7 70-14 I 3 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE HEREIN CHRONOLOGY ... · SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE HEREIN CHRONOLOGY _ ... advance notice of the convoy's arrival, The Soviet ... The Soviets

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HR7O 14

Date: 06-05-2013 ‘ ' &

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE HEREIN CHRONOLOGY

_THE CONVOY-DISMOUNTING CRISIS O‘NVTHE

BERLIN AUTOBAHN,87—16

OCTOBER 1963‘

US Dismounting Policy:

In order to facilitate processing, thecommander

of a US troop convoytraveling on the Autobahn will order his troops to dismount for a

Vhead—count only when all of the following criteria are met:

1) The Soviet officer-in-charge requests that the troops dismount.2) The number of tr00ps in the convoy is 31 or more, exclusive of

one driver and one assistant driver perwprime mover°3) It is not raining or showing at the checkpoint.4) The Soviets are not trying to photograph the US troops or to

disseminate derogatory propaganda to them.5) The Soviets permit the US troops to keep individual weapons

with them while they are dismounted.

If the head-count is not started within five minutes after the US vehi~cles have been counted, the trOops will be remounted and the Sovietswill be told that the head—count must be c0nducted with the troops inthe vehicles. If the head-count is net completed within fifteen min—utes after it is started, the troOps will be remounted and any furthercount will take place with them in the vehicles.

Since supply and administrative conVoys do not'carry troops and containonly a driver and assistant driver per_vehicle, they never dismount.

British Dismounting Policy:

'In order to facilitate processing, the Commander of a British militaryconvoy traveling the Autobahn will Order his tr00ps to dismount unlessone or more of the following circumstances exist:

1) The total number of personn l in the convoy is 40 or fewerincluding drivers and'aSSistant driVerS, "

2) No single vehicle is carrying ten or more men, exclusive ofdriver and assistant driver. ' '

3) The troops are traveling in buses.4) It is.raining or snowing at the checkpoint.

Tr00ps will not remain dismounted for more than ten minutes. If theSoviet officer in charge appears to be prelonging the count unduly, the

convoy command will warn him that the tr00ps will be remounted shortly.

- After ten minutes have elapsed fellowing dismounting, the convoy Comman~’ der will order his troops to remount and will report the incident to

Berlin. ' '

Troops are not to be photographed by soviet or East German personnelwhile dismounted. If checkpoint’perSOnne1”attempt to photograph vehi~cles or dismounted troops, the convoy Commander immediately Will order

.his troops to remount and will report the incident to Berlin.

Prepared by: Office of Current Intelli,ence, CIA.

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8 October

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0714Z

1111Z

During the day a US convoy consisting of 26 vehicles

and 79 personnel cleared both Soviet checkpoints

without incident and without demands that its per-sonnel dismount for a head—count.

9 October

Convoy 18i consisting of 30 vehicles and sufficientpersonnel to dismount, arrived at Marienborn in the

rain, The Soviets were given 90-minute notice of

the convoy's arrivalo The Soviet officer in charge

demanded that the troops dismount to be counted,but the UL on o ‘ mmander refused because of the.

.weatherov

The weather cleared at Marienborn and the troops of

convoy 1i dismounted before a real issue developed.

Convoy 21, (eastbound), consisting of 34 vehicles and

sufficient personnel to dismount, arrived at Marienborn-

in the rain° The Soviets were given ninety-minute

advance notice of the convoy's arrival, The Sovietofficer in charge demanded that the personnel dis—

mount to be counted, but the convo commander

refused because of the weather,

1226Z_ The rain stopped at Marienborn, the personnel of

convoy 21 dismounted for a head-count, and Ycleared the checkpoint ten minutes later.

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During the day a third US convoy, consisting of 26vehicles and 67 personnel cleared both Soviet

checkpoints without incident and without demandsthat its personnel dismount for a head-count.

10 October

Convoy 24 (westbound), consisting of 25 vehicles and

73 personnel, arrived at Babelsberg° The Soviets

had been given eight—hour notification of the con-voy's arrival“ It cleared the checkpoint with nodifficulty and with no Soviet demands that its

personnel dismount,

Convoy 27 (eastbound), consisting of 18 vehiCles and

61 personnel, arrived at Marienborn. The Soviets

had been given one—hour notification of the convoy's

arrival. Although the convoy was in the non—dismount

category, the Soviet duty officer demanded that its

personnel dismount to be counted. The convoy_commander

refused, and the Soviet officer refused to process

Convoy 24 (westbound), which cleared Babelsberg with-

out dismounting at 05342, arrived at Marienborn.

The Soviet officer in charge demanded that its per—sonnel dismount, the convoy commander refused, and

the Soviet declined to process the coits troops were ordered to dismount.

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The commander of the US Helmstedt Detachment arrivedat Marienborn»and was told by the Soviet OIC: "We'

are not detaining you; you are detaining yourselvesand denyinj access to yourselves by not dismounting."

Convoy 25 (westbound), consisting of 27 vehicles and"117 men, arrived at Marienborn and pulled in behind

convoy 24, with orders not to submit for processinguntil the other two convoys had been clearedo Convoy25 had arrived at Babelsberg upon ninety—minute ‘notice earlier in the mroning, its troops haddismounted upon request and it had been processedwithout difficulty.

.

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The US Helmstedt commander orally protested to the

Soviet commander of the Marienborn checkpoint, C01.Spiridonov,.regarding the continued detention of theUS convoys, and stated that the US did not intendto depart from accepted procedures. The Sovietrepeated his contention that the personnel of

convoys 24 and 27 would have ' unt or theywould be denied clearance.

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The US Commandant in Berlin (USCOB)? Geno Polk, whohas jurisdiction over all US Autobahn convoysy pro—posed to USAREUR that the convoys at Marienborn bedirected to block the Autobahn, thus increasing

pressure on the Soviets, keeping civilians out of‘the area, and denying the Soviets the opportunityof blocking the Autobahn.with German civilian trucks

—-a trick which GDR border guards have used in thepast to b100k East German escapees.

USCOB issued a warning order to the Helmstedt

commander to be prepared to block the Autobahnwith vehicles from the three US convoys.

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USCOB declared that an "impasse" existed at Marienborn.

