99% Muslim, 1% Non-Turkish

99% Muslim, 1%Non-Turkish

Elif Sercen Nurcan

Content

1- Abstract

2- High Tensions

3- “I’m a Christian, but I’m also a Turk”

4- Conclusion

5- References

Abstract

Turkey has an apparent and well-known problem with its

minority rights. Repeatedly reported by the European Union

Progress Reports in addition to a myriad of other information

sources plus academic works, Republic of Turkey carries a

history laced with discriminatory practices against its

minorities, especially against Alevis and Christians.

Unfortunately, majority of the acts and practices aren’t

carried out by the state though it serves as a dystopic

example; society itself engages in such acts both on a macro

and micro level. Leaving the much debated Muslim minorities

discussion aside, I divert my attention to a specific yet often

ignored case that made itself known especially after 2007. It

is the case of violence of all kinds particularly targeting

non-foreign Christians. Acts and the kind of societal reaction

that follows them make one ponder about how these acts make

themselves come to be and what are the discourses underlying

this area of identity based contention that is capable of

birthing bloody acts and mortal silences surrounding the entire

society. By aiding subjectivities of real

life experiences with objective archival and statistical facts,

the crucial answers can be found in the area of discussion

framed by formation and conceptualization of the modern state,

modernization brought on by Kemalism, Turkish westernization

and democratization experience, and violences on inter-personal

level.

Keywords: Protestant Christians in Turkey, violences, state

policies, cultural religion, theory of exclusion/inclusion,

religious identity, Sunni Islam

High Tensions

A blurry general picture of the state of Christians in

Turkey can be derived from statistical data. According to the

Turkish government, 90% of the population is considered as

Muslim, the majority being Sunni. To this day, government

officially recognizes only three minority religious

communities: Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Apostolic

Christians, and Jews, even though other sizable non-Muslim

communities exist in real life. Subjects in question,

Protestants, number around 3.000; further workable guesses

cannot be derived as the threat of social exclusion and

potential material losses inhibit people’s public declaration

of their true religion. Claims of the state regarding the 90%

Muslim population largely stem from this obscured reality.

About 90% of the issued ID cards in Turkey have “Islam” written

in the “Religion” box on them. This practice has been condemned

as being against human rights by the European Court of Human

Rights in February 2010. Government still has yet to

take a solid step to remove the box altogether, though citizens

acquired the right to leave the box empty in 2013.

Considering what Gambetti states about the state being

the ultimate arbiter of truth, morality and subjectivity

(Gambetti, 2013, p.129), the official policies and stances

taken in legal cases affect the society’s perception of

Christians. However, compared with official stances, Islam’s

effect on the societal perceptions are relatively deeper and

has been deeping further throughout the Islamist AKP government

era. To exemplify this point, World Values Survey carried out

in Turkey by Yılmaz Esmer in 2011, revealed that 84% of

citizens don’t want gay neighbors, while 64%, 54%, and 48% do

not wish to live next to an Atheist, Jew, and Christian,

respectively. Regarding this outcome, Prof. Murat Sömer

commented that the what survey results indicate is that despite

socio-economic development, Turkish society isn’t opening up to

diversity, pluralism, and equality. Additionally, "Instead,

many people are becoming more religious-conservative,

patriarchal and open to violence," he said.

Discussion centered around the Christian identity in

Turkey is incredibly complicated owing to the multiple sects

and how each sect is perceived by the rest of the society.

Owing to particularities in their historical relations with the

Sunni community, Armenian and Rum (Greek) communities face

different conditions than Syriac community that faces its own

distinctive problems. There are almost countless smaller sub-

groups of these big sects; however, due to their numbers,

Protestant community is positioned somewhere in between

being a sect or a subgroup in Turkey. The fact that they aren’t

insulated from all kinds of violences must be underlined.

Protestants lack the relations and recognition other Christian

communities have fostered with the Sunni majority over

centuries; it arguably leaves them more prone to

misunderstandings and less chances of social representation

within the general society, not to mention violences. Violence

of words, explained by Balibar, victimizes those who are

‘denied the right to define themselves’ (Balibar, 1991, p.18).

