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82D DIVISION
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
IN THE
WORLD WAR
PREPARED BY THE
AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE
1944
Foreword
THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress
in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American
forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of
this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in
Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries
there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and
Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital
part played by American forces in the World War and detailed
information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.
In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately
set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each
division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases
studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the
results of this research should now be made available to the
public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of
twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of
one division.
In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is
treated in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough
to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact
concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide
an excellent background for tactical studies and present an
extensive list of sources upon which further study can be
based.
AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION
s/John J. Pershing, Chairman
PREFACE
IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in
mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared
by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the
purpose of determining the front line of each American division for
each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were
essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other
arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were
covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete
understanding of the infantry action.
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The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the
Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure
that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and
thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as
from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission
from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War
Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as
were the French, British and German documents which had been
collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily
front lines of each division were determined and plotted on
large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were
prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to
officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional
information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down
to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or
controversial points, the reference was carried further. The
replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to
correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the
Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which
otherwise would have been lost.
In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond
the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength
tables have been added and enough other material
v
has been included to present connected histories of the division
from their organization until the conclusion of their service
it
Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to
the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.
In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the
divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been
included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and
the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition it shows,
by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the
division concerned.
All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive
for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10
and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations,
and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates
between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have
been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases
infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have
been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated.
The dates on the battle line of the maps include the period during
which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight
unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the
line held at midnight, October 9.
The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by
American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it
was necessary to use parts of two or more
sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which
accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often
found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in
the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of
abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation
appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain
topographical features which are well known, and are frequently
referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form for example,
Argonne Forest rather than Fort d'Argonne, Marne River rather than
Marne Rivire.
The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records
of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared,
however, only for the periods of active operations. The
vi
purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the
division command during specific
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actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached
during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements
of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will
be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty
tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or
on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all
casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.
vii
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
A. E. F.American Expeditionary Forces Chau. (Chteau)Chateau
excl.exclusive Fme. (Ferme)farm G. H. Q.General Headquarters
incl.inclusive Min. (Moulin)mill Mon. (Maison)house Rau.
(Ruisseau)brook Rav., Rin. (Ravin)ravine Riv. (Rivire)river Tr.
(Tranche)trench
1
Organization, and Service from
FOREWORD iiiPREFACE vABBREVIATIONS xORGANIZATION, AND SERVICE
FROM ARRIVAL IN THE A. E. F. UNTIL AUGUST 16
1
Organization of the Division-Authorized StrengthMap of France
and BelgiumArrival in EuropeEarly ServiceLagney and Lucey
Sectors.
ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE AND MARBACHE SECTOR 5Marbache Sector,
August 17-September 11St. Mihiel Offensive, September 12-16Marbache
Sector, September 17-20Casualties.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE AND SUBSEQUENT SERVICE 15Meuse-Argonne
Offensive, September 29-November 2Subsequent Service, November 3,
1918-June 1919Casualties.
APPENDIX 55Table of Organization, Infantry Division, November
11, 1918Strength of 82d DivisionGeneral Table of
CasualtiesSources.
INDEX 63OPERATION MAPS [Omitted]
Pocket Marbache Sector, August 17-September 11, St. Mihiel
Offensive, September 12-16 and Marbache Sector, September 17-20.
Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 29-November 2.
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Arrival in the A. E. F. until August 16
THE 82D DIVISION, National Army, was organized at Camp Gordon,
Georgia, in August 1917. The original personnel was composed of
selective service men from Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee. These
men, however, were practically all transferred to other divisions
during October 1917. Replacements were received largely from New
England and the Middle Atlantic States. [1] 1
The principal units of the division were:
163d Infantry Brigade 325th Infantry Regiment 326th Infantry
Regiment 320th Machine-Gun Battalion
164th Infantry Brigade 327th Infantry Regiment 328th Infantry
Regiment 321st Machine-Gun Battalion
157th Field Artillery Brigade 320th Field Artillery Regiment
(75-mm guns) 319th Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm guns) 321st
Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns) 307th Trench-Mortar
Battery
Divisional Troops 319th Machine-Gun Battalion 307th Engineer
Regiment 307th Field Signal Battalion Headquarters Troop Trains
[1]
The details of organization of the American infantry division
were changed from time to time during the World War. Under the
tables of organization which were in use in the American
Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general,
were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the
division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its
1 The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the
sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All
sources are listed in the appendix (p. 57).
The Front Lines July 17, 1918 and Nov. 11, 1918
4
principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12
6-inch trench mortars, 260
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machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further details concerning the
composition of the American infantry division appear in the table
on page 55. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces
seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The
actual strength of the 82d Division on certain dates is shown in
the table on page 56. The approximate strength of the division for
other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle
losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts
of battle operations. [197]
On April 10, 1918, the 82d Division moved via Camps Mills, New
Jersey, and Upton, New York, to the ports of Boston, Brooklyn and
New York City, en route to Liverpool, England. The advance
detachment sailed on April 16, followed by the remainder of the
division during April, May and June. The last unit arrived in
England on July 10. After a brief stay in rest camps, the troops
embarked at Southampton for Le Havre. [1]
Following its arrival in France, the 82d Division, less the
artillery, engineers and field signal battalion, proceeded to the
St. Valery-sur-Somme training area. Here it trained with the
British 66th Division until June 15. The artillery brigade, upon
its arrival in France on June 4, proceeded to La Courtine for
instruction. The engineers and field signal battalion arrived at Le
Havre on June 3-4. [1]
On June 15 the division moved to the area of the French Eighth
Army in the vicinity of Toul, where the detached units, except the
artillery, rejoined. It was assigned to the French XXXII Corps on
June 22, and two days later moved to the Wovre front. From June 25
to July 17 the division, less artillery, was affiliated with the
French 154th Division, and participated in the occupation of the
Lagney Sector on the south face of the St. Mihiel salient. On July
18 the sector was reduced in extent, redesignated the Lucey Sector,
and command given to the 82d Division. The division was relieved in
the Lucey Sector on August 10 by the 89th Division, and moved to
the vicinity of Toul. [1]
5
St. Mihiel Offensive and Marbache Sector MARBACHE SECTOR, AUGUST
17-SEPTEMBER 11 ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER
12-16 MARBACHE SECTOR, SEPTEMBER 17-20
FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in
France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army
under American command at the earliest possible moment. To
accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it
would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to
Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The
organization of this army was further deferred by the critical
situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring
and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied
reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they
received immediate support. In this crisis the American
Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration
of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and
made all American combatant forces available for service with the
British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were
able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a
decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch a successful
counteroffensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July
24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic
offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the
Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American
army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients
which interfered with railroad communications which were essential
to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel
salient. [9, 196]
6
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The American First Army was organized on August 10, and directed
to reduce this salient. [9]
The St. Mihiel salient was roughly triangular in shape, with its
angles near Pont-A-Mousson, St. Mihiel and Verdun. It was
approximately 35 kilometers across the base, extended about 25
kilometers into the Allied lines, and was important in that it cut
the Verdun-Toul railroad and allowed the Germans to interrupt
traffic on the Paris-Nancy railroad with artillery fire. It also
covered the permanent fortifications of Metz, protected the Briey
iron basin, and would seriously threaten the flank of any Allied
operations which might be undertaken in the Meuse-Argonne region.
[9, 196]
The St. Mihiel salient had been formed during the operations of
1914 and, although the French had launched strong attacks against
it at various times, the lines had not been materially changed.
From the heights of the Moselle north of Pont-a-Mousson, the German
front line extended westward across the Wovre plain to the heights
of the Meuse, ascended these heights, included the town of St.
Mihiel and again descended to the plain southeast of Verdun. Within
the salient proper, there were two principal defensive zones or
positions. The first included the outpost positions, except in the
area north of Les Eparges. In this area it was withdrawn some
distance into the plain because the Allies held the dominating
heights of the Meuse. The second position lay from 4 to 8
kilometers in rear of the first, and generally parallel to it.
