A Chronology of Russia From Yeltsin

Contents

CAN PUTIN SURVIVE? ..................................................................................................... 6

Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline ......................................................... 7

The Tide Turns Against Putin ........................................................................................ 8

Imagining Russia After Putin ....................................................................................... 10

A CHRONOLOGY OF RUSSIA FROM YELTSIN'S FALL THROUGH PUTIN'S RISE ... 11

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 12

Kosovo Crisis Sets Template for New Russian Politics .......................................... 13

In Russia, Putin's Power Almost Absolute .............................................................. 13

Former Soviet Union Net Assessment 2005: Unilateral Concessions to the West

Are Over, Reaction Has Begun............................................................................... 13

Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus ....................................................................... 13

Russia: Rebuilding an Empire While It Can ............................................................ 14

KOSOVO CRISIS SETS TEMPLATE FOR NEW RUSSIAN POLITICS ......................... 15

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 15

IN RUSSIA, PUTIN'S POWER ALMOST ABSOLUTE .................................................... 18

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 18

FORMER SOVIET UNION NET ASSESSMENT -- 2005 ................................................ 19

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 19

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 20

The FSU's Social and Political Drivers ........................................................................ 25

Restraints or Arresting Factors.................................................................................... 29

Enablers ...................................................................................................................... 31

RUSSIA AND ROTATING THE U.S. FOCUS ................................................................. 33

Exploiting U.S. Distractions ......................................................................................... 33

NATO Expansion and Color Revolutions .................................................................... 34

The Closing Window ................................................................................................... 35

The Middle East Connection ....................................................................................... 36

Bush's Long Shot ........................................................................................................ 37

RUSSIA: REBUILDING AN EMPIRE WHILE IT CAN ..................................................... 39

Geography and Empire-Building ................................................................................. 39

Maintaining a Strong State .......................................................................................... 40

Putin's Plans ................................................................................................................ 41

RUSSIA AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY DANCE ............................................................... 44

THE WESTERN VIEW OF RUSSIA ................................................................................ 46

Cold War vs. Post-Cold War ....................................................................................... 46

The Post-Post Cold War World ................................................................................... 48

Responding to the United States ................................................................................ 50

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, INTRODUCTION: THE TARGETS .................... 52

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 52

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 52

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 53

The Inherent Russian Struggle ............................................................................... 53

The Window of Opportunity .................................................................................... 54

The Russian Plan .................................................................................................... 55

A Closing Window ................................................................................................... 56

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 1: THE NECESSITIES ............................ 57

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 57

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 57

Ukraine .................................................................................................................... 58

Russia's Levers ....................................................................................................... 59

Russia's Success and Roadblocks ......................................................................... 60

Belarus .................................................................................................................... 61

Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................. 63

Georgia ................................................................................................................... 64

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 2: THE DESIRABLES ............................. 67

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 67

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 68

The Baltics .............................................................................................................. 68

Azerbaijan ............................................................................................................... 70

Turkmenistan .......................................................................................................... 72

Uzbekistan .............................................................................................................. 73

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 3: THE EXTRAS ..................................... 75

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 75

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 75

Moldova .................................................................................................................. 75

Armenia ................................................................................................................... 78

Kyrgyzstan .............................................................................................................. 79

Tajikistan ................................................................................................................. 81

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 4: THE MAJOR PLAYERS ..................... 83

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 83

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 83

Germany ................................................................................................................. 84

France ..................................................................................................................... 86

Turkey ..................................................................................................................... 87

Poland ..................................................................................................................... 88

The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle .............................................................. 89

Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 90

Geopolitical Imperatives .............................................................................................. 97

Strategy of the Russian Empire................................................................................... 98

Contemporary Russia ................................................................................................ 102

The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength ......................................... 107

The State of the Russian State ................................................................................. 107

Geography and Development ................................................................................... 109

The Reality of Russian Power ................................................................................... 111

The Coming Era of Russia's Dark Rider ........................................................................ 114

The Russian Cycle .................................................................................................... 115

The Dark Rider .......................................................................................................... 117

Why the Crackdown? ................................................................................................ 118

Russian Resurgence Timeline ....................................................................................... 120

Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence .............................................. 120

Russia's Growing Resurgence ................................................................... 120

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 4: The Major Players ................ 120

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras............................... 120

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 2: The Desirables ...................... 120

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities .................... 120

Russia's Expanding Influence, Introduction: The Targets ................. 120

Ukraine's Election and the Russian Resurgence ................................. 120

Russia, Turkey: The Resurgent Powers' Wary Approach ................. 120

Russian Oligarchs Part 3: The Party's Over .......................................... 120

Russian Oligarchs Part 2: The Evolution of a New Business Elite. 121

Russian Oligarchs Part 1: Putin's Endgame Against His Rivals ..... 121

Editor's Choice ..................................................................................................... 121

Nigeria: Opting Out of an Insurgency ....................................................... 121

Turkey and Qatar's Shared Regional Interests ..................................... 121

Israel and Gaza: Then and Now ................................................................ 121

Related Content ................................................................................................... 121

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 2: The Desirables ...................... 121

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras............................... 121

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities .................... 122

Related Situation Reports ................................................................................ 122

Ukraine: Germany Welcomes Reduced Russian Troop Deployment

On Border .......................................................................................................... 122

Germany: Russia's Actions In Crimea Understandable, Former

Chancellor Says .............................................................................................. 122

Russia: France, Germany Warn Of Further Sanctions If Ukrainian

Election Stopped ............................................................................................. 122

CAN PUTIN SURVIVE?

Geopolitical Weekly

Monday, July 21, 2014 - 16:05 Print Text Size

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Stratfor

By George Friedman

There is a general view that Vladimir Putin governs the Russian Federation as a dictator,

that he has defeated and intimidated his opponents and that he has marshaled a

powerful threat to surrounding countries. This is a reasonable view, but perhaps it should

be re-evaluated in the context of recent events.

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Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline

Ukraine is, of course, the place to start. The country is vital to Russia as a buffer against

the West and as a route for delivering energy to Europe, which is the foundation of the

Russian economy. On Jan. 1, Ukraine's president was Viktor Yanukovich, generally

regarded as favorably inclined to Russia. Given the complexity of Ukrainian society and

politics, it would be unreasonable to say Ukraine under him was merely a Russian

puppet. But it is fair to say that under Yanukovich and his supporters, fundamental

Russian interests in Ukraine were secure.

This was extremely important to Putin. Part of the reason Putin had replaced Boris

Yeltsin in 2000 was Yeltsin's performance during the Kosovo war. Russia was allied with

the Serbs and had not wanted NATO to launch a war against Serbia. Russian wishes

were disregarded. The Russian views simply didn't matter to the West. Still, when the air

war failed to force Belgrade's capitulation, the Russians negotiated a settlement that

allowed U.S. and other NATO troops to enter and administer Kosovo. As part of that

settlement, Russian troops were promised a significant part in peacekeeping in Kosovo.

But the Russians were never allowed to take up that role, and Yeltsin proved unable to

respond to the insult.

Putin also replaced Yeltsin because of the disastrous state of the Russian economy.

Though Russia had always been poor, there was a pervasive sense that it been a force

to be reckoned with in international affairs. Under Yeltsin, however, Russia had become

even poorer and was now held in contempt in international affairs. Putin had to deal with

both issues. He took a long time before moving to recreate Russian power, though he

said early on that the fall of the Soviet Union had been the greatest geopolitical disaster

of the 20th century. This did not mean he wanted to resurrect the Soviet Union in its

failed form, but rather that he wanted Russian power to be taken seriously again, and he

wanted to protect and enhance Russian national interests.