In such a context, normal daily frictions occurring between

individuals take on a more dangerous nature and easily

resolvable disagreements turn into physical violence. A rather

unforgettable example is the Zirve Publishing House Massacre

that occurred on 18 April 2007. The Zirve Publishing House

located in Malatya became the scene of a massacre as three

employees of the Bible publishing house were attacked, tortured

and murdered by five Sunni Muslim assailants. Pastor Necati

Aydın, Uğur Yüksel and Tilmann Geske were the victims. Chief

suspect was Yunus Emre Günaydın, who had attended the mass

sermoned by Pastor Aydın the day before crime took place. Rest

of the suspects, all between the ages 19-23, were detained

under accusations of terrorist activities and planned homicide

as there is no clause in the Turkish Criminal Law specific to

hate crimes. Malatya Heavy Penal Court No. 3 started to hear

the case in 2008 which was integrated to the Ergenekon Case

later on 17 March 2011. Detailed inspections of the evidence

materials showed that Malatya Gendarmerie had carried out

detailed surveillance of the Zirve Publishing House prior to

the murders and had spotted the assailant group before crime

took place. Although gendarmarie is considered as an extension

of the state power, this development signals a new dialectic

whereby the state is being

continually refounded, not only “through its (not so mythic)

appropriation of private justice” (Das and Poole 2004, p.14)

but also through society’s (not so mythic) appropriation of

public justice and violence. Case continued on unresolved until

March 2014 when President Abdullah Gül signed a law that limits

the detainment time period to 5 years. Thanks to this law, all

of the assailants were released on 8 March 2014 without much

media attention. How does a Christian perceive this

development? One of my interviewees, Erol, a Christian

Anatolian Turk whose family was registered under a Muslim

identity during the Ottoman period commented by: “Zirve olayı

ile ilgili yorum yapmak Tanrı’nın yargısına karışmaktır.Onun

için bu konuda olaya karışanları bağışladık ve onları hem

adalete hem de Tanrı’ya havale ettik. Hristiyanlığı seçen veya

sempatisi olan halkı biraz da olsa ürkütmüştür.Fakat bizleri

sadece şehit olan kardeşler için üzüntümüz olup sevindirici

yanı ise gökyüzünde Rabbin yanında olmaları bizleri

sevindirmektedir. Diğer inançlarda olan kişiler ise bizlere

karşı hiçbir değişiklik olmamıştır. Kendi yaşantımda ki değişim

ise daha çok hizmet etmek ve Rabbin sözünü duyurmaya çalışmak

en büyük hizmetimdir. (Translation: Commenting about the Zirve

event means meddling with God’s judgement. This is why we’ve

forgiven those who were involved in this event and left their

cases to justice and God. Even to a small degree, (this event)

scared the people who had chosen Christianity and those who

felt sympathy with Christianity. However, even though we feel

sadness for our brothers who were martyred, we feel happiness

for them being up in the sky with God. There has been no

change in how people of other faiths treat us. The change in my

own life is that I feel serving God and promulgating God’s

message is my biggest duty more.)”

Renewed over time, government policy and practice

contributed to the generally free practice of religion;

however, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious

groups and on religious expression in government offices and

state-run institutions. Churches operating in Turkey generally

face administrative challenges to employ foreign church

personnel, apart from the Catholic Church and congregations

linked to the diplomatic community. However, legal cases are

the main official areas where Christianity related perceptions

and discourses of the Sunni majority spring to life. In October

2006, a prosecutor pressed criminal charges against Hakan

Taştan and Turan Topal, two ex-Muslim converts to Christianity

for violating the infamous Article 301 ("insulting

Turkishness"), inciting hatred against Islam, and secretly

compiling data on private citizens for a Bible correspondence

course. Case accused two men on the basis of reports that

defendants were approaching grade and high school students in

Silivri and apparently attempting to convert them to

Christianity. To collect evidence, police searched defendants’

houses and offices, confiscating two computers, as well as

books and papers. The three plaintiffs claimed that the

defendants called Islam a "primitive and fabricated religion"

