89_5_01_Stokes_Whitman.pdf

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Transatlantic triage?

European and UK grand strategy

after the US rebalance to Asia

DOUG STOKES AND RICHARD G. WHITMAN*

International Aairs89: 5 (2013) 10871107 2013 The Author(s). International Aairs 2013 The Royal Institute o International Aairs. Published by John Wiley & SonsLt, 9600 Garsingtn Ra, Or ox4 2dq, UK an 350 Main Street, Malen, MA 02148, USA.

In the pst-Cl War era, relatins within the transatlantic eence cmmunityhave warme an cle, with a particular rp in temperature ater the 2003

invasin an ccupatin Ira. Hwever, changes in the internatinal istribu-tin pwer an cntemprary challenges t US uniplarity signal a una-mental structural realignment wrl plitics.1 A calescence rising pwers,the cntinuing reverberatins the glbal nancial crisis 2008 an the reper-cussins in the Mile East an Nrth Arica (MENA) the Arab Spring havesubjecte internatinal relatins t eep an abiing change.2 While the UniteStates remains cmmitte t Eurpe an MENA, ater events in Ira, an in thecntet austerity an strategic reappraisal, it is ar less keen t take the lea,especially in Eurpes near abra. Instea, it preers t lea rm behin. AsAmerica reassesses the epth its cmmitment an begins t irect its atten-

tin elsewhere, particularly twars Asia, an in the braer cntet intra-Eurpean pst-austerity eence bugets, Eurpe will ace har chices: the70-year systemic permissiveness that allwe sme Eurpean states t ine utwhile the US picke up the security bill has mve rm east t glbal nancialcrisis an pst-Ira amine. In the US cntet, ebates as t hw it may recali-brate its gran strategy in the cntet a strategic reappraisal nw tiresystemic architectures are mving ahea, with a bra cnsensus emerging inbth plicy an acaemic ebates that the Obama aministratins 2011 pivtt Asia signals an emerging gran strategy shre balancing: the US is

* Our thanks r cmments n earlier versins this piece t Sven Biscp, James Rgers an the annymusreviewers. We wul als like t thank Inerjeet Parmar, Steve Burman an the participants at the 2013 Sin-US struggles ver Asia sympsium at the UK Freign an Cmmnwealth Oce.

1 Christpher Layne, US ecline, in Michael C an Dug Stkes, es, US oreign policy (Or: OrUniversity Press, 2012), p. 418; r an etene iscussin, see his This time its real: the en uniplarityan the Pa Americana, International Studies Quarterly 56: 1, 2012, pp. 20313. See als Arvin Subramanian,The inevitable superpwer: why Chinas rise is a sure thing, Foreign Aairs 90: 5, Sept.Oct. 2011, pp. 6678.

2 Wu Xinb,Unerstaning the geplitical implicatins the glbal nancial crisis, Washington Quarterly 33:4, Oct. 2010, pp. 15563;Paul K. MacDnal an Jseph M. Parent,Graceul ecline? The surprising success great pwer retrenchment, International Security 35: 4, Spring 2011, pp. 744.Fr a rbust rebuttal thesystemic cnstraints n US uniplarity, see Michael Beckley, Chinas century? Why Americas ege willenure, International Security 36: 3, 2011/12, pp. 4178; als Rbert J. Lieber, Power and willpower in the Ameri-can uture: why the United States is not destined to decline (Cambrige: Cambrige University Press, 2012); RbertKagan, The world America made (New Yrk: Ranm Huse, 2012); an esp. Stephen G. Brks an WilliamWhlrth, World out o balance: international relations theory and the challenge o American hegemony (Princetn, NJ:Princetn University Press, 2008).


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Doug Stokes and Richard G. Whitman

1088International Afairs 89: 5, 2013Copyright 2013 The Author(s). International Afairs 2013 The Royal Institute o International Afairs.

abanning primacy an is nw retrenching shre an shiting burens tlcal allies.3

Hw will Eurpe respn t shits in US pririties? It t has seen its inter-natinal relatins aecte by the glbal nancial crisis. Persistent prblems in its

plitical ecnmy have serve t put the Eurpean prject uner severe strain,with ptential svereign eaults an mismatches between mnetary an scalintegratin ampliying centriugal rces. Viewe ptimistically, the ptentialnecessity a cllective Eurpean respnse t evelping trens utsie theeurzne may well a urgency t Eurpean cperatin an thus serve t knitthe cmmunity tgether, strategically at least: the brewing evelpments utthere can help sharpen the cus in here. Currently, Eurpean security cntinuest be veretermine by bth the natinal interests its cnstituent states anUS security guarantees. Hw will Eurpe aapt as the US buren shits, an arc instability evelps in its periphery, an ecnmic multiplarity eepens in

regins where har security ilemmas persist an yet it can bring t bear nly itsnrmative st pwer? Will it apply triagethe rering pririties an allca-tin scarce resurces accringlyr will it stumble alng with n inner crer visin an simply hpe r the best?

In this article, we argue that these changes in the cntets glbal internatinalrelatins present a structural pprtunity r the mapping a cmmn Eurpeangran strategy. As the term suggests, gran strategy is mre epansive thanmilitary strategy, seeks t mbilize a bra range pwer resurces an is neces-sarily uture-cuse: hw es a cmmunity use the resurces available t it t

help bring int being the kin uture avurable t its interests? Factring in thebraest capability range a natin r a grup natins, incluing its plitical,ecnmic, cultural an strategic assets, gran strategy can help rganize int acherent plan hw we mve rm the here an nw t a esire there an then.

This call r a Eurpean gran strategy presents bth cmplicatins an ppr-tunities. As the 2013 jint French-le an British-backe interventin in Maliunerscre, Eurpe currently has nly tw main strategic pwers, France anthe UK, with many ther Eurpean militaries increasingly resembling s-callebnsai armies.4 As such, the heavy liting invlve in wrking t evelpEurpean gran strategy will naturally all t these tw pwers. Arguably,

hwever, given its traitinal rle as interlcutr between Eurpe an the UniteStates, the UK in particular cul emerge as a key player in helping t map ut thisnascent Eurpean gran strategy an hw it relates t a nw rebalancing UniteStates. Institutinal awareness in the UK is alreay evelping, albeit tentatively,as evience in bth the UKs 2010 Strategic Deence an Security Review

3 Christpher Layne, Americas Mile East gran strategy ater Ira: the mment r shre balancing hasarrive, Review o International Studies 35: 1, Jan. 2009, pp. 525; Lanin Xiang, China an the pivt,Survival 54: 5, Nv. 2012, pp. 11328. Fr a very useul summary an verview, see Patrick Prter, Sharingpower? Prospects or a US concert-balance strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War Cllege Strategic StuiesInstitute, April 2013), http://www.strategicstuiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/isplay.cm?pubi=1149, accesse31 July 2013.

4 Antni Missirli, Enabling the uture European military capabilities 20132025: challenges and avenues (Paris: Eur-pean Unin Institute r Security Stuies, May 2013), p. 12.


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(SDSR) an the Natinal Security Strategy (NSS) the same year.5 Mrever,the plicy an acaemic wrls are beginning t act in unisn n sme thekey issues we cver in this article.6 As we mve twars the 2015 SDSR, the UKhas a number chices: it may chse t g it alne; r it may seek t wrk

with an thrugh Eurpean architectures, all the while eepening its relatinshipswith rienly states in thse regins with which the Unite States nw has lessappetite t engage.7 Whatever chice is mae, the eeper scal institutinalizatinnw taking place in the eurzne will cmplicate this evelping American-liteEurpean security rer an will aect hw UK strategy evlves. The prspect a reerenum in Britain n its EU membership wul als have an impactupn UK chices, especially i the result that reerenum were t manatewithrawal rm the EU altgether.