Across the base of the salient was the third position. This
position, known to the Germans as the Michel Stellung, formed a
part of their great defensive system, popularly called the
Hindenburg Line, which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North
Sea. The outposts of this position extended along the general line,
Prny Bois de Grand Fontaine Rembercourt Dampvitoux Jonville
Harville Etain. The first position was well organized with a dense
network of wire, deep well-constructed trenches and numerous
concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements. The second position
was also well protected by wire but had few trenches. The third had
not been entirely completed but had a good system of wire
entanglements and numerous concrete strongpoints. [9]
7
It was originally planned that the attack on the St. Mihiel
salient would penetrate the hostile third position, and be
exploited to the fullest extent. On September 2, however, it was
decided that the First Army would launch the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive later in the month. The St. Mihiel Offensive, therefore,
was limited to clearing the salient only so far as was necessary to
insure the safety of the later operation. The army plan, as finally
approved, provided only for the penetration of the first and second
positions and the establishment of a defensive line across the base
of the salient in front of the hostile third position. This was to
be accomplished by three coordinated attacks; a principal attack,
by the I and IV Corps from right to left, against the south face, a
secondary attack against the west face by the V Corps and a holding
attack against the tip of the salient by the French II Colonial
Corps. In preparation for the offensive the First Army assumed
command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle
River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun, on August
30. The operation was to begin at 1 a. m., September 12, with an
artillery preparation. The main attack was to be launched at 5 a.
m.; the secondary attack at 8 a. m. [9]
The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the
service of the 82d Division in the St. Mihiel Offensive and
Marbache Sector. This synopsis is designed to make the principal
facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact
form.
On August 19 the 82d Division relieved the 2d Division in the
Marbache Sector. On September 12, as the right division of the I
Corps and of the First Army, the 82d Division conducted aggressive
raiding and patrolling along its entire front with the mission of
exerting pressure on the enemy's left flank, but made no permanent
advance. The French 125th Division was to the right, and the
American 90th Division to the left. The 328th Infantry, west of the
Moselle River, advanced north of Norroy on September 13 to protect
the right of the 90th Division. From this position, the
regiment
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moved forward on September 15
8
to the general line, Vandires Cote 327, to cover the advance of
the 90th Division. On September 16 the regiment withdrew to the
high ground south of Vandires. The elements of the division west of
the river were relieved by the 90th Division on September 18.
East of the river, active patrolling continued from September 13
to 16, but no advance was made.
The St. Mihiel Offensive merged into sector service on September
17. On September 20 the division was relieved in the Marbache
Sector by the French 69th Division.
Aug. 17- Sept. 11
After the relief of the 82d Division in the Lucey Sector, it had
returned to the vicinity of Toul, where it remained for one week.
It was still assigned to the French XXXII Corps, French Eighth
Army. As part of the concentration of the American First Army for
the St. Mihiel Offensive, the division, less its artillery, began
to relieve the 2d Division in the Marbache Sector on August 17. It
completed the relief and assumed command of the sector on the
morning of August 19. The sector extended from La Renaissance,
inclusive, about 2 kilometers southeast of Port-sur-Seille, to
Pont-a-Mousson, thence to a point approximately 1,200 meters west
of the Moselle River and about 2 kilometers northwest of
Pont-a-Mousson. To the right of the division was the French 32d
Division, which was relieved by the French 125th Division on August
20. To the left of the 82d Division was the American 1st Division.
The 82d Division occupied the sector with infantry brigades
abreast, the 163d Infantry Brigade on the right. The order of
infantry regiments, from right to left, was 325th, 326th, 327th and
328th. The 328th occupied that part of the sector west of the
Moselle River. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade, 2d Division,
remained in the sector in support of the 82d Division. [2, 3, 4,
5]
On August 22 the French XXXII Corps was relieved by the American
I Corps, and the Division passed to the tactical control of that
corps, becoming its right division. On the same day the 157th Field
Artillery Brigade, less two battalions, which remained detached
until the end of the month, joined the division and relieved the 2d
Field Artillery Brigade. [6,7]
9
The 90th Division relieved the 1st Division, to the left of the
82d Division, on August 24. [8]
The First Army had issued its field orders for the St. Mihiel
Offensive on September 7. These orders established the following
principal objectives:
For the I and IV Corps.
First-phase line: Fort du Bois le Prtre Viville-en-Haye Essey
Bois Rat.
First-day line: Fort du Bois le Prtre Bois Grard Jaulny Nonsard
Bois Rat.
First-phase, second day: Fort du Bois le Prtre Bois Grard Jaulny
St. Benoit Bois de Vigneulles.
For the V Corps.
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First-day line: crossroads 2 kilometers south of
Dommartin-la-Montagne Herbeuville Trsauvaux.
For all corps.
Army objective: Fort du Bois le Prtre Bois Grard Jaulny St.
Benoit Hattonville Thillot Trsauvaux.
Exploitation line: Norroy Bois de Grand Fontaine Rembercourt
Dampvitoux Wol Trsauvaux.
The I Corps, with the 82d, 90th, 5th and 2d Divisions in line
from right to left, was to pivot on the 90th Division and advance
its left to the first-phase, second-day line, and penetrate the
hostile second position in the vicinity of Thiaucourt. The IV
Corps, with the 89th, 42d and 1st Divisions in line from right to
left, was to drive hard toward St. Benoit and Vigneulles. It was to
penetrate the hostile second position on its entire front, and push
on to the first-phase second-day line without further orders. Upon
receipt of orders from the army commander, it was to drive on to
the army objective. The V Corps, with the American 26th Division,
the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division and one brigade of the
American 4th Division, in line from right to left, was to push
forward aggressively to the first-day line. Upon orders of the army
commander, it was to pivot on the French 15th Colonial Infantry
Division, swing to the northeast and advance to the army objective,
with its right at hillot. The French II
10
Colonial Corps was to conduct deep raids at the hour of attack
and carry out local operations during the opening phase of the
attack to cover the exposed flanks of the IV and V Corps. It was
also to protect the right of the V Corps in its advance to the army
objective. Lastly, the French II Colonial Corps was to advance in
the direction, St. Mihiel Hattonville, and occupy the army
objective between the IV and V Corps. All corps upon reaching the
army objective were to organize it for defense and push strong
reconnaissance detachments to the exploitation line. The attack was
to be strongly supported by artillery and aviation. Tanks were
assigned to the I and IV Corps. [10]
The I Corps issued field orders on September 8 which provided
that only that portion of the corps west of Bois de Presle would
attack. Troops in that wood and between the wood and the Moselle
River were directed to hold the front they then occupied. The
mission of the 82d Division was to exert pressure on the enemy and
maintain contact with him by deep and continuous patrolling.
[11]
To carry out this mission, the division made no change in the
disposition of its infantry regiments. On September 10 it ordered
the 163d Infantry Brigade to establish mobile combat groups near La
Seille Rivire in the direction of Port-sur-Seille,
Morville-sur-Seille and Cheminot. The 164th Infantry Brigade was
directed to push similar groups north of Pont--Mousson on both
sides of the Moselle. One company in each regiment was ordered to
be held in constant readiness for deep patrol action. [12, 13]
Sept. 12
Early on the morning of September 12, patrols of the 325th
Infantry pushed toward Eply and Cheminot, and gained contact with
the enemy. [14]
At 3:50 p. m. the division ordered the 163d Infantry Brigade to
put a company in Bois de la Voivrotte, if practicable, and to hold
the northern edge of the wood. The 163d Infantry Brigade reported
at 8:25 p. m. that the 326th Infantry had reached Bois de la Tte
d'Or and Bois de la Voivrotte, but had been stopped by enemy fire
and had been unable to gain the northern edge of Bois
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de la Voivrotte. [15, 16]
11
During the morning, patrols of the 327th Infantry advanced to
Bois de la Tte d'Or and entered Ferme de Bel-Air, but in the late
afternoon were driven back to their lines. [17]
West of the Moselle, patrols of the 328th Infantry raided the
enemy position at Maison Gauthier, shortly after noon. These
patrols established posts at that place and in trenches 400 meters
to the west and northwest, but were subsequently withdrawn.
[17]
The front line of the division remained unchanged at the close
of the first day's fighting. [18]
Sept. 13
The attack of the First Army on the 12th had been highly
successful. At the close of the day, it had reached the first
objectives of the second day on most of its front. Reports from
aviators and ground troops indicated that the enemy was withdrawing
from the salient. The army commander, therefore, directed the IV
and V Corps to push strong detachments forward to Vigneulles during
the night of September 12-13. These detachments advanced across the
front of the French II Colonial Corps, and effected a junction in
the vicinity of Vigneulles early on the morning of September 13,
thus closing the salient. [9]
The 163d Infantry Brigade continued its patrol activities on
September 13. At 6 p. m. two companies of the 327th Infantry raided
Ferme de Bel-Air and the southern edge of Bois Frhaut. [19, 20]
West of the river, the right regiment of the 90th Division was
engaged in mopping up Fort du Bois le Prtre and the quarries about
Norroy. To cover the right flank of the 90th Division, which had
become exposed during the morning, the 164th Infantry Brigade, at 1
p. m., ordered the 328th Infantry to advance its 2d Battalion to
Tranche de la Moselle and Tranche de la Courberie. At 5:45 p. m.
the 82d Division notified the 328th Infantry that the right of the
90th Division was then 350 meters northwest of Norroy, and ordered
the regiment to establish contact with the 90th Division at that
point. After dark, and under severe hostile fire from the east bank
of the river, the 2d Battalion advanced through Norroy and gained
the high ground beyond the town without meeting infantry
12
resistance. The right flank was refused for protection against
possible attack from across the Moselle. The left flank was in
contact with the 90th Division northwest of Norroy. [2, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26]
Sept. 14
East of the Moselle, patrol actions continued on September 14.