and described Turks as a "cursed people." The accused denied

all charges. On May 28, 2009, court proceedings continued but

court called five witnesses to appear at the next hearing, set

for October 15, 2009. During this hearing some witnesses

testified to the effect that they did not even know the

defendants. The court in Silivri adjourned the hearing to 28

January 2010 to listen to three more witnesses. Starting point

of this case carried a parallelity with the persecution of many

intellectuals during that time period as the Article 301

provided a firm structure for the accusations. One of the worst

outcome of such cases was that of the Armenian journalist Hrant

Dink, who was accused of insulting Turkishness and

interfering with legal procedure. “Dink paid with his life for

the ‘negative publicity’ he received during his trial: he was

assassinated in January 2007.“ (Gambetti, 2013, p.139) Despite

the controversy surrounding the assailant Ogün Samast and the

involvement of the police in addition to the district

attorneys, assailant received a sentence of 22 years and 10

months.

Violence doesn’t have to be physical, or state-led.

Additonally, it doesn’t have to manifest itself in the form of

generalized criminal practices. Rather than obvious examples,

as stated by Gambetti regarding the Kurdish identity being

directly associated with the terrorist notion, social violence

can break out along the ideological fault lines dictated by the

state, coming closer to what Rozenbaum and Sederberg (1974)

call ‘establishment violence’. (Gambetti, 2013, p.129) That

being said, issue of being a non-foreign Christian, defined

here as a Turkish speaking Christian considering

himself/herself as Turkish and likely belonging to the

Protestant sect, is even more related to the interpersonal

relations and complexities of fulfillment of the identity in

daily life. Considering the fact that most people belonging to

any religion aren’t religious to the point where religion

practically dictates their every single action and thought, and

compels them to carry out purposefully harmful agendas against

people of other faiths, most non-foreign Christians can carry

on with their lives without any noticeable problems. But,

frictions occur when the verbal language fails to incorporate

the object into the Turkish speaking majority although object

considers himself/herself as Turkish, an official document like

the ID card revealing the religious choices is revealed, or an

informal and indirect questioning of one’s faith comes along in

the individual’s life. A Turkish speaking, American born

Christian considering himself as Turkish, M., conveyed his

thoughts about this matter by these words: “...Because I’m

secular, I don’t think about religion that much...But,

unfortunately, in Turkey, and I know there is the psychological

aspect to it, not only political and sociological, it’s my own

psychology. But unfortunately, as

a Christian living in a majority Muslim country, most of my

experiences related to me being a Christian is mostly negative.

Not like I have negative things happen to me everyday, but I

can say it’s a constant, not constant but it’s like, stressful.

It’s not easy or enjoyable in the slightest bit, being a

Christian in a Muslim country.” Taking another perspective into

consideration, the perspective of a Christian foreign student

in Istanbul, Esther conveyed a different take on the challenges

she faces as a Christian living in Turkey: “Some negative

experiences that I have had are people who ask about my faith,

and when shared, disagree strongly and act rude toward myself

and my faith. But to be honest, this does not bother me much. I

am able to overcome and not become emotional or angry because

Jesus had warned his disciples about this... I personally know

that many Christians around the world were strengthened because

persecution for our faith is a blessing.” These opinions of

course do not represent the entirety of their respective

subgroups, and individuals have their own characters, but what

causes these individuals to perceive what they experience in

such different ways?

“I’m a Christian but I’m also a Turk”

Bobby Said alikenes Islam to ‘a reserve army of symbols’

