624 OCTOBER TERM, 1942. - Library of Congress · 2017. 12. 11. · 624 OCTOBER TERM, 1942. Syllabus. 319 U. S. mental subdivisions. Those matters, as well as the char-acter, extent

624 OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

Syllabus. 319 U. S.

mental subdivisions. Those matters, as well as the char-acter, extent and duration of tax exemptions for theIndians, are questions of policy for the consideration ofCongress, not the courts. Board of Commissioners v.Seber, supra. Our inquiry is not with what Congressmight or should have done, but with what it has done.That inquiry can be answered here only by holding thatthe restricted funds in these estates, as well as the landswhich the Court holds immune, were not subject to Okla-homa's estate tax.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. Jus-

TICE FRANKFURTER join in this dissent.

WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATIONET AL. v. BARNETTE ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA.

No. 591. Argued March 11, 1943.--Decided June 14, 1943.

1. State action against which the Fourteenth Amendment protects in-cludes action by a state board of education. P. 637.

2. The action of a State in making it compulsory for children in thepublic schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance-by extendingthe right arm, palm upward, and declaring, "I pledge allegiance tothe flag of the United States of America and to the Republic forwhich it stands: one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justicefor all"--violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. P. 642.

So held as applied to children who were expelled for refusal tocomply, and whose absence thereby became "unlawful," subject-ing them and their parents or guardians to punishment.

3. That those who refused compliance did so on religious groundsdoes not control the decision of this question; and it is unnecessaryto inquire into the sincerity of their views. P. 634.

4. Under the Federal Constitution, compulsion as here employed isnot a permissible means of achieving "national unity." P. 640.

BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE. 625

624 Opinion of the Court.

5. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, overruled; Ham-ilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, distinguished. Pp. 642, 632.

47 F. Supp. 251, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decree of a District Court of threejudges enjoining the enforcement of a regulation of theWest Virginia State Board of Education requiring chil-dren in the public schools to salute the American flag.

Mr. W. Holt Wooddell, Assistant Attorney General ofWest Virginia, with whom Mr. Ira J. Partlow was on thebrief, for appellants.

Mr. Hayden C. Covington for appellees.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed on behalf of the Com-mittee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Associa-tion, consisting of Messrs. Douglas Arant, Julius Birge,William D. Campbell, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., L. StanleyFord, Abe Fortas, George I. Haight, H. Austin Hauxhurst,Monte M. Lemann, Alvin Richards, Earl F. Morris, Bur-ton W. Musser, and Basil O'Connor; and by Messrs. Os-mond K. Fraenkel, Arthur Garfield Hays, and Howard B.Lee, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union,-urging affirmance; and by Mr. Ralph B. Gregg, on behalfof the American Legion, urging reversal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of theCourt.

Following the decision by this Court on June 3, 1940,in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586;the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to re-quire all schools therein to conduct courses of instructionin history, civics, and in the Constitutions of the UnitedStates and of the State "for the purpose of teaching, fos-tering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spiritof Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the or-ganization and machinery .of the government." Appel-


Opinion of the Court. 319 U. S.

lant Board of Education was directed, with advice of theState Superintendent of Schools, to "prescribe the coursesof study covering these subjects" for public schools. TheAct made it the duty of private, parochial and denomi-national schools to prescribe courses of study "similar tothose required for the public schools." '

The Board of Education on January 9, 1942, adopted aresolution containing recitals taken largely from theCourt's Gobitis opinion and ordering that the salute tothe flag become "a regular part of the program of activi-ties in the public schools," that all teachers and pupils"shall be required to participate in the salute honoringthe Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however,that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act ofinsubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly." 2

I § 1734, West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.):

"In all public, private, parochial and denominational schools locatedwithin this state there shall be given regular courses of instructionin history of the United' States, in civics, and in the constitutions ofthe United States and of the State of West Virginia, for the purposeof teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spiritof Americanism, and :ncreasing the knowledge of the organizationand machinery of the government of the United States and of thestate of West Virginia. The state board of education shall, with theadvice of the state superintendent of schools, prescribe the coursesof study covering these subjects for the public elementary and gram-mar schools, public high schools and state normal schools. It shallbe the 'duty of the officials or boards having authority over the re-spective private, parochial and denominational schools to prescribe.courses of study for the schools under their control and supervisionsimilar to those required for the public schools."

The text is as follows:"WHEREAs, The West Virginia State Board of Education holds in

highest regard those rights and privileges guaranteed by the Bill ofRights in the Constitution of the United States of America and in theConstitution of West Virginia, specifically, the first amendment to theConstitution of the United States as restated in the fourteenth amend-



The resolution originally required the "commonly ac-cepted salute to the Flag" which it defined. Objections tothe salute as "being too much like Hitler's" were raised bythe Parent and Teachers Association, the Boy and Girl

ment to the same document and in the guarantee of religious freedomin Article HI of the Constitution of this State, and

"WmsnAB, The West Virginia State Board of Education honors thebroad principle that one's convictions about the ultimate mystery ofthe universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach oflaw; that the propagation of belief is protected whether in church orchapel, mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meeting house; that theConstitutions of the United States and of the State of West Virginiaassure generous immunity to the individual from imposition of pen-alty for offending, in the course of his own religious activities, thereligious views of others, be they a minority or those who are dom-inant in the government, but

"WHan&xs, The West Virginia State Board of Education recognizesthat the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conceptionof religious duty into conflict with the secular interests of his fellow-man; that conscientious scruples have not in the course of. the longstruggle for religious toleration relieved the individual from obedienceto the general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of thereligious beliefs; that the mere possession of convictions which con-tradict the relevant concerns of political society does not relieve thecitizen from the discharge of political responsibility, and

"WH xY s, The West Virginia State Board of Education holds thatnational unity is the basis of national security; that the flag of ourNation is the symbol of our National Unity transcending all internaldifferences, however large within the framework of the Constitution;that the Flag is the symbol of the Nation's power; that emblem offreedom in its truest, best sense; that it signifies government restingon the consent of the governed, liberty regulated by law, protection ofthe weak against the strong, security against the exercise of arbitrarypower, and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggres-sion, and

"WHEIs, The West Virginia State Board of Education maintainsthat the public schools, established by the legisaturc of the State ofWest Virginia under the authority of the Constitution of the State ofWest Virginia and supported by taxes imposed by legally constitutedmeasures, are dealing with the formative period in the development



Scouts, the Red Cross, and the Federation of Women'sClubs.' Some modification appears to have been madein deference to these objections, but no concession wasmade to Jehovah's Witnesses." What is now required isthe "stiff-arm" salute, the saluter to keep the right handraised with palm turned up while the following is repeated:"I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of

in citizenship that the Flag is an allowable portion of the program ofschools thus publicly supported.

"Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the West Virginia Board of Educa-tion does hereby recognize and order that the commonly accepted saluteto the Flag of the United States--the right hand is placed upon thebreast and the following pledge repeated in unison: 'I pledge allegianceto the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic forwhich it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice forall'-now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in thepublic schools, supported in whole or in part by public funds, andthat all teachers as defined by law in West Virginia and pupils in suchschools shall be required to participate in the salute, honoring theNation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal tosalute the Flag be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shallbe dealt with accordingly."3The National Headquarters of the United States Flag Association

takes the position that the extension of the right arm in this salute tothe flag is not the Nazi-Fascist salute, "although quite similar to it.In the Pledge to the Flag the right arm is extended and raised, palmUPWARD, whereas the Nazis extend the arm practically straight tothe front (the finger tips being about even with the eyes), palmDOWNWARD, and the Fascists do the same except they raise thearm slightly higher." James A. Moss, The Flag of the UnitedStates: Its History and Symbolism (1914) 108.

' They have offered in lieu of participating in the flag salute ceremony"periodically and publicly" to give the following pledge:

"I have pledged my unqualified allegiance and devotion to Jehovah,the Almighty God, and to His Kingdom, for which Jesus commands allChristians to pray.

"I respect the flag of the United States and acknowledge it as asymbol of freedom and justice to all.'I pledge allegiance and obedience to all the laws of the United States

that are consistent with God's law, as set forth in the Bible."



America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Na-tion, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

Failure to conform is "insubordination" dealt with byexpulsion. Readmission is denied by statute until com-pliance. Meanwhile the expelled child is "unlawfully ab-sent" ' and may be proceeded against as a delinquent.His parents or guardians are liable to prosecution,7 andif convicted are subject to fine not exceeding $50 and jailterm not exceeding thirty days.'

Appellees, citizens of the United States and of West Vir-ginia, brought suit in the United States District Court forthemselves and others similarly situated asking its injunc-tion to restrain enforcement of these laws and regulationsagainst Jehovah's Witnesses. The Witnesses are an un-incorporated body teaching that the obligation imposedby law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by tem-poral government. Their religious beliefs include a literalversion of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which says:"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or anylikeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is inthe earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth;thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them."They consider that the flag is an "image" within this com-mand. For this reason they refuse to salute it.