[18]
West of the river, the 164th Infantry Brigade, at 8:30 a. m.,
ordered the 328th Infantry to maintain close contact with the 90th
Division and to advance with it. The 82d Division confirmed this
order, and directed the 164th Infantry Brigade to avoid undue
exposure to fire from the high ground east of the river. [27,
28]
As the right of the 90th Division made no advance during the
day, the 328th Infantry continued to hold its position north of
Norroy. [20, 29]
Sept. 15
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East of the Moselle, the situation remained unchanged on
September 15. [29]
The relief of the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, by the 3d
Battalion, was begun during the night of September 14-15 and
completed during the early morning of the 15th. [30]
About 7 a. m. the 90th Division, covered by its patrols which
had spent the night on the southern slope of Cote 327, advanced its
right across the valley of Le Trey Ruisseau to the crest of Cote
327, and sent patrols east to the river. [2, 31]
At 11:50 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade, acting on division
orders, directed the 328th Infantry to advance its 3d Battalion to
the ridge northwest of Vandires, and gain contact with the 90th
Division. The 1st Battalion, which was in support, was ordered to
occupy the positions vacated by the 3d Battalion. [32, 33]
The 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, advanced at 1 p. m., passed
through Vandires and established positions east of the town and on
the hill 400 meters to the northwest. Having suffered heavy
casualties from artillery fire from the north and northeast, the
battalion withdrew from its exposed position after midnight,
September 15. [2, 34, 35]
Sept. 16
There was no change in the situation east of the Moselle on
September 16. [36]
13
West of the river, the 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, relieved
the 3d Battalion in the front line during the early morning and, to
secure better cover, organized new positions on the high ground
south of Vandires. The battalion maintained contact with the 90th
Division by patrols, and controlled Vandires and the west bank of
the Moselle as far as the canal. There was no further change in the
front line of the 82d Division on September 16. [36, 37]
Sept. 17-20
The St. Mihiel Offensive merged into sector occupation on
September 17. On the previous day, the I Corps had directed the
90th Division to relieve those elements of the 82d Division west of
the Moselle River during the night of September 17-18. This relief
was accomplished as ordered, and command of this portion of the
sector passed to the 90th Division during the morning of September
18. The new boundary between the divisions was the Moselle River.
[9, 38, 40]
On September 17 orders were issued covering the relief of the
82d Division in the Marbache Sector by the French 69th Division.
Command was to pass at 8 a. m., September 20. [39]
The IV Corps relieved the I Corps at noon, September 18. The
situation remained unchanged on September 19, and on the 20th, the
division was relieved by the French 69th Division and assigned by
the First Army to the I Corps. Later in the day, the field orders
of the First Army for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive placed the
division in army reserve, and directed that it be held in readiness
to move to the vicinity of Clermont-en-Argonne, to take part in the
attack west of the Meuse River. The division moved to the vicinity
of Marbache on the 20th. [1, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46]
14
CASUALTIES, ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE AND MARBACHE SECTOR
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Aug. 17-Sept. 11 Sept. 12-16 Sept. 17-22
82d Division
325th Inf W 34 76 12DW 1K 5
326th Inf W 14 104 23 DW 3 4 K 2 4 3
327th Inf W 6 116 7DW 1 10 K 2 22 1
328th Inf (1st Bn DS Sept. 12-14)
W 14 253 44DW 8 2K 1 35 2
319th MG Bn W DW K
320th MG Bn W 11 DW K
321st MG Bn W 2 61 7DW 3 K 8
319th FA(DSAug.17-21; 1st Bn DS Aug. 22-28)
W 1 7 6DW K
320th FA W 1 5 DW K
321st FA (DS Aug.17-21, 1st Bn DS Aug. 22-31)
W 1 23 DW K 4 1
307th Engrs W 6 44 11DW 2 K
Others W 8 16 17DW 1 2 5K 1 4
Total 105 816 146 Attached Units
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W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action;
DS=detached service
15
Meuse-Argonne Offensive and Subsequent Service MEUSE-ARGONNE
OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 29-NOVEMBFR 2 SUBSEQUENT SERVICE,
NOVEMBER 3, 1918-JUNE 1919
WITH THE REDUCTION of the St. Mihiel and other salients the
immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had
been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great
converging offensives which had been agreed upon by the
Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in
September. These offensives included an American attack to be
launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne
Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the
Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal on September 27 of the
British-French attack between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers; and a
combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these
principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken.
[9, 47, 48, 198]
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be
directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the
Carignan Sedan-Mzires railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers
from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German
positions to the west and northwest of Sedan untenable. [9]
Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the
previous four years, constructed a strong system of field
fortifications. On the Meuse-Argonne front, there were four
distinct defensive positions. The first lay close behind the front
line. The second included Montfaucon and traversed the Argonne
south of Apremont. The third, which was known to
16
the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of the
Hindenburg Line. This position extended from Bois de Fort, across
the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north
of Grand-Pr. The fourth position included the heights of
Barricourt, and extended westward to Buzancy and Thnorgues. The
first three positions had been thoroughly organized, and numerous
intermediate positions constructed between them. These defenses,
together with the natural military strength of the terrain,
presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The
importance of the communications protected by this front made it
certain that the Germans would resist here to the last
12th FA (2d Div) (Aug.19-22)
W DW K
15th FA (2d Div) W 1 DW K
17th FA (2d Div) (Aug.19-22)
W DW K
Total 1 Aggregate total 106 816 146
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extremity. [9]
The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16
kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position. This
penetration would force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest,
and insure the junction of the First Army with the French Fourth
Army at Grand-Pr. A further advance of 16 kilometers was then to be
made to the line, Stenay-le Chesne. Such an advance would outflank
the enemy's position along the Aisne River, in front of the French
Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on Mzires or Sedan.
These operations were to be supplemented by an attack to clear the
heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois de la Grande
Montagne. [9]
In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the front of the
First Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the
Argonne Forest on September 22. It attacked at 5:30 a. m.,
September 26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to
left. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army attacked
in conjunction with the American forces. Elements of the First Army
east of the Meuse did not attack during the opening days of the
offensive. [9]
By September 28 the First Army had made a maximum advance of
about 11 kilometers, and had reached the general line, Meuse River
Bois de la Cte Lmont Bois de Brieulles Nantillois Apremont Champ
Mahaut Moulin de l'Homme Mort. At this time it was confronted by
three strong positions in the German line; Cunel heights, Romagne
heights and the
17
eastern edge of the Argonne Forest near Chtel-Chhry and Cornay.
[9, 196]
Following its relief in the Marbache Sector on September 20, the
82d Division moved to Marbache, and on the 24th, proceeded to the
vicinity of Triaucourt and Rarcourt, south of Clermont-en-Argonne.
It was in First Army reserve when the Meuse-Argonne Offensive
commenced on September 26. [1]
The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the
service of the 82d Division in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This
synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this
service available to the reader in compact form.
Prior to the entry of the 82d Division into line in the
Meuse-Argonne Offensive, elements were used from September 29 to
October 3 to support the 28th Division, and on September 30, to
stiffen the lines of the 35th Division near Baulny.
On October 7 the 82d Division, less one infantry brigade, and in
conjunction with the 28th Division to the left, attacked the east
flank of the Argonne Forest in the vicinity of Chtel-Chhry. By
nightfall an advance of about 1 kilometer had been made. The attack
continued on October 8. On October 9 the remaining infantry brigade
of the 82d Division passed through the 28th Division, and executed
a turning movement to the north, while the brigade on the right
attacked north.
On October 10 Martincourt Ferme and Marcq were occupied. One
battalion relieved elements of the 1st Division east of the
Aire.
On October 11 the division attacked on both sides of the Aire.
By night the ridge southeast of St. Juvin had been consolidated;
and on the left, the railroad north of Martincourt Ferme had been
reached. The town of St. Juvin was transferred to the zone of
action of the 77th Division on the 11th.
On October 14 the 82d Division advanced its line to the St.
Georges - St. Juvin road. A determined hostile counterattack was
broken up on October 15. On the left, the line was advanced about
500 meters.