when he talks about

fundamentalism (Said, 1994, p.266), but fundamental

understanding of Islam isn’t necessarily the case with social

exclusion directed at non-foreign Christians. For example,

during our interview M. drew the distinction that “If I go to

Izmir and say I feel myself as Turkish, even if I say I came

from America, people in Izmir would probably accept me as a

Turkish person. And they wouldn’t ask any questions about my

religion. Because a secular person wouldn’t think about one

thing or another, whether I was a Muslim or Christian, maybe in

the back of their heads they would think it or assume that I’m

a Christian but it wouldn’t matter to them if I told them I

felt Turkish. This is a type of nationalism that’s connected to

Kemalism in fact, but at the very least, if I go to Izmir, if I

told them I felt Turkish, it would be enough for them. Even if

I told them I was Greek, in fact they would still be nice and

feel a connection through Turkish. But if I went to Yozgat, or

Rize, or I don’t know...Kayseri, it’s not going to be enough

since I’m Christian, you know?” His exclusion from the society

isn’t necessarily tied to a single reason, whether he can

speak Turkish but being a Christian or he can’t speak Turkish

but is a Muslim wouldn’t prevent his dislocation from the

societal fabric in these cities. He continued with: “I can

probably marry an average Izmir girl and her family wouldn’t

get that upset. But if I married an average girl from Kayseri,

her family would get upset.” Drawing on Said’s statement about

culture formation, human practices like marriage traditions and

norms create and interpret cultures. “Islamic cultural

practices, like all other practices, are a product of

articulation.” (Said, 1994, p.266) M.’s distinction of Izmir

from the conservative cities like Kayseri captures what

Kemalist project created: In Turkey the (re)invention of ‘The

Turk’ was used to replace ‘The Muslim’ as a historical subject.

But this

project failed to take hold over the conservative cities and

West-oriented Kemalism embarking on the project of

Westernization (re)produced an Oriental subject that refuses to

recognize a consensual basic human act like marriage due to the

religious choice of one of the actors in question. In Said’s

sense, Turkey can be considered as an ‘Islamic state’ since it

is a description of a moral universe where real life practices

are structured along the lines of morality (Said, 1994, p.267-

270) And this universe brings about the important question

about its own labeling. Just what exactly is happening when a

non-foreign Christian is socially excluded, discriminated

against, or getting killed based on his/her own religion?

Balibar offers an answer to the question above: ‘racism

without races’ whose dominant theme is the insurmountability of

cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, doesn’t

postulate the superiority of certain groups in relation to

others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the

incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; it is what is

called a differentialist racism. Ethnicity no longer plays a crucial

role in this universe, it’s the religious label an individual

has stuck on himself/herself. Uniquely shaped culture defines

and stereotypes an individual, acting as the nature, locking

individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a

determination that is immutable and intangible in origin.

(Balibar, 1991, p.21-22) Actions, behavior, and speech of an

individual is regarded on the basis of stereotypes shaped

around the preexistent Sunni Turkish culture ; what M., Erol or

Esther does provides a benchmark for the further interactions

with their respective subgroups for the majority.

Personal Observation: A Night with Rambaba and Yaşam Kilisesi

Pastor Rambaba’s 4 day long event was announced on the

Yaşam Church’s website and there were no entrance requirements.

I’ve attended the last day. Event’s location was a wedding

hall, right next to a bar. Before the event began, I met Erol,

one of the people who kindly gave me an interview later on, and

a couple of Yaşam Church members, one of whom later informed me

that I wasn’t allowed to observe the church itself lest the

followers feel insecure in a place where they are supposed to

feel the most secure. Also, I was cautioned not to take any

photographs or videos, one of the Yaşam Church members voiced

her concerns about possible outcomes of revealation of names.

Fear of persecution on behalf of one’s beliefs is more than

understandable in Turkey, thus, while heeding what I was told

during the event, observations of a Protestant church

environment became unavailable. However, key features of the

event and its actors were easily observable and led to a couple

of conclusions about non-foreign Protestants.

Event started with a small sermon of Lukas 5:26 from

Pastor of the Yaşam Church, ending with chants of “Bugün

şaşılacak işler göreceğiz. (Translation: Today our eyes have

beheld wonders!” Pamphlets about Alfa, an open course about

Christianity were distributed and some people filled out

questionnaires with their contact information so they could

receive news about the course. A music group then took the

stage and sung 6 songs in the form of ilahi. One of the main

characteristic of the language of Turkish Protestanism I’ve

noticed is that it adopted Muslim terminology of “Rab, mümin,

Amin, Hamdolsun, etc” although “Haleluyah” was kept close to

“Halelujah”. People clapped their hands throughout the songs

and enthuastically sung along while standing up. Wedding hall

was filled with around 200 people (children included) by the

time Rambaba, a pastor from India, took stage around 8:28 pm.