We begin the article by ientiying key glbal trens that will impact upn thestructural cntet Eurpes internatinal relatins. These inclue the rise

Asia, eepening ecnmic multiplarity, an the cntinue tumult in the MENAregin as a result transitin an change since the Arab Spring. We then mve nt cnsier Eurpes current strategic ebates, an the cnstraints an pprtunitiesbearing n the institutinal evelpment Eurpean gran strategy. Given theUKs relative military pwer in Eurpe, even in the cntet austerity-ictatecutbacks, we then cnclue with a cnsieratin pssible British respnses tthis evelping Eurpean ebate. Will Lnn respn as a Eurpean leaer thathelps cascae strategic evelpment in the Eurpean cntet? Will it g it alne?Will it mule thrugh? Or will it pt r a chice that is nne these r perhaps

raws n all them? Whatever path is chsen, the UKs ten raught relatinshipwith Eurpe will cmplicate eeper strategic interepenence, while its eaultstrategy remaining relevant t the Unite States will nee t be recalibrateas the US itsel reassesses its vital natinal interests. It is cmmn r UK strate-gists t argue that we nt gran strategy; but whether we r nt, granstrategic changes will us.8

The US pivot to Asia

In 2011, largely in acknwlegement the scal cnstraints impse by the

repercussins the nancial crisis, the Obama aministratin cmmitte itselt cutting $500 billin rm the US eence buget ver the net ecae. Far mre

5 HM Gvernment, A strong Britain in an age o uncertainty: the National Security Strategy (Lnn: The Stati-nery Oce, Oct. 2010), p. 15, https://www.gv.uk/gvernment/uplas/system/uplas/attachment_ata/le/61936/natinal-security-strategy.p; see als HM Gvernment, Securing Britain in an age o uncertainty:the Strategic Deence and Security Review (Lnn: TSO, 2010), http://www.irect.gv.uk/pr_cnsum_g/grups/g_igitalassets/@g/@en/cuments/igitalasset/g_191634.p, bth accesse 31 July 2013.

6 Fr eample, Eeters Strategy an Security Institute has begun research an eucatinal initiatives eplicitlycuse n helping t evelp the UKs natinal gran strategy in cnjunctin with senir plicy-makers:see http://www.eeter.ac.uk/strategy/, accesse 31 July 2013.

7 On evelping UK eence partnerships in the Gul, see Gareth Stansel an Saul Kelly, A return to east oSuez? UK military deployment to the Gul, brieng paper (Lnn: Ryal Unite Services Institute, April 2013),http://www.rusi.rg/wnlas/assets/East__Suez_Return_042013.p, accesse 31 July 2013.

8 Patrick Prter, Why Britain esnt gran strategy, RUSI Journal155: 4, Aug. 2010, pp. 612.


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signicant r Eurpe was its recalibratin US pririties t reect the gal sustaining US leaership int the uture. The centrepiece this recalibratin wasa strategic pivt esigne t rebalance US military investment, mving rm acus n Eurpe an n current cnicts twars a cus n uture capabilities

an a priritizatin East Asia, a regin that wul becme its main strategican plitical pririty r the twenty-rst century.9 The 2011 rebalance an thecncmitant guiance issue by the Obama aministratin eplicitly recgnizesChina an the East Asian regin mre generally as the central ulcrum USinterests, as well as the esirability r the Unite States evelping a eepercapacity t help structure Asias internatinal relatins an institutinal rame-wrks: Chinas emergence as a reginal pwer will have the ptential t aectthe U.S. ecnmy an ur security in a variety ways, an Americas well-being will be linke t security cncerns in the regin: the maintenance peace,stability, the ree w cmmerce, an U.S. inuence in this ynamic regin

will epen in part n an unerlying balance military capability an presence.10

East Asian states have grave ears abut what Chinas rise may prten anthey cntinue t hege accringly.11 Imprtantly, strategic ears an mutualenmity between leaing reginal states, mst ntably between Japan an China,as well as struggles ver reginal leaership, have been a key centriugal rce ininhibiting eepening Asian interepenence. China has apte an increasinglyassertive stance in relatin t its claims ver the Suth China Sea, a ptentiallyresurce-rich area that may pssess mre il than any ther territry in the wrlecept that Saui Arabia. These anieties, alng with ther reginal cncerns

incluing a nuclear Nrth Krea, suabbles ver Chinas near-mnply n rare-earth resurces an Sin-Japanese tensins ver the wnership the isputeDiayu/Senkaku islans, all increase the meiating pwer the Unite States,which attaches t its status as bth eternal hegemn (an thus arbiter a brarange strategic relatinships in Asia) an hege last resrt.12

It is cmmn t argue that ecnmic interepenence es nt necessarilyreuce the tenency twars Great Pwer cnict: many analysts pint t theailure intra-Eurpean trae t slw, let alne halt, the march t war in Eurpein 1914.13 Hwever, there are ualitative ierences between the situatin in theearly twentieth century an tays cnguratin bth wrl plitics an the

glbal ecnmy. The gegraphic ispersin multinatinal pructin enhances9 US Department Deense, Sustaining US global leadership: priorities or 21st century deense (Washingtn DC:

Department Deense, 2012). See als US Senate Arme Services Cmmittee, Statement o Admiral Robert F.Willard, US Navy Commander, US Pacic Command beore the Senate Armed Services Committee , 28 Feb. 2012, p. 2,http://arme-services.senate.gv/statemnt/2012/02%20February/Willar%2002-28-12.p, accesse 31 July2013.

10 US Department Deense, Sustaining US global leadership, p. 2.11 On Japans attempts t scialize the Chinese rise within a braer East Asian security rer, see Evelyn Gh,

Hw Japan matters in the evlving East Asian security rer, International Aairs 87: 4, July 2011, pp. 887902.12 Fr a summary sme the key issues n Chinas mnply rare-earth minerals, see Ciny Hurst,

Chinas rare earth elements industry: what can the West learn? (Washingtn DC: Institute r the Analysis GlbalSecurity, 2010).

13 Fr a useul summary the range psitins, see Ewar D. Mansel an Brian M. Pllins, es, Economicinterdependence and international conict: new perspectives on an enduring debate (Ann Arbr: University MichiganPress, 2003).


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the prspect r great pwer stability by creating very strng negative eebackr war-initiating states thrugh supply cut-s, acilitate by much greater levels reign irect investment an the internatinalizatin pructin.14 Giventhe etent US an Eurpean ecnmic interepenence with Asia, an with

China in particular, cuple with ther actrs inhibiting cnict such as Chinaspssessin nuclear weapns an strng anti-access an aerial-enial technlgy,Americas cercive pwer ptins against China are very limite an the analgywith 1914 is verplaye.15 Nevertheless, while Americas har ptins are limite,it is pssible t view the US rebalance t Asia as abut seeking both t cmpelChina with military sticks (cercive pwer) andt strengthen its nn-cercivestructural an institutinal carrts by reinrcing its capacity t help shapethe bra systemic structures Asias gestrategic an ecnmic relatinsinpractice, by tying Asian states int US-le netwrks an thus helping t partiallycntrl the cntet Chinas reginal internatinal relatins.

Specically, it wul be a mistake t interpret the pivt in strictly militaryterms. Instea, we shul unerstan it as a uickening Americas ecaes-lng mve twars Asia, with the Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP), a US-le ree-trae agreement in the AsiaPacic, aing t US institutinal weight in theregin. The TPP, initiate in 2005 an epane in 2012 t inclue a number Asian ecnmies, is esigne t evelp a ree-market an US-le alternativet Chinas versin state capitalism in Asia, an t link reginal states intUS-le institutinal ramewrks. Accring t Davi Grn, rmer irectr plicy planning at the US State Department, the TPP is a ge-strategic game

changer r the Unite States, an an invitatin t Chinas neighbrs t sharethe benets ree trae while eepening their plitical an security relatinshipswith Washingtn. The TPP will thus secure a lasting thl r liberal trae,investment, an regulatry principles in the wrls mst ecnmically prmisingregin.16 The TPP will thus help leverage US pwer in ways that avi mreirect, cercive rms actin that cul increase the ptential r kinetic warin the regin while institutinalizing US pwer within a series multilateral anbilateral strategic an ecnmic partnerships. In s ing it will eepen Americascapabilities t manage the bra reginal systemic structures an internal institu-tinal relatinships ecnmically pwerul but strategically subrinate Asian

pwers.17 As rmer US Secretary State Hillary Clintn argue, the pivtan the Unite States treaty alliances with Japan, Suth Krea, Australia, the

14 Stephen G. Brks, Producing security: multinational corporations, globalization, and the changing calculus o conict(Princetn, NJ: Princetn University Press, ), p. .

