5. Meeting: Informal Sector and Informal Practices in Everyday Life - The Informal Sector in Russia "Sociology of Everyday life. Lifestyles, образ жизни,

5. Meeting:Informal Sector and Informal Practices in Everyday Life- The Informal Sector in Russia

"Sociology of Everyday life. Lifestyles, образ жизни,

Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings in Russia."

The Informal Sector in Russia

• Rosser and al. (2000) show that the size of the informal economy is positively correlated with income inequality

• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) find evidence of higher wage rates in Russia of secondary jobs compared to wage rates of primary jobs

• Kim (2002) emphasizes that in Russia working in the informal sector or having more than one job is a way to get well-paid and to make additional money

c.f.: Beuran/Kalugina 2006: Social exclusion and the informal sector: the case of Russia


• Even though working in the informal sector presents some disadvantages (higher job insecurity, worse working conditions), informal activities provide individuals with an employment that enables them to fit their needs and increase their well-being

• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) notice that in Russia individuals participate in informal activities because of the higher incomes available in this sector despite the higher risk

• furthermore the informal sector provides more autonomy and flexibility for individual initiative and creativity than the formal sector (De Grazia, 1982; Renooy, 1990)


• following Goskomstat (2004), shadow economy comprises no more than 25% of the GDP and informal sector employs around 17% of the labor force

• officials of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, executive agency responsible for tax enforcement, estimate the size of shadow economy by at least as much as 40% of the GDP

• Maslova and Baranenkova (2003) conclude that informal employment amounts to 25 million people, or about 30% of the labor force

• Schneider and Enste (2003) state even higher values of 35 million people (42% of labor force) in shadow employment

• according to Ryvkina (2001), at least half of Russian population is employed informally

• Eliseeva and Schirina (2003) state that in case of St.-Petersburg region, which officially comes very closely to the national average, shadow economy actually exceeds its official counterpart

c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh , p.1


Set of survival strategies in the Informal Sector

• (1) having another job; • (2) using a dacha or other plot of land to grow

food; • (3) working as private taxi driver; • (4) renting out one’s apartment;• (5) business trips abroad (to purchase goods for

resale), and• (6) renting out one’s garage (Johnson, Kaufmann, Ustenko 1997:185-6)

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• worsening of formal employment conditions, reduction in real wages and quasi absence of social security

• during the first decade of transformation a lot of households with working age member fall into poverty

• "new” phenomenon of "working poor" has become wide-spread• facing negative economic conditions, Russian population has to change its

behaviour on the labour market: selfemployment, moonlighting and informal activities have become a reality for many individuals (Kim, 2002)

• since 1998 the number of persons working in the IS increased



The structure of informal employment in Russia

• among all types of informal employment the major input — over 50% — comes from the employees of informal sector

• self-employed, multiple job holders and incompliant formal sector employees account respectively for 21, 13, and 15%

• c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.6

• age structure of informal employment by gender shows that the highest informal employment rates are observed among younger age groups

c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.7


The structure of informal employment in Russia• Informal employment on average provides lower wage rates as well as

lower monthly wage amounts


The structure of informal employment in Russia• the prevalence of formal employment — 90% — is observed in the

organizations owned by different levels of government• 50% of the employees of private sector are employed on informal basis• 10% of municipal and 8% of federal and regional employees work

informally


6. Meeting:The Meaning of Blat in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Period- Informal Networks in Russia




• Rosser and al. (2000) show that the size of the informal economy is positively correlated with income inequality

• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) find evidence of higher wage rates in Russia of secondary jobs compared to wage rates of primary jobs

• Kim (2002) emphasizes that in Russia working in the informal sector or having more than one job is a way to get well-paid and to make additional money



• Even though working in the informal sector presents some disadvantages (higher job insecurity, worse working conditions), informal activities provide individuals with an employment that enables them to fit their needs and increase their well-being

• Foley (1997) and Kolev (1998) notice that in Russia individuals participate in informal activities because of the higher incomes available in this sector despite the higher risk

• furthermore the informal sector provides more autonomy and flexibility for individual initiative and creativity than the formal sector (De Grazia, 1982; Renooy, 1990)


