6-15 Case Digests

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 87698 September 24, 1991PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OSCAR IRINEO,respondents.The Legal Department, PAL for petitioner.Francisco M. Delos Reyes for private respondent.NARVASA,J.:pThis case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), who was dismissed from his work onAugust 23, 1967on the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel, submitted on August 11, 1967 after an investigation commenced in July, 1967 in coordination with a well known accounting firm.1The Fact Finding Panel recommended the criminal prosecution of the employee, Oscar Irineo, together with four others, namely: Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, Jacinto Macatol and Jesus Saba, on account of complicity in irregular refunds of international plane tickets.2On the basis of the panel's report, and the testimony of witnesses taken in the course of the investigation, criminal proceedings were also initiated against four of the PAL employees above named, namely: Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, and Jacinto Macatol. They were prosecuted forestafathru falsification of commercial documents in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, under an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal onSeptember 25, 1968.3The case resulted in the conviction after due trial of all the accused onMarch 1, 1976;this, despite the fiscal's having earlier moved for the dismissal of the charges as against Irineo and Macatol.4All four (4) defendants filed motions for reconsideration and/or new trial. All the motions were denied except Macatol's. After due hearing on said motions, the Trial Court rendered an amended decision datedSeptember 23, 1977absolving Macatol of any liability for the offense charged, "for lack of sufficient evidence." The other three appealed.5OnJuly 6, 1978 about twelve (12) years after his dismissal from employment Macatol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL in the Department of Labor. His complaint was however dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the ground that his right of action had prescribed. That dismissal was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission in a decision promulgated onMay 30, 1980. The Commission ruled that "the running of the prescriptive period ... commenced on the date ... (Macatol's) cause of action accrued;" that such cause of action did not accrue "upon the termination of the criminal case," but upon "his dismissal, the legality or illegality of which could be determined soon after it was effected ... (and a) suit to contest its legality could proceed independently of any criminal proceedings;" that "if no criminal case was instituted, following the logic of the complainant's argument, the cause of action would not and could not have accrued at all; ... (and) the institution of the criminal action did not bar the complainant from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal."6On the other hand, the appeal taken by Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, resulted in a decision promulgated onSeptember 23, 1983by the Intermediate Appellate Court,7affirming the judgment of conviction only as regards Rogelio Damian, but acquitting Irineo and Rabasco "on grounds of reasonable doubt."8OnMay 10, 1984,seventeen (17) years after the termination of his employment on August 23, 1967, Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back wages on the claim that that termination was illegal. It is the action thus instituted that has given rise to the proceedings now before this Court.Irineo's action eventuated in a decision of the Labor Arbiter dated November 12, 1985,9decreeing his reinstatement to his position in 1967 without loss of seniority rights and the payment to him of back wages "from August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement," as well asmoral damages in the amount of P300,000.00.The Arbiter overruled the defense of prescription asserted by PAL, among others. The Arbiter held that since there was a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and there was, too, a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority, the termination by PAL of Irineo's employment on August 23, 1967 merely "amounted to a suspension per (said) PAL IRD Circular No. 66-11." According to the Arbiter, said IRD Circular No. 66-11 was not raised in issue in the earlier case instituted by Macatol,supra,10and this serves to distinguish Macatol's case from Irineo's, precluding reaching a conclusion in the latter similar to that in the former (i.e., that the claim was barred by prescription). The Arbiter held, in fine, that in view of said Circular No. 66-11, PAL's termination of Irineo's employment should be deemed only as an act by which "Irineo was placed under preventive suspension until his (criminal) case was finally adjudicated, for after all, the arbitration branch of the Commission should put meaning to the law between the parties and unless such law between the parties are (sic) implemented the same would become useless." The Arbiter concluded with the following disposition:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing PAL to terminate the suspension of Irineo which it imposed on August 23, 1967 and to reinstate him to his position without loss of seniority rights and with backwages from August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement.Lastly, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is (sic) awarded to complainant.PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the Arbiter's judgment. In a Resolution promulgated on February 28, 1989, the Third Division of the NLRC upheld all the Arbiter's conclusions.11The NLRC agreed with the Arbiter that "applying the mandate of IRD Circular No. 66-11 which respondent PAL itself solely promulgated," Irineo was never dismissed from employment but "was merely under preventive suspension;" and that PAL's termination of Irineo's work was violative of the "Injunction Order dated September 3, 1963 in CIR Case No. 43-IPA" (forbidding, during the pendency of said case, the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority), even though that order "lost its efficacy when the parties concerned entered into a valid Certified Bargaining Agreement" (on December 7, 1965, according to petitioner PAL12). It also affirmed the award of moral damages.PAL is now before this Court, praying for the issuance of a writ ofcertiorarito nullify and set aside the NLRC Resolution of February 28, 1989 as constituting "a plain case of patent abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same an exemplary example of power arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the rule of law." The Court issued a temporary restraining order on April 26, 1989 prohibiting enforcement or implementation of the challenged resolution.13Required to comment in public respondent's behalf, the Office of the Solicitor General begged to be excused, declaring that "(a)fter an exhaustive and judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the issues involved, ... (it could not), without violating the law, espouse the position taken by the respondent ... (NLRC) ..." Comments were filed by private respondent14and the Senior Research Attorney of the NLRC in the latter's behalf,15which the Court resolved to treat as their answers to PAL's petition.In light of the material facts above set out, it is not indeed possible, as the Solicitor General holds, to defend the decision of the respondent Commission or that of the Labor Arbiter.That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workingmen cannot be gainsaid; but that care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and commiseration.The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President Benigno P. Toda, Jr. dated August 23, 1967, based evidently on the investigation and report of the fact finding panel, leaves no doubt that Irineo's employment was being ended; the language is plain and categorical. It reads pertinently as follows:16To: Oscar IreneoComptroller's DepartmentFor being involved in the irregular refund of tickets in the international service to the damage and prejudice of the company,you are dismissed from the service effective immediately.The acts committed being criminal, resulting in the swindling of the company, the Legal Department is directed to file immediately the corresponding criminal cases against you.To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do, that that declaration, "you are dismissed from the service effective immediately," should be construed merely as a suspension, not a dismissal, from employment, is illogical if not downright ludicrous. They attempt to justify this conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and construe this as a complete foreclosure or prohibition of any alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part, such as the imposition of administrative sanctions or penalties; in other words, any disciplinary action against an erring employee was absolutely dependent on the outcome of the criminal action against the latter, no disciplinary measure of any nature being permissible against the employee "until the final adjudication" of his criminal case. It is a construction that has nothing to support it, is contrary to common sense, and one certainly not justified by the