8.29.13 Putative Intervenors_ Reply to Petitioner_s Answer and New Matter

7/30/2019 8.29.13 Putative Intervenors_ Reply to Petitioner_s Answer and New Matter

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DECHERT LLPBy: Robert C. Heim (Pa. 15758)Alexander R. Bilus (Pa. 203680)William T. McEnroe (Pa. 308821)Joanna L. Barry (Pa. 3l 1438)Cira Centre

2929 Arch StreetPhiladelphia, PA I 9104-2808(21s) 994-4000David S. Cohen (Pa.8881l)3320 Market StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19104(2ts) s7t-4714Attomeys for Putative Intervenors

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVAIIIA

COMMON WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIADEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 379 M.D.2013Petitioner,

D. BRUCE HANES, in his capacity as theClerk of Orphans' Court of MontgomeryCounty,Respondent.

PUTATIVE INTER\TENORS' REPLY TO PETITIONER'S ANSWERAND NEW MATTER TO THE VERIF'IED PETITION X'OR LEAVE TO INTERVENEPutative Intervenors, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby reply to the New

Matter contained in Petitioner's Answer and New Matter to the Verified Petition for Leave toIntervene:

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l. Putative Intervenors incorporate paragraphs 1 to 24 ofthe Petition to Intervene asif fully set forth herein, and incorporate by reference the Brief in Support of the Reply toPetitioner's Answer and New Matter to the Verified Petition for Leave to Intervene as if fullv setforth herein.

2. Paragraph 2 sets forth conclusions of law to which no response is required; to theextent one is required, the averments are DENIED. Putative Intervenors DENY that they lack alegally enforceable interest that supports the Petition to Intervene.

3. Paragraph 3 sets forth conclusions of law to which no response is required;to theextent one is required, the averments are DENIED. Putative Intervenors DENY that theirinterests will be adequately represented by Respondent D. Bruce Hanes. Unlike RespondentHanes, the validity of Putative Intervenors' marriage licenses and their entitlement to the legalbenefits of marriage are at stake in this action.

4. Paragraph 4 sets forth conclusions of law to which no response is required; to theextent one is required, the averments are DENIED. Putative lntervenors DENY that they haveno interest in the outcome of this mandamus action, and assert that they, unlike all other citizens,will be personally affected by the Court's decision in this action because it affects the validity oftheir marriage licenses.

5. Paragraph 5 sets fonh conclusions of law to which no response is required; to theextent one is required, the averments are ADMITTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.Putative Intervenors ADMIT that under the separation of powers doctrine public officials enforcethe law and that the courts have the power to declare a law unconstitutional. Putative IntervenorsDENY that the courts are the only branch of government that interpret the Constitution and that

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Respondent Hanes or Putative Intervenors cannot challenge tlre constitutionality of the MarriageLaw in response to the Amended Petition for Review in the Nature of an Action in Mandamus.

6. Paragraph 6 sets forth conclusions of law to which no response is required; to theextent one is required, Putative Intervenors ADMIT that no court has yet held that the MarriageLaw is unconstitutional, although the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.Iilindsor makes clear that the Maniage Law violates the United States and Pennsylvaniaconstitutions.

7 . Paragraph 7 sets forth conclusions of law to which no response is required; to theextent one is required, Putative Intervenors DENY that, should the Court determine it hasjurisdiction, the constitutionality of the Marriage Law is not properly before the Court. PutativeIntervenors DENY that the mandamus action seeks only to compel the Clerk to comply with theLaw, as Petitioner's Answer and New Matter explicitly denies that "any marriages purportedlyissued by the Clerk to couples of the same sex are legally valid." Answer and New Matter'lf 1.

WHEREFORE, Putative Intervenors respectfully request that the Court grant the Petitionto Intervene.