• following Goskomstat (2004), shadow economy comprises no more than 25% of the GDP and informal sector employs around 17% of the labor force

• officials of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, executive agency responsible for tax enforcement, estimate the size of shadow economy by at least as much as 40% of the GDP

• Maslova and Baranenkova (2003) conclude that informal employment amounts to 25 million people, or about 30% of the labor force

• Schneider and Enste (2003) state even higher values of 35 million people (42% of labor force) in shadow employment

• according to Ryvkina (2001), at least half of Russian population is employed informally

• Eliseeva and Schirina (2003) state that in case of St.-Petersburg region, which officially comes very closely to the national average, shadow economy actually exceeds its official counterpart

c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh , p.1


Set of survival strategies in the Informal Sector

• (1) having another job; • (2) using a dacha or other plot of land to grow

food; • (3) working as private taxi driver; • (4) renting out one’s apartment;• (5) business trips abroad (to purchase goods for

resale), and• (6) renting out one’s garage (Johnson, Kaufmann, Ustenko 1997:185-6)

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• worsening of formal employment conditions, reduction in real wages and quasi absence of social security

• during the first decade of transformation a lot of households with working age member fall into poverty

• "new” phenomenon of "working poor" has become wide-spread• facing negative economic conditions, Russian population has to change its

behaviour on the labour market: selfemployment, moonlighting and informal activities have become a reality for many individuals (Kim, 2002)

• since 1998 the number of persons working in the IS increased




• among all types of informal employment the major input — over 50% — comes from the employees of informal sector

• self-employed, multiple job holders and incompliant formal sector employees account respectively for 21, 13, and 15%

• c.f. Merkuryeva, Irina (2006): Informal Employment in Russia: Combining Disadvantages and Opportunities, Discussion Paper, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION, School of Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, p.6

• age structure of informal employment by gender shows that the highest informal employment rates are observed among younger age groups



The structure of informal employment in Russia• Informal employment on average provides lower wage rates as well as

lower monthly wage amounts


The structure of informal employment in Russia• the prevalence of formal employment — 90% — is observed in the

organizations owned by different levels of government• 50% of the employees of private sector are employed on informal basis• 10% of municipal and 8% of federal and regional employees work

informally


Infomal Sector does not automatically mean Informal Practices!!!

Informal Practices an Activities

• formal institutions of the state socialism broke down relatively quickly

• informal structures, practices and relation patterns are resources that the actors in the transformative process can make use of

• How do these inherited informal structures and relation pattern influence the transformation process?

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Types of ‘hidden’ (unmeasured, untaxed and/or unregulated) activities

• informal activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’;• underground activities, which are deliberately concealed from

public authorities to avoid either the payment of taxes or compliance with certain regulations;

• iIllegal activities, which generate goods and services forbidden by the law or which are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised producers; and

• household activities, which produce goods and services for own consumption and are outside the SNA production boundary

c.f. System of National Accounts (SNA, 1993)

What are “informal practices”?

• people’s regular strategies to manipulate or exploit formal rules by enforcing informal norms and personal obligations in formal contexts

• reflect changes in the balance between constraining and enabling qualities of the structure

• functions move away from compensating for rigid constraints toward the active exploitation of weaknesses in the new systems

• it does not mean that informal practices are simply responses to political and economic constraints; they are also shaped by historical and cultural factors (c.f. Ledeneva 2008:119)

c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China, Comparative Studies in Society and History;50(1):118–144

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Grossman’s five types of activities in the illegal second economy

• Stealing from the state, which involved stealing anything from enterprise light bulbs and toilet rolls to output produced, was widespread.

• Speculation• Illicit production• Underground enterprises or formal enterprises that

were simultaneously involved in anything from small-scale ‘plan manipulation’ to large-scale illegal production

• Corruption

c.f. Grossman (1982:249)

Grossman’s three types of corruption

• the daily ‘petty bribing’ of Soviet authorities, and particularly of law enforcement officials

• the tradition of prinosheniye, nowadays podnosheniye, which involved the regular bringing of valuable gifts to one’s supervisors; and the purchase of lucrative official positions (Grossman 1982:251-2).

