A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS IN THE WESTERN SAHEL AND NIGERIA

Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE

CRIME-TERROR NEXUS IN THE WESTERN

SAHEL AND NIGERIA

Richard Charles Copeland Davies

August 2010

I hereby certify that this dissertation, which is approximately 14,950 words in length, has been composed by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. This project was conducted by me in Devon and London from May 2010 to August 2010 towards fulfillment of the requirements of the University of St Andrews for the degree of M.Litt, under the supervision of Dr Peter Lehr.

Signature of candidate:………. R C C Davies……..Date:………20/08/10

Richard C. C. Davies

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CONTENTS i. Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………..…..… i ii. Abbreviations and Acknowledgments……………………………………..………….…iii 1. INTRODUCTION: A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?

1.1 RATIONALE FOR A CRIME-TERROR NEXUS…………………………...1 1.2 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME AS A

NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT……………….......................................3 1.3 GLOBALISATION HERALDS NEW CRIMINOGENIC LANDSCAPE.......4

2. LITERATURE REVIEW: CHARTING THE NEXUS

2.1 RESEARCH GAP…………………………………………………………......5 2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK…………………………………………......6 2.3 TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AS TOC+………………………………..9 2.4 CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION………………………….................10

3. METHODOLOGY: INVESTIGATING THE NEXUS

3.1 DATA SETS……………………………………………………….................11 3.2 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS……………………………….....................12 3.3 MOST DIFFERENT SYSTEMS DESIGN……………………...................13

4. CON AIR? EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN AQIM AND SOUTH

AMERICAN NARCO-CARTELS IN THE WESTERN SAHEL 4.1 WEST AFRICA AS A TRANSIT HUB……………………………………..15 4.2 GEOGRAPHY: HIGHWAY 10……………………………………………..18 4.3 PROFILE: MAIN PROTAGONISTS……………………………………….19 4.4 ANALYSIS: AQIM COURTS FARC…………………………....................21 4.5 CRIMINAL FINANCE: DRUGS AS FUNDING……………………………22 4.6 PRECIPTANT FACTORS AND DESTABILISING EFFECTS…………..23 4.7 CONVERGENCE: A THREAT TO SECURITY……………....................24 4.8 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS………………………………………................26 4.9 ANALYSIS: CON AIR…………………………………………...................31

5. DELTA FORCE? EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN MEND AND CRIMINAL SYNDICATES OPERATING IN THE NIGER DELTA 5.1 NIGERIA: CRUDEPOLITIK?..................................................................33 5.2 GEOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………..35 5.3 PROFILE: MAIN PROTAGONISTS………………………………………..35 5.4 ANALYSIS: OIL BUNKERING……………………………………………. .38 5.5 CRIMINAL FINANCE: OIL AS FUNDING…………………………………39 5.6 PRECIPIENT FACTORS AND DESTABILISING EFFECTS….. ………41 5.7 CONVERGENCE: A THREAT TO SECURITY ……………...................43 5.8 STATISITICAL ANALYSIS………………………………………………….44 5.9 ANALYSIS: KIDNAPPING AND RANSOM……………………………….47

6. COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS: COMMON FACTORS

6.1 THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY………………………….................49 6.2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE…………………………….................50 6.3 POLITICAL FACTORS……………………………………………………...51 6.4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS…………………………….....................53 6.5 THE ECONOMY………………………………………………....................55 6.6 GEOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………..56 6.7 INCOME STREAMS………………………………………….....................57 6.8 COUNTERPARTIES: SHADOW FACILITATORS………......................59 6.9 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS………………………………................61 6.10 A DANGEROUS LIASION: PROFIT MAXIMISATION?.........................62

7. DISCUSSION

7.1 SHORTCOMINGS…………………………………………………………...64 7.2 EVALUATION……………………………………………………………...…66

8. CONCLUSION 8.1 SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………68 8.2 RESULTS …………………………………………………………….………69 8.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS…………………………………………….70 9. ANNEX……………………………………………………………………………………73 10. BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................76

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold-war and the concomitant reduction in state-

sponsorship for terrorist organisations had a manifest impact on the

complex and dynamic relationship between Transnational Organised

Crime (TOC) and terrorism. Against the backdrop of ‘new terrorism’ and

the post September 11th environment of fastidious law enforcement and

robust counter-terrorism, this paper will investigate the extent to which

terrorist organisations in the Western Sahel and Nigeria are allying

themselves to criminal organisations, or indeed embarking on criminal

activities themselves, to raise funds for their financially depleted cells.

Perhaps more importantly, it will also examine whether such criminal

motivations are compromising their ideological integrity and transforming

their character from terrorist to hybrid criminal-terrorist organisations.

A comparative analysis is adopted in order to identify the shared

characteristics that could give rise to the existence of an unusually

advanced crime-terror nexus within two different areas of West Africa.

These case studies are augmented with the statistical analysis of

secondary data such that the investigation follows a mixed methods

approach. In both cases the results show a high degree of correlation

between the proxies used to measure the levels of criminal and terrorist

activity, which appears to confirm the existence of the crime-terror nexus.

The comparative analysis yields a number of shared precipitant factors

including: weak governance, inaccessible physical geography, inequality,

corruption, a national mono-economy dominated by a single commodity,

an international marketplace for this principle commodity and the

presence of third-party shadow facilitators (Hezbollah).

In conclusion, the paper notes that the nexus appears more advanced in

the Niger Delta where militants have moved closer towards a hybrid

criminal-terrorist organisation, but the threat from this ‘domestic terrorism’

is less pronounced than from the international terrorists operating in the

Sahel. Further research is required to prove causation, but based on the

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findings, it argues that by adopting multilateral policies which seek to

decouple the explicit financial link between TOC and terrorism, and by

increasing developmental aid from the international community rather

than adopting hard-line unilateral military counter-terrorist strategies, the

spectre of terrorism in West Africa can be expunged.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM Al’Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DEA Drug Enforcement Agency

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (Annex 1)

EU European Union

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organisation

GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

GTD Global Terrorist Database

ICG International Crisis Group

IMB International Maritime Bureau

MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MPS Metropolitan Police Service

NDPVF Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency

TOC Transnational organised crime

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

VNSA Violent Non-State Actors

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I am grateful to Dr. Peter Lehr for his guidance and assistance throughout

my time working on this thesis. Similarly, I am indebted to the senior

officers and officials within the Metropolitan Police Counter-terrorism

Command, the Home Office, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

who took time to meet with me and discuss some of the issues that

provide the contextual backdrop for this project.

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1 INTRODUCTION: A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?

1.1 RATIONALE FOR A CRIME-TERROR NEXUS

The existential shock of the Soviet Union‟s demise combined with the

emergence of „new terrorism‟1 in the modern era of globalisation has had

a significant impact on the dynamic relationship between terrorism and

Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) as terrorists make unprecedented

forays into organised crime to raise funds for their financially depleted

cells (Dishman, p246, 2005). At the strategic level, the withdrawal of state

sponsorship forced terrorists to acquire new income streams to ensure

their survival2; this was facilitated by the evolution of a networked and

less hierarchical structure which conferred on them a flexibility to embark

on nefarious activities, at the operational level, without the explicit

approval of their executive leadership (Dishman, p237, 2005).

The extent of the crime-terror nexus is contentious (Rollins, Wyler, &

Rosen, p13, 2010). Is it possible that economic pragmatism may triumph

over doctrinaire reservations about engaging in criminal activity as

terrorist organisations recognise the importance of a solid financial footing

for their continued survival and succumb to the allure the of supernormal

profits associated with organised crime? (Mincheva & Gurr, p2, 2008).

This paper seeks to contribute towards the research gap on the

contemporary crime-terror nexus by conducting a comparative analysis of

the phenomenon in two distinct geo-political arenas: the Western Sahel

(Mali and Mauritania) and Nigeria. It will begin with a brief discussion of

1 See Tucker (2001) for a discussion of what constitutes „new terrorism‟

2 Emerson (p3, 2005) notes that alongside indoctrination and recruitment, financing is

one of three key components required for terrorism

2

the emergence of TOC as a national security threat, and how

globalisation has changed the „criminogenic‟ environment, before

conducting a literature review to obtain a theoretical framework upon

which to structure the investigation. After discussing the methodology, the

paper will explore a detailed case study of each geographic locale before

identifying common themes that emerge and discussing them in a „most

different‟ systems design of comparative analysis that seeks to address

some of the points from Bovenkerk and Chakra‟s research agenda

(Annex 1). In conclusion, it will seek to explain the extent of the

relationship, the key factors which precipitate it, likely future trends and

possible policy prescription.

For the purposes of this investigation „terrorism‟ describes premeditated

acts of violence perpetrated for political, religious and/or ideological ends,

against civilian targets to inflict harm, and intimidate the public and coerce

government or state compliance with the goals of the perpetrator

(Hutchinson & O‟Malley, p1098, 2007). „Organised crime‟ describes a

group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for

a period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one

crime punishable by at least four years incarceration; in order to obtain,

directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UN Convention

against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000).

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1.2 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

Terrorism has been framed as a threat to national security since the 19th

Century campaigns by nascent anarchist groups, such as Narodnaya

Volya (cf. Hoffman, p19, 1998), but it is only recently that the deleterious

effects of TOC have been examined. Shelley (1995) concluded that TOC

had the ability to undermine the state in the 21st century; a view that was

reiterated beyond the narrow confines of academia by politicians such as

President Clinton who declared TOC a „national security threat‟ in

Presidential Directive 42 (Picarelli, p2, 2006). In 2004, the UN Secretary-

General‟s high level panel on „Threats, Challenges and Change‟ identified

six key security challenges including terrorism and TOC (McCusker, p3,

2006). More recently, the 2009 US National Intelligence Strategy

incorporated an explicit reference to the link between terrorism and

organised crime, and their commensurate threat to national security, in

one of its six mission objectives3.

As there is some degree of convergence in the political rhetoric used to

address TOC and terrorism, it is not surprising that a degree of

collaboration between, or metamorphosis of, these groups stands up to

logical scrutiny (Ehrenfeld, 1990). Since the Cold War, non-state actors

have reacted to changes in their environment and constitute part of a new

spectrum of non-military threats that cross the former divide between

internal and external security which have, arguably, challenged the

3 The „combat violent extremism‟ mission objective is to „penetrate and support the

disruption of terrorist organisations and the nexus between terrorism and criminal activities‟ (Rollins, Wyler, & Rosen, p43, 2010)

4

security of the state itself for the first time (Makarenko, p140, 2004;

Kostakos & Kostakos, p7, 2006). Cynics, however, assert this consensus

reflects the value of the nexus as a convenient label for pooling resources

to target the common ground where the political agendas of the „war on

terror‟ and the „war on drugs‟ overlap (SGOC, p1, 2006).

1.3 GLOBALISATION HERALDS NEW CRIMINOGENIC LANDSCAPE

Pettinger (p21, 2000) notes that “as no organisation exists in isolation

from its environment, the nature and extent of the relationship and

interaction must be considered”. In the criminological context, the concept

of „external criminogenic environment‟ is a reference to the reality that

surrounds the external realm of criminal and terrorist organisations as

opposed to its structure, organisation and modus operandi which

constitute the „internal criminogenic environment‟ (Pettinger, p21, 2000).