15 This is nt t rule ut ttally the pssibility Great Pwer war between the US an China, but simply tstate that there are ualitative ierences between tays internatinal relatins an thse prevailing berethe First Wrl War that invaliate cmparisns between intra-Eurpean trae then an tays glbal ecn-my.

16 Ian Bremmer an Davi Grn, Tw key reign plicy penings r Obama, New York Times,25 Feb.2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/opinion/global/two-key-oreign-policy-openings-or-obama.html?pagewante=all, accesse 31 July 2013.

17 Fr an etene iscussin n the rle that US strategic prepnerance has playe in unerwriting itsecnmic hegemny, see Carla Nrrl, Americas global advantage: US hegemony and international cooperation(Cambrige: Cambrige University Press, 2010).


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Philippines, an Thailan are the ulcrum r ur strategic turn t the AsiaPacic They leverage ur reginal presence an enhance ur reginal leaership at atime evlving security challenges.18

In the cntet ptential US ecline, the pivt an the TPP make a great eal

sense r US interests, as institutinal architectures help reeze istributins pwer at the time their creatin. Ikenberry captures this lgic in arguing thatthe US must ask itsel what

srts investments in glbal institutinal architecture I want t make nw s that thecming pwer shits will aversely impact me the least? That is, what srts institutinalarrangements I want t have in place t prtect my interests when I am less pwerul?

In answering this uestin, Ikenberry cntinues that the US shul try t embethe unatins the Western-riente internatinal system s eeply thatChina has verwhelming incentives t integrate int it rather than t ppse an

verturn it.19 The US rebalance t Asia is thus abut perceive US ecline ana rising China, an aims t eepen Americas structural pwer t shape Asianinternatinal relatins while lcking in current istributins pwer thrugheeper institutinalizatin. As Clintn argue, as we prcee, we will cntinuet embe ur relatinship with China in a braer reginal ramewrk securityalliances, ecnmic netwrks, an scial cnnectins.20 The pivt is thuspartiallyabut cntaining China, but is als abut structuring Asias braer internatinalrelatins an leveraging them int US-centre netwrks an institutinal architec-tures. What impact will these trens have n the geplitical cntet Eurpesinternatinal relatins?

Trends in Europes international relations

Cnict in Eurpe, in cntrast t Asia, remains relatively pacientwith-staning the calls r the UK t return t its pre-1939 rle as a Eurpean shrebalancer.21 The mature an evelpe ecnmic interepenence betweenEurpean pwers, plitical an strategic institutinalizatin, an cntinue USsystemic uniplarity cntinue t act as signicant ampeners n intra-Eurpeanhar balancing. It is telling that in the ace the 2010 eurzne crisis, arguably

the greatest centriugal challenge t pan-Eurpean internatinal relatins sincethe Secn Wrl War, the respnse Eurpes pwers, ecluing the UK, hasbeen nt t ragment, but t make eeper cmmitments t Eurpean institutin-alizatin, albeit with a strnger Germany at Eurpes cre. Hwever, bth the USrebalance an the Arab Spring are changing the systemic structural cntets Eurpes internatinal relatins, an by etensin the UKs.

18 Hillary Clinton, Americas pacic century, Foreign Policy,Nov. 2011, http://www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacic_century?page=ull, accesse 31 July 2013.

19 G. Jhn Ikenberry, Liberal rer builing, in Melvyn P. Lefer an Jerey W. Legr, es, To lead the world:American strategy ater the Bush Doctrine (Or: Or University Press, 2008), p. 103.

20 Clintn, Americas pacic century.21 Luis Simn an James Rgers, British gestrategy r a new Eurpean age, RUSI Journal 156: 2, AprilMay

2011, pp. 528.


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Specically, against the backrp the American shit in its internatinalrelatins t Asia, pst-Cl War Eurpean mves twars greater eence integra-tin have mve at a glacial pace, hinere by the cmbinatin Eurpean reliancen US security gs, ierential assignment strategic resurces t eal with

likely threats, histrical baggage, cllective actin prblems an leaership rival-ries. Acrss Eurpe, given the Cl War legacy strategic architectures, mstntably in the rm NATO, bth intellectual an material resurces remaininsuciently evelpe at the natinal level. France an the UK remain Eurpesleaing military pwers by a cnsierable margin. In 2011, the UK ccupie urthplace glbally with eence spening US$62.7 billin, with France just behinat US$62.5 billin. The net highest-spening Eurpean pwer was Germany withan estimate gure US$46.7 billin; ater that came Italy, spening just verhal as much as the UK at US$34.5 billin.22 In this cntet, an espite EurpesCmmn Security an Deence Plicy (CSDP), nascent structures r aggregating

cllective capabilities an eepening institutinal pwer cntinue t remain highlyragmentary, with ierential cntributins veretermine by natinal interests.

The cllapse in 2012 the eence merger between BAE Systems an theEurpean Aernautic Deence an Space Cmpany (EADS) nly serve t urtherunerscre the iculties marrying the natinal interests Eurpean pwers tbraer rms Eurpean eence cperatin as a precursr t eeper strategicintegratin an intra-Eurpean institutinal strategic pwer capacity. This esnt be well r transatlantic security cperatinr, inee, r the pst-American capacity t prject har pwer in parts the wrl that are alreay

emerging as the new ulcrums twenty-rst-century cnict, such as the MileEast an Asia. As nte abve, an as illustrate by the 2012 Sin-Japanese clashver the Diayu/Senkaku islans in the East Asian seas, security ilemmas abunin the Asian cntet. Eurpe es have maritime capacity, wing t its navalrle in the nrth Atlantic uring the Cl War. Hwever, its pwer prjectincapabilities are limite, cnstraining its capacity t inuence Asias internatinalrelatins; an yet the regin is as imprtant t Eurpes plitical ecnmy as itis t Americas. While the perceptin US ecline is eaggerate, the rise Asia, western withrawal rm Aghanistan, eence aaptatins impse by scalausterity an the plitical transitins uner way in MENA will all prunly

alter the structural cntets Eurpean an British interests.23 As the UniteStates pulls ut Aghanistan, it is uite pssible that this nascent ivisin labur will uicken, whether Eurpe likes it r nt.

The European (in)capacity for engagement

The EU an its member states have respne with uncertainty an hesitancyt the early twenty-rst-century transitins in internatinal relatins. Iniviu-

22 Stckhlm Internatinal Peace Research Institute, The 15 major spender countries in 2011, http://www.sipri.rg/research/armaments/mile/resultutput/mile_15, accesse 31 July 2103.

23 On the cntinuing ecnmic strength the US ater the nancial crisis, see Dug Stkes, Achilles eal:llar ecline an US gran strategy ater the crisis, Review o International Political Economy,rthcming 2013.


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ally an cllectively, Eurpean states are struggling t ene the nature therelatinships that they wish t cultivate with the new rising pwers an the bestway t respn t a cntinuing prcess strategic rerientatin by the UniteStates. Eurpeans have been especially wary unamentally recalibrating their

relatinship with America, even while iscussins apparent US relative eclinecntinue, with increase perceptins iminishe US military pwer as a cnse-uence the iculties encuntere in Ira an Aghanistan. As well as ailing trmulate apprpriate strategies t aapt t structural changes within internatinalrelatins, Eurpean states cntinue t ace cllective actin prblems in respningt reign plicy epises an crises. Dierences amng the EUs member stateshave impee cllective respnses t recent crises in Mali an Libya as they earlierhampere the Unins cllective respnses t the US-le interventins in Ira anAghanistan. A key issue uncertainty r the EU is whether it can evelp thecapacity t ene an pursue a gran strategy in respnse t a shiting structure

pwer within internatinal relatins. What shul be the aspiratin any suchstrategy? Can the EU cme t mre clsely resemble ther signicant an risingpwers within internatinal relatins, an can it acuire the necessary iplmatican military capabilities t eercise such a rle? T s wul reuire nt justthe evelpment the harware material resurces t act as a Great Pwerbut als the stware ieas an aspiratins t seek such a rle.