The Soviet commander at Marienborn stated that if

the US would dismount those vehicles in convoy 27

which carried five or more passengers, exclusive

of drivers, convoy 24 would be processed without

dismountingo The US OIC refused the "compromiseo”

SERB, the foreign liaison branch of Group Soviet

Forces Germany (GSFG) requested a meeting with the

chief of the US Military Liaison Mission (USMLM)

in Potsdamo _

On orders from USAREUR, convoy25

pulled ahead of

convoy 249 dismounted9 and was processed through the

Marienborn checkpoint without further incident. ‘

The chief of the L re orted for his meeting with

SERB officialso

The meeting between the chief USMLM and officials of

SERB ended after the Soviet” charged that the US

convoys were being held up because of their refusal

to comply with "normal clearance proceduresa" He

stated that they would not be allowed to pass until

these procedures had been complied with. The US

officer orally protested the delays» stating that

it was not normal procedure for convoys of such size

to dismount and that the US would not comply with

the Soviet demando

Acting USCINCEUR3 Gena McConnell? approved for

simultaneous delivery to SERB and to the Soviet

commander at Marienborn alultimatum which had been

drafted by the Quadripartite Group in Bonn, The

ultimatum was to state that if clearance procedures

had not begun within ninety—minutes of the ultimatum's

delivery2 the convoys would proceed without clearance,

The Soviet OIC at Marienborn told the US Autobahn—

operations officer from Helmstedt that only the personnel

in the 2°5—tpn trucks were required to dismount° The

US officer rejected the offer on the.grounds that it

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was not in accordance with long—standings procedures.

The chief USMLM delivered an ultimatum to SERBstating that if by 2030Z clearance procedures hadnot commenced, both detained convoys.would proceedwithout clearance. The ultimatum stated thatconvoy 25 had been instructed to proceed .in orderto demonstrate that the US was following customaryprocedures, ‘ Iled upon the Soviets to dolikewise.

Gen. McConnell apparently had a change of heart anddirected that the ultimatum not be delivered toSERB or to the Soviet Marienborn commander. Informedthat it already had been delivered to SERB, hedirected the US Autobahn-operations offideliver it to the Marienborn commander.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived at the WhiteHouse for a previously-scheduled talk with thePresident. When informed of the Autobahn incident,he reportedly agreed to send a messa e to Moscow"influencing" the course.of events.

Gen.McConne11 instructed the US Autobahn-operationsofficer to deliver the ultimatum to the Soviet OICat Marienborn a 20 e deadline was movedback to 2245Z.

.

The Allied Berlin commandan US Headquartersto consider the situation. '

The US Autobahn—operations officer delivered thetwo—hour ultimatum to the Soviet commander atMarienborn, and the chief USMLM informed SERBof the new deadline.

The Soviets moved trucks in front of convoy 24, thusblocking one of the Autobahn’s two open westboundlanes, and posted armed guards around the convoy.East GermangcuSLQmsnpersonnel were moved out ofthe area°

0n orders-from USCOB, convoy 24 blocked off westboundAutobahn traffic, and West German customs policestopped eastbound traffic at the interzonal border,thus cutting off the flow of traffic into the check-point area.

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The Soviets pulled a truck across all three west—bound Autobahn lanes and stationed one officerand five armed enlisted men between the truck andconvoy 24. East German workers placed s ikedboards in front of both convoys.

The Soviet OIC told the US Autobahn—operationsofficer that he would clear both convoys withoutrequiring their personnel to dismount if the USwould move its vehicles back into line and thusstop blocking westbound traffic. The US officeragreed. and the clearance of convoy 27 commenced.

The US ultimatum was scheduled toexpire.[;;;;;;;;;;j

Convoy 27 cleared Marienborn without dismountinand proceeded eastward toward Babelsberg.

[ii]

The Soviets removed the truck blocking the west—bound lanes, and traffic began flowing again inboth directions.

The Soviets began processing convoy 24. [ ]

11 October

Convoy 24 cleared Marienborn without dismoun ' andcontinued its journey to West Germany.

convoy 27 arrived at Babelsberg and was met by

Soviet checkpoint commander Col. Sergin, whoinformed the US OIC that he had orders not toclear the convoy unless and until its personneldismounted for a head-count. The convoy commanderrefused to order his men to dismount and immediately

reported the Soviet demand to USCOB.

The US Autobahn-operations officer orally protestedthe convoy delay to the Soviet checkpoint commander,who again stated that he had instructions from hisheadquarters not to clear the convoy unless the troops

dismounted. He said that if they wauld dismount, hewould clear the convoy in fifteen minutes. The US

officer refused to comply.

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Several high—ranking East German border guard officers

were observed in the vicinity of the Babelsberg check—Epoint-wagost unusual occurrence, according to USCOB.

Convoy 28 (westbound), consisting of 25 vehicles and143 men, arrived at Babelsberg. The Soviets hadeight—hour advance notice of its arrival. Becauseit was of dismount size, its personnel dismounted

upon request, and it processed through Babelsbergwithout incident.‘

Convoy 28 completed processing at Babelsberg andcontinued down the Autobahn toward Helmstedt. [iiiiiiiiiij

The Soviets placed barriers at both ends of convoy27, thus blocking it off completely. At the sametime the eastbound lanes of the Autobahn were closed,'

and eastbound traffic was routed into one of thewestboundtlanes.

AP Berlin reported information from "reliable

informants” to the effect that 100 Soviet troops

armed with sub—machine guns were waiting for convoy27 at the Babelsberg checkpoint. The dispatch

quoted an unidentified Allied officer as sayingthat he had never seen so many Soviet soldiers atthe checkpoint.

Convoy 29 (westbound), consisting of 26 vehicles and164 personnel from a rifle company, arrived atBabelsberg, The Soviets received ninety-minutenotice of its arrival, The conVoy submitted to

processing, and because it was of dismount size,

its commander ordered his men to dismdunt upon"request, The convoy was cleared without incident,but instead of proceeding down the Autobahn towardHelmstedt, it remained in the checkpoint area in

accordance with USCOB orders to support convoy 27.

Aerial reconnaissance by a US Army helicopter overthe Babelsberg checkpoint area revealed no signs

that Soviet or East German troops were massing in

the vicinity, Ten westbound and approximately 100

eastbound trucks were baCked u at the checkpoint,according to USCOB°

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A US Provost Marshal officer presented another ora‘protest to the Soviet Babelsberg commander.

The Soviet controller at the Berlin Air SafetyCenter (BASC) protested US helicopter flights overthe Babelsberg checkpoint area. The US controllerreplied by restating Allied rights to fly anywherewithin the Berlin Control Zone.

Gen. McCOnnell authorized US officers in Berlin todeliver simultaneous ultimatums to SERB and the

' Soviet Babelsberg commander to the effect that ifconvoy 27 was not cleared within two hours itwould proceed without clearance.

[;;;;;;;;]

‘Two Soviet armored personnel carriers (APCS) arrivedin the checkpoint area.

The Soviet Babelsberg commander issued an ultimatumto the effect that if the personnel of convoy 27did not dismount for processing within thrityminutes, Autobahn access to Berlin would be

'blocked. The Soviets then moved 'ee s additionalAPCS into the checkpoint area.

glnanf

The Soviet BASC controller charged that US helicopterswere making provocative flights over Soviet "objects"in the vicinity of Stahnsdorf. ,He said that failureto end such flights immediately could lead to "veryheavy undesirable consequences, responsibility forwhich would rest with American authorities.” TheUS controller replied by restating Allied rightsto fly anywhere within the Berlin Control ZOne andby noting that properly filed flight plans mpassed to the Soviets for their information.