After the Cold War, Held (p4, 1995) observed that “ideological conflict is

being steadily displaced by universal democratic reasoning and market

orientated thinking” which appears to have coincided with a decline in the

role of the state (Vayrnnen, p43, 2000). Globalisation has made a

tremendous impact on the external criminogenic environment as huge

advances in technology, communications, transportation and financial

instruments, combined with the removal of border controls and

substantial immigration flows, have „collapsed the notion of space and

fostered a climate favourable to those who are adept at using Information

5

Technology4‟ (IT) (Castells, 2000). The opportunity cost of this „shrinking‟

globe and of „liberalising‟ economic and social relations has, however,

been to confer on individuals within TOC and terrorism better tools with

which to mitigate additional risks that collaborative projects may incur

(Picarelli, p8, 2006). Giroux (2010) asserts that the emergence of Violent

Non-State Actors (VNSA), operating in a complex micro-geography

devoid of state-boundaries and actively involved in the trading of illicit

materials, highlights the shift in this external criminogenic landscape and

notes how their networked structure, molded around economic interests,

enables them to exploit this by rapidly adapting to shifting conditions.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW: CHARTING THE NEXUS 2.1 RESEARCH GAP

Schmid (1996) describes TOC and terrorism as „distinct phenomena‟, but

recognises that this should not obfuscate the existence of a crime-terror

nexus as „there are links‟ and „there is some common ground‟, it is just

unclear quite what the „close connection‟ between international terrorism

and TOC consists of. Moreover, analysts talk of an „intelligence and

research gap‟ in the prevalence, threat and future threats associated with

the nexus and reiterate the importance of continued academic research in

order to establish a more accurate understanding of the relationship

(Rollins, Wyler, & Rosen, p4/46, 2010).

4 This technological component forms the basis for Arquilla & Ronfeldt‟s (2001) „netwar‟

model which illustrates how IT is used to form crime and terror networks designed to evade state intervention and improve organisations‟ ability to operate with little to no central leadership.

6

One of the inherent problems of researching the crime-terror nexus is the

clandestine nature of both groups and the (ostensible) lack of any

systematic collection or analysis of such information by government

authorities (Rollins, Wyler, & Rosen, p9, 2010). In addition, the absence

of a holistic approach has hampered its investigation; only a handful of

scholars have addressed TOC and terrorism conterminously and the

nascent nature of these studies suggests that academics and

policymakers are yet to reach a consensus on the exact nature, and even

the existence, of the relationship (Picarelli, p1, 2006).

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

„Methods versus motives‟ is an established model of the crime-terror

nexus which posits that cooperation between TOC and terrorists

generally occurs only when terrorists are „forced‟ to ally with organised

criminals, and that such relationships are temporary and/or parasitical as

opposed to symbiotic (Hutchinson & O‟Malley, p1096, 2007). It is the

inherently divergent objectives of the terrorists, seeking political inclusion

and legitimisation (in the case of revolutionary movements) and/ or

political dominance (in the case of most religious terrorist organisations),

vis-à-vis those of the criminals, seeking optimal business environments,

that confines any cooperation between the two groups to sporadic and

myopic marriages of convenience in which the benefits of cooperation

outweigh the risks to security (Hutchinson & O‟Malley, p1100, 2007). In

such circumstances, collaboration can serve as a „force multiplier‟ for

both parties bolstering their capabilities, strengthening their infrastructure

7

and increasing their wealth, but they are fraught with risk which Schmid‟s

criminological comparison cites as one of the three reasons why the

crime-terror nexus is unlikely to develop beyond such short-term

arrangements (Rollins, Wyler, & Rosen, p5, 2010; Schmid, 1996).

Makarenko (2004) models a linear relationship (Fig. 2.2.1) between TOC

and terrorism such that groups can transition along the continuum. This

can accommodate alliances with other organisations, reflect

organisational learning and the ability of organisations to develop their

reciprocal criminal/ terrorist repertoire in-house, and formulates, in the

extreme case, their convergence in a black-hole where „hybrid‟

organisations simultaneously exhibit both criminal and terrorist

characteristics (Makarenko, p138, 2004).

Figure 2.2.1: Crime-terror continuum

Bovenkerk & Chakra (p13, 2004) substantiate the case for terrorists

making the transition towards a focal point in a different model which

suggests that the „methods not motives‟ argument is archaic:

“when it comes to… temptation, in the long run greed tends to be stronger than ideology. The newly emerging hybrid group of „organized criminal terrorists‟ is likely to be a group of individuals who sponsor, support and/or actively engage in terrorist activity in order to promote their own… interests, striving to acquire more power and wealth. Organized crime, in this perspective, would be the outcome of any merger that might take place”.

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This perspective is echoed by those such as Hutchinson & O‟Malley

(p1099, 2007), who argue new terrorist organisations are more a

„confederation‟ of individuals and entities than an organised body of

procedures and hierarchies, and Stern (p28, 2003), who notes that

„professional terrorists‟ can be influenced and it is, therefore, possible for

“grievances [to] evolve into greed: for money, political power, status or

attention”.

Picarelli (2006) submits that traditional realist and liberal theories of

international relations are inappropriate in this context as they are

predicated on the central role of the state and an understanding of

security that falls under the rubric of high politics and focuses on

maintaining the territorial sovereignty of state actors (Makarenko, 2002).

By using a dyadic model drawn from Rosenau‟s (1990) post-international

paradigm, Picarelli (p22, 2006) seeks to accommodate the role of

individuals and non-state actors in a new typology that classifies terrorist

and criminal organisations as either „sovereign free‟ or „sovereign bound‟.

The model eclipses the parsimonious view that criminals and terrorists

only engage in short-term marriages of convenience and appears to lend

support to Makarenko‟s (2004) concept of a black-hole by arguing that a

merger of sovereign free crime and terror groups would prove most

harmful to states (Picarelli, p22, 2006). Moreover, this „multi-centric‟

nexus, which played a part in funding the terrorist attacks in America on

11th September 2001, represents the most ready route for terrorists to

acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (Picarelli, p22, 2006).

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2.3 TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AS TOC+

Terrorist organisations are functionally and organisationally well placed to

engage in organised crime themselves, and their ideological (not

financial) motivation reduces the vulnerability of such activity to infiltration

by the state (Hutchinson & O'Malley, p1102, 2007). Realist philosophy

dictates that the main objective of any organisation, formed by rational

actors, is to ensure its continued survival and, assuming both TOC and

terrorism are comprised of such actors, whilst their secondary objectives

may differ (i.e. profit versus political power), their continued survival is a

shared primary objective that mandates a secure financial platform

(SGOC, p6, 2006).

An alliance with TOC could lead to a „futuristic hybrid crime-terror

nightmare‟, however terrorists are, ceteris paribus, more likely to exploit

the characteristics and performances they already possess for their

political purpose to generate income (Hutchinson & O'Malley, p1102,

2007). Adopting best-practice from TOC and incorporating an in-house

criminal capability yields terrorists two advantages vis-à-vis TOC, both

predicated on trust. Unlike TOC, where the individual and organisational

objectives of profit maximisation overlap, terrorists are united by a strong

commitment to a political or religious cause and are unlikely to be

seduced by the monetary inducements of law enforcement agencies or

competitors into betraying their organisation (Hutchinson & O'Malley,

p1101, 2007). Similarly, they are less likely to require a premium payment

for riskier operations and/or to secure their loyalty, so the costs of running

10

hybrid „organised terror groups‟ are reduced (Hutchinson & O'Malley,

p1101, 2007).

2.4 CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION

“Alarming prognostications about a „grand shift‟ where terrorists and

criminals operate hand in hand will likely prove unfounded”, however

under certain conditions, cooperation between terrorism and TOC can

exceed more than just a short term business arrangement (Dishman,

p56, 2001). The relationship is complex, encompassing everything from

money, geography, politics, arms and tactics, but Sarrion and Baumert

(2008) argue that the connection is prevalent where three factors

converge; poverty, a weak state and corruption. This reference to a weak

state is a common theme and is supported by Hutchinson & O'Malley

(p1103, 2007), who note evidence of cooperation under exceptional

conditions in regions loosely controlled by weak or transnational states.

Echoing the „sovereign free‟ and „sovereign bound‟ classifications, they

recognise a difference between national and transnational criminal

organisations and explain the latter are more likely to collaborate with

terrorists as they often originate in post-conflict regions and failing states,

in order to profit from state chaos and ongoing conflict, and it is in exactly

these circumstances that terrorist and revolutionary groups are often

already present (Hutchinson & O'Malley, p1105, 2007).

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3 METHODOLOGY: INVESTIGATING THE NEXUS 3.1 DATA SETS

One of the challenges of conducting research into the clandestine

phenomena of both terrorism and TOC is obtaining robust statistical data

(Neuman, p309, 2007). As direct observation and/or the primary

collection of data are beyond the scope of this investigation, the paper

conducts a comparative analysis that draws mainly on two reliable

sources of secondary data: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) publications and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

UNODC publications, such as the annual „World Drug Reports‟, contain

information predicated on the results of the Annual Reports

Questionnaire5 (ARQ) and are augmented with information from

INTERPOL, EUROPOL, the World Customs Organisation, National law

enforcement agencies and regional initiatives such as the UNODC‟s

„Data for Africa‟ project (UNODC, p294, 2009). In spite of the difficulties of

comparing data derived through different methodologies, such reports do

“allow the drawing up of global trends and patterns of the drugs trade”

(Fortune, 2010).

The GTD is based on research conducted by the Pinkerton Global

Intelligence Service (PGIS) in which secondary open source data is

analysed for acts of terrorism within a vast array of outlets including

newswires, government officials, PGIS offices worldwide, special interest

5 Member states are mandated to provide this information under the international drugs

control conventions (Annex 2)

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groups, political parties and private individuals (LaFree & Dugan, p184,

2007). A comparison of eight preeminent terrorism event databases

shows that there are nearly seven times as many incidents reported in

the GTD as the next most populous; principally because it encompasses

international and domestic acts of terrorism (LaFree & Dugan, p184,

2007). The reliability and validity of the GTD have engendered it to

organisations such as The Economist (2008) and academics such as

Wang et al (2008).

3.2 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Together with the experimental method, the statistical method and the

case study approach, the comparative method is one of the four

fundamental methods that can be used to test the validity of general

empirical propositions (Lijphart, p682, 1971). By reinterpreting data,

finding new evidence and/or assembling evidence in a different way, the

comparative method can be used to enhance existing explanations and

engender support for new ones, indeed the way such research raises

questions and simulates theory building is a major strength (Neuman,

p305/317, 2007). This comparative analysis is based on a mixed method

design consisting of case studies and statistical analysis of corresponding

secondary data. The importance of the design and the case selection is

emphasised by Peters (1998) who notes that, in the absence of the ability

to randomise case assignments or manipulate variables, these

components have a critical role in ensuring that the research findings are

not contaminated by threats to validity. Random sampling is rarely an

13

option as sufficient information for all countries is seldom available and,

moreover, is unavailable for a non-random subset (poor countries, non-

democratic countries etc) (Neuman, p318, 2007). The sources of

variance are therefore controlled through the ex-ante selection of cases

as opposed to ex-post manipulations of data and, as a result,

comparative designs tend to rely upon fewer cases but ones that are

selected purposefully (Peters, 1998).

3.3 MOST DIFFERENT SYSTEMS DESIGN

“Comparative politics involves the development of theories explaining

behaviour within groups of countries that are essentially similar” (Peters,

1998). Such analysis reduces the impact of extraneous variables and it is

for that reason that the two case studies chosen in this paper comprise

the Western Sahel (Mali and Mauritania) and Nigeria- both regions of

West Africa6. In spite of the similarities, a comparative analysis will also

contrast the differences between these cases in any number of ways and,

as such, there are two distinct approaches to a comparative analysis: the

most similar and most different systems designs (Peters, 1998). Most

similar designs are the usual method employed in comparative research

but, in this instance, are inappropriate as the unit of analysis is the nation

state and in isolating extraneous variance through most similar case

selection, the comparison may not be able to identify all the relevant

factors that can explain the existence of the crime-terror nexus (Neuman,

p318, 2007; Peters, 1998). Adopting a most different system prevents a

6 Defined in Annex 3

14

myopic focus on a small number of factors and, instead, looks at most

different cases to identify what they have in common that could explain

the shared phenomenon (Peters, 1998).

