742261

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Body'n'Soul?: Voice and Movement in Keith Jarrett's PianismAuthor(s): Jairo MorenoSource: The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 75-92Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/742261

Accessed: 18/08/2009 22:12

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76

The

Musical

Quarterly

make

Elvis

look

like

a mannequin."4 The author John Litweil adopts a

more

provocative

tone,

referring

to

Jarrett's

"autoerotic

groans,

sighs,

grunts,

and

moans,

as

he

leaps

from

his chair

to

thrust his

pelvis

at

the

keyboard

while he

plays."5

By

1994

John

Andrews

of

Down

Beat

summa-

rizes

the

jazz

establishment's

attitude:

"bashing

Keith

Jarrett

enjoys

criti-

cal

cachet

right

now."6

It

is

noteworthy,

however,

that critics

such as

Andrews, Cordle,

and

Ephland,

among

others,

also

praise

the

artistry

of

Jarrett's

improvi-

sations and

his

virtuoso

pianism.7

Positive

evaluations

of

his

playing

hardly

drown out the criticism.

Despite

these

concessions,

Jarrett's

critics

focus for

the

most

part

on

a

decidedly

negative

aspect

of

his

playing:

Jar-

rett's

voice

and

body

movement are

sonorous and

visual

hindrances

interfering

with the

beautiful

music he

produces.

The

present

essay

addresses the

assumptions

these

critiques

are

based

on,

assumptions

that,

however

concealed,

I

believe

fuel the

criti-

cal

reception

of

musical

performance

as

aesthetic

experience,

the

cre-

ative

processes

of

jazz

improvisation,

and,

most

fundamentally,

the rela-

tionship between performer and listener.8 My approach is pluralistic,

seeking

to address

these

questions

from

a

variety

of

perspectives.

In

the

first section

I

focus

on

Jarrett's

voice,

elaborating

on the

distinction

often

made

between

interiority

and

exteriority,

and

so frame the

critics'

reaction within a

critical

model based on the

concept

of

logocentrism.

Using

this

concept

I

consider the

notion

of

performance

authenticity,

the

ontotheological

connotations within the

very

idea of

authenticity,

and

the

stability

of

meaning

that

authenticists desire in

musical sound.

I

also consider the artificial separation between meaning and the material-

ity

of

the voice as a

pertinent

way

to address the

critics'

misunderstand-

ing

of

cognitive

processes

in

jazz

improvisation

and

their claims about

timbral

purity.

Lastly,

I

discuss the

extent

to which

conventions

of

per-

formance

practice discourage

instrumentalists to vocalize. A second

sec-

tion

concentrates on the

etiquette

of

the

body,

sketching

a

general

his-

tory

of its

reception

from

Aquinas

and Descartes to the romantics and

transcendentalists,

and to the rise of the

aesthetic as a

category during

the

late

eighteenth

and

early

nineteenth

centuries.

I

conclude

by

dis-

cussing

Jarrett's

body

as

a

contested

site

of

expression

and

the

constitu-

tion of the

self,

on the

one

hand,

and

discipline,

on the other.

The

crit-

ics'

discourse,

I will

show,

is

firmly

located within

outmoded

aesthetic

boundaries

imposed

in

the

nineteenth

century. My critique

of

Jarrett's

reception

by

the

journalistic

establishment calls into

question

the values

of such

an

outdated

aesthetic and the usefulness of

applying

such

an "art

music" aesthetic

to

modem

jazz.

Critiques

of modem

jazz-at

once a

popular

and an

elitist musical

expression-urgently

necessitate

a

recon-

sideration of the aesthetic experience.

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Voice

and Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism

77

1

Critical

accounts

of

Jarrett's

pianism

set

up

a hierarchical

opposition

between

a

pure

acoustic

signal

from the

piano

and the adulterated sound

resulting

once

the

human voice

is

superimposed.

An

intruder,

the

voice

is

perceived

as a

separate

layer,

or,

as the critic Owen Cordle

puts

it,

"a

singing

over."9

(I

will discuss the

appropriateness

of the

expression

"singing"

later.)

Here the

preposition

"over"-with

its attendant

spatial

connotations-constitutes

no

empty

journalistic

jargon.

Rather,

it

sug-

gests

the existence

of an ideal

space,

the sound

of the

piano,

that

can

and,

in the critics'

opinion,

should be

contemplated

without interfer-

ence. Their

position

is

predicated

on

the

concept

that

improvisational

creation

is an internal

process

of

which the

piano

constitutes its most

intimate

(i.e.,

authentic)

expression.

We

may

call

this

internal

process

cognitive

or

imaginative,

for

at the moment

I

make no distinction.

What

is clear is that there

exists a

well-marked

conceptual

distance

sep-

arating

inner

process

and outward

expression,

and

that this

duality

establishes a definite hierarchical ordering and, furthermore, is an ideo-

logical imposition

that has its roots

in

logocentrism,

a

most

pervasive

trope

in

Western

epistemology.

Logocentrism,

to

review,

establishes

an order of

meaning

conceived

as foundation

(that

is,

thought,

truth, reason,

logic,

the

word,

or

logos),

a

foundation

that is considered to be

prior

to

and

independent

of the

signs

or acts

in which

they

are

expressed

or

made

physically

manifest.10 It sees

language

as a

mediating

system

through

which

thought

is realized. In

this view spoken or, worse yet, written words are physical signifiers

standing

for

spiritual,

transcendental

signifieds.

There

exists

in

logocen-

trism

a

strong

desire for the

unmediated,

which

constitutes a

perhaps

insatiable need for

self-sufficiency

showing

itself

in

attitudes toward

meaning (e.g.,

the belief that

the

signified

has

logical precedence

over

the

signifier,

a

logical precedence

that is underwritten

by

a

point

of

pres-

ence or fixed

origin)."I

But in

logocentric ideology,

a

similar attitude

shapes

the

very

idea

of

the

subject's

position

before the world. That

is

to

say,

there

must be

a

validating presence

or center

that

supports

the

existence of

subjects.

According

to

this,

the

subject

designates

an invari-

able

metaphysical

presence,

be

it

essence, existence,

God,

substance,

or

transcendentality,

which it

realizes and which in

this

process

becomes

internal to it

(I

will

refer

to this

presence

as

"inside").

The

goal

of the

human

subject,

under

these

terms,

is to be

present

to

itself,

presence

constituting

the

nuclear

matrix of

logocentrism.

In

fact,

the

unshakable

belief

in

the

discontinuity

between

immaterial and

material

gives

"inside" a

seeming

epistemological

stability.

This

stability,

however,

exacts a high cost for those elements that are determined to create any

8/20/2019 742261


78

The Musical

Quarterly

kind of distancebetween a

metaphysicalpresence

and those domains of

human

activity

that it seeks

to

ground.