• blat, or the use of personal influence to obtain favours to which a person or firm was lawfully entitled

Bribery

• a form of pecuniary corruption (monetary corruption)• an act implying money or gift given that alters the behaviour

of the recipient• constitutes a crime • defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the offering, giving,

receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in discharge of a public or legal duty

• can be any money, good, right in action, property, preferment, privilege, object of value, advantage, or merely a promise or undertaking to induce or influence the action, vote, or influence of a person in an official or public capacity

Typology of Corrupt Acts Level I: Everyday Interaction between Officials and Citizens1.Bribery of public officials to bend rules2.Obfuscation and over-regulation by officials3.Misuse of licensing and inspection powers by officials

Level II: Interaction with Public Institutions1.Self-serving use of public funds (bonuses and hidden salaries; overspending on luxury cars, travel, receptions, equipment; appropriating cars, apartments, dachas)2.Profiteering from public resources (selling off environmental assets, leasing offices and equipment for personal gain; using public employees for private work; quasi-privatization of state-owned enterprises and property)3. Malpractice and profiteering from privatization and public procurement (steering business and assets to self and cronies; disregarding conflicts of interest; breaking rules of competitive bidding)4. Influence peddling, manipulation of personnel decisions (engaging in nepotism, clientelism, favoritism; sabotaging personnel reform to preserve turf)

Level III: Influence over Political Institutions1.“State Capture” (building of personal fiefdoms; exploiting public institutions for enrichment of self and network)2.Forming secret power networks to collude in corrupt acts3.Undermining elections and political competition (e.g. illicit campaign and party financing) 4.Misuse of legislative power (“selling” laws to private interest, blocking anti-corruption legislation)5.Corruption of the judicial process (“selling” court decision, false and /or lack of prosecution) 6.Misuse of audits and investigatory powers7.Using kompromat for political blackmails8.Corruption in and of the media

Level I: Everyday Interaction between Officials and Citizens1.Bribery of public officials to bend rules2.Obfuscation and over-regulation by officials3.Misuse of licensing and inspection powers by officials

Level II: Interaction with Public Institutions1.Self-serving use of public funds (bonuses and hidden salaries; overspending on luxury cars, travel, receptions, equipment; appropriating cars, apartments, dachas)2.Profiteering from public resources (selling off environmental assets, leasing offices and equipment for personal gain; using public employees for private work; quasi-privatization of state-owned enterprises and property)3. Malpractice and profiteering from privatization and public procurement (steering business and assets to self and cronies; disregarding conflicts of interest; breaking rules of competitive bidding)4. Influence peddling, manipulation of personnel decisions (engaging in nepotism, clientelism, favoritism; sabotaging personnel reform to preserve turf)

Level III: Influence over Political Institutions1.“State Capture” (building of personal fiefdoms; exploiting public institutions for enrichment of self and network)2.Forming secret power networks to collude in corrupt acts3.Undermining elections and political competition (e.g. illicit campaign and party financing) 4.Misuse of legislative power (“selling” laws to private interest, blocking anti-corruption legislation)5.Corruption of the judicial process (“selling” court decision, false and /or lack of prosecution) 6.Misuse of audits and investigatory powers7.Using kompromat for political blackmails8.Corruption in and of the media

Karklins, Rasma (2005): The System Made Me Do It. Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, Armonk & London: M.E.Sharpe, p. 25Karklins, Rasma (2005): The System Made Me Do It. Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, Armonk & London: M.E.Sharpe, p. 25

Is Post-Communism more Corrupt? The Regime-Oriented Answer

• Jakob Van Klaveren tried to distinguish between different forms of constitutional regimes in terms of their corruptibility

• In Klaveren’s analysis there are two preconditions for corruption: first, an administration that allows its officials a wide margin of autonomy; and second, a moral code that does not impose any standard of probity on state functionaries (e.g. oligarchic republics)

• By contrast, the triumph of democracy was expected to put an end to the schemes of corrupt officials

• official discourse of communist governments also argued that corruption was embedded in capitalism but alien to socialism, but regime-oriented explanations seem false

• The argument that communism by its nature is less corrupt than the post-communist regimes is a theoretical speculation

c.f. Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Corruption Paradox. Why Post-Communism Is/Looks More Corrupt Than Communism, in: http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub02.doc