Whilst any substantial piece of research will be based on a framework of

assumptions, concepts and theories, the most different systems design

enables these concepts to interact with the evidence and stimulate the

research leaving open the possibility that any number of variables may be

able to explain the phenomenon (Neuman, p311, 2007). Skocpol (1979)

adopted this approach to investigate revolution as the lack of fit between

the histories of revolutions in France, Russia and China and their

contrasting political, economic and social systems encouraged her to

research what was sufficiently common among these systems to produce

political events that were effectively similar (Neuman, p311, 2007; Peters,

1998). In addition, this design is not particularly concerned with countries

as a unit of analysis (which is useful when considering the actions of

„sovereign free‟ actors), rather it is variable based research with the

principal task of finding relationships among variables that can survive

being transported across a range of different countries (Peters, 1998).

15

4 CON AIR? EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN AQIM AND SOUTH AMERICAN NARCO-CARTELS IN THE WESTERN SAHEL

Figure 4.0.1 Map of West Africa

7

4.1 WEST AFRICA AS A TRANSIT HUB

The most commonly cited instances of cooperation and strategic

alliances between TOC and terrorism exist in the realm of the

international drugs trade and, according to the US Drug Enforcement

Agency (DEA), the number of terrorist organisations involved in the global

drug trade has increased from 14 in 2003 to 18 in 2008 (Makarenko,

p132, 2004; Rollins, Wyler & Rosen, p2, 2010). As recently as 2005, the

UNODC deputy director said that Africa was “relatively insulated from the

7 ICG, 2005

16

global drugs traffic8”, but since then West Africa has emerged as a hub

for cocaine trafficking between Latin America and Europe with annual

flows in the region estimated at between 50 to 60 tonnes (BBC, 2009;

UNODC, 2010). In the face of competition from Mexican cartels and

market saturation in North America, and increased interdiction efforts by

law enforcement efforts on the maritime routes to the emerging European

market via the Caribbean and/or Spanish and Portuguese archipelagos,

Latin American cocaine smugglers are purportedly collaborating with Al

Qaeda affiliates in the Western Sahel who conspire to protect illicit

consignments destined for the European Union (EU) through the Sahara

(Pham, 2010; Rollins, Wyler & Rosen, 2010).

Cocaine Market: EU vs US

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

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1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Year

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US

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EU Market

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Fig 4.1.1

9

For centuries the Sahara has been criss-crossed by men carrying goods

and ideas; the resilience of these smuggling networks was emphasised

as they emerged as the economic lifeblood of the Saharan peoples

following protracted droughts in the 1970‟s and 80‟s that devastated

8 With the exception of Nigeria

9 UNODC, 2010c

17

livestock and the fragile economy (ICG, p1, 2005; Fellows, 2005). The

UNODC Executive Director explains, however, that drug trafficking

through this network has now taken on a „whole new dimension‟ evolving

from caravans to larger, more high-tech and faster deliveries described

elsewhere as the „drug trafficking equivalent of the Dakar Rally10‟ through

4,000km of inhospitable terrain controlled by rebels and Al-Qaeda

affiliates documented to have had links with organised crime, rogue

states and kleptocracies (Costa, 2009; Sarrion & Baumert, p4, 2008). It is

feared this increased narcotics footprint could embolden terrorists and

anti-government forces who profit through a strategic alliance or

parasitical relationship that enables them to fund continued operations,

purchase equipment and pay-foot soldiers (Costa, 2009).

Mali and Mauritania will provide the prism through which to analyse the

extent of the crime-terror nexus in the Sahel as Mali appears to be most

clearly targeted by external Islamic extremists, and Al Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is reported to have established training camps in

Mauritania and treat the area as a sanctuary (ICG, p2, 2005; al-Shishani,

2010; Fellows, 2005). In a theoretical exercise, military and government

counter-terrorism officials from a number of countries were asked “If you

were a terrorist leader, where would you locate your base?” (ICG, p16,

2005). Mali was the most popular choice and also considered to be at

greatest risk of terrorist activity within the Sahel by the diplomats and

security officials present (ICG, p16, 2005). The lack of „military challenge‟

10

Itself, cancelled in 2008 due to the terrorist threat in Mauritania (Dakar, 2010)

18

makes Mali especially vulnerable vis-à-vis other countries in the region

and is one of the reasons the United Kingdom has recently opened an

embassy in the country (FCO, 2010).

4.2 GEOGRAPHY: HIGHWAY 10

Figure 4.2.1

11 Principle Cocaine trafficking routes

Drug trafficking in West Africa has been classified as “one of the ten

stories the world should hear more about” (UNDPI, 2008); the geography

of the region can help to explain why it is becoming an increasingly

popular route. West Africa represents the shortest transatlantic crossing

from South America (along the tenth parallel north) which helps the

traffickers to minimise the transport costs of the general cargo and fishing

vessels and/ or aircraft that depart from Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname

and Brazil, and by taking the quickest route they also reduce the risk of

11

UNODC, 2010d

19

interdiction (Pham, 2010; SOCA, p30, 2009). The combination of myriad

coastal inlets and lagoons, and the absence of comprehensive radar

coverage help to screen deliveries that represent the first part of a huge

network encompassing rogue pilots, jungle rebels and stretching as far as

the desert Bedouins in the Sahel where this section shall focus (Pham,

2010; Logan, 2010). The sheer magnitude of this largely inhospitable

landscape cannot feasibly be patrolled by weak governments and, in

Mauritania, AQIM is exploiting the absence of governance over an area of

more than a million square kilometres, between Algeria and the other

Sahel countries, to centralise its operations and establish training camps

(Choate, 2007; al-Shishani, 2010).

4.3 PROFILE: MAIN PROTAGONISTS

AQIM is an organisation comprised, principally, of Algerians and Tuareg

rebels that operates in the vast borderless Sahel region of Africa

encompassing southern Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger (Fig 4.0.1)

(Saleh, 2010). AQIM succeeds the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication

et le Combat12 (GSPC), a militant Islamic group formed during Algeria‟s

civil war in the 1990‟s, which allied itself to Al Qaeda in 2007 (Saleh,

2010b, 2010). It is a small, agile group with between 100 and 200 men

but analysts caution that it has been gaining in notoriety and could

transform its capabilities if it capitalises on the trans-Sahara cocaine

pipeline (Gaynor & Diallo, 2010).

12

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

20

After encountering concerted resistance from the Algerian security forces,

AQIM appears to have shifted the focus of its operations to the Saharan

south where, over the past couple of years, its footprint and the frequency

of its attacks have become more pronounced, suggesting it is growing

and becoming a more effective organisation (Saleh, 2010; al-Shishani,

2010). The majority of its actions are predicated on common crime

including kidnappings for ransoms and the smuggling of illicit goods,

however it is understood that AQIM aspires to conduct a large attack to

prove its loyalty to Al Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad (Saleh, 2010b).

Whilst launching an attack on mainland Europe would be an ambitious

objective given the clamp down on the Algerian Diaspora13 in the

aftermath of the 7th July attack on London in 2005, an attack in West

Africa is feasible and would enable the militants to send a message that

“even where Islam is supposed to be moderate, we are here” (Saleh,

2010; ICG, p35, 2005). The victims of its high profile attacks include a

British tourist, an American aid worker, 4 French tourists, 15 Mauritanian

soldiers and 11 Algerian paramilitary police (Saleh, 2010b, Fellows, 2005;

Fletcher, 2008; BBC, 2005; Al Jazeera, 2010).

The South American narco-cartels are predominantly Colombian

organised crime groups associated with the Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia14 (FARC) (SOCA, p30, 2009; Bronstein,

2010). FARC‟s intimate involvement in the drugs trade has, arguably,

corrupted its impassion and ideology transforming it from a genuine

13

Who had, until this point, enjoyed a prominent role in fraud, money laundering, credit card fraud and were associated with mosques in North London in particular (MPS, 2010) 14

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

21

revolutionary movement into little more than a branch of organised crime

(Wilkinson, p15,2006; Harmon, p54, 2000). “Drugs barons and

revolutionary leaders do not walk on the same path to success” but it

would seem that, in this context, they share the same metric for success:

the pecuniary reward derived from entrepreneurial expansion into

countries like Mali that have emerged as „industrial depots‟ for cocaine

and facilitate access to the lucrative European market (Dishman, p45,

2001; Gaynor & Diallo, 2010).

4.4 ANALYSIS: AQIM COURTS FARC

In December 2009 three Malinese men

appeared before a New York

courthouse charged with „conspiracy to

commit acts of narco-terrorism‟ and

„conspiracy to provide material support

to a foreign terrorist organisation‟

(Pham, 2010). They were charged as a result of a sting operation

executed by the DEA in which a French speaking Confidential Source

(CS) posed as a Lebanese radical committed to “opposing the interests of

the United States, Israel, and… the west and its ideals” (Logan, 2010).

The CS convinced the trio that he was acting as an interlocutor for FARC

who needed assistance in moving consignments of narcotics across the

Sahara and was, subsequently, given assurances that “al-Qaeda would

protect the FARC‟s cocaine shipment from Mali through North Africa and

into Morocco en route to Spain” (Logan, 2010; Pham, 2010). Whilst the

22

trio, ostensibly representing AQIM, were

committed to the same anti-American cause

as the CS, the $10,000 they charged per

kilogram of cocaine15 probably held an equal

allure and helped influence their decision to accept the offer (Pham,

2010). In doing so, they were liable to be charged with supporting three

groups formally designated by the US State Department as „Foreign

Terrorist Organisation‟ (FTO): al-Qaeda, AQIM and FARC in a case

which uncovered, for the first time, a

„solid connection‟ between Latin

American drug smugglers and a well

established terrorist organisation

(Pham, 2010; Logan, 2010).

4.5 CRIMINAL FINANCE: DRUGS AS FUNDING

Although terrorist organisations derive funds from an array of criminal

activities, including robberies, extortion, kidnapping, arms trading, fraud

and people trafficking, drug trafficking is at the top of the hierarchy and is

particularly relevant in this case as AQIM is unable to cultivate cocaine in-

house (Hutchinson & O‟Malley, p1097, 2007; Makarenko, p135, 2004).

The potential rewards from narcotics are powerful enough to assuage

intransigent attitudes towards strategic alliances as happened in Lebanon

when war between ideologies stopped at the edge of the poppy field

(Bovenkerk, & Chakra, p12, 2004). As the UN notes “the world over, drug

15

For shipments between 500 and 1,000kg

23

money eventually trumps ideology” (UNODC, pv, 2009c). In the Western

Sahel there is a compelling economic rationale for such cooperation as

narco-cartels coordinate the delivery of the cocaine but AQIM controls the

territory through which these consignments must transit to reach the EU

(Cilluffo, 2000). This synergistic relationship whereby AQIM effectively

safeguards the cocaine pipeline through the Sahara enables funds

garnered from the global $320bn drug trade to be realised by both groups

for the continued funding of their organisations and operations (Costa,

2010; Cilluffo, 2000).

4.6 PRECIPTANT FACTORS AND DESTABILISING EFFECTS

The limited evidence of significant cooperation between TOC and

terrorism tends to be isolated to specific geographic regions in which

three themes emerge: poverty, a weak state and corruption (Makarenko,

p132, 2004; Sarrion & Baumert, p2, 2008). Latin American narco-cartels

are reacting to market forces and pursuing entrepreneurial expansion into

permissive new business opportunities such that they could be described

as Fast Moving Criminal Groups16 (Rollins, Wyler & Rosen, p2, 2010).

Establishing an industrial depot in Mali enables them to take advantage of

cheaper labour, political instability, rudimentary law enforcement,

endemic corruption, porous borders, widespread poverty and closer

proximity to the EU in what surely constitutes a „paradise‟ for organised

crime (Doward, 2009; ICG, p31, 2005). This environment is also sought

by AQIM as it helps to corrode the legitimacy of the government and

16

Given the parallels to conventional Fast Moving Consumer Goods companies

24

facilitates the recruitment, or at least acquiescence, of the proletariat that

it depends on in order to operate in such hostile terrain (Makarenko,

p132, 2004; Dishman, p5, 2001).