The breaking point came in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004. Yanukovich

was elected president that year under dubious circumstances, but demonstrators forced

him to submit to a second election. He lost, and a pro-Western government took office.

At that time, Putin accused the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies of having

organized the demonstrations. Fairly publicly, this was the point when Putin became

convinced that the West intended to destroy the Russian Federation, sending it the way

of the Soviet Union. For him, Ukraine's importance to Russia was self-evident. He

therefore believed that the CIA organized the demonstration to put Russia in a

dangerous position, and that the only reason for this was the overarching desire to

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cripple or destroy Russia. Following the Kosovo affair, Putin publicly moved from

suspicion to hostility to the West.

The Russians worked from 2004 to 2010 to undo the Orange Revolution. They worked to

rebuild the Russian military, focus their intelligence apparatus and use whatever

economic influence they had to reshape their relationship with Ukraine. If they couldn't

control Ukraine, they did not want it to be controlled by the United States and Europe.

This was, of course, not their only international interest, but it was the pivotal one.

Russia's invasion of Georgia had more to do with Ukraine than it had to do with the

Caucasus. At the time, the United States was still bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While Washington had no formal obligation to Georgia, there were close ties and implicit

guarantees. The invasion of Georgia was designed to do two things. The first was to

show the region that the Russian military, which had been in shambles in 2000, was able

to act decisively in 2008. The second was to demonstrate to the region, and particularly

to Kiev, that American guarantees, explicit or implicit, had no value. In 2010, Yanukovich

was elected president of Ukraine, reversing the Orange Revolution and limiting Western

influence in the country.

Recognizing the rift that was developing with Russia and the general trend against the

United States in the region, the Obama administration tried to recreate older models of

relationships when Hillary Clinton presented Putin with a "restart" button in 2009. But

Washington wanted to restore the relationship in place during what Putin regarded as

the "bad old days." He naturally had no interest in such a restart. Instead, he saw the

United States as having adopted a defensive posture, and he intended to exploit his

advantage.

One place he did so was in Europe, using EU dependence on Russian energy to grow

closer to the Continent, particularly Germany. But his high point came during the Syrian

affair, when the Obama administration threatened airstrikes after Damascus used

chemical weapons only to back off from its threat. The Russians aggressively opposed

Obama's move, proposing a process of negotiations instead. The Russians emerged

from the crisis appearing decisive and capable, the United States indecisive and

feckless. Russian power accordingly appeared on the rise, and in spite of a weakening

economy, this boosted Putin's standing.

The Tide Turns Against Putin

Events in Ukraine this year, by contrast, have proved devastating to Putin. In January,

Russia dominated Ukraine. By February, Yanukovich had fled the country and a pro-

Western government had taken power. The general uprising against Kiev that Putin had

been expecting in eastern Ukraine after Yanukovich's ouster never happened.

Meanwhile, the Kiev government, with Western advisers, implanted itself more firmly. By

July, the Russians controlled only small parts of Ukraine. These included Crimea, where

the Russians had always held overwhelming military force by virtue of treaty, and a

triangle of territory from Donetsk to Luhansk to Severodonetsk, where a small number of

insurgents apparently supported by Russian special operations forces controlled a dozen

or so towns.

If no Ukrainian uprising occurred, Putin's strategy was to allow the government in Kiev to

unravel of its own accord and to split the United States from Europe by exploiting

Russia's strong trade and energy ties with the Continent. And this is where the crash of

the Malaysia Airlines jet is crucial. If it turns out -- as appears to be the case -- that

Russia supplied air defense systems to the separatists and sent crews to man them

(since operating those systems requires extensive training), Russia could be held

responsible for shooting down the plane. And this means Moscow's ability to divide the

Europeans from the Americans would decline. Putin then moves from being an effective,

sophisticated ruler who ruthlessly uses power to being a dangerous incompetent

supporting a hopeless insurrection with wholly inappropriate weapons. And the West, no

matter how opposed some countries might be to a split with Putin, must come to grips

with how effective and rational he really is.

Meanwhile, Putin must consider the fate of his predecessors. Nikita Khrushchev returned

from vacation in October 1964 to find himself replaced by his protege, Leonid Brezhnev,

and facing charges of, among other things, "harebrained scheming." Khrushchev had

recently been humiliated in the Cuban missile crisis. This plus his failure to move the

economy forward after about a decade in power saw his closest colleagues "retire" him.

A massive setback in foreign affairs and economic failures had resulted in an apparently

unassailable figure being deposed.

Russia's economic situation is nowhere near as catastrophic as it was under Khrushchev

or Yeltsin, but it has deteriorated substantially recently, and perhaps more important, has

failed to meet expectations. After recovering from the 2008 crisis, Russia has seen

several years of declining gross domestic product growth rates, and its central bank is

forecasting zero growth this year. Given current pressures, we would guess the Russian

economy will slide into recession sometime in 2014. The debt levels of regional

governments have doubled in the past four years, and several regions are close to

bankruptcy. Moreover, some metals and mining firms are facing bankruptcy. The

Ukrainian crisis has made things worse. Capital flight from Russia in the first six months

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stood at $76 billion, compared to $63 billion for all of 2013. Foreign direct investment fell

50 percent in the first half of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013. And all this

happened in spite of oil prices remaining higher than $100 per barrel.

Putin's popularity at home soared after the successful Sochi Winter Olympics and after

the Western media made him look like the aggressor in Crimea. He has, after all, built

his reputation on being tough and aggressive. But as the reality of the situation in

Ukraine becomes more obvious, the great victory will be seen as covering a retreat

coming at a time of serious economic problems. For many leaders, the events in Ukraine

would not represent such an immense challenge. But Putin has built his image on a

tough foreign policy, and the economy meant his ratings were not very high before

Ukraine.

Imagining Russia After Putin

In the sort of regime that Putin has helped craft, the democratic process may not be the

key to understanding what will happen next. Putin has restored Soviet elements to the

structure of the government, even using the term "Politburo" for his inner Cabinets.

These are all men of his choosing, of course, and so one might assume they would be

loyal to him. But in the Soviet-style Politburo, close colleagues were frequently the most

feared.

The Politburo model is designed for a leader to build coalitions among factions. Putin

has been very good at doing that, but then he has been very successful at all the things

he has done until now. His ability to hold things together declines as trust in his abilities

declines and various factions concerned about the consequences of remaining closely

tied to a failing leader start to maneuver. Like Khrushchev, who was failing in economic

and foreign policy, Putin could have his colleagues remove him.

It is difficult to know how a succession crisis would play out, given that the constitutional

process of succession exists alongside the informal government Putin has created. From

a democratic standpoint, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Moscow Mayor Sergei

Sobyanin are as popular as Putin is, and I suspect they both will become more

popular in time. In a Soviet-style struggle, Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov and Security

Council Chief Nicolai Patryushev would be possible contenders. But there are others.

Who, after all, expected the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev?

Ultimately, politicians who miscalculate and mismanage tend not to survive. Putin

miscalculated in Ukraine, failing to anticipate the fall of an ally, failing to respond

effectively and then stumbling badly in trying to recoup. His management of the economy

has not been exemplary of late either, to say the least. He has colleagues who believe

they could do a better job, and now there are important people in Europe who would be

glad to see him go. He must reverse this tide rapidly, or he may be replaced.