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Dated: havc+zi,ZOLZ-J-

Respectfu lly submitted,

Dechert LLPCira Centre2929 Atch StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19104-2808David S. Cohen (Pa. 88811)3320 Market StreetPhiladslphia, PA 19104Attorneys for Putative Intervenors

C. Heim @a. 15758)Alexander R. Bilus @a. 203680)William T. McEnroe (Pa. 308821)Joanna L. Barry @a. 311438)


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI certify that the foregoing Putative Intervenors' Reply to Petitioner's Answer and New

Matter to the Verified Petition for Leave to Intervene was served upon the interested partieslisted below on August 29,2013 via prepaid First Class U.S. Mail, addressed as follows:

Alison TaylorChief CounselPennsylvania Department of HealthOffice of Legal Counsel825 Health and Welfare Building625 Forster SteetHarrisburg, PA17120

Attorneys for PetitionerRaymond McGarryJoshua M. SteinNicole R. ForzatoNatasha Taylor-SmithMichael P. ClarkeSolicitor for the Register of Wills& Clerk of Orphans' Court of

Montgomery CountyOne Montgomery Plaza, Suite 410P.O. Box 311Norristown, PA 19404Attorneys for Respondent

Dated: August 29,2013

Cira Cente,2929 Arch St.Philadelphia, PA i9104


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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

COMMON WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIADEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 379 M.D.2013Petitioner,

D. BRUCE HANES, in his capacity as theClerk of Orphans' Court of MontgomeryCounty,Respondent,

PUTATIVE INTERVENORS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF'THE REPLYTO PETITIONER'S ANSWER AND NEW MATTERTO THE VERIFIED PETITION TO INTERVENEIn their Petition to Intervene, Putative Intervenors demonstrated that the determination of

this action "may affect any legally enforceable interest of such person whether or not suchperson may be bound by a judgment in the action." Pa. R. Civ. P.2327. In response, theDepartment of Health compares Putative Intervenors, who are all adults in loving, committedrelationships,to lZ-year-old children. The Department of Health claims that, like licenses thatmight be issued to 12-year-olds, Putative Intervenors' licenses are invalid. But unlike theDepartment of Health's hypothetical l2-year-olds, Putative Intervenors have received validmarriage licenses and seek now to protect those licenses from the Department of Health's attackon their validity. The sole basis for Department of Health's attack is a law that clearly violatesthe United States and Pennsylvania constitutions and that was only enacted to impose inequalityon same-sex couples. As discussed further below, the Department of Health's arguments against


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intervention do not withstand scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Petition toIntervene.

Putative Intervenors Must Be Permitted To Intervene To Protect Their LegallyEnforceable Interests.First, the Department of Health claims that Putative Intervenors do not have a "legally

enforceable interest" at stake. This claim is absurd, as right now Putative Intervenors are in thepossession of marriage licenses properly granted to them by Respondent Hanes and which nocourt has declared invalid. If Putative Intervenors are not permitted to intervene, they will not beable to protect their interests in the continuing validity of their licenses. The Department ofHealth's argument that there is no interest in an "invalid" license puts the cart before the horse:these licenses are valid and have not been declared otherwise by any court, and PutativeIntervenors have every riglit to protect and act upon them.

Second, the Department of Health argues that it is not seeking to invalidate the marriagelicenses already issued to Putative lntervenors, only to prevent Respondent Hanes from issuing

more licenses in the future. But the Court's decision on whether Respondent Hanes maycontinue to issue licenses will necessarily involve a determination that what Respondent Haneshas done was proper or improper. That decision will impact the validity of Putative Intervenors'marriage licenses. Moreover, the Department of Health specifically asserts in response to thePetition to Intervene and elsewhere that Putative Intervenors' licenses are invalid. There couldbe no clearer case in which intervention were proper than one in which a court ruling mightthreaten a couple's extant marriage license.

Third, the Department of Health claims that Putative Intervenors' claims of harm are only"speculative." This is wrong. Any decision of the Court that holds that Respondent Hanescannot issue marriage licenses to same sex couples will cause great harm to Putative Intervenors,

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because it will put their marriage licenses in jeopardy. There are almost two thousand federaland state laws that provide benefits and protections to married couples; if Putative Intervenors'marriages are invalidated, they would lose the prospect of attaining all of those benefits andprotections. The Department of Health places great emphasis on Putative Intervenors' use oftheword "may" in their Petition to lntervene, asserting that this somehow means that PutativeInteryenors'claims of harm are only speculative. But Putative Intervenors' allegations track thelanguage of the Rule of Civil Procedure that governs intervention: the Rule specifically permitsintervention if an "action may affect any legally enforceable interest." Pa. R.C.P. 2327(4).Accordingly, the Court should ignore the Department of Health's misplaced emphasis on theword "may."