The EU is als acing strategic ambiguity within its wn neighburh.The previusly high egree stability, inee stasis, in the EUs suthern aneastern neighburh ell ramatically in early 2011. The Arab Spring ushere

in changes n the EUs suthern brers that in scale, pace an intercnnect-eness matche the changes in Central an Eastern Eurpe tw ecaes earlier.Hwever, nw the leitmotiwas nt a return t Eurpe but rather the rejectin lng-entrenche rms authritarianism. Imprtantly, Eurpean epenencen American pwer r the 2011 interventin in Libya unerscre a cntinueisparity between US an Eurpean institutinal pwer an respnse capabilities,while the French-le interventin in Mali shwe that instability n Eurpessuthern ank is very real an that Eurpe may be grping twars eeper eenceintegratin. In the wake the Arab Spring, transitins acrss MENA are still inu an the nal utcmes remain uncertain. Hwever, given bth the regins

gegraphic primity t Eurpe an the imprtance the natural resurces itcmmans, it will necessarily remain high n the strategic raar r bth Eurpean, t a lesser etent, the Unite States. At the time writing, the Syrian civilwar cntinues t act as a pry r a wier reginal sectarian schisman, withthe eath tll nw in the tens thusans, a cntinue reminer eep westernreluctance t intervene in the regin, at least vertly. Mre braly, the pst-ArabSpring transitins cuple with the US rebalance signiy unamental structuralshits in the envirnment that the UK an Eurpe mre generally will nee tnavigate. Fast-evelping Nrth American il inepenence, the s-calle shalerevlutin, will als change the geplitical calculatins the Wests interests inthe MENA regin, with the US appetite r eep strategic cmmitments in the


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Mile East, signicantly reuce by the eperience in Ira, likely t be urtheriminishe by this rapily evelping sel-suciency.24

Face with evelpments in MENA, bth the EU an the US were unpre-pare an struggle t rmulate an apprpriate plicy respnse. In aressing the

events in its suthern neighburh, the EU grapple with tw issues. First, thereign plicy innvatins intruce by the Lisbn Treaty, which entere intrce n 1 December 2009, were nt yet ully peratinal; in particular, the newEurpean Eternal Actin Service (EEAS), intene t perate as the iplmaticservice the EU uner the cntrl the EU High Representative an Vice-Presient the Eurpean Cmmissin (HR/VP), was still uner cnstructin.This create a capacity ecit in the EUs mechanisms r respning t reignplicy challenges. Further, it severely cnstraine the capacity the High Repre-sentative t ully eplit the main innvatin the Lisbn Treaty: that is, therawing tgether the EUs Cmmn Freign an Security Plicy (CFSP) an

the ther strans its eternal relatins.A secn issue was that the EUs Eurpean Neighburh Plicy (ENP) was

nt esigne as a plicy r crisis management but rather as a plicy r the EUsmeium- an lng-term engagement with its neighburs. Cnseuently, thearchitecture the ENP remaine largely unchange by the events acrss MENAin 2011 an 2012. Furthermre, the EUs bjectives r the regin have nt changesubstantially with the Arab Spring. The EU has nt rmulate an alternativeplicy eringr eample, enlargement t the suth an eastern Meiterra-nean is nt a plicy ptinan, mre generally, the EU has yet t evelp a

cherent lng-term strategy r the regin incluing a clear ivisin laburwith the Unite States n respective rles an respnsibilities. Althugh the EUi revamp its neighburh plicies as a respnse t the ppular uprisings inthe regin, this was t sme etent anther case l wine in new bttles.25The EU cntinue t priritize technical cperatin an sught t eal withprblems in this part the wrl thrugh techncratic means in the rm newcperatin prgrammes, newly launche task rces, an resrt t prgram-matic bjectives an benchmarks.26 The cntinuatin the eurzne crisis hasensure that the preminant cus r plitical energy an ert has cntinuet be the EU itsel rather than its immeiate neighburh.

The European approach to grand strategy

The Eurpean apprach t the Arab Spring is a subset a wier prblem currentlyace in transatlantic relatins: the incapacity the EU an its member states t

24 See Lenar Maugeri, Oil: the net revlutin. The unpreceente upsurge il pructin capacity anwhat it means r the wrl, iscussin paper 2012-10 (Cambrige, MA: Beler Center r Science an Inter-natinal Aairs, Harvar Kenney Schl), June 2012, http://belercenter.ksg.harvar.eu/publicatin/22144/il.html, accesse July 31 2013.

25 Richard G. Whitman and Ana E. Juncos, The Arab Spring, the eurozone crisis and the neighbourhood: a regionin fux,Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review of the European Union in 2011, no. 50, 2012, pp. 14761.

26 Eurpean Cuncil n Freign Relatins, European oreign policy scorecard 2013, Jan. 2013, http://www.ecr.eu/screcar/2013, accesse 31 July 2013.


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engage cllectively in thinking abut gran strategy. Fr the peri the ClWar, mst EU member states utsurce gran strategy activity t the UniteStates an were largely ree-riers n the apprach generate n the ther sie the Atlantic. Iniviually an cllectively, they have nt regaine a capacity r

inepenent strategic thinking.27 Hwever, as utline abve, times are changing.While the Unite States cntinues t enjy hemispheric stability, Eurpe nw hasa highly unstable ank t the suth an an unpreictable ne t the east. Againstthis backrp, the Unite States is becming less tlerant perceive ree-riing.Rbert Gates, speaking n his resignatin as US Deense Secretary, mae reer-ence t the scal realities acing the transatlantic alliance:

The blunt reality is that there will be winling appetite an patience in the U.S. Cngress,an in the American by plitic writ large, t epen increasingly precius uns nbehal natins that are apparently unwilling t evte the necessary resurces t beserius an capable partners in their wn eense.28

The pivt away rm Eurpe t Asia, while as yet largely symblic, is a clearsignal intent an ne that makes sense rm the US perspective. As such, thereis a evelping Eurpean awareness the nee t gain a capacity r relatingthe structural changes taking place within internatinal relatins t Eurpeancapacity r inuence. Hwever, this ntin that the EU nees a gran strategy islargely cnne t the Eurpean think-tank an acaemic cmmunity.29 Belw,we cnsier in turn tw bra categries cnstraints n Eurpes prspects gaining such an ability: the nrmative an the institutinal.

Normative constraints

The EUs search r a signicant rle in internatinal relatins is circumscribeby a particular nrmative unerstaning the rms pwer it shul acuiret eercise inuence. A Great Pwer rle was mte r the EU in the 1990sin respnse t the apparent mment uniplar pre-eminence the UniteStates an the nee t balance this hyperpuissance.30 This iea, hwever, int achieve wiesprea acceptance amng the EUs plicy-making elite, whichahere instea t the eeply embee ntin that the EU shul seek t stress

the istinctiveness its capabilities an aspiratins r internatinal relatins.This psitin was establishe an rene uring the ecaes the ClWar. The then Eurpean Cmmunity was cnsiere t be a civilian pwer,

27 Olivier e France an Nick Witney, Europes strategic cacophony, Eurpean Cuncil n Freign Relatins plicybrie n. 77,April 2013.

28 Greg Jae an Michael Birnbaum, Gates rebukes Eurpean allies in arewell speech, Washington Post, 10 June2011, http://articles.washingtnpst.cm/2011-06-10/natinal/35236044_1_nat-air-rce-secretary-rbert-m-gates, accesse 31 July 2013.