5 § 1851 (1), West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.):"If a child be dismissed, suspended, or expelled from school because

of refusal of such child to meet the legal and lawful requirements of theschool and the established regulations of the county and/or state boardof education, further admission of the child to school shall be refuseduntil such requirements and regulations be complied with. Any suchchild shall be treated as being unlawfully absent from school duringthe time he refuses to comply with such requirements and regulations,and any person having legal or actual control of such child shall beliable to prosecution under the provisions of this article for the absenceof such child from school."

6 § 4904 (4), West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.).7 See Note 5, supra.-§§ 1847, 1851, West Virginia Code (1941 Supp.).

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.


Children of this faith have been expelled from schooland are threatened with exclusion for no other cause. Offi-cials threaten to send them to reformatories maintainedfor criminally inclined juveniles. Parents of such childrenhave been prosecuted and are threatened with prosecu-tions for causing delinquency.

The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaintsetting forth these facts and alleging that the law and regu-lations are an unconstitutional denial of religious freedom,and of freedom of speech, and are invalid under the "dueprocess" and "equal protection" clauses of the Four-teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Thecause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Courtof three judges. It restrained enforcement as to the plain-tiffs and those of that class. The Board of Educationbrought the case here by direct appeal.'

This case calls upon us to reconsider a precedent decision,as the Court throughout its history often has been requiredto do.1' Before turning to the Gobitis case, however, it isdesirable to notice certain characteristics by which this con-troversy is distinguished.

The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bringthem into collision with rights asserted by any otherindividual. It is such conflicts which most frequently re-quire intervention of the State to determine where therights of one end and those of another begin. But the re-fusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony doesnot interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor isthere any question in this case that their behavior is peace-able and orderly. The sole conflict is between authorityand rights of the individual. The State asserts powerto condition access to public education on making a pre-scribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce

9§ 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 380.10 See authorities cited in Helvering v. G7ifflths, 318 U. S. 371, 401,

note 52.



attendance by punishing both parent and child. The lat-ter stand on a right of self-determination in matters thattouch individual opinion and personal attitude.

As the present CHIEF JUSTICE said in dissent in theGobitis case, the State may "require teaching by instruc-tion and study of all in our history and in the structureand organization of our government, including the guar-anties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire patriotismand love of country." 310 U. S. at 604. Here, however,we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declarea belief. They are not merely made acquainted with theflag salute so that they may be informed as to what it isor even what it means. The issue here is whether thisslow and easily neglected 11 route to aroused loyalties con-stitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compul-sory salute and slogan. ' This issue is not prejudiced by

11 See the nation-wide survey of the study of American history con-ducted by the New York Times, the results of which are published inthe issue of June 21, 1942, and are there summarized on p. 1, col.1, as follows:

"82 per cent of the institutions of higher learning in the UnitedStates do not require the study of United States history for theundergraduate degree. Eighteen per cent of the colleges and uni-versities require such history courses before a degree is awarded. Itwas found that many students complete their four years in collegewithout taking any history courses dealing with this country.

"Seventy-two per cent of the colleges and universities do not re-quire United States history for admission, while 28 per cent require it.As a result, the survey revealed, many students go through high school,college and then to the professional or graduate institution withouthaving explored courses in the history of their country.

"Less than 10 per cent of the total undergraduate body was enrolledin United States history classes during the Spring semester just ended.Only 8 per cent of the freshman class took courses in United Stateshistory, although 30 per cent was enrolled in European or worldhistory courses."

'12 The Resolution of the Board of Education did not adopt theflag salute because it was claimed to have educational value. It seemsto have been concerned with promotion of national unity (see footnote



the Court's previous holding that where a State, withoutcompelling attendance, extends college facilities to pupilswho voluntarily enroll, it may prescribe military trainingas part of the course without offense to the Constitution.It was held that those who take advantage of its oppor-tunities may not on ground of conscience refuse compli-ance with such conditions. Hamilton v. Regents, 293U. S. 245. In the present case attendance is not optional.That case is also to be distinguished from the present onebecause, independently of college privileges or require-ments, the State has power to raise militia and impose theduties of service therein upon its citizens.

There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges,the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is aprimitive but effective way of communicating ideas. Theuse of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea,institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind tomind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges andecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their fol-lowings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The Stateannounces rank, function, and authority through crownsand maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaksthrough the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, andclerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey politicalideas just as religious symbols come to convey theologicalones. Associated with many of these symbols are appro-priate gestures of acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowedor bared head, a bended knee. A person gets from a

2), which justification is considered later in this opinion. No infor-mation as to its educational aspect is called to our attention exceptOlander, Children's Knowledge of the Flag Salute, 35 Journal ofEducational Research 300, 305, which sets forth a study of the abilityof a large and representative number of children to remember andstate the meaning of the flag salute which they recited each day in.school. His conclusion was that it revealed "a rather pathetic pictureof our attempts to teach children not only the words but the meaningof our Flag Salute."


624 Opion of the Court.

symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man'scomfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.

Over a decade ago Chief Justice Hughes led this Courtin holding that the display of a red flag as a symbol ofopposition by peaceful and legal means to organized gov-ernment was protected by the free speech guaranties ofthe Constitution. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359.Here it is the State that employs a flag as a symbol ofadherence to government as presently organized. Itrequires the individual to communicate by word and signhis acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks. Ob-jection to this form of communication when coerced isan old one, well known to the framers of the Bill ofRights.'8

It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute andpledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude ofmind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplatesthat pupils forego any contrary convictions of their ownand become unwilling converts to the prescribed ceremonyor whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent bywords without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning.It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppressionof expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitutiononly when the expression presents a clear and present dan-ger of action of a kind the State is empowered to preveutand punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmationcould be commanded only on even more immediate andurgent grounds than silence. But here the power of com-

28 Early Christians were frequently persecuted for their refusal toparticipate in ceremonies before the statue of the emperor or othersymbol of imperial authority. The story of William Tell's sentenceto shoot an apple off his son's head for refusal to salute a bailiff'shat is an ancient one. 21 Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed.) 911-912. The Quakers, William Penn included, suffered punishmentrather than uncover their heads in deference to any civil authority.Braithwaite, The Beginnings of Quakerism (1912) 200, 229-230, 232-233, 447, 451; Fox, Quakers Courageous (1941) 113.

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.


pulsion is invoked without any allegation that remainingpassive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear andpresent danger that would justify an effort even to muffleexpression. To sustain the compulsory flag salute we arerequired to say that a Bill of Rights which guards theindividual's right to speak his own mind, left it open topublic authorities to compel him to utter what is not inhis mind.

Whether the First Amendment to the Constitution willpermit officials to order observance of ritual of this naturedoes not depend upon whether as a voluntary exercise wewould think it to be good, bad or merely innocuous. Anycredo of nationalism is likely to include what some dis-approve or to omit what others think essential, and to giveoff different overtones as it takes on different accents orinterpretations.1' If official power exists to coerce accept-ance of any patriotic creed, what it shall contain cannot bedecided by courts, but must be largely discretionary withthe ordaining authority, whose power to prescribe wouldno doubt include power to amend. Hence validity of theasserted power to force an American citizen publicly toprofess any statement of belief or to engage in any cere-mony of assent to one, presents questions of power thatmust be considered independently of any idea we may haveas to the utility of the ceremony in question.

Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possessionof particular religious views or the sincerity with whichthey are held. While religion supplies appellees' motivefor enduring the discomforts of making the issue in thiscase, many citizens who do not share these religious views

14 For example: Use of "Republic," if rendered to distinguish our

government from a "democracy," or the words "one Nation," if in-tended to distinguish it from a "federation," open up old and bittercontroversies in our political history; "liberty and justice for all," if itmust be accepted as descriptive of the present order rather than anideal, might to some seem an overstatement.



hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional lib-erty of the individual."5 It is not necessary to inquirewhether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the dutyto salute unless we first find power to make the salute alegal duty.

The Gobitis decision, however, assumed, as did the argu-ment in that case and in this, that power exists in the Stateto impose the flag salute discipline upon school children ingeneral. The Court only examined and rejected a claimbased on religious beliefs of immunity from an unques-tioned general rule.16 The question which underlies the

'5 Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1939-40, 35 American PoliticalScience Review 250, 271, observes: "All of the eloquence by which themajority extol the ceremony of flag saluting" as a free expression ofpatriotism. turns sour when used to describe the brutal compulsionwhich requires a sensitive and conscientious child to stultify himselfin public." For further criticism of the opinion in the Gobitis caseby persons who do not share the faith of the Witnesses see: Powell,Conscience and the Constitution, in Democracy and National Unity(University of Chicago Press, 1941) 1; Wilkinson, Some Aspects of theConstitutional Guarantees of Civil Liberty, 11 Fordham Law Review50; Fennell, The "Reconstructed Court" and Religious Freedom: TheGobitis Case in Retrospect, 19 New York University Law QuarterlyReview 31; Green, Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 Wash-ington University Law Quarterly 497; 9 International Juridical Associa-tion Bulletin 1; 39 Michigan Law Review 149; 15 St. John's LawReview 95.