This perfect storm can lead to a „Dutch disease‟ as the economic income

derived from cocaine exports dwarfs indigenous commodities (Fig 4.8.2),

such as cashew nuts, and workers find themselves asking “why bother

exporting nuts when income prospects appear far greater in providing

security to cocaine barons?” (UNODC, p41, 2008). The influx of revenue

can also appreciate the currency making the remaining exports more

expensive, less competitive and, therefore, create a stronger incentive for

embracing narcotics (UNODC, p45, 2008). This can compound a sense

of frustration amongst those impoverished individuals and/or members of

the security forces who are not capitalising on the boom; precisely the

backdrop against which AQIM recruits (ICG, p14, 2005). As AQIM grows

alongside increased revenue derived from cocaine, the ensuing violence

and conflict amongst those who embrace its ideology has the potential to

make past wars pale in comparison, even without considering the

likelihood that the cartels will establish an internal consumption market

raising the spectre of child soldiers in drug-induced hazes (Farah, 2009).

4.7 CONVERGENCE: A THREAT TO SECURITY

Weak or transitional states which facilitate the expansion of an

environment conducive to convergent or hybrid operations are dubbed

„black holes‟ (Dishman, p1106, 2001; Makarenko, p138, 2004). These

25

represent a safe haven that emerges from a vicious cycle predicated

upon vulnerability and instability where the effects of terrorism are

compounded by the arrival of TOC which deepens vulnerability and

creates „shell states‟; sovereign in name but hollowed out by TOC and

terrorist groups in collusion with corrupt officials and the security services

leaving an epicentre of lawlessness and instability through a process of

„gangsterization‟ that threatens the wider region (Costa, 2010; UNODC,

p1, 2008; Hutchinson & O‟Malley, p1104, 2007). In this vacuum, TOC and

terrorist groups are equally motivated by the “accumulation of wealth,

control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and

legitimacy” which, together, constitute „useable‟ power to allocate values

and resources in society (Manwaring, p7, 1993).

To consider drug trafficking as a threat to national security is not just

hyperbole; West Africa is one of the few regions in which it is conceivable

that weak governments are vulnerable to coup d’états from myriad

actors17 (UNODC, p35, 2008). This „cancer‟ is far advanced in a host

body that is weak and unable to fight back without a great deal of help

and structural change; the security implications are very real (Farah,

2009; UNODC, p35, 2008). Indeed, parts of Northern Mali are already a

no-go area for law enforcement agencies: “If you go there with feeble

means… you don‟t come back” (Gaynor & Diallo, 2010). Three new

bases and 9,000 extra personnel for the Military and Police are now

tasked with restricting movement and supplies along this „main supply

17

Since Independence West Africa has experienced 68 coups and attempted coups (UNODC, p235, 2010c)

26

route‟ (Home Office, 2010). In Mauritania, the government turned to

repression in order to cling to power which constituted one of the worst

internal situations in the Sahel and risked falling victim to a ju-jitsu

strategy18, but a proactive strategy, the introduction of 45 border-posts

and a willingness to pursue terrorists across state boundaries is now

starting to tackle the threat (ICG, p2, 2005; Homes Office, 2010).

4.8 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Figure 4.8.1

19 Cocaine seizures

18

Terrorists seek to provoke a heavy-handed military reaction which galvanises popular support for its cause and helps to embolden the organisation, allowing it to conduct a more effective campaign. 19

UNODC, 2010d

27

The potential for the cocaine pipeline to fuel conflict is manifest; a line of

cocaine snorted in Europe buys 100 rounds of AK-47 ammunition in West

Africa which, multiplied by 850 tonnes a year, constitutes a frightening

prospect greater than David versus Goliath (Farah, 2009; Costa, 2010). It

is emerging as the region‟s most lucrative commodity and generates

profits that are several orders of magnitude larger than the diamond trade

which, itself, is associated with conflict (Farah, 2009).

Figure 4.8.220

West African export commodities

20

UNODC, 2008

28

Seizures: West Africa vs EU

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Year

EU

Se

izu

res

/ M

etr

ic

ton

ne

s

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

We

st

Afr

ic S

eiz

ure

s/ K

g

EU

West Africa

Figure 4.8.3

21

Since 2003, the number of seizures in West Africa has grown

exponentially vis-à-vis seizures in the EU representing its increasing

prominence in cocaine trafficking (Fig. 4.8.3).

Fig 4.8.422

Fig. 4.8.4 charts the indexed growth of seizures in Venezuela and West

Africa as a proxy for the volume of trafficking across the Atlantic and

21

UNODC, 2008, 2010c 22

UNODC, 2008

Seizures: West Africa vs. Venezuela

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

Ind

ex

ed

gro

wth

West Africa

Venezuela

29

shows that in 200323 there appears to have been a strategic shift in

trafficking routes24 away from the Caribbean and Azores/Canary Islands

towards West Africa.

Seizures: Africa vs West Africa

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008Year

Se

izu

res

/ K

g

Africa

West Africa

Fig 4.8.5

25

Fig. 4.8.5 shows how this growth in cocaine seizures in West Africa

constitutes an increasing proportion of seizures in Africa as a whole

which reflects the growing importance of the region as a transit hub.

The crime-terror nexus suggests that terrorist groups will benefit from the

proceeds of increased cocaine trafficking into West Africa which may

manifest itself though increased levels of terrorist violence. In order to test

this hypothesis, and determine if there was any commensurate increase,

the metric used for terrorist violence was the annual number of fatalities

23

A year before the UK recognised the permissive effects on governance and drugs flow, and the increased presence of Venezuelan, Colombian, Mexican and Dutch nationals in the region (Home Office, 2010). 24

See Fig. 2.1.1 25

UNODC, 2007, 2008

30

attributed to AQIM26 which was then compared to the seizures of cocaine

in West Africa as a proxy for the level of TOC.

Lethality of Terrorist Attacks vs Seizures in West Africa

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

Year

Fa

taliti

es

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Se

izu

res

/ K

g

AQIM / GSPC

Seizures

Fig 4.8.6

27

Fig 4.8.6 shows that increases in the lethality of AQIM attacks are

followed by increases in the volume of seizures. Whilst this may seem

paradoxical, as the hypothesis is that AQIM attacks should increase with

income derived from increased trafficking, the seizures are a lagging

indicator of the volume of trafficking as it takes law enforcement agencies

a period of time to uncover a trend and plan counter-narcotics operations

accordingly28.

26

And its predecessor the GSPC 27

GTD, 2010; UNODC, 2008 28

The UNODC West African head describes the response as reactive not proactive (BBC, 2007)

31

W. Africa Seizures vs AQIM Lethality

y = 0.0211x + 18.076

0

50

100

150

200

0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000

Seizures / Kg

Fa

taliti

es

Fig 4.8.7

29

The correlation coefficient between the variables is 0.81 suggesting a

strong positive correlation and a direct relationship that can be seen in

Fig 4.8.7. Assuming that „seizures‟ are a reliable proxy for AQIM

involvement in criminal activity, the average „cost‟ per lethal strike

equates to the proceeds of 47.4kg of cocaine.

4.9 ANALYSIS: CON AIR

In an attempt to mitigate increased

maritime interdiction efforts, Latin

American cartels have established

their own narco-aviation network

between Venezuela and West

African countries, including

Mauritania and Mali, that acts as an air bridge and transports contraband

across the Atlantic every day (Gaynor & Diallo, 2010). Since 2006, at

least 10 aircraft within this network, including executive Gulfstream II jets

29

GTD, 2010; UNODC, 2008

32

and Boeing cargo planes, have been identified by US and West African

officials (grâce à serendipitous finds) who caution the fleet is likely to be

significantly larger (Gaynor & Diallo, 2010).

One such find that came as a „complete

surprise‟ was the discovery of a burnt out

Boeing 727 Cargo plane in December 2009

that had been ditched in Mali‟s desert sands (BBC, 2009b). It is believed

the plane experienced technical difficulties taking off, after unloading its

cargo of up to 10 tonnes at a remote airfield, and was deliberately set

alight after crash-landing (BBC, 2009b). Despite such drastic measures,

traces of cocaine remained when officials examined the wreckage

providing valuable evidence of the direct link between the narco-airline

and AQIM which controls the smuggling routes in the area (AP, 2009;

Doward, 2009). So grave are the potential

consequences that, in 2008, an official

from the US State Department sent a note

to his superiors describing the emerging

trend as “the most significant development

in the criminal exploitation of aircraft since 9/11” (Gaynor & Diallo, 2010).

33

5 DELTA FORCE? EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN MEND AND CRIMINAL SYNDICATES OPERATING IN THE NIGER DELTA

FIGURE 5.0.130

Map of Niger Delta

5.1 NIGERIA: CRUDEPOLITIK?

Nigeria is Africa‟s most populous country, with a population of 148 million,

and its rich endowment of natural resources, especially oil and gas, have

equipped it with a robust macroeconomic platform that should have

transformed it into the continent‟s economic powerhouse; an achievement

it has yet to realise (ICG, 2009). It is comprised of a mosaic of 250

distinct ethnic groups that are broadly aligned with a Muslim north and a

Christian south, in which the resource rich Niger Delta is located (Duffield,

2010; BBC, 2010). The Nigerian government administers the revenue

from the exploitation and export of the resources in the Delta which

accounts for 95% of the country‟s foreign exchange earnings and 80% of

30

ICG, 2006

34

budgetary revenues (UNODC, p20, 2009; Marquardt, 2007). There is

resentment amongst the Ijaw31 that the substantial oil revenues bypass

the Delta‟s pervasive poverty and disappear to federal, as opposed to

regional, government (Marquardt, 2007; Lubeck, Watts, & Lipschutz, p8,

2007). Oil has brought neither prosperity nor tranquillity to the Delta which

has been mired in conflict since its reserves were discovered over 30

years ago- when a sense of disenfranchisement and exclusion first

emerged (Lubeck, Watts, & Lipschutz, p6, 2007).

As the proportion of a country‟s GDP accounted for by oil increases, a raft

of socioeconomic metrics, such as economic inequality and corruption,

increase by equal measures in a phenomenon termed the „curse‟ of oil;

something with which, uniquely, “the IMF, economist Jeffery Sachs, the

human rights community, the Catholic church and millions or urban poor

are in full agreement” (Lubeck, Watts, & Lipschutz, p8, 2007). From 2003

there was an upsurge in the level of terrorist violence in the Delta which

had also degenerated into large scale criminal activities including

piracy32, hostage-taking and ransom collection, and was proliferating

outside the confines of the region (Giroux, 2010; Abati, 2009). This

section investigates whether the militants‟ operations in such a „mono-

commodity economy‟, initially an instrument of ideological struggle and

directed at the Multinational oil companies and the state, have evolved,

through alliance with criminals or by adopting criminal activity in-house, to

31

The largest ethnic group in the Delta and the country‟s fourth largest at 14 million 32

Piracy attacks on vessels off the Nigerian coast are going unreported and could exceed those that have taken place off the coast of Somalia (IMB, 2010)

35

become a major source of livelihood that transcends the divide between

„terrorist‟ and „criminal‟ organisations (Ikelegbe, p31, 2006; Abati, 2009).

5.2 GEOGRAPHY

The Niger Delta is the world‟s third largest wetland with 22 major

estuaries covering 70,000km² of dense mangrove swamps and

waterways interlinked in an intricate network rich in wetlands, biodiversity,

and oil and gas reserves that is bounded by the border with Cameroon

and the Atlantic Ocean (Ogundiya, p33, 2009; Marquardt, 2007). Given

this remote and impenetrable environment, it is not surprising that this

“Scotland sized muse of creeks and rivers transacted by pipelines is an

ideal place for criminal syndicates [or militants] to steal crude oil and

other hydrocarbon liquids” (ICG, p8, 2006).