As

a

system,

logocentrism

attempts

to delimit

potential meanings

and indeterminacies

hat would

invalidate

presence

as a

guarantee

of

signification

and

ultimately

of

being. Accordingly,

a number

of

hierarchically

organizedoppositions

can

be

grafted

onto the

conceptual

scheme of

logocentrism:

or

example,

reality

and

appearance,meaning

and

form,

essence and

accident,

imma-

terial and

material,

and

the central

metaphor

of inside

and

outside.

By wayof examplewe maynote the overtonesof logocentricism

audible

in

contemporary

debates

in art-music

quarters

about the rela-

tionship

between

musical

creation and

its

reproduction,

particularly

s

manifested

n

the so-called authentic

performance

movement. The

very

idea

of

authenticity

evinces

an

obsession

with

origin, interpretive

clo-

sure,

and the illusion of

self-presence:

he

ontological

stability

of the

musical

text

afforded

by

the

primacy

given

to

poiesis

entails the

repres-

sion of absence

(the

performer spires

o

become,

in

some

sense,

the

composer)

and of difference

(there

is

only

one

possible,

valid

expression

-not an

interpretation-of

a

work).

By

this

account,

the

nonauthentic

results rom the

expulsion

of

thought

from a state

of

grace

out into the

exteriority

of

representation.12

uriously

enough,

while the motto of

logocentrism

s

contemptus

mundi,

authenticists,

as RichardTaruskinhas

noted,

are

willing

to

give

music a rather

narrowdefinition:

the timbral

qualities

that

original

instruments

produce.

The biblical connotations

in the

expression

"expulsion

of

thought

from a state of

grace

out into the

exteriority

of

representation"

bove

are

particularly

imely

considering

that

compositional

or

improvisational

inspiration

s still for

many

based

upon

a

metaphysical

or even

religious

form of communication.

For

many

of

Jarrett's

ritics

too,

I

suspect,

improvisation

constitutes

an

internal

process

observing

"a

mystical

reliance

on

illusory

nonknowledge,"

o use Taruskin's

words.13

mprovi-

sation,

in their

minds,

is not

conscious;

in

fact,

a

"natural"

mproviser

s

one who

appears

o

suddenly

abandon

all accumulated

knowledge

in

the

rapture

of creation.14

Accordingly,

mprovisation

s described

as an

attributeof the soul, a private,interiorprocess.On the otherhand, the

artful,

which is to

say

the

human,

is exiled

in

the

exteriority

of the

body,

which

brings

the

interior

process

to

the

outside,

or

realizes t. As

a

result,

conscious

thought

would be seen

as a

layer

that is

separated

rom

the

soul,

the

purity

of

which it contaminates.

The

concepts

of unconscious-

ness

(i.e.,

naturalness)

and the soul

in

improvisation

parallel

the

inner,

spiritual,

and self-sufficient

nucleus reified

by

logocentrism.

Jarrett,

how-

ever,

would

have

none

of

it, since,

according

to

him,

"one of the bad

raps

that

improvisation

s

alwaysgoing

to have

is that

it is an off-the-

8/20/2019 742261


Voice

and Movement n

Jarrett's

ianism

79

top-of your-head,pattern-related,non-intellectual thing. Whereasnreal-

ity,

with

consciousness,

mprovisation

s a much

deeper

apping f something

than

any

other

process."15

What

are we then

to make of

Jarrett's

"singing"

musical lines

simul-

taneously

with the

piano?

I

believe

that

by

this

procedure

he reveals

the

presence

of

a

conscious

thought

process.

He

makes

explicit

the

fact

that

imagining

sound and

structuring

it around the chord

progressions

and

melodies

of the

songs

he

improvises

on entails

embodying

it

in

mind,

soul, and body (here, body signifies the voice). The sound of his voice

unleashes

what in

the critics' minds should

be a

metaphysical

presence,

which

is to

say,

an invisible or

repressed

Other. To let this Other become

audible

is

to

make

a

public

admission of the

presence

and

power

of

con-

sciousness

in

improvisation.

Once

audible,

this

presence

becomes an

Other

that,

in

fact,

helps

divide

Jarrett's

self into a

pianist

and

a

grunter,

or so the critics

argue.

This

Other,

the

grunter,

the

voice,

competes

for

our attention

in

performance

and

occupies space

reserved

exclusively

for

the musical

imagination-in

the critics' account of

improvisation,

that

is.

It is as if

they

do

not

want to witness the

embodiment of the musi-

cian's

soul,

which

encompasses

the

totality

of his

playing,

or,

put

another

way,

to admit that the

doings

of the soul

in

improvisation

are

as much

mental and

physical

as

they

are

spiritual.

Jarrett,

the critics

may

think,

should leave the

singing

to his

practice

studio. What

they

fail to

realize,

however,

is that

Jarrett's

vocalization constitutes an

ontological

facet

of

musical

creation. That

is to

say,

the

sound

will

not come

into

being

unless it

is

imagined.

There

is

a

cognitive

factor

at

work

in

the real-time

process of improvising that melds together thought, sentiment, finger

action,

and vocal

articulation.

Thought

and

musical

realization

happen

at

once;

there is

neither

temporal

deferral

nor

spatial

distance

separating

the

two.16

Just

as the

essence of

language

resides not

in

the distance

between

thought

and

speech

but

in

the

material

continuity

evident

when

we,

for

example,

hear

ourselves

speak,

Jarrett's

voice

establishes a

similar

immediacy

between

his

body

(i.e.,

vocal

chords)

and

the musical

sounds the

listeners

perceive.17

This

is

not,

however,

the

kind

of

un-

mediation that logocentrism aspires to; in the present case the voice

projects

onto the

outside

something

that

critics

suggest

is valid

only

as

interiority.

To continue

the

language

analogy,

in

Jarrett's

pianism

signi-

fier

and

signified

are

bound in a

sign,

where

expression

is

inevitably

joined

both to the

emotional

and

cognitive

meaning

it

ex-presses.18

If

we

consider

his

voice as

gesture-in

opposition,

that

is,

to the

sound

of the

piano-we

may

invoke

the

logocentric

association

between

sound and

idea

as the

signifying aspect

of

musical

communication. In

the

critics'

account,

on the other

hand,

voice

qua gesture

is

excluded

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80

The

Musical

Quarterly

fromsignifying unctions,becominga redundant,accessorialrepresenta-

tion,

one that assumesa

disruptive

role

in

the unwritten

conventions

of

performance-practice

tiquette. Defying

these

conventions,

Jarrett's

vocal

pianism

constitutes

a

site where

music,

as a

metaphysical

entity,

becomes

physical,

human,

sensuous.