Finally, the Department of Health contends that Putative Intervenors' interests areadequately represented by Respondent Hanes. But with all due respect to Mr. Hanes, it is not hismariage license that has been put at risk by this action nor are his rights at stake when a courtdetermines whether Putative Intervenors' Iicenses are valid. The Department of Health alsosuggests that the plaintiffs in Whitewood, et al. v. Corbett,No. 13-1861 (M.D. Pa.2013), willadequately represent the Putative Intervenors. The plaintiffs in the federal action have nobearing on Putative Intervenors' representationin this action and, in any event, no plaintiffinthat case has received a Pennsylvania marriage license. Putative Intervenors have a right toprotect their marriages from this attack, and must be permitted to intervene here.il. The Constitutionality Of The Marriage Law Is At Issue In This Action.

A primary focus of the Department of Health's brief is that Putative Intervenors shouldnot be permitted to intervene because Putative Intervenors improperly are seeking to "inject" theissue of the constitutionality of the Marriage Law into this action. This is erroneous.

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Respondent Hanes also has raised the constitutionality of the Marriage Law as a defense to theDepartment's petition for mandamus, and he was correct to do so for two reasons: first, becausehe is directed by statute to consider the law when issuing marriage licenses, and second, becausePennsylvania law permits an officer in these circumstances to raise the constitutionality of astatute as a defense to a mandamus action. Furthermore, even if Respondent Hanes as the Clerkof the Montgomery County Orphans' Court cannot raise the constitutionality of the MarriageLaw as a defense, Putative Intervenors as couples who have received valid marriage licenses thathave not been declared invalid by a court must be permitted to raise the issue to protect theirinterests.

A. Respondent Hanes Is Required by Statute to Consider the Constitutionalityof the Marriage Law.Under Pennsylvania law, Respondent Hanes shall issue a marriage license "if it appears

from the properly completed applications on behalf of each of the parties to the proposedmarriage that there is no legal objection to the marria ge." 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1307 (emphasis added).Furthermore, Respondent Hanes must examine each applicant for a marriage license under oathas to "the legality of the contemplated mariage." 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1306 (emphasis added).Sections 1306 and 1307 are statutory directives that require Respondent Hanes to considerthestate of the law and determine the "legality" of the contemplated marriage. Pursuant to theseprovisions, Respondent Hanes must review the laws of the Commonwealth and the United Statesand determine whether such laws pose a legal impediment to the marriage. See Commonwealthv. State Treasurer,29 Pa. C.C. 545, 1904 WL 2600, at *6 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1904) (discussingwhether "established by law" means "established by a (valid) law"). Because the United Statesand Pennsylvania Constitutions are both law, Respondent Hanes must incorporate them into his

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consideration under sections 1306 and 1307; thus, this Court must also consider the constitutionsin determining whether Respondent Hanes has acted in accordance with law.

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor,l33S.Ct 2675 (2013), and as discussed in Putative Interyenors' Proposed Preliminary Objectionsand Brief in Support of the Preliminary Objections, it has become clear that the Mariage Law'sdefinition of marriage offends the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions.r Accordingly,when presented with marriage applications from same-sex couples, Respondent Hanesperformed his statutorily-directed duty, examined the law, and determined there was no legalobjection to the mariages.