"I The opinion says "That the flag-salute is an allowable portion of aschool program for those who do not invoke conscientious scruples issurely not debatable. But for us to insist that, though the ceremonymay be required, exceptional immunity must be given to dissidents, is tomaintain that there is no basis for a legislative judgment that such anexemption might introduce elements of difficulty into the school disci-pline, might cast doubts in the minds of the other children which wouldthemselves weaken the effect of the exercise." (Italics ours.) 310U. S. at 599-600. And elsewhere the question under consideration wasstated, "When does the constitutional guarantee compel exemption fromdoing what society thinks necessary for the promotion of some greatcommon end, or from a penalty for conduct which appears dangerousto the general good?" (Italics ours.) Id. at 593. And again, ".

531559-44----44



flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony sotouching matters of opinion and political attitude may beimposed upon the individual by official authority underpowers committed to any political organization under ourConstitution. We examine rather than assume existenceof this power and, against this broader definition of issuesin this case, reexamine specific grounds assigned for theGobitis decision.

1. It was said that the flag-salute controversy confrontedthe Court with "the problem which Lincoln cast in mem-orable dilemma: 'Must a government of necessity be toostrong for the liberties of its people, or too wbeak to main-tain its own existence?'" and that the answer must be infavor of strength. Minersville School District v. Gobitis,supra, at 596.

We think these issues may be examined free of pressureor restraint growing out of such considerations.

It may be doubted whether Mr. Lincoln would havethought that the strength of government to maintain it-self would be impressively vindicated by our confirmingpower of the State to expel a handful of children fromschool. Such oversimplification, so handy in political de-bate, often lacks the precision necessary to postulates ofjudicial reasoning. If validly applied to this problem, theutterance cited would resolve every issue of power in favorof those in authority and would require us to overrideevery liberty thought to weaken or delay execution oftheir policies.

Government of limited power need not be anemic gov-ernment. Assurance that rights are secure tends to di-minish fear and jealousy of strong government, and bymaking us feel safe to live under it makes for its bettersupport. Without promise of a limiting Bill of Rights it is

whether school children, like the Gobitis children, must be excusedfrom conduct required of all the other children in the promotion ofnational cohesion. . . ." (Italics ours.) Id. at 595.



doubtful if our Constitution could have mustered enoughstrength to enable its ratification. To enforce those rightstoday is not to choose weak government over strong gov-ernment. It is only to adhere as a means of strength toindividual freedom of mind in preference to officially dis-ciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disap-pointing and disastrous end.

The subject now before us exemplifies this principle.Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular in-struction and political neutrality, will not be partisan orenemy of any class, creed, party, or faction. If it is to im-pose any ideological discipline, however, each party ordenomination must seek to control, or failing that, toweaken the influence of the educational system. Observ-ance of the limitations of the Constitution will not weakengovernment in the field appropriate for its exercise.

2. It was also considered in the Gobitis case that func-tions of educational officers in States, counties and schooldistricts were such that to interfere with their authority"would in effect make us the school board for the country."Id. at 598.

The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to theStates, protects the citizen against the State itself andall of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly dis-cretionary functions, but none that they may not performwithin the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they areeducating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulousprotection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source andteach youth to discount important principles of our gov-ernment as mere platitudes.

Such Boards are numerous and their territorial jurisdic-tion often small. But small and local authority may feelless sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agen-cies of publicity may be less vigilant in calling it to ac-



count. Tile action of Congress in making flag observancevoluntary "r and respecting the conscience of the objectorin a matter so vital as raising the Army I8 contrasts sharplywith these local regulations in matters relatively trivial tothe welfare of the nation. There are village tyrants aswell as village Hampdens, but none who acts under color oflaw is beyond reach of the Constitution.

3. The Gobitis opinion reasoned that this is a field"where courts possess no marked and certainly no con-trolling competence," that it is committed to the legisla-tures as well as the courts to guard cherished liberties andthat it is constitutionally appropriate to "fight out thewise use of legislative authority in the forum of publicopinion and before legislative assemblies rather than totransfer such a contest to the judicial arena," since all the"effective means of inducing political changes are leftfree." Id. at 597-598, 600.

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdrawcertain subjects from the vicissitudes of political contro-versy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities andofficials and to establish them as legal principles to beapplied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, andproperty, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worshipand assembly, and other fundamental rights may not besubmitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of noelections..

"Section 7 of House Joint Resolution 359, approved December 22,1942, 56 Stat. 1074, 36 U. S. C. (1942 Supp.) § 172, prescribes nopenalties for nonconformity but provides:

"That the pledge of allegiance to the flag, 'I pledge allegiance to theflag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which itstands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all,' be ren-dered by standing with the right hand over the heart. However, civil-ians will always show full respect to the flag when the pledge is givenby merely standing at attention, men removing the headdress . . ."

I8 § 5 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U. S.C. (App.) § 307 (g).



In weighing arguments of the parties it is important todistinguish between the due process clause of the Four-teenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting theprinciples of the First Amendment and those cases in whichit is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation whichcollides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it alsocollides with the principles of the First, is much moredefinite than the test when only the Fourteenth isinvolved. Much of the vagueness of the due processclause disappears when the specific prohibitions of theFirst become its standard. The right of a State to regu-late, for example, a public utility may well include, so faras the due process test is concerned, power to impose all ofthe restrictions which a legislature may have a "rationalbasis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press,of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on suchslender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction onlyto prevent grave and immediate danger to interests whichthe State may lawfully protect. It is important to notethat while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bearsdirectly upon the State it is the more specific limitingprinciples of the First Amendment that finally, governthis case.

Nor-does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to asser-tions of official authority depend upon our possession ofmarked competence in the field where the invasion ofrights occurs. True, the task of translating the majesticgeneralities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of thepattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century,into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the prob-lems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confi-dence. These principles grew in soil which also produceda philosophy that the individual was the center of society,that his liberty was attainable through mere absence ofgovernmental restraints, and that government should beentrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervi-


Opinion of the Court. 319 U. S

sion over men's affairs. We must transplant these rightsto a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle ofnon-interference has withered at least as to economicaffairs, and social advancements are increasingly soughtthrough closer integration of society and through ex-panded and strengthened governmental controls. Thesechanged conditions often deprive precedents of reliabilityand cast us more than we would choose upon our ownjudgment. But we act in these matters not by authorityof our competence but by force of our commissions. Wecannot, because of modest estimates of our competence insuch specialties as public education, withhold the judg-ment that history authenticates as the function of thisCourt when liberty is infringed.

4. Lastly, and this is the very heart of the Gobitisopinion, it reasons that "National unity is the basis ofnational security," that the authorities have "the rightto select appropriate means for its attainment," and hencereaches the conclusion that such compulsory measures to-ward "national unity" are constitutional. Id. at 595.Upon the verity of this assumption depends our answerin this case.

National unity as an end which officials may foster bypersuasion and example is not in question. The problemis whether under our Constitution compulsion as here em-ployed is a permissible means for its achievement.

Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in supportof some end thought essential to their time and countryhave been waged by many good as well as by evil men.Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but atother times and places the ends have been racial or terri-torial security, support of a dynasty or regime, and par-ticular plans for saving souls. As first and moderatemethods to attain unity have failed, those bent on itsaccomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity.



As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater,so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.Probably no deeper division of our people could proceedfrom any provocation than from finding it necessary tochoose what doctrine and whose program public educa-tional officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing.Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherenceis the lesson of every such effort from the Roman driveto stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity,the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity,the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down tothe fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon findthemselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unifi-cation of opinion achieves only the unanimity of thegraveyard.

It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amend-ment to our Constitution was designed to avoid theseends by avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticismin the American concept of the State or of the nature ororigin of its authority. We set up government by con-sent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies thosein power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, notpublic opinion by authority.

The case is made difficult not because the principles ofits decision are obscure but because the flag involved isour own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of theConstitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectuallyand spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegratethe social organization. To believe that patriotism willnot flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary andspontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to makean unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutionsto free minds. We can have intellectual individualism

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

Opinion of the Court. 319 U.S.

and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to excep-tional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricityand abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless toothers or to the State as those we deal with here, theprice is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limitedto things that do not matter much. That would be amere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance isthe right to differ as to things that touch the heart of theexisting order.

If- there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribewhat shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess byword or act their faith therein. If there are any circum-stances which permit an exception, they do not now occurto us.19

We think the action of the local authorities in compel-ling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutionallimitations on their power and invades the sphere of in-tellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the FirstAmendment to our Constitution to reserve from all officialcontrol.

The decision of this Court in Minersville School Dis-trict v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few per curiamdecisions which preceded and foreshadowed it are over-ruled, and the judgment enjoining enforcement of theWest Virginia Regulation is

Affirmed.