The

objection

to

Jarrett's

ocal

intrusionsstems from their

unique-

ness

as

a

simultaneously

material/immaterial,

song"/thought

ntity,

and

from the

ways

in

which the

naturaldialectic it

creates

with

the

piano

createsobstaclesin grasping he unity of expressionandmeaning.This

is what

Kaja

Silverman

expresses

when she notes that "the

voice

is

the

site

of

perhaps

he most radicalof

all

subjective

divisions-the

division

between

meaning

and

materiality."19

ut once it

is

understood

positively

as the site

where

meaning

and

materialityconverge

ratherthan divide-

a

union

that

makes

possible

meaningful

communication-the voice

ceases to

be

seen

as

hindrance and is

regarded

nstead as

a

manifestation

of the

way

in which

disembodiedand embodied

expression

define

one

another

(being

mindful,

of

course

that disembodied

expression

s no

expression

at

all).

The

materiality

of

meaning

as sound is a

presence

always-already-there,

locus

of

the embodied

condition

of

our

being

in

the world. To

acknowledge

his

is to

accept

that the

vocal,

gestural

expression

of music

is

in no

way

less

significant

a

part

of

the whole than

its

"pure"

ound is.

Thus

the

voice

cannot

only

be a

layering

over,

a

simultaneous

commentary

on the

piano

line,

or

even

the embodiment

of

an

otherwise

pure

sound

image.

The

jazz

mproviser

pitomizes

the

idea of the moment:

piano

and

voice are united

in

time, and,

in addi-

tion, theirsumis inseparableromthe consciousness hat originates

them both.

What

Jarrett's

ocal chords

produce

is

symbolic

material

nsofaras

it resemblesa common

signifier,

namely singing.

But

simply

to

interpret

his vocal

utterances

as

fulfilling

the

musicalfunction

of

singing

would be

inadequate

because it would be

judging

his vocalizations

mproperly

s

an

object,

ratherthan as

a

process.

Considering

Jarrett's

music

as

an

object

allows

critics to

reify

a

given

improvisation

as

a finished

work and

thus to impose ontologicalcategoriesusuallyappliedto art-musicscores

in which

many,

but not

all,

parameters

are

carefully

pecified

and

notated.

The informationcontained

in a score

becomes

a

neat

spatial

representation

of the

composers'

attempt

to limit

potential

variants

in

the

reproduction

of a finished

work. But

I

have

already

ketched

how for

the

jazz

mproviser

reation is

a

process,

a

dynamic, temporal

activity,

one

to

which

a

fixed

spatial

conceptualization

of the work

does

not

apply.

Thus,

Jarrett's

tterances

are

significant

n that

they allegorically

point

to another

domain.

By

this

I

mean

that the voice

represents

an

8/20/2019 742261


Voice

and Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism 81

unseen cognitive reality apprehendedby the consciousnessand thus

becomes

a manifestationof

an

existing

but

usually

repressed

voice.

The

conditions

supporting

his

repression

demand further

discussion.

It is

curious

how

instrumentalists

are

encouraged

o

sing through

their

instruments,

yet

performancepractice

conventions have

set

strict

limits

to

the

notion.

The

same

discipline

system

that

prohibits adding

octave

doublings

to a

passage

n

a written score

by

Chopin,

for

example

(which

amounts to

controlling

the

performer's

musical

utterance

under

the auspicesof respectfor the composer'sntention), seeks also to con-

trol

movement and

gesture.

These elements are controlled because

there

is

in

place

a conventional belief

in

the role of the

performer;

hus the

articulationsand

gesticulations

of the

body

are

part

of

the

mechanics

of

reproduction,

but

not,

perverselyenough,

of the

articulationof mean-

ing.20

Control

is

applied

to the

signifying

elements of the

language

of the

body

in

order

to

obtain

homogeneity

in

the

sociomusicalorderknown as

performance-practice tiquette.

The

control these conventions have

over

the

signs

of

the

body,

assume,

I think

mistakenly,

he

separability

of the

signified

from the

signifier,

he voice fromthe

performer's

xpres-

sivity.

To

illustrate his

separation,

considerhow instrumental

tudio

teachers

encourage

students

to internalize

heir

singing,

because

during

performance,

according

to our

conventions,

they

have

to choose one

form of

expression:

nstrument

or

voice,

but never

both.

By

convention

the

instrumentalist s asked

to have a

hold on

her

voice,

becoming

a

conduit for the

composer's

ntentions.

But this

passivity

s no more

than

a simulacrumof a socially imposedcorrectmeaningof music and perfor-

mance. The

voice,

in

this

case,

acquires

a

strictly

extramusical

tatus,

so

much so that

"singing"

urns

out to be

little more than an

immaterial

sound.

A

musician's nstrument

becomes both her

voice and her

mes-

sage,

as the

internalized

inging

voice

is muted.21

Sadly,

we

become

"ventriloquists"

f our

own soul.22

Consequently,

n

a

jazz

pianist's

case,

conventions of

improvisation

are

restricted

only

to

a

kind of

digital

expression,

fingertips

pressing

on

keys.

There is

no

allowance for

vocal-

izationsof

anykind, for such expressions ie beyondthe boundariesof

accepted

performance

practice.

Jarrett

s,

after

all,

not

a

singer;

we

pur-

chase

his

recordings

expecting

to hear an

improviser's

oice

through

the

piano,

not the

pianist's

voice. The

conductor Hermann

Scherchen

has stated

that

orchestral

players

may

have

impressive

control on

their

instruments,

but

often,

he

comments,

"we

miss one

thing:

the

soul

of the

music,

the

song

that

gives

inward

ife

to musical

sounds.To

sing

is the

life-function

of

music. Where

there is

no

singing,

the

formsof

music

become

distorted

and

they

move in

a

senseless

time-order

mposed

from

8/20/2019 742261


82 The Musical

Quarterly

without."23wouldputit bluntly:herearetwo kindsofmusic,"music"

and

"music

hat

sings."

arrett

s

expressing

he

latter;

but he makes

music hat

sings

explicitly, gainst

stablished onventions.

My

argu-

ment,then,

is that the

expectation

f the

performer's

cquiescence

o

silence

during

performance

riginates

n a

seldom-questionediscipli-

nary

convention,

one that

bearsno

substantiveonnection

with music

in

the wonderful

ensethat

Scherchen

rticulates.

arrett's

oice

exposes

the

subjectivity

f

performance

ractice

nd

dissolves

he

implicit

on-

tractual bligationsheseconventions avecreatedwith the listener.

Another

challenge

o

conventional

erformance

ractice

n

Jar-

rett's

ase s the critics' oncern

with timbral

urity.

