520 F

520 F.2d 250UNITED STATES of America, Apellee, v. Roland William DUBE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.No. 75-1034.United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.Argued May 5, 1975.Decided June 30, 1975.Peter L. Murray, Portland, Maine, by appointment of the Court, Murray, Plumb & Murray, Portland, Maine, was on brief, for appellant.Peter Mills, U. S. Atty., for appellee.Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.McENTEE, Circuit Judge.1Defendant Dube was tried on an indictment charging him with robbery of a federally insured bank. He did not deny that he committed the robbery, but introduced the testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist that he was insane when he committed the offense. The prosecution did not present expert opinion evidence but relied instead on cross-examination and the lay testimony of two bank tellers and Dube's accomplice to rebut his case. Dube moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the prosecution had failed as a matter of law to sustain its burden of proving his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but the motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and Dube appeals.2A criminal defendant is presumed sane, but the introduction of evidence of insanity dispels the presumption and subjects the prosecution to the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Beltran v. United States,302 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1962). Insanity is a jury question unless a reasonable man viewing the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution must necessarily possess a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity. United States v. Coleman,501 F.2d 342(10th Cir. 1974). The nature and quantum of rebuttal evidence sufficient to present a jury question is to some extent determined by the strength of the case for insanity. United States v. Bass,490 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1974). There is no general principle that the prosecution must counter defendant's expert medical evidence with expert testimony of its own. See United States v. Shackelford,494 F.2d 67(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934, 94 S.Ct. 2647, 41 L.Ed.2d 237 (1974). The expert testimony is not conclusive even where uncontradicted; its weight and credibility are for the jury to determine, United States v. Lutz,420 F.2d 414, 415 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911, 90 S.Ct. 1709, 26 L.Ed.2d 73 (1970), and it may be rebutted in various ways apart from the introduction of countervailing expert opinion.13We do not think the evidence in this case was such that a reasonable man must necessarily have entertained doubts as to defendant's sanity. Both Dr. Voss, the psychiatrist, and Dr. Bishop, the psychologist, testified that in their opinion defendant was a schizophrenic and substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the crime.2They arrived at those diagnoses nearly five months after the robbery and only a week before trial. Dr. Voss's opinion was based on two hours of interviews and Dr. Bishop's on a one-hour interview and three hours of intelligence and personality testing. Diagnoses based on such minimal observation are suspect. Mims v. United States,375 F.2d 135, 146 (5th Cir. 1967). Though both examined and diagnosed defendant separately, they subsequently discussed his case together before testifying. Neither had any prior acquaintance with defendant nor did either treat him at any time. In fact, in contrast to most of the cases defendant cites, he had no organic manifestations, had never received any psychiatric treatment and had experienced no earlier abnormal episodes of any kind. Id. Some of the factors the experts relied on in reaching their diagnoses were contradictory or unconvincing.34Most importantly, Dr. Voss's diagnosis was based almost entirely on the subjective history narrated by defendant and his counsel, see United States v. Ingman,426 F.2d 973(9th Cir. 1970), and Dr. Bishop undoubtedly interpreted the test results in light of the history he received. Both testified that they were able to detect malingering and that defendant could not fabricate a history suggesting schizophrenia, but of course a jury would not be bound to believe these assertions. Id. Indeed the factual assumptions they derived from Dube's narrative, on which they predicated their conclusions, did not comport with the testimony at trial. On the basis of defendant's statements, both regarded the robbery as compulsive and irrational, but the testimony of Mrs. Kyllonen, the accomplice, furnished abundant evidence of a carefully planned and executed crime.4The experts' testimony also seemed to rest in part on the notion that bank robbery is an irrational activity in the first place, making the competence of a bank robber at least suspect.5Both concluded that defendant was shy, a "loner," unable to form emotional attachments to others, but Mrs. Kyllonen testified that she was in love with defendant, that they had lived together for as long as three weeks before the robbery and that they had arranged to get back together after defendant disposed of some stolen checks in New York. She also testified that during the period immediately after the robbery she did not notice anything peculiar about defendant's activities. Since expert opinion rises no higher than the reasons on which it is based, Dusky v. United States,295 F.2d 743(8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998, 82 S.Ct. 625, 7 L.Ed.2d 536 (1962), we cannot say that it would be unreasonable to discount the testimony of Drs. Voss and Bishop heavily. We agree with our concurring brother that the prosecution was remiss in not offering psychiatric testimony of its own. However, on all the evidence we think the court correctly allowed the case to go to the jury. See United States v. Coleman, supra.5 Affirmed.432 U.S. 19797 S.Ct. 231953 L.Ed.2d 281Gordon G. PATTERSON, Jr., Appellant,v.State of NEW YORK.No. 75-1861.Argued March 1, 1977.Decided June 17, 1977.SyllabusNew York law requiring that the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter held not to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mallaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, distinguished. Pp. 201-216.(a) Such affirmative defense does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State must prove in order to convict, but constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion. Pp. 206-207.(b) The Due Process Clause does not put New York to the choice of abandoning such an affirmative defense or undertaking to disprove its existence in order to convict for a crime which is otherwise within the State's constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment. If the State chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, it may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty, and to recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, expensive, and inaccurate. Pp. 207-209.39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898, affirmed.Victor J. Rubino, New York City, for the appellant.John M. Finnerty, Steuben County Dist. Atty., Bath, N.Y., for the appellee.Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.1The question here is the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause of burdening the defendant in a New York State murder trial with proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law.2* After a brief and unstable marriage, the appellant, Gordon Patterson, Jr., became estranged from his wife, Roberta. Roberta resumed an association with John Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged prior to her marriage to appellant. On December 27, 1970, Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There, he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in the presence of John Northrup. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head.3Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. In New York there are two elements of this crime: (1) "intent to cause the death of another person"; and (2) "caus(ing) the death of such person or of a third person." N.Y.Penal Law 125.25 (McKinney 1975).1Malice aforethought is not an element of the crime. In addition, the State permits a person accused of murder to raise an affirmative defense that he "acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse."24New York also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally kills another person "under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance."3Appellant confessed before trial to killing Northrup, but at trial he raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.45The jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime of murder. Focusing on the element of intent, the trial court charged:6"Before you, considering all of the evidence, can convict this defendant or any-one of murder, you must believe and decide that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended, in firing the gun, to kill either the victim himself or some other human being. . . .