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The extreme right advanced on October 16. On October 18 lines on
Cte 182 were taken over from the 78th Division and an out-
18
post was established west of the Agron River. During the
succeed-ing days the line was extended on Cte 182, the outpost
withdrawn from west of the Agron and the center of the line
advanced.
From October 22 to 30, the line remained unchanged. During the
night of October 30-31, the 82d Division was relieved by the 80th
and 77th Divisions.
Sept. 29- Oct. 6
Under authority of the First Army, the I Corps detached the
327th Infantry from the 82d Division on September 29. The regiment
took position west of Varennes in reserve of the 28th Division.
Under orders of the latter division, the 2d Battalion entered the
front line of the 35th Division on September 30, and took up a
position on the ridge northeast of Baulny. The 1st Battalion held a
position near Charpentry in support of the 2d Battalion. These two
battalions returned to the vicinity of Varennes on October 1, after
the 35th Division had been relieved by the 1st Division. The
regiment reverted from reserve of the 28th Division to control of
the 82d Division on October 3. [49, 50, 51]
On October 2 the First Army released the 82d Division from army
reserve, and placed it at the disposal of the I Corps for the
purpose of relieving the 28th Division when the relief of that
division should become necessary. The 82d Division, less the 157th
Field Artillery Brigade, was assembled in the vicinity of Varennes
by October 3. The artillery brigade joined the division on October
6. [50, 52, 53, 54, 55]
At this time the front of the I Corps was held by the 1st, 28th
and 77th Divisions from right to left. The V Corps was to the
right; the French Fourth Army to the left. [59]
By October 6, the advance of the I Corps had been stopped on a
general line, Flville Apremont le Chne Tondu Binarville, by strong
positions in the Argonne Forest and on the heights near Chtel-Chhry
and Cornay. From the latter positions, the enemy delivered
destructive flanking fire on both the 1st and 28th Divisions. [56,
57, 58]
In order to reduce the positions about Cornay and Chtel-Chhry,
and force the evacuation of those confronting the 77th Division in
the Argonne Forest, the First Army ordered
19
the I Corps to attack westward on October 7. The corps was to
protect its right flank from north of Bois de Boyon and advance to
the objective, Flville (excl.) Cornay (excl.) thence west to the
crest of the main ridge in the Argonne Forest thence south along
the crest of this ridge to the right of the 77th Division. [59]
The I Corps issued its field orders at 6 p. m., October 6. The
attack was to be launched at 5 a. m., October 7, on the front then
held by the 28th Division. The first objective was the line,
Flville (excl.) Cornay (incl.) Hill 223 (incl.) Cote 244 cemetery
on Le Chne Tondu, 1,500 meters south-west of Apremont. The corps
objective was the same as the first objective to Cornay, thence the
line, point 151, 500 meters west of Cornay la Viergette, 2
kilometers southwest of Apremont. Divisions were to advance to the
first objective without regard to the progress of the divisions to
the right or left, and be prepared to advance to the corps
objective three hours after the attack was launched. The corps
objective was to be organized for defense and held at all costs.
[60]
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The 82d Division, less one infantry brigade, was to be placed
between the 1st and 28th Divisions, and was assigned the following
boundaries:
Right: Flville (excl.) point 151. Left: Ferme des Granges la
Forge chateau north of Chtel-Chhry horizontal grid line 79.8.
The infantry of the 82d Division was to relieve that of the 28th
Division on the front, Flville (excl.) la Forge, before midnight,
October 6. The leading elements were to cross the Aire by the
bridge at La Forge and by improvised foot-bridges between Flville
and La Forge, form along the railroad track west of the Aire and
cover their front by active patrolling. One infantry brigade of the
82d Division was to remain in corps reserve. To the right of the
82d Division, the 1st Division was to hold its line and continue
exploitation. To the left, the 28th Division was to attack to the
westward. The 77th Division, to the left of the 28th, with its
right resting on Le Chne Tondu, was to hold its front and be
prepared to advance upon receipt of orders. [60]
20
In order to obtain the advantage of surprise, the corps directed
that great care would be taken to conceal preparatory dis-positions
from the enemy and that the corps artillery would con-tinue its
normal interdiction fire. The fire of the division artillery of the
28th and 82d Divisions was to be coordinated under the chief of
corps artillery. There was to be no artillery preparation; but the
attack was to be covered by a rolling barrage, and artillery fire
concentrated on known enemy positions as the advance progressed.
Two 75-mm guns were at-tached to each leading infantry battalion as
accompanying guns. The corps also directed that front-line infantry
battalions would not be reinforced, but would be passed through by
support battalions when definitely slowed down by enemy resistance.
[60]
At 9:30 p. m., October 6, the 82d Division issued field orders
designating the 164th Infantry Brigade as the attacking brigade.
These orders directed combat liaison detachments, each consist-ing
of one rifle company and one machine-gun platoon, to maintain
contact with the 1st Division near the bridge at Flville, and with
the 28th Division to the left. [61]
The 164th Infantry Brigade issued its field orders at 10:45
p.m., October 6. The 327th Infantry, on the right, was ordered to
take Cote 180, Cornay and the high ground to the east of that
place. The 328th Infantry, on the left, was to capture Hill 223.
Both regiments were directed to advance from the first objective to
the corps objective at 8 a. m. Companies from the support
battalions were given the flank-liaison missions prescribed by
division orders. [62]
The infantry regiments deployed as follows:
Oct. 7
The 164th Infantry Brigade marched from Varennes to its zone of
action during the night of October 6-7. Troops of the
328th Infantry 1st Battalion 2d Battalion
327th Infantry 1st Battalion 2d Battalion
Brigade Reserve 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry 3d Battalion, 328th
Infantry
[50]
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21
28th Division holding the bridge at La Forge, and machine-gun
units of that division which covered the ground east of the Aire by
fire from Pleinchamp Ferme, stood relieved as soon as elements of
the 82d Division passed their positions. [2, 50, 51, 63, 64]
The 327th Infantry reached its line of departure along the
railroad west of the Aire, east of Cote 180, in time to attack at 5
a. m. as ordered. The 1st Battalion, with Companies D and C in
assault, from right to left, attacked without artillery support,
and about 6 a. m. reached the crest of Cote 180. Here a short halt
was made before advancing on Cornay. Company D did not at once
execute the change of direction to the north, and Company B, from
support, replaced Company D in the assault echelon. Adjustment was
soon made, however, and Com-pany B returned to support. Upon
crossing the crest of Cote 180, hostile machine-gun fire was
encountered and, about 8 a. m., Company C was forced to return to
Cote 180, after having reached the Cornay Chtel-Chhry road. Soon
afterward, heavy hostile fire forced Company D also to return to
Cote 180. About 9 a. m. Company H was sent forward from support,
and took position to the left of Company C. During this attack
Company F, with machine-gun support, formed a combat-liaison group
connecting with the 1st Division to the right. This company, while
attempting to advance north from Ruisseau d'Exermont, received such
heavy fire across the flats of the Aire and from Flville that it
could not cross the stream. [2, 65]
During the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, dug in
on the military crest of Cote 180, with outposts on the
northwestern slope of the hill, and in the ravine of Ruisseau de
Boulasson. The line at night was held by Companies D, C, A and H,
from right to left. There was liaison across the Aire with Company
F, which in turn maintained liaison by patrols with the support
elements of the 1st Division, but not with its front line. The left
of Company H, 327th Infantry, maintained contact with the 328th
Infantry across the saddle between Cote 180 and Hill 223. [65]
The 328th Infantry, having in the darkness missed the guides
22
of the 28th Division, arrived in the vicinity of La Forge about
4:30 a. m. There was a heavy fog. Companies A and C formed on the
open ground west of the woods of Ferme des Granges; Companies B and
D formed in the woods. Companies A and C were partially
disorganized by hostile shelling which forced the men to take cover
in shell holes. At 7:25 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered
the 328th Infantry to attack Hill 223 at 8 a. m. This message was
relayed by the 328th Infantry to its 1st Battalion at 8:20 a. m.