Is Post-Communism more Corrupt? The Regime-Oriented Answer

• the argument was that being more repressive and stronger in enforcement, the authoritarian state is less inclined to be corrupt than democracies, which tend to be weak and liberal, is self-defeating

• this argument already lost its popularity in the 1960s by two major considerations:

1. the communist system was rife with regulations and permissions; public officials had great margins for discretion: the ideal preconditions for corruption

2. In the late 1980s, governments and publics both perceived communism as corrupt; in the late 1980s, communism was far from a model of perfect authoritarianism, and the price of corruption was much lower than in the 1950s


Is Post-Communism more Corrupt?The Institution-Oriented Answer

• following Baker’s “ Crime and Punishment” this school seeks to explain the “corruption paradox” in three major directions

1. weak state institutions combined with high uncertainty and a low standard of living create conditions in which taking bribes becomes a rational choice preference

2. privatization and the more general process of large-scale redistribution of public wealth create greater incentives for corruption, and are thus the major explanation for the “corruption choice” of many businessmen

3. communist-era corruption is more efficient than the post-communist corruption


• in the communist period, corruption was swept under the carpet and the public was unaware of its scope

• today, corruption has captured the imagination of the media and the overproduction of corruption stories has shaped public opinion, producing the feeling of the overwhelming presence of corruption in public life

• the lack of freedom of the press in the communist period both suppressed and fueled the circulation of corruption stories

Is Post-Communism more Corrupt? The Virtual Answer


Is Post-Communism more Corrupt? The Social Capital Answer

• understanding “blat” as social capital• blat was widespread in socialist period; the dominant

form of corruption in the communist period• blat was an exchange of favors: even if gifts and

money were sometimes part of blat relations, the driving force of the transaction was the exchange of favors, and not a bribe

• Blat was totally conditioned by the existence of the economy of shortage


Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life

• Blat emerged in the early socialist state and is still highly relevant today

• Blat was first observed by Sovietologists in 1950s (Crankshaw 1956, Berliner 1957)

• a comprehensive sociological study (Ledeneva 1998) was undertaken in the middle of the 1990s

• recent publications on Russian managerial culture have continued research into blat.

c.f. Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,

Research and Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60

Definition and Origin of the Word Blat • There is no unified, agreed meaning of blat and the term cannot easily be

translated into English (Michailova & Worm 2003)• for most Russians, however, it is an obvious word which does not need

definition• blat for Joseph Berliner (1957: 182), “...the term blat is one of the many

flavoured words which are so intimate a part of a particular culture that they can be only awkwardly rendered in the language of another...”

• There are working definitions of blat:• Blat is an exchange of ‘favours of access’ in conditions of shortages and a

state system of privileges; ‘favours of access’ are provided at the public expense (Ledeneva 1998).

• Blat exchange is often mediated and covered by the rhetoric of friendship or acquaintance: sharing, helping out, and friendly support, mutual care. Intertwined with personal networks blat provided access to public resources through personal channels (Ledeneva 1998).

• Blat involves a “reliance for favours upon personal contacts with people in influential positions” (Kryshtanovskaia 1994: 9).

previous research of blat derives from three main areas:

• Sociology where blat was studied in a social context as an instrument of satisfying basic needs of common people in everyday life (Ledeneva 1998, Ledeneva, Lovell & Rogachevskii 2000).

• Business ethics where blat was briefly mentioned as a peculiarity of the Russian business class (Blackwell 1991, Stojanov 1992, Puffer et al. 1997, Hendley et al. 2000, Hunter 2003).

• Cross cultural analyses of Russian and Western managers that pointed out the different attitudes towards blat by Western and Russian managers (Puffer 1994, Puffer & McCarthy 1995).