Putin is far from finished. But he has governed for 14 years counting the time Dmitri

Medvedev was officially in charge, and that is a long time. He may well regain his

footing, but as things stand at the moment, I would expect quiet thoughts to be stirring in

his colleagues' minds. Putin himself must be re-examining his options daily. Retreating in

the face of the West and accepting the status quo in Ukraine would be difficult, given that

the Kosovo issue that helped propel him to power and given what he has said about

Ukraine over the years. But the current situation cannot sustain itself. The wild card in

this situation is that if Putin finds himself in serious political trouble, he might become

more rather than less aggressive. Whether Putin is in real trouble is not something I can

be certain of, but too many things have gone wrong for him lately for me not to consider

the possibility. And as in any political crisis, more and more extreme options are

contemplated if the situation deteriorates.

Those who think that Putin is both the most repressive and aggressive Russian leader

imaginable should bear in mind that this is far from the case. Lenin, for example, was

fearsome. But Stalin was much worse. There may similarly come a time when the world

looks at the Putin era as a time of liberality. For if the struggle by Putin to survive, and by

his challengers to displace him, becomes more intense, the willingness of all to become

more brutal might well increase.

A CHRONOLOGY OF RUSSIA

FROM YELTSIN'S FALL THROUGH

PUTIN'S RISE

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rise#axzz38H8hgZNx

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Analysis

July 20, 2014 | 0611 Print Text Size

Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses a joint session of the Russian parliament in Moscow on March 18. (SERGEI ILNITSKY/AFP/Getty Images)

Analysis

Editor's Note: As Stratfor readies to look forward in coming days at the implications for Russia -- and its leader Vladimir Putin -- in the downing July 17 of a Malaysian jetliner, we also invite readers to take stock with us of past forecasts of Russias geopolitical evolution in the context of global events. Stratfor Chairman George Friedman will examine the likelihood of Putins undoing in the next issue of Geopolitical Weekly, to publish July 22. Accordingly, we look back here at 1998, when we predicted the unfolding Kosovo crisis would be the undoing of late Russian President Boris Yeltsin. We share our assessment from 2000, when we assessed how newly elected President Putin was rapidly consolidating absolute power. In 2005, Stratfor reassessed Putin's situation after his first presidential term and laid out how his leadership would begin to reverse the tide of concessions and reassert Russias role in line with historical cycles -- including the forging of strategic relationships with countries such as Germany. In 2008, we looked at how Russia would capitalize on American weaknesses, including the fatigue of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2011, we foresaw the next stage, as Russia moved to solidify its sphere of influence while still able. In this forecast, we saw the events setting the stage

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for todays crisis in Ukraine. Now, we foresee more historical change. We offer this chronology of forecasts in advance of our next report on Russias future.

Kosovo Crisis Sets Template for New Russian Politics

During the Kosovo crisis, as Russian politicians rallied to challenge NATO intervention in Serbia and found a new source of unity, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin found himself isolated.

Oct. 15, 1998: One voice that has been relatively weak has been that of embattled Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Though he declared his firm opposition to NATO strikes on October 9, Russia's nationalists and communists have claimed that weak Yeltsin leadership allowed the U.S. and the West to assert hegemony. Yeltsin is even losing control of national policy regarding Kosovo. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was forced to rebut Defense Ministry statements on the issue, claiming only Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry could make official policy. Kosovo may be Yeltsin's undoing, as it has united and revitalized his opponents.

In Russia, Putin's Power Almost Absolute

Following Boris Yeltsin's December 1999 resignation, Vladimir Putin became acting president and then president in 2000.

Dec. 27, 2001: Two allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin joined Russia's most influential business lobby on Dec. 21. That was followed by a live, national call-in program Dec. 24 -- broadcast via television, radio and Internet -- in which Putin fielded questions from his countrymen for 2 1/2 hours. Taken together, these events signal Putin has nearly finished consolidating his economic, political and social control and is now better positioned to hammer the few resistant elements into line. With newfound political stability, the president will set about implementing reforms passed in 2001 and begin crafting a new raft of reforms in 2002.

Former Soviet Union Net Assessment 2005: Unilateral Concessions to the West Are Over, Reaction Has Begun

July 15, 2005: In this era, there have been two different phases. The first -- a phase of outright geopolitical retreat by Russia and the FSU's other states, with no real attempts to resist outside powers' strategic penetration -- started in 1991 and appears to have ended by 2004 or 2005 at the latest. Currently, the second phase is starting, as regional powers -- led by Russia -- begin a strategic response to the recent decline and to outside powers' increasing influence. The attempts to reverse the tide started after Russian President Vladimir Putin was re-elected for his second term last year.

Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus

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With the United States entangled in wars in the Middle East and South Asia:

April 1, 2008: Russia has taken advantage of the imbalance in the U.S. politico-military posture to attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. To this end, Russia has taken advantage of its enhanced financial position -- due to soaring commodity prices, particularly in the energy sector -- as well as a lack of American options in the region.

Russia: Rebuilding an Empire While It Can

Oct. 31, 2011: U.S.-Russian relations seem to have been relatively quiet recently, as there are numerous contradictory views in Washington about the true nature of Russia's current foreign policy. Doubts remain about the sincerity of the U.S. State Department's so-called "reset" of relations with Russia -- the term used in 2009 when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton handed a reset button to her Russian counterpart as a symbol of a freeze on escalating tensions between Moscow and Washington. The concern is whether the "reset" is truly a shift in relations between the two former adversaries or simply a respite before relations deteriorate again.

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KOSOVO CRISIS SETS TEMPLATE

FOR NEW RUSSIAN POLITICS

Analysis

October 15, 1998 | 0000 Print Text Size

Analysis

Though it continues to suffer from economic collapse and domestic political turmoil,

Russia has rallied behind one issue, the Kosovo crisis, setting the mold for both internal

and external Russian politics for some time to come. The United States is crediting the

threat of NATO action with forcing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic into accepting

a diplomatic resolution to the Kosovo crisis, claiming that the threat of military action

made use of military force unnecessary. However, it remains to be seen whether

anything was really achieved in Kosovo -- as the fox was thrown out of the coop after it

already killed the hen -- and Milosevic has already begun to make good on his threat to

take vengeance against the intervening foreigners by targeting their allies in Belgrade,

the independent press and rights groups. Much more important than the outcome in

Yugoslavia, however, is how NATO's standoff with Milosevic has played in Moscow.

Divided over every other policy issue, Russian politicians have come together to

challenge NATO intervention in Serbia. Even the most Western oriented have insisted

that only the UN Security Council has the right to authorize military intervention in

Yugoslavia, while the Communists have warned of the resumption of the Cold War and

radical firebrand Viktor Ilyukhin has gone so far as to threaten the lives of Western

diplomats in Moscow. Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry's main

directorate for international military cooperation, told Russian Public TV on October 13

that "the operation which is being prepared against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is

a provocation by the alliance's military forces against Russia, too. Yes, this will only

create a precedent. Other countries in Europe, the CIS and Russia included, could find

themselves the next targets of NATO action." Ivashov said that, if NATO launched

strikes against Yugoslavia, Russia would resume full military cooperation with Belgrade,

including violating the arms sale embargo against Yugoslavia. In addition, Ivashov

claimed that Russia would respond to any attack on Yugoslavia with "a change in

partnership with NATO" and a search for "possible new military allies to maintain the

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necessary military balance." Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov announced that Russia's

relations with NATO may have to be reevaluated, and Russia already recalled its

representatives to NATO on October 12.

The factions in the Russian Duma have also united over the Kosovo issue. Duma

Chairman Gennady Seleznev said that NATO should reconsider its actions in Kosovo

because a military attack would give "an impetus for the start of a cold war." Seleznev

announced that the Duma has decided to send a four-member parliamentary delegation

to Yugoslavia, which will stay in the country until the termination of NATO ultimatum.