MR. JusTIcE ROBERTS and MR. JusTICE REED adhere tothe views expressed by the Court in Minersville School

IoThe Nation .may raise armies and compel citizens to give mili-

tary service. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366. It follows,of course, that those subject to military discipline are under manyduties and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolableas to those in civilian life.

642


624 BLAcK and Douoms, JJ., concurring.

District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, and are of the opinionthat the judgment below should be reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JusTIcE DouGLAS, con-curring:

We are substantially in agreement with the opinion justread, but since we originally joined with the Court in theGobitis case, it is appropriate that we make a brief state-ment of reasons for our change of view.

Reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid baragainst state regulation of conduct thought inimical tothe public welfare was the controlling influence whichmoved us to consent to the Gobitis decision. Long re-flection convinced us that although the principle is sound,its application in the particular case was wrong. Jones v.Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 623. We believe that the statutebefore us fails to accord full scope to the freedom of re-ligion secured to the appellees by the First and FourteenthAmendments.

The statute requires the appellees to participate in aceremony aimed at inculcating respect for the flag and forthis country. The Jehovah's Witnesses, without any de-sire to show disrespect for either the flag or the country,interpret the Bible as commanding, at the risk of God's dis-pleasure, that they not go through the form of a pledgeof allegiance to any flag. The devoutness of their beliefis evidenced by their willingness to suffer persecution andpunishment, rather-than make the pledge.

No well-ordered society can leave to the individuals anabsolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by theState, as to everything they will or will not do. The FirstAmendment does not go so far. Religious faiths, honestlyheld, do not free individuals from responsibility to conductthemselves obediently to laws which are either impera-tively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave


MunwRH, J., concurring. 319 U. S.

and pressingly imminent dangers or which, without anygeneral prohibition, merely regulate time, place or mannerof religious activity. Decision as to the constitutionalityof particular laws which strike at the substance of religioustenets and practices must be made by this Court. Theduty is a solemn one, and in meeting it we cannot say thata failure, because of religious scruples, to assume a particu-lar physical position and to repeat the words of a patrioticformula creates a grave danger to the nation. Such astatutory exaction is a form of test oath, and the test oathhas always been abhorrent in the United States.

Words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty tonothing but self-interest. Love of country must springfrom willing hearts and free minds, inspired by a fair ad-ministration of wise laws enacted by the people's electedrepresentatives within the bounds of express constitutionalprohibitions. These laws must, to be consistent with theFirst Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflict-ing viewpoints consistent with a society of free men.

Neither our domestic tranquillity in peace nor our mar-tial effort in war depend on compelling little children toparticipate in a ceremony which ends in nothing for thembut a fear of spiritual condemnation. If, as we think,their fears are groundless, time and reason are the properantidotes for their errors. The ceremonial, when en-forced against conscientious objectors, more likely todefeat than to serve its high purpose, is a handy imple-ment for disguised religious persecution. As such, it isinconsistent with our Constitution's plan and purpose.

MR. JUSTICE M\URPHY, concurring:

I agree with the opinion of the Court and join in it.The complaint challenges an order of the State Board of

Education which requires teachers and pupils to participatein the prescribed salute to the flag. For refusal to con-form with the requirement, the State law prescribes ex-


624 MuRPHY, J., concurring.

pulsion. The offender is required by law to be treated asunlawfully absent from school and the parent or guardianis made liable to prosecution and punishment for such ab-sence. Thus not only is the privilege of public educationconditioned on compliance with the requirement, but non-compliance is virtually made unlawful. In effect com-pliance is compulsory and not optional. It is the claimof appellees that the regulation is invalid as a restriction onreligious freedom and freedom of speech, secured to themagainst State infringement by the First and FourteenthAmendments to the Constitution of the United States.

A reluctance to interfere with considered state action, thefact that the end sought is a desirable one, the emotionaroused by the flag as a symbol for which we have foughtand are now fighting again,-all of these are understand-able. But there is before us the right of freedom to be-lieve, freedom to worship one's Maker according to thedictates of one's conscience, a right which the Constitu-tion specifically shelters. Reflection has convinced methat as a judge I have no loftier duty or responsibility thanto uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches.

The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guar-anteed by the Constitution against State action includesboth the right to speak freely and the right to refrainfrom speaking at all, except insofar as essential operationsof government may require it for the preservation of anorderly s9ciety,-as in the case of compulsion to give evi-dence in court. Without wishing to disparage the pur-poses and intentions of those who hope to inculcate senti-ments of loyalty and patriotism by requiring a declarationof allegiance as a feature of public education, or undulybelittle the benefits that may accrue therefrom, I am im-pelled to conclude that such a requirement is not essentialto the maintenance of effective government and orderlysociety. To many it is deeply distasteful to join in a pub-lic chorus of affirmation of private belief. By some, in-

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

cluding the members of this sect, it is apparently regardedas incompatible with a primary religious obligation andtherefore a restriction on religious freedom. Official com-pulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious beliefsis the antithesis of freedom of worship which, it is well torecall, was achieved in this country only after what Jeffer-son characterized as the "severest contests in which I haveever been engaged." 1

I am unable to agree that the benefits that may accrueto society from the compulsory flag salute are sufficientlydefinite and tangible to justify the invasion of freedom andprivacy that is entailed or to compensate for a restraint onthe freedom of the individual to be vocal or silent accord-ing to his conscience or personal inclination. The trench-ant words in the preamble to the Virginia Statute for Re-ligious Freedom remain unanswerable: ". . . all attemptsto influence [the mind] by temporal punishments, or bur-dens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habitsof hypocrisy and meanness, . . ." Any spark of love forcountry which may be generated in a child or his associatesby forcing him to make what is to him an empty gestureand recite words wrung from him contrary to his religiousbeliefs is overshadowed by the desirability of preservingfreedom of conscience to the full. It is in that freedomand the example of persuasion, not in force and compul-sion, that the real unity of America lies.

MR. JUSTIcE F RANKFURTER, dissenting:

One who belongs to the most vilified and persecutedminority in history is not likely to be insensible to the free-doms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purelypersonal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly asso-ciate myself with the general libertarian views in theCourt's opinion, representing as they do the thought and

1See Jefferson, Autobiography, vol. 1, pp. 53-59.


624 FRANKF RTER, J., dissenting.

action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew norGentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equalattachment to the Constitution and are equally bound byour judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenshipfrom the earliest or the latest immigrants to these shores.As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing myprivate notions of policy into the Constitution, no matterhow deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I maydeem their disregard. The duty of a judge who must de-cide which of two claims before the Court shall prevail,that of a State to enact and enforce laws within its generalcompetence or that of an. individual to refuse obediencebecause of the demands of his conscience, is not that of theordinary person. It can never be emphasized too muchthat one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a lawshould be excluded altogether when one is doing one's dutyon the bench. The only opinion of our own even lookingin that direction that is material is our opinion whetherlegislators could in reason have enacted such a law. In thelight of all the circumstances, including the history of thisquestion in this Court, it would require more daring thanI possess to deny that reasonable legislators could havetaken the action which is before us for review. Most un-willingly, therefore, I must differ from my brethren withregard to legislation like this. I cannot bring my mindto believe that the "liberty" secured by the Due ProcessClause gives this Court authority to deny to the State ofWest Virginia the attainment of that which we all rec-ognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely, the promo-tion of good citizenship, by employment of the means herechosen.

Not so long ago we were admonished that "the onlycheck upon our own exercise of power is our own sense ofself-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from thestatute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the bal-lot and to the processes of democratic government."

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FRANKDURTER, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 79 (dissent). Wehave been told that generalities do not decide concretecases. But the intensity with which a general principleis held may determine a particular issue, and whether weput first things first may decide a specific controversy.

The admonition that judicial self-restraint alone limitsarbitrary exercise of our authority is relevant every timewe are asked to nullify legislation. The Constitution doesnot give us greater veto power when dealing with onephase of "liberty" than with another, or when dealingwith grade school regulations than with college regulationsthat offend conscience, as was the case in Hamilton v.Regents, 293 U. S. 245. In neither situation is our func-tion comparable to that of a legislature or are we freeto act as though we were a super-legislature. Judicialself-restraint is equally necessary whenever an exercise ofpolitical or legislative power- is challenged. There is nowarrant in the constitutional basis of this Court's author-ity for attributing different r~les to it depending upon thenature of the challenge to the legislation. Our power doesnot vary according to the particular provision of the Billof Rights which is invoked. The right not to have prop-erty taken without just compensation has, so far as thescope of judicial power is concerned, the same constitu-tional dignity as the right to be protected against unrea-sonable searches and seizures, and the latter has no lessclaim than freedom of the press or freedom of speech orreligious freedom. In no instance is this Court the pri-mary protector of the particular liberty that is invoked.This Court has recognized, what hardly could be denied,that all the provisions of the first ten Amendments are"specific" prohibitions, United States v. Carolene ProductsCo., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4. But each specific Amend-ment, in so far as embraced within the Fourteenth Amend-ment, must be equally respected, and the function of this


624 FRANKrTER, J., dissenting.

Court does not differ in passing on the constitutionalityof legislation challenged under different Amendments.

When Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for this Court,wrote that "it must be remembered that legislatures areultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of thepeople in quite as great a degree as the courts," Missouri,K. & T. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270, he went to thevery essence of our constitutional system and the demo-cratic conception of our society. He did not mean thatfor only some phases of civil government this Court wasnot to supplant legislatures and sit in judgment uponthe right or wrong of a challenged measure. He was stat-ing the comprehensive judicial duty and r6le of this Courtin our constitutional scheme whenever legislation issought to be nullified on any ground, namely, that respon-sibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerableas they are directly to the people, and this Court's onlyand very narrow function is to determine whether withinthe broad grant of authority vested in legislatures theyhave exercised a judgment for which reasonable justifica-tion can be offered.

The framers of the federal Constitution might havechosen to assign an active share in the process of legisla-tion to this Court. They had before them the well-knownexample of New York's Council of Revision, which hadbeen functioning since 1777. After stating that "laws in-consistent with the spirit of this constitution, or withthe public good, may be hastily and unadvisedly passed,"the state constitution made the judges of New York partof the legislative process by providing that "all bills whichhave passed the senate and assembly shall, before theybecome laws," be presented to a Council of which thejudges constituted a majority, "for their revisal and con-sideration." Art. III, New York Constitution of 1777.Judges exercised this legislative function in New York


FRNKFURTR, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

for nearly fifty years. See Art. I, § 12, New York Con-stitution of 1821. But the framers of the Constitutiondenied such legislative powers to the federal judiciary.They chose instead to insulate the judiciary from thelegislative function. They did not grant to this Courtsupervision over legislation.

The reason why from the beginning even the narrowjudicial authority to nullify legislation has been viewedwith a jealous eye is that it serves to prevent the full playof the democratic process. The fact that it may be anundemocratic aspect of our scheme of government doesnot call for its rejection or its disuse. But it is the bestof reasons, as this Court has frequently recognized, forthe greatest caution in its use.

The precise scope of the question before us defines thelimits of the constitutional power that is in issue. TheState of West Virginia requires all pupils to share in thesalute to the flag as part of school training in citizenship.The present action is one to enjoin the enforcement of thisrequirement by those in school attendance. We have notbefore us any attempt by the State to punish disobedientchildren or visit penal consequences on their parents. Allthat is in question is the right of the State to compel par-ticipation in this exercise by those who choose to attend thepublic schools.

We are not reviewing merely the action of a local schoolboard. The flag salute requirement in this case comes be-fore us with the full authority of the State of West Virginia.We are in fact.passing judgment on "the power of the Stateas a whole." Rippey v. Texas, 193 U. S. 504,509; Skiriotesv. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 79. Practically we are passingupon the political power of each of the forty-eight states.Moreover, since the First Amendment has been read intothe Fourteenth, our problem is precisely the same as itwould be if we had before us an Act of Congress for theDistrict of Columbia. To suggest that we are here con-


624 FRANKFURTFR, J., dissenting.

cerned with the heedless action of some village tyrantsis to distort the augustness of the constitutional issue andthe reach of the consequences of our decision.

Under our constitutional system the legislature ischarged solely with civil concerns of society. If theavowed or intrinsic legislative purpose is either to pro-mote or to discourage some religious community or creed,it is clearly within the constitutional restrictions imposedon legislatures and cannot stand. But it by no means fol-lows that legislative power is wanting whenever a generalhon-discriminatory civil regulation in fact touches con-scientious scruples or religious beliefs of an individual ora group. Regard for such scruples or beliefs undoubtedlypresents one of the most reasonable claims for the exertionof legislative accommodation. It is, of course, beyondour power to rewrite the State's requirement, by providingexemptions for those who do not wish to participate inthe flag salute or by making some other accommodationsto meet their scruples. That wisdom might suggest themaking of such accommodations and that school admin-istration would not find it too difficult to make them andyet maintain the ceremony for those not refusing to con-form, is outside our province to suggest. Tact, respect,and generosity toward variant views will always commendthemselves to those charged with the duties of legislationso as to achieve a maximum of good will and to require aminimum of unwilling submission to a general law. Butthe real question is, who is to make such accommodations,the courts or the legislature?

This is no dry, technical matter. It cuts deep into one'sconception of the democratic process-it concerns no lessthe practical differences between the means for makingthese accommodations that are open to courts and to leg-islatures. A court can only strike down. It can onlysay "This or that law is void." It cannot modify orqualify, it cannot make exceptions to a general require-

531559-44 "45


FwAxKnmnu, J., dissenting. 319 U. &

ment. And it strikes down not merely for a day. At leastthe finding of unconstitutionality ought not to haveephemeral significance unless the Constitution is to bereduced to the fugitive importance of mere legislation.When we are dealing with the Constitution of the UnitedStates, and more particularly with the great safeguards ofthe Bill of Rights, we are dealing with principles of libertyand justice "so rooted in the traditions and conscience ofour people as to be ranked as fundamental"-somethingwithout which "a fair and enlightened system of justicewould be impossible." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319325; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 530, 531. If thefunction of this Court is to be essentially no different fromthat of a legislature, if the considerations governing consti-tutional construction are to be substantially those that un-derlie legislation, then indeed judges should not have lifetenure and they should be made directly responsible tothe electorate. There have been many but unsuccessfulproposals in the last sixty years to amend the Constitutionto that end. See Sen. Doc. No. 91, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,pp. 248-51.

Conscientious scruples, all would admit, cannot standagainst every legislative compulsion to do positive acts inconflict with such scruples. We have been told that suchcompulsions override religious scruples only as to majorconcerns of the state. But the determination of what ismajor and what is minor itself raises questions of policy.For the way in which men equally guided by reason ap-praise importance goes to the very heart of policy. Judgesshould be very diffident in setting their judgment againstthat of a state in determining what is and what is not amajor concern, what means are appropriate to proper ends,and what is the total social cost in striking the balance ofimponderables.

What one can say with assurance is that the history outof which grew constitutional provisions for religious equal-


624 FRNKURTE, J., dissenting.

ity and the writings of the great exponents of religiousfreedom-Jefferson, Madison, John Adams, BenjaminFranklin-are totally wanting in justification for a claimby dissidents of exceptional immunity from civic measuresof general applicability, measures not in fact disguised as-saults upon such dissident views. The great leaders ofthe American Revolution were determined to remove po-litical support from every religious establishment. Theyput on an equality the different religious sects--Episcopa-lians, Presbyterians, Catholics, Baptists, Methodists,Quakers, Huguenots--which, as dissenters, had been un-der the heel of the various orthodoxies that prevailed indifferent colonies. So far as the state was concerned,there was to be neither orthodoxy nor heterodoxy.. Andso Jefferson and those who followed him wrote guarantiesof religious freedom into our constitutions Religiousminorities as well as religious majorities were to be equalin the eyes of the political state. But Jefferson and theothers also knew that minorities may disrupt society. Itnever would have occurred to them to write into the Con-stitution the subordination of the general civil authorityof the state to sectarian scruples.

.The constitutional protection of religious freedom ter-minated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. Itgave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essenceis freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not free-dom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrancefrom the state, not the state may not exercise that whichexcept by leave of religious loyalties is within the domainof temporal power. Otherwise each individual could setup his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiouslydeemed for the public good by those whose biiness it is-to make laws.

The prohibition against any religious establishment bythe government placed denominations on an equal foot-

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FRANKFYRThR, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

ing-it assured freedom from support by the governmentto any mode of worship and the freedom of individuals tosupport any mode of worship. Any person may thereforebelieve or disbelieve what he pleases. He may practicewhat he will in his own house of worship or publicly withinthe limits of public order. But the lawmaking authorityis not circumscribed by the variety of religious beliefs,otherwise the constitutional guaranty would be not a pro-tection of the free exercise of religion but a denial of theexercise of legislation.

The essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by ourConstitution is therefore this: no religion shall either re-ceive the state's support or incur its hostility. Religionis outside the sphere of political government. This doesnot mean that all matters on which religious organizationsor beliefs may pronounce are outside the sphere of govern-ment. Were this so, instead of the separation of churchand state, there would be the subordination of the state onany matter deemed within the sovereignty of the religiousconscience. Much that is the concern of temporal au-thority affects the spiritual interests of men. But it is notenough to strike down a non-discriminatory law that itmay hurt or offend some dissident view. It would be tooeasy to cite numerous prohibitions and injunctions towhich laws run counter if the variant interpretations ofthe Bible were made the tests of obedience to law. Thevalidity of secular laws cannot be measured by their con-formity to religious doctrines. It is only in a theocraticstate that ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right orwrong.

An act compelling profession of allegiance to a religion,no matter how subtly or tenuously promoted, is bad. Butan act promoting good citizenship and national allegianceis within the domain of governmental authority and istherefore to be judged by the same considerations of powerand of constitutionality as those involved in the many


624 FRANKVRTR, J., disenting.

claims of immunity from civil obedience because of reli-gious scruples.