29 As inicative, see Jlyn Hwrth, The EU as a glbal actr: gran strategy r a glbal gran bargain?,Journal o Common Market Studies 48: 3, 2010, pp. 45574; Michael E. Smith, A liberal gran strategy in a real-ist wrl? Pwer, purpse, an the EUs changing glbal rle, Journal o European Public Policy 18: 2, 2011, pp.14463; Sven Biscp, EU grand strategy: optimism is mandatory, Security Plicy Brie n. 36 (Brussels: EgmntInstitute, July 2012); Sven Biscp, e., The value o power, the power o values: a call or an EU grand strategy , EgmntPaper n. 33 (Brussels: Egmnt Institute, 2009).

30 H. Vrine, Le mne au turnant u sicle, Politique trangre 64:4, 1999, pp. 81321.


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cnstraine bth in the instruments available t its iplmacy an the ptinsavailable t its reign plicy.31 With the en the Cl War, a key cnstraintn a istinctive Eurpean reign plicy isappeare. Hwever, the ntin maintaining a Eurpean ierence, in terms the rms an purpses its

eercise pwer, has ha cnsierable resnance an has been rearticulate inthe acaemic literature as the ntin a nrmative pwer Eurpe.32 This enthu-siasm r a istinctive apprach t an EU rle in internatinal relatins has becmea guiing philsphy r Eurpean reign an security plicy an can be ienti-e as a signicant cnstraint n Eurpean appraches t gestrategic change. Asientie abve, hwever, the transatlantic strategic legacy the Cl War isnw spent, with the Unite States rethinking its gran strategy an priritizingAsia. As the US har pwer euatin that prvie the precnitin r Eurpesst pwer layering changes, Eurpes nrmative cnstraints may well nw alsnee t change.

Institutional constraints

The EU an its member states have given an inrinate amunt attentin tthe evelpment institutins an ecisin-making prcesses r the CFSPan CSDP thrugh successive treaty amenments since the mile the 1990s.Hwever, they have been unable t evise a clear gran strategy ientiying therange capabilities that wul be necessary t give the EU ptimal pwer aninuence within internatinal relatins. Such a preerence r prceure, as a

substitute r plicy substance, has been a lng-term characteristic EU reignplicy-making. Fr eample, the creatin the EEAS was ne the principalreign plicy innvatins the Treaty Lisbn, intene t bring greatercntinuity an impact t the EUs internatinal relatins; yet neither the prcessleaing t its creatin nr the early peri its peratin has le t a system-atic eterminatin the services rle.33 Despite the institutinal signicance the Lisbn rerms, an elementary uestin remains unanswere: what srt iplmatic service es the EU nee i its glbal ambitins are ill-ene?During this early phase its eistence, much the EEASs energy has beencnsume putting iplmatic resurces in place. At the same time, the EEAS an

its appinte hea Barness Ashtn, the EUs HR/VP, have ha t respn tramatic events in Eurpes neighburh against the backgrun a nancialcrisis that has impse severe pressures n Eurpes gvernments an teste thelimits Eurpean sliarity.

31 Franis Duchne, Eurpes rle in wrl peace, in Richar J. Mayne, e., Europe tomorrow: sixteen Europeanslook ahead(Lnn: Fntana, 1972), pp. 3247; Richar G. Whitman,Muscles rm Brussels: the emise civilian pwer Eurpe?, in Ole Elgstrm an Michael Smith, es, The European Unions roles in internationalpolitics (Abingn: Rutlege, 2006), ch. 6.

32 Ian Manners, Nrmative pwer Eurpe: a cntraictin in terms?, Journal o Common Market Studies 40: 2,2002, pp. 23558.

33 Staan Hamra, Thmas Raines an Richar G. Whitman, A diplomatic entrepreneur: making the most o theEuropean External Action Service, Chatham Huse Reprt (Lnn: Chatham Huse, Jan. 2012), http://www.chathamhuse.rg/sites/eault/les/public/Research/Eurpe/r1211_eeas.p, accesse 31 July 2013.


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The EEAS inherite a mie legacy. It tk ver an inrastructure verseasmissins rm the Eurpean Cmmissin, whse manate inclues imprtantstrans eternal relatins but nt the bra menu plitical issues that charac-terize reign plicy in its entirety. It is lle with talente peple, but has t

transrm the varius rganizatinal an natinal cultures these peple representint ne single iplmatic esprit de corps. It assume the reign plicy crinatinrle previusly playe by the EU presiencies, but with little plitical leveragebeyn the limite legitimacy an status that came with the new institutin. Anit was epecte t this in a strategic vacuum, withut a clear an cmprehen-sive visin the interests an bjectives guiing EU reign plicy in a rapilychanging wrl.

As with many ther steps in the evlutin the EUs CFSP, it will take timer the Lisbn rerms t wrk ut. In this respect, the EEAS is little ierentrm ther erts t strengthen the CFSP. In anther respect, hwever, this time

really is ierent: the stakes are higher nw than in the past as the challenges tEurpean reign plicy are munting, bth in its neighburh an beyn.The unling events in the Arab wrl has given urgency t the nee r acherent an eective Eurpean respnse; beyn this, there are mre una-mental rces calling r Eurpe t raise its game. Interestingly, the recent GermanMarshall Funs Transatlantic Trends survey suggeste that Eurpes perceiveimprtance in internatinal aairs, as against that Asia, has increase r Ameri-cans; meanwhile, against the tren ientie in previus recent surveys, Eurpeanperceptins relative ecline, as the centre gravity internatinal aairs

mves rm the Atlantic t the Pacic, remain.

34

Perceptins plicy inuence withut a visin hw t make the mst theiplmatic resurces available t eercise it give rise t a lming anger that theEU will be sieline n the issues that will ene the twenty-rst century. Giventhe US pivt eamine abve, an its eepening capacity t shape the structures Asias internatinal relatins an institutins, it is thus highly likely that Eurpeanstrategic reliance n the Unite States will als eepen, especially as Eurpean anAsian ecnmic interepenence matures. Asia is nw emerging as ne themst imprtant markets r the Eurpean plitical ecnmy. Fr eample, in 2010China became ne the astest-grwing markets r EU eprts, imprting 113

billin wrth gs an servicesa new recr r EUChina trae, up 37 percent rm 2009.35 Similarly, in 2010 Japan became the sith largest imprter rmthe EU, while the Assciatin Sutheast Asian Natins (ASEAN) as a whlebecame the EUs thir largest traing partner in 2011, just behin the US anChina.36 Given the ragmentatin Eurpes strategic psture, it is har t seewhat the Eurpean pwers can collectively er in respnse t the cmple range

34 German Marshall Fun the Unite States, Transatlantic Trends 2012: key ndings 2012, Sept. 2012, http://trens.gmus.rg/les/2012/09/TT-2012_cmplete_web.p, accesse 31 July 2013.

35 Eurpean Cmmissin, Facts an gures n EUChina trae, http://trae.ec.eurpa.eu/clib/cs/2009/september/trac_144591.p, accesse 31 July 2013.

36 Eurpean Cmmissin, ASEAN trae statistics, http://ec.eurpa.eu/trae/creating-pprtunities/bilateral-relatins/regins/asean/, accesse 31 July 2013.


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strategic ilemmas that eist in Asia, an its nrmative st pwer cntinuest be cnitinal n the har pwer US security gs an its eence thecmmns in the regina precnitin r Eurpean trae.