recorded facts.The attempt to sustain the strained theory ofdismissal-qua-suspensionby referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority, is equally indefensible. That prohibition was imposed only in relation to a labor dispute then pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. That dispute however ended when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement two (2) years or so before Irineo was fired on August 23, 1967. In other words, when Irineo's employment was terminated, the CIR injunction adverted was alreadyfunctions officioand could no longer have any relevance to that event.There is moreover, nothing in the record to excuse respondent Irineo's omission to impugn his termination of employment by PAL in line with the respondent commission's theory, i.e., that under existing PAL rules and the CIR injunction, he could only be placed under preventive suspension and therefore his dismissal was illegal. His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his discharge from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his counsel did not share the respondent Commission's belief in the soundness of the theory. His claim must thus be rejected as time-barred, as being unpardonably tardy.Premises considered, it appears clear to the Court that the respondent Commission's conclusions are flawed by errors so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion and should on this account be struck down.WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and issues the writ of certiorari prayed for, NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE the respondent Commission's Resolutions promulgated on February 28, 1989 and on March 20, 1989, MAKING PERMANENT the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1989, and DISMISSING private respondent's complaint. No costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 78409 September 14, 1989NORBERTO SORIANO,petitioner,vs.OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING CORPORATION, KNUT KNUTSEN O.A.S., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division),respondents.R. C. Carrera Law Firm for petitioner.Elmer V. Pormento for private respondents.FERNAN,C.J.:This is a petition forcertiorariseeking to annul and set aside the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA Case No. (M)85-12-0953 entitled "Norberto Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation and Knut Knutsen O.A.S.", which denied petitioner's claim for salary differential and overtime pay and limited the reimbursement of his cash bond to P15,000.00 instead of P20,000.00.In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days. He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985 he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill its promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila.In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for short), a complaint against private respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond allegedly in the amount of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines. Although repatriated, he claims that he failed to receive payment for the following:1. Salary for November which is equivalent to US$800.00;2. Leave pay equivalent to his salary for 16.5 days in the sum of US$440.00;3. Salary differentials which is equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the total sum of US$1,020,00;4. Fixed overtime pay equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the sum of US$1,020.00;5. Overtime pay for 14 Sundays equivalent to US$484.99;6. Repatriation cost of US$945.46;7. Petitioner's cash bond of P20,000.00.1In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA found that petitioner-complainant's total monthly emolument is US$800.00 inclusive of fixed overtime as shown and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to the Accreditation Department of its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary differential; that the version of complainant that there was in effect contract substitution has no grain of truth because although the Employment Contract seems to have corrections on it, said corrections or alterations are in conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the withholding of a certain amount due petitioner was justified to answer for his repatriation expenses which repatriation was found to have been requested by petitioner himself as shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and that petitioner deposited a total amount of P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00 cash bond.2Accordingly, respondent POEA ruled as follows:VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally within ten (10) days from receipt hereof the amount of P15, 000.00 representing the reimbursement of the cash bond deposited by complainant less US$285.83 (to be converted to its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment). Further, attorney's fees equivalent to 10 % of the aforesaid award is assessed against respondents. All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.3Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the aforementioned decision of the POEA to the National Labor Relations Commission. Complainant-petitioner's appeal was dismissed for lack of merit while respondents' appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this recourse.Petitioner submits that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by disregarding the alteration of the employment contract made by private respondent. Petitioner claims that the alteration by private respondent of his salary and overtime rate which is evidenced by the Crew Agreement and the exit pass constitutes a violation of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.6On the other hand, public respondent through the Solicitor General, contends that, as explained by the POEA: "Although the employment contract seems to have corrections, it is in conformity with the Wage Scale submitted to said office.7Apparently, petitioner emphasizes the materiality of the alleged unilateral alteration of the employment contract as this is proscribed by the Labor Code while public respondent finds the same to be merely innocuous. We take a closer look at the effects of these alterations upon petitioner's right to demand for his differential, overtime pay and refund of his return airfare to Manila.A careful examination of the records shows that there is in fact no alteration made in the Crew Agreement8or in the Exit Pass.9As the original data appear, the figures US$800.00 fall under the column salary, while the word "inclusive" is indicated under the column overtime rate. With the supposed alterations, the figures US$560.00 were handwritten above the figures US$800.00 while the figures US$240.00 were also written above the word "inclusive".As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to specify the salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner is entitled under the contract. It was a mere breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime pay. Otherwise stated, with or without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive under the agreement as approved by the POEA is US$800.00 monthly with wage differentials or overtime pay included.10Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders improbable the possibility that petitioner could have misunderstood the amount of compensation he will be receiving under the contract. Nor has petitioner advanced any explanation for statements contrary or inconsistent with what appears in the records. Thus, he claimed: [a] that private respondent extended the duration of the employment contract indefinitely,11but admitted in his Reply that his employment contract was extended for another six (6) months by agreement between private respondent and himself:12[b] that when petitioner demanded for his overtime pay, respondents repatriated him13which again was discarded in his reply stating that he himself requested for his voluntary repatriation because of the bad faith and insincerity of private respondent;14[c] that he was required to post a cash bond in the amount of P20,000.00 but it was found that he deposited only the total amount of P15,000.00; [d] that his salary for November 1985 was not paid when in truth and in fact it was petitioner who owes private respondent US$285.83 for cash advances15and on November 27, 1985 the final pay slip was executed and signed;16and [e] that he finished his contract when on the contrary, despite proddings that he continue working until the renewed contract has expired, he adamantly insisted on his termination.Verily, it is quite apparent that the whole conflict centers on the failure of respondent company to give the petitioner the desired promotion which appears to be improbable at the moment because the M/V Knut Provider continues to be laid off at Limassol for lack of charterers.17It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."18There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract without the approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation of law.Specifically, the law provides:Article 34 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code reads:Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:x x x x(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations as not constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition, exceptions from the coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable, sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin Law.19The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged amendment served to clarify what was agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would go beyond the bounds of reason and justice.As recently laid down by this Court, the rule that there should be concern, sympathy and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the working class, is meet and proper. That in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor, is not an unreasonable or unfair rule.20But to disregard the employer's own rights and interests solely on the basis of that concern and solicitude for labor is unjust and unacceptable.Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the National Labor Relations Commission which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.21In fact sinceMadrigal v. Rafferty22great weight has been accorded to the interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement the same.23WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 46727 September 27, 1939PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES' UNION, INC.,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, composed to Honorables Francisco Zulueta, Leopoldo Rovira, and Jose Generoso, and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC.,respondents.Jose Alejandrino for petitioner.Manuel Escudero for respondent court.L.D. Lockwood for respondent Pampanga Bus Co., Inc.LAUREL,J.:This is a petition for a writ ofcertiorarito review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated on January 14, 1939, denying the demands of the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.The following are the pertinent facts which have given occasion to this industrial dispute: On March 26, 1938, the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., addressed a thirteen- point petition to the management of the Pampanga Bus Co. Upon the failure of the company officials to act upon the petition, a strike was declared by the workers on April 14, 1938. However, through the timely mediation of the Department of Labor, a provisional agreement was reached, by virtue of which the strike was called off, eight demands were granted, and the remaining five were submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement. One of these demands, in the language of the petitioner, is that the respondent Pampanga Bus Co. "pay to all Company drivers affiliated with the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., all the back overtime pay due them under the law." After trial on the disputed demands, the Court of Industrial Relations decidedinter aliathat the claim for back overtime pay could not be allowed.The pertinent portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations is as follows:The evidence is clear that even before the final approval of Act No. 4242 amending Act No. 4123, the Eight Hour Labor Law, by extending the provisions of the latter to other class of laborers including drivers of public service vehicles, a petition was addressed by 44 drivers of the company to the Governor-General asking him to veto the bill amending the law extending it to drivers for the reason stated in their petition (Exhibit 5 and 5-a). About the 6th day of September, 1935, a petition was again addressed by 97 drivers of the company to the Commissioner of Labor requesting adjustment of working hours to permit them to retain their present status with the company as nearly as possible under the law (Exhibits 4, 4-a, 4-b, 4-c, 4-d and 4-e). This petition was prepared after a meeting of the employees was held and was drawn with the help of the manager of the respondent about the last days of August, 1935. In September, 1937, about 347 employees of the different departments of the company again addresses a petition to the Director of Labor expressing their satisfaction with the hours they work and the pay they receive for their labor including the special bonuses and overtime pay they receive for extra work, and asking, in view thereof, that the law be not applied to them (Exhibits 6, 6-a to 6-g).After the enactment of Act No. 4242 several transportation companies operating motor buses filed with Commissioner of Labor petitions for a readjustment of the hours of labor specified in section 1 of the Act on the basis of maintaining thestatus quoas to the hours the drivers were required to be actually on duty in order to enable them to make the prescribed hours daily that the exigencies of the service required. The petitions were based on the impracticability of applying the provisions of the law to drivers of public service vehicles without disrupting the public service and causing pecuniary loss to both employers and employees alike, and the resulting difficulties on the part of the drivers. The testimony of Atty. Carlos Alvear on this point in uncontradicted. He testified that in 1935, he was president of the Philippine Motor Association composed of bus operators operating in the Philippines, of which the respondent is a member. Major Olson, who was at the time the executive secretary of the association, and himself took up the matter with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Labor after the passage of the Act extending the operation of the Eight Labor Law to drivers. In their conference with the Commissioner of Labor, they were told to take advantage of the provisions of the law in which they may apply for the readjustment of the working hours, and in conformity with that suggestion, the executive secretary of the association filed a formal petition, Exhibit 10, on September 5, 1935. When this was filed the Department of Labor further suggested that the drivers of each company file and address a petition of similar nature designating their representatives who will represent them in a conference that the Commissioner of Labor may call for the purpose. With the filing of the petition, the conferees were assured by the Under-Secretary of Labor that the enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law in so far as the drivers were concerned, will be held in abeyance until such time as the meeting or investigations are held. It is not clear as to whether investigations and hearings were finally made but the evidence indicates that the petition was never decided and the companies continued its schedule of hours.Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4123 read as follows:"SEC. 3. The Commissioner of Labor, with the advice of two representatives of the employers concerned, designated by the latter, and of two representatives of the laborers concerned, designated by these, shall, at the request of an interested party, decide in each case whether or not it is proper to increase or decrease the number of hours of labor fixed in section one of this Act, either because the organization or nature of the work require it, or because of lack or insufficiency of competent laborers for certain work in a locality, or because the relieving of the laborers must be done under certain conditions, or by reason of any other exceptional circumstances or conditions of the work or industry concerned; but the number of hours of labor shall in no case exceed twelve daily or seventy-two weekly."SEC. 4. Employees or laborers desiring an increase or decrease of the number of hours of labor shall address an application to this effect to the Commissioner of Labor, stating their reasons. Upon receipt of an application of this kind, the Commissioner of Labor shall call a meeting of the employers and laborers of the establishment or industry concerned, for the designation of advisers as provided in the preceding section hereof. The Commissioner of Labor or his authorized representative, together with the advisers, shall make an investigation of the facts, giving special attention, in the first place, to the human aspect, and in the second place, to the economic aspect of the matter, and he may for this purpose administer oaths, take affidavits examine witnesses and documents and issuesubpoenasandsubpoenas duces tecum. The decision of the Commissioner of Labor may be reconsidered by him at any time."It seems clear that the petitions of both employers and employees for the non-enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law were made in accordance with these provisions of the law. Exhibit 9 of the respondent which is a communication addressed by the Under-Secretary of Labor on September 6, 1935, to the A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc., defines the attitude taken by the Department of Labor in connection with those petitions. It advises the company to submit an application under sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4123 above-quoted for an increase of working hours of such laborers as may fall under the amendment and that pending final solution of said application, the Department of Labor will not make any attempt to enforce said amendment. As has already been stated it is not clear whether final action or decision has been made on the applications with respect to the drivers of the respondent; that it is undeniable fact that up to the outbreak of the dispute, the law was not observed nor enforced in the company; and that upon mutual agreement arrived at by the parties on April 14, 1938, the company worked out a schedule beginning May 1, 