Blat has two main meanings 1. refers to personal networking- the term blat came to Russia from the Polish blat, meaning ‘someone

who provides an umbrella, a cover’- this in turn is taken from Yiddish blat which means ‘close, familiar’, ‘one

of us’, ‘one of our circle’.- This meaning of blat contributes to its human face: people give special

treatment and help to those of their circle, but often this help is provided to meet the expenses of those who are out of their circle

2. alludes to insignificant criminal activity, such as minor theft- (criminal) meaning that explains the fact that most people either pretend

to have nothing to do with blat or refer to it in other words- ‘I obtained it by blat’ one could say ‘I received it from an acquaintance’- In a business context it is acceptable to say ‘I solved this problem using

my connections’ rather than to say ‘I used blat’



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The Concept of Blat (Alena Ledeneva)• Ledeneva defines blat “as an exchange of ‘favours of access’ to

public resources in conditions of shortages and a state system of privileges” (Ledeneva, 1998:37)

• blat is the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to skirt formal procedures (Ledeneva 1998: 1)

• “blat is a roundabout way of arranging things, circumventing the formal procedure by using personal contacts” (Ledeneva, 1996:26).

• Through blat networks public resources were redirected to private uses and to the needs of personal consumption

• These relations were often disguised by the rhetoric of friendship, such as ‘helping out’ a friend or an acquaintance

• Typical of blat was the misrecognition of the reciprocity of exchanges• blat was omnipresent and uses in all spheres of society to fulfil

perceived needs and goods - or in other words: blat was normal

The meaning of blat in the Soviet period• often disguised by the rhetoric of friendship or acquaintance,

in terms of “helping out,” “friendly support,” and “mutual care,” (Ledeneva 1998: 37)

• continue a tradition of give and take practices in Russia (Lovell, Ledeneva, and Rogatchevsii 2000)

• moral obligations imposed by social relationships compel people to break formal rules, which results in the instrumental use of personal networks for achieving goals in other domains, often in a situation of acute need

• blat gave people in socialist period access to state resources through personal channels and other redistributive mechanisms of goods and services in short supply

c.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2008;50(1):118–144

The meaning of blat in the Soviet period

“Blatmeisters” in the Russian context are people:- with certain talents to be successful blat transactors- characters who solve problems and arrange things for others, and

are thus called “useful people” (nuzhnye liudi)- “brokers” with many contacts, not necessarily pleasant to everyone

but energetic, jolly, and cheerful• were often employed in professions which delivered personal

services—doctors, beauticians, or sauna workers—or which gave them special access to goods—shop assistants, or supply and storage employees


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Boren’s (2002) reasons why blat was not effectively counteracted by the Soviet authorities

• a) The official economy would not have been able to function without it since it helped in direction the supply of goods and services to where they were demand.

• b) Powerful persons were involved in the system and had no incentive to change it.

• c) It directed people’s attention away from politics and towards consumption

“The Ethics of Blat…

…are the same as the Ethics of Friendship”(1) obligation to help—help your friends unselfishly and

they will come to your aid(2) Do not expect gratitude but be grateful(3) Look to the future—long-term reciprocity(4) Keep within limits—ask within limits(5) Know the contexts in which the informal friendship

code has priority over formal legal codes(6) Socially ostracize those who follow the letter of law


Discussion in Sociology

• The role of blat in contemporary’s Russia and its disappearance or continuing

1. The Give Me a Bribe Society2. The Relevance of Blat-Relations

The “Give Me a Bribe Society”

• disappearance of blat is the key to understanding the post-communist reality

• end of the economy of shortage and the emergence of real money changed the rules of the game

• major process to be observed in all transition countries is the monetarization of blat relations and the replacement of blat by bribe

• for the majority of people, the transition from communism to post-communism was one from a “do me a favor society” to a “give me a bribe society”.

• bribery replaced blat as the dominant form of corruption• the major difference between blat and bribery is their respective

functions in reproducing the social order• blat was a socially acceptable form of corruption that increased the social

equality and the fairness of the communist society• in blat transactions participants understood their corrupt activities as

“help” and covered them in the rhetoric of friendship


How Bribery Reinforces Inequality

The social functions of bribery in post-communist reality differ from the functions of blat:

• Bribery causes inflation of the social capital defined as blat• Bribery cannot be covered by the rhetoric of friendship, and

this makes people feel morally uncomfortable• Bribery contributes to social stratification, making it easier for

the rich to obtain everything they want• Blat transactions took form in the context of solidarity and

friendship; bribery takes the form of competition• In a society suffering the rise of social inequality, bribery takes

the form of a selective tax (it helps concentrate power in the hands of elites)


Blat as a Personal Network in Former Command Economy

• One of the key meanings of blat is communication within one’s circle, or one’s personal network

• according to Michailova and Worm (2003) the three main features of personal networking are:

- Social resourcing- Continuity of relationship- Coexistence of trust and cooperation on the one

hand and power and domination on the other.

Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life,


Social Resourcing• As blat exists not only within one’s own network, but also

between blat network members, the phenomenon has become termed ‘set blatnyih’

• Within ‘set blatnyih’, the members are involved in both double and multisided relationships ‘social resourcing’ or the ability to access various types of resources through one’s social connections

• following example: Exchange is often facilitated by participants outside the double-sided relationship. Hence, obligations might stretch to people whom one does not know directly or will never meet. In such a network persons A, B and C have mutual commitments of exchanging favours. In spite of this, only A and B as well as B and C are involved in double-side relations. Thus, even without knowing each other, A and C are mutually committed through their involvement with B



Continuity of Relationships • Russians like to develop close long-term personal

relationships which are a prerequisite for the existence of blat (Sedov 2004, Vandysheva & Gamov 2004)

• Close long-term personal relationships are used to protect individual and group interests for personal gain,e.g. people maintain contacts with their school and university friends, with friends from military service, with former neighbours and others who can be trusted

• People often support each other and grow together personally and professionally (Ryzhova 2004, Tchumanova 2004)



Continuity of Relationships• long-term personal relationships of former Komsomol (Young

Communist League in the former Soviet Union) officials help them to survive and succeed in business and in maintaining opportunities to acquire greater wealth for people of their circle

• When interviewed on 23 February 2004, one of our respondents in Russia indicated, most of the current ‘new Russians’ – wealthy Russian businessmen – are former Komsomol officials

• Their ability to ‘go through’ various issues in business can often be explained not only by their excellent self-discipline and organisational skills gained in the Komsomol, but to a large extent by having everywhere a circle of former colleagues and acquaintances

• They still have better access to government funds and permissions, bank loans, and resources

Coexistence of Trust and Cooperation on the one Hand and Power on the Other

• Blackwell (1991) highlighted the following example to illustrate how blat relates to the features of personal network

• Hellof and Fitzgerald, two Canadian business people, who entered the Russian market with an educational project in the early 1990s experienced the necessity of blat

• These two Canadians had their first lesson in the importance of blat when they needed to get tickets to Leningrad (formerly St Petersburg) to meet Mr. Efimov, one of the project managers in Russia

• Getting tickets for the Leningrad train required waiting in line for nine hours, while flying to Leningrad was by the circuitous route to Helsinki, Finland, and back to Leningrad

• When the Russian project manager, Mr. Efimov, acted, within a few hours a first-class automobile was ready to transport these Canadian business people to Leningrad

• Answering questions on his experience of dealing with the Soviets, Fitzgerald said that it is important to find the right partner – who understands the Westerners for starters (Blackwell, 1991)

• This example highlights how the Canadians’ continuous relationship with one of the Russian project managers (Mr. Efimov) gave them access to resources (luxury and in-time transportation), that were generally unavailable

c.f. Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life, Research and

Practice in Human Resource Management, 12(1), 34-60

Change and Continuity in Blat PracticesThree major changes in blat practices:

1. a certain “monetization” of blat practices has taken place (money has become the focus of “shortage” and the driving force by which blat connections become reoriented) affects the non-monetary nature of the blat exchange of favors (Ledeneva 2000: 192–93)

2. post-Soviet privatization of state property revolutionized the blat “means of exchange”—a favor of access

official “gatekeepers” in a centralized state economy provided favors of access on two conditions:

(1) the “gate” itself was not alienable (it belonged to the state);(2) gatekeepers had some certainty in staying in charge of re-distribution most “favors of access” demanded from officials were about privatizing resources

or converting them into capital by means of licenses, permissions, or tax allowances

3. scale of blat exchange has changed in the post-Soviet economy- personal businesses are set up with the help of blat connections- state property is privatized, and state budget funds are rerouted in the interests

of private businessesc.f. Ledeneva, Alena (2008): Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2008;50(1):118–

144

Lonkila, M. (1997) 'Informal Exchange Relations in Post-Soviet Russia: A Comparative Perspective'