Inee, the Eurpean Unin Institute r Security Stuies (EUISS), the EUs

lea agency ealing with the analysis reign, security an eence plicyissues, accurately captures the preminant perspective n strategic respnsibili-ties in Asia:

the EUas ppse t a ew Member Statescannt be epecte t play an active militaryrle in East Asia, in part ue t the current cus n Eurpes turbulent neighburh,but als because the lack agreement, interest an military capacities in the 27 natinalcapitals.37

Cllective Eurpean pwer t aect the strategic structural cntets Asiasinternatinal relatins thus remains limite; but its institutinal pwer, amplieby eepening AsianEU ecnmic interepenence, remains strnger. Inee,Eurpean strategic weakness in Asia has in act been interprete as a strength r itsbraer institutinal utreach t the regin, particularly t a rising China; the lack any serius cmmitment by the EU t Asias security has mae it easier r EUplicy makers t engage Beijing acrss the bar an avi cntentius matters.38In shrt, its iplmatic stly-stly apprach, an seeming nn-threatening lack capacity t aect the systemic cntet Asian strategic relatins, are vieweas Eurpean strengths in pursuing bra ecnmic interests an nascent Asianutreach.39 As such, the EU as a cllectivity has n strategic purchase in Asia an

its st pwer has nt yet translate int the capacity t help shape the reginsinstitutins r the structural cntets its eepening interepenence (unlike theUnite States with, r eample, its leaership the TPP). It remains t be seenhw this strategy plays ut in the cntet the US pivt an where the EUwishes t ientiy strategic pririties: in the increasingly unstable MENA regin,with a range seemingly intractablesecurity prblems, r in a rising East Asia thatwill rm the ulcrum key gestrategicilemmas as we mve rwar.

Shrtcmings in EU iplmacy are als starkly apparent in the EUs bilat-eral relatinships. The EUs ienticatin strategic partners in the EurpeanSecurity Strategy (ESS) has cuse attentin n sme the mst icult partner-

ships. Bere turning t the prblems, hwever, it is wrth cnsiering whatthe EU has achieve. All bilateral relatins are marke by variatins in uratin,nature an epth. The ntin strategic partnerships is signicant, hwever,in that it reects EU glbal plitical ambitins, an is esigne t cmplementan reinrce EU actin at the multilateral level. The EUs relatinship with the

37 Daniel Kehane, The EUs rle in East Asian security, in Patryk Pawlak, e., Look east, act east: transatlanticagendas in the Asia Pacic (Paris: EUISS, 2012), p. 49, http://www.iss.eurpa.eu/publicatins/etail/article/lk-east-act-east-transatlantic-agenas-in-the-asia-pacic/, accesse 31 July 2013.

38 Nicla Casarini, The EUs apprach t China: implicatins r transatlantic relatins, in Pawlak, e., Lookeast, act east, p. 60.

39 Richar G. Whitman, The EU: staning asie rm the changing glbal balance pwer?, Politics 30: 1,2010, pp. 2432.


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Unite States is perhaps its eepest bilateral partnership. The relatinship suereuring Presient Gerge W. Bushs aministratin (20002008), but transatlanticcperatin remains crucial. Perceptins Eurpean ithering an ree-riingasie, the relatinship is shwing signs imprvement uner Barack Obamas

presiency, with bth the EU an the Obama aministratin supprting multi-lateral slutins t glbal prblems. The 2013 Transatlantic Trae an InvestmentPartnership (eamine briey belw) urther reinrces the strng ties betweenthe US an the EU.

Is the EU incapable of a grand strategy rethink?

Over the past ecae, the EU has evte signicant energy an time t prucingstrategies. As well as 134 iniviual cuntry strategies, it has strategies r mstregins (Central Asia, the Anes, etc.), thematic issues (cunter-terrrism,nn-prlieratin, etc.), even whle cntinents (Asia, Arica, Antarctica).40 It hasals rge a number strategic partnerships that seek t rame an institutin-alize its mst imprtant bilateral relatinships.41

As HR/VP, Barness Ashtn has cntinue this tren, presiing ver therevisin plans r the Hrn Arica an the Sahel, a revise versin theENP an a strategy n energy security. Yet espite this plethra strategies,there is nt yet a cmprehensive ramewrk t irect the EEAS an the EUsCSDP. The ESS, rate in 2003 an reviewe in 2008, remains the mst seriusattempt t raw tgether a Eurpean gran strategy. The ESS ably escribe

the threat envirnment Eurpe in 2003 an suggeste sme plicy implica-tins, braly sketching ways in which the Unin cul becme mre active,mre capable an mre cherent in respning t threats. It als serve the useulpurpse engaging plicy-makers an analysts acrss Eurpe in a pan-Eurpeanebate abut gran strategy, an enhancing the activity the cmmunity peple in Brussels an in capitals wh engage in an nging ebate abut EUreign an security plicy.

Fr eample, the then High Representative r the CFSP, Javier Slana,presente the rst ESS t the Eurpean Cuncil in December 2003.42 Thecument was clear in its ienticatin the key threats t Eurpean security:

terrrism, prlieratin weapns mass estructin, reginal cnicts, stateailure an rganize crime. The review the ESS publishe in December 2008upate the list security threats acing Eurpe t inclue climate change anglbal ecnmic crisis.43 What it i nt was set ut any clear agena as t

40 Fr EU strategy papers see http://www.eeas.eurpa.eu/sp/ine_en.htm, accesse 31 July 2013.41 See als Michael Smith, Des strategic iplmacy make a ierence in the EUs relatins with the great

pwers? The iplmacy the EUs strategic partnership with China, paper presente t the Eurpean UninStuies Assciatin annual cnerence, Bstn, March 2011, http://euce.rg/eusa/2011/papers/8l_smith.p,accesse 31 July 2013.

42 Cuncil the Eurpean Unin, A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy (Brussels, 2003),http://www.cnsilium.eurpa.eu/shwPage.asp?i=266&lang=en, accesse 31 July 2013.

43 Council o the European Union, Report on the implementation of the Security Strategy: providing security in a changingworld(Brussels, 2009), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en, accessed 31 July 2013.


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hw the EU wul rganize its relatinships with the set strategic partnersientie in the ESS. Rather, the cus was upn the EUs preerre me iplmacy: multilateralism an the cmmitment t internatinal cperatin teal with glbal security challenges. This was t be achieve by supprting an

eective multilateral system.44There has been much urging by think-tanks an plicy analysts ver the last

ve years that an upate versin the ESS be rmulate. Althugh cllectivelythe EUs heas state an gvernment have nt cmmitte themselves t a newstrategy, in mi-2012 the reign ministers Italy, Plan, Spain an Sweensught t launch a ebate n a Eurpean Glbal Strategy an invite a grup Eurpean think-tanks t reect n what this shul cntain. The grups reprt,presente in May 2013, is essentially iagnstic in listing the current challengesace by Eurpean gvernments; but its very title, Towards a European global

strategy, is inicative a Eurpean reluctance t cmmit ecisively t a clearlyene gran strategy.45

Leading the EU to a grand strategy?

With the US strategic pivt the EU has reache a rk in the ra. Either theUnin as a whleits member states an its institutinsbuils an supprtsa iplmatic an military inrastructure s that it can help lea n the issuesthat ene the cntemprary reign aairs agena r it will risk a situatin inwhich cuntries lse cnence in the value the CFSP/CSDP ramewrk.

The latter ptin wul lea inevitably t increase natinalizatin reignplicy in Eurpe an a ptential weakening the EUs signicance in wrlaairs. This is the risk. But there is als an pprtunity: the very eistence theEEAS/CSDP prvies the EU with a chance t reinvent its rle internatinally.A new ESS cul set clearer pririties r implementatin, especially in terms the gegraphic cus EU reign plicy. Pssible reginal areas strategiccus cul be the eastern an suthern neighburh, Central Asia, the Gul,an sub-Saharan Arica; pssible thematic areas, in aitin, cul be maritimesecurity acrss the glbe an helping the UN.

In the absence an EU prcess gran strategy rmatin the key vehicle

Eurpean strategic recalibratin has been NATO. NATO has prvie the meansby which the Unite States an Eurpeans have been able t engageeach ther nissues strategic reectin, mst ntably thrugh the enitin new strategiccncepts in the pst-Cl War peri an in the cmmitment t Aghanistan.Hwever, it has nt been pssible t use the NATOEU relatinship as a vehiclethrugh which t stimulate a irect strategic ialgue between the Unite States

44 The Lisbn Treaty reiterates the EUs cmmitment t prmte multilateral slutins t cmmn prblems,in particular in the ramewrk the Unite Natins: see Treaty Lisbn amening the Treaty n Eur-pean Unin an the Treaty establishing the Eurpean Cmmunity, signe at Lisbn, 13 December 2007,Ofcial Journal o the European Union, C306, vl. 50.