1938, placing all its employees under an eight-hour schedule.In view of the foregoing fact, the court is the opinion that the drivers are not entitled to the overtime pay demanded for the whole period the law was not observed or enforced in the company. They are entitled to payment of wages for hours worked in excess of the legal hours only beginning May 1, 1938.On January 30, 1939, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations, sittingin banc,with the following observations:We have reviewed carefully the evidence on record with regard to the claim for back overtime pay we find that it amply supports the findings and conclusions set forth in support of the motion for reconsideration are virtually a repetition of the reasons advanced in the memorandum of the petitioner filed before the case was decided and were already discussed and considered in the decision. The evidence permits no other conclusion than that the employees were not coerced not intimidated by the respondent on the repeated occasions they signed and presented to the Department of Labor their petitions for non-enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The employees were indubitably aware of certain hardships the enforcement of the law at that time would bring to them and these prompted their attitude of preferring the continuation of the schedule of hours observed prior to the enactment of the legislation extending the benefits of the Eight Hour Labor Law to drivers of motor vehicles in public utility enterprises. Whatever pecuniary advantage they would have gained by the strict observance of the law by the company should they be made to work more than eight hours a day was apparently waived or given up by them in exchange of their personal convenience and of the additional monthly pay the respondent gave to those employees who were assigned to routes where the daily working hours exceeded the maximum fixed by law. The evidence that the company paid additional salaries not only to drivers but also to its conductors who were assigned to such routes stands uncontradicted and no attempt even was made by the petitioner to deny it. Without need of passing on the question as to whether the provisions of the law are mandatory or not, in the light of the above facts and applying the rules of equity invoked by the union, we are constrained to hold that the petitioners are not rightly entitled to the payment sought.InKapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Pantranco vs. Pangasinan Transportation Co.(39 Off. Gaz., 1217), we have held that, to be entitled to the benefits of section 5 of Act No. 4123, fulfillment of the mandate of the law is necessary, this being a matter of public interest. Where both parties, as in this case, we have violated the law, this court must decline to extend the strong arm of equity, as neither party is entitled to its aid. This is especially true in view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations which we should not disturb.We are not, to be sure insensible to the argument that industrial disputes should be decided with an eye on the welfare of the working class, who, in the inter-play of economic forces, is said to find itself in the "end of the stick." In the case at bar, however, we find no reason for disturbing the action taken by the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, which is a special court enjoined to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable" (sec. 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103).The petition is dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE),petitioner,vs.BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.),respondents.Jose C. Espinas for petitioner.Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the change of the divisor in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days.On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holidaypay in the light of the Court's decision inChartered Bank Employees Association v.Ople(138 SCRA273 [1985]).Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator.On January 2, 1980, Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to:pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. (Rollo,p.31)Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) theexclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from theholiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145)Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of251 as divisor is an established employee benefit whichcannot be diminished.On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the company's sales personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant of 10 days' holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor.Both Nestle and UFE filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration. Respondent Arbitrator treated the two motions as appeals and forwarded the case to the NLRC which issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 remanding the case to the respondent arbitrator on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in voluntary arbitration cases pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code as amended by Section 10, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and as implemented by Section 5 of the rules implementing B.P. Blg. 130.However, in a letter dated July 6, 1987, the respondent arbitrator refused to take cognizance of the case reasoning that he had no more jurisdiction to continue as arbitrator because he had resigned from service effective May 1, 1986.Hence, this petition.The petitioner union raises the following issues:1) Whether or not Nestle's sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay.The petitioner insists that respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code. The respondent company controverts this assertion.Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."The controversy centers on the interpretation of the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. if they are Makati-based.The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales personnel's working hours which can be determined with reasonable certainty.The Court does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual field work.We concur with the following disquisition by the respondent arbitrator:The requirement for the salesmen and other similarly situated employees to report for work at the office at 8:00 a.m. and return at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. is not within the realm of work in the field as defined in the Code but an exercise of purely management prerogative of providing administrative control over such personnel. This does not in any manner provide a reasonable level of determination on the actual field work of the employees which can be reasonably ascertained. The theoretical analysis that salesmen and other similarly-situated workers regularly report for work at 8:00 a.m. and return to their home station at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., creating the assumption that their field work is supervised, is surface projection. Actual field work begins after 8:00 a.m.,when the sales personnel follow their field itinerary, and ends immediately before 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. when they report back to their office. The period between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises their hours of work in the field, the extent or scope and result of which are subject to their individual capacity and industry and which "cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." This is the reason why effective supervision over field work of salesmen and medical representatives, truck drivers and merchandisers is practically a physical impossibility. Consequently, they are excluded from the ten holidays with pay award. (Rollo, pp. 36-37)Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:Rule IV Holidays with PaySec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except:xxx xxx xxx(e) Field personnel and other employeeswhose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer. . . (Emphasis supplied)While contending that such rule added another element not found in the law (Rollo, p. 13), the petitioner nevertheless attempted to show that its affected members are not covered by the abovementioned rule. The petitioner asserts that the company's sales personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the SOD (Supervisor of the Day) schedule and the company circular dated March 15, 1984 (Annexes 2 and 3,Rollo, pp. 53-55).Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned rule did not add another element to the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer.The SOD schedule adverted to by the petitioner does not in the least signify that these sales personnel's time and performance are supervised. The purpose of this schedule is merely to ensure that the sales personnel are out of the office not later than 8:00 a.m. and are back in the office not earlier than 4:00 p.m.Likewise, the Court fails to see how the company can monitor the number of actual hours spent in field work by an employee through the imposition of sanctions on absenteeism contained in the company circular of March 15, 1984.The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are given incentive bonus every quarter based on their performance is proof that their actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty.The Court thinks otherwise.The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6) proper truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190).The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given incentive bonuses precisely because of the difficulty in measuring their actual hours of field work. These employees are evaluated by the result of their work and not by the actual hours of field work which are hardly susceptible to determination.InSan Miguel Brewery, Inc.v.Democratic Labor Organization(8 SCRA 613 [1963]), the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of the job of a salesman. Citing the case ofJewel Tea Co.v.Williams,C.C.A. Okla.,118 F. 2d 202, the Court stated:The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent, works individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime he ordinarily receives commissions as extra compensation. He works away from his employer's place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day.While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime pay, the same rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies.The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrator's ruling that, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional 10 holidays and the employees should reimburse the amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251 days' divisor.Arbitrator Vivar's rationale for his decision is as follows:. . . The new doctrinal policy established which ordered payment of ten holidays certainly adds to or accelerates the basis of conversion and computation by ten days. With the inclusion of ten holidays as paid days, the divisor is no longer 251 but 261 or 262 if election day is counted. This is indeed an extremely difficult legal question of interpretation which accounts for what is claimed as falling within the concept of "solutio indebti."When the claim of the Union for payment of ten holidays was granted, there was a consequent need to abandon that 251 divisor. To maintain it would create an impossible situation where the employees would benefit with additional ten days with pay but would simultaneously enjoy higher benefits by discarding the same ten days for purposes of computing overtime and night time services and considering sick and vacation leave credits. Therefore, reimbursement of such overpayment with the use of 251 as divisor arises concomitant with the award of ten holidays with pay. (Rollo, p. 34)The divisor assumes an important role in determining whether or not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid employee's salary and in the computation of his daily rate. This is the thrust of our pronouncement inChartered Bank Employees Association v.Ople(supra). In that case, We held:It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in the policy instruction, the company practice indicates that the monthly salaries of the employees are so computed as to include the holiday pay provided by law. The petitioner contends otherwise.One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that the Chartered Bank, in computing overtime compensation for its employees, employs a "divisor" of 251 days. The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10) legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all non-working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251.In the petitioner's case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as follows:monthly rate x 12 months251 daysFollowing the criterion laid down in theChartered Bankcase, the use of 251 days' divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, whichrepresents the employee's annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday pay. To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employee's annual salary is P25,100, then dividing such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days' holiday pay, his annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by 261 days, thedaily rate is still P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and after the grant of holiday pay.Respondent Nestle's invocation ofsolutio indebiti, or payment by mistake, due to its use of 251 days as divisor must fail in light of the Labor Code mandate that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." (Article 4). Moreover, prior to September 1, 1980, when the company was on a 6-day working schedule, the divisor used by the company was 303, indicating that the 10 holidays were likewise not paid. When Filipro shifted to a 5-day working schebule on September 1, 1980, it had the chance to rectify its error, if ever there was one but did not do so. It is now too late to allege payment by mistake.Nestle also questions the voluntary arbitrator's ruling that holiday pay should be computed from November 1, 1974. This ruling was not questioned by the petitioner union as obviously said decision was favorable to it. Technically, therefore, respondent Nestle should have filed a separate petition raising the issue of effectivity of the holiday pay award. This Court has ruled that an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. (Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989], citing La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394 [1986]). Nevertheless, in order to fully settle the issues so that the execution of the Court's decision in this case may not be needlessly delayed by another petition, the Court resolved to take up the matter of effectivity of the holiday pay award raised by Nestle.Nestle insists that the reckoning period for the application of the holiday pay award is 1985 when theChartered Bankdecision, promulgated on August 28, 1985, became final and executory, and not from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. Although the Court does not entirely agree with Nestle, we find its claim meritorious.InInsular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v.Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 [1984], hereinafter referred to as the IBAA case, the Court declared that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, issued by the then Secretary of Labor on February 16, 1976 and April 23, 1976, respectively, and which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday pay benefits, are null and void. The Court therein reasoned that, in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, the aforementioned implementing rule and policy instruction amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. TheChartered Bankcase reiterated the above ruling and added the "divisor" test.However, prior to their being declared null and void, the implementing rule and policy instruction enjoyed the presumption of validity and hence, Nestle's non-payment of the holiday benefit up to the promulgation of the IBAA case on October 23, 1984 was in compliance with these presumably valid rule and policy instruction.In the case ofDe Agbayani v.Philippine National Bank, 38 SCRA 429 [1971], the Court discussed the effect to be given to a legislative or executive act subsequently declared invalid:xxx xxx xxx. . . It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the government organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution inAraneta v.Hill(93 Phil. 1002 [1952]) and the decision inManila Motor Co., Inc.v.Flores(99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court inFernandez v.Cuerva and Co. (21 SCRA 1095 [1967]. (At pp. 434-435)The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. It is now almost the end of 1991. To require various companies to reach back to 1975nowand nullify acts done in good faith is unduly harsh. 1984 is a fairer reckoning period under the facts of this case.Applying the aforementioned doctrine to the case at bar,it is not far-fetched that Nestle, relying on the implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction before this Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give holiday pay benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondent Nestle's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair to impose additional burdens on Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984 was not in any way attributed to Nestle's fault.The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of theIBAA case.WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 117442-43 January 11, 1995FEM'S ELEGANCE LODGING HOUSE, FENITHA SAAVEDRA and IRIES ANTHONY SAAVEDRA,petitioners,vs.The Honorable LEON P. MURILLO, Labor Arbiter, Regional Arbitration Branch, Region X, National Labor Relations Commission, Cagayan de Oro City, ALFONSO GALLETO, GEORGE VEDAD, ROLAND PANTONIAL, REYNALDO DELAORAO, FELICISIMO BAQUILID, CECILIO SAJOL, ANNABEL CASTRO, BENJAMIN CABRERA, RHONDEL PADERANGA, ZENAIDA GUTIB, AIDA IMBAT and MARIA GRACE ATUEL,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NQUIASON,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of court with temporary restraining order to reverse and set aside the Order dated September 21, 1994 of the Labor Arbiter in the NLRC RAB X Cases Nos. 10-04-00232 (-00233)-94.Petitioner FEM's elegance Lodging House is a business enterprise engaged in providing lodging accommodations. It is owned by petitioner Fenitha Saavedra and managed by petitioner Iries Anthony Saavedra. Private respondents are former employees of petitioners whose services were terminated between March and April, 1994.Sometime after their