l’emploi

Dans son discours donné à laconférence sur la croissance etl’emploi qui se tenait à Rome enjuin 1996, le Président Santerindiquait déjà quelle devait êtrel’approche globale que devaientsuivre la Commission et sespartenaires pour améliorer lasituation de l’emploi en Europe.Il définissait quatre orientations:créer un cadre macro-économique tourné versl’emploi, engager une actionrésolue en vue d’achever lemarché intérieur, accélérer laréforme des systèmes d’emploi,enfin utiliser au mieux lespolitiques structurelleseuropéennes. Dans ses lignesdirectrices en faveur de l’emploidu 1er octobre 1997, laCommission, quant à elle,proposa aux États membresquatre axes d’action: libérerl’initiative entrepreneuriale,développer une nouvelle culturede l’emploi, encourager laflexibilité, renforcer l’égalitéentre hommes et femmes. Lesconclusions du sommet deLuxembourg de novembre 1997reprennent pour une large partces propositions. La politique deconcurrence peut concourir ausuccès d’au moins trois desquatre objectifs définis par lePrésident Santer et contribuerefficacement à la réalisation desobjectifs fixés par le Sommet de

La politique de concurrence, unepolitique en faveur de l’emploi

Eric Cuziat, DG IV-A-1

â OPINION AND COMMENTS


Luxembourg. En effet, par sonaction sur la structure desmarchés, elle exerce uneinfluence directe sur lacompétitivité de l’économieeuropéenne et sur son niveau decroissance, et, en conséquence,participe à cette orientation ducadre macro-économique versl’emploi. Les efforts déployéspar la Commission au travers desa politique de concurrence pourdécloisonner les marchés au seinde l’Union, apportent un soutienmajeur à l’achèvement dumarché intérieur. Enfin, lecontrôle des aides d’état, commele souligne le paragraphe 27 des“lignes directrices”, permet defaire en sorte que de telles aidescontribuent à créer desentreprises saines et donc desemplois durables, tout engarantissant une concurrenceloyale. Gageons aussi qu’uneréduction des budgets consacrésaux aides d’État permettrait delibérer des ressources quipourraient être réorientées versdes actions plus prometteuses enmatière de création d’emplois.

2. La libéralisation et l’emploi

La politique de libéralisation desservices publics de l’énergie, destransports ou des télécommuni-cations, que la Commissionmène avec mesure dans lerespect des missions d’intérêtéconomique général, conduit elleaussi au soutien d’une politiqueen faveur de l’emploi. La miseen concurrence des opérateursjouïssant au préalable d’unesituation de monopole etl’introduction de nouveauxentrants sur ces marchés se

traduisent de façon quasi-immédiate par une améliorationde la productivité des anciensmonopoleurs et une réduction deleurs coûts d’exploitation. Cephénomène génère un doubleeffet positif: il renforce lacompétitivité des anciensmonopoleurs et provoque desbaisses tarifaires pour lesconsommateurs. Cette tendancedécroissante des prix desservices des industries de réseauest un facteur déterminant pourla compétitivité de l’industrieeuropéenne dont les différentsrapports du Groupe consultatifsur la Compétitivité ont montréque les entreprises souffraientd’un véritable handicap vis-à-visde leurs principaux concurrentsinternationaux, lié aux prixélevés de ces services. Dans lepremier rapport par exemple, ilest fait état d’une étude quimontre que certains de cesservices coûtaient en 1995, 22fois plus cher en Europe qu’auxÉtats-Unis. Le renforcementglobal de la compétitivité denotre économie soutient lacroissance et favorise l’emploi.

Par ailleurs, le processus delibéralisation entamé dans lessecteurs de haute technologiecomme les télécommunicationsprovoque du fait del’introduction de la concurrenceune émulation entre lesentreprises en termes derecherche, d’investissements etde développement de nouveauxproduits et services, émulationpropre à stimuler la créationd’emplois. La libéralisationconduit également de nouveauxentrants à pénétrer des marchés

jusque là forclos et à créer denouveaux emplois. Une étuderéalisée en 19961 a montré quedans le cadre d’une libéralisationrapide du secteur des télécom-munications et d’une diffusionaccélérée des technologies, lacréation globale nette (ou lasauvegarde) de 1,3 millionsd’emplois en Europe pouvait êtreenvisagée en 2005. Dans le cadred’un scénario où la libéralisationserait moins rapide, l’impact estévalué à 200 000 emploisnouveaux..

Au nombre de ces emplois,l’étude précitée souligne quel’apparition de nouveauxopérateurs et prestataires deservices se traduirait par lacréation de 50 000 à 160 000emplois, selon les scénarios.

L’ouverture des transportsaériens à la concurrence aprovoqué la restructuration descompagnies nationales qui s’esttrès souvent traduite par dessuppressions d’emplois. En1994, les membres de l’AEA quiregroupe les compagniesaériennes européennes avaientainsi supprimé 5000 postes detravail. Il y a fort à parierqu’après la mise en oeuvre desrestructurations, dans uncontexte d’accroissement dutrafic aérien, ces mêmescompagnies renoueront avec lescréations d’emplois. On sesouvient du plan de survie deBritish Airways en 1982 quientraîna une réduction de 1 Les effets sur l’emploi du processus de

libéralisation dans le secteur destélécommunications, Rapport final, BIPEConseil, octobre 1996.



quelques 20 000 emplois sur les55 000 que comptait l’entreprise.Après plusieurs années d’efforts,la compagnie ayant renoué avecles bénéfices, British Airways aretrouvé ses effectifs du débutdes années 1980. Ces emploisdoivent être considérés commedes emplois plus sains et plusstables. Parallèlement, lalibéralisation a donné naissanceà de nouvelles compagniesaériennes2, créatrices d’emplois.Les tarifs concurrentiels de cesentreprises qui ont entraîné unebaisse générale des prix dans cesecteur ont permis à descatégories nouvelles deconsommateurs d’accéder aumarché du transport aérien3 et cefaisant ont accru la demandeglobale sur ce marché. Cetaccroissement de la demande,fruit de la libéralisation, réduit lerisque d’un simple transfert despostes de travail et garantit unestabilité des emplois maintenusou créés.

Ainsi, la politique de laCommission en matièred’ouverture des industries deréseaux à la concurrence,politique qui demeurerespectueuse des missions deservice public, est-ellegénératrice d’effets positifs surl’emploi.

2 Sur dix ans (1986-1996), le nombre total de

compagnies aériennes communautairesopérant des vols réguliers est passé de 99 à156. Entre 1993 et 1996, 80 compagnies secréèrent, en majorité des compagniesprivées, tandis que 60 disparaissaient, ycompris à la suite de regroupement.

3 Il est estimé qu’environ 90 à 95% despassagers voyagent désormais à des prixréduits.(1996).

3. Une action multiforme enfaveur de l’emploi

Par des actions plus ponctuelles,la politique de concurrence peutégalement contribuer à soutenirles autres politiques favorables àla création d’emplois.

Il est bien connu que les Petiteset Moyennes Entreprises sontdes viviers en matière d’emplois.Toute action qui tend à libérerleur initiative entrepreneurialeest donc positive. Le sommet deLuxembourg recommandenotamment de simplifier leurenvironnement réglementaire etadministratif. Dans ses réformeslégislatives en cours, laCommission a tenu compte decette exigence, y compris dans ledomaine de la concurrence. Nonpas que ces règles vont àl’encontre de la créationd’emplois puisqu’elles cherchentà créer les conditions optimalesde fonctionnement des marchés,mais, dans la mesure où leséventuelles restrictions deconcurrence mises en oeuvre parles PME ont rarement un effetsensible sur le marché commun,la Commission considère qu’iln’y a pas lieu d’alourdirinutilement la chargeadministrative de ces entreprisesqui se caractérisent par leurcapacité d’initiative et leurcélérité. C’est ainsi que lacommunication sur les accordsd’importance mineure réserve untraitement plus favorable auxPME qui se voient exemptéessous certaines conditions del’application des règles deconcurrence. La Commission aadopté une démarche parallèle

en ce qui concerne le contrôledes aides d’État, dans ses lignesdirectrices sur les aides auxPME. De même, certains textesqui cherchent à allèger lescontraintes règlementaires etadministratives des grandesentreprises peuvent égalementvoir leurs effets bénéfiques serépercuter au stade des PME.Ainsi, le règlement d’exemptionconcernant les accords detransfert de technologie quifavorise la diffusion rapide desinnovations technologiquesintéresse les PME qui, dans lessecteurs de haute technologie,sont de grandes consommatricesde produits innovants.

Le Conseil indique égalementdans ses conclusions que larecherche et l’innovationconstituent des facteursimportants pour la croissance etdonc l’emploi. La politique deconcurrence adopte en généralune attitude bienveillante àl’égard de ces alliances quicontribuent à la découverte denouveaux produits et services età la diffusion de l’innovationtechnologique. Elle demeuretoutefois vigilante sur le respectdes principes de concurrenceafin que tous les acteurséconomiques puissent tirer profitde ces innovations et intensifierle jeu de la concurrence, facteurde compétitivité et de croissance.Dans cet esprit, la Commission apar exemple autorisé la créationd’entreprises communes entreconcurrents puissants ayant pourobjet le développement et lafabrication de nouveauxproduits: Pasteur Mérieux/Merckdans le domaine pharmaceutique



(1994) ou ATR/BAe dans lesecteur aéronautique (1995) parexemple. La Commission estégalement conduite à faire ensorte que certains accords necomportent pas de clauses quirestreignent la capacitéinnovatrice de l’un descontractants comme dansl’affaire Santa Cruz/Microsoft(1997). En outre, il convient derappeler ici que la Commissioncherche à faciliter la recherche etla diffusion de l’innovation enallègeant la charge adminis-trative qui pèse sur lesentreprises en en simplifiant lecadre réglementaire: citons icil’adoption du règlement sur lestransferts de technologie, déjàmentionné, ou les réflexionsengagées sur le règlementd’exemption sur les accords derecherche et développement,mais aussi l’action de laCommission en ce qui concernela société de l’information où lestechnologies jouent un rôlecapital. Ajoutons enfin que lesaides à la recherche, autoriséesdès lors qu’elles necontreviennent pas aux dispo-sitions communautaires enmatière de concurrence, peuventconstituer des incitations nonnégligeables à la recherche et àl’innovation.

4. L’exigence sociale

Bien entendu, l’intensification dela concurrence se traduit aussipar des restructurations et parl’éviction des acteurs du marchéles moins dynamiques, ce quiinévitablement implique, defaçon conjoncturelle, lafermeture d’unités de production

et donc des effets négatifs surl’emploi. Dans de tellescirconstances, il est difficiled’expliquer que l’action enfaveur de la compétitivité n’estpas, partiellement au moins et àcourt terme sans doute,destructrice d’emplois. Au-delàdes solutions en termes decroissance auxquelles lapolitique de concurrence peutcontribuer activement, il estnécessaire d’apporter uneréponse sociale à ces effetsconjoncturels, car l’Europe,comme le rappelait le présidentSanter, ne saurait être qu’un seulprojet économique.

Tout d’abord, il faut soulignerque dans l’application des règlesde concurrence, la Commissionn’ignore pas de prendre encompte des considérationsd’ordre social, respectant ainsil’objectif de cohésionéconomique et sociale qui figureau nombre des objectifsfondamentaux du traité. Cela estparticulièrement vrai dans ledomaine des aides d’État nonseulement lorsqu’il s’agitd’évaluer la compatibilité desaides à l’emploi ou à laformation mais aussi lorsque laCommission apprécie la légalitéde certaines aides sectorielles ourégionales et notamment lesplans de restructuration qui lesaccompagne. Cela est vraiégalement dans le cadre ducontrôle des concentrations. Leconsidérant 13 du règlementstipule en effet que “laCommission se doit de placerson appréciation dans le cadregénéral de la réalisation desobjectifs fondamentaux du traité,

y compris celui du renforcementde la cohésion économique etsociale”. C’est dans l’affaireKali und Salz/MdK que laCommission rappela pour lapremière fois cette exigence enautorisant une concentration surla base du principe del’”entreprise défaillante”. Demême, dans son arrêt du 27 avril1995, (affaire Nestlé/Perrier), leTribunal de premier instance asouligné que dans son analysed’une concentration, laCommission peut dans certainescirconstances tenir compte deconsidérations d’ordre social.Rappelons enfin que la Cour dejustice dans l’arrêt Metro-Saba afait référence au progrès socialcomme cause d’exemption d’uneentente, bien que les dispositionsde l’article 85-3 du traité ne leprévoient pas de façon expresse4.La Commission cherche doncdans la mesure du possible àconcilier les principes de libreconcurrence et de cohésionéconomique et sociale de sorteque l’application du droitcommunautaire de laconcurrence ne se fasse pas aumépris du tissu social.

En outre, il est nécessaire derespecter le dialogue social:informer les représentants dupersonnel et discuter avec euxdes solutions alternatives 4 La Cour observe en effet qu’une obligation

se justifiait dans la mesure où elleconstituait “en ce qui concerne le maintiende l’emploi, un élément de stabilisationdont la recherche rentre, au titre del’amélioration des conditions générales deproduction, spécialement dans lescirconstances d’une conjonctureéconomique défavorable, dans le cadre desobjectifs que l’article 85-3 permet deviser”.



possibles, comme le stipule ladirective communautaire sur leslicenciements collectifs. Cedialogue, au-delà des exigenceshumaines, répond aussi à unenouvelle conception del’efficacité économique.Associer les salariés del’entreprise aux décisionsstratégiques de ce type est unfacteur de gain de compétitivité.Il est sans doute nécessaireégalement d’introduire unecertaine flexibilité dans lemarché du travail, comme lerecommandait déjà le LivreBlanc de la Commission sur lacroissance, la compétitivité etl’emploi et que le Conseil deLuxembourg à fort justementrappelé, d’inciter les salariés à lamobilité professionnelle etgéographique, afin de faciliterles reconversions vers lesnouveaux marchés créateursd’emploi, de développer lesactions de formation et ledéveloppement des compétencesau sein de l’entreprise ou encorede réduire le coût relatif de lamain d’oeuvre non qualifiée. Cesmesures qui figurent dans lespropositions du Groupeconsultatif sur la compétitivitédépassent la politique deconcurrence à proprement parleret relèvent du champ plus largede la politique économique etsociale dont la première neconstitue qu’un des aspects. Ilappartient sans doute auxservices en charge de laconcurrence de placer leur actiondans cette perspective.

5. Le contrôle des aides d’état

Il est un autre domaine importantoù la Commission trouve àappliquer le principe de lacohésion économique et sociale,à savoir celui du contrôle desaides d’état. Ce n’est pas sansraison que les conclusions duSommet de Luxembourg sefocalisent sur cet aspect. Eneffet, les aides d’État peuventêtre particulièrement nuisibles aufonctionnement concurrentieldes marchés et par conséquent àla croissance et à l’emploi dansla mesure où ces aides isolent etprotègent les entreprises qui ensont bénéficiaires des effets duprocessus concurrentiel. Lesrestructurations nécessaires deces entreprises maintenuesartificiellement en activité ensont retardées. Une tellesituation ne manque pas dedissuader les entreprises nonbénéficiaires d’entrer sur cesmarchés protégés. Ainsi, lesrégions ou les secteurséconomiques dans lesquels lesaides d’État produisent leurseffets entrent-elles dans unphénomène de sclérose qui necontribue ni à promouvoir lacroissance, ni à créer desemplois stables et durables.C’est pourquoi l’article 92 duTraité interdit l’octroi d’aidespubliques à certaines entreprisesqui conduisent à fausser laconcurrence dans le marchécommun. Il n’en autorise pasmoins sous certaines conditionsles aides nécessaires à larestructuration des entreprises endifficulté ou au développementdes régions les plus défavoriséesde l’Union.

En ce qui concerne le premierpoint, la Commission,conformément aux lignesdirectrices qu’elle a publiées en1994, subordonne l’approbationdes aides à la restructuration aurespect de conditions strictes quipermettent de s’assurer que cesaides, limitées dans le temps etde façon irrévocable, ne visentpas à maintenir artificiellementdes entreprises, et donc desemplois, en sursis mais à opérerun rétablissement de la viabilitéà long terme de l’entreprise dansun délai raisonnable. Dans cesconditions, les aides publiquesconcourrent à renforcer lacapacité des entreprises àaffronter la concurrence sur lesmarchés. C’est ainsi que laCommission a approuvé larecapitalisation et les plans derestructuration de nombreusescompagnies aériennes natio-nales, ces dernières années.

En matière d’aides à finalitérégionale, la Commission sur labase de critères économiquess’attache à circonscrire les zonesles plus défavorisées de l’Unionet à déterminer pour chacuned’elles le niveau d’intensité desaides, afin que les aides d’étatsoient ciblées sur les régions del’Union réellement en difficulté.Alors que le cinquième rapportsur les aides d’état souligne unarrêt de la tendance à laréduction des aides, laCommission vient d’adopter denouvelles lignes directricesconcernant ces aides à finalitérégionale. Elles répondent aubesoin de plus en plus ressenti deréduire l’effet distorsif des aidessur la concurrence et d’assurer



une plus grande efficacité pourle développement des régions enretard ou en difficulté.

Le contrôle des aides d’étatcontribue ainsi, de façondécisive, à la cohésionéconomique et sociale del’Union européenne dans saglobalité. Il permet notammentd’éviter que certaines aides quine seraient pas directement liéesau renforcement de lacompétitivité ou dudéveloppement régional nemaintiennent artificiellement enactivité des entreprises ou desrégions et ne transfèrent endéfinitive leurs problèmesd’emploi, temporairementrésolus, vers d’autres entreprisesou régions qui, elles, nebénéficieraient d’aucune aidepublique. Veiller à ce que cestransferts ne se produisent, c’estaussi anticiper sur d’éventuellessurenchères entre États ourégions en ce qui concerne levolume des aides accordées pourun résultat neutre en matièred’emplois.

Enfin, la Commission estparticulièrement attentive auxaides publiques destinées àl’emploi. De manière générale,un dispositif d’allégement decharges sociales pour un secteurd’activité particulier estconsidéré comme un systèmed’aides au fonctionnement. Cesdernières sont reconnues commeperturbant fortement leséchanges intra-communautaireset faussant gravement laconcurrence entre les Étatsmembres sur le long terme. LaCour de justice a confirmé dans

sa jurisprudence le caractèred'aide d'État de toute mesured’allégement de charges socialesou fiscales qui ne se justifie paspar la nature et l’économie dusystème dans lequel elles’inscrit.

En revanche, la Commission afait preuve d’ouverture et debienveillance à l’égard d’aides àl’emploi notamment pour lescatégories les plus défavoriséesde chômeurs ou pour les zonesurbaines difficiles tout ens’entourant des garantiesnécessaires pour donner unvéritable effet utile à l’objectifde création nette d’emploisstables. C’est ainsi qu’à la suitede la notification par la Francede son pacte de relance pour laville, consistant notamment dansdes interventions financières del’État, la Commission a expriméune position de principefavorable à l’égard de ces aidesdont l’objectif est de résoudreautant que faire se peut lesproblèmes dont souffrentcertaines zones urbaines.

Conclusion

Contrairement à une idée reçue,la mise en oeuvre d’unepolitique de concurrence estcompatible avec une action enfaveur de l’emploi. Elle est àmême en effet de contribuer aumaintien voire à la créationd’emplois stables et durables enEurope. Dans un contexted’internationalisation croissantedes marchés, la bataille pourl’emploi se gagnera sur le terrainde la compétitivité. A certainségards, il n’est pas faux

d’affirmer qu’un marché à hautdegré de concurrence prépare lesemplois de demain.

À n’en pas douter, une politiquede concurrence, menée sansraison, serait à tout le moinsindifférente vis-à-vis del’emploi. Or, la Commissionconduit sa politique deconcurrence de façon équilibréeen respectant le principe decohésion économique et socialeou celui de service d’intérêtgénéral, dès lors que lefonctionnement concurrentieldes marchés n’est pas mis encause. Il s’agit non pasd’appliquer les règles deconcurrence de manière extrême,mais de tenir compte desdifficultés sociales dans unemesure compatible avec lesrègles du traité.

La Commission ne méconnaitpas les effets destructeurs surl’emploi des restructurationsqu’implique l’intensification dela concurrence. C’est pourquoi,elle promeut le dialogue socialqui est à la base du modèleeuropéen mais incite égalementles partenaires sociaux à fairepreuve d’imagination en matièred’organisation du travail etsoutient les actions menées enmatière de flexibilité ou detemps partiel qui ont donné desrésultats encourageants danscertains États membres del’Union.

La bataille pour l’emploi segagnera de deux façons :

-par le développement de lacroissance économique, en



misant notamment sur l’inno-vation et les produits de hautetechnologie;

-par une modification del’organisation du travail dans lesens d’une plus grande

flexibilité, sans renoncer pourautant au modèle socialeuropéen.

Some of the main recentcontroversial issues in thetelecommunications sector arerelated to prices for access toservices, networks and otherfacilities of the incumbenttelecommunications operators.Already in the run-up to the fullliberalisation of the Europeantelecommunications sector asfrom 1 January 1998 (cf. Article2 of Commission Directive90/388/EEC, OJ No L 192,24.7.1990, p. 10, as amended byCommission Directive96/19/EC, OJ No L 74,22.3.1996, p. 13), networkaccess pricing and, morespecifically, interconnectiontariffs have proven to be ofcrucial importance for themarket entry of competitors.After the full liberalisation,access pricing by the incumbentoperators has become even moreimportant, as competitors try togain market share in the coremarkets of the traditionalcarriers, i.e. voice telephony and

the underlying networkinfrastructure.

THE GENERALFRAMEWORK

As the central problem ofopening up telecommunicationsmarkets, certain aspects ofaccess to facilities of the formermonopoly undertakings havebeen specifically addressed insecondary Communitylegislation. For interconnectionto the telephone network, themost important examples ofaccess in telecommunications, aset of sector-specific rules werecreated in the framework of thedirectives on Open NetworkProvision (ONP), especially bythe one concerninginterconnection (Directive97/33/EC, OJ No L 199,26.7.1997, p. 32). Theseprovisions, which have to betransposed by the Member Statesinto domestic law and applied by

the national telecommunicationsregulators, are more specificthan the general competitionrules of the EU and will maketheir application unnecessary inmany cases. In principle, though,the competition provisions,including Article 86 EC-Treaty,continue to be applicablealongside the ONP rules.However, Article 86 EC-Treatyempowers the Commission onlyto carry out an a posterioricontrol of abuse. This meansthat, in general, the Commissionis entitled to intervene, be it at itsown initiative or upon acomplaint, only once the pricesare effectively charged by thetelecommunications operatorconcerned.

To take account of theimportance of the competitionrelated problems of access intelecommunications, theCommission adopted on 31March 1998 a notice on theapplication of the competitionrules to access agreements in thetelecommunications sector (cf.the contribution by K. Coates inthis issue), which inter aliaexplains how the Commissionintends to apply Article 86 EC-Treaty to these issues.

According to Article 86 EC-Treaty, the abuse of a dominantposition within the common

Commission Practice concerningexcessive pricing inTelecommunications

By Marcel HAAG and Robert KLOTZ, DG IV-C-1



market shall be prohibited. Thisprovision explicitly mentions inits paragraph 2 lit. a that such anabuse may in particular consistin “directly or indirectlyimposing unfair purchasing orselling prices to othercompanies”. In case that such anabuse is found, the Commissionis empowered, pursuant toCouncil Regulation 17/62implementing Articles 85 and 86EC-Treaty (OJ No. 13,21.2.1962, p. 204/62), to obligethe companies concerned toterminate the abuse and toimpose fines.

Although price abuses areexplicitly mentioned in Article86 EC-Treaty, formalCommission decisionsconcerning price abuse are rare.One of the main reasons for theabsence of a more extensive caselaw can be found in the practicaldifficulties of establishing priceabuse. In particular as regardsexcessive pricing, little case lawhas developed so far.

According to the European Courtof Justice, a price is excessive ifit is “excessive in relation to theeconomic value of the serviceprovided” (Case 26/75, GeneralMotors Continental, ECR 1975,p. 1367, para. 12). The Courtheld that one method ofestablishing a price excess is bycomparing the price and theproduction cost of a product. InUnited Brands, the Court statedthat an “excess could, inter alia,be determined objectively if itwere possible for it to becalculated by making acomparison between the sellingprice of the product in question

and its cost of production” (Case27/76, United Brands, ECR1978, p. 207, para. 251).However, given the practicaldifficulties in many cases todetermine the production cost ofa product or service, the Courtalso admitted other methods ofcalculation. In Ahmed Saeed, theCourt indicated that Communitylegislation setting out pricingprinciples may be taken intoaccount (Case 66/86, AhmedSaeed, ECR 1989, p. 838, para.43). Furthermore, such anassessment may be made bycomparing the prices charged forthe same product or service onother geographic markets (cf.Case 395/87, Tournier, ECR1988, p. 2521, para. 38; andJoint Cases 110/88, 241/88 and242/88, Lucazeau, ECR 1988, p.2811, para. 25). In these cases,the Court stated that “when anundertaking holding a dominantposition imposes scales of feesfor its services which areappreciably higher than thosecharged in other Member Statesand where a comparison of thefee levels has been made on aconsistent basis, that differencemust be regarded as indicative ofan abuse of a dominant position.In such a case, it is for theundertaking in question to justifythe difference by reference toobjective dissimilarities betweenthe situation in the MemberStates concerned and thesituation prevailing in all theother Member States.” Inparticular, a comparison betweenthe prices charged by a dominantundertaking and those chargedon comparable competitivemarkets could, according to the

Court, provide a basis forassessing whether or not theprices charged by the dominantundertaking are fair (cf. Case30/87, Bodson, ECR 1988, p.2507, para. 31).

The assessment of the cost of aservice is particularly difficult inthe telecommunications sector,as many of the dominantoperators in the EU have untilrecently been operated asgovernment departments underpublic budget rules. Appropriatecost allocation is thereforecurrently in many casesimpossible. In the future,however, it can be expected thatcost allocation will be facilitatedby the cost accountingrequirements set out in the ONPframework (cf. Article 7 ofEuropean Parliament andCouncil Directive 97/33/EC, OJNo L 199, 26.7.1997, p. 32).

RECENT PRACTICE INTHE ASSESSMENT OFPRICE ABUSE

In spite of the practicaldifficulties entailed in theapplication of Article 86 EC-Treaty to excessive pricing, theCommission assessed a numberof such cases in thetelecommunications sector. TheCommission’s recent practice inthis field can be illustrated by thefollowing examples:

1. Upon a complaint byITT Promedia, the Belgiandirectory-publishing subsidiaryof the US ITT World Directoriescompany, the Commission



investigated into Belgacom’sprices for access to subscriberdata for the publication oftelephone directories. Thecomplainant alleged that theprices charged by the Belgianincumbent telecommunicationsoperator were excessive anddiscriminatory in the sense ofArticle 86 EC-Treaty. TheCommission carried out anassessment of the prices charged,with the support of an expertauditing firm, and insisted infully implementing the cost-orientation principle. After theCommission had sent out aformal statement of objections atthe end of 1995, Belgacomfinally agreed, in a settlementwith the Commission, to asubstantial reduction (by morethan 90%) of these prices bydropping any variablecomponent in relation to theturnover or profit of directorypublishers. Following thecomplainant withdrawing itscomplaint, this procedure wasterminated by the Commission inApril 1997 (cf. Press ReleaseIP/97/292 of 11.4.1997).

2. In another case, theCommission dealt with theproblem of access to the networkof Deutsche Telekom (DT) onthe basis of a complaint againstDT’s business customer tariffs,which was lodged by certainproviders of corporate networkservices in Germany. TheCommission found in this casethat the introduction of suchtariffs lead to an abusive price-cost squeeze on competitors. Toget rid of this effect, theCommission invited DT inter

alia to conclude more favourableagreements on access to thepublic telephone network withcompetitors. DT subsequentlyput forward an agreementstipulating prices which wereunacceptable to competitors. Acomparative market studyordered by the Commissionshowed that the proposed priceswere exorbitant. In this study, itwas assumed that, in the absenceof special circumstances, a priceis highly likely to be abusive if itexceeds by more than 100% theones found on comparablecompetitive markets and thatunder those circumstances, thecontinuation of the procedurewould normally be warranted.As a result, DT declared itselfwilling to substantially reduce itstariffs and presented anappropriate draft contract to thecomplainants. The tariffreductions conceded by DT wereconsiderable, as they range from38% in the case of local networkaccess to 78% for access to thelong-distance network (cf. PressRelease IP/96/975 of 4.11.1996;and K. Van Miert, Wirtschaftund Wettbewerb, 1/1998, p. 7).

3. In an own-initiativeprocedure regarding accesspricing, which was opened in theearly days of January 1998, theCommission proceeded againstDT’s high fees concerning theprovision of carrier-preselectionand number portability. In orderto determine whether these feeswere excessive in the sense ofArticle 86 EC-Treaty, theCommission used its powersunder Article 11 of Regulation17/62 to request information

from undertakings and industryassociations in all EU MemberStates. With the help of thereplies provided, theCommission established acomparative market analysis, onthe basis of which an abuseassessment could be carried out.In the course of the procedure,DT considerably reduced theamounts of the fees concerned,notably for carrier preselectionby almost 50%. As Communityinterest and the rights of thirdparties did not require that theCommission continued itsexamination pending a parallelprocedure before the nationalregulatory authority, the own-initiative procedure wasterminated and the analysis ofthe information received wascommunicated to the competentnational authorities in order tosupport them in theirinvestigation of the case (cf.Press Release IP 98/430 of13.5.1998).