Companies B and D, from right to left, were formed for the attack
under cover of the Ferme des Granges woods. After passing through
Com-panies A and C, which were then re-formed and followed in
support, they attacked across the Aire about noon. [ 2, 50, 63, 66,
67, 68]
The delay of the attack of the 328th Infantry caused the right
flank of the 28th Division, on the hill west of Chtel-Chhry, to
become exposed. To protect its right, troops of that division
occupied the southern slopes of Hill 223, pending the arrival of
the 328th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, reached the
crest of Hill 223 shortly after 12:30 p. m. without encountering
infantry resistance. The troops of the 28th Division on the hill
withdrew, and the assault companies of the 328th Infantry commenced
to organize the position. About 5 p. m., the Germans launched a
counterattack which was repulsed. The line across the crest of the
hill was held during the night, with contact to both flanks. [64,
69, 70, 71]
At 9:45 p. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade issued field orders
stating that the Commander-in-Chief had ordered a powerful thrust
to be made for the purpose of cutting the road and rail-road about
2 kilometers west of Hill 223, and that this mission had been
assigned to the 164th Infantry Brigade. The order directed that the
support battalions of both infantry regiments should cross the Aire
during
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the night and be prepared to make the final drive to the corps
objective before noon, October 8. The division machine-gun
battalion was placed at the disposal of the 327th Infantry. The
328th Infantry was charged with the duty of driving hard, straight
west, to cross the railroad at the nearest point. A rolling barrage
was provided for, which
23
was to advance at the rate of 100 meters in three minutes until
the railroad was reached. The barrage was then to stand 300 meters
beyond the railroad until ordered to stop. This order designated
the hour of attack as 5 a. m., October 8. [72]
At 10:30 p. m. the I Corps ordered the attack resumed at 6 a.
m., October 8, and assigned as right boundary of the 82d Division,
the Baulny St. Juvin road, and as left boundary the line, Hill 223
(incl.) point on narrow-gauge railroad 1 kilometer southwest of
Pylne Marcq (excl.) thence north to the Aire. An advance was
ordered to the line Flville (excl.) Cornay (incl.) la Besogne. This
line was to be organized for defense with outposts pushed forward
to the Aire. It was further announced that the ist Division had
passed to the V Corps. The right boundary thus became both the
divisional and the corps boundary. [73]
The 82d Division issued no field orders on October 7; but at
11:35 p. m. notified the 164th Infantry Brigade, in a field message
that, under I Corps orders, the hour of attack was postponed to 6
a. m. The 164th Infantry Brigade amended its field orders
accordingly, and at midnight, October 7, issued orders changing the
mission of the 327th Infantry to conform to that specified in corps
orders, which included the taking of Cornay. At 1:25 a. m., October
8, the 82d Division forwarded the corps orders to the 164th
Infantry Brigade, with the addi-tional information that one company
of IS tanks had been assigned to that brigade for the attack. [74,
75, 76, 77]
At 11:20 p. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade attached the 3d
Battalion, 328th Infantry, to the 327th Infantry; the 3d Battalion
of the latter remained in brigade reserve. This battalion did not
join the 327th Infantry until 2 p. m., October 8. [78, 79, 80]
Oct. 8
The 327th Infantry ordered its 1st Battalion to attack at 6 a.
m., supported by the 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry. The 2d
Battalion, 327th Infantry, was directed to cross the Aire before
daylight, and take positions on Cote 180 to cover the right flank.
[2, 51, 65]
The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, attacked westward about 6 a.
m., but about 6:30 a. m. was ordered by the 327th
24
Infantry to attack Cornay. The change of direction was made, and
the battalion advanced slowly northward. About 3 p. m. patrols of
Company A reached the south edge of Cornay, and about 4:30 p. m.
the battalion attacked the town. Cornay was entered before dark,
and during the evening, groups of Company C, 327th Infantry, and
Company I, 328th Infantry, commenced mopping up the village.
Shortly before midnight these troops withdrew to the south and east
of the town, and organized a line north of the Cornay Croix de
Bayle road. This portion of the line was not in liaison with units
across the Aire, nor with the 328th Infantry to the left. Company
F, 327th Infantry, which had crossed the Aire during the morning to
take up positions on Cote 180, recrossed the river later in the
day, and reoccupied its old positions along Ruisseau d'Exermont,
where liaison was secured by patrols with the 1st Division,
covering a gap of about 500 meters. Two com-panies of the 2d
Battalion, 327th Infantry, in support on Cote 180, maintained
contact with the 328th Infantry to the left. [2, 50, 51, 65, 81,
82]
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The 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, crossed the Aire during the
night of October 7-8. It passed through the 1st Battalion, 328th
Infantry, on Hill 223, and attacked at 6 a. m. as ordered. By 9 a.
m. the leading companies, in spite of machine-gun resistance, had
reached a line about 1 kilometer west of the line of departure.
About 2 p. m. Company D, 328th Infantry, was sent forward as
reinforcement, and was placed on the left of the line. During the
morning the I Corps ordered that the advance be pushed; a renewal
of the attack was therefore planned for the afternoon. The 164th
Infantry Brigade assigned the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, then in
brigade reserve, to the 328th Infantry for the afternoon attack,
but shortly thereafter notified the 328th Infantry that it was
retaining two companies of this battalion as brigade reserve. The
latter message did not reach the 328th Infantry until after the
attack had commenced. [2, 63, 83]
It was originally planned to launch a joint attack at 3:30 p. m.
The 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, was to advance from Hill 223 to
the road on Champrocher ridge west of Cornay.
25
It was to be assisted on the left by the 2d Battalion, 328th
Infantry, reinforced by Companies A and D, 328th Infantry. The
attack was to be supported by artillery. The available artillery,
however, proved to be insufficient for the execution of this plan.
Therefore, the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, was ordered to make
the attack alone. The assault companies, I and M, advanced at 4:20
p. m. with weak artillery support, and by 6 p. m. had gained the
objective. In the meantime, the remaining companies of the 3d
Battalion, 327th Infantry, K and L, had reverted to brigade reserve
and were not available to support the troops on the objective.
Later in the evening, Company G, 328th Infantry, was sent forward
to the new line, but the position was found to be untenable.
Shortly before midnight, the companies on Champrocher ridge
withdrew to the line of departure, and organized a position on the
north-western slope of Hill 223. A small detachment of Company M,
327th Infantry, remained on Hill 263 until October 9. Liaison was
secured with support elements of the 327th Infantry to the right,
and with the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, to the left. There was a
gap of about 600 meters between the left of the positions of the
1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, southeast of Cornay, and the right
of the line on Hill 223. There was also a gap of 1 kilometer
between the positions on Hill 223 and the right of the 2d
Battalion, 328th Infantry. [2, 70]
In the meantime, the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, had continued
its advance. Elements of the battalion reached the objective, the
light railroad and road 2 kilometers west of Hill 923, about 5 p.
m. The right was refused to give protection from the north, and the
line organized for the night. The position was held by Companies E,
F, G and D from right to left. To the right, liaison was
established with the positions on Hill 223. The left gained contact
with the 28th Division, which advanced to this line about 9:30 p.
m. [2, 63, 84]
At 8 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders directing the
resumption of the attack at 8:30 a. m., October 9. The objectives
were the same as those given in corps orders of October 7. The 163d
Infantry Brigade was released from corps reserve, and
26
ordered to relieve the 28th Division on the line then held by
the latter. The relief was to be completed before 4 a. m., October
9. The left boundary of the 28th Division was to become the new
left boundary of the 82d Division. This was a line extending
generally northwest from La Viergette to La Besogne. The division
artillery and engineers of the 28th Division were at-tached to the
82d Division. [85]
Oct. 9
The 82d Division issued its field orders at 2:35 a. m., October
9. The 163d Infantry Brigade, less the
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325th Infantry, was directed to relieve the 28th Division, and
to gain the corps ob-jective, the line, Flville la Besogne. The
325th Infantry was designated as division reserve. The 164th
Infantry Brigade was ordered to continue its attack. The 53d Field
Artillery Brigade, 28th Division, was directed to support the
attack of the 163d Infantry Brigade; and the 157th Field Artillery
Brigade, 82d Division, that of the 164th Infantry Brigade. The
corps objective was to be organized in depth as a line of
resistance. Exploitation patrols were to be pushed forward to the
Aire. [86]
Presumably acting upon advance notice of the division field
orders, the 164th Infantry Brigade had issued its orders on October
8. These orders directed the 327th Infantry to attack between
Flville (excl.) and Cornay (incl.); and the 328th Infantry to
attack between Cornay (excl.) and the narrow-gaugerailroad (incl.).
The 328th Infantry was charged with maintaining combat liaison with
the 326th Infantry, which was to go into position to its left; and,
as the swing to the north was made, to keep the narrow-gauge
railroad as its west boundary. Companies K and L, 327th Infantry,
were released from brigade reserve and returned to their regiment.
[87]
During the night of October 8-9 and the early morning of the
9th, local actions occurred in and around Cornay. Patrols of the
1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, and groups from the 3d Battalion,
328th Infantry, attempted to secure the town. Companies K and L,
327th Infantry, had joined the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry,
during the night in the positions east and south- east of the
village. The attack was renewed about 8:30 a. m. by the 1st
Battalion, 327th Infantry, assisted by the 3d Bat-
27
talion, 328th Infantry, and Companies K and L, 327th Infantry.