Duma Deputy Speaker Vladimir Ryzhkov announced that the Duma is planning to pass a

resolution calling any NATO strike on Yugoslavia an "unmitigated threat to the Russian

Federation."

Seleznev also issued a pan-Slavic appeal to Russia's "friends and allies", including

Belarus and Ukraine, to also send delegations to Yugoslavia. As usual, Belarus is way

ahead of Moscow on this. On October 12, the Belarusian news agency "Belapan"

reported that 200 Belarusian citizens stand ready to go to Yugoslavia as volunteers to

combat NATO intervention in Kosovo. Ukraine has been more restrained, with Foreign

Minister Tarasyuk claiming "it is only the UN Security Council which has the right to take

a decision on the use of force." Ukraine also offered to participate in OSCE monitoring of

the situation in Kosovo.

Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov declared that "an attack on

Yugoslavia with would be equivalent to a declaration of war against Russia." He

reinforced the Russia military's warning, saying "in the event of an attack we would

support Yugoslavia with all our forces." Zyuganov echoed Seleznev's assertion that, if

NATO carries out an attack on Yugoslavia, the Russian Parliament will revoke all

cooperation agreements with NATO and withdraw from the weapons embargo against

Yugoslavia.

The radical Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the Duma's Security Committee and leader of

the Movement for Support of the Army, Defense Industry and Military Science, said on

October 13 that the Movement was "ready at the first call to send military specialists to

Yugoslavia to organize resistance in the event of NATO strikes against Serbia."

Moreover, Ilyukhin threatened the West by saying that "in view of growing anti-NATO

and anti- American moods in Russia, it is impossible to guarantee that no hostile acts will

be carried out against diplomats and other representatives of NATO member states

working in Moscow. NATO's terrorist methods in relation to Yugoslavia may boomerang

and hit those who initiate them."

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on October 14 praised Russian unity over Kosovo.

He said that "It is the first time that I observe such a situation where on such an

important international problem Russia has spoken with a single voice. Ivanov credited

Russian unity with averting a NATO strike on Yugoslavia. Kosovo has given Russia's

political factions a source of unity, something they will remember even if the situation in

Yugoslavia calms down. Pan-Slavism works. Assertive foreign policy works.

Confrontation with NATO works. These themes unite Russia internally, help rebuild ties

within its former empire, and help reestablish Russia as a great power.

But talk, as they say, is cheap. More alarming than this rhetoric, however, have been

reports suggesting that Russia has already violated the arms embargo against

Yugoslavia, and has provided the Serbs with military aid. On October 7, the Times of

London reported that Russia has supplied the Yugoslav army with new warheads, fuses,

and sensors for its SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, a charge that Russian state arms export

company Rosovooruzheniye has denied. According to the International Institute for

Strategic Studies, Yugoslavia has eight surface-to- air missile batteries at eight sites, as

well as 100 other missiles. According to Jane's, the Yugoslav army has an unknown

number of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, and SA-13 towed or mobile surface-to-

air missile systems, as well as a variety of man-portable missiles.

However, according to an unconfirmed report we have received from a source in St.

Petersburg, Yugoslavia may have acquired far more than just an upgrade for its SA-6

missiles. According to our source, a few weeks ago Russia shipped 50 2S6M

"Tunguska" self- propelled air-defense systems to the Serbs. The Tunguska is one of

Russia's newest weapons systems, mounting two 30mm antiaircraft guns and up to eight

9M311 (SA-19) two-stage, hypersonic, low to medium altitude surface-to-air missiles.

The Tunguska is reportedly in service only with the CIS and India.

If this report of deployment to Yugoslavia is true, it would indicate a serious threat to

either air-strikes or reconnaissance against the Serbs. It would also demonstrate that

Russia has crossed the line, putting its missiles where its mouth is. Interestingly, on

October 9, ITAR-TASS cited an anonymous senior Defense Ministry official as saying

Yugoslavia now has both passive and active defense mechanisms to either destroy or

misdirect Tomahawk cruise missiles. Finally, if the Tunguskas were not flown into

Belgrade, then this report would indicate that Russia now has the tacit backing of either

Romania or Bulgaria, as the weapons would have had to come in by rail. On October 12,

the state secretary of the Russian-backed breakaway Dnestr region of Moldova denied

reports that Russian troops and equipment were being shipped to Yugoslavia via the

Dnestr region. Valeriy Litsky claimed that, such activity could not be occurring because it

would have to cross the territory of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania.

Regardless of the veracity of the various arms transfer reports, interesting though they

may be, the real story is the fact that Russia's response to the Kosovo crisis has set the

pattern for Russian foreign and domestic politics for the forseeable future. Russia has

united to reaffirm its claim to its traditional sphere of influence. Pan-Slavism and

opposition to NATO and the West can serve as a unifying force to stabilize Russia's

internal disputes, to attract Russia's CIS allies into closer ties, and to begin the process

of reestablishing Russia as a regional, if not a great power.

One voice that has been relatively weak has been that of embattled Russian President

Boris Yeltsin. Though he declared his firm opposition to NATO strikes on October 9,

Russia's nationalists and communists have claimed that weak Yeltsin leadership allowed

the U.S. and the West to assert hegemony. Yeltsin is even losing control of national

policy regarding Kosovo. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was forced to rebut

Defense Ministry statements on the issue, claiming only Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry

could make official policy. Kosovo may be Yeltsin's undoing, as it has united and

revitalized his opponents. However, Yeltsin has always been an opportunist, and he may

yet see his salvation in seizing this issue and being more nationalistic and aggressive

than his opponents. What that would look like is frightening to contemplate.

IN RUSSIA, PUTIN'S POWER

ALMOST ABSOLUTE

Analysis

December 27, 2001 | 0000 Print Text Size

Analysis

Two allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin joined Russia's most influential business

lobby on Dec. 21. That was followed by a live, national call-in program Dec. 24 --

broadcast via television, radio and Internet -- in which Putin fielded questions from his

http://www.stratfor.com/analysisjavascript:void(0)

countrymen for 2 1/2 hours. Taken together, these events signal Putin has nearly

finished consolidating his economic, political and social control and is now better

positioned to hammer the few resistant elements into line. With newfound political

stability, the president will set about implementing reforms passed in 2001 and begin

crafting a new raft of reforms in 2002.This fresh momentum comes at a fortuitous

moment. U.S. and European leaders are now openly saying Russia should join the

World Trade Organization in 2003. For that to happen, Putin must prove to the world that

Russia can make its reform laws stick in 2002.Russia's oligarchs control the bulk of the

economy and have made the reform process a nightmare. On Dec. 21, the president and

his allies took yet another step to bring the oligarchs to heel: Former prime minister

Yevgeny Primakov and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller joined the Union of Industrialists and

Entrepreneurs, commonly known as the trade union of the oligarchs. Putin can now

manipulate the oligarchs, or at a bare minimum eviscerate the body they use to

coordinate their actions.

Read more: In Russia, Putin's Power Almost Absolute | Stratfor

FORMER SOVIET UNION NET

ASSESSMENT -- 2005

Analysis

July 15, 2005 | 2131 Print Text Size

Summary

The Former Soviet Union (FSU) has been one of the world's most influential regions for

more than a thousand years, due in part to its strategic location and valuable resources.

It has entered a new epoch where outside forces -- mainly the United States -- are

gaining the upper hand in the region while Russia suffers a systemic crisis. Given the

FSU's past geopolitical performance, a move to repel outside forces probably is brewing.