45 Towards a European global strategy: securing European inuence in a changing world, May 2013, http://www.euglbalstrategy.eu/nyheter/116449, accesse 31 July 2013.


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an the Eurpean Unin. The rmal relatinship between the EU an NATOremains essentially stalemate. In the absence an eective brige between thetw rganizatins, bth pursue verlapping an uplicating initiatives such asthe EUs pling an sharing prcess in parallel t NATOs prcess smart

eence.46The EUs big three member states have als respne ierentially t the

new strategic envirnment. Germany remains essentially strategically cnstipatein its unwillingness t assess the apprpriate rle an pwer that it shul playinternatinally. It remains irrelevant as a ptential player in jump-starting aEurpean ebate n Eurpean gran strategy. France represents an entirelyierent prpsitin an is actively engage in ebate n hw t preserve pweran inuence, as mst recently emnstrate by the publicatin its lng-awaite new eence white paper.47 Mrever, the recent Angl-French eenceagreements emnstrate that the UK an France are bth actively engage in

seeking strategic respnses t the shits taking place within glbal plitics thrughbilateral cllabratin greater epth an substance.48 Further, bth cuntrieshave als emnstrate the esire t maintain the capacity r bilateral interper-ability in military peratins inepenent NATO.49

Despite achievements that were unthinkable in the early pst-Cl War years,the EU tay ails t punch its true weight an t capitalize n its strengths.Why is this still the case? First, the EUs impact an inuence suer rm a lack jine-up glbal plicy; multilateral bjectives are nt eectively pursue inbilateral partnerships, an vice versa. Greater synergy between the bilateral an

multilateral levels wul cntribute t a mre cherent an visible glbal rle,allwing the EU t present a mre ecisive an cherent message t partners. Acherent glbal plicy wul als have t g sme way twars aressing theincnsistencies in EU eternal plicy that have le t a lss supprt r (as wellas aith in) the EU at the glbal levelparticularly in the cases trae an humanrights plicies.

Secn, the EU nees t reslve ierences between member states in rert imprve its relatins with the emerging pwers. The EU is a much strngerplayer, at bth multilateral an bilateral levels, when it is unite. It is n surprisethat success at the UN an the WTO an with partners such as China cmes when

EU members have alreay reache a cnsensus amng themselves. Reasns r EUsuccesses an ailures in specic cases reuire urther scrutiny, but clearly unity purpse is a crucial actr. Wrking r greater cnsensus between member statesreuires leaership an painstaking iplmacy, but is a prereuisite r strength-ening the EUs glbal rle. Once this rst step is taken, member states might putan en t bilateral agreements that nt llw the EU line, an the EU will

46 Christian Mlling, Pooling and sharing in the EU and NATO, SWP Cmments n. 18 (Berlin: Stitung Wissen-schat un Plitik, June 2012).

47 Livre blanc: dense et scurit nationale, 2013 (Paris, 2013), http://www.guvernement.r/sites/eault/les/chiers_joints/livre-blanc-sur-la-deense-et-la-securite-nationale_2013.pd; http://europeangeostrategy.ideasneurpe.eu/2013/05/01/the-2013-rench-eence-white-paper/, bth accesse 31 July 2013.

48 Matthew Harris, Britain an France as nuclear partners, Survival54: 1, Feb.March 2012, pp. 730.49 Franis Heisburg, A surprising little war: rst lessns Mali, Survival55: 2, AprilMay 2013, pp. 718.


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have the cnence t punch its weight alngsie Russia, China an ther glbalpwers. The EU has ptential, thrugh the capabilities its member states, t becnsiere a caniate r Great Pwer status; but it es nt envisin itsel as anactive participant in rging a new glbal balance pwer.

On the basis ur arguments abut the changes currently taking place ininternatinal relatins an the impact these may have n Eurpes security, wenw cnclue with a brie cnsieratin the UKs ptins. It is nt ur inten-tin, an it is beyn the purview an article this length, t map ut specicptins the UK may have in terms calibrating a gran strategy. Rather, weset ut t evelp insights int current an uture ptential trens an relatethese t what we might call a structural pprtunity t evelp an eepenialgue n hw Eurpes pwers may evelp a cmmn visin r at least asense strategic irectinality. The UK will be in the lea n these ebates ra variety reasns. First, it is ne Eurpes leaing military pwers an has

histrically enjye greater eence spening per GDP than any ther Eurpeanpwer. Secn, the UK has the mst raught relatinship with Eurpe, an assuch its braer plitical ecnmy relatins with Eurpe may well inuence theirectin its strategic relatins. Thir, the UK has traitinally enjye a rleas interlcutr between the US an the EU. As Thmas e Maizire, GermanysDeence Minister, argue in the cntet a ptential British eit rm the EU:I think it is part the British traitin that Britain has t play a rle in the wrl [w]e in Germany wul lse a strng partner r a pr-Atlantic c-peratinwith America an a pragmatic British way t eal with security issues.50 As such,

Britains gran strategy, evelping against the backgrun austerity an eepshits in wrl plitics, has the capacity t raically alter the EU ebate.

The UK: does it need to be in it to win it?

Develpments uner way in the MENA regin, as well as the US rebalance tAsia, are likely t reuire a crinate Eurpean respnse, given the cnstraintsn eence bugets in the wake the nancial crisis an the bra cmmnality interests share by the western pwers. As we have argue, hwever, there islittle evience as yet any appreciatin the systemic changes currently uner

way in transatlantic security relatins being reecte in plicy, althugh there isa evelping mmentum within NATO r a new plicy smart eense thatseeks t aggregate capabilities an eepen integratin in the pst-austerity era.51This may well play t the UKs capacity r strategic institutin-builing, givenits status as a leaing military pwer in Eurpe an its histric rle as interlcutrbetween the Unite States an Eurpe, as well as helping t legitimate actin.Hwever, in any attempt t leverage its pwer in a evelping Eurpean ebate,

50 Nick Hpkins, UK wul jeparise military staning by leaving EU, says German minister, Guardian,22 April 2013, http://www.guarian.c.uk/wrl/2013/apr/22/uk-military-eu-german-minister, accesse 31

July 2013.51 NATO, Summit eclaratin n eence capabilities: twar NATO rces 2020, May 2012, http://www.

nat.int/cps/en/SID-17400478-A9170CA4/natlive/cial_tets_87594.htm, accesse 31 July 2013.


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its strategic relatins may well be cmplicate by its ten ractius psitin vis--vis integratin within the EU plitical ecnmy. I the UK were t mve mreenitively ut Eurpes rbit, its ptins wul be likely t iminish alngwith its capacity t shape architectures an mul pririties. As cntingencies

emerge that reuire crinate respnses, particularly in the cntet austerity,an as centripetal rces gather strength, a signicant institutinal reappraisal thatsaw the UKs psitin shit rm being in t being ut cul als unermine itspprtunities r a braer strategic vice in Eurpe as well as ptentially changethe balance calculatin key pwers within wrl plitics.