The Soviet duty officer at Babelsberg stated thatif convoy 29 were not moved out of the checkpointarea immediatel it ould be blocked. The convoydid not move.

[ximl]

‘

US officers delivered simultaneous ultimatums toSERB and to the Soviet.checkpoint commander, statingthat if convoy 27 was not cleared within one hourthe convoy Would proceed without clearance.

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Convoy 28, which cleared Babelsberg without incident

at O604Z, arrived at Marienborn, dismounted uponrequest, and was processed withoutincident.

Convoy 28 cleared Marienborn without incident and.proceeded on its way to West Germany.

A US Mission officer briefed West Berlin MayorWilly

Brandt on the Autobahn situation.

Two Soviet units with a total of eight APCs arrivedat the checkpoint, bringing the number of suchvehicles in the area to 12—15. Three APCs then movedonto the Autobahn in front of convoy 27 and twoothers stationed themselves in the center of theeastbound lane. Soviet L uncovered andloaded machine guns.

UPI reported that the Soviets had permitted US MPpatrols to bring hot coffee and fresh fruit out tothe personnel of the delayed convoys. The dispatch

noted that Soviet APCs on the scene were positionedin such a way that they were not visible from WestBerlin.

TASS reported in English that Soviet Defense MinisterMalinovskiy, touring Poland on a "friendship visit,"called on the chairman of the Warsaw "People's

Council," then toured various points of interest

in the Polish capital.

The US ultimatum, delivered at 0945Z, expired.[:::::::::::]

AP-reported that a Mission officer in Berlin had 'announced that all Autobahn traffic had been blocked Iby "a wholly unilateral Soviet action,“ then had

reversed himself a few minutes later by stating ;that only the eastbound lane had been blocked and i

that traffic was m ' ' both directions in thewestbound lane.

[gylngln■

Soviet and East German vehicles boxed in convoy 29.

The commander of convoy 27 raised the checkpoint

barrier and ordered his convoy to advance withoutclearance. The lead vehicle proceeded a few yards

until its wa was blocked by a Soviet APC,then

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11 October conft

11122 The US Autobahn-operations officer delivered a"strong protest" to the Soviet Babelsberg commander.

1150Z The chief of the USMLM was told by the acting Chief

of SERB that the commander of convoy 27 was required

to "follow normal procedure for verification like

the other convoy.commanders have done or the column

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will not be allowed to proceed to West Berlin."

He added: "This decision is final. We do not

intend to proceed with further discussions on that

question." The Soviet then stated that this wasGSFG's final decision and that he personally

could not understand why the US was "trying to

complicate this matter of clearance procedures."

-The Three Western Berlincommandants met under UK

chairmanShip and unanimously made the following

recommendations to LIVE OAK: 1) that the "strongest"

possible protest be directed to CINCGSFG by the

three Allied CINCs, stressing the "incomprehensible

attitude of Soviet authorities;" 2) that convoy

29 be directed to stay in place for tactical

reasons; 3) that French and BritiSh "solidarity

convoys" not be dispatched at the moment because

of the diversity of Allied dismounting policy;

4) that the dispatch of "solidarity convoys" waspreferable to the implementation of Back—Stroke.

.Gen° McConnell informed JCS that the Bonn Quadripartite

Group had instructed him to alert the Free-Style

‘probe in place but not to move it. He reported

that he was taking action as directed,

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) met in Washington towork out recommendations for possible courses ofaction. V

Secretary Rusk summoned Soviet Ambassador Dobryninto the Department and pointed out to him that theSoviets were engaged in a unilateral attempt tochange long-established checkpoint procedures byforce. Rusk requested that the incident be broughtto Khrushchev's personal attention. Dobrynin‘disclaimed any knowledge of the incident butstated that a messa e had been sent to Moscowduring the night.

[f:::::]

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_The JCS meeting ended.

The Ambassadorial Group met in Washington under thechairmanship of Ambassador Thompson, who outlineddevelopments to date and stated that the Sovietactions were "completely out of character with"Gromyko's talks with the President and SecretaryRusk. However, Thompson said, the US felt itnecessary to react strongly, inasmuch as theAutobahn stoppage could be a "serious test ofintentions.” The British and German representativesagreed that it would be best to proceed with theassembly of a Free-Style group; the French represent—ative was withouLlinstructionslandldidlnoilcgmmeni

on the matter.

JCS directed Gen. McConnell that "no further convoyswill be moved over the Autobahn which are of suchsize that they are at or below the minimum sizerequiring dismOunt."

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11 October com'tp

13462 A Soviet MIG 15 circled three-timesover the Babelsberg

checkpoint area at an altitude of approximately '300 feet. ]

Soviet troops which dismounted from their APCs atabout 1000Z returned to their carriers and a arentlyremained in them throughout the evening.

[BE]

.14432' East German communications personnel began erecting

a ground—plane—type radio antenna on the north sideof the Autobahn, opposite the checkpoint areat uUSCOB

Hggtigate■ that the antenna's range was 30-40 miles.

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The Embassy suggested that the US search for asolution which would "give the Soviets someface—saving possibilities," such as "a meeting

between the two commanders—in-chief (CINCs) at the

checkpoint itselfa" The Embassy recommended that

CINCUSAREUR send a message to CINCGSFG suggesting

that each CINC nominate a Senior officer to meet

dzBabelsbergo The US representative, USAREUR Chief

of Staff Geno Baker, would be instructed to point

out that the US was not altering its procedures

and to offer to withdraw convoy 29 in exchan e for

Soviet processing of convoy 27”[g]

The President met for forty-five minutes with

Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador

Thompson, according to press reports. A pressofficer then announced that the US had "no reason

to believe" that the Soviets would not reconsider

and allow the convoy to proceed into Berlin.

‘7?16052A Soviet major at the checkpoint area informed the

US provost marshal representative that convoy 29

could proceed but nun convoy 27 would not be cleared

unless its personnel dismounted. The US officer

replied that the personnel would not dismount, since

to do so would re resent a change in established

procedures.

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A Free—Style force consisting of 18 officers, 131men, and 35 vehicles including APCs and armoredbulldozers, was placed on a four—hour alert inHelmstedt. The force reportedly was composed ofpersonnel and equipment of all three Allies but

was predominantly British.

JCS informed Gen. McConnell that, pending furthernotice, no more convoys of non—dismount size wereto be dispatched on the Autobahn. [

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin telephoned Moscow toreport on his morning meeting wi■h Secretary Rusk.

USCOB reported that seven helicopter reconnaissanceflights conducted during the day revealed that 21Soviet vehicles and approximately 69 Soviet motorizedrifle troops were in the checkpoint area. One EastGerman radio vehicle and about 60 GDR border guardsand Vopos were noted. Twentyefive Soviet officers,including three lieutenant colonels and five majors,

were counted. No unusual troo movements wereobserved in the area.

[4444444JL4W

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1700Z The personnel of convoy 27 were rovided a hot mealfrom Berlin via MP sedans.