7"Always remember that you must not expect or require the defendant to prove to your satisfaction that his acts were done without the intent to kill. Whatever proof he may have attempted, however far he may have gone in an effort to convince you of his innocence or guiltlessness, he is not obliged, he is not obligated to prove anything. It is always the People's burden to prove his guilt, and to prove that he intended to kill in this instance beyond a reasonable doubt." App. A70-A71.58The jury was further instructed, consistently with New York law, that the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was told that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had intentionally killed Northrup but that appellant had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, it had to find appellant guilty of manslaughter instead of murder.9The jury found appellant guilty of murder. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the Appellate Division affirmed. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur,421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), in which the Court declared Maine's murder statute unconstitutional. Under the Maine statute, a person accused of murder could rebut the statutory presumption that he committed the offense with "malice aforethought" by proving that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Court held that this scheme improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecutor to the defendant and was therefore a violation of due process. In the Court of Appeals appellant urged that New York's murder statute is functionally equivalent to the one struck down in Mullaney and that therefore his conviction should be reversed.610The Court of Appeals rejected appellant's argument, holding that the New York murder statute is consistent with due process. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976). The Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that the New York statute involved no shifting of the burden to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged since the New York affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance bears no direct relationship to any element of murder. This appeal ensued, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U.S. 813, 97 S.Ct. 52, 50 L.Ed.2d 72 (1976). We affirm.II11It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government, Irvine v. California,347 U.S. 128, 134, 74 S.Ct. 381, 384, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954) (plurality opinion), and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States. Among other things, it is normally "within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion," and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Speiser v. Randall,357 U.S. 513, 523, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); Leland v. Oregon,343 U.S. 790, 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 1007, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts,291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).12In determining whether New York's allocation to the defendant of proving the mitigating circumstances of severe emotional disturbance is consistent with due process, it is therefore relevant to note that this defense is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation and that at common law the burden of proving the latter, as well as other affirmative defenses indeed, "all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation" rested on the defendant. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *201; M. Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762); Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S., at 693-694, 95 S.Ct., at 1886-1887.7This was the rule when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, and it was the American rule when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93 (1845).813In 1895 the common-law view was abandoned with respect to the insanity defense in federal prosecutions. Davis v. United States,160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895). This ruling had wide impact on the practice in the federal courts with respect to the burden of proving various affirmative defenses, and the prosecution in a majority of jurisdictions in this country sooner or later came to shoulder the burden of proving the sanity of the accused and of disproving the facts constituting other affirmative defenses, including provocation. Davis was not a constitutional ruling, however, as Leland v. Oregon, supra, made clear.914At issue in Leland v. Oregon was the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Oregon rule that the defense of insanity must be proved by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Noting that Davis "obviously establish(ed) no constitutional doctrine," 343 U.S., at 797, 72 S.Ct. at 1007, the Court refused to strike down the Oregon scheme, saying that the burden of proving all elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt, including the elements of premeditation and deliberation, was placed on the State under Oregon procedures and remained there throughout the trial. To convict, the jury was required to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence, including the evidence going to the issue of insanity. Only then was the jury "to consider separately the issue of legal sanity per se. . . ." Id., at 795, 72 S.Ct. at 1006. This practice did not offend the Due Process Clause even though among the 20 States then placing the burden of proving his insanity on the defendant, Oregon was alone in requiring him to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.15In 1970, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship,397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur,421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the Court further announced that under the Maine law of homicide, the burden could not constitutionally be placed on the defendant of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing had occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, concurring, expressed their understanding that the Mullaney decision did not call into question the ruling in Leland v. Oregon, supra, with respect to the proof of insanity.16Subsequently, the Court confirmed that it remained constitutional to burden the defendant with proving his insanity defense when it dismissed, as not raising a substantial federal question, a case in which the appellant specifically challenged the continuing validity of Leland v. Oregon. This occurred in Rivera v. Delaware,429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976), an appeal from a Delaware conviction which, in reliance on Leland, had been affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court over the claim that the Delaware statute was unconstitutional because it burdened the defendant with proving his affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The claim in this Court was that Leland had been overruled by Winship and Mullaney. We dismissed the appeal as not presenting a substantial federal question. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda,422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975).III17We cannot conclude that Patterson's conviction under the New York law deprived him of due process of law. The crime of murder is defined by the statute, which represents a recent revision of the state criminal code, as causing the death of another person with intent to do so. The death, the intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if a person is to be convicted of murder. No further facts are either presumed or inferred in order to constitute the crime. The statute does provide an affirmative defense that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation which, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the crime to manslaughter, an offense defined in a separate section of the statute. It is plain enough that if the intentional killing is shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a murderer unless he demonstrates the mitigating circumstances.18Here, the jury was instructed in accordance with the statute, and the guilty verdict confirms that the State successfully carried its burden of proving the facts of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the evidence, including any evidence that might have been offered with respect to Patterson's mental state at the time of the crime, raised a reasonable doubt about his guilt as a murderer; and clearly the evidence failed to convince the jury that Patterson's affirmative defense had been made out. It seems to us that the State satisfied the mandate of Winship that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which (Patterson was) charged." 397 U.S., at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1073.19In convicting Patterson under its murder statute, New York did no more than Leland and Rivera permitted it to do without violating the Due Process Clause. Under those cases, once the facts constituting a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence including the evidence of the defendant's mental state, the State may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.20The New York law on extreme emotional disturbance follows this pattern. This affirmative defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting "the defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them," 39 N.Y.2d, at 302, 383 N.Y.S.2d, at 582, 347 N.E.2d, at 907, does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion; and unless we are to overturn Leland and Rivera, New York has not violated the Due Process Clause, and Patterson's conviction must be sustained.21We are unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera. But even if we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put in issue, it would not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. Here, in revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a substantially expanded version of the older heat-of-passion concept; but it was willing to do so only if the facts making out the defense were established by the defendant with sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to undertake to establish the absence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps fearing that proof would be too difficult and that too many persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence need merely raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's emotional state. It has been said that the new criminal code of New York contains some 25 affirmative defenses which exculpate or mitigate but which must be established by the defendant to be operative.10The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment.22The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Winship, 397 U.S., at 372, 90 S.Ct., at 1077 (Harlan, J., concurring). The social cost of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is thus an increased risk that the guilty will go free. While it is clear that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk it must bear is not without limits; and Mr. Justice Harlan's aphorism provides little guidance for determining what those limits are. Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person. Punishment of those found guilty by a jury, for example, is not forbidden merely because there is a remote possibility in some instances that an innocent person might go to jail.23It is said that the common-law rule permits a State to punish one as a murderer when it is as likely as not that he acted in the heat of passion or under severe emotional distress and when, if he did, he is guilty only of manslaughter. But this has always been the case in those jurisdictions adhering to the traditional rule. It is also very likely true that fewer convictions of murder would occur if New York were required to negative the affirmative defense at issue here. But in each instance of a murder conviction under the present law New York will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally killed another person, an act which it is not disputed the State may constitutionally criminalize and punish. If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonably certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.11We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here.24This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard. "(I)t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." McFarland v. American Sugar Rfg. Co.,241 U.S. 79, 86, 36 S.Ct. 498, 500, 60 L.Ed. 899 (1916). The legislature cannot "validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt." Tot v. United States,319 U.S. 463, 469, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 1246, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S., at 523-525, 78 S.Ct., at 1340-1341. Morrison v. California,291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), also makes the point with sufficient clarity.25Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses were to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required.12This was not the problem to which Winship was addressed. Nor does the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses for whatever reasons mean that those States that strike a different balance are in violation of the Constitution.13IV26It is urged that Mullaney v. Wilbur necessarily invalidates Patterson's conviction. In Mullaney the charge was murder,14which the Maine statute defined as the unlawful killing of a human being "with malice aforethought, either express or implied." The trial court instructed the jury that the words "malice aforethought" were most important because "malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder." Malice, as the statute indicated and as the court instructed, could be implied and was to be implied from "any deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another suddenly . . . or without a considerable provocation," in which event an intentional killing was murder unless by a preponderance of the evidence it was shown that the act was committed "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation." The instructions emphasized that " 'malice aforethought and heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things'; thus, by proving the latter the defendant would negate the former." 421 U.S., at 686-687, 95 S.Ct. at 1883 (citation omitted).27Wilbur's conviction, which followed, was affirmed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that murder and manslaughter were varying degrees of the crime of felonious homicide and that the presumption of malice arising from the unlawful killing was a mere policy presumption operating to cast on the defendant the burden of proving provocation if he was to be found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder a burden which the Maine law had allocated to him at least since the mid-1800's.28The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue, holding that the presumption unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proof with respect to an essential element of the crime. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disputed this interpretation of Maine law in State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (1973), declaring that malice aforethought, in the sense of premeditation, was not an element of the crime of murder and that the federal court had erroneously equated the presumption of malice with a presumption of premeditation.29"Maine law does not rely on a presumption of 'premeditation' (as Wilbur v. Mullaney assumed) to prove an essential element of unlawful homicide punishable as murder.30Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 'malice aforethought' (in the sense of 'premeditation') is not essential to conviction. . . . (T)he failure of the State to prove 'premeditation' in this context is not fatal to such a prosecution because, by legal definition under Maine law, a killing becomes unlawful and punishable as 'murder' on proof of 'any deliberate, cruel act, committed by one person against another, suddenly without any, or without a considerable provocation.' State v. Neal, 37 Me. 468, 470 (1854). Neal has been frequently cited with approval by our Court." Id., at 664-665. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)31When the judgment of the First Circuit was vacated for reconsideration in the light of Lafferty, that court reaffirmed its view that Wilbur's conviction was unconstitutional. This Court, accepting the Maine court's interpretation of the Maine law, unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeals that Wilbur's due process rights had been invaded by the presumption casting upon him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation.32Mullaney's holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt.15In our view, the Mullaney holding should not be so broadly read. The concurrence of two Justices in Mullaney was necessarily contrary to such a reading; and a majority of the Court refused to so understand and apply Mullaney when Rivera was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.33Mullaney surely held that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense. This is true even though the State's practice, as in Maine, had been traditionally to the contrary. Such shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so important that it must be either proved or presumed is impermissible under the Due Process Clause.34It was unnecessary to go further in Mullaney. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court made it clear that malice aforethought, which was mentioned in the statutory definition of the crime, was not equivalent to premeditation and that the presumption of malice traditionally arising in intentional homicide cases carried no factual meaning insofar as premeditation was concerned. Even so, a killing became murder in Maine when it resulted from a deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another, "suddenly without any, or without a considerable provocation." State v. Lafferty, supra, at 665. Premeditation was not within the definition of murder; but malice, in the sense of the absence of provocation, was part of the definition of that crime. Yet malice, i. e., lack of provocation, was presumed and could be rebutted by the defendant only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted with heat of passion upon sudden provocation. In Mullaney we held that however traditional this mode of proceeding might have been, it is contrary to the Due Process Clause as construed in Winship.35As we have explained, nothing was presumed or implied against Patterson; and his conviction is not invalid under any of our prior cases. The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is36Affirmed.

268 U.S. 17845 S.Ct. 47069 L.Ed. 904YEE HEMv.UNITED STATES.No. 303.Argued March 19, 1925.Decided April 27, 1925.Messrs. Gerard J. Pilliod and Joseph C. Breitenstein, both of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff in error.[Argument of Counsel from pages 178-180 intentionally omitted]Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan, for the United States.Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.1Plaintiff in error was convicted in the court below of the offense of concealing a quantity of smoking opium after importation, with knowledge that it had been imported in violation of Act Feb. 9, 1909, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, as amended by Act Jan. 17, 1914, c. 9, 38 Stat. 275 (Comp. St. 8800-8801f). Sections 2 and 3 of the act as amended (Comp. St. 8801, 8801a) are challenged as unconstitutional, on the ground that they contravene the due process of law and the compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution.2Section 1 of the Act (Comp. St. 8800) prohibits the importation into the United States of opium in any form after April 1, 1909, except that opium and preparations and derivatives thereof, other than smoking opium or opium prepared for smoking, may be imported for medicinal purposes only, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 2 provides, among other things, that if any person shall conceal or facilitate the concealment of such opium, etc., after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, the offender shall be subject to fine or imprisonment or both. It further provides that whenever the defendant on trial is shown to have, or to have had, possession of such opium, etc., 'such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.' Section 3 provides that on and after July 1, 1913:3'All smoking opium or opium prepared for smoking found within the United States shall be presumed to have been imported after the first day of April, nineteen hundred and nine, and the burden of proof shall be on the claimant or the accused to rebut such presumption.'4The plaintiff in error, at the time of his arrest in August, 1923, was found in possession of and concealing a quantity of smoking opium. The lower court overruled a motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty, and, after stating the foregoing statutory presumptions, charged the jury in substance that the burden of proof was on the accused to rebut such presumptions; and that it devolved upon him to explain that he was rightfully in possession of the smoking opium'at least explain it to the satisfaction of the jury.' The court further charged that the defendant was presumed to be innocent until the government had satisfied the minds of the jurors of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that the burden to adduce such proof of guilt beyond the existence of a reasonable doubt rested on the government at all times and throughout the trial; and that a conviction could not be had 'while a rational doubt remains in the minds of the jury.' The authority of Congress to prohibit the importation of opium in any form and, as a measure reasonably calculated to aid in the enforcement of the prohibition, to make its concealment with knowledge of its unlawful importation a criminal offense, is not open to doubt. Brolan v. United States,236 U. S. 216, 35 S. Ct. 285, 59 L. Ed. 544; Steinfeldt v. United States, 219 F. 879, 135 C. C. A. 549. The question presented is whether Congress has power to enact the provisions in respect of the presumptions arising from the unexplained possession of such opium and from its presence in this country after the time fixed by the statute.5In Mobile, etc., R. R. v. Turnipseed,219 U. S. 35, 42, 43, 31 S. Ct. 136, 137, 138 (55 L. Ed. 78, 32 L. R. A. [N. S.] 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463), this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Lurton, said:6'The law of evidence is full of presumptions either of fact or law. The former are, of course, disputable, and the strength of any inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon the generality of the experience upon which it is founded. * * *7'Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of government. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are numerous. * * *8'That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact provided and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not, under a guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed.' See, also, Luria v. United States,231 U. S. 9, 25, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101; State v. Moriarty, 50 Conn. 415, 417; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray (Mass.) 1, 3; State v. Sheehan, 28 R. I. 160, 66 A. 66.9The legislative provisions here assailed satisfy these requirements in respect of due process. They have been upheld against similar attacks, without exception so far as we are advised, by the lower federal courts. Charley Toy v. United States (C. C. A.) 266 F. 326, 329; Gee Woe v. United States, 250 F. 428, 162 C. C. A. 498; Ng Choy Fong v. United States, 245 F. 305, 157 C. C. A. 497; United States v. Yee Fing (D. C.) 222 F. 154; United States v. Ah Hung (D. C.) 243 F. 762, 764. We think it is not an illogical inference that opium, found in this country more than 4 years (in the present case, more than 14 years) after its importation had been prohibited, was unlawfully imported. Nor do we think the further provision, that possession of such opium in the absence of a satisfactory explanation shall create a presumption of guilt, is 'so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.' By universal sentiment, and settled policy as evidenced by state and local legislation for more than half a century, opium is an illegitimate commodity, the use of which, except as a medicinal agent, is rigidly condemned. Legitimate possession, unless for medicinal use, is so highly improbable that to say to any person who obtains the outlawed commodity, 'since you are bound to know that it cannot be brought into this country at all, except under regulation for medicinal use, you must at your peril ascertain and be prepared to show the facts and circumstances which rebut, or tend to rebut, the natural inference of unlawful importation, or your knowledge of it,' is not such an unreasonable requirement as to cause it to fall outside the constitutional power of Congress.10Every accused person, of course, enters upon his trial clothed with the presumption of innocence. But that presumption may be overcome, not only by direct proof, but, in many cases, when the facts standing alone are not enough, by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative presumption. If the effect of the legislative act is to give to the facts from which the presumption is drawn an artificial value to some extent, it is no more than happens in respect of a great variety of presumptions not resting upon statute. See Dunlop v. United States,165 U. S. 486, 502, 503, 17 S. Ct. 375, 41 L. Ed. 799; Wilson v. United States,162 U. S. 613, 619, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090. In the Wilson Case the accused, charged with murder, was found, soon after the homicide, in possession of property that had belonged to the dead man. This court upheld a charge of the trial court to the effect that such possession required the accused to account for it, to show that as far as he was concerned the possession was innocent and honest, and that if not so accounted for it became 'the foundation for a presumption of guilt against the defendant.'11The point that the practical effect of the statute creating the presumption is to compel the accused person to be a witness against himself may be put aside with slight discussion. The statute compels nothing. It does no more than to make possession of the prohibited article prima facie evidence of guilt. It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he chooses. If the accused happens to be the only repository of the facts necessary to negative the presumption arising from his possession, that is a misfortune which the statute under review does not create but which is inherent in the case. The same situation might present itself if there were no statutory presumption and a prima facie case of concealment with knowledge of unlawful importation were made by the evidence. The necessity of an explanation by the accused would be quite as compelling in that case as in this; but the constraint upon him to give testimony would arise there, as it arises here, simply from the force of circumstances and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the Constitution.12Judgment affirmed.

442 U.S. 14099 S.Ct. 221360 L.Ed.2d 777COUNTY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY, NEW YORK, et al., Petitioners,v.Samuel ALLEN et al.No. 77-1554.Argued Feb. 22, 1979.Decided June 4, 1979.SyllabusRespondents (three adult males) and a 16-year-old girl (Jane Doe) were jointly tried in a New York state court on charges,inter alia,of illegally possessing two loaded handguns found in an automobile in which they were riding when it was stopped for speeding. The guns had been positioned crosswise in Jane Doe's open handbag on either the front floor or front seat on the passenger side where she was sitting. All four defendants objected to the introduction of the guns into evidence, arguing that the State had not adequately demonstrated a connection between the guns and the defendants. The trial court overruled the objection, relying on the presumption of possession created by a New York statute providing that the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle, except when,inter alia,the firearm is found "upon the person" of one of the occupants. The trial court also denied respondents' motion to dismiss the charges on the alleged ground that such exception applied because the guns were found on Jane Doe's person, the court concluding that the applicability of the exception was a question of fact for the jury. After being instructed that it was entitled to infer possession from the defendants' presence in the car, to consider all circumstances tending to support or contradict such inference, and to decide the matter for itself without regard to how much evidence the defendants introduced, the jury convicted all four defendants of illegal possession of the handguns. Defendants' post-trial motion in which they challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute as applied to them, was denied. Both the intermediate appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, the latter court holding that it was a jury question whether the guns were on Jane Doe's person, treating this question as having been resolved in the prosecution's favor, and concluding that therefore the presumption applied and that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. The court also summarily rejected the argument that the presumption was unconstitutional as applied in this case. Respondents then filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, contending that they were denied due process of law by the application of the statutory presumption. The District Court issued the writ, holding that respondents had not "deliberately bypassed" their federal claim by their actions at trial and that the mere presence of two guns in a woman's handbag in a car could not reasonably give rise to the inference that they were in the possession of three other persons in the car. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the New York Court of Appeals had decided respondents' constitutional claim on its merits rather than on any independent state procedural ground that might have barred collateral relief and, without deciding whether the presumption was constitutional as applied in this case, that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.Held:1. The District Court had jurisdiction to entertain respondents' claim that the statutory presumption is unconstitutional. There is no support in New York law or the history of this litigation for an inference that the New York courts decided such claim on an independent and adequate state procedural ground that bars the federal courts from addressing the issue on habeas corpus. If neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim. Pp. 147-154.2. The United States Court of Appeals erred in deciding the facial constitutionality issue. In analyzing a mandatory presumption, which the jury must accept even if it is the sole evidence of an element of an offense (as opposed to a purely permissive presumption, which allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant), it is irrelevant that there is ample evidence in the record other than the presumption to support a conviction. Without determining whether the presumption in this case was mandatory, the Court of Appeals analyzed it on its face as if it were, despite the fact that the state trial judge's instructions made it clear that it was not. Pp. 2223-2227.3. As applied to the facts of this case, the statutory presumption is constitutional. Under the circumstances, the jury would have been entirely reasonable in rejecting the suggestion that the guns were in Jane Doe's sole possession. Assuming that the jury did reject it, the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the car's floor or seat in the plain view of respondents, and in such a case it is surely rational to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the guns' presence and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over them. The application of the presumption in this case thus comports with the standard,Leary v. United States,395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57, that there be a "rational connection" between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the latter is "more likely than not to flow from" the former. Moreover, the presumption should not be judged by a more stringent "reasonable doubt" test, insofar as it is a permissive rather than a mandatory presumption. Pp. 163-167.568 F.2d 998, reversed.Eileen Shapiro, New York City, for petitioners.Michael A. Young, New York City, for respondents.Mr. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.1A New York statute provides that, with certain exceptions, the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle.1The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that respondents may challenge the constitutionality of this statute in a federal habeas corpus proceeding and that the statute is "unconstitutional on its face."568 F.2d 998, 1009. We granted certiorari to review these holdings and also to consider whether the statute is constitutional in its application to respondents. 439 U.S. 815, 99 S.Ct. 75, 58 L.Ed.2d 106.2Four persons, three adult males (respondents) and a 16-year-old girl (Jane Doe, who is not a respondent here), were jointly tried on charges that they possessed two loaded handguns, a loaded machinegun, and over a pound of heroin found in a Chevrolet in which they were riding when it was stopped for speeding on the New York Thruway shortly after noon on March 28, 1973. The two large-caliber handguns, which together with their ammunition weighed approximately six pounds, were seen through the window of the car by the investigating police officer. They were positioned crosswise in an open handbag on either the front floor or the front seat of the car on the passenger side where Jane Doe was sitting. Jane Doe admitted that the handbag was hers.2The machinegun and the heroin were discovered in the trunk after the police pried it open. The car had been borrowed from the driver's brother earlier that day; the key to the trunk could not be found in the car or on the person of any of its occupants, although there was testimony that two of the occupants had placed something in the trunk before embarking in the borrowed car.3The jury convicted all four of possession of the handguns and acquitted them of possession of the contents of the trunk.3Counsel for all four defendants objected to the introduction into evidence of the two handguns, the machinegun, and the drugs, arguing that the State had not adequately demonstrated a connection between their clients and the contraband. The trial court overruled the objection, relying on the presumption of possession created by the New York statute. Tr. 474-483. Because that presumption does not apply if a weapon is found "upon the person" of one of the occupants of the car, see n. 1,supra,the three male defendants also moved to dismiss the charges relating to the handguns on the ground that the guns were found on the person of Jane Doe. Respondents made this motion both at the close of the prosecution's case and at the close of all evidence. The trial judge twice denied it, concluding that the applicability of the "upon the person" exception was a question of fact for the jury. Tr. 544-557, 589-590.4At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the jurors that they were entitled to infer possession from the defendants' presence in the car. He did not make any reference to the "upon the person" exception in his explanation of the statutory presumption, nor did any of the defendants object to this omission or request alternative or additional instructions on the subject.5Defendants filed a post-trial motion in which they challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute as applied in this case. The challenge was made in support of their argument that the evidence, apart from the presumption, was insufficient to sustain the convictions. The motion was denied,id., at 775-776, and the convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion.People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D.2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1975).6The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed.People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (1976). It rejected the argument that as a matter of law the guns were on Jane Doe's person because they were in her pocketbook. Although the court recognized that in some circumstances the evidence could only lead to the conclusion that the weapons were in one person's sole possession, it held that this record presented a jury question on that issue. Since the defendants had not asked the trial judge to submit the question to the jury, the Court of Appeals treated the case as though the jury had resolved this fact question in the prosecution's favor. It therefore concluded that the presumption did apply and that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.Id., at 509-512, 387 N.Y.S.2d, at 99-101, 354 N.E.2d, at 839-841. It also summarily rejected the argument that the presumption was unconstitutional as applied in this case. Seeinfra, at 153-154.7Respondents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York contending that they were denied due process of law by the application of the statutory presumption of possession. The District Court issued the writ, holding that respondents had not "deliberately bypassed" their federal claim by their actions at trial and that the mere presence of two guns in a woman's handbag in a car could not reasonably give rise to the inference that they were in the possession of three other persons in the car. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a-36a.8The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but for different reasons. First, the entire panel concluded that the New York Court of Appeals had decided respondents' constitutional claim on its merits rather than on any independent state procedural ground that might have barred collateral relief. Then, the majority of the court, without deciding whether the presumption was constitutional as applied in this case, concluded that the statute is unconstitutional on its face because the "presumption obviously sweeps within its compass (1) many occupants who may not know they are riding with a gun (which may be out of their sight), and (2) many who may be aware of the presence of the gun but not permitted access to it."4Concurring separately, Judge Timbers agreed with the District Court that the statute was unconstitutional as applied but considered it improper to reach the issue of the statute's facial constitutionality. 568 F.2d, at 1011-1012.9The petition for a writ of certiorari presented three questions: (1) whether the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain respondents' claim that the presumption is unconstitutional; (2) whether it was proper for the Court of Appeals to decide the facial constitutionality issue; and (3) whether the application of the presumption in this case is unconstitutional. We answer the first question in the affirmative, the second two in the negative. We accordingly reverse.10* This is the sixth time that respondents have asked a court to hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to rely on the presumption because the evidence is otherwise insufficient to convict them.5No court has refused to hear the claim or suggested that it was improperly presented. Nevertheless, because respondents made it for the first time only after the jury had announced its verdict, and because the state courts were less than explicit in their reasons for rejecting it, the question arises whether the New York courts did so on the basis of an independent and adequate state procedural ground that bars the federal courts from addressing the issue on habeas corpus.6SeeWainwright v. Sykes,433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594;Fayv. Noia,372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 848, 9 L.Ed.2d 837. We conclude that there is no support in either the law of New York or the history of this litigation for an inference that the New York courts decided respondents' constitutional claim on a procedural ground, and that the question of the presumption's constitutionality is therefore properly before us. SeeFranks v. Delaware,438 U.S. 154, 161-162, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2679-2680, 57 L.Ed.2d 667;Mullaney v. Wilbur,421 U.S. 684, 704-705, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1892-1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 508. (REHNQUIST, J., concurring).711New York has no clear contemporaneous-objection policy that applies in this case.8No New York court, either in this litigation or in any other case that we have found, has ever expressly refused on contemporaneous-objection grounds to consider a post-trial claim such as the one respondents made. Cf.Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 433 U.S., at 74, 97 S.Ct., at 2499. Indeed, the rule in New York appears to be that "insufficiency of the evidence" claims may be raised at any time until sentence has been imposed.9Moreover, even if New York's contemporaneous-objection rule did generally bar the type of postverdict insufficiency claim that respondents made, there are at least two judicially created exceptions to that rule that might nonetheless apply in this case.1012The conclusion that the New York courts did not rely on a state procedural ground in rejecting respondents' constitutional claim is supported, not only by the probable unavailability in New York law of any such ground, but also by three aspects of this record. First, the prosecution never argued to any state court that a procedural default had occurred. This omission surely suggests that the New York courts were not thinking in procedural terms when they decided the issue. Indeed, the parties did not even apprise the appellate courts of the timing of respondents' objection to the presumption; a procedural default would not have been discovered, therefore, unless those courts combed the transcript themselves. If they did so without any prompting from the parties and based their decision on what they found, they surely would have said so.13Second, the trial court ruled on the merits when it denied respondents' motion to set aside the verdict. Tr. 775-776. Because it was not authorized to do so unless the issue was preserved for appeal, the trial court implicitly decided that there was no procedural default.11The most logical inference to be drawn from the Appellate Division's unexplained affirmance is that that court accepted not only the judgment but also the reasoning of the trial court.14Third, it is apparent on careful examination that the New York Court of Appeals did not ignore respondents' constitutional claim in its opinion. Instead, it summarily rejected the claim on its merits. That court had been faced with the issue in several prior cases and had always held the presumption constitutional. Indeed, the State confined its brief on the subject in the Court of Appeals to a string citation of some of those cases. Respondents' Brief in the Court of Appeals, p. 9. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court of Appeals confineditsdiscussion of the issue to a reprise of the explanation that its prior cases have traditionally given for the statute in holding it constitutional and a citation of two of those cases. 40 N.Y.2d, at 509-511, 387 N.Y.S.2d, at 99-100, 354 N.E.2d, at 839-840, citingPeople v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394, 306 N.Y.S.2d 889, 255 N.E.2d 136 (1969);People v. Leyva, 38 N.Y.2d 160, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30, 341 N.E.2d 546 (1975). Although it omits the word "constitutional," the most logical interpretation of this discussion is that it was intended as a passing and summary disposition of an issue that had already been decided on numerous occasions. This interpretation is borne out by the fact that the dissenting members of the Court of Appeals unequivocally addressed the merits of the constitutional claim12and by the fact that three Second Circuit Judges, whose experience with New York practice is entitled to respect, concluded that the State's highest court had decided the issue on its merits. 568 F.2d, at 1000. SeeBishop v. Wood,426 U.S. 341, 345-346, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077-2078, 48 L.Ed.2d 684;Huddleston v. Dwyer,322 U.S. 232, 237, 64 S.Ct. 1015, 1018, 88 L.Ed. 1246.15Our conclusion that it was proper for the federal courts to address respondents' claim is confirmed by the policies informing the "adequate state ground" exception to habeas corpus jurisdiction. The purpose of that exception is to accord appropriate respect to the sovereignty of the States in our federal system.Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 433 U.S., at 88, 97 S.Ct., at 2507. But if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim.13II16Although 28 U.S.C. 2254 authorizes the federal courts to entertain respondents' claim that they are being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, it is not a grant of power to decide constitutional questions not necessarily subsumed within that claim. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have the authority to adjudicate specific controversies between adverse litigants over which and over whom they have jurisdiction. In the exercise of that authority, they have a duty to decide constitutional questions when necessary to dispose of the litigation before them. But they have an equally strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order to determine the rights of the parties to the case under consideration.E. g., New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,440 U.S. 568, 582-583, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1363-1364, 59 L.Ed.2d 587.17A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations.Broadrick v. Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2914, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (and cases cited). A limited exception has been recognized for statutes that broadly prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment.Id., at 611-616, 93 S.Ct., at 2915-2918. This exception has been justified by the overriding interest in removing illegal deterrents to the exercise of the right of free speech.E. g., Gooding v. Wilson,405 U.S. 518, 520, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105, 31 L.Ed.2d 408;Dombrowski v. Pfister,380 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120, 14 L.Ed.2d 22. That justification, of course, has no application to a statute that enhances the legal risks associated with riding in vehicles containing dangerous weapons.18In this case, the Court of Appeals undertook the task of deciding the constitutionality of the New York statute "on its face." Its conclusion that the statutory presumption was arbitrary rested entirely on its view of the fairness of applying the presumption in hypothetical situationssituations, indeed, in which it is improbable that a jury would return a conviction,14or that a prosecution would ever be instituted.15We must accordingly inquire whether these respondents had standing to advance the arguments that the Court of Appeals considered decisive. An analysis of our prior cases indicates that the answer to this inquiry depends on the type of presumption that is involved in the case.19Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crimethat is, an "ultimate" or "elemental" factfrom the existence of one or more "evidentiary" or "basic" facts.E. g., Barnes v. United States,412 U.S. 837, 843-844, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2361-2362, 37 L.Ed.2d 380;Tot v. United States,319 U.S. 463, 467, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 87 L.Ed.2d 1519;Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed,219 U.S. 35, 42, 31 S.Ct. 136, 137, 55 L.Ed. 78. The value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case, however, depending on the strength of the connection between the particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the device curtails the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence independently. Nonetheless, in criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. SeeIn re Winship,397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368;Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S., at 702-703 n. 31, 95 S.Ct., at 1891-1892 n. 31. The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allowsbut does not requirethe trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. See,e. g., Barnes v. United States, supra, 412 U.S., at 840 n. 3, 93 S.Ct., at 2360 n. 3. In that situation the basic fact may constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. See,e. g., Turner v. United States,396 U.S. 398, 402 n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 642, 645, n. 2, 24 L.Ed.2d 610. When reviewing this type of device, the Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him.E. g., Barnes v. United States, supra, 412 U.S., at 845, 93 S.Ct., at 2362;Turner v. United States, supra, 396 U.S., at 419-424, 90 S.Ct., at 653-656. See alsoUnited States v. Gainey,380 U.S. 63, 67-68, 69-70, 85 S.Ct. 754, 757-758, 758-759, 13 L.Ed.2d 658. Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination.20A mandatory presumption is a far more troublesome evidentiary device. For it may affect not only the strength of the "no reasonable doubt" burden but also the placement of that burden; it tells the trier that he or theymustfind the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.E. g., Turner v. United States, supra, at 401-402, and n. 1, 90 S.Ct., at 644-645, and n. 1;Leary v. United States,395 U.S. 6, 30, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1545, 23 L.Ed.2d 57;United States v. Romano,382 U.S. 136, 137, and n. 4, 138, 143, 86 S.Ct. 279, 280, and n. 4, 281, 283, 15 L.Ed.2d 210;Tot v. United States, supra, 319 U.S., at 469, 63 S.Ct., at 1245.16In this situation, the Court has generally examined the presumption on its face to determine the extent to which the basic and elemental facts coincide.E. g., Turner v. United States, supra, 396 U.S., at 408-418, 90 S.Ct., at 648-653;Leary v.United States, supra, 395 U.S., at 45-52, 89 S.Ct., at 1552-1553;United States v. Romano, supra, 382 U.S., at 140-141, 86 S.Ct., at 281-282;Tot v. United States, 319 U.S., at 468, 63 S.Ct., at 1245. To the extent that the trier of fact is forced to abide by the presumption, and may not reject it based on an independent evaluation of the particular facts presented by the State, the analysis of the presumption's constitutional validity is logically divorced from those facts and based on the presumption's accuracy in the run of cases.17It is for this reason that the Court has held it irrelevant in analyzing a mandatory presumption, but not in analyzing a purely permissive one, that there is ample evidence in the record other