CONCLUSION

The preceding examples showthat in recent cases of allegedexcessive pricing in thetelecommunications sector, theCommission used a cost-priceanalysis (see case 1, supra) or,where necessary, a comparativemarket analysis (see cases 2 and3, supra), in order to assess apossible abuse. Given that anextensive body of sector-specificlegislation, including pricingprinciples, is now in place, theCommission might in the future,where appropriate, also takethose principles into account in



an assessment of a possible priceabuse.

In some of the above mentionedcases, it appears that theCommission had to use acomparative approach, becausethe necessary cost informationwas not available. To carry out acomparative analysis, theCommission either used expertstudies, in particular wherecomplex accounting informationwas required (see case 2, supra)or information gathered on thebasis of requests for informationin accordance with Regulation17/62 (see case 3, supra). It isclear that a market comparisoncan only provide an indication ofan abuse, if the differencebetween the prices charged onthe various markets issignificant. On the contrary, incases were the prices chargeddeviate only slightly from theprice level on comparative

markets, this disparity could notbe considered as giving a primafacie indication for abuse.Depending on the merits of eachindividual case, the benchmarkfor Commission interventionmay vary considerably. In thesecond case mentioned above, adifference of more then 100%between the price examined andthe price levels in comparativemarkets was found to beunacceptable. In other cases,however, the Commission mighthave to intervene even if thisdifference is significantlysmaller. In any event, evenwhere a significant differenceexists, the undertakingconcerned always has thepossibility of demonstrating thathigher prices are objectivelyjustified.

The Commission itself neveraspired to use Article 86 EC-Treaty in order to act as a price

setting authority (cf. already theFifth Report on CompetitionPolicy, 1975, point 76). RecentCommission practice in casesconcerning the telecommuni-cations sector is fully in line withthis general policy. Priceregulation has been left to thenational regulatory authorities,acting on the basis of sector-specific telecommunicationsregulations, which areharmonised under the EC ruleson ONP. However, it has alsobecome clear that theCommission will make full useof its powers under Article 86EC-Treaty wherever this isnecessary to prevent abusivepricing strategies and inparticular excessive pricingobstructing effective marketentry on the liberalisedtelecommunications markets.

Le 31 mars 1998 la Cour a renduson arrêt dans les affaires mettanten cause la légalité de la décisiondu 14 décembre 1993 par laquellela Commission a déclaré, sousconditions, le projet deconcentration entre Kali und Salz

AG (ci-après K+S) etMitteldeustche Kali AG (ci-aprèsMdK) compatible avec le marchécommun.

Cette décision avait fait l'objet dedeux recours, l'un intenté par laRépublique française, l'autre

intenté par la Sociétécommerciale des potasses et del'azote (ci-après SCPA) et par lasociété Entreprise minière etchimique (ci-après EMC),entreprise mère de SCPA.

Les griefs des requérantes àl'égard de la décision peuvent êtrerésumées comme suit:

a) la Commission n'aurait pasrespecté l'obligation qui luiincombe de collaborer avecles autorités nationales envertu de l'article 19 du

Commentaire sur l’Arrêt de la Cour du 31mars 1998 dans l’affaire ‘Kali und Salz’

F. E. González-Díaz, DG IV-B



règlement sur les concen-trations en ce que, d'une part,elle n'aurait pas fourni entemps utile des donnéesindispensables à l'appré-ciation de la pertinence de ladéfinition des marchés encause et de l'impactconcurrentiel de l'opération deconcentration, et, d'autre part,la remise de ces données àl'occasion de la réunion ducomité consultatif aurait étébeaucoup trop tardive;

b) la Commission aurait fait uneapplication incorrecte de la"failing company defence"dans son appréciation del'effet de la concentration surle marché allemand en cequ'elle n'aurait pas pris encompte la totalité de critèresretenus dans la réglementationantitrust américaine, qu'elleaurait introduit arbitrairementle critère de l'absorption desparts de marché, qu'elle auraitnégligé l'éventualité que MdKpuisse, avec des aides d’État,retrouver sa viabilité ou lapossibilité de reprise moinsdommageable pour laconcurrence, et, enfin, qu'elleaurait dû imposer desconditions précises etsuffisantes visant à ouvrir lemarché pertinent à laconcurrence;

c) la Commission aurait fait uneappréciation erronée del'opération de concentrationsur le marché communautaireà l'exception de l'Allemagneen ce que: i)le marchégéographique de référenceaurait été incorrectementdéfini; ii)le règlement sur les

concentrations ne serait pasapplicable à la création et/ourenforcement d'une positiondominante collective; iii)àsupposer même que lerèglement soit applicable à cegenre de situations, l'opérationde concentration ne donneraitpas lieu, en l'espèce, à lacréation d'une positiondominante collective;

En ce qui concerne la prétendueviolation de l'article 19 durèglement sur les concentrations,la Cour se borne à constater queles données demandées par lesautorités françaises (et transmisespar la Commission à l'occasion dela réunion du comité consultatif)n'étaient pas de nature à remettreen cause l'état du marché tel querésultant des informationscontenues dans l'avant-projet dedécision qui, lui, avait ététransmis en temps utile auxautorités françaises et au comitéconsultatif. La Cour a donc suivi,du moins implicitement, sajurisprudence traditionnelle enmatière de violation de droitsprocéduraux selon laquelle cetype de violations n’estsusceptible d'entraîner l'annu-lation d'une décision que lorsquel'absence d'irrégularité aurait puconduire à un résultat différent decelui qui aurait été retenu si cesdroits procéduraux avaient étérespectés.

Pour ce qui est de l'application dela "failing company defence", laCour accepte la thèse soutenuepar la Commission selon laquelledès lors qu'une opération deconcentration n'est pas la causede la création ou du renforcementd'une position dominante

affectant de manière significativela situation concurrentielle sur lemarché pertinent, il y a lieu de ladéclarer compatible avec lemarché commun ainsi que lescritéres d’application de cettethéorie.

S'agissant de la critique de laFrance selon laquelle laCommission aurait négligél'éventualité que MdK puisse,avec des aides d’État, retrouver saviabilité, l'analyse de la Cour estfort intéressante.

Selon la Cour l'argument de laRépublique française n’était pasfondé étant donné que, enl’espèce, MdK avait déjà reçu desaides d’État considérables et quemême avec les aides prévues dansle projet de concentration, àsavoir 1 044 millions de DM, iln'était pas probable qu'ellepouvait devenir viable.

Or, bien que la Cour n'ait pas fait,du moins formellement, del'examen des possibilités derestructuration une conditiond'application de la "failingcompany defence", l'on ne sauraitexclure, compte tenu de l'analysequ'elle a réalisée aux points 117 à120 de l'arrêt, que l'absenced'examen de cette question puisses'avérer fatal dans une autreaffaire. Par ailleurs, il semblelogique de considérer que sil'entreprise défaillante a deschances de se restructurer,éventuellement après avoirobtenu des aides d’Étatcompatibles avec le marchécommun, il est préférable, dupoint de vue de la protection de lalibre concurrence, d'interdire laconcentration. Néanmoins, ces



possibilités de restructuration nedevraient pas être purementhypothétiques mais devraient êtrefondées, d'une part, et paranalogie avec les règles enmatière d'aides à larestructuration, sur la base d'unplan de restructuration crédible,et, d'autre part, sur l'existenced'une forte probabilité d'obtentiondes aides en question.

En ce qui concerne la définitiondu marché géographique deréférence, la Cour a suivi sonapproche traditionnelle en lamatière. Ainsi, elle a mis l'accentsur l'existence d'un volumeappréciable d'importations danstous les États membres, àl'exception de l'Allemagne, enprovenance d'autres Étatsmembres, sur l'homogénéité duproduit et l'absence depréférences marquées duconsommateur pour desspécialités qui ne sont disponiblesqu'auprès des producteurs locaux,sur l'uniformité des prix dans tousles pays de la Communauté àl'exception de l'Allemagne et surl'absence d'obstacles aux fluxcommerciaux à l'intérieur de laCommunauté hormis l'Allemagneen termes de coûts de transport oud'accès aux canaux dedistribution.

Pour ce qui est de l'applicabilitédu règlement aux positionsdominantes collectives, la Cour aaccepté l'interprétation de laCommission selon laquelle s'ilétait admis que seules lesopérations de concentration quicréent ou renforcent une positiondominante des parties à laconcentration sont visées par cerèglement, la finalité de celui-ci

telle que résultant de sesconsidérants serait partiellementmise en échec en le privant ainsid'une partie non négligeable deson effet utile, sans que celas'impose au regard de l'économiegénérale du régimecommunautaire de contrôle desopérations de concentration.

En ce qui concerne laconstatation de l'existence d'uneposition dominante collectivedans le cas d'espèce, la Courcommence son analyse endécrivant le type d'analyse et leséléments de base caractérisantl'existence d'une positiondominante collective.

D’après la Cour, s'agissant d'uneprétendue position dominantecollective, la Commission esttenue d'apprécier, selon uneanalyse prospective du marchéde référence, si l'opération deconcentration dont elle est saisieaboutit à une situation danslaquelle une concurrenceeffective dans le marché en causeest entravée de manièresignificative par les entreprisesparties à la concentration et uneou plusieurs entreprises tiercesqui ont, ensemble, notamment enraison des facteurs decorrélation existant entre elles, lepouvoir d'adopter une mêmeligne d'action sur le marché etd'agir dans une mesureappréciable indépendamment desautres concurrents, de leurclientèle et, finalement, desconsommateurs1.

1 Cette référence à l’existence de facteurs

de corrélation entre les membres del’oligopole sembler indiquer que la Courn’exclut pas, a priori, l’application de lathéorie de l’oligopole à des cas de

Selon la Cour, une telle démarchenécessite un examen attentifnotamment des circonstances qui,selon chaque cas d'espèce, serévèlent pertinentes aux fins del'appréciation des effets del'opération de concentration sur lejeu de la concurrence dans lemarché de référence.

En ce qui concerne le critère de lapart de marché, la Cour constatequ'une part de marché totaled'environ 60 % répartie àconcurrence de 23% pourK+S/MdK et de 37% pour SCPAne saurait constituer par elle-même un indice décisif del'existence d'une positiondominante collective desditesentreprises.

En d'autres mots, en l'absence desymétrie entre les parts de marchédes entreprises en cause,l'existence de parts de marchécombinées assez élevées neconstitue pas un indice décisif del'existence d'une positiondominante collective.

Quant aux liens structurels entreK+S et SCPA, dont l’existence aconstitué le facteur essentiel surlequel s'est fondée la Commissionpour conclure à la création d'uneposition dominante collective, laCour observe que la Commissionn'a pas établi à suffisance de droitl'existence d'une relation causaleentre l'appartenance de K+S et deSCPA au cartel à l'exportation etleur comportement anticon-currentiel sur le marché en cause.

La Cour exige donc que laCommission montre clairement

concentration même en l’absence de lienstructurels au sens strict du terme.



une relation causale entre le lienstructurel et le comportementescompté des entreprises sur lemarché. Il ne suffit donc pas dementionner toute une série deliens structurels entre lesmembres de l'oligopole pour quela Cour accepte que ces liens sontde nature à éliminer leursrapports de concurrence.

Pour ce qui est des liens entreK+S et SCPA relatifs auxlivraisons de K+S en France, laCour relève que les seuls liensspécifiques de distributionexistant entre ces deux entreprisesportaient sur la kiesérite, c'est-à-dire un produit ne relevant pas dumarché du produit en cause, etque pour le reste, SCPA selimitait à acheter à K+S, auxconditions normales de marché,de la potasse utilisée par EMC oudestinée à la vente en dehors dumarché français. La Courconstate donc que K+S et SCPAn'avaient aucun rapport privilégiépour la distribution de produits àbase de potasse.

La Cour en conclut que lefaisceau de liens structurelsunissant K+S et SCPA, qui, selonla décision constituait le coeur dela décision litigieuse, n'est pasaussi dense et probant que ne l'avoulu faire apparaître laCommission.

Néanmoins, et malgré le fait quela Cour aurait pu terminer à cestade ci son analyse de cettepartie de la décision attaquée,étant donné que selon la décisionelle-même en l'absence de liensstructurels la concentration n'étaitpas de nature à créer une positiondominante collective, elle

examine également la question desavoir si l'argument sous-jacent àla constatation de la créationd'une position dominantecollective entre K+S/MdK etSCPA, selon lequell'«importante» agrégation deMdK à la seule entreprise K+Smaintiendra dans le chef dugroupe allemand et SCPA unintérêt commun à ne pass'engager dans une concurrenceactive l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre, estou non suffisamment fondé.

Or, bien que la Cour considèreque, compte tenu des asymétriesen termes de capacité deproduction ainsi qu'en termes depuissance économique entre K+Set MdK, d'une part, et SCPA,d'autre part, et du fait que, unmarché en baisse, tel que celui dela potasse, est généralementconsidéré comme favorisant, enprincipe, la concurrence entre lesentreprises du secteur concerné(points 235 à 239 de l'arrêt),l'existence de cet intérêt communn'a pas, en l'absence d'autreséléments décisifs, été prouvé,cette démarche sembler confirmerque la Cour n'est pas hostile àl'idée que l'existence d'uneposition dominante collectivepuisse être démontrée même enl'absence de liens structurels entreles membres de l'oligopole.

En ce qui concerne l’accord entreK+S et SCPA interdit par laCommission en 1973, la Courconsidère qu’il constitue, enraison du temps écoulé, un indiceextrêmement faible, voireinsignifiant pour faire présumerl’absence de concurrence entreK+S/MdK et SCPA.

Enfin, s'agissant de l'analyse de laCommission relative au degré depression concurrentielle pouvantêtre exercée par les concurrentssur le prétendu groupe formé parK+S/MdK et SCPA, la Courconstate que, contrairement à cequi a été dit dans la décisionattaquée, les possibilités deconcurrence des producteursétablis dans la CEI et duproducteur espagnol avaient étésoit incorrectement évaluées soitsous-estimées.

Dans ces conditions, la Cour aconclu que la Commission n'estpas parvenue à démontrerl'absence d'un contrepoidsconcurrentiel effectif à l'égard duprétendu groupe formé parK+S/MdK et SCPA.

En ce qui concerne la portée del'arrêt d'annulation, la Cour aconsidéré qu'une annulationlimitée à la partie du dispositif dela décision litigieuse qui porte surles conditions et obligationsénoncées à son point 63 n’étaitpas possible sans que la substancede cette dernière soit modifiée.En effet, selon la Cour lesditesconditions forment, avec ladéclaration de compatibilitécontenue dans le dispositif, uneunité indissociable. La Cour adonc annulé la totalité dudispositif de la décision litigieuse.Ceci signifie qu'en principe laCommission serait libre, à l'issuede l'examen de l'opération deconcentration telle que notifiéeprévu à l'article 10, paragraphe 5du règlement sur lesconcentrations, soit de la déclarercompatible, avec ou sansconditions, avec le marchécommun soit de l'interdire si,



compte tenu des conditions dumarché présentes au moment dela reprise de la procédure, celas'avère nécessaire.

En conclusion, l'arrêt de la Cour aété globalement favorable à laCommission. En effet, sur le plandes principes, la Cour a acceptél'interprétation du règlementproposée par la Commissionconcernant tant son applicabilité àla création ou au renforcementd'une position dominantecollective que la théorie de lasociété défaillante. Elle a étéaussi sensible aux difficultés

administratives découlant desdélais rigoureux imposés par lerèglement dans son examen descritiques formulées par legouvernement français à l’égardde la mise en oeuvre du devoir decollaboration étroite et constanteavec les autorités nationaleschargées des questions deconcurrence. Quant à l'analyse aufond, elle a accepté la définitiondu marché proposée dans ladécision. S'agissant del'application de la théorie del'oligopole aux faits de l'espèce,elle n'a pas remis en cause lescritères de base proposés par la

Commission mais plutôt l'examendes faits lui servant de soutiennécessaire. Elle s'est donc bornéeà rappeler les obligations quiincombent à la Commission enmatière d'instruction d'affaires deconcurrence tout en mettantl'accent sur les difficultésdécoulant de l'analyse prospectivequi caractérise l'examen préventifdes opérations de concentration.Enfin, en annulant la totalité dudispositif de la décision, elle a faitpreuve de son respect pour uneallocation correcte de tâches entreles institutions.

1. The Background With judgment of 28September 1995 the Court ofFirst Instance (CFI) annulleda Commission decision toreject the applicant’s requestto declare that the FrenchGovernment has infringed Art92 and 93 of the Treaty bygranting aid to Sécuripost. On2 April 1998 the EuropeanCourt of Justice (ECJ)rejected an appeal of the

Commission against thisjudgment. a. The Facts In 1987 the French Post Officeentrusted to its newly createdsubsidiary company SécuripostSA the transportation of moneyand valuables, which it hadpreviously carried on itself. Theapplicants are operating in thesame market. In September 1989they filed a request asking theCommission to declare, thatseveral aspects in the relation

between the Post Office andSécuripost constituted state aidand would be in violation of Art92 and 93 of the Treaty. Thesecircumstances namely regarded • Leasing of buildings to

Sécuripost• Maintenance of Sécuripost’s

vehicles• A loan of 15 000 000 FF• The prices paid by the Post

Office for the transportservices

• The secondment ofadministrative staff of thePost Office to Sécuripostwith the possibility toreassign the officials in caseof staff reduction, savingSécuripost the costs forredundancy compensation

• The consequent absence ofcontributions by Sécuripostto unemployment insurancefunds.

Comment on the Judgment of the Court of 2April 1998, Case C-367/95 P: Commission ofthe European Communities and FrenchRepublic v Chambre syndicale nationaledes entreprises de transport de fonds etvaleurs (Sytraval) and Brink’s France SARL

Ansgar HELD, DG IV-G-1



In January 1993 the Commissioninformed the applicants that ithad entered the measuresmentioned above in the registerof non notified aids. On 31December 1993 the Commissioninformed the French governmentthat it has decided to close theinvestigation because thecontested circumstances did notconstitute state aid. On thatsame day it sent a letter to theapplicants, responding to theirarguments and informing themabout its decision.

b. Decision of the Court ofFirst Instance

On 2 March 1994 the applicantsfiled an action against thisdecision at the CFI. The Courtadmitted the action, consideringthe letter of the Commission of31 December to the applicants asa decision within the meaning ofArt 189(4). The Court annulledthe Commission decision forlack of sufficient statement ofreasons, constituting aninfringement of Art 190 of theTreaty. It held that the reasonsstated for the decision do notbear out the conclusion that themeasures complained of by theapplicants did not constitute stateaid within the meaning of Art92. The Court maintained that theCommission, if the complainantwas not able to comment oninformation obtained in thecontext of the investigation, isunder an “automatic” obligationto examine any objection thecomplainant would have raised if

it had been given the opportunityto comment on this information.More alarming for Commissionservices sounded the opinion ofthe Court that the obligation tostate reasons for its decision mayin some circumstances require anexchange of views andarguments with the complainant.It found this necessary for theCommission in order to ascertainwhat view the complainant takesof the information gathered by itin the course of its inquiry. The Court, consequently, did notany more address the issuewhether the treatment ofSécuripost by the Post Officeconstituted state aid or not. 2. The Decision of the Court of

Justice On appeal of the Commissionthe ECJ upheld the decision ofthe prior instance, at least in theresult.

a. Addressee of theCommission Decision

The ECJ agreed with theCommission’s view that thecomplainants were not theaddressees of the Commissiondecision. It underlined that anydecision adopted by theCommission in the area of stateaids is only addressed to theMember States concerned. Thisapplies also if the decisionconcerns complaints fromprivate persons against statemeasures, which they consider tobe state aid. If the Commission

takes such a decision andinforms the complainant as ameasure of good administration,it still is the decision addressedto the Member State which hasto be the subject of an action of athird party and not the letterinforming this party about thedecision. This legal error, however, didnot affect the Court’s decision.The Commission couldnevertheless be challenged in theCourt by private enterprises forits conclusions in the mattersince the complainants, ascompetitors of Sécuripost, are inany case directly andindividually affected by thedecision (Art 173(4)). They musthave the possibility to contestthe decision not to open the Art93(2) procedure.

b. Violation of Art 190 The ECJ underlined that it is theCommissions obligation,pursuant to Art 190, to explain toa complainant in a sufficientlyclear way, for what reasons thefactual or legal elements of thecomplaint were not sufficient tosuggest the existence of state aid.This obligation, however, theCourt underlined, does notinclude a duty of theCommission to enter into adebate with the complainant.That would clearly overstate theprocedural obligations within thepreliminary proceeding beforethe opening of the procedureaccording to Art 93(2).



Such an obligation would indeedgravely impede the efficientwork of the responsibleCommission services and becontradictory to theCommission’s duty to concludethe preliminary phase of theprocedure without delay. In thisstage therefore it cannot beconcluded from the obligation togive a motivation for decisionsthat hearings with affectedparties are held. There is furthermore, the Courtstated, no obligation for theCommission to put itself exofficio in the place of thecomplainant and to examine anypossible comment he could havemade to facts and observationsthat came up during theinvestigation. Nevertheless the Court upheldthe finding of the first instancethat the decision of theCommission was not sufficientlymotivated. In its view theCommission failed to givereasons why it did not consideras state aid the secondment ofPost Office staff to Sécuripost,with the possibility to return it tothe Post Office, and the savingof unemployment fundcontributions by the saidcompany. Concerning the other complaintsmentioned above the ECJadmitted that the CFI hadconfounded the violation of theprocedural obligation of Art 190and the legality of the decision.While the former constituted aninfringement of an essentialprocedural requirement in the

sense of Art 173, the latterwould be a question of theinfringement of the Treaty or arule of law relating to itsapplication and could only beassessed by the court if invokedby the applicant. In fact the CFIhad concluded that theCommission had not sufficientlyassessed and examined therelevant facts and erroneouslyconsidered this as lack ofmotivation. The ECJ did, however, notassess the findings of the firstinstance with regard to thepossible manifest error ofappreciation. It did also notaddress the question whether theapplicants have invoked theseissues of law. It contented itselfwith the statement that theattacked decision suffers in anycase from a lack of motivation.This would in itself be perfectlysufficient to justify its annulmentand consequently the rejection ofthe Commission’s appeal. c. Consequences The wrong assessment of severalparts of the Commissiondecision therefore did not lead toa revision of the court ruling.The ECJ confirmed theannulment of the entire decision.It had, indeed, no other choice. Ifonly a part of the decision is notsufficiently motivated, thisaffects the essential of the wholedecision to open an Art 93(2)procedure or not. Any furtherassessment as to the complianceof other parts of the decisionwith Community law wasunnecessary.

The Commission has to take thedecision in question anew. Infact it has already decided toopen the Art 93(2) procedure in1996, after the ruling of the CFI.Any decision closing thisprocedure needs, of course, tomeet at least the same proceduralstandards as the challengeddecision, if not even more, giventhat the procedure in questionwas just a preliminary one. 3. Conclusion The judgment confirmed but didnot widen the proceduralposition of private complainantsin an Art 93 proceeding. TheCommission will have to takethe new decision in respect of all6 points raised by the applicants.Apart from the necessity tomotivate all parts of the newdecision, it will certainly behelpful to consider the remarksthe CFI has made with respect toa manifest error of appreciation. In any case it is to be welcomedin the interest of administrativeefficiency that the ECJ deniedthe existence of an obligation forthe Commission to enter intocontroversial debates withcomplainants in the course of thepreliminary proceeding of Art93(3). It can be questioned, ofcourse, if it wouldn’t have beenappropriate to open the Art 93(2)procedure in a case where the“preliminary” phase alreadylasted more than 4 years.

ANTI-TRUST RULESApplication of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st January and 30th April


Background

On 31 March 1998, theCommission adopted a Notice onthe Application of theCompetition Rules to AccessAgreements in theTelecommunications Sector (theAccess Notice).

The purpose of the AccessNotice is three-fold:

• To set out access principlesstemming from EUcompetition law as shown in alarge number of Commissiondecisions in order to creategreater market certainty andmore stable conditions forinvestment and commercialinitiative in the telecoms andmultimedia sectors;

• To define and clarify therelationship betweencompetition law and sectorspecific legislation under theArticle 100A framework (inparticular this relates to therelationship betweencompetition rules and OpenNetwork Provisionlegislation);

• To explain how competitionrules will be applied in aconsistent way across thesectors involved in theprovision of new services, andin particular to access issuesand gateways in this context.

It is hoped that the Notice will beof assistance not only to operatorsin the sector, but also to nationalcourts, competition authorities,and, particularly, regulatoryauthorities, the latter beingobliged by Community law totake account of Communitycompetition law provisions intheir implementation of theregulatory framework.

The Notice is not a formal legaltext, but is an expression of theCommission’s view as to thebest interpretation ofCommunity competition law asit applies to the most importantissues in the telecommunicationssector. The Commission willfollow the approach set out inthe Access Notice not only incases pending before it, but alsoin the context of any commentsit may make on cases pendingbefore the Court of Justice orCourt of First Instance. The

Commission will also apply theprinciples set out in the Notice inthe context of any requests fromnational courts or authorities forguidance on the application ofthe competition rules.

Procedural Issues

The first section of the Noticeexamines various proceduralissues of particular relevance tothe telecommunications sector.Community law has establisheda sector specific regulatoryregime for thetelecommunications sector,responsibility for which islargely in the hands of nationalregulatory authorities (NRAs)established in each MemberState.

There are large areas of overlapbetween the responsibilities ofthese NRAs, and theresponsibility of the Commissionand of national competitionauthorities to apply Communitycompetition rules. Given thisoverlap the Commission hassought to provide guidance as towhen it will be appropriate forthe Commission to act in aparticular case.

There is no change in caseswhich must be notified underRegulation 17 in order to benefitfrom an exemption. Similarly,cases which fall under theMerger Regulation areunaffected by the Notice.

In cases where it is not necessaryto notify to the Commission andwhich fall within the jurisdictionof the NRAs, the Commissionwould encourage applicants to

Recent Developments

Commission Notice on the Applicationof the Competition Rules to AccessAgreements in theTelecommunications Sector

Kevin COATES, DG IV-C-1

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


approach the NRAs in the firstinstance, approaching theCommission only if the applicantfeels that its rights underCommunity competition lawhave not been respected. TheCommission is encouraging thisdecentralised approach given themore detailed and specificpowers given to NRAs.However, applicants continue tohave rights under Communitycompetition law and theCommission must intervenewhere there is no otherappropriate means of protectingthose rights. The Noticetherefore sets out the criteriawhere the Commission willintervene.

Market Definition

The Commission has approved aNotice on Market Definition,and Notices such as the AccessNotice will simply refer to themore general Notice on MarketDefinition, with furtherexplanation being limited only topoints of particular importanceto the subject in question.

The Access Notice therefore setsout in general terms thedistinction between the provisionof services, and the provision ofaccess to the facilities necessaryto provide those services to end-users. The distinction isimportant to bear in mind, ashistorically telecoms operatorsare vertically integrated andwould not necessarily havedistinguished between theirdifferent operations.

Substantive Issues

Article 86

The section on Article 86 isprobably the most importantaspect of the Notice. It sets out anumber of practices which couldconstitute abuses whereoperators are either solely orjointly dominant.

In relation to refusals to grantaccess to facilities, this couldconstitute an abuse on the basisof a number of different legalarguments:• essential facilities: if the

facility is essential to thebusiness of the requestingparty;

• discrimination: if the facilityis refused to the requestingparty, but is made available toits competitors;

• bundling: if the requestingparty is offered access to thefacility only in combinationwith other elements which therequesting party does notrequire.

The Notice also looks at somedetail at various pricingproblems:• excessive pricing: if the price

charged for a good or serviceis unrelated to the costs ofprovision. In determiningthis the Commission can haveregard to the actual costs ofprovision, the price chargedby the operator forcomparable goods orservices, the price charged inother geographic areas, or theprice which would prevail ina competitive market

(building on the work of theCommission and nationalregulatory authorities in thisarea).

• discriminatory pricing: if anoperator charges differentprices for equivalenttransactions, where suchdiscrimination could have aneffect on competition. Oneexample of this would be if adominant telecoms operatorcharged different prices forcall termination depending onwhether the call originated ona fixed or a mobile network.

• predatory pricing: if anoperator charges a price for agood or service below whichit could only make a profit byweakening or eliminating oneor more competitors. Again,drawing on the work of theCommission and the nationalregulatory authorities, thisdetermination would tend tobe based on costs which areincremental to the provision ofthe service, over a period oflonger than one year.

Article 85

The Notice also looks briefly atArticle 85 issues: in the currentdevelopment of thetelecommunications sector, thereis relatively little concern aboutthe possible anti-competitiveimplications of interconnectionagreements. Concerns related tomarket partitioning may developover time, however, and this isan area which the Commissionwill keep under careful review.

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


Conclusions and Review

The Commission has indicatedthat the Notice will be keptunder general review in light oftechnical and economicdevelopments in the market, andparticularly in light of the

implications of the convergenceof the telecommunications,media and informationtechnology industries.

The principles set out in theNotice do, however, apply to

other sectors to the extent thatcomparable problems emerge,and it is anticipated that theAccess Notice will be a usefulreference for competitionproblems in areas other thantraditional telecommunications.