[E]

Ambassador Kohler met with Acting Soviet ForeignMinister Zorin to state that Soviet attempts tomake unilateral changes in Autobahn procedures werecompletely unacceptable and incompatable with improvedUS-Soviet relations. Zorin replied that there was"a good deal of convoy traffic" on the Autobahn andthat most convoys had Vcomplied with establishedprocedures," but that convoy 27 had not. Kohler notedthat the Sovietsv function was to facilitate US

-passage on the Autobahn, not to grant, deny, orcontrol it. Zorin replied that the USSR had nointention of creating difficulties, and that if'this

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was true of the as we 1 ever th I I

out all right.

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The Quadripartite Group in Bonn submitted the follow-

in recommendations for consideration by the Ambassadorial

Group in Washington: 1) that orders be issued forthe assembly of‘a Free—Style force and for the

training of a Back-Stroke force prior to assembly,

but that decision on the use of either group be

deferred pending the results of approaches to the

Soviets in Washingtong Moscow, and through GSFG;.2) that the British and French ambassadors in Moscow

be instructed to make supporting representations to

to the Soviet government as soon as possible; 3)

that minor precautionary measures "observable to the

other side" be taken, such as the "appropriate degree

of alert for Allied Berlin garrisons" and an airlift

to Berlin of US forces approximately equivalent to

those detained at the checkpoint; 4) that CINCUSAREURoffer to send his chief of staff to meet with

CINCGSFG'S chief of staff at Babelsberg; 5) that the

British and French CINCs send written protestito

CINCGSFG asking for his personal intervention.

USCOB reported that the Soviets had not harassed

the three US helicopter missions which were flown

over the Babelsberg area since the emplacement

of two anti—aircraft guns near the checkpoint. On

one occasion a Soviet MIG orbiting the area briefly

shadowed a US helicopter, however.

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1745Z ' Gen. McConnell informed JCS of his approval of Gen.Polk's (USCOB) recommendation that Lt° Col. Emanuel'Tinari be appointed commander of US forces at theBabelsberg checkpoint.

1758Z In response to queries from C/JCS, Gen° McConnellrecommended that Free-Style and Back-Stroke forcesbe assembled without a decision to employ them. Henoted that once they were employed, exclusive UScontrol over the operation would be lost. He opposedthe withdrawal of convoy 29, noting that it could beused as a bargaining point for the US. He thenobserved that a forcec■ "tank-dozers" could bedispatched to forceably remove the Soviet APCs with-out the use of firepower, with the understanding thatif the Soviets opened fire, the force would be with-drawn. He expected no difficulties in supplyingboth convoys for an indefinite period of time.

1825Z -A bus carrying 15 Soviet troops arrived at the check-point, unloaded, and departed thirt minutes laterwith fifteen other soldiers.

i

1837Z The Soviet OIC was informed that the personnel ofconvoy 29 would bivouac for the night in the check—point area.' A biv was blocked off withoutSoviet objection.

Ena■areaj

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18412 In reporting the 10 October incident at Marienborn,' ADN announced that "US occupationists from West

Germany" had refused to dismount from their vehicles——"as has been customary for years"~-and therefore

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had not been permitted‘to proceed. The broadcast

asserted that one convoy had allowediitself to be cleared

in the "customary manner" at Babelsberg but had refused

to permit "the corresponding control" at Marienborn.

JCS informed Gen. McConnell of the following develop-A

ments: 1) French and British concurrence was being sought

for the assembly of a Free-Style force, but action onBack—Stroke had been deferred; 2) USAREUR C/S Gen. Baker

was to seek a meeting at once with his Soviet counterpart,

preferably at the checkpoint. Baker was to state that

the first matter was to arrange passage for convoy 27

and that if the Soviets had questions regarding convoyprocedures, "appropriate channels were available for sub-

sequent discussions as required;" 3) a large, dismountable

US convoy was to be dispatched to Berlin as soon as pos-sible to ascertain whether access was still open to '

such a convoy; 4) convoy 29 was to remain in the check-

point area; 5) low flying or "any other use of heli-

c0pters which might be considered provocative" was to

be avoided in the checkpoint area. McConnell wasdirected to report_the occurrence of any recent events

at Babelsberg or Marienborn which might have occasioned

the Soviet action. '

The Quadripartite AmbasSadorial Group met in Washington

under the chairmanship of Ambassador Thompson and wasinformed that the Department had assisted Soviet Ambas-

sador Dobrynin in getting a telephone call through to

Moscow during the morning and that Gromyko had delayed

his departure for New York by one-hour in order to

send a cable to Moscow. After stating his personal

view that Gromyko knew nothing about the incident,

Thompson revealed US plans for arranging a meeting

between USAREUR C/S Gen; Baker and GSFG C/S Gen. Ariko

and for assembling a tripartite Free-Style group. UK

Ambassador Ormsby Gore expressed the belief that Gen.

McConnell had the authority to assemble such a groupwithout further instructions from the individual govern—ments. The British and French were requested to conasider a US proposal to send "solidarity convoys" upthe Autobahn in order to demonstrate Allied unity.

The French Embassy later informed the Department that

Paris supported the US position and was prepared to'

participate in Free-Style and in anv other measuresconsidered desirable.

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Zorin summoned Ambassador Kbhler to the Soviet Foreign

Ministry and informed him that Soviet athorities had

thoroughly investigated the situation and had cometo the conclusion tht the US convoy was refusing toabide by established procedures, which, according to

Zorin, called for conVoys of more than five vehicles

to dismount.‘ Zorin charged that US military authori—

ties in Berlin had "incorrectly informed" the US

government of the situation and had "deliberately

acted in such a way as to complicate the situation."

Kohler replied that he had never heard of any agreement

calling for convoys of more than five vehicles to

dismount but that "if the problem had arisen as

a result of disagreement...as to what size convoyshould be subjected to the dismounting procedure,

then perhaps this was a question which could be

discussed between us latero" In the meantime, he

requested that the current situation be "liquidated"

and the convoy be permitted to proceed. Zorin

then restated the entire Soviet case,_to which

Kohler replied that "subsequently we could discuss

in the proper form what was an obvious di agreement

as to established procedures."

The Soviet troops in the APCs were fed. _

Reporting on the 10 October incident at Marienborn,

East Berlin radio claimed that "after further

attempts to cause provocations," the US Helmstedt

commander had "ordered the two military convoys

to dismount and allow themselves to be checked in the

customary way." The broadcast asserted that because

of the US behavior Autobahn travelers had experienced

delays of up to one houra It then stated that when

the "military column" arrived at Babelsberg, the

"US occuationists" again refused to dismount. Con-

sequently, the convoy_“remains there and is blocking

the civilian'traffic on the highway," the broadcast

concluded.

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LIVE OAK instructed the Berlin commandants to placeall elements of Back—Stroke Party C on four—houralert notice to assemble in the McNair Barracks.

LIVE OAK stressed that the assembly order could be

the three governments involved.

A Back-Stroke force wasinlacedion a four—hour alertin Berlin by LIVE OAK.