That claims are pressed on behalf of sincere religiousconvictions does not of itself establish their constitutionalvalidity. Nor does waving the banner of religious free-dom relieve us from examining into- the power we areasked to deny the states. Otherwise the doctrine of sepa-ration of church and state, so cardinal in the history of thisnation and for the liberty of our people, would mean notthe disestablishment of a state church but the establish-ment of all churches and of all religious groups.

The subjection of dissidents to the general requirement* of saluting the flag, as a measure conducive to the trainingof children in good citizenship, is very far from being thefirst instance of exacting obedience to general laws thathave offended deep religious scruples. Compulsory vac-cination, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, foodinspection regulations, see Shapiro v. Lyle, 30 F. 2d 971,the obligation to bear arms, see Hamilton v. Regents, 293U. S. 245, 267, testimonial duties, see Stansbury v. Marks,2 Dall. 213, compulsory medical treatment, see People v.Vogelgesang, 221 N. Y. 290, 116 N. E. 977-these are butillustrations of conduct that has often been compelled inthe enforcement of legislation of general applicabilityeven though the religious consciences of particular indi-viduals rebelled at the exaction.

Law is concerned with external behavior and not withthe inner life of man. It rests in large measure uponcompulsion. Socrates lives in history partly because hegave his life for the conviction that duty of obedience tosecular law does not presuppose consent to its enactmentor belief in its virtue. The consent upon which free gov-ernment rests is the consent that comes from sharing inthe process of making and unmaking laws. The stateis not shut out from a domain because the individual con-science may deny the state's claim. The individual con-

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FuNKFRT, J., dissenting. 319 U.S.

science may profess what faith it chooses. It may affirmand promote that faith-in the language of the Consti-tution, it may "exercise" it freely-but it cannot therebyrestrict community action through political organs in mat-ters of community concern, so long as the action is notasserted in a discriminatory way either openly or bystealth. One may have the right to practice one's reli-gion and at the same time owe the duty of formal obedi-ence to laws that run counter to one's beliefs. Com-pelling belief implies denial of opportunity to combat itand to assert dissident views. Such compulsion is onething. Quite another matter is submission to conformityof action while denying its wisdom or virtue and withample opportunity for seeking its change or abrogation.

In Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, this Court unani-mously held that one attending a state-maintained uni-versity cannot refuse attendance on courses that offendhis religious scruples. That decision is not overruled to-day, but is distinguished on the ground that attendanceat'the institution for highet education was voluntary andtherefore a student could not refuse compliance with itsconditions and yet take -advantage of its opportunities.But West Virginia does not compel the attendance at itspublic schools of the children here concerned, West Vir-ginia does not so compel, for it cannot. This Court deniedthe right of a state to require its children to attend publicschools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510. Asto its public schools, West Virginia imposes conditionswhich it deems necessary in the development of futurecitizens precisely as California deemed necessary therequirements that offended the student's conscience inthe Hamilton case. The need for higher education andthe duty of the state to provide it as part of a public edu-cational system, are part of the democratic faith of mostof our states. The right to secure such education in in-stitutions not maintained by public funds is unquestioned.


624 Fimmmurm, J., dissenting.

But the practical opportunities for obtaining what is be-coming in increasing measure the conventional equipmentof American youth may be no less burdensome than thatwhich parents are increasingly called upon to bear insending their children to parochial schools because theeducation provided by public schools, though supportedby their taxes, does not satisfy their ethical and, educa-tional necessities. I find it impossible, so far as consti-tutional power is concerned, to differentiate what wassanctioned in the Hamilton case from what is nullified inthis case. And for me it still'remains to be explained whythe grounds of Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Hamiltonv. Regents, supra, are not sufficient to sustain the flagsalute requirement. Such a requirement, like the re-quirement in the Hamilton case, "is not an interferenceby the state with the free exercise of religion when theliberties of the constitution axe read in the light of a cen-tury and a half of history during days of peace and war."293 U. S. 245, 266. The religious worshiper, "if his lib-erties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contributetaxes . . . in furtherance of any other end condemnedby his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right ofprivate judgment has never yet been so exalted abovethe powers and the compulsion of the agencies of govern-ment." Id., at 268.

Parents have the privilege of choosing which schoolsthey wish their children to attend. And the question hereis whether the state may make certain requirements thatseem to it desirable or important for the proper educationof those future citizens who go to schools maintained bythe states, or whether the pupils in those schools may berelieved from those requirements if they run counter tothe consciences of their parents. Not only have parentsthe right to send children to schools of their own choosingbut the state has no right to bring such schools "under astrict governmental control" or give "affirmative direction

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FR&TnmT=, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

concerning the intimate and essential details of suchschools, entrust their control to public officers, and denyboth owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretionin respect of teachers, curriculum, and textbooks." Far-rington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 284, 298. Why shouldnot the state likewise have constitutional power to makereasonable provisions for the proper instruction of chil-dren in schools maintained by it?

When dealing with religious scruples we are dealingwith an almost numberless variety of doctrines and be-liefs entertained with equal sincerity by the particulargroups for which they satisfy man's needs in his relationto the mysteries of the universe. There are in the UnitedStates more than 250 distinctive established religious de-nominations. In the State of Pennsylvania there are 120of these, and in West Virginia as many as 65. But ifreligious scruples afford immunity from civic obedience tolaws, they may be invoked by the religious beliefs of anyindividual even though he holds no membership in anysect or organized denomination. Certainly this Courtcannot be called upon to determine what claims of con-science should be recognized and what should be rejectedas satisfying the "religion" which the Constitution pro-tects. That would indeed resurrect the very discrimina-tory treatment of religion which the Constitution soughtforever to forbid. And so, when confronted with the taskof considering the claims of immunity from obedience toa law dealing with civil affairs because of religious scruples,we cannot conceive religion more narrowly than in theterms in which Judge Augustus N. Hand recently char-acterized it:

"It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion;the content of the term is found in the history of the humanrace and is incapable of comppession into a few words. Re-ligious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of rea-


624 FRAxNrmR, J., dissenting.

son as a means of relating the individual to his fellowmenand to his universe .... [It] may justly be regardedas a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call itconscience or God, that is for many persons at the presenttime the equivalent of what has always been thought areligious impulse." United States v. Kauten, 133 F. 2d703, 708.

Consider the controversial issue of compulsory Bible-reading in public schools. The educational policies ofthe states are in great conflict over this, and the state courtsare divided in their decisions on the issue whether the re-quirement of Bible-reading offends constitutional provi-sions dealing with religious freedom. The requirement ofBible-reading has been justified by various state courtsas an appropriate means of inculcating ethical preceptsand familiarizing pupils with the most lasting expressionof great English literature. Is this Court to over-throw such variant state educational policies by denyingstates the right to entertain such convictions in regardto their school systems, because of a belief that the KingJames version is in fact a sectarian text to which parentsof the Catholic and Jewish faiths and of some Protestantpersuasions may rightly object to having their childrenexposed? On the other hand the religious consciences ofsome parents may rebel at the absence of any Bible-read-ing in the schools. See Washington ex rel. Clithero v.Showalter, 284 U. S. 573. Or is this Court to enter the oldcontroversy between science and religion by unduly de-fining the limits within which a state may experiment withits school curricula? The religious consciences of someparents may be offended by subjecting their children tothe Biblical account of creation, while another state mayoffend parents by prohibiting a teaching of biology thatcontradicts such Biblical account. Compare Scopes v.State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363. What of conscien-

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FRUNxFURTE, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

tious objections to what is devoutly felt by parents to bethe poisoning of impressionable minds of children bychauvinistic teaching of history? This is very far froma fanciful suggestion for in the belief of many thoughtfulpeople nationalism is the seed-bed of war.

There are other issues in the offing which admonish usof the difficulties and complexities that confront statesin the duty of administering their local school systems.All citizens are taxed for the support of public schools al-though this Court has denied the right of a state to compelall children to go to such schools and has recognized theright of parents to send children to privately maintainedschools. Parents who are dissatisfied with the publicschools thus carry a double educational burden. Childrenwho go to public school enjoy in many states derivativeadvantages such as free textbooks, free lunch, and freetransportation in going to and from school. What of theclaims for equality of treatment of those parents who,because of religious scruples, cannot send their childrento public schools? What of the claim that if the right tosend children to privately maintained schools is partlyan exercise of religious conviction, to render effective thisright it should be accompanied by equality of treatmentby the state in supplying free textbooks, free lunch, andfree transportation to childreia who go to private schools?What of the claim that such grants are offensive to thecardinal constitutional. doctrine of separation of churchand state?