than the presumption to support a conviction. E. g.,Turner v. United States,396 U.S., at 407, 90 S.Ct., at 647;Leary v. United States,395 U.S., at 31-32, 89 S.Ct., at 1545-1546;United States v. Romano,382 U.S., at 138-139, 86 S.Ct., at 280-281.21Without determining whether the presumption in this case was mandatory,18the Court of Appeals analyzed it on its face as if it were. In fact, it was not, as the New York Court of Appeals had earlier pointed out. 40 N.Y.2d, at 510-511, 387 N.Y.S.2d, at 100, 354 N.E.2d, at 840.22The trial judge's instructions make it clear that the presumption was merely a part of the prosecution's case,19that it gave rise to a permissive inference available only in certain circumstances, rather than a mandatory conclusion of possession, and that it could be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof offered by defendants in rebuttal.20The judge explained that possession could be actual or constructive, but that constructive possession could not exist without the intent and ability to exercise control or dominion over the weapons.21He also carefully instructed the jury that there is a mandatory presumption of innocence in favor of the defendants that controls unless it, as the exclusive trier of fact, is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the handguns in the manner described by the judge.22In short, the instructions plainly directed the jury to consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference that all four occupants of the car had possession of the two loaded handguns and to decide the matter for itself without regard to how much evidence the defendants introduced.2323Our cases considering the validity of permissive statutory presumptions such as the one involved here have rested on an evaluation of the presumption as applied to the record before the Court. None suggests that a court should pass on the constitutionality of this kind of statute "on its face." It was error for the Court of Appeals to make such a determination in this case.III24As applied to the facts of this case, the presumption of possession is entirely rational. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' analysis, respondents were not "hitchhikers or other casual passengers," and the guns were neither "a few inches in length" nor "out of [respondents'] sight." See n. 4,supra, and accompanying text. The argument against possession by any of the respondents was predicated solely on the fact that the guns were in Jane Doe's pocketbook. But several circumstanceswhich, not surprisingly, her counsel repeatedly emphasized in his questions and his argument,e. g., Tr. 282-283, 294-297, 306made it highly improbable that she was the sole custodian of those weapons.25Even if it was reasonable to conclude that she had placed the guns in her purse before the car was stopped by police, the facts strongly suggest that Jane Doe was not the only person able to exercise dominion over them. The two guns were too large to be concealed in her handbag.24The bag was consequently open, and part of one of the guns was in plain view, within easy access of the driver of the car and even, perhaps, of the other two respondents who were riding in the rear seat.2526Moreover, it is highly improbable that the loaded guns belonged to Jane Doe or that she was solely responsible for their being in her purse. As a 16-year-old girl in the company of three adult men she was the least likely of the four to be carrying one, let alone two, heavy handguns. It is far more probable that she relied on the pocketknife found in her brassiere for any necessary self-protection. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for her counsel to argue and for the jury to infer that when the car was halted for speeding, the other passengers in the car anticipated the risk of a search and attempted to conceal their weapons in a pocketbook in the front seat. The inference is surely more likely than the notion that these weapons were the sole property of the 16-year-old girl.27Under these circumstances, the jury would have been entirely reasonable in rejecting the suggestionwhich, incidentally, defense counsel did not even advance in their closing arguments to the jury26that the handguns were in the sole possession of Jane Doe. Assuming that the jury did reject it, the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in the plain view of the three other occupants of the automobile. In such a case, it is surely rational to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons. The application of the statutory presumption in this case therefore comports with the standard laid down inTot v. United States, 319 U.S., at 467, 63 S.Ct., at 1244, and restated inLeary v. United States, supra, 395 U.S., at 36, 89 S.Ct., at 1548. For there is a "rational connection" between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is "more likely than not to flow from" the former.2728Respondents argue, however, that the validity of the New York presumption must be judged by a "reasonable doubt" test rather than the "more likely than not" standard employed inLeary.28Under the more stringent test, it is argued that a statutory presumption must be rejected unless the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. SeeBarnes v. United States, 412 U.S., at 842-843, 93 S.Ct., at 2361-2362. Respondents' argument again overlooks the distinction between a permissive presumption on which the prosecution is entitled to rely as one not necessarily sufficient part of its proof and a mandatory presumption which the jury must accept even if it is the sole evidence of an element of the offense.29In the latter situation, since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But in the former situation, the prosecution may rely on all of the evidence in the record to meet the reasonable-doubt standard. There is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence before it may be admitted. As long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the test described inLeary.29The permissive presumption, as used in this case, satisfied theLearytest. And, as already noted, the New York Court of Appeals has concluded that the record as a whole was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.30The judgment is reversed.31So ordered.

442 U.S. 51099 S.Ct. 245061 L.Ed.2d 39David SANDSTROM, Petitioner,v.State of MONTANA.No. 78-5384.Argued April 18, 1979.Decided June 18, 1979.SyllabusBased upon a confession and other evidence, petitioner was charged under a Montana statute with "deliberate homicide," in that he "purposely or knowingly" caused the victim's death. At trial, petitioner argued that, although he killed the victim, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly," and therefore was not guilty of deliberate homicide. The trial court instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," over petitioner's objection that such instruction had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge. The jury found petitioner guilty, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption is prohibited, allocation of "someburden of proof" to a defendant is permissible. Finding that under the instruction in question petitioner's sole burden was to produce "some" evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, and not to disprove that he acted "purposely or knowingly," the Montana court held that the instruction did not violate due process standards.Held:Because the jury may have interpreted the challenged presumption as conclusive, like the presumptions inMorissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288, andUnited States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854, or as shifting the burden of persuasion, like that inMullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, and because either interpretation would have violated the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction is unconstitutional. Pp. 514-527.(a) The effect of a presumption in a jury instruction is determined by the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted it, not by a state court's interpretation of its legal import. Pp.514,517.(b) Conclusive presumptions "conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,"Morissette, supra, at 275, 72 S.Ct. at 255, and they "invad[e the] factfinding function,"United States Gypsum Co., supra, at 446, 98 S.Ct. at 2878, which in a criminal case the law assigns to the jury. The presumption announced to petitioner's jury may well have had exactly these consequences, since upon finding proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and of facts insufficient to establish the second (the voluntariness and "ordinary consequences" of petitioner's action), the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was directed to find against petitioner on the element of intent. The State was thus not forced to prove "beyond a reasonable DOUBT . . . EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTe the crime . . . charged,"in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, and petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights. Pp. 521-523.(c) A presumption which, although not conclusive, had the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to petitioner, would have suffered from similar infirmities. If the jury interpreted the presumption in this manner, it could have concluded that upon proof by the State of the slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden was then shifted to petitioner to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state. Such a presumption was found constitutionally deficient inMullaney, supra.P.524(d) Without merit is the State's argument that since the jury could have interpreted the word "intends" in the instruction as referring only to petitioner's "purpose," and could have convicted petitioner solely for his "knowledge" without considering "purpose," it might not have relied upon the tainted presumption at all. First, it is not clear that a jury would have so interpreted "intends". More significantly, even if a jurycouldhave ignored the presumption, it cannot be certain that this is what itdiddo, as its verdict was a general one. Pp. 525-526.