.

The Department directed the US NATO delegation tobrief the North Atlantic Council on developments.

USCINCEUR informed C'JCS of the following developments:1) Free—Style units had been alerted to begin assembl-ing within four hours.of notification, and Back—Strokeunits had been placed on the alert in Berlin; 2)CINCUSAREUR Gen. Freeman would immediately suggest

a meeting between USAREUR C/S Gen. Baker and hisGSFG counterpart at Babelsberg; 3) a large US convoywould be dispatched as soon as possible to determinewhether the Autobahn was still open tosmch traffic;

‘ 4) convoy 29 had been ordered to stand fast, and

any use of helicopters overthe checkpoint areawhich might be considered "provocative" had beenprohibited“ USCINCEUR reported that on twooccasions within the past 48 hours Soviet officershad inquired as to when US troops dismount and whenthey do not: acting chief SERB asked the chiefUSMLM, who replied he did not know; and the SovietBabelsberg commander was quoted as saying that theUS did not have to dismount when there were only afew men in a truCk but when there were "more ha

a few" they would have to get out°

The British relayed a report from their FrontierService that East German checprint personnel wereharassing civilian traffic at Marienborn but werepermitting Allied traffic to pass without hindrance.

The Washington Ambassadorial Group agreed on thetext of a protest note to be delivered tripartitelyto the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The notereasserted the Allies' rights of "unrestricted

access to Berlin" and charged the Soviets withattempting to change established Autobahn procedures

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"on their own violation.V The US Government hadaccepted the text, which was to be referred toLondon and Paris for approval, then relayed to

EMoscowforjielivery and release as soon as possible.

USAREUR Chief or Staff Gen. Baker handed to SovietC01. Banov a letter from CINCUSAREUR to CINCGSFGcharging that the Soviets were refusing to discussthe matter in good faith and proposing an immediatemeeting between Gen. Baker and some senior Sovietofficer at the checkpoint. €01. Banov romised todeliver the letter

promptly...'[Q

USCINCEUR informed JCS of his belief that the ban

on non—dismount convoys did not app1y_to administrative

convoys, which carry only a driver and assistantdriver per vehicle and which do not dismount. Hereported that five such convoys were scheduled totransit the Autobahn during the week beginning 14October.

Acting USCINCEUR McConnel informed JCS that——in theevent of the employment of force——he proposed to 'send the following instructions to CINCUSAREUR: l)tank dazers and/or retrievers Were to be used to

remove Soviet APC's blocking US convoy #27; 2)

prior to this action, all external armament,including main guns, was to be removed and theSoviets were to be notified that no weapons would beused, but steps would be taken to remove obstaclesblocking the convoy, including APC's, which wereconsidered to be employed in a barrier role; 3) thefollowing rules of employment were to be observed:(a) the tanks were to be buttoned prior to committ—

ment; (b) if subjected to enemy fire, the tanks wouldwithdraw; (c) the roadway was to be cleared ofobstacles by using the simplest measures possible.As soon as a single lane had been cleared, the convoywas to proceed to Berlin. The dOZers-would remainin the vicinity until the convoy cleared. The timingof the course was to be as agreed. '

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04302 The Embassy in Bonn advanced the theory that the US

might be able to end a "gratuitous misunderstanding"

and improve its "public relations" by revealing the

number of convoy passengers above which the US would

accede to Soviet demands to dismount-—i.e. 31,

exclusive of one driver and assistant driver pervehicle. The EmbaSsy advised that any such announce—ment contahnthe stipulation that dismounting was acourtesy extended to facilitate orderly processing

of traffic and that the Soviets do not "control"

Allied traffic to and from Berlin.

05582 Hamburg DPA announced that it had been quiet around

the US army convoy blocked by the Soviets and around

the second convoy posted nearby. It quoted a US

spokesman as saying that the men and officers of

the two convoys had spent the night in their vehicles

or in sleeping bags on the edge of the autobahn.

Eyewitnesses said that a field kitchen had supplied

coffee and food. A US helicopter had flown over

the checkpoint several times during the morning.

Interzonal travelers reported that traffic wasbrisk and there were no difficulties. _

0600Z USBER noted that it aIWays has been wary of informing

the Soviets of the details of US dismounting policy

but under the special circumstances now prevailing

cit made the following comments: (1) there is adanger that informing the Soviets will provide them

with an opportunity to declare our policy unacceptable,

thereby defining the issue in harder terms; the

Soviet, moreover, might assume that US policy is

actually our negotiating position and press for

concessions. (2) release to the public would

cause future actions to be the subject of intense

press scrutiny. (3) if it appeared that the US

would be in a position where the policy would have

to be divulged, it would be better first to make apubliczw■ease, so that the Soviets would find it

difficult to think that this is our negotiating

position. USBER recommended against any disclosure

of ■magic numbers." The main concern is ease in

counting, and the 1-5 men in the back of the truck

are easily counted, even by a Soviet soldier on the

fingers of one hand.‘

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Two soldiers from US #29 who needed medical attention»

were sent to Berlin in an MP vehicle which had“delivered brea a They were to return after

_breakfast.‘

USBER reported that ADN had carried a release the

previous evening, in the East press in the morning;

under the headline "US occupiers provoke" to the'effect that two US convoys at Marienborn had "refused

to follow_the practice followed for the past two

years of dismounting from vehicles and being counted

by the control forces of the Soviet army." Amilitary convoy from West Berlin had allowed.itselfto be processed in an "orderly fashion" at Babelsberg

' but had refused "appropriate controls" at Marienborn.At the same time the border at Helmstedt was temporarilyclosed for civilian traffic by the Western side.

After further vain.provocations, the American commandantof Helmstedt.appeared and instructed both convoys tolet themselves be controlled in an orderly fashion,

i.e. by dismounting from the vehiCles and letting

themselves be counted by the Soviet forces. Through'the behavior of the US occupiers temporary delays

occurred during the night of up to 45 minutes in the

direction of West Berlin and up to one hour in the

direction of West Germany. Then the situation onthe Western state border was again normalized."ADN then explained the Babelsberg incident as

,follows: "The US occupiers again refused to dismount

from their vehicles and let themselves be counted in

an orderly fashion.- Therefore, this occupier convoyremains there and blocks civilian traffic on this

lane." b 3

LIVE OAK reported that the position of convoys 27 iand 29 waS‘unchanged. Hot meals had been provided ' awithout Soviet objection. Additional US Convoy

,of about 20 vehicles and 100 men was being planned j

for eastbound movement to reaffirm Allied right 'of access. Tripartite Free Style proble had been

ordered to start assembling at 0800Z today. The

final assembly of Free Style at Volfenbuettel wasexpected around 23002.‘

U

CINCUSAREUR report at this time noted that 2_EM of E

US convoy 29 at Babelsberg were ill. The Soviets

at first questioned their evacuation but then

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agreed after requesting that the evacuated men be

replaced by 2 EM from Berlin. CINCUSAREUR also reported

that 4 BTR-l52's and 3 cargo trucks were parked at

the Stahnsdorf home station of the Soviet 178th Ind

Guards Bn and concluded that this unit probably was pro-viding the Soviet representation at Babelsberg checkpoint.