dismissal from the employment of petitioners, private respondents separately filed two cases against petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. X, Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC RAB X Cases Nos. 10-04-00232-(0023)-94. Private respondents sought for unpaid benefits such as minimum wage, overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, full thirteenth-month pay and separation pay (Rollo, pp. 40-42).On May 31, 1994, a pre-arbitration conference of the cases took place before the Labor Arbiter. It was agreed therein: (1) that both labor cases should be consolidated; and (2) that the parties would file their respective position papers within thirty days from said date or until June 30, 1994, after which the cases would be deemed submitted for resolution (Rollo, p. 14).On June 29, petitioners filed their position paper. On July 7, they inquired from the NLRC whether private respondents had filed their position paper. The receiving clerk of the NLRC confirmed that as of said date private respondents had not yet filed their position paper.The following events then transpired: on July 8, petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss for failure of private respondents to file their position paper within the agreed period (Rollo, p. 38); on July 15, private respondents belatedly filed their position paper; on July 18, petitioners filed a Motion to Expunge [private respondents'] Position Paper from the records of the case (Rollo, p. 45); and on August 23, the Labor Arbiter issued a notice of clarificatory hearing, which was set for September 7 (Rollo, p. 47). Prior to the hearing, petitioners filed a Motion to Resolve [petitioners'] Motion to dismiss and Motion to Expunge [private respondent'] Position Paper from the Records of the Case (Rollo, p. 48).On September 21, the Labor Arbiter issued the order denying the motions filed by petitioners. He held that a fifteen-day delay in filing the position paper was not unreasonable considering that the substantive rights of litigants should not be sacrificed by technicality. He cited Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which provides that all doubts in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of labor. He said that even under Section 15, Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, a delay in the filing of a position paper is not a ground for a motion to dismiss under the principle ofexclusio unius est excludio alterius(Rollo, pp. 51-52).Hence, the present petition where petitioners charged the Labor Arbiter with grave abuse of discretion for issuing the order in contravention of Section 3, Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Said section provides:Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. . . . Unless otherwise requested in writing by both parties, the Labor Arbitershalldirect both parties to submitsimultaneouslytheir position papers/memorandum with the supporting documents and affidavits within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of the last conference, with proof of having furnished each other with copies thereof (Emphasis supplied).Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process and that the Labor Arbiter should have cited private respondents in contempt for their failure to comply with their agreement in the pre-arbitration conference.We dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust their remedies, particularly in seeking redress from the NLRC prior to the filing of the instant petition. Article 223 of the Labor code of the Philippines provides that decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are appealable to the NLRC. Thus, petitioners should have first appealed the questioned order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, and not to this court. their omission is fatal to their cause.However, even if the petition was given due course, we see no merit in petitioners' arguments. The delay of private respondents in the submission of their position paper is a procedural flaw, and the admission thereof is within the discretion of the Labor Arbiter.Well-settled is the rule that technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases, for procedural lapses may be disregarded in the interest of substantial justice, particularly where labor matters are concerned (Ranara v. National Labor Relations commission, 212 SCRA 631 [1992]).The failure to submit a position paper on time is not on of the grounds for the dismissal of a complaint in labor cases (The New Rules of procedure of the NLRC, Rule V, Section 15). It cannot therefore be invoked by petitioners to declare private respondents as non-suited. This stance is in accord with Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which resolves that all doubts in the interpretation of the law and its implementing rules and regulations shall be construed in favor of labor. Needless to state, our jurisprudence is rich with decisions adhering to the State's basic policy of extending protection to Labor where conflicting interests between labor and management exist (Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 118 [1992]).Petitioners cannot claim that they were denied due process inasmuch as they were able to file their position paper. The proper party to invoke due process would have been private respondents, had their position paper been expunged from the records for mere technicality. Since petitioners assert that their defense is meritorious, it is to their best interest that the cases be resolved on the merits. In this manner, the righteousness of their cause can be vindicated.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsPADILLA,J.,concurring:The petition in this case should be dismissed because petitioners did not exhaust their remedies in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) before coming to this Court.It is clear from Article 223 of the Labor Code that decisions, awards orordersof the labor arbiter are appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission. The proper remedy which petitioners should have taken was to appeal to the NLRC the labor arbiter's order denying their motion to dismiss and motion to expunge private respondents' position paper. The present petition is therefore clearly premature, a procedural flaw and should on this score be dismissed.If this Court were to entertain appeals from orders of labor arbiters, even in the form of a petition forcertiorarifor alleged grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we will be opening the flood gates to petitions forcertiorariagainst orders (including interlocutory ones) of labor arbiters when the clear intent of the law is to subject the decisions, awards and orders of labor arbiters to review by the NLRC before they are brought to this Court.Separate OpinionsPADILLA,J.,concurring:The petition in this case should be dismissed because petitioners did not exhaust their remedies in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) before coming to this Court.It is clear from Article 223 of the Labor Code that decisions, awards orordersof the labor arbiter are appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission. The proper remedy which petitioners should have taken was to appeal to the NLRC the labor arbiter's order denying their motion to dismiss and motion to expunge private respondents' position paper. The present petition is therefore clearly premature, a procedural flaw and should on this score be dismissed.If this Court were to entertain appeals from orders of labor arbiters, even in the form of a petition forcertiorarifor alleged grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we will be opening the flood gates to petitions forcertiorariagainst orders (including interlocutory ones) of labor arbiters when the clear intent of the law is to subject the decisions, awards and orders of labor arbiters to review by the NLRC before they are brought to this Court.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-48605 December 14, 1981DOMNA N. VILLAVERT,petitioner,vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Constabulary),respondents.FERNANDEZ,J.:This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0692, entitled "Domna N. Villavert, appellant versus Government Service Insurance System (Philippine Constabulary), respondents," affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits.1The petitioner, Domna N. Villavert, is the mother of the late, Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on December 12, 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. No. 626 as amended with the Government Service Insurance System on March 18, 1976. The said claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance System on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment.The petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed on May 31, 1978 the decision of the respondent, Government Service Insurance System, denying the claim.The record shows that in addition to his duties as Code Verifier, Marcelino N. Villavert also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. In the morning of December 11, 1975, Marcelino reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center at Camp Crame, Quezon City. He performed his duties not only as code verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of December 11, 1975, after a whole day of strenuous activities, Marcelino was still