Whereas

ther

musical

ultures

egard

uzzing

ounds,

or

nstance,

as

being

musically

acceptable,

ven

desirable,

he

Western radition

f artmusic reats

uch

phenomena

s

imperfections,

hat

is,

as non-musical

ccurences.

his

particular

onvention tems

rom he

nineteenth-century

otion

of

the

work

oncept

Werktreue),

concept

hat not

only

includes

performance

practices

ut,

more

mportantly,

mplicitly

egislates

separation

between

performer

nd

composer.24

udging

rom hecritics'

biting

com-

ments

on

Jarrett,

t

appears

s

if

they

embrace

his

philosophy

whole-

heartedly.

o be

sure,

ome

nstrumentalists

n

the

jazz

radition

ave

successfullyncorporated

he

voice as

part

of their

signature

ound-to

wit,

the

bass

great

"Slam"

tewart

ndthe

jazz

and

popguitarist

George

Benson.

However,

hese

musicians'

se

of

the voice

is

critically,

ndthus

socially, ccepted

because

f the

precision

i.e.,

purity)

with

whichtheir

singing

matches

he

pitch

of their

nstruments.

he voice

is

in

this

case

a layeringver, o useCordle'sxpression,ra kindoforchestralevice.

Thereare

alsothose

whose

"dirty"

ound

s

valued,

uch

as

MilesDavis.

In this

case,

however,

qualifier

lways ppears

isguised

s a

compli-

ment;

namely,

ow

he

manages

o

successfully

xploit

imited

nstru-

mental

echnique

o

fit

his artistic

isionand

expression.

ut

those

whosevoiceovers

roduce

o-called

noise,

and

I would

nclude

n

this

group,

long

with

Jarrett,

ablo

Casals,

Glenn

Gould,

and

Arturo

Toscanini,

re

summarily

hastised.

Theirvoice is

considered

n

annoy-

ance.(An interestingxception o thismightbethepianovirtuoso

Erroll

Garner,

whose

grunting

as

been

deemed

acceptable

ecause

t

does

not

in

any

sense

compete

orthe

aural

pace

of the

music,

.e.,

it

is

so

soft

as to

be

barely

udible).

These

days

his attitude

oward

xtrane-

ous

"noise"

as a

dangerous

xtrapolation:

ith the rise

of

digital

rans-

mission

f

sound,

cratches

n

our

vinyl

records

ould

potentially

is-

qualify

hose

performances

rom

being

music.

Thereseems

o be a

move

towards

n

essentialization

f timbre.

Advances

n

electronic

eproduc-

tion

of sound

no

doubt

encourage

his

limited

aesthetic,

one that

seeks

8/20/2019 742261


Voice

and

Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism 83

notonlyto definenoise,but to separatet frommusicandmusicmaking.

Without

digressing

nto a distinction hat couldwell

occupy

us for

quite

some

time-the distinctionbetweennoise andmusic-it is

worth

observing,

onetheless,

hat the

ideathat one can or should

be ableto

filterout

the noisefrom

he musiconce

again

llustrateshe

superiority

of the work

concept

n ourcurrent

erformance

ractices.

Noise

is

sepa-

rate rommusic

because he

performer

s

considered

o be

separate

rom

the

composer

nd

the

composition.25

2

If

in

the

critics'mindsvocalizations

epresent corruption

f

musical

expression,

hen

physical

r

bodily

gestures

are

even worse.

When

critics

compare

arrett

o

those

iconsof

American

popular

ulture,

Elvis

Presley

nd

Jerry

Lewis,

heir ntention s

not

to

elevate

Jarrett

o their

status; ather,hey

are

claiming

hat his

body

movement

during erfor-

mance s

nothing

more

han

superficial

how-business

osturing,

n

empty,

f

at

times

entertaining,acade.

The

body

s

clearly

een as the

locusof ultimate

xteriority

nd

as

a threat or

contemplation

f

a

purely

musical

esthetic-jazz

has,

after

all,

become

part

and

parcel

of

the concert

hall,

the sacred

place

of

art-music

xperience.

Like

he

intrusion

f the

voice,

the intrusion

f

the

body

nto the aesthetic

xpe-

riencehas

a

long

and varied

history.

To

my

mind,

he

somatic

ngage-

mentof

Jarrett's

erformancetyle

makes elevantan

otherwise

isparate

collectionofwriterswho have

greatly

nfluenced ur

understanding

n

general.

am

thinking

of

Aquinas's

medieval

heological

iews;

he

alienation

f the

body

rom he mind

ostered

y

Descartes's

pistemol-

ogy;

and

nineteenth-century

otionsof musical

ranscendentalism,

ar-

ticularly

he

absence

of the

body

rom

he

romantic

xperience

f the

aesthetic.

Long

beforeDescartes

evalued he

body

n

favorof the mind

and

the

soul

in

his effort o

demonstratehe

immanence f the

latter,

Christ-

iantheologians uringheMiddleAgestookmore nterest n thebody,

an

outlookcharacterized

y,

among

other

hings,

ssuesof

liminality,

heightened

one

couldeven

say

sensual)

manner

f

communication,

nd

the

transcendence

f

the

physical

n

the

earthly

domain.26

or

Aquinas,

for

instance,

he

body

carriedhe

imprint

f the

self's

dentity,

he

soul

taking

overthis

function

only

in

the

absenceof the

body,

hat

is,

upon

dying.

"Me"

s

expressed

n

my

body,

or,

as

Aquinasputs

t,

"when

hings

areas

they

should

be,"

hat

is,

here

on

earth.27

nowing, eeling,

and

experiencing

re ocated

n

the

body,

which n

the

late Middle

Ages

also

8/20/2019 742261


8/20/2019 742261


Voiceand

Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism 85

The romantic or transcendentalistposition, curiously,opens the

gates

of

self-expression,

yet

strives

for the

universal. In

particular,

music

appears

as a

phenomenal

manifestationof

things

eternal. "Music

brings

before us

in

rhythm

and

harmony

the form

of motion of

physical

bod-

ies,"

states Friedrichvon

Schelling

in

what could well be a

manifesto

of the

bodily

condition of the musical

experience.

Yet

he

immediately

counteractssuch

impulses

by

adding,

"[I]t

[music]

s...

pure

form,

liber-

ated

from

anyobject

or matter.To this

extent,

music is the art

that

is

least limited by physicalconsiderations n that it representspuremotion

as

such,

abstracted

rom

any

object

and

borne on

invisible,

almost

spiri-

tual

wings."32

The

duality

of this

account of musical

experience, by

which the human

and the exalted

coalesce,

depends

upon

"a

certain

kind of

illusion,

the

ability

to see

and

hear in

a

physical

object

or

perfor-

mance,

less the

concrete and the

physical,

than

the

transcendent,"

s

Lydia

Goehr

puts

it.33

Continuing

with

the

metaphor

of

illusion,

it

is a

short

step

to

asking

the

performer

o

give

him-

or herself

to the

creative

genius,

as E. T.