The European association ofconsumer electronics manufac-turers (EACEM) and sixteen ofits members, all majormanufacturers of televisions andvideo recorders, made avoluntary commitment to reducethe electricity consumption oftelevisions and video recorderswhen they are in “stand by”mode. Although such anagreement between competingmanufacturers to act in parallelcan be seen as a restriction ofcompetition in breach of Article85(1) of the Treaty, theenvironmental benefits of thescheme, the fact that thesebenefits will be shared withconsumers and the fact that thescheme will not eliminatecompetition in the sector mean

that the scheme meets theconditions for the grant of anexemption under Article 85(3) ofthe Treaty. The scheme wasdevised in consultation with thestaff of DG XVII - Energy of theCommission. The reduction inpower use could result in totalEuropean electricity use being3,2 TWh lower each year than itwould otherwise have been by2005. This energy saving willhave significant environmentalbenefits, reducing CO2emission, resource use andglobal warming.

The vast majority of televisionsand video cassette recorders inuse are operated using a remotecontrol, and are typically turnedoff using a remote control rather

than disconnected totally fromtheir power supply. Turning atelevision or video cassetterecorder off using a remotecontrol switches it to a stand bymode where it continues toconsume electricity at a rate thatcan exceed 10W. The consumerelectronics industry was awarethat televisions and videocassette recorders are typicallyleft in this stand by mode forlong periods of time and thattheir design could be improvedto reduce this stand by poweruse. A report prepared for DGXVII - Energy of theCommission quantified thispower use, and estimated thesavings that would result fromreducing it. The key result of thisresearch was that simply byreducing average stand by poweruse to 6W, total power use couldbe reduced by 3,2 TWh per yearby 2005, and by 4,9 TWh peryear by 2010. The maximumcost per unit of reducing thestand by power use of atelevision or video cassetterecorder was estimated as 3ECU.

No individual firm in theindustry felt able to introduce

Recent important decisions

EACEM scheme to reduce stand bypower use of TVs and VCRs receives acomfort letter because of itsenvironmental benefits

John FINNEGAN, DG IV-C-3

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


lower power use in theirproducts. Margins are low in theindustry and the firms feared thatconsumers would not beprepared to pay for the cost ofthe power savings, despite thefact that they would save moneyin the long term. The consumerelectronics industry thereforedevised the voluntary scheme inconsultation with the services ofthe Commission. The manufac-turers who entered the scheme,and membership is open toadditional firms, haveundertaken to meet certaintargets on power use. TheEuropean Association ofConsumer Electronics Manufac-tures (EACEM) has undertakento monitor the operation of thescheme and to report regularly tothe Commission on its progress.In order to avoid any exchangeof confidential informationbetween the member firms,which could have a negative

effect on competition, EACEMhas engaged an independentconsultant who will gatherinformation from the firms as totheir sales and the power use ofunits sold, and simply report thenames of manufacturers notmeeting their commitment.

Under the scheme themanufacturers have undertakenthat, by 1 January 2000, the TVsand VCRs that they sell willconsume no more than 10 W ofpower when in standby modeand that the average powerconsumption of all TVs andVCRs that they sell will be nomore than 6 W in stand by mode.Such an agreement to act in a co-ordinated way is a restriction ofcompetition, and falls under theprohibition of Article 85(1) ofthe EC Treaty. However Article85(3) provides that theCommission can exempt anagreement from this provision

where it meets certainconditions. These conditions arethat the agreement contributes totechnical and economic progress,that its benefits be shared withconsumers, that competition notbe eliminated in the sector andthat the restrictions ofcompetition are indispensable toachieving the benefits of theagreement. The energy savingand environmental benefits ofthis scheme clearly representtechnical and economic progress,and by their nature are passed onto consumers. The Commissionwas also satisfied thatcompetition would not beeliminated in the affectedmarkets and that the restrictiveeffect of the scheme wasessential to achieving its fullbenefits.

(see also the Commission’s pressrelease : IP/98/346)

On 20 May 1998 theCommission declared theArticles 85(1) and 86 of the ECTreaty to be inapplicable to theGerman IFCO packaging system(International Fruit ContainerOrganization). This system is a

multi-transport way of packingfruit and vegetable, based on theuse of standardised, collapsibleand reusable plastic crates. Theboxes are produced bysubsidiaries of the firm SchoellerPlast Holding GmbH,

Düsseldorf, and used for thetransport of goods betweenproducers, grocers and shops bytwelve big German food tradingcompanies. The crates had beenintroduced at the end of 1992,when the trading chains declaredto their suppliers that they wouldprefer goods to be packed inplastic crates.

Following complaints introducedby some trade associations,

Commission clears the IFCOpackaging system

Dieter BIRKENMAIER and Sari SUURNÄKKI, DG IV-E-1

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


traders and fruit producers, theCommission examined the IFCOsystem under the competitionrules of the EC Treaty. In thecourse of the procedure, theCommission demandedsubstantial modifications to thesystem. Accordingly, theobligatory use and other aspectsof the system such as to fixmodel contracts, lump sumpayments to IFCO, an arbitrationsystem for users and anobligation for the food traders toexchange detailed informationabout trade flows, wereabolished. The Commissioninformed the public about thesemodifications by a press releaseof 3 June 1993 and in letters tofood traders.

In its juridical analysis theCommission defined the relevantproduct market as being themarket for packaging intendedor suitable for transportation offresh fruit and vegetables,irrespective of the material used(plastic, wood or carton). Infact, price and cost differencesfor these materials are existing,but not important enough so asto assume different markets.Nor should, at present, adistinction be made - in theabsence of a clear preference

established by national orEuropean environmentallegislation on packaging andpackaging waste - betweenreusable (multi-trip) orrecyclable and recoverablematerials.

Regarding the relevantgeographical market for IFCOcrates, the Commission held thatit is rapidly becoming EU-wide,even if the stronghold of thesystem is still Germany.

Analysing a potential preventionor restriction of competitioncaught by Article 85(1), theCommission concluded that theIFCO system does not violatethe Treaty, taking into accountthe modifications introduced tothe system during the procedure.The Commission based itsargumentation on the fact thatthe use of crates is organisedunilaterally by IFCO/Schoeller,which lend their products on thebase of bilateral contracts tousers. These contracts are partlybased on standard general terms,partly on individually negotiatedstipulations. The IFCO systemis therefore a market-basedservice in direct competitionwith other packaging systems,

e.g. those based on plastic, woodor cartonboard.

The Commission had also toexamine the compatibility of theIFCO system with Article 86 ofthe EC Treaty. According to theresults of an inquiry into the useof crates by German foodtradersdone in March 1997, the tradersparticipating in IFCO have amarket share for fruit andvegetable of around 47%. About23% of their trade in the relevantgoods is packed in IFCO crates,corresponding to 13% ofGerman sales. Consequently,the Commission concluded thatthe IFCO system does not have adominant position on theGerman market for fruit andvegetable packing. The relevantmarket share is considerablybelow the percentage normallynecessary for assuming adominant position; a collectivedominance could be excluded, ascompetition among the IFCOusers and with other companiesactive in the German foodtrading sector is vivid.

On the basis of the aboveconsiderations, the complaintsagainst the IFCO-system havebeen rejected.

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Le 21 janvier 19981, laCommission a adopté unedécision d’interdiction assortied’amende à l’encontre de 6producteurs de produits plats enacier inoxydable représentantplus de 80% de la productioneuropéenne de produits finis enacier inoxydable.

Les entreprises s’étaient réuniesen décembre 1993 à Madrid etavaient convenu d’une hausseidentique et simultanée des prixde l’acier inoxydable. Cetteaugmentation a été obtenue parla modification concertée de laformule de calcul de l’extraalliage, supplément de prixfonction du cours des élémentsd’alliage utilisés dans l’acierinoxydable.

La Commission a décidé que cetaccord de prix constituait uneinfraction grave à l’article 65 dutraité CECA et a infligé auxentreprises des amendes d’unmontant total de 27,3 millionsd’écus.

Cette décision est la deuxièmedécision d’interdiction au titre del’article 65 CECA en l’espace dequelques mois2. Elle s’inscrit, 1 JO L100 du 1.04.1998 p.552 La première a été adoptée le 26

novembre 1997 dans l’affaire“Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl” etconcernait un accord d’échange

comme déjà la décision“Poutrelles”3 en 1994, dans lecadre de la lutte contre lesententes illégales dans le secteursidérurgique.

Dans cette décision, laCommission a pour la premièrefois fait application des lignesdirectrices pour le calcul desamendes4 et de la communicationde la Commission concernant lanon-imposition d’amendes ou laréduction de leur montant dansles affaires portant sur desententes5.

Les amendes ont donc étécalculées à partir d’un montanten valeur absolue déterminé enfonction de la gravité del’infraction pondérée par ladurée de participation dechacune des entreprises. Cemontant de base a été majoré etminoré pour tenir compte descirconstances aggravantes etatténuantes propres à chacunedes entreprises. Il a enfin été faitapplication de la communicationsur la non-imposition d’amendesprécitée.

La rédaction de la décision(paragraphe 73 et suivants)

d’informations (JO L1 du 3.01.1998p.10)

3 JO L116 du 6.5.1994, p.14 JO C 9 du 14.01.1998 p.35 JO C207 du 18.07.1996 p.4

montre comment l’objectif detransparence des lignesdirectrices peut être atteint. Eneffet, dans une affaire impliquantplusieurs entreprises, il estpossible à chacune d’entre ellede connaître à la lecture de ladécision l’appréciation sur lesdifférents paramètresdéterminant l’amende pour tousles auteurs de l’infraction. Lamotivation de chacun desparamêtres de calcul est trèsdétaillée.

Ceci est particulièrementimportant pour la coopérationdes entreprises. En l’espèce,toutes les entreprises ont invoquéla communication sur lacoopération mais seules deuxd’entre elles ont véritablementcoopéré en mettant fin àl’infraction pour l’une et enapportant des informationsimportantes à la Commission aucours de l’instruction pourl’autre. Grace au détail du calculprésenté dans la décisionpubliée, les entreprises ont été enmesure d’apprécier la différencede traitement effectuée par laCommission entre celles quicoopèrent réellement et cellesqui se limitent à une déclarationd’intention.

La Commission condamne un cartelde prix entre des producteurs d’acierinoxydable

Céline GAUER, DG IV-E-1

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


By Decisions of 5 March and 14April 19981, the Commission hasrejected the last two complaintsconcerning the “old” standardUK pub leases used byInntrepreneur.

The Commission rejected thecomplaints because there was nolonger a Community interest todeal with these cases followingthe withdrawal by Inntrepreneur

1 Both published on DG IV’s Internet site

(Antitrust - Cases - Cases closed byFormal Decision 85/86 1998 - pick“NAIL” and “AIL”).

of the notification of these “old”2

standard leases.

By withdrawing the notification,the question of whether Article85(1) applies can be decided bythe UK courts. Unlike theCommission, the national judgecould, if he found Article 85(1)to apply, also determine the civillaw effects following from theprohibition set out in Article85(2).

2 With the reference to “old”, the

Commission refers to the standard leasesentered into by Inntrepreneur with itslessees since 1989 that do notincorporate a discount schemeintroduced by Inntrepreneur in February-March 1997. Leases that do incorporatethis scheme are called the “new” leases.For these “new” leases, notifications arestill pending and the Commission haspublished “exemption” 19(3) notices forthe Inntrepreneur (OJ C 374,10.12.1997) and Spring (OJ C 61,26.2.1998) estate covering the period upto 28 March 1998 and a “negativeclearance” 19(3) notice for thereafter (OJC 133, 30.4.1998). These notices are alsoavailable on DG IV’s Internet site.

If the Commission had continuedwith the case, this would havelead to a duplication ofprocedures, which is not in theCommunity interest.

Furthermore, the Commissionhas pointed out in the Decisionsthat the national judges couldtake some indirect guidance onthe application of Article 85from published communicationspursuant to Article 19(3) ofRegulation No 17, indicating theCommission’s intention toexempt the “new” Inntrepreneurpub leases (see footnote 2).

The “old” Inntrepreneur standard UKpub leases

By Dirk VAN ERPS, DG IV-F-3

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


On 11 March 1998, theCommission adopted a Decisioncondemning Unilever’s practiceof “freezer exclusivity” inIreland, with a view tofacilitating access by othersuppliers to the “impulse” icecream market. A Unileversubsidiary, Van den BerghFoods Limited, is the leadingsupplier of ice cream in Ireland,with a market share in excess of85%. The company has anextensive network of freezercabinets which are put at thedisposal of retailers, with nodirect charge but subject to thecondition that the cabinets are tobe used exclusively for thestorage of Unilever’s products.

The Commission has found that,in the circumstances of the Irishmarket, this provision ofcabinets on exclusive termsresults in many of the recipientoutlets only being in a position

to offer for sale the ice creamproducts of Unilever. Marketresearch relied on by theCommission demonstrates thatretailers are very unlikely eitherto replace incumbent cabinets, inparticular those installed byUnilever, or to install additionalones, particularly alongsideUnilever cabinets. Unilever’scompetitors are consequentlydenied access to these outlets,with the result that their productsare not offered for sale from avery substantial proportion ofretail outlets in Ireland.

TheCommission therefore foundthat the exclusivity condition, asapplied in relation to outletswhose only ice cream cabinetshave been provided by Unilever,infringes Article 85 of the ECTreaty. The Commission hasmoreover found that Unilever isabusing its position of marketdominance in Ireland, contrary

to Article 86 of the EC Treaty,by inducing retailers to enter intoexclusive arrangements of thissort.

The case originated with acomplaint made by Mars in 1991.In the light of objections firstmade by the Commission in 1993,Unilever had made a number ofmodifications to its distributionarrangements. In particular, ascheme allowing retailers to hirepurchase freezer cabinets fromUnilever was introduced in 1995as an optional alternative to thetraditional method of cabinetprovision. It was expected thatthese changes would be likely torender Unilever’s distributionarrangements compatible with thecompetition rules by facilitatingan evolution toward wider freezercabinet ownership by retailers.This would have enabled retailoutlets to offer for sale theproducts of any supplier, therebycontributing to a real opening upof the Irish impulse ice creammarket. The changes did nothowever succeed in bringingabout such an evolution, a failureconfirmed by a comprehensivemarket survey carried out onbehalf of the Commission in thesummer of 1996, and a new setof objections was accordinglyput to Unilever in 1997.

The Commission adopts a Decisionagainst Unilever concerning freezercabinet exclusivity in the Irish icecream market

By Stephen RYAN, DG IV-F-3

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Décision de la Commission du28 janvier 19981

La Commission a infligé uneamende d’un montant de 102millions d’Ecus à l’entrepriseVolkswagen AG - le principalgroupe de constructeursautomobiles européen - pouravoir systématiquement forcé sesconcessionnaires italiens àrefuser de vendre desautomobiles de la marqueVolkswagen et Audi à des clientsétrangers, notamment allemandset autrichiens. Depuis 1995, denombreux consommateurs sesont plaints à la Commission desdifficultés qu’ils rencontraientpour l’achat de voitures neuvesen Italie. Dans sa décision, laCommission conclut queVolkswagen AG, sa filialeitalienne Autogerma S.p.A. ainsique sa filiale Audi AG se sontentendus avec leursconcessionnaires italiens sur unestratégie visant à empêcher et/oulimiter substantiellement lecommerce en provenance d’Italieet à destination des autres Etatsmembres, en particulierl’Autriche et l’Allemagne.

1 voir IP/98/94 du 28.1.1998; le texte

intégral de la décision se trouve au JO L124 du 25.4.1998, p.60.

Volkswagen disposait de troismois pour acquitter l’amende etdevait, en outre, dans un délai dedeux mois, prendre toutes lesdispositions imposées par laCommission afin d’éliminer cesdiverses pratiques.

La décision de la Commissionest l’aboutissement d’uneprocédure entamée à la suite denombreuses réclamationsintroduites par desconsommateurs sur lesdifficultés d’acheter en Italie desvoitures neuves de marqueVolkswagen et Audi.

En octobre 1995, la Commissiona effectué des inspections dansles locaux de Volkswagen AG àWolfsburg, de Audi AG àIngolstadt et de AutogermaS.p.A. à Vérone (filiale à 100 %de Volkswagen et l’importateurofficiel des deux marques pourl’Italie) et auprès d’un certainnombre de concessionnairesVAG dans le nord de l’Italie.Les documents découverts lorsde ces inspections ont apporté lapreuve évidente de la politiquede cloisonnement des marchésmise en place par Volkswagen,Audi et Autogerma.

La Commission établit dans sadécision que la conduite deVolkswagen menace lefonctionnement normal du

Marché Unique et constitue unetrès grave infraction aux règlesdu droit communautaire de laconcurrence.

Pour fixer l’amende, laCommission a tenu compte de ladurée de l’infraction - plus dedix ans – et entre autres, du faitque les sociétés membres dugroupe Volkswagen ont exploitéleur puissance économique vis-à-vis de leurs réseaux deconcessionnaires en Italie pourmettre en place les pratiquesrestrictives. En outre, laCommission a retenu commefacteur aggravant le fait queVolkswagen n’a pas réagi demanière appropriée auxinjonctions de la Commission demettre fin à cette infractiongrave.

L’importance de l’amendedémontre la volonté de laCommission de ne pas tolérer detelles pratiques et d’agir avec lamême rigueur vis-à-vis d’autresconstructeurs qui entendentcloisonner le marché intérieur.

Par date du 8.4.1998, l’entreprisea introduit son recours contre ladécision et l’amende infligéeauprès du Tribunal de PremièreInstance.

Affaire IV/35.733 - Volkswagen

Ulrich KRAUSE-HEIBER, DG IV-F-2

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


1. A l’issue d’une procéduredéclenchée par la plainted’un importateur parallèledanois de balles de tennis,la Commission, après avoiramené la Fédérationdanoise de tennis (FDT)d’abord à changer sespratiques et ensuite à lesnotifier, a approuvé lesystème de parrainagemis en oeuvre par laFédération. Au-delà du casconcret, cette approbation,sous la forme d’une lettreadministrative de clas-sement de type attestationnégative, constitue unsignal donné auxfédérations sportives natio-nales et internationales etaux producteurs/distribu-teurs de produits sportifsquant à certaines pratiquesque la Commissionconsidère comme compa-tibles avec les articles 85 et86.

2. Pour mieux comprendre laportée de cette première prisede position de laCommission, il convient derappeler la situation telle

qu’elle se présentait aumoment de l’introduction dela plainte. L’importateurparallèle qui s’était d’abordadressé à l’Autorité danoisede la concurrence et ensuite,sur conseil de cette dernière,à la Commission, se plaignaitd’une situation bloquée. Il nepouvait pratiquement pasvendre au Danemark desballes achetées dans d’autresÉtats membres à caused’accords conclus entre laFDT et un certain nombre deproducteurs/importateurs.

Ces accords prévoyaient quedans tous les tournoisorganisés par la FDT, seulespouvaient être utilisées lesballes des firmes ayant concluun accord de parrainage avecla FDT et étant de ce faitautorisées à apposer sur lesboîtes de leurs balles, lesticker “balle officielle de laFDT”. Toute partie de tennisjouée avec des balles autresque celles vendues par lesréseaux officiels desfournisseurs officiels étaitdéclarée nulle. Les arbitresdes compétitions organiséespar la FDT étaient sousl’obligation de contrôler queles balles utilisées sortaient

bien de boîtes munies destickers. Dans ces conditions,un double effet de forclusionse manifestait : dans lestournois de la FDT, il n’étaitpas question d’utiliser desballes de marques autres quecelles des fournisseursofficiels et, en plus, il étaitinterdit d’utiliser des balles,même de ces marques, sicelles-là provenaient dumarché parallèle. Leplaignant faisait observer quel’effet de ces pratiques étaitde lui interdire pratiquementtoute vente de balles, lesjoueurs préférant achetermême pour leurs parties endehors des tournois, les ballesdes fournisseurs officiels dela FDT (effet “vitrine”, ou enmots simples : “si cesproducteurs sont lesfournisseurs officiels de laFDT, cela signifie que leursballes sont meilleures que lesautres”).

Les services de laCommission essayèrent deconvaincre la FDT que cespratiques contrevenaient auxarticles 85 et 86 du TraitéCEE. A la suite de l’envoid’une lettre de mini-griefs etensuite d’une communicationde griefs, dans laquelle laFDT se voyait reprocher laviolation tant de l’article 85(à cause de ses accords avecles fournisseurs officiels,destinataires eux aussi, d’unecommunication de griefs tantau niveau nationalqu’international -coupeDavis-) que de l’article 86(abus de position dominante

Parrainage et homologation d’articlessportifs : le cas de la Fédérationdanoise de tennis

Franco GIUFFRIDA, DG IV-F-1

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sur le marché del’organisation des tournois),la FDT préféra mettre fin auxpratiques incriminées. Ellenotifia donc un nouveausystème de parrainage qui secaractérisait essentiellementpar les 3 aspects suivants :

- mise sur pied d’un pool desponsors, constitué aprèsappel d’offres et portantsur une période d’uneannée;

- renonciation à l’utilisationde la dénomination “ballesofficielles de la FDT”;

- libre utilisation des ballesde marques composant lepool, indépendamment del’achat par le biais desréseaux officiels, c’est-à-dire, possibilité d’achatssur le marché parallèle.

3. La Commission considérantque, sous cette forme, lecontrat de parrainage nesoulevait plus les mêmesobjections que les contratsprécédents non notifiés,publia une communicationart. 19§3 annonçant sonintention de prendre uneattitude favorable à sonégard.

4. Entre-temps, la FDT avaittoutefois à nouveau changéde système. Il lui était eneffet apparu que la mise enoeuvre du pool de sponsorsprovoquait des problèmesconcrets de difficile solutionet avait remplacé ce systèmepar une troisième version de

ses contrats de parrainage.Une deuxième notificationintervint donc en 1995.

L’élément qui distinguait lesdeux accords notifiés était lesdisparition du pool remplacépar le choix d’un seul sponsorqui aurait été lié à la FDTpour une période de 3 ans,sans toutefois pouvoir utiliserla mention “balles officiellesde la FDT” ni imposerl’utilisation de balles venduespar le réseau officiel.

5. Face à cette nouvelle donne,les services de la Commissionfurent obligés à apprécier siun contrat d’exclusivité quidonnait à une seule marquele droit de voir ses ballesutilisées - à l’exclusion detoutes autres - pour unepériode de 3 ans, pouvaitobtenir son accord.

Si après discussions avec laFDT, qui accepta de réduirela durée du contrat de 3 à 2ans et de mettre sur pied unsystème structuré d’appeld’offres avec mention descritères employés pour lechoix de la firme retenue, laCommission put enfinmarquer son accord, cela estdû essentiellement auxconsidérations suivantes :

a) Il est vrai que le caractèreexclusif du contratreprésente une restrictionde concurrence, en cequ’il limite la libertécontractuelle de la FDT deconclure avec d’autresproducteurs/distributeurs

ainsi que la liberté destiers qui ne peuvent pasêtre choisis comme co-contractants. Il est toutaussi vrai que le systèmeinitialement notifié d’unpool de sponsors pourraitêtre considéré commeétant moins restrictif deconcurrence. L’argumentinvoqué par la FDT pourjustifier le passage dusystème du pool à celui ducontractant exclusif atoutefois convaincu lesservices de laCommission. Sur unmarché de dimensionsréduites comme le marchédanois, il estvraisemblable qu’il n’y aitpas d’espace pourplusieurs membres d’unpool : les perspectives devoir augmenter ses ventesne sont pas suffisantespour induire plusieursentreprises à devenirsponsors. La conclusionque les services de laCommission en tirent estque si dans le cas d’espècela restriction deconcurrence a étéconsidérée comme nonsensible, il pourrait en êtreautrement sur d’autresmarchés plus importants,où un contrat deparrainage avec un seulcontractant exclusif seraitsusceptible d’engendrerdes effets sensibles sur lastructure du marché que cesoit à l’intérieur d’unterritoire d’un ou plusieursEtats membres.

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b) La FDT a accepté deréduire de 3 à 2 ans, lapériode de chaque contratde parrainage en mettantsur pied un systèmed’appel d’offres assurantque la sélection se fasse demanière transparente, nondiscriminatoire et ouverteà tous les fournisseurs.

c) La FDT a accepté desupprimer la mention de“balle officielle“ en“fournisseur officiel”. Cetaspect mérite un approfon-dissement afin d’expliquerla position de laCommission à l’égard duproblème de l’homo-logation de produitssportifs par la Fédération,nationale ouinternationale.

A ce sujet, il y a lieu denoter que l’homologationtechnique des balles detennis intervient au niveaude la Fédération interna-tionale de Tennis. Touteballe satisfaisant auxnormes techniques défi-nies par la fédérationinternationale peut êtrehomologuée, moyennantpaiement d’une sommeforfaitaire destinée àcouvrir les frais des testset des analyses. Les balleshomologuées reçoivent ladénomination de “Firstgrade Tennis Balls” etsont reconnues de la sorteaptes à être utilisées danstous les tournois etcompétitions.

La plupart des fédérationsnationales de tennisintroduisent cependant, ceque l’on pourrait appelerun second niveaud’homologation ou desélection, basé celui-ci,sur des critères purementfinanciers. Moyennantpaiement d’une sommeforfaitaire ou moyennant,dans certains cas,négociations ou mêmeprocédures d’enchères,une ou certaines marquesde balles de tennis peuventse voir attribuer le label de“Balles officielles” detelle ou telle fédérationnationale - ou encore“Balles officielles” de telou tel grand tournoiorganisé par cettefédération. Le label peutêtre apposé sur les boîtesou même imprimé sur lesballes. Et la mention de“Balles officielles” peutgénéralement être suiviedu texte “Balles sélec-tionnées” ou “Ballesrecommandées” par cesfédérations.

Outre divers avantagessupplémentaires en ma-tière publicitaire ou depromotion qui leur sontréservés (et qui varientd’une fédération à l’autre),ces “Balles officielles”sont également générale-ment les seules à pouvoirêtre utilisées dans lestournois, championnats etautres activités organiséespar ou sous l’égide de cesfédérations. En tournoi et

champion-nat, la sanctionen cas d’utilisation par desclub de tennis de ballesnon-officielles consistegénéra-lement en l’annu-lation du match. Quant aujoueur qui voudrait utiliserune balle non officielle, ilse voit en principe déclaréperdant. Les fédérationsnationales rappellent régu-lièrement aux clubs detennis qu’ils sont tenus derespecter ce règlement.

L’appréciation de pareilssystèmes d’homologationpar les fédérations detennis nationales au regarddes articles 85 et 86 a étédéveloppéeessentiellement dans laprésente affaire.

Le monopole dontdisposent les fédérationsnationales de tennis dansl’organisation des activitésofficielles relatives à cesport leur donne nonseulement une positiondominante sur ce marché,mais leur confèreégalement (outre, bien sûr,l’exclusivité d’attribuer lelabel de “ballesofficielles”) une autoritémorale indéniable pourtout ce qui concerne lapratique de ce sport. Cetteautorité leur permettranotamment d’influencer,le cas échéant, le choix duconsommateur pour lesproduits (balles, raquet-tes,...) utilisés dans cettepratique. Le label de“Balles officielles” et

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l’autorisation de fairesuivre cette mention parles termes “recomman-dées” ou “sélectionnées”par une fédérationnationale de tennis estainsi de nature à inciter lesconsommateurs à consi-dérer que ces balles sontmeilleures sur le plantechnique, alors même quel’autorisation de porter celabel a été conditionnéepar des critères purementfinanciers et que les ballesnon sélectionnées, pourautant qu’elles aient étéhomologuées comme“First Grade Tennis Balls”par la Fédérationinternationale de Tennis,possèdent les mêmesqualités techniques.

Il s’ensuit que le systèmede délivrance par lesfédérations nationales detennis du label de “Ballesofficielles” doit êtreconsidéré discriminatoireà l’égard des producteurset/ou distributeurs excluset partant, compte tenu dela position dominante deces fédérations, comme unabus au titre de l’article86.

Un tel système porteégalement préjudice auxconsommateurs dans lamesure où il entraîneinévitablement un niveauplus élevé des prix desballes sélectionnées.

C’est pour cet ensemblede raisons que l’abandon

par la FDT de la mention“balle officielle” a amenéla Commission à renoncerà sa communication degriefs basée sur l’article86.

En conclusion :

Par la présente affaire, laCommission entend donner desindications aux partiesintéressées quant à la ligne deconduite qu’elle adoptera àl’avenir. Il n’est pas exclu que,comme cela a été fait notammentpar l’Autorité suisse de laconcurrence, la Commission soitamenée à l’avenir, à publier unecommunication au sujet dematériel sportif officiel et duparrainage dans le secteur dusport.

Quand les plus grandsproducteurs au monde d’unproduit se mettent d’accord pourcoopérer au développement d’unnouveau produit destiné, dansleurs intentions, à supplanter àmoyen terme les produitsexistant sur le marché et à

devenir le nouveau “standard”,on imagine aisément que cettecoopération fasse l’objet d’unexamen attentif de la part desAutorités de concurrence.

C’est exactement ce qui s’estpassé dans le cas de ce qu’il est

convenu d’appeler le AdvancedPhotographic System (APS)1.

La procédure

En 1991, Kodak, Fuji, Canon,Minolta et Nikon avaient concluentre elles un accord pour ledéveloppement et l’exploitationsous licence d’un nouveausystème photographique depointe constituant une alternativeaux précédents systèmes ainsiqu’à l’imagerie électronique.

1 Press Release IP/98/353 of 15/4/1998.

La Commission approuve l’accord decoopération conclu entreles plus grands producteursd’appareils photos et de films

Franco GIUFFRIDA, DG IV-F-1

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


Les difficultés techniques àsurmonter étaient considérableset portaient tant sur la productionde nouveaux types d’appareilsphotos que de nouveaux filmsainsi que d’équipements dedéveloppement des films.