required to render overtime service until late in the evening of the same day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police personnel throughout the country for distribution on or before December 15, 1975. He went home late at night and due to fatigue, he went to bed as soon as he arrived without taking his meal. Shortly thereafter, Marcelino was noticed by his mother, the herein petitioner, gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words. The petitioner tried to wake him up and after all efforts to bring him to his senses proved futile, she rushed Marcelino to the UE Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 5:30 o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1975 without regaining consciousness. The case of death was acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis.To support the claim that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis as a result of his duties as a code verifier, computer operator and typist of the Philippine Constabulary, the petitioner submitted the following certification of Lt. Colonel Felino C. Pacheco Jr., commanding officer, of the Philippine Constabulary, which reads:THIS IS TO CERTIFY that MARCELINO N. VILLAVERT, a regular employee of the Constabulary Computer Center, had been performing the following duty assignments in this office in addition to his appointment as Coder Verifier before his death;a. Computer Operator As computer operator he was subject to excessive heat and cold;b. Clerk TypistAs typist he was responsible for typing important communications not only for the office of the Constabulary Computer Center but also for other posts, including engagement speeches of the Chief of Constabulary and other ranking officers of the Command;c. Due to the shortage of qualified civilian personnel to handle the task, he was given excessive work responsibilities in the office which could have aggravated his ailment.d. That more often he took his meals irregularly late in view of the nature of his work especially during the preparation of checks for the salary of the Philippine Constabulary and the National Integrated Police personnel throughout the country;e. He used to perform rotation duties, thereby leaving him in sufficient time to consult the Constabulary Medical Dispensary for routine physical check up about his health.f. That subject employee never drinks alcoholic liquor, neither smokes nor engages on immoral habits during his lifetime.g. That he died in line of duty after retiring from his night shift.This certification is being issued in behalf of legal heirs in order to justify their claim for payment of benefits from the Employees' Compensation to reciprocate the services rendered by the late Marcelino N. Villavert, a loyal and dedicated public servant.2The foregoing certification of Lt. Col. Felino C. Pacheco, Jr. was corroborated by the affidavit of Rustico P. Valenzuela, Chief Clerk of the Constabulary Computer Center, which reads:I, RUSTICO P. VALENZUELA, Master Sergeant, Philippine Constabulary, Filipino of legal age, married and presently Chief Clerk of the Constabulary Computer Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City after having been duly sworn to in accordance to law hereby depose and say:a. That as Chief Clerk I am responsible to my Commanding Officer about the accounting, detail, duties, etc. of all military and civilian personnel in the office and therefore the duties of the late Marcelino N. Villavert are personally known to me prior to his death;b. That the late Marcelino N. Villavert although was appointed as Coder Verifier, still he was instructed to perform extra additional workload due to shortage of qualified civilian personnel to handle administrative function, he being a graduate of the Computer Operator and an expert typist which is seldom found among the qualities of civilian personnel assigned in the Constabulary Computer Center;c. That the late Marcelino N. Villavert was complaining of chest pain and headache prior to his death but because of an urgent call to the service, although it necessitated his rest; he was obliged to go on strenuous duty on the night of December 11, 1975, typing voluminous classified communications, compute allowances and prepare checks for the salary of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police personnel throughout the country for distribution on or before December 15, 1975, scheduled payday, thereby aggravating his ailment due to excessive work, disposed to heat and cold, operating computer machine and over fatigue that caused his sudden death;d. That the late Marcelino N. Villavert before his death have insufficient time to consult the Medical Dispensary for routine physical check-up due to the rotation of his duties and therefore no record of his physical examination could be found in this Headquarters;e. That the death of late Marcelino N. Villavert was service connected in view of the fact that he died while in the performance of his official duties.Affiant further sayeth none.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 22nd day of August 1977 at Quezon City.(SGD) RUSTICO P. VALENZUELAffiantSUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of August 1977 at Quezon City, Metro Manila. Affiant exhibited his Residence Certificate No. A-1183510 issued at Taguig, Metro Manila on January 10, 1977.(SGD) ENRIQUE C VILLANUEVA JR1Lt. PC Administrative Officer3The Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim for compensation on the ground that the petitioner did not present evidence that the illness of Marcelino N. Villavert, acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis, was caused or aggravated by the nature of his duties as employee of the Philippine Constabulary.The Employees' Compensation Commission, citing a book on medicine, said:In medical science, acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is "acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas." It occurs most commonly in association with alcoholism. The onset of the symptoms often occurs during or shortly after bouts of alcoholic intoxication. It also occurs in association with biliary tract disease. Occasionally, it occurs as a complication of peptic ulcer, mumps, viral hepatitis or following the use of drugs such as glucocorticoids, or chlorothiazide. It is sometimes associated with metabolic disorders such as hyperpidemia and hyperparathyroidism. It may also be associated with a genetic type of pancreatitis with onset in childhood. Trauma is a relatively frequent cause of pancreatitis; it may result from a severe blow to the abdomen, a penetrating injury from a bullet or knife wound, inadvertent trauma from surgical procedures in the upper abdomen or rarely, electric shock. Approximately 20% of the patients have no apparent underlying or predisposing cause. (Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison, 7th Edition, pp. 157)4However, the Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease.5From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a "bout of alcoholic intoxication" shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs.It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is set aside and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00).SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and Plana, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsMELENCIO-HERRERA,J.,dissenting.Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation explicitly provides:SECTION 1.x x x x x x x x x(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease annotated under Annex "A" of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions(emphasis supplied).The cause of death of petitioner's son was acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis. This disease is not one of those listed, even under the additional listing, as an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Neither did petitioner present evidence to prove that the risk of contracting hemorrhagic pancreatitis was increased by the working conditions surrounding her son's employment as code verifier, computer operator and typist of the Philippine Constabulary. For which reasons, the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim for compensation.That physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease, as stated by the Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation is not scientifically confirmed "research data." Medical science still associates the disease with alcoholism, binary tract disease, the use of drugs, or trauma, among others. In fact, the exact cause is still unknown. Medical reports indicate that approximately 20% of the patients suffering from that disease have no apparent underlying or predisposing cause.The illness of petitioner's son not having been caused nor aggravated by the nature of his duties as an employee of the Philippine Constabulary, petitioner's claim is not compensable under explicit provisions of existing laws.Separate OpinionsMELENCIO-HERRERA,J.,dissenting.Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation explicitly provides:SECTION 1.x x x x x x x x x(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease annotated under Annex "A" of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions(emphasis supplied).The cause of death of petitioner's son was acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis. This disease is not one of those listed, even under the additional listing, as an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Neither did petitioner present evidence to prove that the risk of contracting hemorrhagic pancreatitis was increased by the working conditions surrounding her son's employment as code verifier, computer operator and typist of the Philippine Constabulary. For which reasons, the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim for compensation.That physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease, as stated by the Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation is not scientifically confirmed "research data." Medical science still associates the disease with alcoholism, binary tract disease, the use of drugs, or trauma, among others. In fact, the exact cause is still unknown. Medical reports indicate that approximately 20% of the patients suffering from that disease have no apparent underlying or predisposing cause.The illness of petitioner's son not having been caused nor aggravated by the nature of his duties as an employee of the Philippine Constabulary, petitioner's claim is not compensable under explicit provisions of existing laws.