In addition, an unidentified source had reported that

the GDR's Berlin commandant, Gen. Poppe and severalunidentified high ranking East German Army officers had

been observed in the vicinity of Babelsberg at approxi-

mately O7OOZ.

Lt. Col. Sergin, commander of the Soviet checkpoint, re-quested the Provost marshalvs representative to have

the troops on the trucks stand up for the headcount.

Then he inquired whether he would be authorized to climb

onto the rear of the vehicle to conduct the count. Next

he requested that the tail gates be lowered. All these

requests were denied on grounds that this had not been

done before and would not be done now. Sergin then

said that he would have to consult Soviet duty officers,

adding that he had no authority to agree to the "demand.7

Finally, he returned with a demand that only the truck

containing the eight men would have to stand u to be

counted. This demand also was refused.[::::ii::::

Col. Sergin told US officers that he was "tired of

playing games" and that he would process convoy 27 with-

out requiring its personnel to dismount. The US OIC

demanded that the Soviet blocking vehicles be removed

first, and Sergin complied. USCOB then granted per- -mission to move the convoy under normal procedures.

Official French reaction to the Autobahn incident

was that it was localized and apparently not "too.

grave," according to the Embassy in Paris. The

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French Government, however, was anxious to cooperate

closely with the US in all matters and to do every;

thing possible to dis la a united Allied front,

.the cable noted.:

The Soviets began processing convoy 27.[:::::::::j::

The processing of convoy 27 was completed, and itcleared the Babelsberg checkpoint a few minutes

later.

Convoy 27 arrived in West Berlin. As it proceeded

to the McNair Barracks in the US sector, West Berliners

reportedly gathered on the streets, cheered. and

passed flowers to the convoy personnel,

The Department informed the Embassy in Moscow that

convoy 27 had been released without dismounting

and that the protest should not be delivered to

the Soviet Foreign Ministry,

Hamburg radio announced triumphantly that convoy 2

had arrived in West Berlin without dismounting.]

Westbound US convoy 29 moved out of checkpoint

Babelsberg, clearing the last barrier at 1210Z.

LIVE OAK reported that the new US convoy—~of

dismount size—~was.expected to arrive at Helmstedt

at 12002. Free Style assembly was to continue and

troops would be held at Wolfenbuettel until further

orders from LIVE OAK. USCOB had reported at 1130Z

that the Soviet checkpoint commander would clear

convoy 27 and it subsequently had been confirmed that

the convoy had been cleared and proceeded throu h

che ointg]

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ADN reported that "members of the US convoy, whosince 10 October had tried to evade in a provocativeform the usual check by the Soviet army at thecheckpoints on the GDR autobahn, today at noon atlast gave in at the Drewitz checkpoint and couldpass." ADN added, as "symptomatic of the intentionsof the US forces to disrupt free traffic that twoUS army crane vehicles, which were given permissionto proceed after control, were preVented from doingso by US military police and censequently thesevehicles also obstructed the passage of civiliantraffic." ADN boasted that civilian traffic never—

.theless moved along the autobahn, although truckdrivers Showed their anno a "at the attitudeof the US occupiers."

[::f:ffj

Ambassador Kohler cabled from Moscow his convictionthat "there was no Soviet government intent toprovoke an incident at this time." KOhler expressedhis opinion that the crisis had been caused by"middle-level" Soviet authorities in Germany whofelt that the US was trying to "extend the range"of its activities on the Autobahn andwho, after a"routine check with Moscow,” decided to order a convoyto dismount for a head count. Kohler felt thatthere was "considerable confusion on the Sovietside" with respect to US Autobahn policy, and headvised that the Soviets be informed of US procedures,

TASS announced in English that an American convoyhad "tried to evade_the appropriate verificationproCedure" and had been detained at Babelsberg."After complying with the verification

,the

vehicles were permitted to continue on theirjourney freely,” the announcement asserted.

C/JCS informed Gen° McConnellthat the prohibition

on Autobahn travel by non-dismount convoys didnot apply to the movement of administrative vehicles.

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Advance notice of eastbound dismount-type convoy TaskForce Alpha was'furnished-to Soviet authorities inMarienborn.

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Task Force Alpha, a special US convoy consisting of147 men in 24 vehicles, arrived at the Marienborncheckpoint. Its personnel dismounted updn re nest,and it was processed withoUt incident.

The Secretary of State transmitted a report fromHulick in Berlin that convoy from Seventh Army of147 men and 24 vehicles——c1ear1y in dismountcategory——was enroute to Helmstedt and would proceedto Berlin. ETA at Soviet checkpoint. Marienborn

was 1615Z, at Babelsberg, 20152. '

Westbound US convoy 29‘ ‘ at the Soviet check—point i‘n’Marienborn°

Task Force Alpha cleared Marienborn without incidentand proceeded up the Autobahn toward Babelsberg. ::::::::::]

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USBER_reported that Governing mayor Brandt, atlunch with General Polk and-Mr. McCloy, was quiered‘

on the attitude of the Senat and West Berliners 'in the event of a several days stoppage of civiliantraffic on the autobahn. Brandt responded withouthesitation that such a situation wOuld pose no‘problem and that such considerations paled insignificance against the damaging psychologicalrepercussions which would have resulted from anybackdown or concessions to Soviet demands on thepart of the US to overcome the impasse. [::::::::::]

Convoy 29 cleared the Marienborn checkpoint withoutincident and proceeded to West Germany. —

The US senior officer in command at Babelsberg.during the convoy's detention reported that Lt.Col. Sergin had been courteous, militarily correct

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and calm during-the-final conversations prior to

the clearance of the convoy. He had offered as"compromises," with the indication that acceptanceof any one would result in immediate processing ofthe_vehic1es, the following: 1) soldiers dismountfor headcount only from trucks containing more thanthree individuals in rear end; 2) tail gates lowered;

-3) soldiers in rear of trucks be ordered to stand

up hear the tailgates; 4) the Soviet checkpoint officerbe allowed to climb into the rear of trucks. The UScommander said Sergin did not appear ruffled orsurprised when his proposals were rejected butattempted to give the impression that he would makethe final decision after further deliberation. Fromthe sequence of events, including a telephonecall, it was clear that the decision had been made athigher headquarters. When Sergin finally announcedthat the convoy would be processed without dismounting,

‘he did so in a matter—éf-fact manner and withoutapparent irritation or concern. USBER noted thatthe series of "compromises" offered prior to giving

up the detention was a relatively familiar featureof such incidents and had occurred earlier in theaffair. '

LIVE OAK informed JCS that the four-hour noticefor the assembly of the Back-Stroke force had

-been cancelled and that the British CINC wouldisSue orders for the dispersal of the Free-Styleforce as soon as possible after 07002 13 October.LIVE OAK noted that it was essential for securitythat all personnel in the Free-Style force remainswithin barracks during itheir stay at Wolfenbuttel,

' ZOOOZ East Berlin radio reported that two US Army cranetrucks which were allowed to pass through the"control point" had been "prevented from continuing

on their way by US Military Police." The broadcast

contended that this action, plus the fact that the

cranes were used to "hinder the clearning of civiliantraffic through control territory," showed that theUS forces involved in the dismounting controvers

"were intent on obstructing free traffic.[X]

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Task Force Alpha arrived at Babelsberg, its personnel

dismounted upon request, and it was processed without

incident.