En 1993, les parties notifièrent àla Commission les accordsintervenus, bien que les accordsne fussent pas tout à faitcomplets: l’activité decoopération entre elles sepoursuivît, tant au plantechnique, qu’à celui de la miseau point des textes juridiquesrégissant leur relation.

Les services de la Commissionne soulevèrent toutefois aucuneobjection à examiner des accordsqui constituaient manifestementune base de travail susceptibled’être adaptée et précisée encours de route. Il fut de la sortepossible d’amener les partiesnotifiantes à englober dans leursconsidérations industrielles, aucours d’un processus, certes delongue haleine mais cependantfructueux, des remarques tenantaux aspects de concurrence.Dans cette phase, la Commissiona pu bénéficier des prises deposition formulées par des tiersqui, tout en étant intéressés àdevenir licenciés pour lenouveau produit, souhaitaientdes changements dans lesconditions de licence.

La toile de fond desinterventions de la Commissionétait constituée par deuxprincipes :

− la coopération était utile etdevait être favorisée,

− des efforts devaient êtreentrepris pour fairedisparaître certains élémentsconsidérés commeinacceptables du point de vuedes règles de concurrence.

A l’issue de ce long processus denégociation, les partiesnotifiantes complétèrent leurnotification début 1997 en tenantcompte des souhaits expriméspar la Commission. Dans cesconditions, celle-ci publia unecommunication art. 19(3) au JO2

qui ne donna lieu à aucuneremarque des tiers. Laprocédure fut donc achevée parla consultation du ComitéConsultatif et l’envoi d’une lettreadministrative de classement detype “exemption”.

Le fond de l’affaire

Dès le début, il était clair auxparties notifiantes que le gage desuccès du nouveau produit tenaità deux aspects essentiels:d’abord un produit fiable, etensuite son degré d’acceptationpar les autres producteurs nonparties à l’accord de coopération.Si l’APS devait avoir une chancede devenir le nouveau standard,les entreprises conceptricesdevaient donc en assurer sadiffusion outre que par leurproduction propre par desaccords de licence avec lesconcurrents.

2 JO N°C 330 du 01/11/1997, p.10.

Les parties notifiantesengagèrent donc des effortsconsidérables pour conclure descontrats de licences avec leurconcurrents en organisant desréunions d’information et desséminaires. Le résultat en fûtqu’un nombre important decontrats de licence fût conclubien avant la date decommercialisation du nouvelAPS qui eu lieu en Europe enavril 1996.

L’intervention de la Commissioneut principalement pour but defaire modifier dans les contratsde licences certaines clauses quià ses yeux limitaient indûment laliberté des licenciés. En effet lesentreprises coopérantes, tout ensouhaitant favoriser l’utilisationsous licence de leur nouveauproduit, affirmaient être enmême temps soucieuses delimiter les risques de productionstechniquement non fiables.D’ou des restrictions sensiblesdans les possibilités par lesparties licenciées de coopérerentre elles. Le but de ladémarche de la Commission étaitnotamment d’assurer que lestiers, un fois les licencesaccordées, puissent être à tempssur le marché avec des produitssous licences pour concurrencerles cinq partenaires.

A la suite de l’intervention de laCommission une certainelibéralisation de la politique delicence a été atteinte. Le savoirfaire technique et un serviced’assistance ont été offerts auxlicenciés à une plus large échellequ’initialement proposé et cecontre redevance ou gratui-

â ANTI-TRUST RULES


tement. En plus, s’agissant desclauses limitant la libertéindustrielle des licenciés, unsystème dégressif dans le tempsa été introduit de sorte qu’auplus tard en 2004 la coopérationentre les licenciés seratotalement ouverte.

Dans ces conditions il a étéestimé que les cinq partenaires àl’issue des nombreuses réunionstechnique avec les services de laCommission, avaient montré leurpromptitude a prendre toute lesmesures nécessaires pourpermettre aux licenciés d’accé-

der au marché en temps voulu etdans des conditions ne suscitantplus des inquiétudes en termesde concurrence.

JUDGMENTS

Judgment of the Court of 31March 1998, Cases C-68/94and C-30/95 : FrenchRepublic and Sociétécommerciale des potasses etde l'azote (SCPA) andEntreprise minière etchimique (EMC) vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities. Communitycontrol of concentrationsbetween undertakings -Collective dominant position.Joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95.

Judgment of the Court (FifthChamber) of 17 March 1998,Case C-387/96 : Criminalproceedings against AndersSjöberg. Reference for apreliminary ruling: Sveahovr„tt - Sweden. Sociallegislation relating to roadtransport - Exception grantedfor vehicles used by publicauthorities to provide publicservices which are not incompetition with professionalroad hauliers - Obligation onthe driver to carry an extractfrom the duty roster.

Judgment of the Court (FifthChamber) of 12 February 1998,Case C-163/96 : Criminalproceedings against SilvanoRaso and Others. Reference fora preliminary ruling: Preturacircondariale di La Spezia -Italy. Freedom to provideservices - Competition - Specialor exclusive rights -Undertakings holding a portterminal concession.

Order of the Court (FirstChamber) of 15 January 1998,Case C-196/97P : Intertronic -F. Cornelis GmbH vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities.

PRESS RELEASES

IP/98/355 [1998-04-15]The Commisison conditionallyapproves sponsorship contractsbetween the Danish TennisFederation and its tennis ballsuppliers (see p. 54)

IP/98/353 [1998-04-15]Commission clears co-operationbetween photo-graphic manu-facturers (see p. 57)

IP/98/346 [1998-04-15]European Commission exempts anindustry scheme from thecompetition rules because of itsenvironmental benefits

IP/98/242 [1998-03-11]The Commission adopts a decisionagainst Unilever concerning freezercabinet exclusivity in the Irish icecream market (see p. 52)

IP/98219 [1998-03-05]Maritime Transport : Consortiumagreements win approval of theCommission

IP/98/197 [1998-02-26]The European Commission sets outits provisional position on Spring’s« new » pub leases

IP/98/154 [1998-02-13]Car prices in the European Union on1 November 1997 – differencesremain high

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IP/98/141 [1998-02-10]Commission launches inquiryinto mobile and fixedtlephony prices in theEuropean Union

IP/98/94 [1998-01-28]Commission finesVolkswagen ECU 102 millionfollowing consumercomplaints (see p. 53)

IP/98/70 [1998-01-21]Commission fines stainlesssteel cartel (see p. 50)

IP/98/30 [1998-01-14]Book pricing agreementsbetween publishers andbooksellers in Germany

IP/98/27 [1998-01-14]European Commission endsFrankfurt airport ground-handling monopoly

IP/98/25 [1998-01-13]Commisison intends to clearScottish and Newcqstle’sstandard pub leases

IP/98/8 [1998-01-07]Reaction of Commissioners Flynnand Van Miert to Press Repotsregarding FIFA’s proposal toexclude sport from the scope ofEuropean Law

IP/98/7 [1998-01-07]Commission has decided to examineagreements concerning air alliancesbetween Air Grance/Delta and AirFrance/Continental

MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89Main developments between 1st January and 30st April


At the beginning of March 1998a package of new merger rulesentered into force. The packageincludes modifications to theMerger Regulation adopted bythe Council in June 1997, a newprocedural Regulation adoptedby the Commission (Imple-menting Regulation) and a set ofnew explanatory notices. Thenotice aligning the proceduralrules for processing mergersunder the ECSC and ECTreaties, which had beenadopted earlier were alsoapplicable as from March 1998.

The main changes to the MergerRegulation broaden its scope anddeal with procedural aspects.The new implementing textsreflect these changes and alsotake account of the pastexperience in applying theCommunity merger rules.

In view of the wide use that ismade of these texts particularlyby the general public, theCommission decided to adoptnew texts rather thanamendments to the old texts.

This approach ensures that, inparticular with regard to theImplementing Regulation, there

will be a single legal text foreach document whichincorporates all the amendmentsrather than a number of texts.

The new texts have been adoptedby the Commission afterwidespread consultation with theMember States, interestedindustry associations and thelegal profession. The texts werealso published on the web site ofDG IV on the internet. Theoverall reaction to the textsproposed by the Commissionhad been positive. Many of theremarks that were made in thecourse of the consultation arereflected in the final texts.

The final texts are available tothe public in the Communitylanguages not only through theirpublication in the OfficialJournal but on the internet. TheCommission services havefurthermore prepared aconsolidated version of theMerger Regulation for thefacility of the reader which isalso available there. In duecourse a paper copy of allrelevant legislative andinterpretative texts in the mergerarea will also be made availableas a Commission publication.

1. The Merger Regulation

The amendments1 to the MergerRegulation2 have been examinedin detail in an earlier edition ofthis Newsletter. 3 In summary thechanges include an additional setof thresholds designed to ensurea reduction in the number ofmultiple national filings of thesame transaction. Furthermoreall full-function joint ventureswhich meet the turnoverthresholds of the MergerRegulation will now be assessedunder the procedures of thatregulation. Co-operative aspectsof such joint ventures will beexamined under the criteria ofArticles 85 (1) and (3) of theEC-Treaty within the proceduresof the Merger Regulation. Thethree week suspension periodhas been extended with theeffect that a transaction can nowonly be implemented after aclearance decision by theCommission. In addition theparties will now be able to adaptthe operation during the firstmonth of the investigation inorder to eliminate competitionconcerns. Operations whichaffect competition in more thanone Member State can now be 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30

June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the control of concentrationsbetween undertakings, OJ L 180, p.1,9.7.1997; corrigendum in OJ L 40, p. 17,13.02.98.

2 Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on thecontrol of concentrations betweenundertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989;corrected version OJ L 257, 21.9.1990.

3 See for more details Jean-Louis Aribaud,Summary of the most important recentdevelopments, Competition PolicyNewsletter, Volume 3, Number 2, Summer1997.

Recent developments

The new merger rules have enteredinto force

Gudrun SCHMIDT, DG IV-B-3

â MERGERS


jointly referred to theCommission by two or more ofthese Member States. Otherchanges relate to the calculationof turnover for credit andfinancial institutions.

2. The ImplementingRegulation, includingForm CO

In order to implement thesechanges to the Merger Regulationthe Commission has adopted anew Implementing Regulation on1 March 1998.4 Modificationshave also been made to thenotification Form CO, annexed tothe regulation, in particular toreflect the fact that all full-function joint ventures whichmeet the turnover thresholds willin future be treated under theMerger Regulation. Otheramendments to the ImplementingRegulation have been introducedon the basis of past experiencewith the application of theCommunity merger legislation. Insome languages they includelinguistic improvements, manyof which were suggested by theMember States. The newImplementing Regulationentered into force on 2 March1998.

4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of

1 March 1998 on the notifications, timelimits and hearings provided for in CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on thecontrol of concentrations betweenundertakings, OJ L 61, 2. 3. 1998;replacing Commission Regulation (EC)3384/94 of 21. December 1989, OJ L 377,31.12.1994.

Changes necessitated by theamendments to the MergerRegulation

Full-function joint ventures

One of the most importantchanges in the MergerRegulation relates to theapplication of the MergerRegulation to all full functionjoint ventures. The text of FormCO takes this into account atvarious points. A new Section 10has been introduced reflectingthe treatment of co-operativejoint ventures under the newlyintroduced Article 2 (4) of theMerger Regulation.

New thresholds

A new Section 2.4. has beenintroduced to Form CO to reflectthe new turnover thresholds thathave been introduced to Article1 paragraph 3 of the MergerRegulation.

Calculation of deadlines

The amended Article 23 of theMerger Regulation provided thelegal basis for the Commissionto streamline the calculation ofthe time periods foreseen by theMerger Regulation for a varietyof procedures. In the oldImplementing Regulation therules on the calculation of timelimits only applied to deadlinesregarding decisions at the end ofthe first and second phase of theexamination of an operation.

Suspension of the concentration

The text of Article 12 of theImplementing Regulation nowtakes account of the fact thatunder the amended MergerRegulation an operation remainssuspended until it is cleared bythe Commission.

Suspension of time limits

The suspension of time limitsrelating to first phase decisionsunder Article 6 MergerRegulation is now possible undersimilar conditions as in phasetwo. Furthermore a suspension ispossible, if the parties areresponsible for the failure ofthird parties to provideinformation. This case will nowbe treated in the same way as arefusal by the parties themselvesto reply.

Commitments

The new wording of Article 18and the newly introduced Article19 of the ImplementingRegulation take account of theamendments in the MergerRegulation providing for theexpress possibility ofcommitments in the first phaseof the merger procedure.

Changes due to past experiencewith the legislation

Amendments considered usefulon the basis of the experiencewith the application of theCommunity merger legislationinclude a variety of issues such asthe way a notification or othercommunications to the

â MERGERS


Commission have to be made, theextent of market relatedinformation to be supplied and thehearing procedure.

Requirements on notificationsand other submissions to theCommission

The Implementing Regulationand Form CO clarify that thenotification and other specifieddocuments have to be submittedin one original as well as theindicated number of copies. Thenumber of copies varies as to theneeds of the stage of procedurefor which they are required. Thetime by which the notificationhas to reach the Commission inorder to ensure registration of anotification on the day of arrivalhas been specified.

Form CO reiterates explicitlythat in accordance with therequirements of the MergerRegulation the time limits willnot begin to run before theparties have provided a completenotification. The rules governingthe granting of waivers from therequirements in Form CO havealso been amended with thesame purpose of clarification.

Information required in FormCO on market participants has tobe provided even in cases ofshort form notification to enablethe Commission to make marketenquiries. It has further beenclarified that generally suchinformation shall relate toindependent customers andsuppliers to ensure that theinformation gathered by theCommission in a market enquiry

does reflect the views ofindependent market participants.

Market definition

A number of points in Form COrelating to the information to beprovided on the marketsconcerned by an operation havebeen clarified. In particularSections 6.2 and 6.3 have beendrafted to state that informationmust be provided forneighbouring markets to affectedmarkets (i.e. markets on which aminimum level of market shareis reached) as well as for non-affected markets (markets onwhich the market share is lowerthan specified for affectedmarkets). The text formerly inforce contained certainambiguities in this respect, inparticular in some languageversions.

Hearings

The text relating to the hearingprovisions in Articles 14 and 15of the Implementing Regulationhas been streamlined andmodernised, taking account ofthe creation of the office of theHearing Officer and introducingan obligation on parties toprovide non-confidentialversions of specified documents.A similar exercise is currentlyunder way with regard toRegulation 99/63 on hearings inthe area of Articles 85 and 86EC-Treaty.

3. The Notices

The amendments to the MergerRegulation also required changes

to the Commission’s explanatorynotices. The notice on jointventures5 and to a lesser degreethe notice on the calculation ofturnover6 are most affected. Thenotice on the concept ofundertakings concerned7 hasbeen modified only in one pointof substance. The notice on theconcept of a concentration8 takesaccount of the changes in itsreferences to the other texts. Insome languages linguisticchanges have been made with aview to improve the text. Thenotice on ancillary restraints wasnot amended at this stage but iscurrently being revised.

Notice on Joint Ventures

The new notice on joint venturesreflects the fact that thedistinction betweenconcentrative and co-operativejoint ventures has ceased todetermine the applicability of theMerger Regulation. Jurisdictionwill now be determined byapplying the criterion of fullfunctionality, on which furtherguidance has been given. Co-

5 Commission notice on the concept of full-

function joint ventures under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on thecontrol of concentrations betweenundertakings, OJ C 66, 2. 3. 1998, p.1.

6 Commission notice on the calculation ofturnover under Council Regulation (EEC)No 4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between undertakings, OJ C66, 2. 3. 1998, p. 25.

7 Commission notice on the concept ofundertakings concerned under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on thecontrol of concentrations betweenundertakings, OJ C 66, 2. 3. 1998, p. 14.

8 Commission notice on the concept ofconcentration under Council Regulation(EEC) No 4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between undertakings, OJ C66, 2. 3. 1998, p. 5.

â MERGERS


operative aspects are thereforenot discussed in the noticeanymore.

It is intended that guidance onthe substantive issues regardingthe co-operative aspects of full-function joint ventures will beprovided in due course after theCommission has had someexperience in handling suchissues. Pending the preparationof such guidance the noticerefers to the relevant principlesin the old notice.

The opportunity has also beenused to up-date the references toprevious cases where the issue offull-functionality has beendiscussed in more detail.

Notice on the Calculation ofTurnover

The new notice on theCalculation of Turnover reflectsthe fact that an additional set ofturnover thresholds has beenintroduced into the MergerRegulation. More changes to thenotice were needed due to thenew rules on the calculation ofturnover for financialinstitutions, based on bankingincome.

Notice on UndertakingsConcerned

This notice has been changedonly in one matter ofsignificance, that is, to adaptparagraph 23 of the text to theCommission’s policy regardingthe treatment of a single parentsubsidiary. The Commissionconsiders that when one orseveral new shareholders acquirejoint control of a single parentsubsidiary while the initialparent company remains, thesubsidiary is not an undertakingconcerned. This policy hadalready been published by theCommission in its CompetitionReport 1996.

Notice on the alignment ofprocedures for processingmergers under the ECSC andEC Treaties

This notice sets out the treatmentof concentrations that fall underthe ECSC Treaty. The procedurefor these mergers will be thesame as applied to mergersunder the EC Treaty within thelimits imposed by the ECSCTreaty. The measures aredesigned to increasetransparency, set out the rights ofdefence and to speed up thedecision making process. Theyhave to be seen against thebackdrop of the forthcomingexpiry of the ECSC Treaty.

In particular the measuresprovide for the issuing of astatement of objections, accessto file and an oral hearing incomplex cases where theCommission is considering aconditional authorisation or aprohibition. They provide fortime limits similar to those setout in the Merger Regulation. Inaddition the fact of a notificationwill be published in the OfficialJournal. Public versions ofArticle 66 ECSC decisionsadopted after a statement ofobjections will be published inthe Official Journal as will thefact of the adoption of otherdecisions. Public versions ofthese other decisions will beavailable to interested parties onrequest.

4. Procedure

These changes to the mergerrules will entail a number oforganisational changes withinthe Directorate General forCompetition (DG IV). Thisapplies in particular to jointventures which may have co-operative aspects which will behandled directly by the relevantsectoral unit within DG IV,thereby optimising the use ofresources and expertise withinthe Directorate General. For theinitial twelve months howeverall notifications and initialcontacts will still be received bythe Merger Task Force in DGIV.

â MERGERS


Statistical Overview

The new year so far shows afurther continuation andstrengthening of the upwardtrend in activity recurrentlynoted in previous issues of theNewsletter. Sixty-nineoperations were notified, anincrease of 64% on the sameperiod in 1997 and comparedwith an annual increase of 30%in 1997 over 1996. There were72 decisions disposing of casesunder the Merger Regulation’smain provisions (ie, Articles 6,8and 9 of Regulation EC 4064/89)- an increase of some 100% onthe equivalent period last year.

Of this total, 60 decisions relatedto operations which were clearedby the Commission at the end ofthe first phase of investigation,and a further six to operationswhere a second, more detailedphase of investigation wasopened because the Commissionhad serious doubts about theoperation’s compatibility withthe common market. There werealso two decisions on casesfollowing second phaseinvestigation, in both instancesclearing the operation subject toundertakings from the parties toremove the risk of creation orreinforcement of the dominant

positions identified by theCommission, and one decisionunder Article 9, granting partialreferral of the case back to therelevant national competitionauthority.

First Application of NewProvisions

The period also includes theintroduction (as from thebeginning of March) of the newthresholds and other changes tothe regulation (see previousarticles). Noteworthy in thisrespect were the completion ofthe first case involvingundertakings given under thenew powers to deal formallywith such matters in the firstphase of investigation (seeOwens-Illinois/BTR Packagingbelow) and the first two notifiedcases which fell to be examinedunder Community mergercontrol procedures because theysatisfied the new second level ofthresholds, designed to ensure areduction in the number ofnational filings of the sametransaction.

The Commission also began toexamine the potential applicationof Article 2(4) of the regulationto full-function joint ventureswhere cooperative aspects couldbe relevant. (For an explanation

of the new rules on structuraljoint ventures see feature ‘TheNew Merger Rules Have EnteredInto Force’ elsewhere in thisissue of the Newsletter.). Theorganisational arrangementswithin DGIV in particular todeal with potential Article 2(4)cases - whereby full-functionjoint ventures which may havecooperative aspects will behandled by the relevant sectoralunit within DGIV - were alsoput into effect.

First Company Fined for Non-Compliance

Finally, this period also saw thefirst case in which theCommission used its powers toimpose fines on companies forlate notification and unlawfulimplementation (see Samsung/AST below).

The following sections providefurther details of the moresignificant cases dealt with in theperiod.

DECISIONS UNDERARTICLE 8 (includingwithdrawals in Phase II)

Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim

In September 1997, the Swisspharmaceutical companyHoffmann-La Roche proposed toacquire Corage Ltd., ultimateparent company of theBoehringer Mannheim Group(BM). After a preliminaryappreciation of the case theCommission concluded that in


Geraldine Emberger and John Kemp, DG IV-B(Merger Task Force)

â MERGERS


clinical chemistry (‘CC’) in vitrodiagnostics - used to testcholesterol, glucose and othersubstances of the body - theparties would after the mergerhave a dominant position in 7Member States, namely Austria,Denmark, Germany, Finland,Portugal, Spain and Sweden, andon 2 October 1997 decided toundertake a detailedinvestigation of the case (Article6(1)(c) of the regulation). Itsview was based not only on highcombined market shares(between 40 and 80% indifferent national markets) butalso on the weakness of existingcompetitors, the parties’unequalled installed base ofinstruments on which CC testsare performed, and the absenceof countervailing purchasingpower. In addition, Roche hadbuilt a dominant position in theDNA probes market in allMember States of the EEA,based on its significant patentestate relating to this key-technology. The Commissionfound that the merger wouldhave strengthened this positioneven further, as BM was about toenter this market and would havebecome one of the mostimportant competitors to Roche.

To address the Commission’scompetition concerns Rocheundertook to divest the majorityof its CC business in all MemberStates where the concentrationwould otherwise causecompetitive concerns. Moreoverin the market for DNA Probes,Roche undertook to grant world-wide licences for its key probetechnology to all interested

market participants. Whereasthe divestment of the CCactivities will greatly reduce themarket share additions createdby the merger, the undertaking tolicense the probe technology willenable entry into the DNA probemarket and should accelerate thedevelopment of this importantgrowth market.

On 4 February 1998 theCommission therefore approvedthe concentration, subject to fullcompliance with theundertakings.

Agfa-Gevaert/Du Pont

In September 1997, Agfa-Gevaert NV and Agfa-GevaertAG notified their intention toacquire the graphic arts filmsbusinesses of EI Dupont deNemours & Co (Dupont). Theoperation concerned the sectorsfor graphic arts film and offsetprinting plates. TheCommission was concerned atthe possibility that in view of thelarge overlapping shares thatappeared to be present, and otherrelevant factors the mergerwould create dominant positionsin some or all of the sectors andgeographic markets involved.Accordingly on 9 October 1997it decided to undertake a detailedinvestigation (see previousissue).

In the second-phaseinvestigation the Commissionfound that the proposedconcentration would lead to adominant position in the EEAmarket for negative plates foruse in offset printing. The

Commission defined separatemarkets for negative printingplates and offset printing plates.This definition was based on twomain factors. First, there is onlylimited supply-side substitu-tability, due to the substantialcosts of adapting productionlines and acquiring a newcustomer base. Second, incontrast to production costs,market prices for different typesof plates were shown not toconverge. The finding ofdominance was based not onlyon the large market share Agfawould gain from the acquisitionof Dupont (over 52% in theEEA) but also on a number ofmarket-specific factors, inparticular finance arrangementswith manufacturers andexclusive arrangements Agfaand Dupont had with maindistributors.

To address the Commission’sconcerns, Agfa offered toterminate its exclusivearrangements with its equipmentsuppliers and distributors toallow competitors to offer theirown negative plates todistributors and thereby developtheir sales more readily.

The Commission consideredthat, subject to full compliancewith the conditions andobligations the operation wouldnot lead to the creation orstrengthening of a dominantposition in the EEA, andaccordingly decided, on 11February 1998, to approve theoperation on that basis.

â MERGERS


Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier

The proposed merger of WoltersKluwer and Reed Elsevier wasnotified to the Commission on10 November 1997. After initialexamination it was concludedthat the operation gave rise toserious competitive concerns in anumber of national markets forprofessional publishing, and anin-depth investigation wasopened on 11 December 1998(see previous issue). Thisconfirmed that the mergerbetween these two leadingpublishers could create adominant position in : the world-wide market for academicpublishing (scientific journalsand books); in the markets forpublications for professional usein the areas of law and tax in theNetherlands, the UnitedKingdom, France and Italy; inthe market for publications forprimary and secondary schools(educational publishing) in theUnited Kingdom; in a number ofmarkets for businesspublications in the Netherlands;in the market for Dutchdictionaries; and in the Europeanmarket for the services providedfrom transport databases.

An important aspect of theCommission’s concerns relatedto the size of the merged entity -several times larger than anyother publisher of professionalinformation in the Community.Such a market structure could inthe Commission’s view preventthe maintenance of a competitivesituation in the supply of legal,fiscal and scientific informationin the European Union, with a

significant impact on the termsand prices at which thisinformation is made available touser and consumers. In addition,the combination of the parties’financial resources andownership of copyrightedcontent across Europe woulddiscourage investments bycompetitors in this area.

For these reasons, theCommission decided to raiseobjections to the merger oncompetition grounds andaddressed a statement to thateffect to Wolters Kluwer andReed Elsevier. However, on 9March 1998 the partiesannounced that they had decidedto abandon their current projectto merge, so the Commissionhad no reason to continue itsprocedure under the mergerregulation and no final decisionon the planned merger has beenor will be adopted.

Wienerberger/Cremer &Breuer

On 4 December 1997Wienerberger BaustoffindustrieAG (“Wienerberger”) andDeutsche Steinzeug Cremer &Breuer (“Cremer & Breuer”)notified their intention to combinetheir activities in the area of claysewage pipes in a joint venture.Cremer & Breuer is the leadingclay pipe producer in Germanyand Wienerberger is the secondbiggest supplier of clay pipes.

According to the parties, althoughthe pipes are made from severaldifferent materials - clay,concrete, different kinds of

plastic, and cast iron - users couldeasily substitute one type foranother, so that there was a singleproduct market, throughoutEurope, for sewage pipes of alltypes. However, theCommission’s initial examinationfound indications to suggest thatcertain materials were moresuitable for particular applicationsthan others. Moreover, thereappeared to be specificpreferences for certain materialsin various Member States, whichcould lead to different conditionsof competition. In Germany inparticular, there was said to be asignificant preference for claypipes, especially for dirty-watermain sewers and mixed-watersewers of small and medium-sized diameters. In the light ofthese indications, on 15 January1998 the Commission decided tocommence an in-depthinvestigation of the proposedoperation. However, on 20March 1998 the parties informedthe Commission that they hadannulled their joint ventureagreement and consequentlywithdrew their notification.

KPMG/Ernst & Young

On 23 December 1997 theCommission was notified of theproposed merger betweenKPMG and Ernst & Young, twoof the so-called ‘Big Six’worldwide accountancy andaudit firms. On 5 February 1998the Commission announced itsintention to carry out a detailedinvestigation of the proposal inview of the possibility that themerged entity would have highmarket shares in several EU

â MERGERS


Member States as regards theprovision of auditing andaccounting and tax services in asignificant number of industrialand commercial sectors. Inreaching this decision, theCommission also took accountof the fact that two othermembers of the ‘Big Six’ - PriceWaterhouse and Coopers andLybrand, had recently alsonotified their intention to merge(see below). However, shortlyafterwards KPMG and Ernst &Young abandoned the mergerplan. There was then no groundsfor the Commission to continueits investigation, and accordinglyno final decision on the case hasbeen or will be adopted.

Thyssen Krupp Stahl/ITWSignode/Titan

On 5 May 1998 the Commissionapproved an operation creating ajoint venture between ThyssenKrupp Stahl and ITW Signode.The joint venture will produceboth steel and plastic strappingin Germany for sale in WesternEurope and the rest of the world.The approval followed a detailedsecond phase investigation underthe Merger Regulation (decisionadopted on 22 December 1997,see previous issue).

Thyssen Krupp Stahl is itself ajoint venture between ThyssenStahl AG (a subsidiary ofThyssen AG) and Krupp HoeschStahl ( a subsidiary of FriedKrupp AG) and was establishedto combine the two groups’production and distribution offlat carbon steel products.ITW Signode is a subsidiary of

Illinois Tool Works Inc. of theUnited States of America and isthe world’s largest producer ofstrapping. The joint venture willacquire all the shares of TitanUmreifungstechnik, currently asubsidiary of the Krupp Groupand Signode System GmbH,which produces both steel andplastic strapping. SignodeSystem GmbH is a subsidiary ofITW Signode. TitanUmreifungstechnik, whichproduces steel strapping andstrapping equipment, has enteredinto an agreement to sell theequipment manufacturing part ofits business and its distributionoperation for both strapping andequipment to a privately ownedGerman company P W Lenzen.This operation will take placeimmediately after the shares inTitan Umreifungstechnik havebeen acquired by Thyssen KruppStahl and ITW Signode.