The FSU's geopolitical drivers include the desire for strong centralized power, Russia's

self-perception as a great nation, a developed sense of common regional identity, a

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-putins-power-almost-absolute-0#ixzz38IpsgpzRhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysisjavascript:void(0)

sense of social justice, and elites' admiration for the West -- which often is not shared by

the masses and creates a backlash.

Analysis

Cycles of Northern Eurasia's Geopolitical History

The Former Soviet Union (FSU), or Northern Eurasia, occupies one-sixth of the Earth's

land area. Both geography and history bear enormously on its current and future

geopolitics. It is centrally located in respect to other major parts of Eurasia -- Europe, the

Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and China/East Asia -- and contains the shortest

land connection between Eurasia's Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Because of its

geography, Northern Eurasia represents both a threat and an opportunity for outside

powers -- something evident throughout the long history of dramatic struggles between

internal and external forces vying for control of this critical land mass.

Northern Eurasia's geopolitical history can be divided into several large epochs:

The World's Periphery: Antiquity to the 9th Century

In its first historic epoch, Northern Eurasia was an object of geopolitics, influenced by

outside forces, rather than a geopolitical subject affecting the rest of the world. Its first

states were indigenous, but the only significant internal regional forces were the

countless nomadic tribes dominating the Eurasian steppes -- and at times turning

themselves into invincible invading armies of horsemen, sowing horror from Europe in

the west to China in the east. Outside powers -- the ancient Greeks, Persians, Alexander

the Great's Greek-Macedonian warriors and the Roman and Byzantine empires --

conquered Northern Eurasia's edges and defined the region's fate.

Russia's First Rise and Decline: 9th Century to 1480

The second epoch lasted from the end of the 9th century through 1480. During that

epoch Russia appeared for the first time in world history and made itself important. In

882, the united state of Rus' formed, embracing all Eastern Slavs -- who were one

people, not yet divided into Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians -- and non-Slavic

tribes in Eastern Europe. Kiev, a city known to have existed since the 5th century,

served as the first capital of Rus'.

In 988, the Russians adopted Orthodox Christianity from the Byzantine Empire, rejecting

the Roman Catholic Pope's entreaties to adopt Catholicism -- a move that continued to

bear heavily on the fundamental differences and uneven, often turbulent, relations

between Russia and the West.

Rus', by then known as Russia, became important to Europe when it successfully

defended itself (and Europe) from the Eurasian nomads. Russia entered European

politics through royal intermarriages, diplomatic ties, trade, alliances and wars. Russia

began to prosper from its control over important trade routes from the Baltic to the Black

Sea, linking Western and Northern Europe to the Byzantine Empire and the Middle East.

But after an initial burst of importance and prosperity, the second half of this epoch

proved catastrophic for Russia and the rest of Northern Eurasia. Genghis Khan's

Mongolian Empire conquered -- and, for the first time, united -- much of the region from

the 13th through the 15th centuries. Russia's rulers then had to pay tribute to the Golden

Horde, a successor of the Mongolian Empire.

The West took a great deal of geopolitical advantage of Russia's defeat at the hands of

the Mongols. Germans, Swedes and Danes conquered the Baltics, forcing Russian

forces allied with some Baltic tribes to retreat to the east and cutting off Russia's access

to the Baltic Sea for centuries. Even worse for Russia, Poles and Lithuanians chipped

away Russia's western principalities and divided the formerly united Eastern Slavs into

three groups: the Russians, who fell under the Golden Horde's control, and the

Ukrainians and the Belarusians, who were both eventually subjugated by Poland --

which persecuted Russian Orthodox adherents and forced many to convert to

Catholicism. Russia was not without success during this era --it managed to check the

Germans and Swedes trying to conquer northwest Russia by defeating their invading

armies of knights in 1240 and 1242.

Russia's Rebirth and Unification of the Region: 1480 to 1861

The third epoch began in 1480, when Russia -- then under Moscow, after Kiev fell into

Polish hands -- overthrew the Golden Horde's control and became independent again; it

finished in 1861, when Russia became a truly modern state. The beginning of that epoch

for Russia almost exactly matches our definition of the beginning of the global modern

epoch -- with the discovery of the Americas in 1492. But Russia's path in that epoch was

very different from that of the seafaring West. Russia embarked on a long quest to unite

all of Northern Eurasia, moving by land from Europe through Northern Asia till it reached

the Pacific.

In the first era of this epoch, from 1480 to 1700, the major geopolitical feature in

Northern Eurasia was Russia's eastward expansion. Even before that, after the Muslim

Ottoman Turkish Empire put an end to the Byzantine Empire in 1453, Russia's Tsar Ivan

III married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor and inherited the geopolitical mission

of the Orthodox Christian world's prime defender. For Russia, this mission is not over

and is remembered in the saying, "Moscow is the Third Rome," establishing succession

after the original Roman Empire and the "Second Rome" of the Byzantine Empire. Also

during this era, Ivan the Terrible made huge gains for Russia, destroying several

Mongolian successor states and thus clearing the way for Russia to expand into Siberia.

However, his attempt to re-open Russia's Baltic Sea access failed.

Peter the Great began another era in this long epoch when in the Northern War, 1700 to

1721, he defeated what was then Europe's best army -- the Swedes -- and took the

Baltics from them. Peter also established the Russian Empire, reformed the country after

Western patterns, opened Russia to world trade and reintroduced Russia into European

geopolitics. Under Catherine the Great, Russia defeated the Turks and gained access to

the Black Sea, through which the Russian fleet was able to go to the Mediterranean in

the second half of the 18th century. The Russian Empire's peak achievement was

defeating Napoleon's 600,000-strong invading army in 1812, playing a major role in

liberating Europe from Napoleon. Russia entered Paris in 1814 and legally established

itself as a centerpiece of European geopolitics at the Vienna Congress in 1815.

Russia's prominence prompted several other big players -- namely Britain, France,

Turkey and Sardinia -- to combine their forces and attack Russia along its borders from

the north through the Crimea and to the Pacific, during the Crimean War from 1853-

1856. In spite of its defeat, by 1861 Russia had all of Northern Eurasia under its power,

with the Amur River lands in the Far East as the latest addition.

World Prominence and Decline: 1861 to 1991

The fourth epoch, from 1861 through 1991, saw Russia's uneven and hard march to

world prominence. This began with the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and continued on

through capitalist reforms in the country, Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese in

1905 and Russia's participation in World War II. The region changed radically in 1917,

when the Bolshevik October Revolution transformed the Russian Empire into the Soviet

Union.

That revolution began the era in which Russia fought for its survival, 1917 through 1945.

During this period, the Soviets repulsed the 14-nation Entente's invasion of Russia in

1918-1922 and the Nazi invasion during World War II. Meanwhile, Russia became

economically formidable through industrialization -- accomplished with no foreign direct

investment -- and a cultural revolution which resulted in complete literacy.

After its May 1945 victory over Germany, the Soviets quickly restored their war-torn

country, developed an indigenous nuclear program, helped anti-colonial movements

around the world and launched the world's first satellite in 1957 and the first man in orbit

in 1961 -- in short, by 1961 Russia was world's second superpower.

However, as in previous epochs, Russia's prominence was followed by decline. From

1961 through 1991 Russia stagnated, overburdened by the exhausting arms race

against the United States and the country's ineffective management. In the end, it was

the Soviet ruling elites -- wishing to change themselves from the country's managers to

the country's owners -- who made a conscious decision for the Soviet Union to cease to

exist.

Current Trends in Northern Eurasia

The region began its fifth historic epoch with the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is

hard to say how long this epoch will last and what it will bring to the FSU in the end, but

we believe the first era in this new epoch is ongoing now. This era is about

disintegration, though there have been attempts at reintegrating the region. Internal

forces are weak but are trying to block outside powers that are making major geopolitical

efforts to establish their positions and even dominance.