5.3 PROFILE: MAIN PROTAGONISTS

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was

established in 2005 and has emerged as the largest umbrella group for

the myriad militant organisations operating in the region (Marquardt,

2007; Chau, 2009). There are few coherent groups and in-fighting is

common; MEND appears to be the most cohesive and politically astute

but even it has been labelled a „dementia inflicted cabal‟ by opponents

(Walker, 2008; ICG, p25, 2006; Terrorism Monitor, 2010). A MEND

commander explains the organisation‟s structure is similar to a hydra33 as

33

A mythological Greek serpent which grew two heads for each one cut off

36

it holds influence over a number of groups34, but its executive leadership

is reluctant to unite too closely with them for fear of infiltration and/or

decapitation: “Our strength is in our disunity” (ICG, p7, 2006). This

networked structure belies the true size of the organisation, but estimates

range from the high hundreds to the low thousands; the vast majority of

which are Catholic Christians within the Ijaw community (ICG, p1, 2006b;

Marquardt, 2007).

MEND‟s arsenal of weapons includes small arms, rocket launchers and

explosives and it is used, in conjunction with its flotilla of speed boats, to

achieve maximum surprise in conflicts with ill-prepared security forces

guarding installations in which it usually has the upper hand (Marquardt,

2007). The sophistication of its attacks against the federal government

and oil multinationals have evolved such that it now has the confidence to

target military barracks and petroleum tankers (Obi, p95, 2006; IGC, p6,

2006).

MEND is a reaction against inequity and the perceived marginalisation of

the Niger Delta by the majority Ijaw; the World Bank states that 80% of oil

monies are accrued by 1% of the population, and 70% of private wealth is

held abroad, whilst 75% of the population live on less than $1 per day

(Ogundiya, p35, 2009; Lubeck, Watts, & Lipschutz, p8, 2007). This quest

for a more equitable distribution of oil revenues, in addition to demands

for high-profile militants to be released, certainly appears to constitute

34

Such as the Martyrs Brigade and the militant Coalition for Militant Action (COMA)

37

“organized violence that induces fear for political ends” and the campaign

against the energy sector shows no sign of abating (Chau, 2009). In 2006

MEND set itself a target of reducing the output of Nigerian oil by 30%

through a „single crushing blow‟ that departs from the small-scale attacks

synonymous with the militants (Lubeck, Watts, & Lipschutz, p9, 2007;

ICG, p25, 2006). It launched an insurgency designed to sabotage the

energy industry but, over time, the violence used in their campaign

against the exploitative, polluting energy companies and the repressive

tendencies of the state reached „terror dimensions‟ (ICG, 2009;

Ogundiya, p31, 2009). The militants can be described as domestic

„terrorists‟ rather than criminals as they employ terrorist violence

(bombings/incendiary attacks, kidnapping, hostage-taking etc) to

communicate their malcontent with the current fiscal federalism that

creates an atmosphere of „perpetual fear‟ for the people of the Delta

(Ogundiya, 2009). In effect, MEND can be perceived as a „local problem‟

centred around power politics rather than a declared ideological

movement that seeks to expand beyond its borders; the „ransoming of

inanimate objects‟ and attacks on non-critical infrastructure are of greater

concern to the international community in the context of compromising

energy security rather than the threat of terrorism per se (Home Office,

2010).

38

5.4 ANALYSIS: OIL BUNKERING

“By 0500, in the darkness before dawn, the ships uncouple from the barges and move out in a convoy to sea to rendezvous with a tanker which will spirit away the stolen oil, making it disappear into another cargo, bound for sale on the world market” (Walker, 2008).

Nigeria has been producing approximately two million barrels of oil per

day (BPD) since the late 1990‟s representing 4% of total crude oil

production and making it the world‟s eighth largest oil producer, but

despite considerable investment, increased

productivity and output have been hampered by

the theft and smuggling of this oil, termed

„bunkering‟ (UNODC, p20, 2009b). Locals have

been involved in oil-bunkering for a considerable

period, but recently the level of organisation and

scale of this crime seems to have evolved (Chau, 2009). In 2008 there

were 606 oil and gas fields, 5,284 wells, 7,000km of pipelines, ten export

terminals and 275 flow stations within the Delta; an infrastructure that

even a developed country would

struggle to protect in such an

inaccessible environ and one that

renders finding an isolated stretch of

pipeline to tap relatively easy

39

(UNODC, p20, 2009b). The theft appears to take place under the cover of

darkness, through sophisticated „hot tapping‟35 or rudimentary „cold

tapping‟36 and accounts for around 150,000 BPD with a value of $3

million destined, principally, for China, North Korea, Israel and South

Africa (UNODC, 2009b).

5.5 CRIMINAL FINANCE: OIL AS FUNDING

The entire „edifice of corruption, violence and sabotage‟ in the Niger Delta

is funded through the theft of oil by myriad criminal syndicates acting in

isolation or as part of a larger militant organisation such as MEND

(Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, p9, 2007). The militant groups spend

considerable time and resources in promulgating their political message

through terrorist violence in order to achieve their main objective of

receiving an increased proportion of oil revenues, however, by their own

admission this is financed through the criminal theft of oil: the leader of

the NDPVF37 explains his organisation garners funds through the sale of

crude oil which are then used to procure arms, but says that this is a

legitimate action as they are only taking back what was stolen from the

Ijaw (UNODC, p23, 2009b). Indeed, the theft of oil is considered a

defensible means of providing income for aggrieved and impoverished

communities by several militant warlords who have admitted involvement

in what constitutes a „key source‟ of funds (ICG, p8, 2006).

35

Creating a branch connection to a pipeline in which the oil is flowing under pressure 36

Explosives are used to put the pipeline out of action while a spur pipeline is attached 37

The Niger Delta People‟s Volunteer Force

40

Some argue that bunkering has evolved into a transnational criminal

enterprise masquerading under the auspices of the violent political

struggles, but the Joint Task Force38 (JTF) commander affirms: “There is

a connection between militancy and illegal bunkering. It is their main

source of sustenance. They use the proceeds from the sale of stolen

petroleum… to procure arms and take care of their needs” (UNODC,

p3/23, 2009b). At a price of $20 per barrel, 150,000 BPD would generate

$3 million which is sufficient to buy political influence, procure quality

weapons, and sustain a militant group of around 1,500 youths for two

months (UNODC, p26, 2009b; Shell, 2003). Giroux (2010) confirms that

“in a region where the lines between political grievances and criminality

have become blurred, groups are increasingly being formed around

lucrative oil theft businesses manifested through on and off-shore

operations”.

It is ironic that the theft of oil provides militants with the means to attack

the oil industry: the NDPVF siphoned off oil from exposed pipelines to

raise sufficient income to lay siege to international oil facilities and kidnap

oil workers in order to extract concessions from the oil companies and the

federal government (Marquardt, 2007). Perhaps the realisation that they

were biting the hand that fed them led to the entrepreneurial initiative of

charging international oil companies discreet payments for „protection‟

and „surveillance‟ of pipelines and other infrastructure (ICG, pi, 2006b).

38

Set up to mount operations against militants in the Delta in response to a concerted MEND campaign (Chau, 2009)

41

5.6 PRECIPIENT FACTORS AND DESTABILISING EFFECTS

Nigeria‟s nascent democracy emerged from three decades of military

dictatorship and remains handicapped by political malpractice, deep

economic contradictions and social inequality measured through high

unemployment, widespread poverty and dismal human welfare conditions

(ICG, 2009). Inequality within the Delta is compounded by a history of

injustice, militarisation, the globalised political economy of oil predation,

crumbling social infrastructure, and long years of administrative neglect

which have fostered perceived and real marginalisation and a sense of

grievance (ICG, 2009; Obi, p97, 2006; Marquardt, 2007). Whilst the

region is endowed with extensive natural resource reserves, their value is

not realised by local communities who live in squalor and abject poverty

and suffer most from the nonchalant attitude of energy companies

towards environmental safety in what constitutes a „reservoir of anger‟

(UN, p3, 2009b; ICG, p17, 2006b). This sense of disenfranchisement,

predicated on a potent cocktail of poverty, crime and corruption is fuelling

the militant threat and the tinderbox that is the Niger Delta appears more

combustible than ever (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, 2007; ICG, pi, 2006b).

Although the militants‟ demands for devolved resource control may be

legitimate, attacks on energy infrastructure and/or oil bunkering are

detrimental to the Nigerian public as mineral wealth remains the property

of the State; the combination of underproduction and forfeited tax

revenues equates to approximately one third of the national budget

(UNODC, 2009b). The economies of such petro-states can be termed

„paradoxes of plenty‟ highlighted by the orgies of consumption by an elite

42

oligarchy on the one hand and the poor economic performance, toxic

environmental pollution and growing inequality on the other (Lubeck,

Watts & Lipschutz, p3, 2007).

The „derivation formula‟ is supposed to ensure that 13% of oil revenues

remain in the state of origin, but the militants claim this is not sufficient or

indeed being adhered to (Marquardt, 2007). Frustrated by the federal

government‟s intransigence, the militants seek “total control of the

resources of the Niger Delta by the people of the Niger Delta and for the

development of the Niger Delta” (Ogundiya, p32, 2009). Conveniently,

this provides a useful illustration of what Makarenko (p135, 2004)

classifies as the first component of the „convergence thesis‟ whereby

criminal groups display political motivations and seek to use terrorism to

establish a monopoly over lucrative economic sectors, such as natural

resources, on the understanding that economic strength is a prerequisite

for political power in the free market economy. The second component

refers to terrorist groups that maintain their political rhetoric as a façade in

order to garner support for their continued criminal operations although, in

reality, they have progressed along the crime-terror continuum into a

different type of organisation (Makarenko, p136, 2004). Analysts should

be cognizant of this transformation from political to criminal orientation as

disillusioned individuals capitalise on the organisation‟s largesse to

pursue their criminal agenda under a „bogus‟ political banner thus

creating a criminal undercurrent that has the potential to impact on the

aims and motivations of the executive leadership (Dishman, p12, 2001).

43

5.7 CONVERGENCE: A THREAT TO SECURITY The expansion of the Delta‟s militant groups into criminal activities

suggests a degree of interconnectedness between disparate criminal and

terrorist threats in what appear to be „hybrid‟ criminal-terrorist networks

(Luna, 2008). Some groups involved in the theft of oil from the region

have been compared to the drug cartels in South America that once

„impassioned and ideological‟, have „lost their revolutionary purity‟ and

made the transition from terrorists to criminal cartels (ICG, p8, 2006;

Harmon, pxvii, 2000). However, in spite of the equivalent value of the

cocaine and oil flows in the region (approximately $1 billion per annum), it

is, arguably, the smuggling of the licit commodity that poses the greatest

threat to the rule of law in the region as the profits go directly to militants,

locally based strongmen and corrupt officials that have the potential to

use this leverage to undermine the rule of law, further compounding the

region‟s instability (UNODC, 2009b). As the cocaine pipeline only transits

the region, the bulk of the revenue is realised elsewhere and only a

minimal payment is received for the safe passage of consignments

through the region, however oil is sourced in Nigeria which reduces costs

and increases profitability vis-à-vis other commodity flows that incur

higher costs, so the bulk of the money flow is inwards (UNODC, 2009b).

44

5.8 STATISITICAL ANALYSIS

Figure 5.8.1

39

If militants in the Delta are conducting oil-bunkering in order to generate

income for their terrorist operations, they should, ceteris paribus, have

greater income when the oil price is higher, which would yield the

capacity to mount a more belligerent campaign. Fig 5.8.1 charts this

relationship, between the average oil price and the number of recorded

terrorist incidents in Nigeria, and shows they are broadly correlated; as

the oil price increases, so too does the incidence of terrorism. There is,

however, another metric which has an even stronger degree of

association with the incidence of terrorism.