A.

Hoffmann

famously

does in

1813: "The

true

artist

lives

only

in

the

work

that

he

has

understoodas the

composer

meant

it

and that he

then

performs.

He

is above

putting

his

own

personality

or-

ward in

any

way,

and

all his

endeavorsare

directed

towarda

single

end

-that

all

the

wonderful

enchanting pictures

and

apparitions

hat

the

composer

has

sealed

into

his work with

magic

power may

be

called

into

active

life,

shining

in

a

thousand

colors,

and that

they

may

surround

mankind in

luminous

sparkling

circles

and,

enkindling

its

imagination,

its

innermost

soul,

may

bear it in

rapid

light

into the

faraway

pirit

realmof sound."34fso much is asked of the performer,what then could

be demanded

of the

listener?

Far

more,

I

would

suspect.

So what of

the

body?

What

begins

during

the

post-Enlightenment

era

as an

auspicious

move

away

from

reason's

exclusive

domination

of

knowledge

and

experience

quickly

becomes a

turn

away

from the

body.

Only by

fleeing

the

body

and

occupying

someone

else's

space by

means

of

contemplation

is

it

possible

to

attain the

highest

degrees

of the

aes-

thetic

experience,

as

Hoffmann

describes t.

The

transfiguration

f

the

self into an other is consideredan act of redemption,a justifiable nter-

pretation

given

the

closeness between

religion

and

romantic

aesthetics.

Or,

as

Schilling

puts

it,

"[I]t

s

music that

elevates

man

to the

infinite,

to

God

himself."35

n

turn,

by

considering

redemption

as a

flight

into an

other

for

eternity,

we

may

compare

t with

ecstasy,

a

category

of

experi-

ence

closely

associatedwith

musical

performance

hroughout

various

cultures.

Ecstasy

means

"to

put

out of

place,"

a

condition

that

would

seem

to have

much in

common

with

music's

so-called

ability

to

trans-

port

the

listener.

But

instead of

fleeing

the

present

moment

into

past

or

8/20/2019 742261


86

The Musical

Quarterly

future,

ecstasy

is

just

the

opposite.

It is an unconditional identification

with the

present

and a

total

suppression

of

past

and

future.36

More

importantly,

in

contrast

to

redemption,

which

again

entails a

kind

of sur-

render,

ecstasy

entails an

absolute oneness

of the self. Two factors

arise,

one

temporal

and the other

ontological,

a conclusion that

I

believe,

returning

to

my

example,

has

an

interesting bearing

on

Jarrett's

perfor-

mative

style.

Keith

Jarrett

is

acutely

aware

that

improvising

constitutes

a

unique,

unrepeatable experience of time in which there is no room for deferral.37

He has stated that "when

you

are an

improviser,

a true

improviser,

you

have to be

familiar with

ecstasy,

otherwise

you

can't connect

with music

...

when

you

are an

improviser,

at

eight

o'clock

tonight,

for

example,

you

have to be so

familiar

with that

state that

you

can

almost

bring

it

on."38

The

"state,"

as he

calls

ecstasy,

demands

one to focus conscious-

ness on the musical

moment,

a condition that

inherently

denies

the

phenomenological

separation

of sound

and

gesture,

of music

and

me-

dium. The musician (and by this I mean the body and soul of the per-

former)

is united

with the instrument

in the creative moment.

The

body,

like the

voice,

assumes

an ever

increasing

role

in

communicating

to the

audience

the

power

of

the

moment.

However,

in

the case of

Jarrett's

body

movement,

we

must ask

whether

his behavior

is

governed

by prac-

tical or

symbolic

considerations,

or

perhaps

even

by

both.

Are

his

gyra-

tions

and

genuflections expressions

of emotional

states

that

cannot be

communicated

any

other

way,

or

are his

gestures

symbolic

but unessen-

tial

expressions?

Maurice

Merleau-Ponty

offers

an answer:

"movement

must somehow

cease to

be a

way

of

designating

things

or

thoughts,

and

become

the

presence

of

that

thought

in the

phenomenal

world,

and,

moreover,

not its

clothing

but its token

or

its

body."39

By

this

account

perception

(esthesis)

and

production

(poiesis)

are

unified,

situated,

and

embodied,

rejecting

the

split

of mind

and

body

and

refusing

to consider

the

body

as

mechanical

object.

Vocalizations

and

gestures

are not

just

supplements

of

pure signifiers

(such

as

music)

whose

signification

is

inde-

pendent

of the

acts

through

which

they

are made manifest:

Jarrett's

body

movement and gesturing are, so to speak, significations of the flesh. From

an aesthetic

point

of

view,

it

should

be noted

that this

position

would

consider

sound and

motion to be

phenomenologically

separable.

We

know that

they

are

not;

deferral

may

operate

in the

relation between

thought

and the

world,

but

not

in

thought

in

relation

to the

spoken

or

written

word,

and

definitely

not

in

the

relation

between

thought

and

musical

expression.

Jazz

improvisation

has

a

unique

way

of

defying

tem-

poral

deferral.

It is

ecstatic;

it

belongs

in the

immediacy

of the

moment.

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Voiceand

Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism

87

Where houghtendsandmovementbeginsbecomesmpossibleo

separate; estures

may

be,

after

all,

forms f

knowledge,

ssential

parts

n

the

production

f sound.Musicians

ave

long

notedthis

relationship,

pointing

oward

kindof kinetic

musical

pistemology.

travinsky

nce

referredo his

fingers

s

his

"inspirers,"

nd

though

an avowed

ormalist,

he alsostated hat

"the

sight

of

the

gestures

ndmovements f the vari-

ous

partsproducing

he music

s

fundamentallyecessary

f it is to

be

grasped

n

all

its fullness."40

t is indeedone of

Jarrett's

tylistic

rade-

marks o producencrediblyongmusical hrases, hraseshat,inciden-

tally,

a

single

breath ouldnot

sustain. t is no "theatrical"oincidence

that

during

hese

ongphrases

e is

usually

ff

the

piano

bench.

This

should

comeas no

surprise,

ince

thinking

n

sound

s

a transaction

in

whichsensebecomesmotion

and

motion,

ense.One

wonders

f,

were

Jarrett

o

sit,

his

fantastically

ong

musical

hrases

would

come

to

cadencesmore

requently.

ny communicating

ignificance

arrett's

movement

may

have couldbe

equally

onsidered

ractical

nd

produc-

tive when viewed rom

he

perspective

f kinetic

knowledge;

t becomes

part

of the

poieticprocess,

dynamic

uccessionhatfollows ts own

logic

andcreates

a

bodily

ogos.41

In

the case

of

Jarrett,

ne final

observation

houldbe

brought

o

bear

n

the discussion:

he

relationship

f the

performer

o the instru-

ment tself.