Cornay was taken and cleared of the enemy by 11 a. m. [2, 50, 51,
65, 88]
The German Fifth Army ordered a withdrawal to a line north of
the Aire. However, before the order reached the front-line troops,
the German 41st Division, which had been reinforced by fresh troops
during the night of October 8-9, launched a counterattack.
Following an artillery preparation, the Germans advanced on Cornay
shortly after noon. Portions of Companies A and D, 327th Infantry,
and groups of the 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, attempted to stem
the advance by barricading themselves in houses in the town.
Company C, 327th Infantry, counterattacked from the positions of
the night before, but was unsuccessful. The troops in the town were
confronted by the enemy on three sides, and stiff fighting ensued.
A number of Americans were captured, and the remainder withdrew. At
2 p. m. the 327th Infantry ordered its 2d Battalion to attack
Cornay, from the vicinity of Cote 180, at 6 p. m. The attack of
this battalion was to be supported by the remnants of the 1st
Battalion, 327th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry, and
Companies K and L, 327th Infantry. Under instructions from the
164th Infantry Brigade, the orders for this attack were rescinded
in a field message sent at 3:20 p. m. At 10 p. m. the brigade
ordered the 327th Infantry to withdraw all troops from the vicinity
of Cornay, and organize its line for the night on the southern edge
of the valley. The line was organized in virtually the same
position as that of October 7. Liaison was established with Company
F, which remained in position along Ruisseau d'Exermont. Patrols
secured liaison with the 1st Division north of Flville. Contact was
effected with the elements of Companies L and M, 327th Infantry, on
Hill 223, where the positions had been strengthened by additional
machine guns sited to fire across the front of Cote 180. [2, 50,
65, 89, 90]
Between 7 and 8 a. m. the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, attacked
due north, with its left on the narrow-gauge railroad. On the left,
the advance up Champrocher ridge proved difficult. Some troops
reached the Champrocher Pylne road about
28
noon. This position could not be held, however, and the
ad-vanced elements were withdrawn to a position about 300 meters
north of and extending farther east than the line held during the
previous
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night. During the day, contact was secured with the 3d
Battalion, 326th Infantry, to the left, and liaison with the 3d
Battalion, 327th Infantry, on the northwestern slopes of Hill 223,
although the gap across the valley was not actually occupied by
troops. [2, 63, 9 1, 92]
After relieving the 28th Division, it was planned that the 326th
Infantry would pivot to the right with its right on the
narrow-gauge railroad. It was then to advance north in con-junction
with the 328th Infantry. [50]
The 326th Infantry, with the 3d and 1st Battalions in line from
right to left, and the 2d Battalion in support, advanced through
the lines of the 28th Division in the early morning of October 9,
and attacked about 8 a. m. The 3d Battalion found little hostile
opposition until about noon, when the pivoting move-ment was
completed and advance to the north began. From this time on the
advance was slow, owing to heavy machine-gun fire. Although a few
troops reached the crest of the ridge, the position could not be
held, and they withdrew about 4 p. m. -to the reverse slope 800
meters southwest of Pylne. Here a line was established for the
night in contact with the 328th Infantry to the right, but without
front-line contact with the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, to the
left. The route of the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, northwest
from the vicinity of Cote 244, was such as to cause a drift to the
left. This battalion, likewise, encountered little resistance until
about noon. Ad-vanced elements were able to make their way to the
vicinity of La Besogne during the afternoon. These troops could not
be supported, however, and a line was formed for the night along
the trail running southwest from the vicinity of Pylne, in con-tact
with the 77th Division. [2, 50, 93]
At 11 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders which directed that
the attack would be resumed at 7 a. m., October 10, for the purpose
of driving the enemy beyond the Aire River. These orders
established the right boundary of the I Corps, and of the 82d
Division, as the line, Baulny (excl.) western edge
29
of Bois de Boyon Sommerance (excl.). The left boundary of the
82d Division remained the same as far as La Besogne. From this
point the new boundary was, Marcq (incl.) north to the Aire River.
Strong outposts were to be established on the high ground 1
kilometer southeast of Marcq, and on the ridge to the north and
northeast of Cornay. The line of resistance, Cornay la Besogne, was
not changed. The 82d Division was ordered to relieve elements of
the 1st Division west of Bois de Boyon by 5 a. m., October 10. The
artillery and engineers of the 28th Division were to be released to
their division on the 10th. [94, 95]
In compliance with verbal orders of the division commander,
which attached the 325th Infantry to the 164th Infantry Bri-gade,
the brigade issued its field orders on October 9. The 325th
Infantry was directed to attack at 5 a. m., October 10, and re-gain
the corps objective from Flville to the narrow-gauge rail-road west
of Cornay. The 2d Battalion was to attack from Cote 180 to the
line, Flville (excl.) Cornay (incl.). The 1st Battalion was to
attack from the ridge west of Hill 223 to the line, Cornay (excl.)
narrow-gauge railroad west of Cornay. The 3d Battalion was to
remain in reserve south and west of Hill 223. The corps objective
was to be organized in depth. Exploitation patrols were to be sent
north to the Aire, which was designated as the limit of the outpost
position. The 327th Infantry and the 328th Infantry were to remain
in position until further orders. All troops were to be in position
for the attack at 4 a. m., October 10. It was also provided that
all the artillery of the 157th Field Artillery Brigade would
support this attack and, upon the arrival of the infantry on the
objective, would be available for harassing and searching fire
north of the objective. [96, 97]
The withdrawal, which had been ordered by the German Fifth Army,
was carried out during the night of October 9-10. [89, 98]
Oct. 10
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The 2d and 1st Battalions, 325th Infantry, from right to left,
had taken the positions ordered by 4 a. m., relieving front-line
Oct. 10 elements of the 327th Infantry and 328th Infantry. The
corps postponed the attack until 7 a. m. At that hour the
attack
30
was launched behind a heavy artillery barrage, and supported by
direct overhead machine-gun fire. Little resistance was encountered
and both battalions reached the corps objective. Organization of
the position was in progress by 10:20 a. m. Acting under
instructions from the corps, the 164th Infantry Brigade, at 10:35
a. m., ordered the enemy driven beyond the Aire. Both battalions
passed their support companies through the front line and patrolled
to the river. No infantry was en-countered. On the right, Company G
and two platoons of Company H established themselves at Martincourt
Ferme. The other two platoons of Company H took positions near
point 177. These troops established an outpost line and patrolled
to the Aire. [2, 50, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103]
Pursuant to orders of the 164th Infantry Brigade, Company K,
325th Infantry, which was then in reserve near Hill 223, was
directed to establish a combat-liaison post between the 1st and 82d
Divisions. It took up a position near the crossing of the Flville
Baulny and the Exermont Chtel-Chhry roads. [100]
There was no front-line liaison between the two platoons of
Company H, 325th Infantry, near point 177, and the 327th Infantry,
across the Aire. Contact was secured between the elements of the
325th Infantry at Martincourt Ferme and those of the 326th Infantry
on the ridge to the west. [2]
On the left, the 326th Infantry attacked at 7:30 a. m. in the
same order as on the previous day. By noon the assault battalions,
having met little resistance, were on the corps ob-jective west of
the narrow-gauge railroad. [93]
About 3:30 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 326th Infantry, then in
support, was ordered to cross the Aire River, and take St. Juvin
and Cte 182. Both places were reported to have been evacuated. The
battalion passed through the front line about 5 p. m. and advanced
through Marcq, without preliminary reconnaissance. It was planned
to attack with Companies G and E in assault, from right to left,
and Companies F and H in support. Company G was to cross the Aire
by the highway bridge and nearby fords; Company E by the railroad
bridge. Movements along the riverbank drew hostile fire from
the
31
vicinity of St. Juvin. After dark, it was discovered that the
bridges had been destroyed. Attempts to cross continued throughout
the evening, but hostile fire prevented. Before midnight, positions
were taken up on the high ground south of the railroad, with
outposts along the river. There was contact to the right with the
front line of the 325th Infantry at Martin-court Ferme. Contact was
established with the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, which had
occupied Marcq, and with the 77th Division in the northwestern edge
of the town. [2, 93, 105]
East of the Aire, the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, moved
forward about noon to relieve elements of the 1st Division north of
Flville. The relief was accomplished at 4:10 p. m. Contact was
established, by patrols, with the left of the 1st Division on Cte
de Maldah, but there was no liaison with the front line of the
325th Infantry west of the river. [22 51, 65, 104]
During the evening, the 164th Infantry Brigade notified the
325th and 327th Infantry Regiments, in field messages, that they
were under its command, and that the 326th and 328th Infantry
Regiments were under the command of the 163d Infantry Brigade. The
328th Infantry was directed to report to the 163d Infantry Brigade
for orders. [106]
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At 8 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders directing the
continuation of the attack at 7 a. m., October 11. The following
zone of action was assigned to the 82d Division:
Right boundary: Sommerance (excl.) Imcourt (excl.). Left
boundary: Marcq (incl.) St. Juvin (excl.) Verpel (excl.).