• compares the informal exchange of favours, goods and information in St. Petersburg and Helsinki

• Forty secondary school teachers in St. Petersburg and thirty-eight in Helsinki kept a diary of their important social relations for two weeks

• Each evening they recorded their significant social encounters of the day in structured questionnaires, e.g. whom they met

• furthermore they added persons whom they had not met during the study period but whom they nevertheless considered as significant for their social life

• Clear differences were found between the informal exchange practices of Russian and Finnish respondents

• Russian teachers exchanged more favours, goods and important information

• Russian respondents having to use their relatives, friends, colleagues or acquaintances in order to obtain informally products or different kinds of services (eg. medical care)

• half of the Russian respondents reported blat exchanges, a practice not found in the Finnish data

• A good example is Olga who described her mother as 'blatnoi chelovek' (person inclined to do things by blat) as opposed to her father who never wanted to use his social relations

• Olga: ...[my own] mother - she is a 'blatnoi' person. Generally there is a category of people - whereever they go, nobody will ever deny them anything. But my father ... he was a very intelligent person, always 'please' and 'thank you'. He was always treated with rough words and left in tears..


• Interviewer: And did not achieve anything. • Olga: And did not achieve anything. He did not know how to ask, he sent

mother everywhere. I am probably the same kind of person. I love achieving things myself. Well, of course, if I need something some kind of contacts appear, it even turned out that I got po blatu to hospital!

• Interviewer: You got there through relations [po znakomstvu]? • Olga: Yes, I did not expect it! I asked [my student's] mother to come to

see me, the son of whom had started to skip lessons and behave badly. There were complaints about him, and I asked her to come. During our conversation she appeared to be an 'uzi' specialist [a doctor specialized in ultra wave diagnostics] at our maternity clinic. I did not know this at all. And I complained that I did not feel good and she invited me to her office. This is how it all happened. ...


• Interviewer: And she also arranged things for you at the hospital? • Olga: She arranged everything, she arranged for me to go very quickly to the

hospital and undergo all these analyses etc. But had I gone myself! You know how you take care of your own health - you do everything at the last moment.

• Interviewer: Yes, that's the way it happens. • Olga: And this happened again - po blatu [by blat]. • Interviewer: Now it is interesting; did you feel indebted to her? • Olga: Yes, I brought her a box of chocolates and a bunch of flowers, and - well,

she is just such a tender person, that... • Interviewer: And you resolved the conflict with her son? • Olga: Yes, we resolved it , here everything is ok (laugh) • Interviewer: And what about the doctor? Were you operated on free of

charge? • Olga: Yes, free of charge. ... it was only a maternity hospital, not far from here.

But I was amazed how they took care of patients. Completely gratuitous maternity hospital ...


• The informal exchanges reported in the St. Petersburg data were more often carried out with colleagues or other work-mediated relations

• stressing the importance of the Russian workplace as a social milieu• In the Russian data the informal exchange relations also involved more

examples of informal exchange mediated by a third person, whereas in Helsinki the relations were more of a dyadic nature

• continuing lack of trust in official institutions and social services was compensated for Russian respondents with the use of their personal relations

• through the use of brokers or a common social context, particularly the workplace

• resulting forms of social life can be characterized as personalized (and mediated (since the brokers were often used)

• networks of personal relations still continue to play a significant role in the life of post-Soviet citizens.


Irina and Alla: Experts of Informal Exchange

• Lonkila illustrates the role of informal exchange in the daily life of St. Petersburg respondents, based on the case descriptions of two middle-aged female teachers

• Irina is a 44-year-old teacher of Russian born in the Ukraine. She met her husband, currently a teacher of physical education, on holiday in Odessa in 1969. Three years later they were married and Irina followed her husband to Leningrad where he was studying at a sports institute. They live together with their 20-year-old daughter in a three room apartment

• Alla is a 36-year-old teacher of literature married to a businessman of the same age. They have a 16-year-old son and eight-year-old daughter. Alla joined the Communist party, taking her membership seriously and, in her own words, was a good communist. Her Komsomol and party relations resulted in a suggestion to study in the German Democratic Republic. At present Alla is a rank-and-file teacher at school but thanks to her friends at the university she can also teach Russian to foreigners.