Jack

DeJohnette,

he

drummer ith

Jarrett's

rio

and

a

musical ssociate

f his

since

the

1960s,

has

said,

"Keith

eally

has

a

love affairwith the

piano,

t is

a

relationship

ith that

instrument."42

One is reminded f a famous

azz

anecdote

about

John

Coltrane,

which,

whether

apocryphal

rnot,

goes

to theheartof the matter.AfterCol-

trane

had

played

nnumerablehoruses

n

a

solo,

Miles

Davis

reportedly

asked

him,

"Hey

ohn,

why

didn't

you

stop?"

oltrane

eplied,

"I

didn't

know

how."Davis

hen

suggested,

just

ake

the

hornout of

your

mouth[ ]."

asier

aid handone.Coltrane's

oint,

as

I

see

it,

is that the

instruments not

simply

vehicle to

express

ourself

ut becomes

part

of the

musician's

elf,

an

extensionof the

subject,

not

an

object.

The

pianopresents

nique

hallenges

n this

regard.

t is an

intensely

physi-

cal instrument,et inhardly nyother nstrumentsthe humanbody

more

removed.At

best,

besides he

fingertips,

he solesof

ourshoeswill

make

actualcontact.There

s some

perversity

n

this,

and

also

in

the

fact

that

while

it offers

he

entire

spectrum

f

acoustical

requencies,

t

doesnot offer

ts voice. Put

another

way,

he

grain

of

the

piano's

oice,

its

particular

imbral

ualities,

annotbe

shaped

by

finger

ction.

A

pianist's

ingers

ndarms

annotaffect he

soundof a

pianobeyond

attack

and

dynamics;

nce

produced,

ts

sound

imply

dies

away,

without

8/20/2019 742261


88 The Musical

Quarterly

therebeing much a pianistcan do. It comes as no surprise hat often,

though

not

exclusively,

it is

pianists

and mallet

instrument

players

who

tend to

give

their

instruments

a

voice,

literally,

and thus

attempt

to

close

that

unbridgeable

ap

between

subject

and

object. Jarrett's

nique

musi-

cal

voice forms

part

of a

reciprocally

nhancing

fusion

between

the

piano

sound and

his

vocalizations,

resulting

n

a mutual

envelopment,

as it

were. But

also,

Jarrett's

odily

gestures

become

part

of

a

profoundly

physical interplay

with the

piano,

whose

inanimate

body they

seem to

bringto life.

Part

of the listener's

confusion

and

resistancethat

Jarrett's

move-

ment

generates

resides

in the fact that

these

movements resembleother

aspects

of

emotional

expression

in

our lives

(i.e.,

dancing

or

lovemak-

ing).

But such

similaritiesbetween his voice and

true

singing

are

a

resemblanceor

even an

unfortunatecoincidence.

It

is

thus

important

not

to

consider

body

movement

as

encoding

a kind of visual

semantics,

which would be

saying

that the

body

"means"

hrough

movement what

the music

might

be

trying

to

express

n

sound.43

From

the

epistemologi-

cal

standpoint

that

I

am

trying

to

describe,

he

aural

presence

of the

music

establishes

a

relation to the

body,

and,

reciprocally,

he visual

presence

of the

body

constitutes a

representation

of the

fundamental

materiality

of

music,

its acoustical

presence.

Certainly,

there

is a kind

of

semiotic contradiction

here,

one that Richard

Leppert

characterizes s

"the

slippage

between the

physical

activity

that

produces

musical sound

and the abstract

nature of what it

produces."44

erformance

may

be

ges-

turalor

theatrical,

but whatever the

case,

from

the listener's

perspective

it is alwaysat the distanceof the gaze,which may,at times,objectify.

Sound,

by

contrast,

draws he

subject

in,

surrounding

er-in

fact,

mak-

ing

everyone

it reaches

sensual.

Enticing

as it no doubt

is,

this

division

gives

sound

ontological

exclusivity

in the

aesthetic

experience

of

music;

by

this

account,

music is

sound,

and

only

sound is music.

I

disagree.

Pre-

cisely

because

performance

s

a

socially

constructed

phenomenon,

it

becomes

urgent

to resist such

a

division,

particularly

ecause

it

polarizes

production

and

reception.

The

aesthetic

I have in

mind

is

shaped

by

both. KeithJarrett's ianismillustratesa late-twentieth-centuryaes-

thetic,

one

in which

the distinction between sound

and music has col-

lapsed.

His sounds and

gestures

are

unquestionablypart

of the

music,

so much

so that

one could describethese sounds

and

gestures

not

as a

translationor mechanisms n

service

of

music,

or

an

addition

to the

music,

but

the music itself.

Seeing

Jarrett

mprovise

remindsme of

how

much of

music's

power

residesnot

just

in the

notes or

in the

spaces

between

them,

but also

in

the

fully

embodied movement that invites

me,

as a

listener,

to

partici-

8/20/2019 742261


Voiceand

Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism 89

pate in the moment. A critiqueof Jarrett's oice and movement as an

obstacle to the music denies the

possibility

of

unifying

the

mental,

the

spiritual,

he

embodied,

and the

unrepeatable

of

in-the-moment

cre-

ation.

If

Aquinas

was

right

and

the self is

inscribed n our

body

and

soul

-and

I

wholly agree

with him-then

how

can

anyone

deny

Jarrett's

right

to

a

form of

expression

that is of a

piece through

time

and

space,

a

self that is not

subject

to

parsingaccording

to a most

pervasive,yet

usu-

ally

unexamined inheritance of our

intellectual tradition?

When

Jarrett's

bodyappears o takeflightand his voice seems to sing, it is becausehe

believes in the

priority

of

the

improviser

as

a

person

whose

imagination

rolls and tumblesfrom

vocal

chords

as well

as

fingers,

whose

body

is

not

only

instrument,

expression,

and

locus of

self,

but self

itself.

In

Jarrett's

pianism,

communication is

aural,oral,

visual,

and

kinetic;

it

encom-

passespoiesis

and

esthesis,

logos

and

pathos.

To center

music'scommuni-

cation

in

sound alone

is to dehumanize

t. So as

long

as we

permit

the

critical

establishmentto

stomp

around

with their

late-romantic

deas

of

the

aesthetic

experience

and their

logocentristic

notions

of

music,

all

those acts

that make a

performance

a

performance

will

be

regarded

s a

surplus

of

humanness.This is

something

that we

simply

cannot

allow

to

be,

no

matter how

heightened

the

promises

of

transcendentalism

may

be. It is not

Jarrett's

estures

and

moans that

are out of

place, "layered

over,"

t is the

aesthetic

by

which we

measure hem.