39

OPEC, 2010; GTD, 2010

Average Oil Price vs Incidence of Terrorism

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Year

Inc

ide

nc

e &

Av

. P

ric

e/ $

Price

Incidence

45

Figure 5.8.240

Fig. 5.8.2 shows the opportunity cost of underproduction per annum

(total) through oil-bunkering (stolen) and through oil that stays in the

ground because of security threats to facilities and staff (shut-in); a

measure that incorporates both price and volume (Asuni, p2, 2009).

40

Asuni, 2009

Value of Lost Oil Production

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Year

Va

lue

p.a

. /$

bn

Stolen

Shut-in

Total

46

Figure 5.8.341

Fig. 5.8.3 compares this total value with the incidence of terrorism and

shows that there is a very strong correlation between the total value of

lost oil production and incidence of terrorism. Whilst such correlation is

necessary to confirm causation, it is not sufficient by itself, but

nonetheless would be consistent with a hypothesis that terrorists are

involved with criminal activity in the Delta. The correlation coefficient of

0.94 suggests a stronger correlation with the incidence of terrorism than

does the oil price alone (0.91).

41

Asuni, 2009; GTD, 2009

Total Value of Lost Production vs Incidence of Terrorism

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Year

Ind

ex

ed

Gro

wth

(2

00

0=

10

0)

Value

Incidence

47

Figure 5.8.442

The direct nature of the relationship between the value of lost production

and the incidence of terrorism is charted in Fig. 5.8.4 which confirms a

very strong, positive and direct relationship between the two variables. As

the value of lost production increases, so too does the incidence of

terrorist violence. If the value of lost production could be taken as a proxy

for the level of militant involvement in criminal activity (through oil-

bunkering or through sabotage leading to facilities being shut down) the

average value of lost production per attack would be $0.35bn.

5.9 ANALYSIS: KIDNAPPING AND RANSOM

“The kidnapper is perpetually on the prowl. He does not wear a uniform, he can easily blend into the crowd, he has no distinguishing features, and he can strike anywhere and whenever he chooses. Every time he does, he exposes the soft underbelly of the Nigerian State and its vulnerability” (Abati, 2009).

42

Asuni, 2009; GTD, 2009

Total Value of Lost Production vs Incidence of Terrorism

y = 2.8229x - 12.215

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0 10 20 30 40

Value / $bn

Inc

ide

nc

e

48

At a time when the Nigerian government is trying to

re-brand the country‟s image, this particular brand

of terrorism is becoming more frequent and

gradually turning the country into a kidnapper‟s den

and a high risk decision for international

investment (Abati, 2009). The militants sought to

reiterate their demands for a renegotiation of Nigeria and the Delta‟s role

in it, but its commercial value quickly became apparent; between 2006

and 2008 it bolstered finances by over $100 million43 (Chau, 2009;

Okocha & Ikokwu, 2009). Whilst the targets were initially foreign oil

workers, the militants increased the scope of their targets and the spectre

of kidnapping now stalks everyone who can pay from the children and

relatives of high-profile political figures to members of the business elite:

“Nigerians are no longer safe in their own land” (Marquardt, 2007; Abati,

2009). Kidnap and hostage-taking has emerged as a predominant threat;

no day passes without a reported incident as well armed militants raid

both on and off-shore facilities to kidnap workers and executives

(Ogundiya, 2009; Marquardt, 2007; Okocha & Ikokwu, 2009). The

government‟s policy of complying with

demands helps to ensure the safe

release of the majority of victims44 but

at the expense of promoting a „culture

of extortion‟ as militants are assured of

a negotiated ransom settlement (Abati, 2009; Marquardt, 2007).

43

According to the Inspector General of Police 44

Between 2006 and 2008: 126 victims were released unharmed, 1 had four fingers chopped off and 1 was killed

49

6 COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS: COMMON FACTORS

6.1 THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The language used to describe the impact of drug traffickers in the Sahel

and militants in the Delta emphasises the very real nature of the national

security threat, considered analogous to a „cancer… far advanced in a

host body that is weak and unable to fight back‟ and a „malignant growth

spreading violently across the Delta‟ (Farah, 2009; ICG, p26, 2006b).

Given the number of coups and attempted coups in West Africa, the

region is especially vulnerable to the deleterious effects of the nexus as

weak governance and ineffective law enforcement and judicial systems

present a neutral territory for TOC and militants to meet and form

alliances that would often not be possible under other circumstances

(Farah, 2009).

The case studies confirm a correlation between AQIM (and GSPC)

activity and the value of cocaine seizures with a marked increase from

2003, and between militant‟s activity in the Delta and the value of lost oil

production with a marked increase from 2005. Globalisation facilitates the

ability of terrorism and TOC to cooperate, so it is conceivable that the

proliferation of cheap mobile phone communication and internet access

has taken longer than expected to reach TOC/ terrorist groups in the

region, and it was not until this time that the associations evolved.

50

6.2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

A networked structure has emerged as a hallmark of „new terrorism‟ as

groups seek to mitigate the increased threat from law enforcement

agencies in the post 9/11 environment; MEND is an example of such a

group that the case study showed as having the „cohesive but disparate‟

networked structure more commonly associated with franchises of Al

Qaeda such as AQIM (Home Office, 2010). AQIM and MEND are both

relatively young groups, having been formed in 2007 and 2005

respectively, so they have both been able to assimilate the experiences

of other organisations45 to give them the best possible chance of

outlasting the average two year terrorist lifecycle (Rapoport, p11, 2003).

There are similarities too as far as the organisational structure of the TOC

actors are concerned; both the narco-cartels and oil barons operate on

the global market with strong demand in Europe, China, North Korea,

Israel and South Africa (UNODC, 2010; UNODC, 2009b). Whilst the

narco-cartels in this study are treated principally as criminal

organisations, they are synonymous with elements of the terrorist group

FARC. Conversely, this paper has shown how the terrorist group MEND

is involved in the criminal activity of oil-bunkering and sabotage. Such

groups, with the ability to embrace both sides of the crime-terror

continuum, are indicative of organisations that have become

„conglomerates of causes‟, as opposed to a de facto terrorist or criminal

organisation, whose actions echo Bovenkerk and Chakra‟s (2004)

45

Such as the NDPVF (MEND‟s predecessor) whose leader was captured by authorities (Marquardt, 2007)

51

conclusion that, over the long term, any convergence is away from the

political objectives of terrorism to the individualist pecuniary advantages

of organised crime (Makerenko, p136, 2004).

6.3 POLITICAL FACTORS

Mali, Mauritania and Nigeria were all European colonies that gained their

independence from France and Britain in 1960, and whose current form

of governance is, respectively, a republic, a military Junta and a federal

republic (CIA, 2010). It should, however, be noted that Nigeria was

governed as a military dictatorship for three decades at the end of the

20th century and hence remains a nascent democracy (ICG, 2009).

Figure 6.3.146

Overall Index of African Governance

The weak governance evident within these countries (Fig 6.3.1) is one

tenet of a political landscape that ensures law enforcement efforts and

judicial enforcement are ill-equipped to tackle new challenges, such as

46

UNODC, 2007b

52

narcotics-trafficking or industrial scale oil-theft, assuming that they even

have a nationwide presence (Pham, 2010). Perhaps this realisation is

why there has been increased international cooperation both regionally,

through the Joint Military Command Centre to fund direct trans-Sahel

operations against AQIM, and elsewhere, for instance the US Navy‟s

assistance in helping Nigeria to tackle piracy and off-shore attacks on oil

platforms through training and specialist boats, or the French military‟s

proposed construction of runways in Mali (Saleh, 2010b; Marquardt,

2007; Terrorism Monitor, 2010). The criminal aspect of the nexus is also

benefiting from international expertise; Britain‟s Serious and Organised

Crime Agency (SOCA) is helping to increase law enforcement capacity

across the region by providing expertise and forensic support which

recently helped Gambian authorities seize 2,100kg of cocaine worth in

excess of £100 million at UK wholesale prices; a record haul for West

Africa (SOCA, 2010). In 2006 one of its liaison officers in Sierra Leone

intercepted a 600kg cocaine package en route from Venezuela as part of

„Operation Camport‟ which signalled one of the „first signs of the problem‟

(Home Office, 2010). Similarly, in Nigeria, the absence of coherent

government programs to tackle the scourge of oil-bunkering has forced

the major multinational oil companies to launch their own community

development programs through the Niger Delta Development

Commission (NDDC) with the objective of acting as a catalyst for

economic and social development in the region (Dept. of State, 2010).

53

6.4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

“There are no jobs. Injustice is obvious, corruption everywhere. What do you do? Leave the country or turn to violence?” (BBC, 2005b)

This vignette was articulated by a journalist in Mali but succinctly

summarises some of the preconditions common to both the Western

Sahel and Nigeria which enable the evolution of the crime-terror nexus.

Sarrion and Baumert (p2, 2008) attribute the nexus to a weak state,

poverty and corruption, and note that it is confined to certain geographical

areas; having already examined the weak governance, this section will

focus on the remaining two factors.

Unemployment is indicative of poor economic growth and a lack of

economic development that manifests itself in the widespread poverty

prevalent in both case studies, but the role of poverty can be expanded.

When people who earn $100 a month see others earn $11,000 protecting

a single cocaine consignment (as in Mali) or kidnappers earn a $200,000

ransom per target (as in Nigeria) it is not just absolute poverty, but the

relative poverty which is also important as this encompasses economic

inequality (Gaynor & Diallo, 2010; Okocha & Ikokwu, 2009). Over the

period 1992-1997, all three countries had a similar level of inequality as

measured by the UN Gini Index47.

The UNODC notes that “the unlimited budget of foreign drug dealers

makes it very easy to corrupt people”, but in Nigeria too corruption is

47

The Gini index lies between 0 and 100. A value of 0 represents absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality: Nigeria = 42.9; Mali = 39; Mauritania = 39 (UN, 2009)

54

prevalent with the UNODC noting that the conflict and corruption

associated with oil-bunkering pose a bigger threat than the direct losses

(Skelton, 2010; UNODC, p20, 2009b). Transparency International

compiles an annual „Corruption Perceptions Index‟ which enables rank

comparison of different nations and the three countries find themselves in

a similar position once more48 although it is Nigeria that appears to have

the least control over the problem (Fig. 6.4.1). The International Director

of SOCA explains that corruption makes it hard to find people to trust: to

become a „trusted partner‟ that has the capacity to deliver meaningfully

against issues, individuals and organisations progress through four prior

stages- information sharing, intelligence operations, joint operations and

capacity building (Keeley & Lewis, 2008; Home Office, 2010).

Figure 6.4.149

Control of Corruption in West Africa (0 = World Average)

48

Mali = 111th; Mauritania = 130

th; Nigeria = 130

th. 180 Countries (TI, 2009)

49 UNODC, 2008

55

6.5 THE ECONOMY

The absolute value of the economic inflows due to cocaine and oil

trafficking are directly comparable and equate to approximately $1bn per

annum (UNODC, 2009b). As oil is a licit commodity, it is possible to

measure its importance to the Nigerian economy to which it contributes

95% of the county‟s foreign reserve earnings and 80% of its budgetary

revenues (UNODC, p20, 2009; Marquardt, 2007). Such a high

dependence on a single commodity renders Nigeria a mono-economy

and although there is no licit trade in cocaine, from which to garner similar

statistics for the Western Sahel, the equivalence of the illicit flows and

absence of other commodities suggests Mauritania and Mali also fit this

description. Although Nigeria‟s mono-economy is organic, as the natural

resources are found beneath it, the creation of a market related to

cocaine in Mali and Mauritania is more ad-hoc and emerged as a

combination of factors, such as its proximity to the European market and

increased interdiction on other major trafficking routes. Nonetheless, the

common factor, in this instance, is the existence of an international

market for the commodities which leads TOC syndicates to relocate to, or

at least re-orientate the focus of their operations towards, the region in

order to capitalise on these new „business‟ opportunities. This is an

example of the market orientated thinking ordinarily associated with

commerce and private enterprise, however the involvement of AQIM in

protecting narcotics consignments, and of MEND in oil-bunkering and

kidnapping, would suggest that these groups have also made the

56

structural reforms necessary to enable them to remain financially self-

sufficient in the post Cold-war era (Held, p4, 1995).