Fr eample, in the cntet USUK bilateral relatins, it is arguable thatthe UKs braer leverage is increase as a result its institutinal pwer as btha shaper , an a participant in, pan-Eurpean structures. This was mae plain byPhilip H. Grn, US assistant secretary in the Bureau Eurpean an EurasianAairs, when, articulating the psitin the Obama aministratin, he argue

that a UK utsie the Eurpean Unin wul be markely less relevant t USinterests, an that such a mve wul severely weaken the special relatinship.Grn state that:

A strng British vice in [the] Eurpean Unin is in the American interest r theUK t be a part that strnger, mre imprtant vice in the wrl is smething I knwa lt British peple welcme, an rm an American perspective we certainly welcmethe British vice in that EU.52

The nancial crisis 2008 an the subseuent eurzne svereign ebt crisis 2010 have strippe sme the multilateral pretensins rm the Eurpean prject,with Germany, Eurpes banker, emerging rm the crisis as even mre imprtantt US interests. Its hanling the crisis was ully backe by the Unite States,with rmer US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner enrsing German ChancellrMerkels austerity plan r Eurpe; inee, many linke Obamas secn termre-electin t her hanling the eurzne crisis.53 Recent evelpments in inter-natinal ecnmic gvernance will nly reinrce the nee r the UK t eepenits management Eurpean relatins. Specically, the annuncement early in2013 a new US-le Transatlantic Trae an Investment Partnership (TTIP) reetrae eal between the US an the EU is intene t spee up increase USEU

ecnmic integratin thrugh the liberalizatin trae; a ptential bst in USEU trae wrth mre than US$120 billin is envisage within ve years the ealging thrugh.54 Perhaps mre imprtantly, TTIP is intene t create a USEUtrae bulwark t help shape the rules internatinal trae an prvie the insti-tutinal cntet r Chinese entry int USEU markets. The US has mae it clear

52Jim Pickard, What Obamas Europe adviser actually said about the UK in the EU, Financial Times, 10 Jan.2013, http://blogs.t.com/westminster/2013/01/what-exactly-did-obamas-europe-adviser-say-about-uk-in-eu/,accessed 31 July 2013.

53 Geral F. Seib, Fr Obama, Merkel hls a key, Wall Street Journal, 27 Dec. 2011, http://nline.wsj.cm/article/SB10001424052970204296804577122442071520040.html, accesse 31 July 2013.

54 Fr backgrun, see Ian Traynr, US an EU gvernments aiming t agree transatlantic ree trae pact,

Guardian, 13 Feb. 2013, http://www.guarian.c.uk/business/2013/eb/13/us-an-eu-transatlantic-trae-liberalisatin, accesse 31 July 2013.


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that a UK ut the EU wul nt enjy inclusin in TTIP, entailing a ptentiallss 1%2% in aitinal GDP n bth sies the Atlantic accring t theBritish ambassar t Washingtn, Sir Peter Westmactt. He cntinue that evena 1% bump wul translate, at current GDP levels, int an etra $325bn.55

In the absence an EU gran strategy r current security strategy, the UKis nt ace with the nee t engage with a Eurpean security ebate t which itnees t recncile natinal plicy. This ptentially presents an pprtunity rthe UK t act as a catalyst. As the ebate n the UKs natinal strategy evelps,it cul well give impetus t a braer pan-Eurpean ialgue. The annunce-ment in 2010 the Deence an Security C-peratin Treaty between Eurpeskey strategic pwers, France an the UK, as well as eence cperatin inLibya an Mali, may well inicate evelping BritishFrench mmentum in thisirectin.56 Given these cnsieratins, an the present set circumstances, theUKs ptins acrss the bra pwer capability range are relatively limite, an

hinge t a cnsierable etent n its institutinal relatins with aggregatins states, such as the EU, r Great Pwers, such as the Unite States an a risingChina.

As an engage architect, the UK cul use its cnsierable relative weight thelp shape the evelping Eurpean architectural matri in such a way as t insti-tutinalize UK natinal interests mre rmly, an in s ing help steer the struc-tural cntets its internatinal relatins while maintaining its wn relevance tthe Unite States as a useul interlcutr an Eurpean partner. Alternatively, theUK cul remain a stumbling can kicker, alling rm ne crisis t the net withn clear plan as t hw t arrive where it wants t be, r inee what t whenit gets there. Simply kicking the can urther wn the ra amunts t a rm strategic nn-strategy r muling thrugh, where it is neither in nr ut themajr institutinal matrices an is betwit an between a nw retrenching UniteStates an a ithering Eurpe.57 Alternatively, we might see a Jhnny ew-matesscenari evelp: a mre inwar-lking an isengage UK utsie the majrcentres cllective institutinalize pwer. The UK might enjy such relativeislatin but cul suer rm iminishing inuence, cnstraine by a lack either carrt r stick club gs t persuae ther pwers int UK-centricnetwrks pwer an inuence. In this scenari, while it might cntribute t

pan-Eurpean strategy an security n an a hc basis, islatin wul reuce itspprtunities an vice in helping t shape respnses r utcmes. Leverage withther majr centres pwer, mst ntably the Unite States an a rising Asia,cul iminish as the UK lst its tier ne status.

Which these highly cntingent scenaris, i any, cmes int being will beecie by hw Britain respns t sme the (by n means ehaustively liste)

55 Julian Brger, EU eit wul put US trae eal at risk, Britain warne, Guardian,27 May 2013, http://www.guarian.c.uk/business/2013/may/27/eu-eit-risks-us-trae-eal, accesse 31 July 2013.

56 Fr a etaile iscussin n Angl-French eence cperatin, see Julian Linley-French, Britain and France:a dialogue o decline? Anglo-French deence co-operation and implications or the European and Euro-Atlantic security anddeence relationships (Lnn: Chatham Huse, 2010).

57 Paul Crnish an Anrew M. Drman, Smart muling thrugh: rethinking UK natinal strategy beynAghanistan, International Aairs 88: 2, March 2013, pp. 21322.


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eeper trens an pwer shits ientie in this article. What is clear is that thecuntry is at a crssras in transatlantic relatins, with n ully evelpe visinr gran strategy either in the UK natinal cntet r n a pan-Eurpean basis.All ras nt, curse, run thrugh Washingtn, Brussels, Paris r Berlin;

but given the generalize nature the threats ace an the nw well-establishenrm calitin warare within the transatlantic alliance, cuple with the harshrealities austerity, institutins can act as a rce multiplier r UK natinalinterests. Hw many times has the UK ught utsie alliances? Given this histry,why nt try t lea ebates an nascent architectures? Sharper thinking withinEurpe an the UK in the cntet gran strategy, twars an rganizatinalcncept that lks ahea an relates ways, means an ens acrss a bra pwerrange t evlving trens an evelpments, wul be a very useul start in helpingnavigate a cmmn Eurpean uture.

Conclusion

Eurpean natin-states inepenently an cllectively ace a gran strategychallenge. Specically, the signicant challenge r the EU an its member statesis t respn t bth the braer structural changes taking place within inter-natinal relatins an in particular the recalibratin US reign an securityplicy twars Asia. D the EU an its member states have the capacity t enean implement a respnse t the change cus US attentin? On presenttrens the EU an its member states will be gestrategic actrs nly by pry t

the Unite States, an t ate they have nt create a mechanism that allws rthe clear eterminatin a cllective EU respnse: the uture glbal gals rEurpean pwer an inuence are unspecie an n cre visin is ene. Atpresent, Eurpeans can nly respn t near-term security challenges by engagingin strategic triagebut withut any establishe rering pririties r any clearratinale r the allcatin scarce plitical an military pwer resurces.

Transatlantic relatins remain rganize r military security thrugh NATOan r ecnmic an trae relatinships via the EU. Alngsie these strans the relatinship there is an emergent ivisin labur, with the MENA regin, asthe EUs near abra, becming a Eurpean sphere inuence an respnsibility

r Asia as the regin preminant cncern alling t the Unite States.I a Eurpean capacity r mre active gran strategy-making is t be stimu-

late, the prcess will have t be le by France an the UK, with ptentially theHR/VP an EEAS. Other Eurpean states can be ivie between thse, such asGermany, which appear incapable gran strategizing, an thse that will llwrather than lea any such prcess. EU ambitins may, by eault, remain largelycnne t the Meiterranean an eastern Eurpe. Hwever, the increasinginterest in an invlvement with a wier neighburh, incluing the Sahelan the Hrn Arica, suggests that there is an ambitin t wien the Eurpeanstrategic cckpit. This activity will nee t be built upn i there is t be a cnnec-tin t the wier glbal strategic challenges t which Eurpean thinking nees


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t ajust. The key challenge r the British an French gvernments is t createan rive an EU ebate an t c-pt ther member states, as well as the HR/VP an the EEAS, t create the necessary mmentum t cnstruct an apprpriateEurpean respnse t the pivt. Eurpe nees t mve rm strategic triage t the

gran strategic treatment.


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