The Commission’s investigationshowed that ITW Signode andthe joint venture would togetherhave between 35% and 40% ofthe combined market for steeland plastic strapping in WesternEuropean market. TheCommission has concluded thatthe operation would notstrengthen or create a dominantposition for a number of reasons.In particular because while theoverall (i.e. for both steel andplastic strapping) was growing,consumption of steel strappingthe only strapping product madeby Titan has been falling overthe long term and will continueto decline. On the other handconsumption of plastic strapping,where the parties are

comparatively weak, is growingrapidly. Thus the parties marketposition will be eroded over timeby the joint effects of the declineof the product sector in whichthey are strong and the growth inthe plastic sector. Barriers toentry in the growing plasticsector are low and there arealready a large number of activecompetitors.

OTHER IMPORTANTDECISIONS UNDERARTICLE 6 OF THEREGULATION

SchweizerischeBankgesellschaft(SBG)/SchweizerischeBankverein (SBV)

On 3 February, 1998 theundertakings SchweizerischeBankgesellschaft (SBG) andSchweizerischer Bankverein(SBV), two Swiss basedcompanies active in private andcorporate banking and in thefinancial services business worldwide, notified their proposal tomerge their businesses into UBSAG (UBS), an entitiy whichwould replace SBG and SBV.

The concentration has world widescale given the fact that UBS willbe the largest European bank withtotal assets of around 508,000million ECU and will be amongthe leading finance institutionsworld wide in investment bankingand asset management. Themerger involves some issuesconcerning retail banking inSwitzerland which are currentlydealt with by the Swiss Antitrust

â MERGERS


authorities. The proposed mergerhas also been notified to the USantitrust authorities.

The affected product marketswhere SBG and SBV haveoverlapping activities in the EUare M&A (merger and aquisition),equity underwriting and equitytrading.

In M&A and equity underwritingthe parties had market shares of42 % and 32% respectively inPortugal. However, shares of theparties and their competitorsvaried considerably over time.The Commission found out thatthe fluctuations were largely dueto the tendency to carry outtransactions without the use of anexternal advisor as well as to thefact that in smaller economiesthere are usually only a limitednumber of large acquisitions andprivatisations every year. SBGand SBV temporarily succeededin achieving a stronger marketposition in M & A advice andequity underwriting in Portugalafter obtaining a contract toprivatise the Portuguesetelecommunications sector.However, given the above-mentioned circumstances, theseshares were not considered likelyto establish a long-term orpermanent dominant position onthe markets in question.

As for equity trading, combinedmarket shares post mergeramounted to around 20 % in theUK. However, the increment wasless than 1%. Furthermore, UBS’strongest competitor, MerrillLynch & Co., has about 7-15%market share in the UK.

Finally, the Commission took intoaccount that there are a number ofother important competitors activein the affected markets, namelyMerrill Lynch & Co., Goldman,Sachs and Co., Morgan Stanley &Co., Deutsche Bank, etc. Thebanking services sector ischaracterised by a high degree ofliberalisation and deregulationoffering market access to potentialcompetitors without significantrestrictions, which are limited tothe respective national bankingand stock exchange controlregimes. The banking servicesmarket is a highly innovative andcompetitive market with anincreasing degree of globalisation.

For these reasons, theCommission concluded that theconcentration would not createany dominant position in thecommon market or in asubstantial part of it, and decidedon 4 March 1998 to approve theoperation.

Nestlé/Dalgety

On 2 April 1998 theCommission approved Nestlé’sacquisition of the Spillers petfood business from Dalgety.Nestlé of Switzerland is engagedin a wide range of foodbusinesses including pet food.Dalgety of Britain is active inagribusiness, food distributionand food manufacturingincluding pet food. Theoperation was notified on 27February 1998.

The markets affected by theoperation were the EEA marketsfor prepared dog and cat food.

Dog and cat food aredifferentiated product marketswith a large variety of products,brands and packages. Adistinction is normally madebetween food for dogs and thatfor cats, and also between so-called dry and wet food types(‘dry’ foods requring the additionof milk or water before serving,‘wet’ foods being ready-to-eat).

In the dog food market, theoperation created only smallmarket share additions, giving theparties will a combined market ofless than 15% . Mars of the USwill continue to be the clearmarket leader. Consequently, theCommission concluded that theoperation did not lead to thecreation or strengthening of adominant position in the dog foodmarket.

As far as the cat food market isconcerned Mars is the marketleader with almost half of themarket at the EEA level. Spillersis number two and Nestlé numberthree. Following the operationNestlé/Spillers will be a clearnumber two, and together Marsand Nestlé/Spillers will havemore than 70% of the cat foodmarket. Furthermore,Nestlé/Spillers will be a companywith a range of brands and abreadth of production andlogistics which is comparable tothe market leader Mars. TheCommission, therefore, examinedwhether the operation would giverise to the creation of duopolisticdominance in the cat food market.

In past years the cat food markethas been characterised by a

â MERGERS


significant degree of competitionand falling prices. After havingexamined the market structure ofthe cat food market and theresulting likely future competitiverelationship between Mars andNestlé/Spillers, the Commissionconcluded that the competitivepressures were likely to continueto exist for the foreseeable future,despite the highly concentratednature of the market. In particular,the Commission noted that the drysector of the market is under-developed and likely to growrapidly, which should encouragecompetition; furthermore, themarket will remain subject topotential competition.

Consequently, the Commissionconcluded that the concentrationdid not create or strengthen anydominant position in theCommon Market or in asubstantial part of it, and,therefore, decided to approve theoperation.

Owens-Illinois/BTR Packaging

The Commission decided on 21April 1998 to clear theacquisition of BTR’s PackagingBusiness Group (BTRPackaging) by Owens-Illinois,Inc (Owens-Illinois), subject tocommitments submitted to theCommission. The decisionmarks the first occasion of theuse of the Commission’s newpowers regarding formalacceptance of commitments atthe first phase of investigation.

Owens-Illinois, an Americancorporation, is an internationalmanufacturer of glass containers,

machinery and plastic packagingproducts and a world-widelicensor of glass technology.BTR is a global engineeringcompany and manufactures glasscontainers in the UK through itssubsidiary BTR Packaging. Thecase was notified on 4 March1998.

The Commission’s investigationfound competition concernsarising from the operation in theglass container market. TheCommission concluded that theproposed operation, as originallynotified, would have created orreinforced Owens-Illinois’sdominant position in the glasscontainer market in the UK andIreland. This finding was basedon the high market shares of theparties (50-75% depending onthe end-user segment), the lowmarket shares of the remainingcompetitors, and the lack ofcompetitive pressure fromoutside the UK due to hightransport costs.

Following negotiations with theCommission, Owens-Illinoisgave commitments to addressthese concerns. Thecommitments includeundertakings to divest the wholeof the glass container businesscarried on by BTR Packagingthrough its subsidiary RockwareGroup Limited (Rockware) at itsfour plants in the UK. Owens-Illinois has also undertaken todivest Rockware’s 50% interestin a glass recycling joint venture,British Glass RecyclingCompany Ltd., which is jointlyowned with Owens-Illinois.

These remedies, whoseimplementation will be closelymonitored by the Commission,will completely eliminate theoverlap between Owens-Illinoisand BTR Packaging in the UKglass container market andrender the operation compatiblewith the common market.

Modifications to the MergerRegulation which came intoforce on 1 March 1998 expresslyprovide for this possibility andgive the Commission anextended period of 6 weeks inwhich to adopt a first phasedecision if commitments areoffered. Commitments in thefirst phase of the procedure areonly accepted where thecompetition problem is readilyidentifiable, and where a clear-cut remedy is availableproviding a complete andeffective solution which can beimplemented without unduecomplication and delay.

REFERENCE BACK TOMEMBER STATES UNDERARTICLE 9 OF THEREGULATION

Promodes/S21/Grupo GS

On 10 March 1998 theCommission decided to referpartially to the competent Italianauthorities (“Autorità Garantedella Concorrenza e delMercato” ) the examination ofthe acquisition by the Frenchretailing group Promodès of jointcontrol with Schemaventuno (aholding company belonging tothe Benetton and Del Vecchio

â MERGERS


families) of GS, a companyformerly solely controlled bySchemaventuno. By a seconddecision adopted the same daythe Commission declared the restof the operation compatible withthe common market.

In its decisions on this case theCommission confirmed itspractice concerning partialreferral of the examination of amerger to a Member State (nowcodified with the latestamendments to the MergerRegulation).

The Autorità had asked for thepartial referral of the case on 16February 1998, as in its view thecreation of the new group wouldthreaten to create or reinforce adominant position in certainlocal markets for retaildistribution within Italy -specifically, in the provinces ofTorino, Vercelli and Aosta.

The Commission decided torefer the case to the Autorità asregards the effects of theoperation on each of these localareas. The Commissionconsidered that an examinationby the national authority wouldenable the relevant geographicmarkets and the position of theretail outlets concerned by theoperation to be more preciselydefined, so that a fullcompetitive analysis could becarried out.

As far as the rest of the case wasconcerned, the Commissionconsidered that the notifiedoperation did not raise anyserious doubts about competition

at the national level. Irrespectiveof the exact product marketdefinition adopted, the combinedmarket shares of the parties weregenerally low. The operationwas most likely to have effectsin North-Western Italy(Piemonte and Lombardia).Even there, however, theoperation did not appear to raiseserious concerns other than inthe three provinces mentionedabove, in view of the locationsof the sales points, the relativelysmall market shares andincrements and the presence of anumber of competitors. Inconsequence, the Commissiondeclared the operationcompatible with the commonmarket as regards those aspectswhich were not the subject of thereferral to the Italian Authority.

DECISION TO IMPOSEFINES FOR LATE FILINGAND UNLAWFULIMPLEMENTATION OF ACONCENTRATION -ARTICLE 14 OF THEREGULATIONSamsung/AST

On 11 February 1998 theCommission announced that ithad fined the Korean companySamsung ECU 33,000 forfailing to notify a concentrationto the Commission in good timeand for putting into effect theconcentration without theCommission’s authorisation.This was the first occasion onwhich the powers under theMerger Regulation to imposefines have been exercised.

On 22 April 1997, theCommission received anotification of a proposedconcentration pursuant to theMerger Regulation by which theundertaking SamsungElectronics Co., L+d (Samsung)acquired control of the whole ofAST Research, Inc. (AST) , anAmerican company active in themarket for personal computers,by way of public bid. However,the information in theCommission’s possessionindicated, beyond doubt, thatSamsung had already acquired,without prior notification,control of AST at least inJanuary 1996 within the meaningof the Merger Regulation. TheMerger Regulation requires thata concentration with aCommunity dimension shall benotified to the Commission notmore than one week after theacquisition of a controllinginterest. In addition, Samsungalso breached the MergerRegulation’s requirement that anundertaking must not implementa proposed merger until it hasreceived prior authorisation fromthe Commission.

In setting the amount of the finethe Commission took intoaccount that no damage tocompetition had been caused; thatthe parties finally notified theoperation and the infringementappeared not to be intentional;and that Samsung recognised thebreach and cooperated with theCommission in its investigations.Nevertheless, the absence ofnotification and theimplementation of the mergerwithout the Commission’s

â MERGERS


authorisation continued for asignificant period of time;moreover, Samsung is animportant company withsignificant activities in Europeand must be considered to beaware of the Community Mergercontrol rules.

The relatively small amount ofthe fines takes particular accountof the fact that this is the firsttime a company has been finedfor non compliance with itsobligations under the MergerRegulation.

JUDGMENTS

France v Commission C-68/94,C-30/95 European CourtReports 1998 0000 fulltextCelex No. : 694J0068 Dateof document : 31/03/98 Date ofapplication : 18/02/94Judgmentof the Court of 31 March 1998.French Republic and Soci‚t‚commerciale des potasses et del'azote (SCPA) and EntrepriseminiŠre et chimique (EMC) vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities. Communitycontrol of concentrationsbetween undertakings -Collective dominant position.Joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95.

PRESS RELEASES

IP/98/390 [1998-04-29]Commission approves the buy-out of BTR’s Formica businessby three investment banks

IP/98/389 [1998-04-20]Commission approves the GESEACO joint venture betweenGE Capital Services and SeaContainers Ltd

IP/98/371 [1998-04-24]Commission clears acquisitionof AMB, GPA and Proxima byAssicurazioni Generali S.p.A.

IP/98/370 [1998-04-24]The Commission clears takeoverof Royal NederlandVerzerkeringsgroep byAssurances Générales de France

IP/98/369 [1998-04-23]Commission clears theacquisition of BTRPACKAGING by OWENS-ILLINOIS with undertakingssubmitted by OWENS-ILLINOIS (see p. 70)

IP/98/366 [1998-04-21]Wienerberger and Cremer &Breuer withdraw theirnotification of creation of a jointventure (see p. 67)

IP/98/363 [1998-04-17]The Commission approvesacquisition of Novalis andNyltech by Rhodianyl,subsidiary of Rhône-Poulenc

IP/98/362 [1998-04-17]Commission approves theformation of a joint venture

between ARAG and Winterthurin Switzerland

IP/98/332 [1998-04-06]Commission decides that Deutagand Ilbau asphalt plant jointventure is not a merger

IP/98/326 [1998-04-03]Commission approves Nestlé’sacquisition of the Spillers petfood business from Dalgety (seep. 69)

IP/98/318 [1998-04-03]Commission approves mergerbetween ROYAL BANK OFCANADA (RBC) and BANKOF MONTREAL (BMO)

IP/98/294 [1998-03-26]Commission clears UK musicand bookshop joint venture

IP/98/293 [1998-03-26)Commission clears UK planthire joint venture by Tarmac andBovis

IP/98/269 [1998-03-24]Commission clears hotel groupsmerger

IP/98/268 [1998-03-24]Commission clears acquisitionof Digital by Compaq

IP/98/265 [1998-03-19]Commission clears aconcentration between NORTELand NORWEB in thetelecommunications sector

IP/98/264 [1998-03-19]Commission has approved thecreation of a joint venturebetween Sanofi and Bristol-

â MERGERS


Myers Squibb for two newpharmaceuticals

IP/98/261 [1998-03-18]Commission authorises theacquisition of a participation inESTAG by EDF

IP/98/252 [1998-03-13]The Commission approves thecreation of a joint venturebetween CEREOL/EBS andSOFIPROTEOL in the sector ofoilseed crushing and oilproduction

IP/98/249 [1998-03-12]Commission approves jointventure in the modern retailsector (hard discount) in Italy

IP/98/248 [1998-03-12]The Commission approvesmerger in foundry equipmentsector

IP/98/244 [1998-03-11]Commission has decided to referpartially to the Italian authoritiesthe proposed acquisition of GSby PROMODES andSCHEMAVENTUNO for adetailed investigation.Commission has also cleared therest of the operation.

IP/98/243 [1998-03-11]Commission clears the take overof GUILBERT by the groupPINAULT-PRINTEMPS-REDOUTE

IP/98/230 [1998-03-10]Wolters Kluwer and ReedElsevier have announced thatfollowing the objections of theCommission, they have

abandoned their projectedmerger (see p. 67)

IP/98/226 [1998-03-10]Commission approves jointventure TRANSRAPID betweenTHYSSEN, ADTRANZ andSIEMENS to merge theirmagnetic leviation trainactivities

IP/98/216 [1998-03-05]Commission approves themerger between SchweizerischeBankgesellschaft (SBG) andSchweizerischer Bankverein(SBV) (see p. 68)

IP/98/215 [1998-03-04]Commission clears acquisitionof Dutch real estate bank by theGerman Bayerische Vereinsbank

IP/98/213 [1998-03-04]Commission to carry out detailedinquiry into proposed mergerbetween WorldCom and MCI

IP/98/206 [1998-03-02]Commission clears the take overof Havas Intermédiation by thegroup CLT-UFA

IP/98/205 [1998-03-02]Waste management: the UKgroup Shanks & McEwan entersthe Belgian market by acquiringsome of the activities of theSuez-Lyonnaise des Eaux group

IP/98/202 [1998-02-27]Commission clears acquisitionof ACTEBIS Holding GmbH byOTTO Versand

IP/98/201 [1998-02-27]The Commission authorises theacquisition by British Steel of apart of the capital of Europipe

IP/98/181 [1998-02-24]The Commission approvesCaterpillar’s acquisition ofPerkins diesel engine business

IP/98/166 [1998-02-18]The Commission fines Samsungfor late notification of aconcentration

IP/98/159 [1998-02-17]Commission clears theacquisition of San Pellegrino byNestlé

IP/98/158 [1998-02-17]Commission clears aconcentration in local andregional passenger transportsector

IP/98/157 [1998-02-16]Commission clears the mergerbetween Zürich and the financialservices business of B.A.T.Industries

IP/98/156 [1998-02-17]Commission clears merger inprivate medical insurance

IP/98/155 [1998-02-16]Commission authorises theacquisition of Hüls StyreneBusiness by BP

IP/98/152 [1998-02-12]Commission authorises theacquisition of the automotivecomponents activities of Philipsby Mannesmann

â MERGERS


IP/98/148 [1998-02-11]Commission approvesacquisition by AGFA ofDupont’s activities in the graphicarts sector, subject for conditions(see p. 66)

IP/98/139 [1998-02-09]The Commission approves theacquisition of sole control overHAMBROS BANK by SociétéGénérale

IP/98/138 [1998-02-09]Commission approves theacquisition by PROMODES ofSIMAGO, S.A. in the sector ofthe retail grocery in Spain (see p.70)

IP/98/137 [1998-02-09]Commission clears theacquisition of Catteau byPromodès in the retaildistribution sector

IP/98/132 [1998-02-05]Commission to carry out detailedinquiry into proposed mergerbetween KPMG and Ernst &Young (see p. 67)

IP/98/131 [1998-02-05]The Commission approves theacquisition by Stinnes of BTLfrom Finnlines

IP/98/130 [1998-02-05]Commission clears theacquisition of Francorosso byAlpitour under the joint controlof IFIL and the Isoardi family

IP/98/129 [1998-02-05]The Commission approves theacquisition of Fritidsresor byThomson

IP/98/121 [1998-02-04]The Commission clears theacquisition of BoehringerMannheim by Hoffmann-LaRoche under conditions andobligations

IP/98/107 [1998-01-30]Commission clears acquisitionof DEUTSCHE WAGGONBAUAG by BOMBARDIER

IP/98/106 [1998-01-30]Commission clears acquisitionof Klöckner ChemiehandelGmbH by Metallgesellschaft AG

IP/98/105 [1998-01-30]Commission clears the computertraining joint venture“Futurekids Deutschland”between Burda and Bertelsmann

IP/98/104 [1998-01-30]Commission clears the take overof Bertrand Faure by Ecia

IP/98/103 [1998-01-30]Commission opens indepthinvestigation in the DeutscheTelekom / Beta Research case

IP/98/102 [1998-01-30]The Commission approves theacquisition of sole control overBanque Paribas Nederland byBanque Paribas Belgique

IP/98/101 [1998-01-30]Commission approves jointventure between DFO andScadlines to merge their BalticSea ferry operations

IP/98/98 [1998-01-29]Commission clears theacquisition of Matra BAeDynamics of a 30 % interest in

the missile business of DaimlerBenz Aerospace

IP/98/97 [1998-01-28]The Commission authorises twoconcentrations affecting thesituation of control in CABLE ITELEVISIO DE CATALUNYA(a cable operator in Catalonia)

IP/98/83 [1998-01-26]The Commission approves theacquisition of sole control overBanque Bruxelles Lambert/BankBrussel Lambert by the INGGROEP

IP/98/78 [1998-01-23]Commission clears joint venturebetween Dow Jones and NBC

IP/98/77 [1998-01-22]Commission opens indepthinvestigation in theBERTELSMANN / KIRCH /PREMIERE case

IP/98/74 [1998-01-22]Commission to carry out detailedinquiry into proposed mergerbetween Price Waterhouse andCoopers & Lybrand

IP/98/73 [1998-01-22]Commission approves a jointventure in the clinical sector

IP/98/57 [1998-01-20]The Commission authorises theacquisition by Usinor of controlof Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi

IP/98/51 [1998-01-19]Commission decides to openindepth investigations regardingthe creation of a joint venturebetween Wienerberger andCremer & Breuer (see p. 67)

â MERGERS


IP/98/50 [1998-01-19]The Commission approvesmerger in informationtechnology sector in Denmark

IP/98/49 [1998-01-19]The Commission approves thecreation of a joint venturebetween Eastman Kodak andSun Chemical in the sector ofgraphic arts

IP/98/48 [1998-01-19]Commission clears theacquisition by Mannesmann of acontrolling stake in the Italiantelecommunications operatorINFOSTRADA

IP/98/47 [1998-01-19]Commission clears acquisitionof PFANNKUCH-Group bySPAR Handels AG/ITM-Group

IP/98/46 [1998-01-19]Commission clears acquisitionof parts of PRO-Group by SPARHandels AG/ITM-Group

IP/98/38 [1998-01-15]The Commission approves theacquisition by ARBED /ACERALIA of the ARISTRAINSTEEL group

LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTIONApplication of Article 90 ECMain developments between 1st January and 30th May


Télécommunications

Cable review

Deux directives, celle de 1995concernant le câble1 et celle de1996 sur la libéralisation totaledes télécommunications au 1erjanvier 19982, imposaient à laCommission une révision de ladirective "câble" sous deuxaspects particuliers :

- l'incidence sur la concurrencede la fourniture, par un seul etmême opérateur, de réseauxde télécommunications et deréseaux câblés detélédistribution, et

- les restrictions à l'utilisationdes réseaux detélécommunications pour lafourniture de capacité detélédistribution par câble.

A la lumière des conclusions dedeux études qu'elle a faitentreprendre, la Commission aadopté, le 17 décembre 1997 uneCommunication concernant leréexamen de ces deuxdirectives3, ensemble avec unprojet de directive modifiant ladirective 90/388/CEE en vue degarantir que les réseaux de

1 Directive 95/51/CE de la Commission, JO

L 256 du 26.10.1995, p. 49.2 Directive 96/19/CE de la Commission, JO

L 74 du 22.3.1996, p. 13.3 JO C 71 du 7.3.1998, p. 4-17.

télécommunications et lesréseaux câblés de télévisionappartenant à un seul et mêmeopérateur constituent des entitésjuridiques distincts4. LaCommission compte finaliserson texte législatif après avoirpris connaissance decommentaires éventuels quidevront lui parvenir, dans undélai de deux mois environ,après la publication au JournalOfficiel (7.3.1998).

En vue de conclure laconsultation publique, laCommission a publié uneinvitation d’expression d’intérêtpour la réunion de consultationqu’elle envisage d’organiser.5

Internet

Le 1 janvier 1998, laCommission a adopté uneCommunication définissant sapolitique en matière decommunications vocales surInternet.6 Il est prévu dans ce

4 JO C 71 du 7.3.1998, p. 23-26.5 J.O. C150 du 16.5.1998, p. 3. Les parties

intéressées peuvent manifester leur intérêtpar télécopieur (32-2-2969819) ou parcourrier électronique ([email protected]). Ces parties serontindividuellement invitées à la réunion deconsultation

6 JO n° C 6 du 10.01.1998, p. 4). Le texte dela Communication est égalementdisponible sur le site web de la DG IV(http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/lawliber/libera.htm).

texte que les communicationsvocales sur Internet ne relèverontpas du règlement régissant latéléphonie vocale jusqu’à cequ’un certain nombre deconditions aient été remplies.

Dans le cadre du droitcommunautaire, la fourniture decommunications vocales surInternet ne constitue pas pourl’heure un “service de téléphonievocale” au sens de la directive90/388/CEE (“directive servicesde télécommunication”)7. LesEtats membres ne peuvent doncla soumettre à des procédures delicence individuelle, mais tout auplus à des procédures dedéclaration.

Les communications vocales surInternet ne seront définiescomme services de téléphonievocale et, partant, ne relèverontde la réglementation sur lesservices classiques de téléphonievocale qu’à condition que:- ces communications fassent

l’objet d’une exploitationcommerciale,

- elles soient fournies pour lepublic,

- le service soit fourni audépart et à destination despoints de terminaison duréseau public

- il comporte le transport directet la commutation de la voixen temps réel.

Actuellement, les services decommunication vocale surInternet ne satisfont pas à tousces critères; ils ne seront donc

7 Directive de la Commission; JO L 192 du

24.7.1990, p. 10.

Développements les plus récents,

Angela BARDENHEWER, DG IV-A-1

â LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTION


pas considérés pour le momentcomme des services detéléphonie vocale. Les marchésresteront ainsi ouverts àl’innovation en ce qui concerneInternet, ce qui pourraitpermettre de proposer desservices de téléphoniemultimédia sur Internet. Celasignifie également que lesprestataires d’accès à Internet nepeuvent être tenus de contribuerau financement du serviceuniversel.

Toutefois, compte tenu de lasophistication croissante de leuroffre, certains fournisseurs decommunications vocales surInternet pourront être considéréscomme des prestataires deservices de téléphonie vocale surla base des critères énoncés etseront donc soumis à laréglementation applicable auxfournisseurs de services detéléphonie vocale dès qu’ilsoffriront une qualité de serviceéquivalente aux servicesclassiques de téléphonie vocale.

La Communication de laCommission concerne égalementles Etats membres qui ont obtenudes délais de mise en oeuvresupplémentaires pour lalibéralisation de la téléphonievocale après le 1er janvier 1998.Elle précise que, jusqu’à la datede la libéralisation totale, cespays ne peuvent par exemplebloquer la fourniture sur Internetd’un service de communicationsvocales fonctionnant par carte, àmoins qu’ils ne puissent apporterla preuve que le service en causene constitue qu’un simplesubstitut du service universel de

téléphonie vocale et qu’il setaille à ce titre une partimportante du marché descommunications internationaleset à longue distance.

L’état de la libéralisation dumarché des télécommunicationsdans l’Union

Un peu plus d’un mois aprèsl’ouverture complète du marchédes télécommunications dans lamajeure partie de l’Union, le 18février 1998, la Commission aadopté un nouveau rapport sur lamise en oeuvre par les Etatsmembres des directives enmatières de télécommu-nications.8 Ce rapport fournitune "photographie" de lasituation après le “big bang” dupremier janvier et confirme quedans tous ces Etats membres denouveaux opérateurs ont étéautorisés à fournir des servicesde téléphonie vocale ou à établiret exploiter des réseaux publicsde télécommunications enconcurrence avec l’opérateur enplace.

La Commission avait déjàadopté, en mai et octobre 1997,des rapports sur l’état de latransposition de ce paquetréglementaire et a ainsi puidentifier les Etats dans lesquelsdes efforts étaient encorenécessaires pour assurer unemise en oeuvre effective ducadre réglementaire. Ennovembre 1997, la Commissionavait lancé des mises en demeureà l’encontre de sept Etats

8 COM (1998) 80 final.

membres qui n’avaient pasrespectés des échéancesimportantes. Ces procédures sesont révélées efficaces, et ont,comme le démontre le rapport defévrier 1998, poussé les paysconcernés à prendre les mesuresappropriées en vue de latransposition du cadreréglementaire.

Ce bilan globalementencourageant est importantcompte tenu de l’entrée envigueur de l’accord OMC sur lesservices de télécommunicationsde base, début février 1998.

Il n’en demeure pas moins que lerapport identifie un certainsnombre de problèmessubsistants, y compris en ce quiconcerne la transposition de ladirective 90/388/CEE de juin1990 (call-back non libéralisé auPortugal et en Grèce parexemple). En outre des retardsde transposition de lalibéralisation des infrastructuresalternatives ont été observésdans certains des Etats membrequi bénéficient de dérogations(et ceci malgré les périodesadditionnelles de mise en oeuvreaccordée à ces Etats membrespour l’adoption de ces mesures).Certains Etats membres n’ont enoutre toujours pas totalement misen oeuvre la directive visant àlibéraliser les services parsatellite, alors que la troisièmegénération de mobiles (UMTS)et les futurs services decommunications personnellespar satellites (S-PCS) sont déjà àl’ordre du jour. Cette situationest lourde de conséquences pour

â LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTION


la préparation et ledéveloppement des ces services.

La Commission a depuisl’adoption du rapport entamé desprocédures d’infraction àl’encontre de certains des Etatsmembres concernés, concernantdes cas de transpositionincomplète. En parallèle, ellecontinue l’examen de laconformité des mesuresnationales relatives à l’intercon-nexion, au contour du serviceuniversel et aux modalités decalcul du coût et du financementde celui-ci, ainsi qu’auxprocédures et conditions d’octroides autorisations. L’impact deces mesures nationales sur lesconditions de concurrence estanalysé et des actions devrontêtre prises s’il devait s’avérerqu’elles constituent des barrièresà l’entrée pour les nouveauxopérateurs, pour s’assurer quel’ouverture des télécommu-nications à la concurrence profitedavantage aux citoyenseuropéens.

Dans sa réunion du 6 mai 1998la Commission a ainsi décidéd’entamer des procéduresd’infraction formelles àl’encontre des certains Etatsmembres qui ont imposé desobligations aux opérateurs detélécommunications d’affecterune partie de leurs recettes ouinvestissements à la recherche etdéveloppement ou à laformation. De telles conditionsne sont en effet pas prévues dansla directive 97/13/CE9, qui

9 Directive du Parlement et du Conseil du

10.4.1997 relative à un cadre commun pour

harmonise de manièreexhaustive les conditionsauxquelles l’octroi de licencespeut être soumis.