For the first time in a long while, Northern Eurasia is not united, and centrifugal forces

are prevailing over centripetal. Also for the first time in a long while, the FSU's strongest

power -- Russia -- is not strong enough to check foreign powers' penetration into the

region. As in ancient times, Northern Eurasia is becoming more of an object of

geopolitics than its subject, with outside powers' exerting much stronger influence on it

than it can project outside its borders. This weakening and pulling apart of the FSU has

been accompanied by the severe post-Soviet economic decline and systemic crisis in

the region's states.

Unilateral Concessions to the West Are Over, Reaction Has

Begun

In this era, there have been two different phases. The first -- a phase of outright

geopolitical retreat by Russia and the FSU's other states, with no real attempts to resist

outside powers' strategic penetration -- started in 1991 and appears to have ended by

2004 or 2005 at the latest. Currently, the second phase is starting, as regional powers --

led by Russia -- begin a strategic response to the recent decline and to outside powers'

increasing influence. The attempts to reverse the tide started after Russian President

Vladimir Putin was re-elected for his second term last year. It is likely that these attempts

did not start earlier because some parts of the Russian elite -- and perhaps other

regional upper classes, too -- realized only recently that this current epoch and era could

be about something much worse than a temporary decline: Their states' very existence

could well come to an end unless dramatic measures are taken quickly.

Taking into account that Ukraine -- the region's strongest power after the Russian

Federation and also Moscow's closest ally -- became pro-Western in late 2004, that

Moscow is failing on virtually all fronts and that Russians are dying at a rate of about a

million a year while the birth rate in Russia is one-sixth of the abortion rate, it becomes

clear that Russia is doomed to disappear not just politically but also demographically

unless it fights with all the power it can muster to reverse these current trends.

This year's events and developments indicate that Russian policy has just turned the

corner and is fighting against the U.S.-led geopolitical offensive into the FSU. Russia is

refusing to make new unilateral concessions to Washington, while forming a meaningful

strategic partnership with China and seeking other allies; Moscow is making major arms

sales and other cooperative deals with the United States' foes; Russian officials are

talking publicly for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union about U.S. intelligence

services using nongovernmental organizations to foment unrest in the FSU against

Russian interests; the list goes on.

However, this new policy is still in its embryonic stage. The Kremlin still is seeking the

best answers to its multiple problems -- starting with how to take U.S. pressure off of

Russia without confronting Washington directly, and finishing with how to fight the U.S.-

led geopolitical thrust without scaring Western investors away from Russia. So it appears

that much fighting for Russia's survival is still ahead.

During this transitional time, Putin is doing a lot of fence-sitting. For example, within just

a few days, He joined China's President Hu Jintao in calling for the end of unilateralism -

- referring to the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush and its striving for

global dominance -- but also asked the G-8 to deny aid to Zimbabwe, ruled by the

stridently anti-U.S. Robert Mugabe. Given these apparently opposing impulses, it comes

into question whether Putin has the political will to deploy all means necessary to repel

the U.S. strategic geopolitical attack. However, geopolitics teaches that though leaders'

roles are important, it is the country's national interests that determine a nation's fate.

Russia's utmost interest and concern now is its survival as an independent and

sovereign state and as a united entity. This is the highest stake possible. Thus, if Putin

does not take action, then his replacement -- made constitutionally or otherwise -- will

drive Russia on its next, and perhaps final, bid to save itself from geopolitical oblivion.

It should be noted that not just Russia, but all the FSU nations are in the same boat --

their failure as states, to the point of disappearing from the map, is a very real prospect.

This concerns all FSU states no matter whether they are aligned with Washington or

Moscow. Unofficial data says more Azerbaijanis have to live in Russia than in Azerbaijan

because there are no jobs available at home. Witnesses say the entire male populations

of many western Ukrainian villages have to seek low-paying jobs abroad to secure their

families' survival. Millions have left Georgia and Armenia since the end of the Soviet

Union. These are only a few among many signs of decline.

The FSU's Social and Political Drivers

Through the course of Northern Eurasia's history, several core drivers have

always shaped the region's politics.

The Desire for a Strong Central Power

The desire for strong -- at times, absolute -- central power has always been present in

the region. No matter who ruled it, be it a Mongolian khan, a Russian tsar, a Russian

emperor or a Soviet president, all have tried to concentrate as much power as possible

at the very top level. This desire for strong power could be called a whim on the part of

power-hungry rulers, were it not that the masses and sometimes the elites have strongly

supported this tendency. This indicates that the pattern has its objective roots in the

FSU's geography and history.

To start with, the region's sheer size and ethnic diversity make foreign and internal

relations difficult to manage. The diverse and often conflicting agendas of neighboring

states and distant powers alike only adds to that challenge -- as does the need to protect

thousands of miles of borders. Perhaps more important, Northern Eurasia's vastness

makes it impossible to develop it internally as a viable, unified economic or political entity

without a very strong central power.

This geography lesson was long ago learned by locals who wanted a mighty central

power and supported it against competing elites trying to gain independence from the

top ruler. In fact, the region's history is full of examples of the masses supporting a tsar

against landowners and nobles, or supporting a strong Soviet ruler against Soviet elites.

Now the FSU's masses who want to see their countries revived, strong and united are

supporting centralized governments under strong rulers, rather than regional and local

elites who are vying for more autonomy or even independence.

The FSU nations' geopolitical mentality also calls for supporting a strong central power.

In Russia, this attitude has been long reinforced by Orthodox Christian beliefs and

historical experience which both point to the necessity of a strong central government,

even a single ruler, for the good of the nation. Indeed, when Northern Eurasia becomes

fractionalized, it usually suffers disastrous consequences -- as it did in the 12th and 13th

centuries, when the power of the ruler in Kiev became nominal and the Russian regions,

driven apart from each other by local princes, were unable to defend themselves

individually from invading Mongols.

This desire for centralized power at the top drives not only Russia but all the other

nations in the region. Take Belarus or the Central Asian nations, for example. Their

highly centralized structure is not simply due to the leaders' desires for power -- it is

driven by their peoples' historically tested thinking that a weak central power would leave

their countries vulnerable to foreign incursions and to internal chaos.

Insiders vs. Outsiders

The FSU's people have always had to defend their independence from outside powers.

A sense of common regional identity has helped this attitude to persist, as has the long-

established presence of ethnically mixed communities throughout Northern Eurasia. The

inclination of regional powers to stand together against an outside power has been

demonstrated numerous times. This tendency seems to have waned in importance since

the end of the Soviet Union, but it is still present -- as evidenced by several FSU nations

working together, rather than with outside forces, to block the spread of Islamist

militancy.

The resistance to the U.S. expansion into the FSU should be viewed in this framework,

too. Though it appears that a majority of non-Russian elites -- and even some Russian

elites -- welcome the U.S. advance and its accompanying political and financial benefits,

the majority among the masses in the FSU oppose this development and see it as a

grave danger to their countries. It should not be forgotten that many in the region --

mostly among the general populace, but some among the elites -- still think of the FSU

as one entity which should be united from the inside. This is why nostalgia for the Soviet

era is so strong not only in Russia but in some other FSU countries. It is not a desire to

return to the Soviet Union and the communist system (though millions would like to see

that happen). Rather it is a desire for some sort of reunification into an economic and

even political union, in which the region's peoples will feel secure against the current

turbulence -- which many see as a result of outside forces trying to take over the region

and its resources, and make its people servants to the West.