6.6 GEOGRAPHY

At first, the extreme arid environment of the barren Sahel appears to have

little in common with the resource rich, fertile oasis of the Niger Delta, but

the case study analysis shows a number of similarities that seem to

enable the development of a crime-terror nexus. The inaccessible nature

of the Sahara and myriad waterways of the Delta preclude law

enforcement agencies, with limited resources, from conducting robust

patrols or investigations that could, for instance, lead to the discovery of a

clandestine makeshift runway in Mali, or a suspected militant base in the

Delta. Moreover, the value in local knowledge of trading routes or

waterways, acquired over many years by members of AQIM and MEND,

can be realised through participation in criminal activity (either

safeguarding cocaine through the Sahara or bunkering oil from remote

locations in the Delta).

Given the weak governance and economies that pervade in both studies,

it is unlikely that communications and infrastructure will be introduced to

connect these regions without international support. It is axiomatic that

the exorbitant costs that the state would incur in such an inaccessible

region, over and above the normal costs of construction of critical

infrastructure such as bridges and roads, are likely to ensure that these

areas remain low priorities. Ceteris paribus, a rational government will act

57

to maximise the benefits of economic development programs, such as

construction, for the majority of the electorate/ population by pursuing a

high number of low cost projects rather than a low number of high cost

projects.

6.7 INCOME STREAMS

Analysis of both case studies suggests that the income flows are derived

from similar sources with tier 1 funding coming from the trafficking of

narcotics and/or oil; tier 2 funding coming from kidnapping, hostage-

taking and ransom collection; and tier 3 funding comprising a range of

other sources such as remittances from European Diaspora and cigarette

smuggling (UNODC, 2009b).

Whilst this investigation has discussed cocaine trafficking in West Africa,

groups have not missed the opportunity to generate income from Heroin.

The UNODC has acquired evidence that drugs are becoming a „new

currency‟ in the region as cocaine from the West is being traded 1:1 with

heroin from the East in remote areas of the Sahara (Costa, 2009).

Perhaps this helps to explain why so many West African nations carrying

heroin were destined for Nigeria (Fig. 6.7.1).

58

Figure 6.7.150

Destination of heroin seized from West African nationals

The additional presence of narcotics in Nigeria raises the possibility that

militants could supplement their income from oil by couriering these to the

European market. However, the documented cases of trafficking from

Nigeria to Europe are orchestrated through a „shot-gun‟ approach where

a large number of couriers, carrying relatively small amounts, are put on

the same plane with the aim of overwhelming law enforcement agencies

at the point of departure and destination; an advanced logistical operation

more conducive to well resourced criminal syndicates than impoverished

militants from the Delta51 (Talking Drugs, 2009; Wyler & Cook, 2009).

50

UNODC, 2009b 51

The conspicuous behaviour of the illiterate proletariat in such unfamiliar international

environments would draw undue attention to any operation and jeopardise its success (Von Hippel, p27, 2002). It is more likely that those such as the „Christmas Day‟ bomber, an engineering graduate and son of a wealthy Nigerian banker will be selected for international operations (p755, Newman, 2006)

59

The value of trafficking flows in both studies is approximately $1bn

(UNODC, 2009b) and, given the similarities of the three tier funding

streams, it is possible to model this in an equation:

π = f (RT + RK + [RS + D]) – f (CT + CK + CS + O)

Where: π Net income

RT Revenue from trafficking (narcotics and/or oil) Rk Revenue from kidnap and ransom operations

RS Revenue from other smuggling e.g. cigarettes D Remittances from Diaspora CT Costs associated with trafficking/ bunkering CK Costs associated with kidnap operations Cs Costs associated with other smuggling

O Operational costs of mounting a terrorist campaign including weapons, explosives and payments to officials

Although there are slight nuances in the structural relationship with

organised crime (AQIM appears to have a parasitical relationship with

narco-cartels, but MEND conducts the bunkering in-house and is involved

with TOC towards the later stages of the process) the model can

accommodate these as the constituent parts are common to both cases

so, for instance, CT is likely to be higher for MEND given that it is

conducting bunkering operations as opposed to AQIM which is

safeguarding consignments in a less synergistic amalgam of the crime-

terror nexus.

6.8 COUNTERPARTIES: SHADOW FACILITATORS

In researching both case studies there was an undercurrent of „shadow

facilitators‟ that consistently appeared alongside the principal TOC/

terrorism actors and acted as middlemen between the two (Logan, 2010).

Moreover, in both instances, this role seems to be performed by the

60

extensive Lebanese expatriate community which is an ardent supporter of

the terrorist group Hezbollah (Doward, 2009).

With regard to the narcotics trade, Hezbollah appears to be capitalising

on the Lebanese Diaspora community in South America and West Africa

where it is prominent in the trade of illegal commodities and has

controlled the decades old contraband networks and routes to Europe

(Pham, 2010). The Lebanese enjoy this „comfortable middleman position‟,

in which they can satisfy both parties, as they share the same „Islamic

head‟ as AQIM yet adopt a hard enough business approach to impress

the narco-cartels (Home Office, 2010). Their presence on both sides of

the Atlantic enables Hezbollah to guarantee the efficient connection

between the continents, thus securing rights to negotiate the purchase of

cocaine from Latin American narco-cartels in West African access points

such as Guineau-Bissau, which is then transported through the Sahel by

AQIM, who receive payment from Hezbollah for safeguarding the

consignments or allowing it to transit through their territory (Pham, 2010;

Vernaschi, 2010). Its active role in the region was exemplified by a DEA

Confidential Source who posed as a Lebanese radical committed to

“opposing the interests of the United States” in a sting operation that led

to the arrest of three Malinese men on charges of narco-terrorism (see

section 4.4)

In Nigeria too, whilst the rationale for Lebanese involvement is less

compelling, there is evidence of its activity. In spite of the opacity of the

61

market for stolen oil (as a tanker full of oil can change hands several

times at sea) Lebanese brokers are frequently mentioned and, in

addition, there are reports of Hezbollah continuing to develop its

presence within the various Nigerian Movements (UNODC, p23, 2009b;

Ousman, p78, 2004). Acting as a catalyst in this way Hezbollah may play

a crucial role that helps to explain why the crime-terror nexus has

become unusually pronounced in both case studies.

6.9 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Reflecting on the theoretical models examined in the introduction, it would

seem that one emerges as the most likely explanation for the existence of

the nexus. As the narco-cartels control the commodity, and AQIM control

the smuggling routes, the „methods versus motives‟ model could apply as

both parties are forced to cooperate to realise the value of the cocaine,

however in the Niger Delta the militants seem to have subsumed the

criminal activity of oil-bunkering in-house, and the potential exists for

them to sell this in the absence of support from TOC syndicates that

facilitate its sale on international markets.

Figure 6.9.1: Crime-terror continuum

In Makarenko‟s (2004) model, the alliance between AQIM and the narco-

cartels would be located at position „1‟ whereas MEND‟s operations in the

62

Niger Delta would suggest it should be closer to the convergence point at

position „2‟ (Fig. 6.9.1). The case studies also demonstrate that both

studies constitute a threat to national security, in spite of the fact that

MEND‟s geographic ties to the Delta render it „sovereign bound‟ and

AQIM‟s roaming operations across the entire region lead to it being

classified as „sovereign free‟ (Picarelli, p22, 2006).

It is Bovenkerk and Chakra‟s (p13, 2004) explanation that is most

appropriate; they argue that greed will triumph over ideology in the long

run and that newly emerging „organized criminal terrorists‟ are collections

of individuals whose involvement is predicated on their personal ambition

to succeed through the acquisition of greater power and wealth. Albeit

through different mechanisms, the case studies suggest both AQIM and

MEND have reoriented themselves towards criminal activity, but whether

the logical extension of the model, in which convergent groups abandon

their distinct motivators, will emerge remains to be seen.

6.10 A DANGEROUS LIASION: PROFIT MAXIMISATION?

AQIM and MEND appear not to be able to draw on the support of a

bourgeoisie, well-educated elite capable of planning and executing a

devastating attack against Western interests as other groups, such as Al

Qaeda, have done elsewhere in Africa52. It is not clear whether this is due

to the absence of precipitant factors, such as the presence of foreign

troops, that act as a catalyst and compound the socio-economic

52

Consider the attacks on US embassies and bombing of an Israeli hotel in Kenya/ Tanzania (Shinn, 2007)

63

preconditions or if the absence of any single substantial attack in either

region is indicative of a political ideology that was never that strong in the

first instance (cf. Bjørgo, 2005). Their belligerent rhetoric would suggest,

however, that they will continue their efforts to execute such an attack;

MEND‟s spokesman explains they are “preparing to deliver a single,

crushing blow” and analysts caution that AQIM aspires to mount a big

attack in Europe (ICG, p25, 2006; Saleh, 2010b). Perhaps this ostensible

lack of an intelligentsia in the upper echelons of the organisations

removes some of the concerns TOC groups have about collaborating with

terrorist organisations53 or, more prosaically, they are only acting in the

rational belief that they will be able to gain financially from any

collaboration with such a group. Under the conditions prevalent in these

studies, however, it appears that the shared motivations that collectively

direct these conglomerates of causes are charting a course towards

organised crime.

53

Such as their courtship of the media (Hutchinson & O‟Malley, p1099, 2007)

64

7 DISCUSSION

7.1 SHORTCOMINGS

The omnipotent consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, the most

significant shock to the financial system and global economy since the

Great Depression, may have an impact on the levels of cooperation

between TOC and terrorism. In Nigeria, the oil price has collapsed from

its high in 2008 and there could be adverse consequences for the income

derived from oil-bunkering which, in turn, could affect the level of terrorist

violence. Likewise, there are possible consequences for the cocaine

market if global demand fell and was reflected through reduced seizures

as narco-cartels reacted to market forces and reduced supply in order to

prevent prices from being depressed. Although the paper has been able

to incorporate recent anecdotal evidence, the lack of comprehensive

statistical data from the GTD and the UNODC, the principle sources of

secondary data, beyond 2008 jeopardises the completeness of the

information from which the conclusions are drawn. Likewise, any

conclusions based on the extrapolation of the existing data beyond 2008

are also vulnerable to criticisms that they are unreliable as they are

unlikely to account for the existential impact of the financial crisis.

A second issue related to completeness involves the data within the GTD

itself. The metric for AQIM lethality was compiled from the fatalities

resulting from AQIM and GSPC attacks in the region. For two of these

attacks, however, the number of fatalities was listed as „unknown‟. During

the period under investigation, there were 92 incidents of terrorism in

65

which over 600 people were killed so it can be assumed that the impact

of the two results lacking the number of fatalities has a negligible impact

on the overall trend (GTD, 2010).

Given the illicit nature of the cocaine pipeline through Mali and

Mauritania, obtaining accurate statistics relating specifically to these

countries proved exceptionally difficult, especially given the lack of

comprehensive data held by the national governments. Reports from the

UNODC provided the principle source of information for statistics on drug

seizures in the region but, although some of these were specific to

individual countries, some were compiled from aggregated seizures in the

West Africa region as a whole. While this serves as a useful proxy for the

volume of the flow in Mali and Mauritania, adopting this methodology is

susceptible to criticisms of ecological fallacy whereby information

gathered at a higher or aggregated unit of analysis is used to make a

statement about a lower or disaggregated unit of analysis; what happens

in one unit of analysis does not always hold for another unit of analysis

(Neuman, p97, 2007). However, in the absence of such disaggregated

information, and given that conducting field research would be

impractical, this is the closest approximation to country level data. Taken

as being representative of the nature of flow and the emergent crime-

terror nexus at this regional level, the results of this analysis certainly

appear to corroborate claims that “addressing drug trafficking and the

associated criminal activity is key to West Africa‟s future progress

towards peace, security, stability and development” (FCO, 2010b).