These questions assume increasing importance in viewof the steady growth of parochial schools both in numberand in population. I am not borrowing trouble by adum-brating these issues nor am I parading horrible examplesof the consequences of today's decision. I am aware thatwe must decide the case before us and not some other case.But that does not mean that a case is dissociated fromthe past and unrelated to the future. We must decide this


624 FNKFURTER, J., dissenting.

case with due regard for what went before and no lessregard for what may come after. Is it really a fair con-struction of such a fundamental concept as the right freelyto exercise one's religion that a state cannot choose to re-quire all children who attend public school to make thesame gesture of allegiance to the symbol of our nationallife because it may offend the conscience of some children,but that it may compel all children to attend public schoolto listen to the King James version although it may offendthe consciences of their parents? And what of the largerissue of claiming immunity from obedience to a generalcivil regulation that has a reasonable relation to a publicpurpose within the general competence of the state? SeePierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535. Anothermember of the sect now before us insisted that in for-bidding her two little girls, aged nine and twelve, to dis-tribute pamphlets Oregon infringed her and their freedomof religion in that the children were engaged in "preach-ing the gospel of God's Kingdom." A procedural tech-nicality led to the dismissal of the case, but the problemremains. McSparran v. Portland, 318 U. S. 768.

These questions are not lightly stirred. They touchthe most delicate issues and their solution challenges thebest wisdom of political and religious statesmen. But itpresents awful possibilities to try to encase the solu-tion, of these problems within the rigid prohibitions ofunconstitutionality.

We are told that a flag salute is a doubtful substitutefor adequate understanding of our institutions. Thestates that require such a school exercise do not have tojustify it as the only means for promoting good citizenshipin children, but merely as one of diverse means for ac-complishing a worthy end. We may deem it a foolishmeasure, but the point is that this Court is not the organof government to resolve doubts as to whether it will ful-fill its purpose. Only if there be no doubt that any rea-

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FANKFUUTFR, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

sonable. mind could entertain can we deny to the statesthe right to resolve doubts their way and not ours.

That which to the majority may seem essential for thewelfare of the state may offend the consciences of a mi-nority. But, so long as no inroads are made upon theactual exercise of religion by the minority, to deny thepolitical power of the majority to enact laws concernedwith civil matters, simply because they may offend theconsciences of a minority, really means that the consciencesof a minority are more sacred and more enshrined in theConstitution than the consciences of a majority.

We are told that symbolism is a dramatic but primi-tive way of communicating ideas. Symbolism is ines-capable. Even the most sophisticated live by symbols.But it is not for this Court to make psychological judg-ments as to the effectiveness of a particular symbol ininculcating concededly indispensable feelings, particu-larly if the state happens to see fit to utilize the symbolthat represents our heritage and our hopes. And surelyonly flippancy could be responsible for the suggestion thatconstitutional'validity of a requirement to salute our flagimplies equal validity of a requirement to salute a dictator.The significance of a symbol lies in what it represents. Toreject the swastika does not imply rejection of the Cross.And so it bears repetition to say that it mocks reason anddenies our whole history to find in the allowance of arequirement to salute our flag on fitting occasions theseeds of sanction for obeisance to a leader. To deny thepower to employ educational symbols is to say that thestate's educational system may not stimulate the imagi-nation because this may lead to unwise stimulation.

The right of West Virginia to utilize the flag salute aspart of its educational process is denied because, so it isargued, it cannot be justified as a means of meeting a"clear and present danger" to national unity. In passingit deserves to be noted that the four cases which unani-


624 FRANxpUaTER, J., dissenting.

mously sustained the power of states to utilize such aneducational measure arose and were all decided beforethe present World War. But to measure the state'spower to make such regulations as are here resistedby the imminence of national danger is wholly to miscon-ceive the origin and purpose of the concept of "clear andpresent danger." To apply such a test is for the Courtto assume, however unwittingly, a legislative responsibil-ity that does not belong to it. To talk about "clearand present danger" as the touchstone of allowable edu-cational policy by the states whenever school curriculamay impinge upon the boundaries of individual con-,science, is to take a felicitous phrase out of the contextof the particular situation where it arose and for whichit was adapted. Mr. Justice Holmes used the phrase"clear and present danger" in a case involving merespeech as a means by which alone to accomplish seditionin time of war. By that phrase he meant merely toindicate that, in view of the protection given to utteranceby the First Amendment, in order that mere utterancemay not be proscribed, "the words used are used in suchcircumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clearand present danger that they will bring about the sub-stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52. The "sub-stantive evils" about which he was speaking were induce-ment of insubordination in the military and naval forcesof the United States and obstruction of enlistment whilethe country was at war. He was not enunciating a formalrule that there can be no restriction upon speech and,still less, no compulsion where conscience balks, unlessimminent danger would thereby be wrought "to ourinstitutions or our government."

The flag salute exercise has no kinship whatever to theoath tests so odious in history. For the oath test was oneof the instruments for suppressing heretical beliefs.

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FRAuNKFuRTE, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

Saluting the flag suppresses no belief nor curbs it. Chil-dren and their parents may believe what they please, avowtheir belief and practice it. It is not even remotely sug-gested that the requirement for saluting the flag involvesthe slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity onthe part both of the children and of their parents to dis-avow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning thatothers attach to the gesture of salute. All channels ofaffirmative free expression are open to both children andparents. Had we before us any act of the state puttingthe slightest curbs upon such free expression, I shouldnot lag behind any member of this Court in striking downsuch an invasion of the right to freedom of thought andfreedom of speech protected by the Constitution.

I am fortified in my view of this case by the history ofthe flag salute controversy in this Court. Five timeshas the precise question now before us been adjudicated.Four times the Court unanimously found that the re-quirement of such a school exercise was not beyond thepowers of the states. Indeed in the first three cases tocome before the Court the constitutional claim now sus-tained was deemed so clearly unmeritorious that thisCourt dismissed the appeals for want of a substantialfederal question. Leoles v. Landers, 302 U. S. 656; Heringv. State Board of Education, 303 U. S. 624; Gabrielli v.Knickerbocker, 306 U.' S. 621. In the fourth case thejudgment of the district court upholding the state lawwas summarily affirmed on the authority of the earliercases. Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U. S. 621. The fifthcase, Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, wasbrought here because the decision of the Circuit Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit ran counter to our rulings.They were reaffirmed after full consideration, with oneJustice dissenting.

What may be even more significant than this uniformrecognition of state authority is the fact that every Jus-


624 FRAn KU=R, J., dissenting.

tice-thirteen in all-who has hitherto participated in.judging this matter has at one or more times found noconstitutional infirmity in what is now condemned.Only the two Justices sitting for the first time on thisffatter have not heretofore found this legislation inoffen-sive to the "liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution.And among the Justices who sustained this measure wereoutstanding judicial leaders in the zealous enforcement ofconstitutional safeguards of civil liberties-men likeChief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Jus-tice Cardozo, to mention only those no longer on theCourt.

One's conception of the Constitution cannot be severedfrom one's conception of a judge's function in applyingit. The Court has no reason for existence if it merely re-flects the pressures of the day. Our system is built onthe faith that men set apart for this special function,freed from the influences of immediacy and from the de-flections of worldly ambition, will become able to take aview of longer range than the period of responsibilityentrusted to Congress and legislatures. We are dealingwith matters as to which legislators and voters have con-flicting views. Are we as judges to impose our strongconvictions on where wisdom lies? That which threeyears ago had seemed to five successive Courts to liewithin permissible areas of legislation is now outlawed bythe deciding shift of opinion of two Justices. What rea-son is there to believe that they or their successors maynot have another view a few years hence? Is that whichwas deemed to be of so fundamental a nature as to bewritten into the Constitution to endure for all times tobe the sport of shifting winds of doctrine? Of course,judicial opinions, even as to questions of constitution-ality, are not immutable. As has been true in the past,the Court will from time to time reverse its position.But I believe that never before these Jehovah's Witnesses

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FANKU RTE, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

cases (except for minor deviations subsequently re-traced) has this Court overruled decisions so as to restrictthe powers of democratic government. Always hereto-fore, it has withdrawn narrow views of legislative author-ity so as to authorize what formerly it had denied.

In view of this history it must be plain that whatthirteen Justices found to be within the constitutionalauthority of a state, legislators can not be deemed un-reasonable in enacting. Therefore, in denying to thestates what heretofore has received such impressive ju-dicial sanction, some other tests of unconstitutionalitymust surely be guiding the Court than the absence of arational justification for the legislation. But I know ofno other test which this Court is authorized to apply innullifying legislation.

In the past this Court has from time to time set its viewsof policy against that embodied in legislation by findinglaws in conflict with what was called the "spirit of theConstitution." Such undefined destructive power wasnot conferred on this Court by the Constitution. Beforea duly enacted law can be judicially nullified, it must beforbidden by some explicit restriction upon political au-thority in thp Constitution. Equally inadmissible is theclaim to strike down legislation because to us as individualsit seems opposed to the "plan and purpose" of the Consti-tution. That is too tempting a basis for finding in one'spersonal views the purposes of the Founders.

The uncontrollable power wielded by this Court bringsit very close to the most sensitive areas of public affairs.As appeal from legislation to adjudication becomes morefrequent, and its consequences more far-reaching, judicialself-restraint becomes more and not less important, lestwe unwarrantably enter social and political domainswholly outside our concern. I think I appreciate fullythe objections to the law before us. But to deny thatit presents a question upon which men might reasonably


624 FzN;KPRTER, J., dissenting.

differ appears to me to be intolerance. And since menmay so reasonably differ, I deem it beyond my constitu-tional power to assert my view of the wisdom of this lawagainst the view of the State of West Virginia.