(e) Since whether the jury's reliance upon the instruction constituted, or could have ever constituted, harmless error are issues that were not considered by the Montana Supreme Court, this Court will not reach them as an initial matter. Pp. 526-527.176 Mont. 492, 580 P.2d 106, reversed and remanded.Byron W. Boggs, Helena, Mont., for petitioner.Michael T. Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Mont., for respondent.Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.1The question presented is whether, in a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged, the jury instruction, "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," violates the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.2* On November 22, 1976, 18-year-old David Sandstrom confessed to the slaying of Annie Jessen. Based upon the confession and corroborating evidence, petitioner was charged on December 2 with "deliberate homicide," Mont.Code Ann. 45-5-102 (1978), in that he "purposely or knowingly caused the death of Annie Jessen." App. 3.1At trial, Sandstrom's attorney informed the jury that, although his client admitted killing Jessen, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly," and was therefore not guilty of "deliberate homicide" but of a lesser crime.Id., at 6-8. The basic support for this contention was the testimony of two court-appointed mental health experts, each of whom described for the jury petitioner's mental state at the time of the incident. Sandstrom's attorney argued that this testimony demonstrated that petitioner, due to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption, did not kill Annie Jessen "purposely or knowingly."23The prosecution requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Petitioner's counsel objected, arguing that "the instruction has the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of" purpose or knowledge to the defense, and that "that is impermissible under the Federal Constitution, due process of law."Id., at 34. He offered to provide a number of federal decisions in support of the objection, including this Court's holding inMullaney v. Wilbur,421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), but was told by the judge: "You can give those to the Supreme Court. The objection is overruled." App. 34. The instruction was delivered, the jury found petitioner guilty of deliberate homicide,id., at 38, and petitioner was sentenced to 100 years in prison.4Sandstrom appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana, again contending that the instruction shifted to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the crime charged, in violation ofMullaney v. Wilbur, supra, In re Winship,397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), andPatterson v. New York,432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). The Montana court conceded that these cases did prohibit shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption, but held that the cases "do not prohibit allocation ofsomeburden of proof to a defendant under certain circumstances." 176 Mont. 492, 497, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (1978). Since in the court's view, "[d]efendant's sole burden under instruction No. 5 was to producesomeevidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, not to disprove that he acted 'purposely' or 'knowingly,' . . . the instruction does not violate due process standards as defined by the United States or Montana Constitution . . . ."Ibid.(emphasis added).5Both federal and state courts have held, under a variety of rationales, that the giving of an instruction similar to that challenged here is fatal to the validity of a criminal conviction.3We granted certiorari, 439 U.S. 1067, 99 S.Ct. 832, 59 L.Ed.2d 31 (1979), to decide the important question of the instruction's constitutionality. We reverse.II6The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it describes. SeeUlster County Court v. Allen,442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2227, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). That determination requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury, seeid., at 157-159, n. 16, 99 S.Ct., at 2225, for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.7Respondent argues, first, that the instruction merely described a permissive inferencethat is, it allowed but did not require the jury to draw conclusions about defendant's intent from his actionsand that such inferences are constitutional. Brief for Respondent 3, 15. These arguments need not detain us long, for even respondent admits that "it's possible" that the jury believed they were required to apply the presumption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Sandstrom's jurors were told that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." They were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it. It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory. See generallyUnited States v. Wharton, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 298,433 F.2d 451, 456 (1970);Green v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 98, 99,405 F.2d 1368, 1369 (1968). See also Montana Rule of Evidence 301(a).48In the alternative, respondent urges that, even if viewed as a mandatory presumption rather than as a permissive inference, the presumption did not conclusively establish intent but rather could be rebutted. On this view, the instruction required the jury, if satisfied as to the facts which trigger the presumption, to find intentunlessthe defendant offered evidence to the contrary. Moreover, according to the State, all the defendant had to do to rebut the presumption was produce "some" contrary evidence; he did not have to "prove" that he lacked the required mental state. Thus, "[a]t most, it placed aburden of productionon the petitioner," but "did not shift to petitioner theburden of persuasionwith respect to any element of the offense . . .." Brief for Respondent 3 (emphasis added). Again, respondent contends that presumptions with this limited effect pass constitutional muster.9We need not review respondent's constitutional argument on this point either, however, for we reject this characterization of the presumption as well. Respondent concedes there is a "risk" that the jury, once having found petitioner's act voluntary, would interpret the instruction as automatically directing a finding of intent. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. Moreover, the State also concedes that numerous courts "have differed as to the effect of the presumption when given as a jury instruction without further explanation as to its use by the jury," and that some have found it to shift more than the burden of production, and even to have conclusive effect. Brief for Respondent 17. Nonetheless, the State contends that the only authoritative reading of the effect of the presumption resides in the Supreme Court of Montana. And the State argues that by holding that "[d]efendant's sole burden under instruction No. 5 was to producesomeevidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, not to disprove that he acted 'purposely' or 'knowingly,' " 176 Mont., at 497-498, 580 P.2d at 109 (emphasis added), the Montana Supreme Court decisively established that the presumption at most affected only the burden of going forward with evidence of intentthat is, the burden of production.510The Supreme Court of Montana is, of course, the final authority on the legal weight to be given a presumption under Montana law, but it is not the final authority on the interpretation which a jury could have given the instruction. If Montana intended its presumption to have only the effect described by its Supreme Court, then we are convinced that a reasonable juror could well have been misled by the instruction given, and could have believed that the presumption was not limited to requiring the defendant to satisfy only a burden of production. Petitioner's jury was told that "[t]he law presumesthat a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." They were not told that the presumption could be rebutted, as the Montana Supreme Court held, by the defendant's simple presentation of "some" evidence; nor even that it could be rebutted at all. Given the common definition of "presume" as "to suppose to be true without proof," Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 911 (1974), and given the lack of qualifying instructions as to the legal effect of the presumption, we cannot discount the possibility that the jury may have interpreted the instruction in either of two more stringent ways.11First, a reasonable jury could well have interpreted the presumption as "conclusive," that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but rather as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary actions (and their "ordinary" consequences), unlessthe defendantproved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than "some" evidence thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. Numerous federal and state courts have warned that instructions of the type given here can be interpreted in just these ways. See generallyUnited States v. Wharton, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 293,433 F.2d 451(1970);Berkovitz v. United States,213 F.2d 468(CA5 1954);State v. Roberts, 88 Wash.2d 337, 341-342, 562 P.2d 1259, 1261-1262 (1977) (en banc);State v. Warbritton, 211 Kan. 506, 509, 506 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1973);Hall v. State, 49 Ala.App. 381, 385, 272 So.2d 590, 593 (Crim.App.1973). See alsoUnited States v. Chiantese,560 F.2d 1244, 1255 (CA5 1977). And although the Montana Supreme Court held to the contrary in this case, Montana's own Rules of Evidence expressly state that the presumption at issue here may be overcome only "by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption." Montana Rule of Evidence 301(b)(2).6Such a requirement shifts not only the burden of production, but also the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intent.712We do not reject the possibility that some jurors may have interpreted the challenged instruction as permissive, or, if mandatory, as requiring only that the defendant come forward with "some" evidence in rebuttal. However, the fact that a reasonable juror could have given the presumption conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect means that we cannot