Russian Self-Perception as Great Nation

There is a long-entrenched view among Russians that they are a great nation -- born in

the many wars Russia won throughout the centuries, successful (more often than not) in

acquiring new territories, and almost always successful in defending their own. This

perception has been strengthened by the Russian state's continuous existence -- now

for more than 1100 years -- while other states have disappeared into the darkness of

history. This attitude will no doubt be a driving force if the nation makes a grand push to

save itself from the geopolitical catastrophe it now faces.

Orthodox Christianity

Orthodox Christianity is not only found among the majority of Russia's people, it is strong

in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. Orthodox Christian beliefs and

ideals have played a vital role in keeping parts of Northern Eurasia together for

centuries. Russia's revival and renewed alliance with other FSU nations will have

Orthodox Christianity as one of its most important unifiers and drivers.

Though Western media correctly report that the Russian Orthodox Church is trying to

stop what it calls "Protestant proselytization" into traditional Orthodox strongholds, it

should be noted that one of the Church's goals is to keep Russians mindful of their

national interests. Indeed, some Russian Protestant converts not only do care for

Russia, but refuse to think of Russia as their motherland. Geopolitically speaking, if such

views spread in Russia, the country will have no hope for revival.

Westernization of Elites -- and Backlash

Be they tsarist aristocrats or 19th-century democrats, modern-day liberals or

bureaucrats, many -- in fact, the majority -- of the region's national elites have long

looked (openly or secretly) to the West as a model. In some cases, admiration for the

West has helped the local elites make their nations stronger and more advanced while

remaining independent from the West -- as when Peter the Great forcefully Westernized

Russia, opened access to the Baltic Sea and successfully confronted some Western

European foes. But in other cases it has led to subjugation to the West -- as when Peter

III, a servile admirer of Prussia's King Friedrich II, withdrew from Berlin and the other

German territories the Russian army had gained during the Seven Years War (1756 to

1763).

While there is no doubt that Putin is a true Westernizer, it is unclear whether he will

ultimately choose to stand up openly to the United States to protect Russia's interests.

So far, his timid attempts to make trouble for Washington -- by aiding U.S. foes while

trying to avoid confrontation with Washington, even at the cost of unilateral concessions

-- do not put Putin on the same level as Peter the Great.

Russian elites' admiration for the West has always caused a backlash from the masses,

and from those leaders and elites who believe the region should follow its own path.

Hence, there has been a constant struggle between Westernizers and those insisting

that Russia has its own place in geopolitics and should make its own way.

Striving to Unite Around the Strongest

The tendency to unite around the strongest power has been an important regional driver

-- but it ultimately helps only powers that are truly strong. A weak central power gets no

respect -- as evidenced now by Russia's consistently humiliation at the hands of its tiny

neighbors who have Washington's backing. When Russia was strong, this tendency

helped it a lot; no matter whether other elites in the region agreed with Russia's agenda

at the time, they flocked to Moscow and helped it defeat outsiders. Now, however, this

pattern often works in favor of the United States in the FSU because local elites consider

Washington far stronger than other powers, including Moscow.

Social Justice

The FSU's mentality calls for locals, on both individual and national levels, to put social

justice and fairness as their paramount motivation, sometimes even surpassing

patriotism. The regional understanding of justice is strikingly different from that in the

West, especially in the United States. For people in the FSU, justice is about every

human being's inalienable right to housing, work, food and other elements necessary for

survival. It is also about equality, with people firmly believing that all, no matter how rich

or poor they are, should have the same access to everything. The region's people

traditionally have been averse to seeing the accumulation of wealth as a person's

ultimate goal. Many despise financial speculation, and greed is the most universally

deplored sin in the FSU. Success is not considered a category by which to distinguish

people; those who are unlucky receive sympathy.

This striving for social justice has much more to do with the FSU's internal policies -- i.e.,

how power players and other inhabitants shape their societies -- than with the FSU's

foreign policies, which are mostly shaped by geopolitical concerns. The struggle for

social justice has been a constant feature in the region, with Russia alone having

experienced four major peasant wars and hundreds of major uprisings over the last

several centuries. For this reason, Northern Eurasia became the first place in the world

where communism -- which many consider a practical expression of this concept of

social justice in the modern world -- came into being. Russian rural communities, based

on equality and collectivism, formed the core of Russia's society for more than a

thousand years until they were destroyed by Pyotr Stolypin's capitalist reforms after the

revolution of 1905 -- this paved the way for the October Revolution of 1917 and for the

success of communism. Even now, with capitalism reigning almost everywhere in the

region, a majority of people believe that social justice is more important than profits.

Even many of the rich there -- often called New Russians -- behave dramatically

differently from Western capitalists. For the New Russians, having money is more about

showing off than about accumulating wealth. It is difficult to imagine a Russian in his 80s

still working to accumulate wealth; it would not make sense to the Russians, who learn

from the Orthodox Church that they cannot take their wealth to Heaven.

The drive for social justice has enormous geopolitical implications. First, the Bush

administration's policies are unpopular among the region's masses, meaning that many

could turn away from cooperating with U.S. forces or policies. Some local elites could

face pressure from the masses and begin resisting U.S. policies. Second, many in the

FSU see Islam as a religion of justice and see Islamists -- both moderate and radical --

as defenders of justice against corrupt local leaders who sold their nations out to the

unjust West; thus Islamist militants are getting a great deal of sympathy in the region.

Finally, local militaries -- particularly the Russians -- have a historical tendency to fight

valiantly if they believe they are fighting for a just cause; they perform much more poorly

if they do not. For example, many Russian soldiers fighting in World War I, disappointed

with the tsarist regime, deserted the front, though in World War II many soldiers --

including some who had deserted in World War I -- fought to the death, convinced they

were defending their motherland and system of social justice.

Restraints or Arresting Factors

Too Much Bureaucracy and Widespread Corruption

Bureaucracy and corruption have been grave obstacles indeed for whatever

undertakings Northern Eurasian governments have launched through the centuries, and

it remains a major arresting factor. For example, Russia's defeats in the Crimean War

(1853 to 1856) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904 to 1905) were caused not only by

poor technology and lack of rail transportation, but also by an absolutely immovable

tsarist bureaucracy whose procrastination, lethargy and indifference became legendary.

Corruption has also been a major trademark of regional bureaucracies. Widespread

corruption -- often bordering on or crossing the line into treason -- has often helped the

region's foes and continues to do so. For example, the main factor deciding the success

of pro-U.S. "revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was that local security

service leaders in those countries switched sides after secret talks with the opposition

and representatives of the West. While some of the local officials were scared into

switching sides by threats -- for example, threats to seize their often "dirty" secret bank

accounts in the West -- others were bribed in different ways.

Poor Local Democracy Traditions

This is an important arresting factor, because the lack of democratic traditions has often

left local communities very poorly organized on the grassroots level when such

organization was most required, such as during an invasion. This in turn has led

passivity when urgent mobilization is needed, with leaders on all levels waiting too long

for instructions from the central government.

Attempts to revive the region would have a greater chance of success if local forces

learned from the Western experience of democratic self-organization, and discovered

solutions that would work for Northern Eurasia. Indeed, there is some local history of

democratic traditions, though mostly from earlier times. In Russia, for example, the

medieval city-republics of Novgorod and Pskov were democratically elected; Ukraine has

had elements of direct rule by the people when the Cossacks held democratic elections;

and many Belarusians were able to organize themselves quickly on a local level, without

outsiders' help, and take the initiative to attack Nazi German occupying troops in 1941.

So despite the masses' current passivity in those countries, there could be some limited

grassroots organization when the masses perceive that their nations are threatened.