213 Phil. 334

SECOND DIVISION[ G.R. No. L-58176, March 23, 1984 ]RUTH JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O NMAKASIAR, Acting C.J.:This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated August 20, 1981 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in ECC Case No. 1587, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), denying petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.The undisputed facts are as follows:Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who joined the government service in June, 1969 as a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.).After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to the rank of constable second class. On December 16, 1974, he was again promoted to the rank of sergeant (p. 26, rec.).Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus from Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to Anulung, Cagayan. While on their way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was seated on the left side of the bus, fell down from the bus because of the sudden stop of the vehicle. As a result, he was confined at the Cagayan Provincial Hospital for about one (1) week, and thereafter, released (comment of respondent ECC, pp. 25-36, rec.). He was again confined for further treatment from November 7, 1978 to May 16, 1979 at the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City.While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, he was assigned as security to one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). In compliance with his duty, he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.).On November 7, 1978, the deceased was again confined at the Cagayan Provincial Hospital and then transferred to the AFP V. Luna Medical Center at Quezon City for further treatment. He complained of off-and-on back pains, associated with occasional cough and also the swelling of the right forearm. The doctors found a mass growth on his right forearm, which grew to the size of 3 by 2 inches, hard and associated with pain, which the doctors diagnosed as "aortic aneurysm, medrastinal tumor" (p. 27, rec.).His condition improved somewhat after treatment and he was released on May 16, 1979. He was advised to have complete rest and to continue medication. He was then given light duty inside the barracks of their company. Unfortunately, his ailment continued and became more serious.On May 12, 1980, he died in his house at Anulung, Cagayan, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening. He was barely 35 years old at the time of his death.The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic carcinoma" which is a malignant tumor of the lungs.On June 6, 1980, an administrative hearing was conducted before the PC Regional Board. It was their official findings that the subject enlisted man "died in line of duty"; that the deceased was a PC member of the 111th PC Company at Tuguegarao, Cagayan; that he died due to "bronchogenic CA"; and that he "died not as a result of his misconduct and did not violate any provisions of the Articles of War" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980).The Board recommended "that all benefits due to or become due subject EP be paid and settled to his legal heirs" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). Thus, as per records of the GSIS, petitioner was paid benefits due to her deceased husband under Republic Act. No. 610 (Comment of respondent ECC, p. 27, rec.).Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD No. 626, as amended with the respondent GSIS. Said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that her husband's death is not compensable "for the reason that the injury/sickness that caused his death is not due to the circumstances of the employment or in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of said employment" (Letter of denial by the GSIS dated July 14, 1980, ECC rec.).The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees Compensation Commission in its decision dated August 21, 1981, stating among others:"xx xx xx."After an exhausted (sic) study of the evidences (sic) on record and the applicable law on the case, we conclude that the law has been properly applied by the respondent System. x x x."Bronchogenic carcinoma, medical authorities disclose, is the most common form of malignancy in males reaching a peak between the fifth and seventh decades and accounting for one in four male cancer deaths. The sex incidence is at least 5 to 1, male to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical authorities have confirmed the relationship between lung cancer and cigarette smoking. Other factors that may have potential roles are exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and asbestos (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicineby Wintrobe, et al., 7th Edition, p. 1322)."Although Presidential Decree. No. 626, as amended was envisioned to give relief to workingmen, who sustain an injury or contract an ailment in the course of employment and that to best attain its lofty objective, a liberal interpretation of the law should pervade in its implementation, this precept, however, may not be invoked as not even a slight causal link between the development of the ailment and the decedent's (sic) duties and working conditions as a PC sergeant could be deduced from the records of this case. The respondent System's ruling that appellant's claim does not fall within the beneficiant provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, and therefore the same should be denied, is in full harmony with the law and the facts obtaining herein."xx xx xx" (Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.).On September 28, 1981, petitioner, assisted by counsel, filed the instant petition, the only pertinent issue being whether or not her husband's death from bronchogenic carcinoma is compensable under the law.The petitioner contends that her husband's death is compensable and that respondent Commission erred in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted circumstance that when the deceased entered into the Philippine Constabulary, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. She further contends that as a soldier, her husband's work has always been in the field where exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest was the rule rather than the exception. The nature of work of a soldier being to protect life and property of citizens, he was subject to call at any time of day or night. Furthermore, he was even assigned as security to one Emilio Cordero and always accompanied the latter wherever he went. Exposed to these circumstances for several years, the deceased's physical constitution began to deteriorate, which eventually resulted to his death from bronchogenic carcinoma (Petition, pp. 2-9, rec.).On the other hand, respondent Commission maintains that while the deceased soldier may have been exposed to elements of dust and dirt and condition of lack of rest and continued fatigue by virtue of his duties to protect the life and property of the citizens, such conditions have no causal relation to his contraction of bronchogenic carcinoma. It is also the opinion of the respondent that since there is evidence of the deceased to be a smoker, "the late Sgt. Jimenez may have indulged heavily in smoking and drinking, not merely 'occasionally'. And it has been demonstrated medically that the more cigarettes a person smokes, the greater the risk of developing lung cancer" (Memorandum, p. 62, rec.). In short, the respondent alleges that the deceased was responsible to a large degree for his having contracted bronchogenic carcinoma that led to his demise.WE find the petitioner's claim meritorious.Primary carcinoma of the lung is the most common fatal cancer and its frequency is increasing (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647). Admittedly, cancer of the lungs (bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline cases where a study of the circumstances of the case is mandated to fully appreciate whether the nature of the work of the deceased increased the possibility of contracting such an ailment. In the case of Laron vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 90), WE