For

Jarrett

he

music is

voice,

body,

and

soul.

Notes

An

earlier

version of this

article

was

presented

at the

1996

meeting

of

the

American

Musicological

Society

in

Baltimore.The

author is

grateful

o

Julia

Hubbert or her

com-

ments on a

previous

draft

of

this

article.

1.

Owen

Cordle,

review of

Standards,

Vol.

1,

The Keith

Jarrett

Trio,

ECM

Records,

1983,

Down

Beat

(Jan.

1984):

32.

2.

John

Ephland,

review

of

Tribute,

The

Keith

Jarrett

Trio,

ECM

Records,

1990,

Down

Beat

(May

1991):

30.

3. In a

personal

communication,

the

pianist

Michael

Cain,

who

attended

a

recording

session

by

Jarrett's

rio,

told me that

Jarrett

engages

his

body regardless

f

whether he is

playing

before an

audience

or

not. We

shall returnto

this

point.

4.

Len

Lyons,

The Great

Jazz

Pianists

Speaking

f

Their

Livesand

Music

(New

York:

Da

Capo

Press,

1989),

295.

The

interestedreader

may

observe

Jarrett

n

several

commer-

cially

available

videos;

I

recommendKeith

arrett,

Solo

Tribute,

RCA

Victor

09026-

68201-3.

5.

John

Litweiler,

The

Freedom

rinciple:

azz

After

1958

(New

York:

W.

Morrow,

1984),

233-35.

8/20/2019 742261


90 The Musical

Quarterly

6. John Andrews,"CatchingUp with Keith,"Down Beat(Oct. 1994): 55. Andrews's

pronouncement

seems

prophetic;

n a recent

article-critique

itled "Who's

Overrated?

Who's Underrated?"

arrett

arned three

entries,

the

highest

number,

n

the

"overrated"

category.

To

witness,

Bill

Milkowski,

"And don't

get

me startedabout his horrible

mewling";

and Tom

Terrell,

"[H]e

has become a

petulant,

arrogant, gomaniacal,

elf-

proclaimed

artiste'who dabbles

wanly

in

classical

shallows,

can't

swing, grunts/contorts

grotesquely."

azzTimes

7

(Sept.

1997):

31,

39.

7.

Most

critics,

it

should

be

noted,

are enthusiastic about

Jarrett's

ontribution

to

jazz

piano.

Some

exceptions,

such as the critic

Gary

Giddins,

do exist.

Giddins,

for

instance,

objects

to

Jarrett's

lleged

excessive

lyricism

and romanticism.

8.

I

do

not,

in this

essay,

attempt

to

place

criticism

of

Jarrett

n

the context of the

ani-

mosity

that

has

accompanied

the

jazz

establishment's eaction

to his work

outside

jazz,

namely

the distrust

with

which

jazz

critics

view

Jarrett's

mmensely

popular

recordings

of

solo

piano

concerts.

9. Keith

Shadwick

writes of

Jarrett'sBye Bye

Blackbird

a

1993 albumdedicated to the

memory

of Miles

Davis),

"A

very worthy

tribute

indeed,

although

his

[Jarrett's]

ocal

intrusions

are,

as

usual,

a

drag."

Keith

Shadwick,

review of

Bye Bye

Blackbird,

he Keith

Jarrett

Trio,

ECM

Records, 1993,

in

Gramophone

June

1993): 118-19,

119.

10. The classicexpositionof the tenets of logocentrismappears n JacquesDerrida,Of

Grammatology,

rans.

Gayatri

Chakravorty

Spivak

(Baltimore:

Johns

Hopkins

University

Press,

1976).

11.

See

Jacques

Derrida,

Writing

nd

Difference,

rans. Alan Bass

(London:

Routledge,

1978),

278.

12.

This

is

a

point

that critics of the "authentic

performance"

movement

have not

made.

Much critical

discussion,

such as

that

by

Richard

Taruskin,

enters around ts

nineteenth

century

philosophical

roots

(transcendentalism,absolutism, ormalism,

ult

of the

genius,

and so

on)

and

its modernistmanifestation

(e.g.,

the dehumanization

of

artexpression).See RichardTaruskin,Textand Act: EssaysonMusicandPerformance

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press, 1995).

13.

Taruskin,

Text

and

Act,

100-101

passim.

14.

Paul

Berliner

thoroughly

describes

he

complex

learning

processes

undertaken

by

improvising

musicians;

ee his

Thinking

n

Jazz:

The

Infinite

Art

of ImprovisationChicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1994).

In

section

2

of

this

essay

I will

discussthe

role of

transcendentalism

and

the

aesthetic

in

molding

conceptions

of musical

creation as nat-

ural and

of

its

performance

as

disembodied.

15.

lan

Carr,

Keith

arrett:

The

Man and His Music

(New

York:

Da

Capo

Press,

1991),

66.

Italics

in

original.

16. For a discussion

of issuesof

temporality

n

jazz

mprovisation,

ee Ed

Sarath,

"A

New

Look at

Improvisation,"

ournal

f

Music

Theory

40

(1996):

1-38.

17.

Jonathan

Dunsby

addresses

he acoustic differences

n the

ways

instrumentalists

and

singers

hear themselves

during

performance

n

Performing

Music:Shared

Concerns

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press, 1995),

60-61.

18.

Julia

Kristeva

writes of

a kind of

primordial

emiotic

of

gesture,

suggesting

a

kind of

kinetic

communication

in

which

no

distinction

is made

between

signified

and

signifier.

This position fits well the perspectiveof the improviser orwhom the doingsof the body

8/20/2019 742261


Voice

and Movement

n

Jarrett's

ianism

91

set forth

relations

without

pointing

to

specific

objects

within these relations.See

Julia

Kristeva,"Legeste, pratiqueou communication?"n Semeiotike:RecherchesouruneSem-

analyse

Paris:

Editions

du

Seil,

1969),

93

passim.

19.

Kaja

Silverman,

The Acoustic

Mirror:The Female

Voice

n

Psychoanalysis

nd

Cinema

(Bloomington:

Indiana

University

Press, 1988),

44.

Silverman's

nsightful

aphorism

appears

n

the

context of a

broad

synthesis

of French

psychoanalytic

heory

about

the

voice

and

sound;

there she

deals

in

particular

with issues

of

gendering

and

subjectivity

in

classic

cinema.

20. See

Michel

Foucault,

Discipline

nd

Punish,

rans.

Alan Sheridan

(New

York:

Vin-

tage

Books,

1977),

136-37.

21.

I

do

not intend

with this characterization

o indict

those musicians

who do

not

vocalize

as

being

nonexpressive

or

necessarilyrepressed.