The line, Imcourt (excl.) Champigneulle (incl.) Grand-Pr
(incl.), was assigned as the first objective; two other objec-tives
were assigned farther to the north. One regiment of 75-mm guns was
to support the attack of each infantry brigade, and at least one
gun was to accompany each assault infantry battalion. A group of
tanks was designated to operate with the 82d Division. [107]
The 82d Division issued its field orders at 11 p. m. These
orders confirmed the information contained in the field messages of
the 164th Infantry Brigade, attaching the 328th Infantry to
32
the 163d Infantry Brigade, and the 325th Infantry to the 164th
Infantry Brigade. The 164th Infantry Brigade was to attack between
the east boundary of the division and vertical grid line 98.5; the
163d Infantry Brigade between that grid line and the west boundary.
The assault battalions were ordered to cross the Aire before
daylight, covered by strong patrols. They were to be formed for the
attack by 5 a. m. on the north bank of the Aire, on a line
extending west from Sommerance, just north of La Rance Ruisseau, to
the Flville St. Juvin road. Combat liaison between infantry
brigades, and with the divisions to the right and left, was
provided for. The order stated that five tanks would support the
attack, deploying across the front of the division as the infantry
moved forward. The artillery was instructed to keep harassing and
interdiction fire in front of the advancing infantry, and to assign
one regiment of 75-mm guns to each attacking brigade. The
accompany-ing guns prescribed by the corps were assigned to the
leading battalions. [108]
Oct. 11
The 164th Infantry Brigade issued its field orders on October
11. The 327th Infantry was to attack on the right; the 325th on the
left. Presumably through a typographical error, the corps west
boundary was assigned to the 325th Infantry as the left limit of
its zone of action. The boundary between regiments was given as
vertical grid line 99.3 until it crossed the St. Georges St. Juvin
road, thence to a point midway between Imcourt and Allipont. Each
regiment was ordered to attack with one battalion in assault, one
in support and one in reserve. The reserve battalion, 327th
Infantry, was designated as division reserve; the reserve
battalion, 325th Infantry, as brigade reserve. [109]
The 327th Infantry was in position for the attack at 5 a. m. The
3d Battalion, less Company K, which had been broken up and assigned
to other companies of the regiment, was to pass through the 2d
Battalion. The 2d Battalion was then to follow in support. Just
before 5 a. m. instructions were received to postpone the attack to
conform to field orders of the I Corps. These instructions were
relayed to the advanced troops, who attacked from the Sommerance
St. Juvin road at
33
7 a. m., without artillery support. No tanks arrived to support
the attack. Relatively good progress was made, and the leading
elements of the 3d Battalion, which, with both flanks exposed,
crossed the ridge southeast of St. Juvin and penetrated the enemy
wire northwest of Hill 230. Enemy resistance was too strong,
however, for these advanced positions to be held, and a withdrawal
to the vicinity of the Sommerance St. Juvin road was ordered about
9:30 a. m. The troops withdrew, covered by machine guns. The 2d
Battalion was put into the line along the road, on the right of the
3d Battalion, with all four companies in line. About 11:40 a. m.
the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered a withdrawal, under cover of
machine-gun fire, to positions which could be held. Further
withdrawal was made to
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the positions of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, south of the
road. The movement was completed about 1 p. m. [2, 50, 51, 65,
110]
At 2 p. m. the 82d Division ordered the 164th Infantry Brigade
to employ the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, then in division
reserve, to regain the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. Pursuant to
these instructions, the brigade ordered this battalion to report to
the 327th Infantry, which was directed to advance straight north
from the patches of woods north of the Sommerance St. Juvin road,
regain the ridge and dig in. The 325th Infantry, on the left, was
to be instructed to conform to the movements of the attacking
battalion. No advance beyond the ridge was to be made. [2, 65, 100,
111]
About 5 p. m. the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, advanced as
ordered, passing through elements of the other two battalions and
the right of the 325th Infantry, and gained its objective about 7
p. m. Some of its troops withdrew from the summit of the ridge
during the evening, but returned before midnight and organized the
crest for defense. Units of the 325th Infantry outposted the right
of this line. Liaison was secured with those units of the 325th
Infantry which were to the left. [65, 112]
The 325th Infantry received the orders of the 164th Infantry
Brigade about midnight, October 10. The 3d Battalion, less Company
K, was in reserve in the, vicinity of Hill 223.
34
Early in the day, Company K had been sent across the Aire to
maintain liaison with the 1st Division. Shortly after receipt of
the brigade orders, the 325th Infantry directed its 3d Battalion,
less Company K, to march via Flville in time to reach the line of
departure by 5 a. m. The 2d and 1st Battalions were ordered to
withdraw from the outpost position and line of resistance and
follow in the order named. [100, 113]
At 7 a. m., the 3d Battalion was marching along the Flville St.
Juvin road, with the head of the column about 1 kilometer south of
the junction of the Sommerance St. Juvin road. At this point sharp
fire was received from the front and from the ridge to the right.
Two companies deployed to the right of the road. The third took
position in the ditch of La Rance Ruisseau and returned the hostile
fire. The battalion soon took up the advance and, with both flanks
exposed, reached the objective, the ridge southeast of St. Juvin.
By 10:30 a. m. the 2d Battalion had been sent in to strengthen the
line. Liaison was secured, to the right, with the 327th Infantry
which had fallen back to the Sommerance St. Juvin road. Owing to
the withdrawal of the 327th Infantry, the right flank of the 325th
Infantry remained exposed for a considerable period of time. [2,
100, 101]
At 11:09 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered Companies B
and C, 325th Infantry, then in brigade reserve, to reinforce the
line on the ridge. About the same time, Companies A and D, 325th
Infantry, were sent from brigade reserve to reinforce the 327th
Infantry. Since this regiment was withdrawing, it returned the two
companies to the 325th Infantry. In the afternoon they joined the
remainder of their battalion in the front line on the ridge. During
the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, extended the right
of its line to the northern outskirts of Sommerance, and sent
Company F to secure liaison to the left. Late in the afternoon, the
1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, advanced through the right of the
325th Infantry and established itself on the objective. Company E,
325th Infantry, outposted the right of the line of the 1st
Battalion, 327th Infantry, while Company H, 325th Infantry, placed
a screen around Sommerance. Company H secured
35
liaison by patrols with the 42d Division, which was relieving
the 1st Division. Company G, 325th Infantry, remained in support
just west of Sommerance. [2, 101]
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In the zone of action of the 325th Infantry, the 1st and 3d
Battalions were intermingled along the ridge during the afternoon.
Reorganization was accomplished after dark and the 1st Battalion
took over the front line, with the 3d Battalion in close support.
Company F, 325th Infantry, remained on the left, and during the
evening established contact with Company M, 326th Infantry, which
had crossed the Aire and moved to the ridge. The position held was
generally along the crest of the ridge. [100, 101]
During the night of October 10-11, troops of the 307th Engineers
helped repair the bridges in front of the 2d Battalion, 326th
Infantry, which was ordered to cross at daybreak and take St.
Juvin. [105]
The movement commenced about 5 a.m. No tanks appeared in this
area, and there was no artillery support. Covered by a fog,
Companies G and E and portions of Company F had crossed by 5:40 a.
m. While they were deploying, the fog lifted and very heavy
machine-gun fire was received from the direction of St. Juvin.
Company G was able to move forward about 75 meters by crawling, but
Company E could not advance. The fire was so intense that all
troops had to be withdrawn to the south bank of the river. The
withdrawal was covered by the fire of Company F, and by an overhead
barrage of the Machine-Gun Company, 326th Infantry. A line was
formed along the railroad. Contact was maintained with the 77th
Division to the left at the same point as on the previous night.
Patrols covered the ground to the river and the bridge during the
night of October 11-12. [2, 114]
Company M, 326th Infantry, forded the Aire east of Martin-court
Ferme, and moved up the Flville St. Juvin road to the positions of
the 325th Infantry on the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. The other
companies of the 3d Battalion, 326th Infantry, remained west of the
Aire. The 1st Battalion continued in support of the 2d Battalion.