De nouveaux opérateurs dans lemarché des radiocommuni-cations mobiles

La date du 1er janvier 1998, étaitégalement l’échéance fixée pourl’octroi d’autorisations dansl’ensemble de la Communautépour l’exploitation de systèmesmobiles DCS-1800. Tous lesEtats membres ayant à cette dateentamé les procéduresnécessaires, sauf l’Italie. LaCommission a donc décidéd’entamer une procédured’infraction contre l’Italie, qui anéanmoins été suspendue, suite àun accord entre la Gouvernementitalien et la Commission. Seloncet accord, les services de laCommission ont été étroitementassociés aux différentes étapesde l’élaboration et du lancementde l’appel d’offres pour untroisième opérateur mobile enItalie. La procédure de sélectiondevrait pouvoir être achevée à lafin du mois de mai.

Compte tenu du tempsnécessaire pour construire lesréseaux concernés, les nouveauxopérateurs devraient commencerd’opérer à la fin de cette année,ce qui devrait augmenter le degréde concurrence au bénéfice desutilisateurs.

les autorisations générales et les licencesindividuelles dans le secteur des servicesde télécommunication, JO L 117 du7.5.1997, p. 15.

Énergie

La directive concernant lemarché intérieur du gaz a étéadoptée lors du Conseil“Energie” du 11 mai 1998. Lesprincipales dispositions de cettedirective, qui n’ont pas étémodifiées depuis l’adoption de laposition commune par le Conseilen décembre 1997, ont étédécrites dans le numéroprécedent du Newsletter.

PRESS RELEASES

IP/98/309 [1998-03-31]Commisison adopts Notice on theapplication of the competition rulesto Access agreements in thetelecommunications sector

IP/98/182 [1998-02-25]Commission publishes MonitoringReport on Universal Service in theTelecommunications Sector

IP/98/165 [1998-02-18]Third report on the implementationof the EU telecommunicationsregulatory package

IP/98/39 [1998-01-15]Commission defines its position onInternet telephony in the context ofthe liberalisation of the EUtelecommunications markets

IP/98/32 [1998-01-14]An Event marking the liberalisationof telecom-munications in Europe,Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels, 19th

January

STATE AIDMain developments between 1st January and 30th April 1998


I. The Commission’s objectives

At the Industry Council of 14November 1996, under the IrishPresidency, the Commissionlaunched an initiative for thereorientation of State aid controlby the use of Article 94 of theTreaty. The modernisationprogramme would focus on theimplementation of a moretransparent, coherent andefficient policy. The Councilwelcomed these ambitious plansand encouraged the Commissionto make proposals.

With the adoption of aCommission proposal for anenabling Regulation on 15 July1997, a first step to realise theCommission’s objectives wasmade. Adopted by the Councilon 7 May 1998, this Regulationempowers the Commission toexempt certain categories of aidfrom the notification obligationby means of block exemptionRegulations. This shouldsimplify the control system for“routine” cases and allow theCommission to concentrate itsresources on the more complexand most distortive cases.

The proposal for a proceduralRegulation adopted by theCommission on 18 February1998 is the second chapter of theCommission’s initiative underArticle 94. It has a double goal.

First, the proposal aims atincreasing transparency andlegal certainty by a codificationand clarification of theprocedural rules in the State aidfield. At present, the only legalprovisions on State aidprocedures are those of Article93 of the Treaty. However,during the last 40 years a wholeset of rules has been developedthrough the Commission’spractice and the jurisprudence ofthe Court of Justice. Thisfragmentation of rules in caselaw, Commission notices,communications, guidelines, etc.has reduced the clarity of thesystem provided for in theTreaty. Integration of theprocedural rules in one coherenttext was thus needed, in order tomake State aid controltransparent for Member States,enterprises and the public atlarge.

The proposal should not belimited to a codification of the

existing practice, however. In theCommission’s view, theRegulation should alsocontribute to realise the objectiveof efficiency and a reinforcementof State aid control. Theproposal therefore enlarges thecontrol system with some newinstruments and tightens up therules on those points where theneed for a more effective systemarose.

II. Contents of the proposal

As the Regulation lays downrules for the application ofArticle 93 of the Treaty, itconfirms first of all thecornerstones of the systemforeseen in this Article: theobligation of prior notificationand the standstill clause.Effective State aid control canonly function if Member Statesnotify their aid projects to theCommission and do not put theminto effect before theCommission has authorisedthem. Most of the otherprovisions are eitherconsequences of these principlesor instruments to ensure thatthey are respected.

Concerning the “normal”procedure of notification theproposal mainly codifies theexisting practice. According toArticle 93 of the Treaty twophases can be distinguished.After a preliminary examination,the Commission may decide notto raise objections if the notifiedmeasure does not constitute aidor does not raise doubts as to itscompatibility with the commonmarket. If doubts about the

Recent developments

The Commission’s proposal for aRegulation on State Aid procedures

Adinda SINNAEVE, DG IV-G-1

â STATE AID


compatibility of the notifiedmeasure exist, the Commissionhas to open a formalinvestigation procedure andinvite the Member Stateconcerned and interested partiesto submit their comments beforetaking a final decision. The firstexamination phase shall beclosed within two months fromthe receipt of a completenotification.

Where Member States haveinfringed the rules of priornotification and standstill, theprocedure basically follows thesame pattern as for notified aid,but it is completed with severaladditional instruments, which aremainly based on the case law ofthe Court.During the examination of thecompatibility of the illegallygranted aid, the Commission hasdifferent kinds of injunctions atits disposal:• the information injunction,

which should allow theCommission to obtain allnecessary information on theunlawful aid;

• the suspension injunction, bywhich the Commission canorder a Member State tosuspend the unlawful aiduntil a decision on itscompatibility is taken.

• the recovery injunction, bywhich the Commission canorder provisional recovery ofthe unlawful aid pending itsfinal decision.

The suspension injunction andthe recovery injunction areconservatory measures and a

logical consequence of thestandstill clause. They aim at re-establishing a situation whichshould have prevailed anyway ifArticle 93 (3) had beenrespected. The recoveryinjunction is also an importanttool for the protection ofcompetitors, which may havesuffered damage from the illegalgranting of aid, which a finalrecovery decision could notrepair. In cases where the examinationof the unlawful aid results in afinal negative decision, meaningthat the aid is not only unlawfulon procedural grounds but alsoincompatible with the commonmarket, definite recovery of theaid from the beneficiary is theonly way to restore competition.Since the middle of the 1980s,the Commission has developed apolicy of systematically askingrecovery. This practice isreinforced in the proposal by theobligation for the Commission toorder recovery of incompatibleunlawful aid. What is even more important,however, is the execution ofrecovery decisions. Experiencehas shown that the presentsituation regarding compliancewith recovery decisions is farfrom being satisfactory. Nearly10 % of the recovery decisionsare not executed 10 years afterthey have been taken, in themajority of cases because ofpending procedures beforenational courts. Such delaysmake restoration of faircompetition practicallyimpossible and diminish the

effectiveness and credibility ofcompetition policy. Moreover,there appear to be significantdifferences between MemberStates in this regard. Themajority of long-pending casesof unrecovered aid occur in afew states, so that an inequalityof treatment betweenbeneficiaries is created. In orderto remedy this situation theCommission’s proposal statesthat national procedures forrecovery shall only apply,“provided that they allow theimmediate and effectiveexecution of the Commission’sdecision” and that “remediesunder national law shall not havesuspensive effect”. This lastsentence could be directlyapplied by national judges and isin line with the jurisprudence ofthe Court which has constantlyrejected the application ofprovisions of national law thatprevent the effective executionof recovery decisions. Accordingto the proposal, beneficiariescould still use the legal remediesexisting in their national lawsystem, but pending the outcomeof the proceedings,reimbursement should takeplace. It should be recalled that thewhole procedure on unlawfulaid, including the recovery rules,would never have to be applied,if Member States respected therules of the Treaty. Figures showa high proportion of non-notifiedcases over the years (ca. 21 %of all registered cases in 1997).Taken account of this situation, astricter policy, including the useof suspension and recovery

â STATE AID


injunctions, and the effectiveenforcement of recoverydecisions is indispensable. An efficient State aid controlsystem would not be completewithout the necessary means tomonitor compliance withCommission decisions. Theproposal contains threeinstruments that should enablethe Commission to do thisfollow-up:• a general reporting

obligation on all existing aidschemes. Annual reports arean important source ofinformation in the context ofthe constant review ofexisting aid according toArticle 93 (1) of the Treaty.In addition, they shouldprovide information aboutpre-accession aid schemes,which would otherwiseperhaps remain unknown tothe Commission.

• on-site monitoring powers ofthe Commission. Theproposal foresees that theCommission shall beallowed to make on-sitemonitoring visits to thebeneficiary, in cases whereserious doubts aboutcompliance with conditionaldecisions exist. If, forinstance, the Commissionhas approved an aid underthe condition of a capacityreduction, such visits may bethe only way to checkwhether the conditions havebeen respected.

• Co-operation with nationalindependent supervisorybodies. The Commission

proposes that Member Statesdesignate an independentbody, such as thecompetition authority or theCourt of Auditors, which theCommission can ask for areport when it has doubtsabout compliance withcertain decisions. This thirdinstrument would givenational bodies a role in themonitoring of State aid.

III. Third party rights The Commission proposalconfirms the bilateral characterof State aid procedures, whichare based upon a dialoguebetween the Member Stateconcerned and the Commission.It chose not to create specificnew rights for third parties, andin particular not to givecomplainants a status similar tothe one they enjoy in Art. 85-86cases. This position was recentlyupheld by the Court of Justice inthe Sytraval judgment (seecomment in this Newsletter).The Court confirmed that therole of competitors in State aidprocedures is strictly limited tothe formal investigationprocedure, where theircomments on the aid should helpthe Commission to obtain all theinformation necessary to assesscompatibility. The Commission considers that,under the present system, therights of third parties are alreadysufficiently protected at everystage of the procedure:• They may complain to the

Commission about analleged unlawful aid to a

competitor. The proposalconfirms that theCommission is obliged toexamine such information.

• Every interested party canobtain a copy ofCommission decisions onState aid.

• Where the Commissiondecides not to raiseobjections to an aid,competitors have thepossibility to introduce anaction for annulment of thedecision under Article 173(4) of the Treaty, in order tooblige the Commission toopen the formalinvestigation procedure.

• Under the formalinvestigation procedureevery interested party isinvited to submit comments.

• Finally, competitors canintroduce actions pursuant toArticle 173 (4) againstpositive or conditionaldecisions closing the formalinvestigation procedure.

To create additional rightssimilar to those in anti-trustprocedures would not only be inconflict with the objective ofincreasing efficiency, but alsocontradict the concept and logicof State aid control, whichdefines third party rights withinthe context of a procedurebetween the Member State andthe Commission. IV. Conclusion The Commission’s proposalsunder Article 94 are a historicalstep in State aid policy. After the

â STATE AID


unsuccessful proposals made atthe end of the Sixties and thebeginning of the Seventies, noinitiatives had been takenanymore and scepticism aboutthe expediency of using Article94 had grown. Today, the

context has changed. Theadoption of the enablingRegulation on 7 May 1998 willallow a simplification ofprocedures. The proceduralRegulation could be anotherimportant step in the

modernisation exercise and givethe Commission the rightinstruments to achieve itsobjectives with regard to Stateaid control.

ITALIE. La Commissionautorise un régime d’aides àl’emploi en Sicile favorisant latransformation d’emplois pré-caires en emplois stables.

La Commission européenne aapprouvé en décembre 1997 unprojet de régime d’aide en faveurde l’emploi en Sicile (Italie). Cerégime prévoit, pour lesentreprises opérant en Sicile, desexonérations de charges socialesvisant à la création nette denouveaux emplois ainsi que latransformation d’emploisprécaires en emplois stables.L’aide moyenne maximale serade 22.000 Ecus par emploi crééou stabilisé. Le budget alloué à cerégime est de +/- 76,5 millionsd’Ecus.

L’intérêt de ce cas réside dansles aides pour la transformationdes emplois précaires en emploisstables. En effet, ce type d’aidesn’est pas expressément prévu par

les Lignes directricescommunautaires pour les aides àl’emploi qui se réfèrentuniquement à deux catégories :création nette d’emplois etmaintien de l’emploi.

La mesure approuvée nes’apparente ni à l’une ni à l’autrecatégorie. Elle présente lacaractéristique particulière depermettre la stabilisationd’emplois précaires. Ellecomporte donc une valeurajoutée constituée par la créationnette d’emplois stables quin’existaient pas auparavant.

Or, la Commission a observé queles Lignes directricescommunautaires concernant lesaides à l’emploi, bien qu’elles neprévoient pas expressément cetype d’intervention, fontréférence au concept de stabilitéen tant que valeur positive, enpermettant l’octroi d’aidesuniquement dans les cas où les

emplois sont créés pour unedurée suffisamment longue. Leconcept de stabilité est en outreprésent dans la conclusion duConseil européen pour l’emploide novembre 1997 qui préconise,entre autres, des mesures “pourfaire reculer durablement lechômage”.

Sur la base de ces considérations,la Commission a estimé qu’on nepeut pas exclure à prioril’approbation de ces mesuressous prétexte qu’elles ne sont pasexpressément prévues par lesLignes directrices citées, car ellesrépondent à une valeur qui y estinscrite et sont susceptiblesd’améliorer la situation dumarché du travail d’une régiongravement affectée par leproblème du chômage et éligibleà la dérogation de l’article 92.3.a)du traité. Elle a donc conclu enfaveur de la compatibilité de cesaides.

De cette manière, la Commissiona rendu compte du soutien de lapolitique de concurrence auxobjectifs communautaires delutte contre le chômage.


Madeleine Tilmans – DG IV.G.1

â STATE AID


PORTUGAL. Aides à laformation. Clôture du dossier. The European Commission andthe Portuguese Government havereached agreement on therepayment of training aid toAutoEuropa, a Ford/Volkswagenjoint venture, that exceeded theapplicable ceiling. TheCommission has thereforedecided to close the file. AutoEuropa is based at Setubal inPortugal and produces the FordGalaxy, VW Sharan and SeatAlhambra models. The companywas created in 1991, on agreenfield site, and has been aforemost example of successfulinward investment into Portugal.The investment requiredsignificant resources, some ofwhich were provided in the formof regional funding (forinvestment) and social funding(for training purposes). TheCommission approved thesemeasures in 1991 and has sincemonitored their application. During this monitoring processthe Commission found out thatAutoEuropa was still receivingpublic funds for trainingpurposes after the launch ofproduction in 1995. TheCommission has assessed suchpayments under the rules ontraining contained in the car aidframework establishing a ceilingof 50% of total cost for basictraining purposes and 25% forjob specific training. Once the Commissionestablished that such ceilings hadbeen exceeded the Portuguese

authorities have co-operatedfully with the Commission toensure prompt repayment of theexcessive aid. This allowed theCommission to close the file. BELGIQUE. La Commisiondécide l’ouverture de laprocédure de l’article 93 §2 dutraité CE en vue d’examiner lacompatibilité avec le marchécommun de l’octroi par lesautorités régionales flamandesd’une garantie de crédit enfaveur de la société detélécommunications HermesEurope Railtel N.V. On 7 April 1998, theCommission decided to openArticle 93(2) proceedingsconcerning a State guaranteecovering 50% of a loan of 50million ECU which is envisagedto be awarded by the RegionalFlemish authorities to HermesEurope Railtel (HER). HER, a joint-venture betweenthe American telecommu-nications service company GTSand the Dutch HIT Rail B.V,aims to become one of theleading pan-European Carrier’sCarrier. HER intends to supply,via its network, a wide range ofhi-tech transfrontier telecommu-nications services and will thusbe acting in a market which hasonly recently been liberalisedthroughout the EU. HER willset-up and operate alongEurope’s rail system an opticalfibre network which, by mid1998, will interconnect 6countries of the EU andSwitzerland and, by the end of

the project, will be acting allover Europe. HER’smanagement centre is located inHoeilaart and its back-up centreis in Antwerp. The project willlead, according to the Belgianauthorities, to the creation ofmore than 200 new jobs. The overall investment sum inFlanders will be 64 million ECUout of which 50 million ECUwill be financed by privatebanks. The Flemish authoritiesintend to provide a guaranteesecuring 50% of the loansprovided by the banks. The Commission had seriousdoubts as to the compatibility ofthe proposed guarantee with theCommunity rules on State aid.First of all, the Commissioncould not exclude that theguarantee constitutes State aidsince there were doubts whetherthe guarantee would be awardedunder market conditions asclaimed by the Belgianauthorities. Secondly, having inmind that it is normallyfavourable to investment aid ofthis kind if such an investment iscarried out by an SME or if theinvestment creates newemployment in a depressed areawith high unemployment, itconcluded that none of these tworequirements were fulfilled inthe present case. TheCommission therefore decided toopen the procedure in order toexamen the proposed aid in moredepth.

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Competition Policy Newsletter 1998 Number 2 June84

FRANCE. La Commissiondécide d’ouvrir la procédure autitre de l’article 93 §2 du traitéCE à l’égard des aides enfaveur de Gooding ConsumerElectronics et de Cofidur pourla reprise de l’ancienne usineGrundig située à Creutzwald enLorraine. Le 25 février 1998, laCommission a décidé d’ouvrir laprocédure prévue à l’article 93 § 2du traité CE à l’égard des aidesoctroyées et projetées dans lecadre de la reprise de l’ancienneusine Grundig de Creutzwald enLorraine en faveur, en premierlieu, de la société GoodingConsumer Electronics (GCE) et,après la faillite de la société crééesur le site et dénommée GoodingElectronique S.A. (GESA), enfaveur de la société Cofidur, lenouveau repreneur. GCE abénéficié d’une aide à larestructuration s’élevant à 36millions de FF (5,44 millionsd’écus). Quant à Cofidur, lesaides à la restructuration prévuesen sa faveur pour la reprise del’ancienne usine GESA secomposent d’une aideexceptionnelle à l’investissementde 2,25 MFF et de deux aidesrégionales, soit une subventionde 1,4 MFF et une avanceremboursable dont l’élémentaide est de 0,9 MFF. Depuis le 22.6.1995, GESA esten redressement judiciaire suite àun dépôt de bilan. Les autoritésjudiciaires françaises ontmaintenu ce redressementjudiciaire jusqu’au maximumlégal, c.à.d. février 1997. Ellesont, par la suite, prononcé laliquidation de GESA et accordé

les actifs de cette société augroupe COFIDUR (le passifn’ayant pas été repris,conformément à cette procéduredite de cession). Par ailleurs, le25 juin 1997, les autoritésfrançaises ont notifié à laCommission un projet denouvelles aides à larestructuration en faveur de lasociété COFIDUR qui, selon lesautorités françaises, est unenouvelle société.

Dans l’ouverture de la procédureconcernant Gooding, laCommission a examiné laconformité de l’opérationproposée par CGE avec leslignes directricescommunautaires pour les aidesau sauvetage et à larestructuration des entreprises endifficulté qui subordonnent lacompatibilité de l’aide au respectd’un certain nombre deconditions. Or, le retour dans undélai raisonnable à la viabilité àlong terme de Gooding n’étaitpas assuré puisque l’on peutdouter du caractère réaliste decertaines hypothèses concernantles conditions d’exploitationfutures. La prévention dedistorsions de concurrenceindues n’était pas assuréepuisque la production étaitamenée à doubler avant la fin duplan de restructuration. Le faitque l’entreprise GESA ait cesséd’exister peut également être unindice qu’elle n’avait pas lasolidité financière nécessaire.

En ce qui concerne l’ouverturede la procédure relative àCofidur, celle-ci se justifie parl’alternative suivante :

• soit, Cofidur est une sociétéqui ne reprend pasl’intégralité des actifs et dupassif de l’entreprise faillie(GESA). Dans ce cas,Cofidur ne semble a priorini être responsable des aidesversées antérieurement, niêtre éligible à des aides à larestructuration;

• soit, Cofidur reprendl’intégralité des actifs et dupassif, auquel cas ellepourrait être éligible auxaides à la restructuration siles conditions requises parles lignes directrices en lamatière sont réunies. Dansce cas, elle pourraitégalement être tenue pourresponsable du rembour-sement des aides précédentesà GESA si la Commissiondevait décider qu’elles sontincompatibles avec le Traité.

Une aide à la restructuration enfaveur de Cofidur ne pourraitêtre autorisée que si laditesociété assumait le passif del’ancienne (GESA), y compris leremboursement des aidesincompatibles perçues par cettedernière. Si, par contre, ces aidesétaient considérées comme aidesrégionales à l’investissement,elles pourraient être autoriséesau titre du régime régionalfrançais PAT.

â STATE AID


ROYAUME-UNI. Feu vert dela Commission à l’octroi d’aidesà la R&D en faveur de Rolls-Royce.

The Commission has authorisedthe proposed R&D aid by theUK authorities to Rolls-Roycefor the development of a newgeneration of three high thrustaero-engines. The new engineswill be derivatives of theexisting Trent engines. The aid isin the form of a reimbursableadvance of £200m to be grantedover 4 years (1988-2001). Thetotal cost of the R&Dprogrammes is £736m.

A pre-condition to obtain theGovernment funds isachievement by the company ofa number of performancemilestones. Significant failuresin key parts of the R&Dprogramme could result in thewithdrawal of furtherGovernment funding.

The Commission found that theterms of the planned investmentwill be as commercial aspossible. On the other hand, itrecognised that given the risk ofpartial failure of the R&Dprogrammes the investmentcannot be consider as fullycommercial. In the absence ofthe Government support thecompany would be unable toraise the moneys on the capitalmarkets and proceed with theR&D programme.

After a thorough examination ofthe case the Commission foundthat the aid complies with theprovisions of the Community

framework for State aid forR&D. In particular, theprogramme costs for which aidwill be granted pertain to thestage of precompetitivedevelopment activity. The aidintensity as a proportion of theeligible costs is in conformitywith the R&D framework andthe Commission practice in thefield of reimbursable advances.

The Commission has verified theincentive effect of the aid. It hasfound that if the notified aid wasnot authorised, the Rolls Royceprogrammes could not be carriedout because of the notavailability of finance fromalternative sources.

The Community framework onR&D aid recognises that one aimof competition policy is toimprove the internationalcompetitiveness of Communityindustry and thereby contributeto the achievement of theobjectives set out in Article130(A) of the Treaty. TheCommission considers that RollsRoyce is the only Europeancompany which has the ability todesign and develop aero-enginesfor large civil aircraft. If theCommission did not authorisethe notified aid Rolls Roycecould not carry out the R&Dprogrammes. The aid is aimed,inter alia, at redressing such amarket failure and as such has anincentive effect.

The Commission has examinedthe situation of the world widelarge aero-engine industry andarrived at the conclusion that theaid contributes to promote the

competitiveness of theCommunity industry.

Nevertheless, the UKGovernment has been required tosubmit an annual report to theCommission on theimplementation of the aid and tonotify in conformity with Article93(3) of the Treaty anymodification to the modalities ofthe aid.

AUTRICHE. La Commissiona décidé d’ouvrir la procédureau titre de l’article 93 §2 dutraité CE à l’égard d’une aideprévue en faveur de KNPLeykam au titre de la R&D

On 25 March 1998, theCommission decided to open aprocedure with respect to theAustrian government’s proposalto give aid of ECU 3.5 million toKNP Leykam (Gratkorn) for thedevelopment of a “millinformation and control system”relating specifically to theconstruction of a new papermachine at Gratkorn, Austria.

KNP Leykam is Europe’sleading producer of coatedwoodfree paper. In 1995, itbegan an investment programmeat their Gratkorn site whichincluded investing of more thanECU 400 million in a new papermachine including productionhall.

The aid would contribute to thedevelopment of a “MillInformation and ControlSystem” for the new papermachine and was notified as

â STATE AID


being aid for research anddevelopment, falling in theR&D-stage of precompetitivedevelopment. The eligible R&D-costs are given as ECU 8.86million, the proposed aidamounts to ECU 3.53 million.For the most part, these costswill not be incurred by KNPLeykam directly, but by itssubcontractors.

The Commission has opened theprocedure given its doubts as towhether the aid proposal fulfilsthe conditions of the EUFramework for State Aid forResearch and Development. Inparticular, these doubts relate tothe R&D-character of the projectand the “incentive effect” of theaid, i.e.whether the aid presentsan inducement for the companyto carry out research which itwould not otherwise havepursued.

THE NETHERLANDS. DutchGovernment drops State aid toPhilips for R&D: theCommission closes itsinvestigation

On 22 April 1998, theCommission decided to close aninvestigation into the Dutchgovernment’s proposal to giveresearch and development aid toPhilips Semiconductors, aninternational semiconductormanufacturer. Funding of ECU 4million was proposed for 1995,with further financing foreseenfrom 1996 to 1998 for a projecton ‘Semiconductor Systems forMultimedia’. The proposedpublic funding corresponded to

operating aid for the company.The decision to close theinvestigation was taken after thewithdrawal of the proposal by theDutch authorities who undertooknot to grant the aid.

ALLEMAGNE. La Commis-sion ouvre la procédure au titrede l’article 93 §2 du traité CE àl’égard des aides qui ont étéoctroyées au titre de la R&D augroupe SICAN et à ses associés.

On 11 March 1998, theCommission decided to open aprocedure with respect to aidgiven to SICAN-group. SICAN-group, situated in Hannover,Niedersachsen, has been set upin the early 90th to undertakeresearch in the area ofmicroelectronics. It has carriedout research projects togetherwith and under contract toenterprises in Niedersachsen.Since 1990, the group is said tohave received several millionECU in state funding.

It seems that a total of more thanECU 100 mio state funding hadnever been approved by theCommission and theCommission has not been able toascertain the beneficiaries, theprecise amount of aid granted tothem, the incentive effect and thenecessity for such aid.

ALLEMAGNE. Décision finalenégative de la Commission àl’égard des aides à larestructuration octroyées à laStahl- und HartgußwerkeBösdorf AG.

La Commission a décidé declore par une décision négativela procédure de l’article 93paragraphe 2 du traité CE qu’elleavait ouverte à l’égard des aidesà la restructuration octroyées à laStahl- und HartgußwerkeBösdorf AG (SHB). Cettesociété opérait dans le secteur dela fonte d’acier. En juin 1996, laCommission avait approuvé desaides à la restructuration en safaveur pour un montant de 5millions de DM (2,5 MECU)sous forme d’une prise departicipation par le fonds deconsolidation du Land deSachsen. Avant que cettedécision n’ait été prise par laCommission, les autoritésallemandes ont octroyé des aidessupplémentaires qui n’ont faitl’objet d’une notification qu’enaoût 1996. Il s’agissait d’unesubvention non remboursabled’un montant de 4,5 Millions deDM (2,25 MECU) et duprolongement du délai deremboursement d’un crédits’élevant à 1,5 Millions de DM(0,75 MECU). En octobre 1996,la SHB a néanmoins dûdemander l’ouverture d’uneprocédure de faillite.

En raison des doutes quant à lacompatibilité des nouvelles aidesavec le marché commun et quantà la réalisation du plan derestructuration qui accompagnaitla première aide, la Commission,

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le 5 février 1997, a ouvert laprocédure de l’article 93paragraphe 2 CE. En raison dudéfaut d’informations de la partdes autorités allemandes, laCommission, par décision du 15juillet 1997, a enjointformellement à l’Allemagne delui fournir les informations utilesà l’examen du dossier.

La Commission a appris, dans lecadre de cette procédure et suiteà l’injonction, que le plan derestructuration de l’entreprisen’avait pas été mis en oeuvred’une manière conséquente. Leplan présenté n’avait pas étéadapté aux difficultés del’entreprise et n’était pas denature à permettre lerétablissement de la viabilité del’entreprise à long terme. Deplus, après examen des aides à lalumière des lignes directricescommunautaires pour les aidesd’Etat au sauvetage et à larestructuration des entreprises endifficulté, elle a dû conclure queles aides en question nepouvaient pas être considéréescomme compatibles avec lemarché commun.

La Commission a donc pris unedécision négative concernanttoutes les aides octroyées enfaveur de SHB [DM 11 millions(5,5 MECU) au total] et ademandé le remboursement deces aides.

ALLEMAGNE. La Commis-sion prend une décision finalenégative à l’égard des aidesoctroyées à la manufacture deporcelaine Triptis PorzellanGmbH.

La Commission a pris unedécision finale négative à l’égarddes aides dont la manufacture deporcelaine Triptis PorzellanGmbH, installée dans le Land deThüringen et privatisée en 1993,a bénéficié illégalement et quiconsistent en l’abandon decréances pour un montant de 8millions de DEM (4 MECU) eten garanties du Land deThüringen à concurrence de90 % de crédits s’élevant à 26,75millions de DEM, l’élément aidereprésentant 24,075 millions deDEM (12 MECU). LaCommission a conclu àl’incompatibilité de celles-ci eten a imposé la récupération.

Fin 1996, les autoritésallemandes notifièrent à laCommission l’octroi d’une aideà Triptis Porzellan sous formed’un abandon de créancesrelatives à des crédits publicsoctroyés en 1995, en vue de larestructuration de l’entreprise,pour un montant de 8 millions deDEM, crédits qui auraient déjàdû être notifiés préalablement àleur octroi en 1995. Dans lecadre de cette restructuration, laHessische Landesbank(HeLaBa), banque publique,avait également abandonné unecréance de 10 millions de DEM.Une procédure au titre del’article 93 § 2 CE fut ouverte enmai 1997 par la Commission envue, notamment, de déterminer

si l’abandon de créance de lapart de la HeLaBa constituait ounon une aide d’Etat. Au cours decette procédure, il est apparu quenon seulement la créance de 10millions de DEM abandonnéepar HeLaBa était en réalitégarantie à concurrence de 90 %par le Land, ce qui constituaitclairement une aide d’Etat, maisque, de plus, au cours des années1993 et 1994, le Land avaitgaranti, toujours à 90 %, desprêts de la part de HeLaBa pourun total de 26,75 millions deDEM (les 10 millions précitésinclus), sans qu’aucunenotification n’en ait été faite à laCommission.