Task Force Alpha cleared the Babelsberg checkpoint

without incident and proceeded to West Berlin.

During the morning the US called a special meeting

of the North Atlantic Council and briefed the

NATO allies on developments at Babelsberg. During

the meeting news arrived that convoy 27 had been

allowed to proceed, so discussion turned to Soviet

motivation in causing the confrontation. The UK,and US delegates expressed the belief that the matter was

not an accidental, local incident and leaned toward

the explanation—-suggested by the Turkish delegates—

that it was a reflection of Khrushchev's announced

design to "tread on Kennedy's corns" in Berlin.:

According to Reuters, Mayor Willy Brandt praised US

firmness during "the test of nerves" over Allied

access rights to Berlin. After the convoy's release

he declared that the fact the test had been with-

stood would ”help Berlin and may also help in alarger context." Minister for All-German Affairs

Barzel, who was present at the US checkpoint at

Dreilinden when the convoy came thnaugh, also

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praised American firemness, adding that this latestSoviet chicanery had shown that "the causes oftension have to be removed ‘f a relaxation of tensionis to come about."

UPI reported that when the US convoy passed throughthe residential area of West Berlin en route to theMcNair barracks West Berliners turned out to wave atthe Americans. [

13 October

OGOOZ USBER reported that Neues Deutschland charged thatUS troops had deliberately sought to impede thefree flow of civilian traffic and provoked complaints.USBER commented that no such complaints had come toits attention and that the opposite had been truein conversations with Berliners. Neues Deutschlandalso found it significant that the "provocation"had begun on the "very same day that the departingAdenauer, the No. 1 enemy of detente, was ridingaround West Berlin." It quoted an unnamed Britisheras asking the question whether "certain NATO circleswould like_to support their demand that a non-aggression pact be tied to so—called guaranteesfor West Be■lin with the help now of organizedincidents?‘ The party Organ concluded with alecture on the dangers of the vestiges of World WarII, the NATO bridgehead in West Berlin and the occupationregime‘there.

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USBER and the US intelligence community in Berlindiscussed possible Soviet motives for provokingthe 12 October Autobahn incidents. Two generaltheses were developed——(l) the probe thesis—-that

the incident began essentially as an effort cleared

in advance at least through GSFG designed to change

Allied autobahn convoy procedures and probe intovAllied contingency p1anning.x This would fit into

the longterm Soviet objective to achieve fixed

autobahn procedures with the maximum restrictive

provisions with a view to the time‘that processing

is turned over to East Germans. The probe ofcontingency planning would include playing out

the scenario long enough to demonstrate essential

Allied helplessness to solve the autobahn impasselocally. (2) The political pressure theSise—that

the incident was a deliberate exercise, cleared in

Moscow as to timing and nature, designed to achieve

not only the objectives under (1) but additional

political information. This would include a test

of US firmness on "minor" issues such as dismounting

during a period of lessened tension and bringing

home to the US and the West generally the continuing

Soviet ability to harass_the Western position and

interests in Berlin, as well as prodding the US

on Berlin, NAP and other issues currently under

discussion at high political levels. USBER itself

believed that Soviet action was carefully calculatedand prepared in advance and spelled out certain

developments which in its opinion support the thesis

of political motivation. These included the timing_a

and placement Of the incidents; the confident; 3

bearing of Soviet checkpoing personnel; the restriction

of the exercise to a Soviet—US confrontation with

the East Germans_either excluded, as at Marienborn,

or, as at Babelsberg, confined to observers andregular checkpoint personnel; the transfer of the

confrontation to Babelsberg; the apparent wish of the

Soviets not to let the situation beCome overheatedin a military sense; the apparent desire in the

exchanges at Babelsberg and at SERB to see the dispute

raised to a high political level; and the obvious

desire to keep civilian traffic moving. J

The US Embassy in Moscow reported that the only

.press reference to the convoy incidents noted sofar was in Pravda, which carried a TASS dispatch

from Berlin based on ADN reporting that the US

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convoy had been detained because of an attempt onthe part of US military to avoid compliance withexisting procedures. It claimed that the convoyhad been released when the personnel check had beencarried out. The dispatch added: "In view ofthe incorrect information widely disseminated bythe Western press on the detention of the American

convoys, it is noted that in recent days, including11 October, all American military convoys, whichhave complied with established check procedure havebeen permitted to ass through.the control pointwithout delay."

[:E:::]

14 October

A US patrol in East Berlin followed a Soviet convoy,which consisted of one ambulance, two sedans, two jeeps,

one field kitchen, one AFC, 17 trucks, and sevencommuniCations vans, from the intersection of Mueggelsee—damm and Fuerstenwalderdamm to the East Berlin/EastGerman border, presumably at Erkner. The convoycontained approximately 175 troops ‘ individual

weapons or helmets were observed.

'WestboundUS convoy 32, consisting of 26 prime movers

and 149 personnel arrived at Marienborn and wasrequested to dismount by the Soviet checkpointcommander. The convoy commander refused becauseit was raining. The rain lifted about 30 minutes ;later and the convoy dismounted for processing,The convoy dismounted a d encountered no difficultiesat Babelsberg;

Convoy 32 cleared the Marienborncheckpoint

andproceeded to West Germany. L

The Mission reported that a test had been carriedout in Berlin to determine the visibility and easeof counting passengers in US convoy trucks. A truck

was loaded with 16 soldiers——nine on one side and

seven on the other—4With the result, in the Mission‘s

words, that "a very small man can with utmost ease seeand count" all the truck's passengers.

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15 October.:

A US helicopter over West Berlin observed nine orten T—54 tanks and 25 Soviet soldiers in the 154thIndependent Guards Battalion compound in Gross-glienicke, just west of West Berlin. Approximately100 border guards,were observed in another art ofthe compound, accOrding to USCINCEUR.

'

During the evening East German border guards atMarienborn held up fifteen Berlin-bound buses for

more than three hours, according to Reuters. Thedelay reportedly was occasioned by East German 'insistance on making a thorough check of all baggage.