22.

Carolyn

Abbate,

from

whom

I

borrow

he

expression,

uses

the notion of

ventrilo-

quism

differently.

She

calls

ventriloquism

he

tendency

to consider

music to

be unable to

speak

for itself.

My

sense is that

"disciplined"

nterpreters,

ike the

magician

with a

painted

doll

on the

lap,

undertake o

speak

for

music without

letting

others see the

phys-

ical

mechanism

by

which sound is

produced.

See

Carolyn

Abbate,

Unsung

Voices:

Opera

and Musical

Narrative

n

the

Nineteenth

Century

Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1991),

16-18

passim.

23.

Handbook

f Conducting,

rans.

M. D. Calvocoressi

(London:

Oxford

University

Press,

1993),

29.

24.

For incisive and

comprehensive

treatmentsof this

subject

see

Taruskin,

Text

and

Act,

and

Lydia

Goehr,

The

Imaginary

Museum

of

MusicalWorks:An

Essay

on the

Philoso-

phy

of

Music

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1992).

25.

Simon

Frithhas

argued

hat listeners of

popular

music

feel

that

they

"own" t:

"it

is

not

just

the recordthat

people

think

they

own:

we feel

that

we also

possess

the

song

itself,

the

particularperformance,

and its

performer."

n

"Towards

n Aesthetic of

Popu-

larMusic," n MusicandSociety:The Politics f Composition,Performance,ndReception,

ed. Richard

Leppert

and Susan

McClary (Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity

Press,

1987),

143.

A

distinction must

be

made,

however,

between two formsof

possession:

that of an

ephemeralperformance

i.e.,

the

concert),

and that which can be

repeated

ad

infinitum

(i.e.,

the

recording).

The disembodied

experience

of

recorded

performances

accentuates

the

sense of

ownership

and

control that

a

listener

might

exert

on music. Fur-

thermore,

t is there that musical

performance,

ollowing

the

purchase

of a

recording,

s

most

objectified.

26.

For an excellent introduction to medieval

conceptions

of the

body,

see Caroline

Bynum, "Why

All

the FuzzAbout the

Body:

A

Medievalist's

Perspective,"

Critical

nquiry

22

(1995):

1-33.

My

account

of

Aquina's

views is

indebted to hers.

27.

Bynum,

"Why

All

the

Fuzz

About the

Body,"

22.

28.

A

central

tenet of udeo-Christiandoctrine is that

by

becoming

flesh

God

grants

us

redemption

rom our

sins.

The

role of

redemption

n

Judeo-Christian

heology undergoes

an

interesting

transformation

n

romantic

accounts

of

the aesthetic

experience,

a

subject

that

I

discussbelow.

29.

Rene

Descartes,

Meditations n First

Philosophy,

rans.

Donald

A.

Cress

(Indianapo-

lis: Hackett

PublishingCompany),

8.

8/20/2019 742261


92

The Musical

Quarterly

30. Here

we

must

keep

in

mind that Descartes s as interested

n

"perspective"

s

he is

in

establishing

"location."

n

addition,

he

somewhat extends medieval

unified

theories

by locating

the

soul

within a

specific

place,

the

pineal

gland.

Thanks to

Julia

Hubbertfor

bringing

these

points

to

my

attention.

31. Descartes's

writings

on

music,

including

the

Compendium

1619),

view

the

subject

from either

a scientific

perspective

(i.e.,

the

physicoacousticaspect

of

sound)

or

a

"com-

positional"

angle

(i.e.,

the

practical

aspect

afforded

by

the

rules

of

counterpoint).

32. From

Philosophie

er

Kunst

1802-3),

cited

in

Music

and

Aesthetics

n

the

Eighteenth

and Nineteenth

Centuries,

d. Peter le

Huray

and

James

Day

(Cambridge:Cambridge

Uni-

versityPress,1981), 280. Italicsin original.

33.

Goehr,

The

Imaginary

Museum,

167.

Naturally,

his

is

not

to

say

that

transcenden-

talism

in music is

responsible

or

post-Cartesian

views of the

body.

Rather,

music

tran-

scendentalismmakes

manifest

some

tenets of the

Enlightenmentproject.

34.

E. T.

A.

Hoffmann,

"Beethoven's nstrumental

Music,"

n Source

Readings

n

Music

History,

ed. Oliver

Strunk

(New

York:

Norton, 1950),

780-81.

35. Gustave

Schilling, Encyclopddie

er

gesammten

musikalischen

Wissenschaften,

der

Universal

Lexikon

erTonkunst

Stuttgart

1834-38),

s.v.

"Romantik

und

Romantisch,"

cited in le

Huray

and

Day,

Music

and

Aesthetics,

470.

36.

I

borrow his

interpretation

rom the novelist

Milan Kundera.See

Testaments

Betrayed:

An

Essay

n

Nine

Parts,

trans.

Linda

Asher

(New

York:

HarperCollins,

1995),

84-87.

37.

The notion of deferral

s

important

to Derrida's

ritique

of

self-presence

as

a

nuclear element

of

logocentrism.

An

important

distinction from this

in

my

discussion

s

that

I

consider

improvisation

as

act,

not

as a

process

divisible

into

thought

and

act.

38.

Art

Lange,

"The

Keith

Jarrett

nterview,"

Down Beat

(June

1984): 16-19,

63.

39. Maurice

Merleau-Ponty,

Phenomenologyf

Perception,

rans.Colin

Smith

(London:

Routledge, 1962), 182.

40.

Igor

Stravinsky,

Chronicle

f

My

Life

(London:

Victor

Gollancz

Ltd., 1936),

122.

41.

This

readingapplies

Kristeva's

ategories

n

"Le

Geste,

Pratique

ou Communica-

tion?"

42.

Carr,

Keith

arrett,

7-48.

43.

There have been

attempts

to work

out theories

of motion

in

music

by

associating

musical

gestures

with

bodily

movement

symptomatic

of human

emotions, moods,

and

feelings.

While

in

principle

such work seeks

to

reclaim the human

body

for

music,

these

theoriesquicklydissolveinto a series of repertoiremovesof associatedmeaning.Fora

sympathetic

summary

f this work

see PatrickShove

and

Bruno

H.

Repp,

"Musical

Motion and

Performance:

Theoretical

and

Empirical

Perspectives,"

n The

Practice

f

Performance:

tudies

n

Musical

nterpretation,

d.

John

Rink

(Cambridge

and

New York:

Cambridge

University

Press, 1995),

55-83.

44.

Richard

Leppert,

The

Sight

of

Sound:

Music,

Representation,

nd the

Historyof

the

Body (Berkeley:

University

of

California

Press,

1993),

xxi.

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