For the sake of complete clarity, the statutorily-authorized process that Respondent Hanesfollowed under Pennsylvania's marriage laws is as follows. Each of the Putative Intervenorsapplied for a license pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1 302. Respondent Hanes then conducted an oralexamination pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1306, including as to the "legality of the contemplatedmarriage." He then, pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1307, assessed whether there were any "legalobjection[s] to the marriage." Respondent Hanes knew that there was a statutory objection to themariage, as the 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1102 indeed states that marriage is between one man and onewoman. However, the command from Section 1307 was not only to look at statutory law (whichthe legislature certainly could have commanded), but to look to any "legal objection." Thatincludes looking to the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, which, as RespondentI The Department of Health claims that the United States Supreme Court declared theDefense of Maniage Act ("DOMA") unconstitutional "principally on grounds of federalism."Dept. of Health's Answer para. 6. This is incorrect. As discussed in Putative Intervenors' Briefin support of their Preliminary Objections, the Court struck down DOMA because it recognizedthat DOMA was enacted solely for reasons of bias and to impose an unequal status on membersof the GLBT community. See United States v. Windsor,733 S.Ct. at 2696 (holding that DOMAis invalid because "no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage andinjure"). These are the same reasons that make Pennsylvania's Marriage Law unconstitutional.

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Hanes determined, require a finding that23 Pa. C.S. $ I 102 is unconstitutional and notapplicable. With 23 Pa. C.S. $ I 102 no longer applicable, there is no "legal objection" toPutative Intervenors' marriages.2 Thus, Respondent Hanes issued the licenses because therewere no "legal objection[s]." Accordingly, Respondent Hanes acted in complete compliancewith controlling United States and Pennsylvania law.

Because Respondent Hanes was performing his duty by determining whether theMarriage Law was a constitutional, legal objection to the marriages of same-sex couples, henecessarily can raise the constitutionality of the Marriage Law in defending against theDepartment of Health's mandamus action to force him to comply with the Marriage Law. Thus,the constitutionality of the Maniage Law is squarely at issue in this action, and PutativeIntervenors should be given the opportunity to properly litigate this issue.

B. Pennsylvania Law Permits Officers Such as Respondent Hanes to Raise theConstitutionalitv of Statute as a Defense to a Mandamus Action.This Court also can and should consider the constitutionality of the Maniage Law

because it is a long-standing principle of Pennsylvania law that govemment officials may raisethe constitutionality of the relevant law as a defense to a mandamus action.3

First, in Commonwealthv. Mathues,59 A.961 (Pa. 1904), the Commonwealth brought amandamus action against the State Treasurer based on his refusal to comply with a law setting

' None ofthe restrictions in 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1304 ("Restrictions on issuance of license")apply here.3 It should also be noted that, in certain circumstances, Pennsylvania courts permit the useof mandamus to compel "a governmental ministerial officer to act in disobedience of therequirements of a relevant statute, before there has been a judicial pronouncement of the Act'svalidity." Boozv.Reed,757 A.zd170,172 (Pa. 1960). Pennsylvaniacourtshavealsoheldthata mandamus action is, "by its very nature, the appropriate means by which to compel [a]government official to perform [an] act in conformance with the Constitution." Millcreek T'ShipSch. Dist. v. Cnty. of Erie,714 A.zd 1095, 1104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis added).

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the salaries ofjudges. Id. at962. The Treasurer argued that the law was unconstitutional, andthe primary question discussed by the lower court was "whether or not the State Treasurer, beinga ministerial officer, had a right in his answer to raise the constitutional question as a defense tohis refusal to honor [the law]." Id. at 964. The trial court determined that "the weight ofauthority appears to be in favor of the cases which hold to the right, and in some instances theduty, of certain administrative officers to refuse to act under what they honestly believe to be anunconstitutional act." Id. at968 (citing Commonwealthv. State Treasurer,29Pa. C.C. 545,1904 WL 2600, at * 1 I (Pa. Com. Pl. 1904). The trial court also distinguished an earlierdecision that had held that a "clerk ofthe court ofquarter sessions" could not raise theconstitutionality of a statute as a defense to a mandamus action because his duties were purelyministerial. Commonwealthv. State Treasurer,29Pa. C.C. 545, 1904 WL 2600 (Pa. Com. Pl.1904) (citing Commonwealthv. James,19 A. 950 (Pa. 1890)). On appeal, the Supreme Courtexpressly considered whether the statute at issue was constitutional, and held that the legislaturehad the power to increase the salaries of sittingjudges. Mathues, 59 A. at 980-82.