Entretemps, en avril 1997,Triptis Porzellan a été déclaréeen faillite. Etant donné quel’abandon de créance de 10millions de DEM datait de 1996,seul le solde de 16,75 millions aété réclamé par HeLaBa dans lecadre de la procédure de faillite.Il est pratiquement certain queseule une part infime de cettecréance pourra être récupérée etque la garantie du Land encouvrira donc pratiquementl’intégralité. C’est pourquoi, laCommission, dans sa décisionfinale, a imposé la récupérationde l’intégralité de l’aide (24,075millions de DEM) liée à lagarantie accordée illégalementsur les 26,75 millions de DEM.En juin 1997, les installations deTriptis ont été cédées par lacuratelle, pour un prix de 2,5millions de DEM (1,25 MECU),à l’entreprise WinterlingPorzellan AG Kirchenlamitz qui,selon les autorités allemandes,

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ne bénéficiera d’aucne aide à larestructuration.

ALLEMAGNE. Décision finalenégative concernant le régimed’allégement fiscal en vertu del’article 52 § 8 de la Loiallemande relative à l'impôt surle revenu

En janvier 1998, la Commissiona pris une décision négative àl’égard du régime d’allégementfiscal instauré par l’article 52,paragraphe 8, de la loi allemanderelative à l’impôt sur le revenu etprévoyant, pour les exercices1996 à 1998 un allégement fiscalparticulier destiné à stimuler lemarché des participations dansles entreprises situées dans lesnouveaux Länder et à Berlin-Ouest et, en conséquence, àaugmenter les fonds propres deces entreprises. Elle en a interditl’application après avoir conclu àson incompatibilité avec lesrègles du traité CE pour lesmotifs qui sont exposés ci-après.

Selon le droit fiscal allemand, lesbénéfices résultant de la vente decertains biens économiques sontassujettis à l’impôt sur lesrevenus ou à celui sur lessociétés. En vertu de l’article 6 bde cette loi, les personnesphysiques ou morales quiréalisent des bénéfices par lacession de certains biensmobiliers ou immobiliers ouencore de participations dans dessociétés de capitaux et quiréinvestissent ces bénéfices parl’acquisition, entre autres, departicipations dans des sociétésde capitaux peuvent déduire de

leur base imposable 50 % desbénéfices réinvestis dans cesacquisitions.

L’article 52, paragraphe 8, entréen vigueur le 1er janvier 1996,prévoit pour les exercices 1996 à1998 une extension de cetallégement fiscal. Sur la base decette disposition, les assujettispeuvent déduire de leur baseimposable 100 % des bénéficesréinvestis lorsqu’il s’agitd’acquisition de parts liées à uneaugmentation de capital ou à laconstitution de nouvellessociétés de capitaux, et que cessociétés de capitaux comptent auplus 250 salariés et ont leur siègesocial, ainsi que leur direction,dans les nouveaux Länder ou àBerlin-Ouest.

Ce régime constitue donc unavantage direct pour lesinvestisseurs bénéficiant del’allégement fiscal mais ilprocure également un avantageindirect aux entreprisesbénéficiant des investissementsréalisés grâce à cet incitantfiscal.

En ce qui concerne lesbénéficiaires directs, laCommission a estimé que cetallégement fiscal constitue unemesure générale. Celle-ci necomporte pas d’élément d’aideétant donné que tous lesassujettis peuvent en bénéficierindépendamment de leur taille,leur secteur d’activité ou lalocalisation de leur siège social,ce pour autant que les bénéficessoient investis d’une manièredéterminée.

Par contre, ce régime constitueune aide d’Etat en faveur desbénéficiaires indirects, soit lesentreprises est-allemandes etberlinoises comptant maximum250 employés. En effet, du faitde l’entrée en vigueur del’article 52, paragraphe 8, cesdernières ont bénéficié d’undouble avantage résultant, d’unepart, d’un accroissement de lademande de participations et,d’autre part, du fait que cetteaugmentation de la demande apermis à ces entreprisesd’imposer aux investisseursl’acceptation de conditionscontractuelles plus intéressantespour elles-mêmes. Ensuite, cetallégement entraînant unediminution des recettes fiscales,il est bien accordé au moyen deressources d’Etat et laconcurrence intra-communau-taire risque d’être faussée car lesentreprises qui ont leur siègesocial et leur direction dans larégion en question serontfavorisées par rapport à cellesqui sont situées dans d’autresrégions d’Allemagne et dansd’autres Etats membres. Mêmesi l’intensité d’aide de cettemesure est faible, ce régime doitêtre considéré comme une aided‘Etat conformément à lajurisprudence de la Cour deJustice selon laquelle la faibleimportance d’une aide n’exclutpas a priori que les échangesentre Etats membres soientaffectés.

Par ailleurs, étant donné que laprise de participation n’est pasliée à la réalisation d’investis-sements initiaux, ce régimecomporte des aides au

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fonctionnement qui ne peuventpas être considérées commecompatibles avec le traité CEétant donné qu’elles sontégalement d’application à Berlin-Ouest, région non éligible à unetelle forme d’aide. De plus, lesrègles spécifiques afférentes àl’octroi d’aides dans les secteurssensibles ne sont pas respectées.

Enfin, le régime prévoit commecondition pour la déductionfiscale le fait que les entreprisesbénéficiaires des participationsaient leur siège et leur directiondans les nouveaux Länderallemands ou à Berlin-Ouest.Cette disposition est contraire àl’interdiction de discriminationprévue aux articles 52 et suivantsdu traité CE relatifs à la libertéd’établissement.

PAYS-BAS. La Commissionprend une décision finalenégative à l’égard d’une aide àl’investissement en faveur de laconstruction d’une usine deperoxyde d’hydrogène àDelfzijl.

Le 21 janvier 1998, laCommission a adopté unedécision finale négative estimantqu’une partie des aides accordéesen 1994 par les autoritésnéerlandaises à la société FMCIndustrial Chemicals(Netherlands) B.V. pour laconstruction d’une usine deperoxyde d’hydrogène à Delfzijlétait incompatible avec le marchécommun.

Cette décision concerneuniquement les aides dépassant le

plafond maximum autorisé par lerégime d’aide régional àl’investissement applicable à larégion où se situe Delfzijl. Eneffet, les aides perçues par FMCs’élèvent à 29,09 MHFL alorsque compte tenu de l’importancede l’investissement réalisé, ellene pouvait en recevoir que 22,79MHFL, soit 20% brut des coûtséligibles.

La Commission a demandé auxautorités néerlandaises de prendreles mesures nécessaires afin deprocéder à la récupération desaides, pour la partie dépassantledit plafond régional autorisé. Eneffet, une acceptation par laCommission d’un dépassementdes plafonds d’aides régionalesconstituerait un précédentdangereux, remettant en cause sapolitique en la matière.

Par ailleurs, dans le cadre dudossier, les autorités néerlandaisesavaient affirmé que FMC avaitsupporté d’importantsinvestissements à caractèreenvironnemental, pour lesquels undépassement de l’intensitémaximum d’aide régionalepouvait être admis. LaCommission a constaté que le siteoù l’usine est implantée fait partied’une réserve naturelle où laréglementation en matièreenvironnementale est très stricte etque la compagnie n’a fait que ceconformer à ladite réglementation.Par conséquent un supplémentd’aide n’a pu être accepté.

JUDGMENTS

Judgment of the Court of 2 April1998 , Case C-367/95 P :Commission of the EuropeanCommunities v Chambresyndicale nationale desentreprises de transport de fondset valeurs (Sytraval) and Brink'sFrance SARL. Appeal. Case C-367/95 P.

Order of the Court (FourthChamber) of 25 March 1998,Case C-174/97 P : Fédérationfrançaise des sociétésd'assurances, Union des sociétésétrangères d'assurances, Groupedes assurances mutuellesagricoles, Fédération nationaledes syndicats d'agents générauxd'assurances, Fédérationfrançaise des courtiersd'assurances et de réassuranceset Bureau international desproducteurs d'assurances et deréassurances v Commission ofthe European Communities.Appeal.

Judgment of the Court (SixthChamber) of 19 February 1998,Case C-309/95 : Commission ofthe European Communities vCouncil of the European Union.Exceptional aid to producers oftable wine in France.

Judgment of the Court (SixthChamber) of 29 January 1998,Case C-280/95 : Commission ofthe European Communities vItalian Republic. State aid -Fiscal bonus on certain taxes -Recovery of aid – Not absolutelyimpossible

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PRESS RELEASES

IP/98/380 [1998-04-22]The Commission investigates theopening of two new Italianshipyards

IP/98/379 [1998-04-22]Dutch Governement drops Stateaid to Philips for R&D: theCommission closes its file (see p.86)

IP/98/378 [1998-04-22]Commission adopts a negativedecision on aid to Stahl- undHargußwerke Bôsdord AG

IP/98/377 [1998-04-22]Commission takes a finalnegative decision against TriptisPozellan GmbH (see p.87)

IP/98/347 [1998-04-14]Commission opens procedureinto aid to Wildauer KurbelwelleGmbH

IP/98/349 [1998-04-08]Commission examines Stateguaranteed loan to HermesEurope Railtel (see p. 83)

IP/98/348 [1998-04-08]Commission approves aid forresearch projects in France andThe Netherlands

IP/98/344 [1998-04-07]Commission approvesprolongation of aid scheme forthe Land of Thuringia for theyears 1997-2001

IP/98/338 [1998-04-07]Commission opens procedureinto aid to the French maritimecompany Brittany Ferries

IP/98/336 [1998-04-07]Aid for debt settlement andconsolidation for agricultural co-operatives and other entreprisesin Greece

IP/98/302 [1998-03-31]Commission inquiry into Stateaid to ‘Centrale del Latte diRoma’

IP/98/288 [1998-03-25]Commission closes itsinvestigation over transport aid toVolvo Truck Corporation inUmeå (northern Sweden)

IP/98/287 [1998-03-25]Commission decides toinvestigate state aid to KNPLeykam, Austria

IP/98/286 [1998-03-25]Commission approvesenvironmental aid to Belgiansteel company SIDMAR

IP/98/285 [1998-03-25]Commission opens investigationinto aid to Spanish syntheticfibres producer BRILEN S.A.

IP/98/284 [1998-03-25]Hoogovens Staal : Commissionraises no objections to proposedaid in favour of the « CycloneConverter Furnace » R&Dproject

IP/98/283 [1998-03-25]Commission authorises R&D aidto Rolls-Royce large engineprogrammes in the UnitedKingdom.

IP/98/282 [1998-03-25]Commission approves regionalaid to Opel for two projects inBochum

IP/98/281 [1998-03-25]Commission opens procedureregarding State aid to DraiswerkeGmbH in Mannheim

IP/98/280 [1998-03-25]Commission opens enquiryagainst Italian state aid for roadsector and intermodal transport

IP/98/278 [1998-03-25]Approval for aid to the RISO2000 project in Italy

IP/98/260 [1998-03-18]Land purchases in the newLänder

IP/98/241 [1998-03-11]The Commission decides toinvestigate state aid to Océ N.V.

IP/98/240 [1998-03-11]Banco di Sicilia and Sicilcassa :Commission requsts furtherinformation on support measuresfor two Sicilian banks

IP/98/239 [1998-03-11]Commission opens procedureregarding State aid th the SICANgroup for R&D inmicroelectronics

IP/98/236 [1998-03-11]Autoeuropa : closure of file aftersatisfactory cooperation betweenthe Commision and Portugueseauthorities

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IP/98/192 [1998-02-26]Commission opens procedureagainst investment aid to TubosEuropa (Extramadura, Spain)

IP/98/186 [1998-02-26]Restructuring of the Volkswerftshipyard in Stralsund (Germany,Mecklenburg-WesternPomerania)

IP/98/191 [1998-02-25]Commission declares Germandevelopment aid to Indonesia inbreach of the shipbuildingDirective

IP/98/189 [1998-02-25]La Commission ouvre uneprocédure à l’égard d’aides enfaveur d’Addinol MineralölwerkeGmbH

IP/98/188 [1998-02-25]Commission approves proposedemployment aid scheme in Sicily(see p. 82)

IP/98/187 [1998-02-25]Commisison declares aid toBremer Vulkan incompatiblewith the Treaty

IP/98/171 [1998-02-18]Commission opens procedureagainst aid to Lürssen in relation

to take-over of Bremer VulkanMarine Schiffbau GmbHIP/98/170 [1998-02-18]Improved transparency in state-aid monitoring procedures

IP/98/169 [1998-02-18]Commission gives go-ahead forregional aid scheme for researchand development in the region ofCastile-leon (Spain)

IP/98/168 [1998-02-18]Commission approves aidscheme for SMEs in the tourismsector in Doñana (Andalusia,Spain)

IP/98/167 [1998-02-18]Commission opens investigationinto state aid to BIOTECBiologische NaturverpackungenGmbH

IP/98/120 [1998-02-04]Commisison approves trainingaid to Opel Belgium

IP/98/68 [1998-01-21]Commisison terminatesproceeding concerning aid ofFRF 2.5 billion to SociétéFrançaise de Production (SFP)

IP/98/67 [1998-01-21]Commission takes note ofunconditional acceptance by

Sweden of new state aidframework for motor vehicleindustry

IP/98/66 [1998-01-21]Guidelines of the Wirtschafts-service Burgenland Aktien-gesellschaft (WIBAG) onholdings in companies:Commission launchesinvestigation

IP/98/65 [1998-01-21]The Commission approves abudget increase ot theconsolidation fund ofMecklenburg-Vorpommern

IP/98/64 [1998-01-21]The Commisison finds that nostate aid elements are involved inthe privatisation of the SpanishAluminium Group INESPAL

IP/98/63 [1998-01-21]Green light for aid foremployment in Berlin and NorthRhine-Westphalia

IP/98/13 [1998-01-09]The European Commissionapproves an aid programme fordefence industry conversion inSpain

INTERNATIONAL


Le Conseil de la Concurrence deTunisie, présidé par M.CHATTI, a organisé les 1er et2 avril 1998 une conférence dehaut niveau sur la concurrence,ouverte à de nombreux experts etpraticiens tunisiens et étrangers,qui était la première du genre surla rive Sud de la Méditerranée.

Elle a permis de faire le point surla mise en oeuvre du droit de laconcurrence en Tunisie - qui estun droit jeune, puisque lacréation du Conseil de laConcurrence ne remonte qu’à1995 -, ainsi que sur lesdéveloppements récents de lapolitique de concurrence enEurope, sur la base d’exposésintroductifs de Mesdames

SCHIRMANS (Présidente duConseil de la Concurrence deBelgique) et PICARD(Rapporteur Général du Conseilde la Concurrence français),MM. JENNY (Vice-Président duConseil de la Concurrence enFrance, Président du Comité del’O.C.D.E. sur la concurrence,ainsi que du Groupe de travail adhoc de l’O.M.C.), PONS(Directeur Général adjoint de laD.G. IV) et SOUTOU (Conseilde la Concurrence français).Cette comparaison internationalea aussi été complétée par deuxexposés de M. BOUFAMA,Président de l’autorité deConcurrence algérienne, et de M.DHANJEE, représentant de laCNUCED.

Cette conférence, ouverte par M.BOUAZIS, Ministre duDomaine de l’Etat et clôturée parM. ZNEIDI, Ministre duCommerce, a été l’occasion,pour le Gouvernement tunisien,de confirmer sa volonté de voirmise en oeuvre une réellepolitique de concurrence enTunisie. Elle a été suivie par unnombreux public, qui estlargement intervenu à l’issue desexposés.

Cette volonté exprimée par lesautorités tunisiennes est d’autantplus importante que l’accordd’association entre la Tunisie etl’Union européenne est entré envigueur le 1er mars 1998 et que,aux termes de cet accord, laTunisie devra appliquer lesrègles de concurrence du Traitéde l’Union européenne, dès lorsque les pratiques en causeaffectent le commerce entre lesdeux parties à l’Accord.

Les intervenants européens ontassuré les Autorités tunisiennesde leur disponibilité pour leurfournir la coopération nécessaire.

Conférence sur le droit et la politiquede concurrence à Tunis les 1 et 2 avril1998

Jean-François PONS, Directeur Général Adjoint

INFORMATION SECTION


DG IV staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et DDirecteur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F

Conseiller auditeur Roger DAOUT 2965383/2960246Conseiller pour les réformes Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2955911

Assistants du Directeur général Henrik MØRCH 2950766/2967532. . .

directement rattachés au Directeur général :

1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information Irène SOUKA 2957206/29959882. Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 1959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions Jonathan FAULL 2958658/2957689Conseiller Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 2951146/2960699Conseiller Georges ROUNIS 2953404

1. Politique générale de la concurrence et coordination Kirtikumar MEHTA 2965033/2995470Chef adjoint d'unité

2. Affaires juridiques et législation Emil PAULIS 2951196/2955894Chef adjoint d'unité

3. Affaires internationales Yves DEVELENNES 2955190/2966861Chef adjoint d'unité . . . ..

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/29672441. Unité opérationnelle I Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/29623682. Unité opérationnelle II . . .3. Unité opérationnelle III Wolfgang MEDERER 29535844. Unité opérationnelle IV . . . 2957389/2952871

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2954512

1. Télécommunications et Postes Herbert UNGERER 2968623/2968622Coordination Société d'information- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 Suzette SCHIFF 2957657/2995365- Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 Christian HOCEPIED 2950627

2. Médias, éditions musicales Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 2953895/2963904

3. Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2951150

â INFORMATION SECTION


DIRECTION DServices Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2959987

2. Transports et infrastructures des transports Serge DURANDE 2957243/2954623

3. Commerce et autres services Jorma PIHLATIE 2953607/2960256

DIRECTION EIndustries de base et énergie Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816

1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non . . .métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre

2. Produits chimiques de base et transformés, Wouter PIEKE 2959824/2956422caoutchouc

3. Energie et eau Paul MALRIC-SMITH 2959675/29649034. Cartels et Inspections . . .

Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels Julian JOSHUA 2955519

DIRECTION FIndustries des biens d'équipement et de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2965550

1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 2956084/2950663

2. Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Dieter SCHWARZ 2951880/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3. Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2995276

DIRECTION GAides d'Etat Asger PETERSEN 2955569/2958566Conseiller . . .

Task Force "Aides dans les nouveaux Länder" Conrado TROMP 2960286

1. Politique des aides d'Etat Anne HOUTMAN 2959628/2960562Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Aides horizontales Jean-Louis COLSON 2960995/2962526

3. Aides à finalité régionale Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2968503/2952521Chef adjoint d'unité Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 2960376/2965071

4. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, construction Martin POWER 2955436/2950068navale, automobiles et fibres synthétiquesChef adjoint d'unité . . .

5. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900électronique, construction mécanique et autressecteurs manufacturiersChef adjoint d'unité . . .

6. Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2967987

7. Analyses, inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2955410



SPEECHES AND ARTICLES

EC Competition Policy and itsImplications for the Sports Sector -SCHAUB - World Sports Forum -St Moritz - 8/03/

Entwicklung der Breitband-kabelnetze aus Europäischer sicht -UNGERER - ONLINE'98 CongressII. Symposium II.4 - Düsseldorf -18/02/98

The Impact of EuropeanLiberalisation and the WTO -UNGERER - CommEd Conference: Pricing '98 - Brussels - 11/02/98

International co-operation inantitrust matters: making the pointin the wake of the Boeing/MDDproceedings - SCHAUB -Newsletter-February 1998 - 1/02/98 Innovation and Competition - PONS- Newsletter-February 1998 -1/02/98

Competing for the Internet -COATES - Newsletter-February1998 - 1/02/98

Commentaire des arrèts de la Courdu 23.10.97 relatifs aux monopolesd'importation et d'exportation de gazet d'électricité - LEVASSEUR -Newsletter-February 1998 - 1/02/

Dominance sur un marché deproduits secondaires -

CHEVALIER - Newsletter-February 1998 - 1/02/98

Ports maritimes et concurrence -ARMANI - Newsletter-February1998 - 1/02/98

State aid policy enforcement in thenew Länder of Germany - Status in1997 - DEPYPERE - Newsletter-February 1998 - 1/02/98

Probleme der Buchpreisbindungnach europäischem Kartellrecht -KAUFMANN - Venise - 29/01/98

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ONCOMPETITION

Unless otherwise indicated,these publications may bepurchased from the sales agentsof the European Communities(see last page) ; use ISBN orCatalogue Number to order.

Legislation

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IA-Rulesapplicable to undertakings -Situation at 30 june 1994; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles85, 86 and 90.

Catalogue No: CM-29-93-A01-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Addendum to VolumeIA-Rules applicable to undertakings- Situation at 1 March 1995.Catalogue No: CM-88-95-436-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIA-Rulesapplicable to State aid - Situation at31 December 1994; this publicationcontains the text of all legislativeacts relevant to Articles 42, 77, 90,92 to 94.Catalogue No: CM-29-93-A02-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT

Competition law in the EC-VolumeII B-Explanation of rules applicableto state aid - Situation at December1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-296-xx-C(xx=language code= FR; les autresversions suivront

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIIA-Rules inthe international field - Situation at31 December 1996 (Edition 1997)Catalogue No: CM-89-95-858-xx-Cxx= language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI

Merger control in the EuropeanUnionCatalogue No: CV-88-95-428-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT

Brochure concerning thecompetition rules applicable toundertakingsas contained in the EEA agreementand their implementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority.Catalogue No: CV-77-92-118-EN-C

Documentation…This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given byCommunity officials that may be of interest. Copies of these are availablefrom DG IV’s Home Page on the World Wide Web. Future issues of theNewsletter will contain details of confernces on Comteition policy whichhave been brught to our attention. Organisere of conferences that wish tomake use of this facility shoul refer to page 1 for the address of DG IV’sInformation Officer.



Official documents

Dealing with the Commission(Edition 1997)-Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding, powers under Articles 85and 86 of the EEC TreatyCatalogue No: CV-95-96-552-xx-C(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT,SV, DA

Green paper on vertical restraints inEC competition policy -COM (96)721- (Ed. 1997)Catalogue No: CB-CO-96-742-xx-C(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NLPT SV FI)

Final report of the multimodalgroup - Presented to CommissionerVan Miert by Sir Bryan Carsberg,Chairman of the Group (Ed. 1997).Catalogue No: CV-11-98-803-EN-C

The institutional framework for theregulation of telecommunicationsand the application of ECcompetition rules - Final Report(Forrester Norall & Sutton).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition aspects of accesspricing-Report to the EuropeanCommissionDecember 1995 (M. Cave, P.Crowther, L. Hancher).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Community Competition Policy inthe Telecommunications Sector(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March1997)-volume II B - a compediumprepared by DG IV-C-1; it containsDirectives under art 90, Decisionsunder Regulation 17 and under theMerger Regulation as well asrelevant Judgments of the Court ofJustice. - Copies available throughDG IV-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623,2968622, fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur lesmodalités d'application duRèglement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de laCommission concernant certainescatégories d’accords de distributionet de service de vente et d'aprèsvente de véhicules automobiles -Copies available through DG IV-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax.+322-2969800)

Competition decisions

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matière d'aidesd'Etat -Article 93, paragraphe 2(Décisions finales négatives)- 1964-1995Catalogue No: CM-96-96-465-xx-C[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964-1995);EN et DA (73-95); GR (81-95); (ESet PT (86-95); SV et FI (95)]

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-93/94Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)



Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-86/88

Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-81/85Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-73/80Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matièrre deconcurrence - Articles 85, 86 et 90du traité CEE-64/72Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.)

Competition reports

European Community CompetitionPolicy 1997Catalogue No: CV-12-98-263-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

XXVI Report on CompetitionPolicy 1996Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C

European Community CompetitionPolicy 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*,FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*)

XXV Report on Competition Policy1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C

European Community CompetitionPolicy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*,FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*)



XXIV Report on competition policy1994Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI)

European Community compe-titionpolicy 1994 (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR,EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI ).Copies available through CelluleInformation DG IV

XXIIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1993Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

XXIIe Report on competition policy1992Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT

XXIe Report on competition policy1991Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Fifth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectors (Edition 1997)Catalogue No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI )

4ième rapport sur les aides d'Etatdans l'Union Européenne dans lesecteur des produits manufacturés etcertains autres secteursCatalogue No: CM-92-95-368-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI)

Other documents and studies

The application of articles 85 & 86of the EC Treaty by national courtsin the Member States

Catalogue No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C(xx= FR, DE, EN, NL)

Examination of current and futureexcess capacity in the Europeanautomobyle industry - Ed. 1997Catalogue No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C

Video : Fair Competition in Europe-Examination of currentCatalogue No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

Communication de la Commission:Les services d'intérêt général enEurope (Ed. 1996)Catalogue No: CM-98-96-897-xx-Cxx= DE, NL, GR, SV

Study of exchange of confidentialinformation agreements and treatiesbetween the US and Member Statesof EU in areas of securities,criminal, tax and customs (Ed.1996)Catalogue No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C

Survey of the Member StateNational Laws governing verticaldistribution agreements (Ed. 1996)Catalogue No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Services de télécomunication enEurope: statistiques en bref,Commerce, services et transports,1/1996Catalogue No: CA-NP-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Report by the group of experts oncompetition policy in the new tradeorder [COM(96)284 fin.]Catalogue No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C

New industrial economics andexperiences from European mergercontrol: New lessons aboutcollective dominance ? (Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C

Proceedings of the EuropeanCompetition Forum (coédition withJ. Wiley) -Ed. 1996Catalogue No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements in theTelecommunications Sector (Ed.1995)Catalogue No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition (Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C

Bierlieferungsverträge in den neuenEU-Mitgliedstaaten Österreich,Schweden und Finnland - Ed. 1996Catalogue No: CV-01-96-074-DE-CDESurveys of the Member States'powers to investigate and sanctionviolations of national competitionlaws (Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C

Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport1995Catalogue No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C

Information exchanges among firmsand their impact on competition(Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC funded R&Dprogrammes on human resourcedevelopment and long termcompetitiveness (Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C

Competition policy in the new tradeorder: strengthening internationalcooperation and rules (Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C

Forum consultatif de lacomptabilité: subventions publiques(Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: C 184 94 735 FR C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acier de



la Communauté: Rapport surl'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995)Catalogue No: CM 83 94 2963 A C

Study on the impact of liberalizationof inward cross border mail on theprovision of the universal postalservice and the options forprogressive liberalization (Ed. 1995)Final report,Catalogue No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C

Meeting universal serviceobligations in a competitivetelecommunications sector (Ed.1994)Catalogue No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy(Ed. 1994)Catalogue No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness,employment: The challenges andways forward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1994)Catalogue No: CM 82 94 529 xx C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Growth, competitiveness,employment: The challenges andways forward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2Part CCatalogue No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the European singlemarket (Ed. 1993)Catalogue No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C

International transport by air, 1993Catalogue No: CA-28-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE<Picture>Lesinvestissements dans les industriesdu charbon et de l'acier de laCommunauté: Enquête 1992 (Ed.1993) - 9 languagesCatalogue No: CM 76 93 6733 A C

EG Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie (Ed. 1992)Catalogue No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C

Green Paper on the development ofthe single market for postal services,9 languagesCatalogue No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C

The effect of different state aidmeasures on intra Communitycompetition (Ed. 1990)Catalogue No: CM 59 90 702 EN C

The effect of conglomerate mergerson competition (Ed. 1990)Catalogue No: CM-59-90-039-EN-C

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL1st January to 30th April 1998

ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONSAND DISORTIONS OF COMPETITIONBY UNDERTAKINGS)

30/04/98C 133 Notice pursuant to Article19(3) of Regulation No 17concerning notifications NoIV/36.456/F3 - Inntrepreneur andIV/36.492/F3 - Spring P. 2325/04/98L 124 Commission Decision98/273/EC of 28 January 1998relating to a proceeding underArticle 85 of the EC Treaty (CaseIV/35.733 - VW) (Only the Germantext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance) P. 6018/04/98C 120 Draft Notice pursuant toArticle 19(3) of Council RegulationNo 17 concerning CaseIV/36.533/F-3 - Yves Saint LaurentParfums P. 2

9/04/98C 111 Notification of an agreement(Case No IV/36.896 - TNNNetwork)

1/04/98L 100 Commission Decision98/247/ECSC of 21 January 1998relating to a proceeding pursuant toArticle 65 of the ECSC Treaty(Case IV/35.814 - Alloy surcharge)(Only the Dutch, French, German,Italian, Spanish and Swedish textsare authentic) (Text with EEArelevance) P. 55

31/03/98C 97 Notification of a joint venture(Case No IV/E-2/36.966:BAYER+GEC) P. 7

17/03/98C 81 Notification of a joint venture(Case No IV/E-2/36.949 - KGS) P. 4

12/03/98C 77 Notice pursuant to Article 5(2)of Council Regulation (EEC) No3975/87 concerning case IV/36.563- IATA Cargo Tariff Conference P. 5

11/03/98L 72 Commission Decision of 14January 1998 relating to aproceeding under Article 86 of theEC Treaty (IV/34.801 FAG -Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG)(Only the German text is authentic)(Text with EEA relevance) P. 30

28/02/98C 65 Notice published pursuant toArticle 19(3) of Council RegulationNo 17 concerning an application fornegative clearance or an individualdecision to grant an exemptionpursuant to Article 85(3) of the ECTreaty (Case No IV/36.327 - TPS)P. 5