A westbound US convoy consisting of 11 vehiclesand 22 personnel transited the Autobahn withoutincident during the day, While the convoy was'being processed athabelsberg, Soviet checkpointcommander Sergin told US Provost Marshal representa-tive Wallace that whenever there were troops inthe back of a.truck-—even as few as one, two, orthree-they would have to dismount regardless of thenumber of vehicles in the convoy. He later appearedto raiSe this number to four or five. He thenturned to the subject dismounting for any convoyconsisting of more than five vehicles, stating:"About five or six months ago we told you that anytime you send more than five prime movers, youwould have to give adVance notifiCation. It seemsthat you have been doing that and it has worked outreal fine(sic). From now on the same procedureshoullapply to dismOunting." thing that Sergin hadbeen at the checkpoint every day since 10 October,the Mission noted that his remarks might reflect"a conscious Soviet decision at a fairly high levelto continue to press the dismounting issue...on an

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CHRONOLOGY OFBRITISH CONVOY STOPPAGE

16 October

Westbound British convoy #15 consisting of ninevehicles and 28 men--non-dismount category-—re—ported to Babelsberg. Soviet officer requestedconvoy to dismount for headcount. British officerrefused since it was small convoy and dismountingnot required.

A second British non-dismount convoy #16 was orderedby UKCOB to remain at the Allied checkpoint atDreilinden.

Sergin and interpreter arrived on scene. Serginsaid if the occupants of the three vehicles contain—ing respectively four, five, and five men dismountedfor count, convoy would be cleared. The Britishofficer refused.

'

British Assistant Provost Marshal arrived and toldSergin that the rules concerning clearance of con—voys was quite clear, had been worked over the pastyear, and that he had no intention of dismountingthe men. Sergin replied that there never had beensuch.a rule and that he was now saying that all con-voys of five or more vehicles must dismount. TheBritish officer refused to have the men dismount.During this exchange Sergin affable and friendly.

A US administrative convoy #33 (non-dismountable) offour vehicles and eight personnel passed throughMarienborn.

Sergin made telephone call and on returning to convoyhe rudely stated that if convoy would dismount it wouldbe cleared in 30 seconds. British officer refused.

CINC EUCOM notified US, UK, French, and German officialsthat in view of the situation at Babelsburg it might benecessary to assembly a FREESTYLE FORCE (Type C) andrequested them to alert at a high state of readiness allelements of their forces, including command and controlelements.

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British>Assistant Provost Marshal delivered a formalprotest to Col. Sergin at Babelsberg as follows:"Your authorities have held up British convoy Number15 for four hours and fifteen minutes by seeking tomake an entirely unwarranted change in the proceduresthat have been accepted hitherto. I am instructed bythe British authorities in Berlin to make a protest inthe strongest terms against the action. I am alsoinstructed to request that this protest be forwardedat once to your higher authorities. Soviet actionin attempting to make an unwarranted change in theaccepted procedure is solely responsible for thedelay to this convoy and the Soviet authorities willtherefore be responsible for the conse uences if theypersist in their present attitude."

[(Lj

British Brigadier General D.L. Darling, Head of theBritish Military Mission at Potsdam delivered a pro-test to GSFG. Text not available. 'To be deliveredat same time as note delivered to Soviet commandantat Babelsburg.

In reply SERB protested about action of Bri~tish convoy commander in not complying with agreedprocedure, and stated that Soviet procedures were asfollows: (A) Warning of a column is passed to thecontrol point in advance; (B) If there is no warningthe column is not allowed to pass; (C) The columnarrives and stops beside the Sovietlersonnel; (D) Thecrews get out of their vehicles and two men only areallowed to stay in each vehicle purely for Soviet con—venience; (E) When this is completed the column isallowed through. SERB went on to say there are certainexceptions to this procedure when single vehicles passthrough the men are not made to dismount. The columntoaday did not wish to follow the accepted procedure.Chief Brixmis was told to explain to the column com—mander and future commanders of columns that the delaywas unnecessary and the fault was that of the Britishauthorities. Chief Brixmis rejected Soviet protestand read out the agreed British protest. One hourfifteen minutes of inconclusive-arguments followed.SERB and Chief Brixmis agreed to report to respectiveauthorities concerned. SERB ended by saying this issuch a small matter that the British should be ableto settle it. Chief Brixmis replied that it might be asmall matter but important prinéiples were at issue andthe-Soviet authorities should be able to settle the matterimmediately by sticking to agreed procedures.

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At conclusion of NAG meeting 16 October, UK per-manent representative stated that UK convoy Washeld up that morning at Babelsberg by the Soviets,and that while the Soviet motives were unknown,the■mcident appeared to fall into the same categoryof those of last week. The acting Secretary Generalasked the council to remain on stand-by and in readiness

:to conveneoonhshort notice. é

US administrative convoy #33 cleared Babelsberg.

CINCEUR reported that Gen. Lemnitzer was in London and gGen. McConnell acting. The latter believed that the ?detention of UK convoy #15 was done on a directive froma higher Soviet authority, since Sergin knows that thenumber of vehicles has nothing to do with dismountingprocedure. McConnell cited Zorin's statement to Kohlerthat pppppfs 01 more than 5 vehicles are dismountable.

CINCEUR reported that Gen. Hublot, deputy to Gen. Aillert-—at the instance of LIVE 0AK—-was suggesting to theQuai d'Orsay that the French schedule and send a convoyof more than 5 vehicles with less than 40 men (exclusiveof drivers). Such a convoy would not be dismountablein accordance with French procedures. Gen. Hublot con—curs but must await the Quai's decision. CINCEUR alsonoted that LIVE OAK had alerted FREESTYLE at home stationsto be ready to commence movement to assembly area on fourhour's notice.

Soviets released British convoy 15under

normal procedures.

LIVE OAK reports CINCBAOR has approved return of elementsof UK Berlin troops training in West Germany. Two com=panies will return by train today and remainder in clearly ;dismountable convoys on 17 October.

.

British convoy #15 arrived at Marienborn. Delayed whileI ‘Soviets requested that personnel dismount. British rem s

fused. ‘

British convoy #15 cleared Marienborn without dismounting.

British convoy #16 which had been standing by at Dreilindencheckpoint returned to West Berlin without attempting toclear through Babelsberg.

-37-



3 W,,

ANNEX] I

The following is a list_of US‘Army convoys.which tranrsited the Autobahn without dismounting from 16 May 1963until 9 October:

Difference

No.

of TotalDate Vehicles Drivers Pers.

16 May 15 30 ' 39 9*19 May

_22 44 66 22

11 June 26 52 78 2612 June 14 28 49 21

#12 June 18 36 98 6212 June 26 52 82 30

*13 June 4 8 30 22# 2 July 26 _52 103 51

,12 July 27-

54 76 22:13 July

.12 24 45 21

1 August .16V

32 51 191 August 16

,32‘ 52 20

2 August 17 34 40 ' 622 August 21 42 62 20

#22 August 25 5O 81 ‘3124 August 1:22 44 53 926 August 26

I52 75 23

30 September 25 50 63 138 October 26 52 79 279 October 26 52

a67 15

#--In dismount category but didn't dismount becauseSoviet officer did not request it.

~*§-De1ayed by refusal to dismount at Soviet request.


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