Second, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 95 A. 929 (Pa. 1 91 5), the Supreme Court againaddressed the constitutionality of a statute when raised as a defense to a mandamus action. .Id. at930. In Brown, a judge refused "to act on a petition or to perform any of the duties of law judgeof Clinton county" because he believed that the act assigning counties to certain districts wasunconstitutional. Id. The Court's analysis began with a discussion of the PennsylvaniaConstitution and held that, "by reason of its contravention of the fourteenth section of theSchedule of the Constitution," the act sought to be enforced was void. Id. at 930-31 .

Next, in In re Donnelly's Estate,l73 A.876 (Pa. Super. 1934), county commissionerschallenged the constitutionality of an act which exempted interest bearing deposits from taxation.

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Id. The Superior Court noted th.at the commissioners "could not whimsically question[] acts ofthe Legislature, but they have discretion, and, when they exercise it reasonably, they are withintheir rights." Id. at877. The court found that "[t]he statute directly affects the local govemmentwhich the county commissioners are chosen to uphold against all unconstitutional acts of theLegislature." .Id. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the challenge to the "right" of thecounty commissions to raise the constitutionality of the act at issue was "withoutmerit." Id. at876. See also Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas,9 A.zd727,732 (Pa. 1939).

More recently, the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County noted that in the"cefebrated case" of Mathues the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "came to grips" with the rightof the State Treasurer to raise a constitutional question as a defense. Commonwealth v. Sloan,1970 no. 9,1971 WL 14163, at *9 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar.77,1971). The court emphasized theMathues opinion's statement Ihat: "14e can hardly subscribe to the doctrine to which the attorneygeneralseekstosupport ... that themerefactthatthe governor... has signeda bil/deprivesthe state treasurer of any and all right to question its constitutionality." Id. at*13 (quotingMathues,59 A. 968) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court held that the State Treasurerhad the authority to question the constitutionality of a legislative act. Id.

The end result of this line of cases is that a government official who exercises discretionin the performance of his or her duties may raise the constitutionality of a statute as a defense toa mandamus action. While it is true that other cases from other jurisdictions cited in Petitioner'spleadings have held otherwise, those cases are irrelevant in the face of directly controllingPennsylvania case law - case law that the Department of Health repeatedly has failed to includein its pleadings.

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Here, Respondent, as Register of Wills and Clerk of the Orphans' Couft, acts in a judicialand not purely ministerial capacity, and exercises discretion when issuing marriage licenses. Toissue a marriage license, Respondent Hanes (i) examines the applicants under oath oraffirmation; (ii) determines whether any specific restrictions apply; (iii) determines the legalityof the contemplated marriage; (iv) determines whether there is a legal objection to the marriage;and (v) determines whether any emergency or extraordinary circumstances exist that call for awaiving of the waiting period. See 23 Pa. C.S: $$ 1303, 1306,1307. These actions all entail theexercise of discretion in a judicial capacity and are not mere ministerial functions. RespondentHanes must examine the applicants and determine that they have satisfied these provisions.Furthermore, his decision is appealable to the Orphans' Court, see 23 Pa. C.S. $ 1308; KeelyApplication,40 Pa. D. & C. 2d226,227 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1966), which also suggests that he isacting in a discretionary and judicial capacity.

In addition, this Court has held that the Register of Wills, acting in his capacity as Clerkof the Orphans' Court, performs judicial functions and is a judicial agency. See Register of Willsv. Office of Open Records, No. 1671 CD 2009, Memorandum Opinion, at 5-6 (Pa. Cmwlth.May 30, 2010). In that case, like this one, the Register of Wills was exercising his authority overmarriage licenses and certificates and was acting as a judicial officer. Id. at2,5-6. The Courtheld that the Register of Wills is a judicial agency and that "Pennsylvania law has long beencf ear on this matter." Id. at 5.