There was no front-line liaison across the river. [2, 93]
36
The 82d Division notified the 326th Infantry in a field message
at 8:30 p. m. that direct attacks on St. Juvin would be
discontinued. The message stated that movements to the east and
north to avoid the town would be ordered. [115]
Oct. 12
At 1 a. m., October 12, the 164th Infantry Brigade notified the
325th and 327th Infantry Regiments that there would be no attack
during the day. It directed that reorganization would continue and
positions be improved. [116]
The front line to the north of the Aire was consolidated along
the ridge southeast of St. Juvin. About 4 p. m. the 42d Division
occupied Sommerance and took over the line of the 2d Battalion,
325th Infantry, as far as the divisional right boundary. The
battalion then passed to, brigade reserve. Contact was maintained
with the 42d Division. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 327th Infantry,
were consolidated during the day. This provisional battalion
continued to hold the front line on the ridge, with the 1st
Battalion in support. The 1st Battalion, 325th Infantry, was
relieved in the front line by the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry.
[50, 65, 100, 101]
In the 326th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, less Company M, forded
the Aire in the early morning and took up positions in the gully
east of Gu Dehamby. One company formed a defensive line facing St.
Juvin, while the other two companies supported this line and the
positions of Company M on the ridge to the north. West of the Aire,
the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion in the frontline. [2,
93, 117, 118]
At 11 a. m. the I Corps issued field orders announcing an attack
on D-day at H-hour for the purpose of supporting the left of the V
Corps, which was to attack at an hour to be announced later. In
this attack the I Corps, pivoting on its left, was to advance to
successive objectives specified in its field
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orders. The 82d Division was to support and protect the left of
the 42d Division; the 77th Division was to support and protect the
left of the 82d Division. The right elements of the 77th Division
were to move into the zone of action of the 82d Division and attack
St. Juvin from the south and east. [119]
Oct. 13
During the morning of October 13, the 164th Infantry Brigade
37
issued field orders giving advance information of a general
attack which was to be made October 14, and stating that the normal
organization of the brigades would be resumed. The 328th Infantry
was directed to relieve the 327th Infantry during the night of
October 13-14 on a 1-battalion front. These orders also provided
for preliminary reconnaissance of the front, and other preparations
for the attack. At 9:15 a. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade ordered
the 325th Infantry to organize in depth, holding its front with one
battalion. [120, 121]
The remainder of the morning and the early afternoon were spent
in making arrangements for the proposed attack. At 4 p. m., the
325th Infantry and the 328th Infantry reverted to the 163d and
164th Infantry Brigades respectively. About this time, after a
heavy artillery preparation, the enemy launched a counterattack,
and advanced in open formation over the ridge cast of St. Juvin.
The fronts of all three regiments east of the Aire were involved.
At 5 p. m. the 82d Division ordered the 164th Infantry Brigade to
assume command of the action east of the river. The division also
directed the 163d Infantry Brigade, west of the Aire, to furnish
any troops requested by the 164th Infantry Brigade. By this time
the counterattack was being definitely repulsed. No withdrawals
were made, and at 5:20 p. m. the 164th Infantry Brigade report-ed
that the counterattack had been stopped on the front of the 327th
Infantry, on the extreme right. On the front of the 325th Infantry,
the 1st Battalion had just completed the relief of the 3d Battalion
when the counterattack commenced. The latter battalion stayed in
the forward positions until the action ceased, when it passed to
support. At 6:50 p. m. the 82d Division ordered the infantry
brigades to resume their normal organization. [2, 101, 114,
118]
During the late afternoon, the 328th Infantry reverted to the
command of the 164th Infantry Brigade and moved from Pylne, west of
the Aire, to positions in rear of the 327th Infantry. About 10 p.
m. the 2d Battalion, 326th Infantry, crossed to the east bank of
the Aire at Flville, and took position in support of the 3d
Battalion, 326th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry,
continued to hold its lines west of the Aire, in contact
38
with the 77th Division. Contact with the left of the 42d
Division was maintained near the divisional right boundary north of
Sommerance. [63, 93, 114, 122]
The relief of the 327th Infantry in the front line by the 328th
Infantry commenced during the evening of October 13, and was
completed about 2:3o a.m., October 14 [123]
At 2 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders announcing that
D-day, referred to in its field orders of October 12, would be
October 14. The corps was to support the left flank of the V Corps
and, pivoting on its left, advance to successive objectives, as
follows:
First objective: Hill 230 Gu Dehamby Marcq (incl.). Corps
objective: ridge 1 kilometer north of Moulin St. Georges Cte 182
Chevires (incl.).
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Divisions were ordered to advance from the first objective at H
plus 1 hours. It is to be noted, however, that the 82d Division
already occupied the first objective except on the ex-treme right.
In preparation for, and to assist the infantry attack, lethal gas
was to be used in rear areas to the fullest extent possible. Troops
were to be in position at 6 a. m., October14. [2, 119, 124]
At 10 p. m. the 82d Division issued its field orders.
Bound-aries were not changed. Provisions were made for the movement
Of 77th Division troops into the zone of action of the 82d Division
for the purpose of attacking St. Juvin from the south and east.
Elements of the 77th Division were to relieve the 1st Battalion,
326th Infantry, south of St. Juvin. Upon being relieved, the
battalion was to cross to the east bank of the Aire. [125]
There was to be a 2-hour artillery preparation. The artillery
was given the special mission of protecting the left flank east of
vertical grid line 97, from St. Juvin and Cte 182, by use of high
explosive and smoke. A battery of 75-mm guns was assigned each
infantry brigade for special missions. The rolling barrage was to
continue for 1 hour after H-hour, and conform to the advance of the
infantry. It was to be resumed at H plus 1 hours to cover the
advance to the corps objective. One 75-mm gun was to accompany each
assault battalion, and
39
Company E, 1st Gas Regiment, was to support the attack of the
164th Infantry Brigade with smoke and thermite. H-hour was later
announced as 8:30 a. m. [125, 126]
The following dispositions were ordered for the attack:
In addition to directing the relief of the 327th Infantry by the
328th Infantry, the field orders of the 164th Infantry Brigade
provided that the attack of the brigade would not begin until five
hours after the beginning of the attack by the 42d Division.
Machine-gun companies were attached to the leading battalions.
[128,129]
The field orders of the 163d Infantry Brigade designated the 3d
Battalion, 325th Infantry, as brigade reserve, and directed it to
move as the rear battalion of the column of its regiment. The 3d
Battalion, 326th Infantry, was to move north from the line of
departure. The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, upon being relieved
by the 77th Division at 6 a. m., was to follow the attack of that
division to the north bank of the Aire, and then join its regiment
as reserve. The battalion was to take no part in the attack of the
77th Division. [100, 127]
Oct. 14
163D INFANTRY BRIGADE 164TH INFANTRY BRIGADE 326th Infantry 3d
Battalion 2d Battalion 1st Battalion
325th Infantry 1st Battalion
328th Infantry 1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion
Brigade Reserve 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry
Brigade Reserve 327th Infantry
DIVISION RESERVE 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry
319th Machine-Gun Battalion
[114, 125, 127, 128]
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About 8:30 a. m., October 14, the 42d Division came abreast of
the right of the 328th Infantry; that regiment then attacked. The
1st Battalion advanced slowly in conjunction with the 42d Division.
About 10 a. m. the right of the battalion was im-peded by troops of
the 42d Division who entered the zone of action of the 328th
Infantry to attack St. Georges from the southwest. Shortly before
noon these troops withdrew to
40
their own zone of action. About noon a detachment of Company D
succeeded in getting through the wire of the Kriemhild Stellung
about 800 meters southwest of St. Georges, while portions of
Company C were about 500 meters to the south. Dur-ing the early
afternoon Company B was placed in line on the left, and attacked
across the St. Georges St. juvin road. Upon reaching the ridge
overlooking Ravin aux Pierres heavy fire was received, and the
advance was stopped about 1:30 p. m. A line was formed along the
St. Georges St. juvin road. In the late afternoon the 2d Battalion
relieved the 1st Battalion in the front line. The 2d Battalion
withdrew its right from the road to gain contact with the 42d
Division on the divisional boundary 1 kilometer south of St.
Georges. This line was maintained during the night. Contact was
secured with the 325th Infantry. [2, 63, 118, 130, 131]
In the center, the 325th infantry attacked about 10 a. m., with
the 1st Battalion in assault. By 11:15 a. m. the wire of the
Kriemhild Stellung had been pierced but, as heavy fire was received
from the right, the troops withdrew to the St. Georges St. Juvin
road. At this time the support companies of the 1st Battalion were
passing through a gas barrage about 750 meter