26/02/98C 61 Notice pursuant to Article19(3) of Regulation No 17



concerning notificationIV/36.492/F3 - Spring P. 3

20/02/98C 53 Renewed Notification of anAgreement on Terminal Dues(REIMS II) between PostalOperators (Caso No IV/36.748 -REIMS II)

10/02/98C 44 Notification of joint ventureagreements (Case No IV/E-2/36.831) P. 7C 44 Notification of agreements(Case No IV/36.832 - Energis) P. 6

7/02/98C 40 Notification of agreements(Case No IV/36.409 - DBKom II) P.11

6/02/98C 39 Commission notice pursuant toArticle 23(3) of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86 concerning CaseIV/MAR/36.253 - P& O Stena LineP. 21

4/02/98C 37 Notification of an agreement(Case No IV/36.858 - ACMA) P. 6C 37 Prior notification of a jointventure (Case No IV/36.848/F-2 -Renault/ZF) P. 5

3/02/98C 36 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17 concerningnotification No IV/36.081/F3 - Bass

24/01/98C 25 Notification of a cooperativejoint venture agreement (Case NoIV/36.213/F-2 - GEAE/P& W) P. 17

21/01/98C 18 Notification of a joint venture(Case No IV/36.530/F3) P. 7

20/01/98C 16 Notification of a joint venture(Case No IV/36.836/F3) P. 4

16/01/98C 12 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17/62concerning Case No IV/C-3/36.494- EACEM energy savingcommitment P. 2

14/01/98C 9 Guidelines on the method ofsetting fines imposed pursuant toArticle 15 (2) of Regulation No 17and Article 65 (5) of the ECSCTreaty P. 3

13/01/98C 8 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17Notification No IV/35.992/F3 -Scottish and Newcastle plc P. 4

3/01/98L 1 COMMISSION DECISION of26 November 1997 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article 65 ofthe ECSC Treaty (Case IV/36.069Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl) (Onlythe German text is authentic) P. 10Control of Concentrations / MergerProcedure

7/05/98C 142 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1107- EDFI/ESTAG) P. 15

6/05/98C 141 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1158- Elf Atochem/Atohaas) P. 8C 141 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1175- Magna/Steyr) P. 7C 141 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1179- Tech Data/Computer 2000) P. 6C 141 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1161- Alcoa/Alumax) P. 5

1/05/98C 136 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1089

- Paribas Belgique/ParibasNederland)C 136 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1140- Halliburton/Dresser)C 136 Re-notification of apreviously notified concentration(Case No IV/M.1146 - SHVEnergy/Thyssen KlöcknerRecycling)C 136 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1170- Dan Transport/Inter Forward) P.16

30/04/98C 133 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1148- STET/GET/Madrid Cable) P. 25

28/04/98C 130 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1177- Belgacom/Tele Danmark/Tulip) P. 3C 130 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1160- GKN/Brambles/SKP)C 130 Prior notification of apreviously notified concentration(Case No IV/M.1101 -Hermes/Sampo/FGB-FCIC)

25/04/98C 128 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1120- Compaq/Digital)C 128 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/JV.1 -Telia/Telenor/Schibsted)C 128 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1132- BT/ESB/AIG)

23/04/98C 125 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case NoIV/ECSC.1278 - Thyssen/Krupp) P. 5C 125 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1110- VAW/Reynolds Metals)C 125 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1009- Georg Fischer/DISA)



C 125 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1054- LGV/BTR)

22/04/98C 123 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1080- Thyssen/Krupp)C 123 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1113- Nortel/Norweb) P. 3

21/04/98C 122 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1178- Koch/Eurosplitter & J. Aron)C 122 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1164- GEC Alsthom/Cegelec)

17/04/98C 118 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1037- Nomura/Blueslate) P. 4

16/04/98C 116 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.958 -Watt AG (II)) P. 2C 116 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1157- Skanska/Scancem)C 116 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1031- Jardine/Appleyard)C 116 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1106- Bayerische Vereinsbank/FGHBank)C 116 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1072- Bertelsmann/Burda/Futurekids)

9/04/98C 111 Re-notification of apreviously notified concentration(Case No IV/M.1060 -Vendex/KBB)

8/04/98C 109 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1143- DSM/GB)

4/04/98C 103 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1146- SHV Energy/Thyssen KlöcknerRecycling)

3/04/98C 101 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1022- Cable i Televisió de Catalunya(CTC))C 101 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1142- Commercial Union/GeneralAccident)C 101 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1102- BBL/American Express)C 101 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1020- GE Capital/Sea Containers)C 101 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1167- ICI/Williams) P. 27

31/03/98C 97 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1125- Céréol/Sofiprotéol - Saipol)C 97 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1096- Société générale/Hambros Bank)C 97 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1091- Cableuropa/Spainco/CTC) P. 8

28/03/98C 93 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1098- Generali/AMB/Athena)C 93 Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1047- Wienerberger/Cremer & Breuer)P. 23C 93 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1139- DLJ/FM Holdings)C 93 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1155- Cendant Corporation/NPC)C 93 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1131- AGF/Royal)

C 93 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1060- Vendex/KBB)C 93 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1094- Caterpillar/Perkins Engines)

27/03/98C 92 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1082- Allianz/AGF)C 92 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1043- BAT/Zurich)C 92 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.987 -Adtranz/Siemens/Thyssen-Transrapid Int.)C 92 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1088- Thomson Corporation/Fritidsresor)C 92 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1045- DFO/Scandlines) P. 16

24/03/98C 88 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1144- Winterthur/ARAG) P. 5C 88 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1006- UPM-Kymmene/April) P. 4

20/03/98C 85 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.999 -CLT - UFA/Havas Intermédiation)P. 2C 85 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1117- Pinault/Guilbert) P. 2

18/03/98C 83 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1083- Rhône-Poulenc/Novalis/Nyltech)P. 3C 83 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1081- Dow Jones/NBC - CNBC Europe)P. 4C 83 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1025



- Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada)P. 4

17/03/98C 81 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1065- Nestlé/San Pellegrino) P. 5C 81 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1041- BASF/Shell (II)) P. 5

14/03/98C 79 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1099- Otto Versand/Actebis) P. 3C 79 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1036- Chrysler/Distributors (Beneluxand Germany))C 79 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1033- Axa-UAP/Axa Aurora) P. 2

13/03/98C 78 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1030- Lafarge/Redland) P. 6C 78 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1109- Owens-Illinois/BTR Packaging)P. 5

11/03/98C 75 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1079- Deutag/Ilbau/Sächsische Asphalt-mischwerke) P. 3

10/03/98C 74 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1138- Royal Bank of Canada/Bank ofMontreal) P. 32

7/03/98C 71 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1134- Tarmac/Bovis) P. 27C 71 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1078- BP/Hüls) P. 26

6/03/98L 66 Corrigendum to CommissionRegulation (EC) No 447/98 of 1March 1998 on the notifications,time limits and hearings providedfor in Council Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between underta-kings (Official Journal of theEuropean Communities No L 61 of2 March 1998) P. 25C 70 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1087- Promodès/Simago)C 70 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1127- Nestlé/Dalgety)C 70 Prior wnotification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1133 -Bass plc/Saison Holdings BV) P. 12

5/03/98C 69 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1112- Advent International/EMI/WHSmith) P. 15

2/03/98L 61 COMMISSION REGU-LATION (EC) No 447/98 of 1March 1998 on the notifications,time limits and hearings providedfor in Council Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between underta-kings (Text with EEA relevance) P.1C 66 Information on the assessmentof full-function joint venturespursuant to the competition rules ofthe European CommunityC 66 COMMISSION NOTICEconcerning alignment of proceduresfor processing mergers under theECSC and EC TreatiesC 66 COMMISSION NOTICE oncalculation of turnover underCouncil Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between underta-kingsC 66 COMMISSION NOTICE onthe concept of undertakings

concerned under Council Regulation(EEC) No 4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between underta-kingsC 66 COMMISSION NOTICE onthe concept of concentration underCouncil Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between underta-kingsC 66 COMMISSION NOTICE onthe concept of full-function jointventures under Council Regulation(EEC) No 4064/89 on the control ofconcentrations between undert-akings P. 1

28/02/98C 65 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1085- Promodès/Catteau) P. 11C 65 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1120- Compaq/Digital) P. 10

26/02/98C 61 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1035- Hochtief/Aer Rianta/DüsseldorfAirport) P. 5

24/02/98C 58 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1113- Nortel/Norweb) P. 9C 58 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1056- Stinnes/BTL) P. 6C 58 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1068- Crédit Suisse FirstBoston/Barclays)

21/02/98C 54 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1107- Edfi/Estag) P. 2

20/02/98C 53 Inapplicability of theRegulation to a notified operation(Case No IV/M.1095 -NEC/Bull/PBN) P. 7



C 53 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1073- Metallgesellschaft/KlöcknerChemiehandel) P. 7

18/02/98C 51 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1105- Tengelmann/Gruppo PAM) P. 11

17/02/98C 50 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1101- Hermes/Sampo/PGB - FCIC) P. 3C 50 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1125- Cereol/Sofiproteol - Saipol) P. 4

14/02/98C 49 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1064- Bombardier/Deutsche Waggon-bau)C 49 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1009- Georg Fischer/DISA) P. 11C 49 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1071- Spar/Pro) P. 13C 49 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1070- Spar/Pfannkuch)C 49 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1018- GE Capital/Woodchester)C 49 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.987 -Adtranz/Siemens/Thyssen -Transrapid Int.)

13/02/98C 48 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.997 -Swedish Match/KAV) P. 5C 48 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1093- ECIA/Bertrand Faure)C 48 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1117- Pinault/Guilbert) P. 6C 48 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1108- SBG/SBV)

12/02/98C 47 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1106- Bayerische Vereinsbank/FGHBank) P. 5C 47 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.980 -Arbed/Aceralia (see also ECSC1237)) P. 6

10/02/98C 44 Re-notification of a previouslynotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI) P. 8C 44 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1029)

7/02/98C 40 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1007- Shell/Montell) P. 10C 40 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1061- ING/BBL) P. 10

6/02/98C 39 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1049- AKZO/PLV-EPL) P. 19C 39 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1059 -Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux/BFI) P. 22C 39 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.999 -CLT-UFA/Havas Intermédiation) P.20C 39 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1075- Nordic Capital/MölnlyckeClinical/Kolmi) P. 19

5/02/98C 38 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.998 -OBS! Danmark) P. 4

4/02/98C 37 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1086- Promodès/S21/Gruppo GS) P. 7C 37 Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo IV/M.1027 - DeutscheTelekom/BetaResearch) P. 4

3/02/98C 36 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1099- Otto Versand/Actebis) P. 4

31/01/98C 33 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1014- British Steel/Europipe) P. 2

30/01/98C 32 Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo IV/M.993 – Bertels-mann/Kirch/Premiere) P. 6C 32 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1057- Terra/ICI) P. 6C 32 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1042 -Eastman Kodak/Sun Chemical) P. 5C 32 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1017- Hannover RE/Skandia) P. 5

27/01/98C 29 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1058- Unichem/Alliance Santé) P. 7C 29 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1003- Alcoa/Inespal) P. 7C 29 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1013- Shell UK/Gulf Oil (Great Britain))P. 6C 29 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1021- Compagnie nationale denavigation/Sogelfa-CIM) P. 8

24/01/98C 25 Re-notification of a previouslynotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1094 - Caterpillar/PerkinsEngines) P. 16C 25 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1046- Ameritech/Tele Danmark) P. 18

23/01/98C 22 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.954 -Bain/Hoechst - Dade Behring) P. 22



C 22 Corrigendum to priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1085 - Promodès/Catteau)(Official Journal of the EuropeanCommunities C 12 of 16 January1998) P. 24C 22 Corrigendum to priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1087 - Promodès/Simago)(Official Journal of the EuropeanCommunities C 12 of 16 January1998) P. 24C 22 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1100- CGEA/Linjebuss) P. 23C 22 Re-notification of a previouslynotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1065 - Nestlé/San Pellegrino)P. 22

22/01/98C 20 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1090- GREA/PPP) P. 15C 20 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1023- IFIL/Worms & Cie) P. 14

21/01/98C 18 Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo IV/M.1047 -Wienerberger/Cremer & Breuer) P. 9C 18 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1043- BAT/Zürich) P. 8 C 18 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1053 -Mannesmann/Philips) P. 6C 18 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1078- BP/Hüls) P. 5

20/01/98C 16 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1055- Cegetel/Vodafone - SFR) P. 13

17/01/98C 13 Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo IV/M.1040 - WoltersKluwer/Reed Elsevier) P. 5

16/01/98C 12 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1085- Promodès/Catteau) P. 15C 12 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1087- Promodès/Simago) P. 14

15/01/98C 10 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1026- Nordic Capital/Apax Industri) P. 9C 10 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.971 -Klöckner/Comercial de Laminados)P. 8C 10 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.988 -M‘rsk/DFDS Travel) P. 8C 10 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1095- NEC/Bull/PBN) P. 7C 10 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1062- Alpitour/Francorosso) P. 6C 10 New effective date ofnotification of a previously notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1022 -Cable I Televisió de Catalunya) P. 5C 10 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1096 -Société générale/Hambros Bank) P. 4C 10 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.917 -Valinox/Timet) P. 3C 10 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.918 -Klöckner/ODS (see alsoIV/ECSC.1244)) P. 3

14/01/98C 9 Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo IV/M.970 - TKS/ITWSignode/Titan) P. 5

13/01/98C 8 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1091- Cableuropa/SpainCom/CTC) P. 2

10/01/98C 6 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1056- Stinnes/BTL) P. 3C 6 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.994 -Dupont/Hitachi) P. 2

9/01/98C 5 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1044- KPMG/Ernst & Young) P. 3

8/01/98C 4 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.984 -Dupont/ICI) P. 4

7/01/98L 3 Corrigendum to CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21December 1989 on the control ofconcentrations betweenundertakings (Official Journal of theEuropean Communities L 257 of 21September 1990) P. 16

ARTICLE 90 (LIBERALISATION)

1/04/98L 101 Directive 98/10/EC of theEuropean Parliament and of theCouncil of 26 February 1998 on theapplication of open networkprovision (ONP) to voice telephonyand on universal service fortelecommunications in acompetitive environment P. 24

19/03/98C 84 Commission Communicationon interconnection pricing in aliberalised telecommunicationsmarket P. 3

7/03/98C 71 Draft Commission Directiveamending Directive 90/388/EEC inorder to ensure thattelecommunications networks andcable TV networks owned by a



single operator are separate legalentities P. 23C 71 Commission communicationconcerning the review undercompetition rules of the jointprovision of telecommunicationsand cable TV networks by a singleoperator and the abolition ofrestrictions on the provision of cableTV capacity overtelecommunications networks P. 4C 71 Notice by the Commissionconcerning a draft Directiveamending Commission Directive90/388/EEC in order to ensure thattelecommunications networks andcable TV networks owned by asingle operator are separate legalentities P. 3

6/02/98C 39 Notice from the Commissionon the application of thecompetition rules to the postalsector and on the assessment ofcertain State measures relating topostal services

10/01/98C 6 Status of voice communicationson Internet under Community lawand, in particular, pursuant toDirective 90/388/EEC P. 4

STATE AID

7/05/98C 142 STATE AID C 7/98 (ex NN1/98) P. 8

5/05/98C 140 STATE AID C 64/97 (ex NN175/95) Germany

1/05/98C 136 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections P.13

28/04/98C 130 STATE AID C 51/97 (ex N753/96) Italy P. 6C 130 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 130 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 130 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

25/04/98C 128 STATE AID C 83/97 (ex NN153/97) Germany

23/04/98C 125 STATE AID C 36/97LuxembourgC 125 Review of production aidceiling for shipbuilding P. 4

21/04/98C 122 STATE AID C 66/97 Sweden17/04/98C 118 STATE AID C 70/97 (ex NN123/97) Germany P. 5

16/04/98C 116 Proposal for a CouncilRegulation (EC) laying downdetailed rules for the application ofArticle 93 of the EC Treaty P. 13

9/04/98C 111 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 111 STATE AID C 73/97 (NN146/97) FranceC 111 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

8/04/98C 109 STATE AID C 41/97 (ex N914/95) Italy

C 109 STATE AID C 40/95GermanyC 109 STATE AID C 77/97 (ex N99/97) Austria

4/04/98C 103 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 103 STATE AID C 86/97 (ex N322/97) IrelandC 103 STATE AID C 76/97 (ex NN115/97) Spain

3/04/98C 101 STATE AID C 87/97 (ex N527/97) Italy P. 2

2/04/98C 100 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections P.19C 100 STATE AID C 4/98 (ex N659/B/97) ItalyC 100 STATE AID C 78/97 (ex NN33/96) Greece P. 7

1/04/98C 99 STATE AID C 61/97 (N771/96, NN 128/96) Germany P. 9C 99 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objection

25/03/98C 89 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 89 STATE AID C 67/97 (ex NN109/B/96) Italy P. 321/03/98C 86 STATE AID C 1/98 (ex N750/B/95) Italy P. 3

20/03/98C 85 STATE AID C 2/98 (ex N27/B/97) Italy P. 9



18/03/98L 80 Commission Decision98/212/EC of 16 April 1997 on theaid granted by Italy to EnirisorseSpA (Only the Italian text isauthentic) (Text with EEArelevance) P. 32C 83 STATE AID C 72/97 (ex NN124/97) Germany P. 10C 83 STATE AID C 65/97 (ex NN65/97) Portugal P. 5

16/03/98L 78 Commission Decision98/204/EC of 30 July 1997conditionally approving aid grantedby France to the GAN group (Onlythe French text is authentic) (Textwith EEA relevance) P. 1

14/03/98C 79 STATE AID C 5/96 France P.10C 79 STATE AID C 69/97 (ex NN122/97) Germany P. 4

11/03/98C 75 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections P. 4

10/03/98C 74 Commission communicationconcerning extension of theguidelines on State aid for rescuingand restructuring firms in difficultyP. 31C 74 GUIDELINES ONNATIONAL REGIONAL AID P. 9

7/03/98L 67 Commission Decision98/183/EC of 1 October 1997concerning aid granted by France toThomson SA and ThomsonMultimedia (Only the French text isauthentic) (Text with EEArelevance) P. 31

6/03/98C 70 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the

EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 70 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 70 STATE AIDS C 90/97 (ex NN180/97) Italy P. 5





19/02/98C 52 STATE AID C 79/97 (ex NN137/96) Italy P. 5

18/02/98C 51 STATE AID C 81/97 (ex NN167/97) ItalyC 51 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 51 STATE AID C 75/97 (ex NN108/97) Germany P. 3

17/02/98C 50 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

14/02/98C 49 STATE AID C 68/97 (NN118/97) Spain P. 2

12/02/98C 47 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

5/02/98C 38 STATE AID (95-010 Norway)P. 6C 38 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections P. 3

4/02/98C 37 STATE AID C 42/97 (ex NN121/96) Germany P. 8

31/01/98C 33 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

30/01/98C 32 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

27/01/98L 20 COMMISSION DECISION98/95/EC of 21 October 1997concerning aid granted by theRegion of Sardinia (Italy) toshipping companies in Sardinia(Only the Italian text is authentic)(Text with EEA relevance) P. 3024/01/98C 25 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections p. 14C 25 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections p. 11C 25 STATE AID C 56/97 (ex NN78/96) Germany P. 2



22/01/98C 20 STATE AID N 680/97Belgium P. 3

17/01/98C 13 STATE AID C 58/94Germany P. 2

16/01/98C 12 Approval of State aid pursuantto Articles 92 and 93 of the ECTreaty Cases where the Commissionraises no objections N 475/96 -Austria P. 5

7/01/98C 3 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections P. 3

3/01/98C 1 Authorization for State aidMeasures not constituting aid in themeaning of Article 4 (c) of theECSC Treaty P. 9

COURT OF JUSTICE / COURTOF FIRST INSTANCE

Affaires introduites devant laCour

Aff. C-57/98 PAsociación Telefónica de EspanñaSA (ATM) / Commission : Pourvoicontre l'arrêt du Tribunal (premièrechambre élargie), rendu le 18décembre 1997, dans l'affaire T-178/94 opposant ATM à laCommission, ayant rejeté commeirrecevable le recours en annulationcontre le classement d'une plainterelative à des aides publiques dontaurait bénéficié Telefónica deEspaña SA - Intérêt pour agir -Poursuite du recours T-178/94 -

Aide d'Etat prétendument consistantdans le fait qu'une entreprisechargée de la gestion de servicesd'intérêt général était soumise à unrégime de sécurité socialeparticulier et, de ce fait, à descotisations inférieures à celles durégime général

Aff. C-436/97 PDeutsche Bahn AG / Commission :Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(première chambre élargie), rendu le21 octobre 1997, dans l'affaire T-229/94 opposant Deutsche Bahn AGà la Commission - Poursuite durecours en annulation en ce quiconcerne la constatation d'un abusde position dominante sur le marchéallemand des transports ferroviairespar la fixation de tarifsdiscriminatoires pour le transportterrestre de conteneurs maritimes etla fixation d'une amende - Règles depreuve

Aff. C-441/97 PWirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl e.a. /Commission : Pourvoi contre l'arrêtdu Tribunal (première chambreélargie), rendu le 24 octobre 1997,dans l'affaire T-244/94 opposantWirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl e.a. àla Commission - Poursuite durecours en annulation de la décision94/259/CECA autorisant des aidesd'Etat aux entreprises sidérurgiquesdu secteur public italien -Détournement de pouvoir -Confiance légitime - Discrimination- Défaut de motivation - Violationdes droits de la défense

Aff. C-1/98British Steel plc / Commission :Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(première chambre élargie), du 24octobre 1997, dans l'affaire T-243/94 opposant British Steel à laCommission - Annulation de ladécision 94/258/CECA de laCommission, du 12 avril 1994,concernant les aides que l'Espagne

envisage d'accorder à l'entreprisepublique de sidérurgie intégréeCorporación de la SiderurgiaIntegral (CSI) et de la décision94/259/CECA de la Commission,du 12 avril 1994, concernant l'octroipar l'Italie d'aides d'Etat auxentreprises sidérurgiques du secteurpublic (groupe sidérurgique Ilva)

Aff. C-15/98Italie / Commission : Annulation dela décision n° 98/95/CE de laCommission, du 21 octobre 1997,concernant une aide octroyée par larégion de Sardaigne (Italie) ausecteur de la navigation enSardaigne et de la lettre de laCommission relative à l'engagementd'une procédure concernant la loi n°9 de la région de Sardaigne du 15février 1996

Aff. C-404/97Commission / Portugal : Man-quement d'Etat - Défaut d'avoirsupprimé et récupéré, dans les délaisprévus, les aides à l'entrepriseEPAC visées par la décisionC(97)2130

Aff. C-422/97Société Anonyme de Traverses enBéton Armé (Sateba) /Commission : Pourvoi contrel'ordonnance du Tribunal (premièrechambre), rendue le 29 septembre1997, dans l'affaire T-83/97opposant Sateba à la Commission -Recevabilité d'un recours visant àl'annulation d'une décision declassement d'une plainte contre lecomportement d'un pouvoiradjudicataire national - Plaintefondée sur la violation de ladirective 93/38/CEE du Conseil, du14 juin 1993, portant coordinationdes procédures de passation desmarchés dans les secteurs de l'eau,de l'énergie, des transports et destélécommunications (JO L 199, p.84) ainsi que sur la violation desrègles sur la libre circulation et des



règles de concurrence - Non-engagement de la procédure au titredu règlement n. 17 - Détournementde procédure consistant dans leclassement d'une plainte visant àl'ouverture d'une procédure del'article 169 du traité CE

Affaires introduites devant leTribunal

Aff. T-596/97Dalmine SpA / Commission :L'annulation des articles 2 et 4 de ladécision de la Commission, du 6octobre 1997, C(97) 3036, relative àune procédure d'application desarticles 85 et 86 du traité CE(IV/35.860 - tubes d'acier)

Aff. T-600/97Ditta Pietro Stagno / Commission :l'annulation de la décision n.C(97)2735 de la Commission, du 30juillet 1997, relative aux aidesaccordées par la Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia aux transporteursroutiers

Aff. T-601/97Ditta Fabrizio Cernecca /Commission : Voir aff. T-600/97

Aff. T-602/97Trasporti e Spedizioni InternazionaliCossutta Snc / Commission : Voiraff. T-600/97

Aff. T-603/97Ditta Giuseppe Camaur /Commission : Voir aff. T-600/97

Aff. T-604/97Cointra Transport and Trade Co. Srl/ Commission : Voir aff. T-600/97

Aff. T-605/97Ditta Autotrasporti Silvano Zottich /Commission : Voir aff. T-600/97

Aff. T-606/97Zootrans Snc / Commission :Voir aff. T-600/97

Aff. T-607/97Pauletic Antonio Succ. di PauleticIgor / Commission : Voir aff. T-600/97

Aff. T-613/97Union française de l'express (Ufex)e.a. / Commission : L'annulation dela décision de la Commission, du1er octobre 1997, statuant quel'assitance logistique et commercialefournie par La Poste à sa filiale, laSociété française de messagerieinternationale (SFMI-Chronopost),ainsi que les autres mesuresdénoncées ne constituent pas desaides d'Etat en faveur de cettesociété

Aff. T-1/98Ditta Fabris Carlo & C. Snc /Commission : L'annulation partiellede la décision n. C(97)2735 de laCommission, du 30 juillet 1997,relative aux aides accordées par laRegione Friuli-Venezia Giulia auxtransporteurs routiers

Aff. T-3/98Ditta D'Odorico Franco /Commission : Voir aff. T-1/98

Aff. T-4/98Ditta Birri Fiorindo / Commission :Voir aff. T-1/98

Aff. T-5/98Ditta Framalicco Maria Cecilia /Commission : Voir aff. T-1/98

Aff. T-6/98Autotrasporti Di Viola Claudio & C.Snc / Commission : Voir aff. T-1/98

Aff. T-8/98Siderca SAIC / Commission :L'annulation de la décision de laCommission, du 6 octobre 1997,C(97) 3036, relative à une

procédure d'application des articles85 et 86 du traité CE (IV/35.860 -tubes d'acier)

Aff. T-16/98Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl e.a. /Commission : l’annulation de ladécision de la Commission98/4/CECA, du 26 novembre 1997,relative à une procédured'application de l'article 65 du traitéCECA concernant un accordd'échange d'informations concluentre seize producteurssidérurgiques allemands membresde l'association Wirtschafts-vereinigung Stahl (affaireIV/36.069)

Aff. T-296/97Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane SpA /Commission : L'annulation de ladécision de la Commission CEC(97) 2616, du 15 juillet 1997,d'autoriser, à certaines conditions,l'aide accordée par les autoritésitaliennes à la société Alitalia, sousforme d'un apport de capital àeffectuer par le holding d'Etat IRI

Aff. T-298/97Mauro Alzetta e.a. / Commission :L'annulation de la décision n°C(98)2735 de la Commission, du 30juillet 1997, relative aux aidesaccordées par la Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia aux transporteursroutiers

Aff. T-312/97Masotti Srl e.a. / Commission :L'annulation de la décision n.C(97)2735 de la Commission, du 30juillet 1997, relative aux aidesaccordées par la Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia aux transporteursroutiers

Aff. T-313/97Impresa Baldo Anna Maria e.a. /Commission : L'annulation de ladécision n. C(97)2735 de laCommission, du 30 juillet 1997,



relative aux aides accordées par laRegione Friuli-Venezia Giulia auxtransporteurs routiers

Aff. T-315/97SUTES SpA e.a. / Commission :L'annulation de la décision n.C(97)2735 de la Commission, du 30juillet 1997, relative aux aidesaccordées par la Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia aux transporteursroutiers

DG IV ON THEWORLD WIDE WEB

DG IV has a home page on theEuropa server available on theWorld Wide Web. Our address is:

http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/

COMING UP

EC - Competition PolicyNewsletter, Nø 3-1998

XXVII Report on CompetitionPolicy - 1997

Competition law in the EC- VolumeIIA - Rules applicable to State aid -Edition 1998

Merger control in the EuropeanUnion - Edition 1998



Cases covered in this issue

Court Judgments

38 Kali und Salz (Merger) 42 Sytraval (State Aid)

Commission

Anti-trust Rules

48 IFCO50 Acier inoxydable51 Inntrepreneur

(Rejection of complaints)

52 Unilever53 Volkswagen54 FDT57 APS

Mergers

65 Hoffmann-La roche/Boehringer Mannhiem

66 Agfa-Gevaert/Du Pont67 Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier67 Wienerberger/Cremer&Breuer67 KPMG/Ernst & Young

68 Thyssen Krupp Stahl/ITW Signode/Titan

68 SBG/SBV69 Nestlé/Dalgety70 Owens Illinois/BTR Packaging70 Promodes/SZI/Grupo GS71 Samsung/AST

Liberalisation & State Intervention

76 Telecommunications

State Aid

82 Italie : Emploi en Sicile83 Portugal : Aides à la formation83 Belgique : Hermès Europe Railtel84 France : Gooding Consumer

Electronics + Cofidur85 Royaume-Uni : Rolls-Royce85 Autriche : KNP Leykam86 Pays-Bas : Philips

86 Allemagne : SICAN86 Allemagne : Hartgußwerke87 Allemagne : Triptis Pozellan88 Allemagne : Régime

d’allègement fiscal 89 Pays-Bas : Peroxyde d’hydrogène

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