This happened when mass protests against the monetization of social benefits -- first

organized by local leaders not linked to political parties -- spread through Russia in

spring 2005.

However, patriarchal and patronage-type relations seem to still prevail on the whole in

the region. The thousand-year-long tradition of following orders from the central

government or from the top clan leader may well continue to inhibit the masses from

organizing themselves.

Geographic Constraints

Geography severely limits FSU nations' capabilities and choices in responding to

external -- and sometimes even internal -- challenges. Rough terrain in some areas

makes quick mobilization difficult, and many of the countries in the region either are

completely landlocked or must contend with seas that freeze over. Russia, for example,

has access to three oceans, but it is too far north to succeed as a sea power; most of its

seaports and naval bases are iced in for months at a time. Thus, seafaring nations such

as the United States and the United Kingdom have always had -- and will always have --

an advantage over Northern Eurasian nations in naval power, and therefore in projecting

power globally.

The region's climate is yet another constraint -- it has made it improbable, if not

impossible, for Northern Eurasian economies to ever attain the world's best standards of

productivity and efficiency. The FSU's location in the northern latitudes means that most

industries must put in more effort than their southern counterparts to produce or extract a

unit of any product. For this reason, Russian and even Caspian oil exploration,

extraction, refining and transportation are doomed to be significantly more expensive

than such operations in the Middle East.

Enablers

Presence of a Strong Unifying Nation

There is a longstanding geopolitical tradition in Northern Eurasia that weaker nations

facing national security threats from powerful outside enemies ask for (and receive) help

from the strongest state in the region. Traditionally, Russia has been that power, leading

not only by force but also by example. History shows that while some smaller nations

joined with Russia under coercion, others did so because of threats posed by external

powers. Faced with genocide at the hands of the Ottoman and Persian empires, Georgia

at the end of the 18th century volunteered to join with Russia -- and Russia has

defended Georgia since then, while providing Georgian elites the same privileges the

Russian elites had. Kazakhs did the same when they faced threats from powerful

nomadic tribes invading from northwest China. Russia also bore the main brunt and

burden of World War II, though defending the Soviet Union was a common effort by all

then-Soviet peoples.

Currently, Russia does not seem to have the qualities needed to lead other states -- and

other regional powers have noticed this, leading them to turn away from Moscow. But

given Russia's centuries-long record of leadership, its current weakness might be the

exception rather than the rule. Russia seems to have a chance to resume its leadership

role if it responds quickly and forcefully to external powers' penetration into the FSU, and

if it helps those governments that want to survive pro-Western "revolutions." Moscow is

already trying to revive its leadership role in Central Asia, where governments such as

Uzbekistan find Russia (albeit in league with China) capable of providing needed support

and furthering the shared goal of checking the U.S. advance in the region.

Human Capital

For centuries, in times of national crisis, the FSU -- especially Russia -- has always had

talented leaders or organizers who appeared suddenly and took on critically important

functions to see the region through history's deadliest turns. For example, at the

beginning of the 17th century, Polish troops occupied Moscow and the half-disintegrated

and partly-occupied Russia had no ruler or national army. Provincial mid-level trader

Kuzma Minin organized and began financing a people's militia in Nizhny Novgorod, and

Dmitry Pozharsky led the militia to liberate Moscow and subsequently the country,

restoring its central authority and sovereignty. Russia has also had fantastic scientific

potential, in part because of high-quality Russian intellectual capital.

Today, when Russia is in a deep and prolonged crisis and suffering a "brain drain," there

are still plenty of talented Russian high-tech professionals in sectors ranging from space

to military-industrial industries to academic sciences who remain in the country and work

for low salaries because of their patriotism. It is possible that, when Russia enters

decisive battles in the future, new talented leaders could replace those in charge now

who seem unable to get Russia through its present difficulties.

Fighting Hardest in Times of Crisis

The quality that makes the FSU most dangerous to its foes is that its people fight best

when facing life-or-death situations. In the past, they have made apparent miracles

happen as they fought against all odds and saved their countries -- overthrowing the

Golden Horde; defeating Polish-Swedish occupying forces in the 17th century and then

the army of King Carlos XII in the 18th century; handing the previously undefeated

Napoleon's forces a crushing defeat and then taking Paris in the 19th century; and

repelling the 14-state Entente and defeating Nazi German forces in the 20th century.

It remains to be seen whether the FSU can still muster the strength to achieve such

successes, though many FSU nations do seem to be facing life-or-death situations. But

given their past performances, there is at least a possibility that they will rescue

themselves.

Read more: Former Soviet Union Net Assessment -- 2005 | Stratfor

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/former-soviet-union-net-assessment-2005#ixzz38IqG8WQe

RUSSIA AND ROTATING THE U.S.

FOCUS

Geopolitical Weekly

Tuesday, April 1, 2008 - 11:59 Print Text Size

By George Friedman

For the past year, STRATFOR has been focusing on what we see as the critical global

geopolitical picture. As the U.S.-jihadist war has developed, it has absorbed American

military resources dramatically. It is overstated to say that the United States lacks the

capacity to intervene anywhere else in the world, but it is not overstated to say that the

United States cannot make a major, sustained intervention without abandoning Iraq.

Thus, the only global power has placed almost all of its military chips in the Islamic

world.

Exploiting U.S. Distractions

Russia has taken advantage of the imbalance in the U.S. politico-military posture to

attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. To this end,

Russia has taken advantage of its enhanced financial position -- due to soaring

commodity prices, particularly in the energy sector -- as well as a lack of American

options in the region.

The Russians do not have any interest in re-establishing the Soviet Union, nor even in

controlling the internal affairs of most of the former Soviet republics. Moscow does want

to do two things, however. First, it wants to coordinate commodity policies across the

board to enhance Russian leverage. Second, and far more important, it wants to limit

U.S. and European influence in these countries. Above all, Russia does not want to see

NATO expand any further -- and Moscow undoubtedly would like to see a NATO

rollback, particularly in the Baltic states.

From a strategic point of view, the United States emerged from the Cold War with a

major opportunity. Since it is not in the United States' interests to have any great power

emerge in Eurasia, making certain that Russia did not re-emerge as a Eurasian

hegemon clearly was a strategic goal of the United States. The Soviet disintegration did

not in any way guarantee that it would not re-emerge in another form.

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-weeklyjavascript:void(0)

The United States pursued this goal in two ways. The first was by seeking to influence

the nature of the Russian regime, trying to make it democratic and capitalist under the

theory that democratic and capitalist nations did not engage in conflict with democratic

and capitalist countries. Whatever the value of the theory, what emerged was not

democracy and capitalism but systemic chaos and decomposition. The Russians

ultimately achieved this state on their own, though the United States and Europe

certainly contributed.

The second way Washington pursued this goal was by trying to repeat the containment

of the Soviet Union with a new containment of Russia. Under this strategy, the United

States in particular executed a series of moves with the end of expanding U.S. influence

in the countries surrounding Russia. This strategy's capstone was incorporating new

countries into NATO, or putting them on the path to NATO membership.

NATO Expansion and Color Revolutions

The Baltic states were included, along with the former Soviet empire in Central Europe.

But the critical piece in all of this was Ukraine. If Ukraine were included in NATO or fell

under Western influence, Russia's southern flank would become indefensible. NATO

would be a hundred miles from Volgograd, formerly known as Stalingrad. NATO would

also be less than a hundred miles from St. Petersburg. In short, Russia would become a

strategic cripple.

The U.S. strategy was to encourage pro-American, democratic movements in the former

Soviet Republics -- the