66

7.2 EVALUATION

This paper has shown evidence of correlation between proxies for TOC,

such as drugs seizures and volumes of lost oil production, and proxies for

terrorism, such as the number of incidents of terrorist violence or a

measure of their lethality. However, the paper relates to fractured and

unstable economies in one of the poorest regions in the world and trying

to establish causality requires considerably more detailed research.

Neuman (p35, 2007) lays out the criterion for establishing causality:

temporal order, association, and the elimination of plausible alternatives.

While this investigation may have confirmed a high degree of correlation

which is necessary to establish causation, it is not sufficient in isolation to

confirm this. This paper could, therefore, act as the basis for further

research conducted specifically into the temporal order and elimination of

plausible alternatives.

Given the constraints on this project, certain metrics were used as

proxies for particular variables in lieu of the desired information. The case

study examining the nexus in the Western Sahel adopted the volume of

drugs seized as a proxy for the volume of cocaine transiting the area,

however, due to the lagging nature of this indicator, there appeared to be

a delay between the increased incidence of terrorism and increased

volume of drugs seized. In order to establish that increased narcotics

were responsible for causing the increased incidence of terrorism, it

would be necessary to adopt alternative metrics that could chart the

increased volume of trafficking in a more expedient manner such that this

67

rise could be seen as a precursor to the rise in incidence of terrorism,

thus fulfilling the temporal order requirement. Similarly, to confirm the

elimination of possible alternative explanations (for instance that the level

of terrorist violence was related to global stock market performance),

such variables could be investigated and the absence of any relationship

would help to confirm that the proceeds from trafficking contraband are

fuelling the increased incidence of terrorism, as opposed to another

extraneous factor (omitted variable bias). One of the strengths of

adopting the most different systems design of comparative analysis,

however, is that a number of different potential causal factors are

investigated in two contrasting cases. This enables the discovery of those

shared characteristics under which a particular phenomenon appears to

emerge, rendering it less likely that any one variable would be omitted.

Future research predicated on this study should also be able to ascertain

the nature of the relationship from 2008 onwards, which is of particular

interest as the existential shock of the collapse in the world‟s financial

markets provides a unique and rigorous opportunity to test the extent of

the nexus. If the crisis was to result in reduced volumes of transatlantic

cocaine trafficking, and the suppressed oil price led to reduced incidence

of oil-bunkering, and these resulted in reduced incidence of terrorism it

would certainly augment the case for the existence of a nexus. If the

incidence of terrorist violence was to continue unabated, an alternative

explanation would be required that would, necessarily, appear to

contradict the existence of a nexus.

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8 CONCLUSION

8.1 SUMMARY

This investigation has examined the crime-terror nexus in two separate

and distinct geopolitical arenas within West Africa in order to establish the

existence and extent of any such relationship. In both cases there is

compelling evidence of a high degree of association between the metrics

for criminal and terrorist activity, although the precise nature of the

relationship appears to differ. In the Western Sahal, AQIM has entered

into a parasitical relationship with Latin American narco-cartels whereby it

profits from the cocaine pipeline by taxing traffickers who transit its

territory and/ or by safeguarding narcotics consignments across the

Sahara in a transaction for services based agreement. In the Niger Delta,

however, the line between criminal and terrorist groups is less

pronounced as MEND militants appear to embrace and profit from

criminal activities themselves as well as trafficking oil through

transnational criminal syndicates. As the value of the income stream

generated from criminal activity becomes more widely understood, the

orientation of both terrorist groups appears to be shifting away from their

ideological foundations; whether they will ever abandon these completely

remains to be seen. MEND is closest to a hybrid criminal-terrorist

organisation that could simultaneously be described as a terrorist group

maintaining its political rhetoric as a façade in order to garner support for

continued criminal operations, and a criminal group displaying political

motivations and employing terrorism to establish a monopoly over

lucrative economic sectors (Makarenko, p135, 2004).

69

The case-studies in this paper seem to reveal the emergence of a crime-

terror nexus at a more advanced stage than has been observed

elsewhere in the literature. There are several preconditions, common to

both studies, identified through the „most different‟ systems design of

comparative analysis that appear to portray a permissive environment

unique to the region which has helped TOC and terrorist actors to forge

their alliances:

Weak governance

Colonial history

Inaccessible physical geography

Poverty

Inequality

Corruption

A national mono-economy dominated by a licit/ illicit commodity

International marketplace for principle commodity

Presence of third-party shadow facilitators (Hezbollah)

Lack of substantial international cooperation

8.2 RESULTS

Limited anecdotal information tends to form the foundation for current

understanding of the crime-terror nexus which portrays the scale and

nature of the cooperation as varying widely (Rollins, Wyler & Rosen,

2010). Whilst this investigation has drawn on such accounts of isolated

incidents, by augmenting them with macro-level statistical analysis, it has

sought to adhere to a holistic mixed-methods approach that enables it to

70

follow the evolution of the nexus, in the region, from both a criminal and

terrorist perspective. Lieberman (2002) asserts that adopting such a

mixed design embodies a complementality that can lead to an analytical

payoff that is greater than the sum of the parts.

The results of the statistical analysis showed a high degree of correlation,

in both case studies, between the metrics used as a proxy for the level of

crime and the level of terrorism. In the first study, the correlation

coefficient, measuring the degree of association between the seizures of

cocaine and the lethality of terrorist strikes, had a value of 0.81. In the

second study, the correlation coefficient between the total value of lost oil

production and the incidence of terrorism was 0.94. These results

underpin the summary findings that the degree of association between

the proxies for crime and terrorism, used as a model for the crime-terror

nexus, is strongest in the Niger Delta.

8.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS

“We cannot divine solutions if we fail to comprehend the full dimensions of a challenge, much less the interlinkages between narco-trafficking and terror finance”

Luna, 2008

Developing a solid grasp of the „interlinkages‟ that constitute the crime-

terror nexus is critical as this knowledge can enable the dismantling of the

illicit financial architecture which supports terrorist activity (Luna, 2008;

Picarelli, p22, 2006). A greater understanding of the contributing factors

and consequences of the nexus should also help policy-makers to direct

71

their limited resources more effectively, especially considering the

apparent threat it constitutes to national security.

The significant criminal activities conducted by, or associated with, the

terrorist groups observed within the narrow focus of this investigation

suggest counter-terrorist strategy would be more successful at locating

group weaknesses if it was revised to concentrate on targeting criminal

as opposed to political motivations (Makarenko, p141, 2004). The more

resources that are deployed to plug intelligence gaps and gather

evidence relating to the nexus, the more sophisticated the level of

response will be as it is able to draw on a more developed understanding

of interconnectedness between the criminal and terrorist aspects of the

organisations (Luna, 2008). By pursuing a less belligerent counter-

terrorist campaign that eschews a hard-line security approach in favour of

a holistic policy targeted at raising socio-economic indicators such as

health, education, democratic accountability and standards of living,

alongside stifling the proceeds of crime, governments can eliminate the

operational capacity; the reservoir of anger from which terrorists recruit;

and, subsequently, the political influence of both criminal and terrorist

groups (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, p5, 2007; Makerenko, p141, 2004).

The analysis of sovereign free crime and terrorist groups in the Western

Sahel serves to highlight the futility of adopting a state-centric response,

given the lack of government authority, rather than pursuing a multi-

lateral approach at the regional or international level (Picarelli, p23,

72

2006). Following operations in Afghanistan, however, Western

governments are reluctant to commit resources for fear of becoming

mired in another reconstruction mission that evolves into conventional

conflict from which they are unable to withdraw (FCO, 2010). It is only by

developing a better understanding of the enabling environment, through

studies such as this, that the international community can begin to

appreciate the value of reconstructive and developmental (as opposed to

military) aid and how, by facilitating significant structural changes, they

can help to excise the growth of the crime-terror nexus and its pernicious

ramifications on their own economies (Farah, 2009; ICG, p26, 2006b).

The findings of this paper, therefore, advocate the development of multi-

lateral initiatives such as the trans-Saharan Crime Monitoring Network

established by the UNODC, or the United State‟s decision to set up a

separate African Command, in part, to tackle the crime-terror nexus (AP,

2009; Fletcher, 2008). There is, however, room for improvement; the

UNODC budget constitutes less than one per cent of the overall UN

budget which, itself is less than one per cent of the yearly global drugs

trade valued at $320 billion (Costa, 2010). By increasing the role of the

UNODC in the region; adopting a similar multi-lateral approach in the

Niger Delta that involves multi-national energy firms directly; and

augmenting this coherent approach with specialist international law

enforcement teams, it is possible to target the criminal avenues that

finance terrorism in West Africa such that the tangible security objective

of a reduction in terrorist violence can be achieved.

73

9 ANNEX ANNEX 1: A RESEARCH AGENDA

SOURCE: Bovenkerk & Chakra, p13, 2004

74

ANNEX 2: PARTIES TO UN DRUGS AND CRIME CONVENTIONS (As at 2 November 2007)

SOURCE: UNODC, 2008

75

ANNEX 3: LIST OF WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

The Republic of BENIN

BURKINA FASO

The Republic of CABO VERDE

The Republic of COTE D'IVOIRE

The Republic of GAMBIA

The Republic of GHANA

The Republic of GUINEE

The Republic of GUINEE BISSAU

The Republic of LIBERIA

The Republic of MALI

The Islamic Republic of MAURITANIA54

The Federal Republic of NIGERIA

The Republic of SENEGAL

The Republic of SIERRA LEONE

TOGOLESE Republic

SOURCE: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 2010)

54

NOTE: The Islamic Republic of Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000, but

continues to be included in the definition of West Africa for the purposes of this investigation.

76

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P21 The MEMRI Blog. Retrieved 29/07/10 http://www.thememriblog.org/image/12089.JPG

P22 „Two tonnes of cocaine seized in The Gambia‟, BBC 08/06/10. Retrieved 29/07/10

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10268510 P22 France 24. Retrieved 26/07/10 http://www.france24.com/en/

4.9 CON AIR

P31 „Africa‟s Drug Problem‟, The New York Times, 11/04/10. Retrieved 29/07/10

http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2010/04/11/magazine/20100411-guinea-bissau-slideshow_index.html

P32 „Burnout Boeing, a clue in African drugs trade‟, AP, 11/12/09. Retrieved 29/07/10 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i6w-doyjewoRGhOaaAHVYfrVWONQ

P33 „Fifty tons of cocaine transported through West Africa yearly‟, Global Post, 27/01/10. Retrieved 29/07/10

Fifty tons of cocaine transported through West Africa yearly http://www.modernghana.com/news/200250/1/fifty-tons-of-

cocaine-transported-through-west-afr.html

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5.4 OIL BUNKERING

P37 UNODC, (2009b) Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment. Vienna: UNODC. Retrieved 15/07/10 http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf

P38 „Niger Delta Talks in Shell‟s “backyard”‟, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 24/02/10. Retrieved 29/07/10 http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/niger-delta-talks-shells-backyard

P38 BBC. Retrieved 29/07/10 http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/41155000/jpg/_41155052_oil_ap.jpg

5.9 KIDNAPPING AND RANSOM

P46 The New York Times http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2006/02/25/international/25host650.jpg

P47 „The Niger Delta: The curse of the black gold‟, The Independent, 02/08/08. Retrieved 29/07/10 http://www.independent.co.uk/multimedia/archive/00041/deltaEPA_41780t.jpg

P47 Max Siollun. Retrieved 29/07/10 http://maxsiollun.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/mend_water2_ap_main.jpg

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