Other decisions reinforce this conclusion. ^See, e.g., Walsh v. Tate,282 A.zd284,288(Pa. 1971) (finding that "the Register of Wills performs a judicial function and is closelyintegrated into the judicial branch of government"); Taylor v. Commonwealth, T3 W.N.C. 378,1 883 WL 13370, at *3 (Pa. Man 21, 1 883). Coufts have held that a Register of Wills performs

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judicial acts because the Register of Wills administers oaths, holds hearings, determines mattersof a judicial nature, and because the Orphans' Court may reverse his decisions on appeal but maynot control the exercise of his judicial discretion. See Taylor, 1883 WL 13370, at*3; In reNearhoof's Estate,l8 Som. L.J.202,1957 WL 6304,at *4 (Pa. O.C. Mifflin Cnty.Feb.27,19s7).

As noted, the Department of Health relies on cases from New York and Oregon statecourts to argue that the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Marriage Law is not an issue in thiscase. But for the reasons stated above, that is not the law of Pennsylvania. And becauseRespondent Hanes regularly performs duties that are more than ministerial, includingdetermining the legality of a maniage application as directed by Sections 1306 and 1307, he mayassert the unconstitutionality of the Marriage Law as a defense to this action pursuant toPennsylvania case law.

C. Even If Respondent Hanes May Not Raise the Constitutionality of theMarriage Law as a Defense, Putative Intervenors Can Challenge theMarriage Law.Even if the Court concludes that Respondent Hanes cannot raise the constitutionality of

the Marriage Law as a defense to this mandamus action, that is not reason to conclude thatPutative Intervenors cannot do so. Putative Intervenors should be permiued to raise any defensein the protection of their marriage licenses, since the Court's decision will impact the validity ofPutative Intervenors' marriage licenses and whether they are entitled to the benefits andprotections of marriage.

According to a 1999 survey, there are 683 Pennsylvania statutory provisions that providebenefits or protections to married couples. ,See Center for Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, Surveyof Statutory Rights Associated with Marriage in Pennsylvania, at 1-6 (l 999) (Ex. B to Pet. to

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lntervene). These benefits and protections implicate all facets of life, include consumerprotections, criminal defenses, domestic relations, educational benefits, estate planning, familybusinesses, health care, parental rights, property rights, public assistance, public employmentbenefits, survivors'rights, taxation, and others. Id. at6-12.

Putative Intervenors, having been granted marriage licenses, should now be able to enjoythe Commonwealth's official recognition of their committed relationships and to claim thebenefits and protections that they are owed by law. But if the Department of Health's action issuccessful, the Court will have decided that Respondent Hanes' actions in issuing the marriagelicenses were improper. Such a decision necessarily will impact the validity of PutativeIntervenors' marriage I icenses.

Upon becoming parties to this action, Putative Intervenors must be permitted to raise theclaims and defenses necessary to protect their rights. SeePa. R.C.P. 2328; see also FranklinNat'l Bank v. Kennedy Coal & Coke Co., 1 50 A. 902 (Pa. 1 930) (holding that an intervenor mayraise an additional matter); Jaillet v. Hill & Hill,l6 Pa. D. & C. 3d 421 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1980)(noting that Rule 2329 "does not preclude the intervenor from introducing a new claim ordefense so long as the ultimate issue is not changed"); Golduater v. Lederer,34Pa.D. &C. 179,185 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1939) ("An intervenor may assert his claim without regard to whether he isinterested in the success of any party to the action or is adverse to all parties."). Accordingly,even if Respondent Hanes may not raise the constitutionality of the Marriage Law as a defense,the Couft should permit Putative Intervenors to challenge its validity. .

WHEREFORE, Putative Intervenors respectfully request that the Court grant the Petitionto lntervene.

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Dated: havq*Ll,ZOLZ-J-

Respectfully submitted,

Dechert LLPCira Centre2929 Arch StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19104-2808David S. Cohen 1fa. AaAt t;3320Market StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19104Attorneys for Putative Intervenors

C. Heim @a. 15758)Alexander R. Bilus (Pa. 203680)William T. McEnroe (Pa.308821)Joanna L. Barry (Pa. 31143S)

8.29.13 Putative Intervenors_ Reply to Petitioner_s Answer and New Matter

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