While organizators adjusted the projection equipment and the

microphone, someone in

the crowd continuously shouted out “O yaşıyor! (Translation:

He’s alive!” Apparently, this was the slogan of the event as

couple more people joined in. Then Rambaba offered a quick

prayer and everyone sat down afterwards. Children were

especially warned to stay away from the stage. For the duration

of Rambaba’s session, a volunteer interpreter was utilized.

Through prayers, Rambaba claimed spiritual healing was taking

place and about a dozen of people requested personal prayers

for relief. The only camera used in the event belonged to Yaşam

Church and only a couple of photos were taken by Rambaba’s

assistant. Additionally, guests were careful not to bring out

their phones, I haven’t observed a person with a phone in hand

after the event began. Event progressed smoothly until 9 pm

when the bar next door started blaring out pop music. Rambaba

didn’t seem disturbed by the music but people started to leave

after commenting about their concentration being broken. As I

stood to leave, two organizators asked about my opinions and

invited me to visit Yaşam Church as well as Kadıköy

Uluslararası Topluluğu.

Conclusion

Availability of a discourse is not the same as the

existence of a discourse. Something becomes available through its

articulation. (Said, 1994, p.272) How a non-foreign Christian

is perceived and included/excluded by the Sunni society

effectively shapes the discourse surrounding that substrata of

the society. Unfortunately, following what interviewees and

event observations reveal, there’s a ‘subtle and crushing form

of exclusion/inclusion’ (Balibar, 1991, p.24). Ability to speak

Turkish doesn’t fully qualify a person as a Turkish in places

like

Kayseri or in the eyes of the people carrying the same

prevalent ‘racist culture without races’. This result is

related to how the society was transformed through project of

modernization, nation-building and more recently, AKP

governmentality. Revealed identities cause frictions between

the affected individuals and the society, often one-sided as

conservative Sunni identity formulated and figuratively set

into stone what a ‘Turk’ is and what a ‘Turk’ cannot be.

Conservativism runs deep in Turkey, deeper than ever in some

places compared to others, and this predicament results in, at

its best, an uncomfortable environment for a non-foreign

Christian that can possibly turn physically violent at its

worst, just like in Zirve Publishing House massacre. Put into a

much shorter message, M. said: “To be honest, you couldn’t pay

me enough to go to Kayseri. You cannot pay me enough to go to

Rize, neither.” Afraid to discomfort him, I didn’t ask this

question that came up to my mind at that very moment: What if

entire Turkey becomes a Kayseri or a Yozgat for Christians?

References

Bobby Said, “Sign O’Times: Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting

the Ninth Crusade” in E. Laclau (ed), The Making of Political

Identities, London, Verso, 1994, p.264-286

Etienne Balibar, “Is There a Neo-Racism?” in E. Balibar

and I. Wallerstein (eds.), Race, Nation, Class, London, Verso,

1991, p.17-28

Veena Das, “The Signature of the State: the Paradox of

Illegibility”, in V. Das and D. Poole (eds.), Anthropology in

the Margins of the State, Santa Fe: School of American Research

Press, 2004, p.225-252

Zeynep Gambetti, “I’m no terrorist, I’m a Kurd: Societal

violence, the state and the

neoliberal order” in Z. Gambetti and M. Godoy-Anativia

(eds.), Rhetorics of Insecurity: Belonging and Violence in the Neoliberal Era,

New York, SSRC/New York University Press, 2013, p.125-152

“Turkey 2009 Progress Report” by the European Commission

for Enlargement, published on 14 October 2009

AİHM nüfus cüzdanlarındaki din hanesi insan haklarına

aykırı buldu: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25051819/

World Values Survey in Turkey reveals negative sentiments

against the “different”, Prof. Murat Sömer comments on the

outcome:

http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features

/setimes/features/2011/08/05/feature-03

Zirve zanlıları serbest bırakıldı:

http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/zirve_katliami_zanlilari

_serbest_birakildi-1180165

Ogün Samast’a 22 yıl 10 ay hapis cezası verildi:

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/7396765.asp?

gid=180&sz=28404