A Casualty of Political Transformation?: The Politics of Japanese Energy Efficiency Phillip Y. Lipscy Department of Political Science & Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
Feb 13, 2016
A Casualty of Political Transformation?:
The Politics of Japanese Energy Efficiency
Phillip Y. Lipscy
Department of Political Science &Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research
Center,Stanford University
Politics of Energy Efficiency: The General Puzzles
• Cross-National Variation in Energy Efficiency Policies and Outcomes–What Explains Cross-national Variation
in Outcomes?–Why are Different Policies Adopted?–What Political Factors Affect the
Effectiveness of Policies?
Why Japan?• Strong Energy Efficiency Record• Important component of foreign
policy and foreign aid • Not Clear Why Japan has Done So
Well• Role of Politics?
Cultural Explanations?• Energy Policy Experts Often Claim: “Japan
is Different”• Unique Culture of Frugality?
The Political Context of Japanese Efficiency Policies
• Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy• Interest Group Politics• Efficiency Clientelism
Bureaucratic Initiative & Independence
• Stable Government Policy– Encourages private sector investment in
efficiency– vs. US: Carter Reagan; Clinton Bush
• Public-Private Communication• Depoliticized Policymaking– Top Runner Program– Explicitly designed to prevent perversion
of policy through lobbying
0.00%
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.04%
0.05%
0.06%
0.07%
0.08%
0.09%
Budgets of National Energy Efficiency Agencies and Ministries, Share of GDP
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Number of Employees in NationalEnergy Efficiency Agencies / Ministries
Interest Group Politics• Interest Group Politics– Absence of Strong Anti-Efficiency
Interest Groups– Early establishment of industry
leadership in efficient products– Virtuous Cycle: • Specialization in efficient products Political
support for efficiency Policy to support efficiency
– e.g. Automobile Sector & Fuel Economy Standards• Toyota; Honda strong lobby for stringent
standards
Efficiency Clientelism• Efficiency Clientelism: policies that served dual
purpose:– Provision of Pork to LDP (Old Ruling Party) Constituencies– Energy Efficiency through Diffuse Costs Imposed on
General Public • Efficiency Clientelism matched up well with
Japan’s post-World War II political arrangements– MMD-SNTV Electoral System; Rural Overrepresentation– LDP One-Party Dominance– Bureaucratic Initiative
• Contributed to Japan’s abnormal transport profile of high costs, low total distance traveled, high rail-share, and low automobile-share
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Total Distance Traveled (All Modes), Annual Passenger KM per Capita
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Passenger KM per Capita by Travel Mode
Car
Bus
Rail, Tram, Metro
Air
Water
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Rail and Bus Share of Total Distance Traveled
Japan
Denmark
Italy
Sweden
Germany
France
Finland
Norway
Great Britain
US
Example: Kei-Cars (軽自動車 )• Subsidization of light-weight
automobiles through tax incentives and relaxed requirements
• Began as part of motorization policy in 1950s
• In 1970s, coopted to serve dual purpose:– Energy Efficiency fuel efficient vehicles
for rural areas with limited public transportation
– Subsidization of rural residents, small business
Subsidies for Kei-CarsKei-Cars Regular
AutomobilesAutomobile Acquisition Tax (Time of Purchase)
3% 5%
Automobile Weight Tax(Every 3 Years)
13,200 (~$160) 56,700 (~$690)(Compact Car)
Automobile Tax (Yearly)
7,200 (~$90) 29,500 (~$360)
Highway Discount(Per Use; Rural Areas Only)
20% Discount n/a
Registration of Parking Space
Not Necessary(Rural Areas Only)
Required
Kei-Car Ownership by PrefecturePrefecture Kei-Cars as
% of TotalPopulation Density (people/km2)
Kochi 50.0% 108Nagasaki 49.6% 349Okinawa 49.0% 609Shimane 48.8% 107Tottori 48.3% 169… … …Osaka 28.0% 4,657Aichi 27.2% 1,436Chiba 26.4% 1,199Saitama 26.0% 1,888Hokkaido 25.9% 70Kanagawa 20.0% 3,728Tokyo 16.2% 5,937
Rural Transportation in US vs. Japan
Other Examples• Highway Tolls• Gasoline Tax• Shinkansen Bullet Train Network• Electricity Prices
The End of Efficiency Clientelism• Political Changes Since the 1990s
Undermine Efficiency Clientelism– Electoral Reform – Delegitimization of Bureaucracy– End of LDP Dominance
• Peculiar Position of DPJ (New Ruling Party)– Public Endorsement of Significant CO2
Reductions • Hatoyama 25% Reduction Target from 1990 Levels
– Policy Commitments that Run Counter to CO2 Reduction
Conclusion• Political Sources of Japan’s Efficiency
Policies – Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy – Interest Group Politics– Efficiency Clientelism
• New Approach? – Distribution of revenues to efficiency-
enhancing activities & R&D rather than pork
– Challenge: difficult to implement pro-efficiency policies with diffuse costs without public backlash
–Where will political support come from?