Jefferson's opposition to judicial review has not beenaccepted by history, but it still serves as an admonitionagainst confusion between judicial and political functions.As a rule of judicial self-restraint, it is still as valid asLincoln's admonition. For those who pass laws not onlyare under duty to pass laws. They are also under duty toobserve the Constitution. And even though legislationrelates to civil liberties, our duty of deference to those whohave the responsibility for making the laws is no lessrelevant or less exacting. And this is so especially whenwe consider the accidental contingencies by which one manmay determine constitutionality and thereby confine thepolitical power of the Congress of the United States andthe legislatures of forty-eight states. The attitude of ju-dicial humility which these considerations enjoin is notan abdication of the judicial function. It is a due ob-servance of its limits. Moreover, it is to be borne in mindthat in a question like this we are not passing on the properdistribution of political power as between the states andthe central government. We are not discharging the basicfunction of this Court as the mediator of powers withinthe federal system. To strike down a law like this is todeny a power to all government.

The whole Court is conscious that this case reachesultimate questions of judicial power and its relation toour scheme of government. It is appropriate, therefore,to recall an utterance as wise as any that I know in analyz-ing what is really involved when the theory of this Court'sfunction is put to the test of practice. The analysis is thatof James Bradley Thayer:". .. there has developed a vast and growing increase ofjudicial interference with legislation. This is a very differ-

531559-44-46

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

FaiN.FUrTm, J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

ent state of things from what our fathers contemplated,a century and more ago, in framing the new system. Sel-dom, indeed, as they imagined, under our system, wouldthis great, novel, tremendous power of the courts be ex-erted,-would this sacred ark of the covenant be takenfrom within the veil. Marshall himself expressed trulyone aspect of the matter, when he said in one of the lateryears of his life: 'No questions can be brought before ajudicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which in-volve the constitutionality of legislative acts. If theybecome indispensably necessary to the case, the courtmust meet and decide them; but if the case may be deter-mined on other grounds, a just respect for the legislaturerequires that the obligation of its laws should not beunnecessarily and wantonly assailed.' And again, a littleearlier than this, he laid down the one true rule of dutyfor the courts. When he went to Philadelphia at the endof September, in 1831, on that painful errand of which Ihave spoken, in answering a cordial tribute from the bar ofthat city he remarked that if he might be permitted toclaim for himself and his associates any part of the kindthings they had said, it would be this, that they had 'neversought to enlarge the judicial power beyond its properbounds, nor feared to carry it to the fullest extent thatduty required.'

"That is the safe twofold rule; nor is the first part ofit any whit less important than the second; nay, more;today it is the part which most requirbs to be emphasized.For just here comes in a consideration of very great weight.Great and, indeed, inestimable as are the advantages in apopular government of this conservative influence,-thepower of the judiciary to disregard unconstitutional leg-islation,-it should be remembered that the exercise of it,even when unavoidable, is always attended with a seriousevil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakescomes from the outside, and the people thus lose thepolitical experience, and the moral education and stimulusthat come from fighting the question out in the ordinaryway, and correcting their own errors. If the decision inMunn v. Illinois and the 'Granger Cases,' twenty-five yearsago, and in the 'Legal Tender Cases,' nearly thirty years

668


624 FuANKFmmRTE, J., dissenting.

ago, had been different; and the legislation there in ques-tion, thought by many to be unconstitutional and by manymore to be ill-advised, had been set aside, we should havebeen saved some trouble and some harm. But I Ventureto think that the good which came to the country and itspeople from the vigorous thinking that had to be donein the political debates that followed, from the infiltra-tion through every part of the population of sound ideasand sentiments, from the rousing into activity' of oppositeelements, the enlargement of ideas, the strengthening ofmoral fibre, and the growth of political experience thatcame out of it all,-that all this far more than outweighedany evil which ever flowed from the refusal of the courtto interfere with the work of the legislature.

"The tendency of a common and easy resort to thisgreat function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarfthe political capacity of the people, and- to deaden itssense of moral responsibility. It is no light thing to dothat.

"What can be done? It is the courts that can do mostto cure the evil; and the opportunity is a very great one.Let them resolutely adhere to first principles. Let themconsider how narrow is the function which the constitu-tions have conferred on them-the office merely of decid-ing litigated cases; how large, therefore, is the duty in-trusted to others, and above all to the legislature. It isthat body which is charged, primarily, with the duty ofjudging of the constitutionality of its work. The consti-tutions generally give them no authority to call upon acourt for advice; they must decide for themselves, andthe courts may never be able to say a word. Such a body,charged, in every State, with almost all the legislativepower of the people, is entitled to the most entire andreal respect; is entitled, as among all rationally permis-sible opinions as to what the constitution allows, to itsown choice. Courts, as has often been said, are not tothink of the legislators, but of the legislature-the great,continuous body itself, abstracted from all the transitoryindividuals who may happen to hold its power. It is thismajestic representative of the people whose action is inquestion, a cordinate department of the government,

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FRANKFURmT J., dissenting. 319 U. S.

charged with the greatest functions, and invested, in con-templation of law, with whatsoever wisdom, virtue, andknowledge the exercise of such functions requires.

"To set aside the acts of such a body, representing in itsown field, which is the very highest of all, the ultimatesovereign, should be a solemn, unusual, and painful act.Something is wrong when it can ever be other than that.And if it be true that the holders of legislative power arecareless or evil, yet the constitutional duty of the courtremains untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protectthe people, by undertaking a function not its own. On theother hand, by adhering rigidly to its own duty, the courtwill help, as nothing else can, to fix the spot where respon-sibility lies, and to bring down on that precise locality thethunderbolt of popular condemnation. The judiciary,today, in dealing with the acts of their cordinate legis-lators, owe to the country no greater or clearer duty thanthat of keeping their hands off these acts wherever it ispossible to do it. For that course-the true course ofjudicial duty always-will powerfully help to bring thepeople and their representatives to a sense of their ownresponsibility. There will still remain to the judiciaryan ample field for the determinations of this remarkablejurisdiction, of which our American law has so muchreason to be proud; a jurisdiction which has had some ofits chief illustrations and its greatest triumphs, as in Mar-shall's time, so in ours, while the courts were refusing toexercise it." J. B. Thayer, John Marshall, (1901) 104-10.

Of course patriotism can not be enforced by the flagsalute. But neither can the liberal spirit be enforced byjudicial invalidation of illiberal legislation. Our constantpreoccupation with the constitutionality of legislationrather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of theAmerican mind with a false value. The tendency of fo-cussing attention on constitutionality is to make consti-tutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law asall right if it is constitutional. Such an attitude is a greatenemy of liberalism. Particularly in legislation affectingfreedom of thought and freedom of speech much whichshould offend a free-spirited society is constitutional. Re-

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I. C. C. v. INLAND WATERWAYS CORP. 671

624 Syllabus.

liance for the most precious interests of civilization, there-fore, must be found outside of their vindication in courtsof law. Only a persistent positive translation of the faithof a free society into the convictions and habits and actionsof a community is the ultimate reliance against unabatedtemptations to fetter the human spirit.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL. V.INLAND WATERWAYS CORP. ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATESFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 175. Argued January 11, 12, 1943.-Decided June 14, 1943.

Proportional rates on reshipments from Chicago to eastern destinationsof grain coming from distant points Northwest on through shipmentwith transit privileges and arriving at Chicago by rail or by lakesteamer, became applicable by reason of tariff wordings to graincoming from points close to Chicago arriving by barge over theIllinois Waterways route which was established after the tariffswere adopted. The railroads filed tariff amendments which woulddeny to the ex-barge grain the privilege of moving eastward onthe proportional rates, and remit it to the higher local rates whichgrain entering Chicago by truck or from local origins by rail wasobliged to pay. Held:

1. That an order by the Interstate Commerce Commission in aproceeding under § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, whichrelieved the proposed tariff amendments from suspension, as not"unlawful," but which did not prevent future adjustments on spe-cific complaint of the rates on the ex-barge traft, was a determina-tion within the administrative competency of the Commission withwhich the District Court should not have interfered. P. 685.

2. Proportional rates differing from each other according to theorigin of the commodity may be fixed lower than local rates and mayapply to outbound movements after stopover in transit. P. 684.

3. Since the Commission refused to approve or prescribe therates here in controversy, they stand only as carrier-made rates andare subject to possible recovery of reparations. P. 686.

4. To perpetuate the existing rate structure by sustaining theDistrict Court's injunction would favor the ex-barge grain over grain

624 OCTOBER TERM, 1942. - Library of Congress · 2017. 12. 11. · 624 OCTOBER TERM, 1942. Syllabus. 319 U. S. mental subdivisions. Those matters, as well as the char-acter, extent

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