Comparing Irina and Alla

• The social life is marked not only by the great number of their exchange relations but also by the intensity and nature of these relations

• Other 'exchange experts' similar to these two teachers were found in St. Petersburg but not in Helsinki

• Both Irina and Alla have reported numerous informal exchange relations particularly with their colleagues and neighbours

• 'All the time I feel the interest of others, how they want to approach me, how they'd like to make friends with me'.

- colleague who helps me with my work - good person who has often helped me [old friend and teacher] - mother's neighbour who helps our family with small repairs - very pleasant woman, always ready to help [neighbour] - we haven't even met but she wants to be helped [sister of an acquaintance] - benevolent and tender person, ready to help [neighbour]


Table 1: Typical Content of the Exchanges of Favours and Material Goods in St. Petersburg and Helsinki Table 1: Typical Content of the Exchanges of Favours and Material Goods in St. Petersburg and Helsinki

Content of the Exchange St. Petersburg Helsinki

Obtaining (dostat), bringing or buying (on other person's behalf with her money) foodstuffs or other kinds of products

40 (17%) 6 (6%)*

Arranging medical or paramedical aid; eg. arranging a contact with a doctor, obtaining or bringing medicine

32 (13%) 7 (6%)*

4.

Lending things other than money (eg. books, videos, computer programs, diskettes, cassettes, sheet music, clothes)

15 (6%) 19 (17%)

5.

Helping with home repairs or work at datcha (St. Petersburg) or moving (Helsinki)

13 (5%) 5 (5%)

6.

Arranging useful contacts; eg. business contact, hairdresser, lawyer

12 (5%) -

7.

Sending or transmitting a parcel 11 (5%) 3 (3%)8.

Arranging somebody's child a place at school (university, sport camp)

8 (3%) -

9.

Tutoring others' children; eg. helping colleague's child in homework

8 (3%) 1 (1%)

10.Giving small gifts (birthday gifts excluded); eg. children's clothes etc.

8 (3%) 6 (6%)

11.Giving a car ride 7 (3%) 29 (27%)12.Miscellaneous small favours or help; eg. taking the children to or from school, sewing a button on shirt etc.

56 (24%) 33 (30%)

Total Number of Exchanges 238 (100%) 109 (100 %)

Table 2: Typical Content of the Exchanges of Important Information in St. Petersburg and Helsinki Table 2: Typical Content of the Exchanges of Important Information in St. Petersburg and Helsinki

Content of the Exchange

St. Petersburg Helsinki

1. Medicine or medical cure

18 (27%) 2 (22%)

2. Where to buy (kupit) cheaper products (mainly foodstuff)

10 (15%) -

3. Children's studies

9 (13%) -

4. Job opportunities

7 (10%) 2 (22%)

5. Where to find or how to obtain (dostat) products

6 (9%) 1 (11%)

6. Official documents (passports, medical documents etc.)

4 (6%) -

7. Common investment opportunities

4 (6%) -

8. Miscellaneous 9 (13%) 4 (44%)Total Number of Exchanges

67 (100%) 9 (100%)

7. Meeting:Gender and Everyday Life in Soviet Russia and GDR



GENDER AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN SOVIET RUSSIA, GDR and post-

Soviet Russia

Role of Women

• Article 35 of the Soviet Constitution states that women and men "have equal rights" and possess equal access to education and training, employment, promotions, and remuneration and to participation in social, political, and cultural activity

• Women also receive special medical and workplace protection, including incentives for mothers to work outside the home and legal and material support in their role as mothers

Role of Women• Nevertheless, both within society in general and within the

family, the position of women in 1989 was not equal to that of men

• For example, in the 1980s women constituted just:over half the country's work forcefour-fifths of its health workersmore than two-thirds of its physicians and economiststhree-quarters of those employed in education• authorities neglected to add, however, that the average pay

for most women in these fields was below the country's average pay

Role of Women• Moreover, the higher the level in a profession, the smaller the

percentage of women• in 1984 women constituted 83 percent of elementary school

directors but only 42 percent of secondary school directors and 38 percent of middle school directors

• In the 1980s, 46 percent of all collective farm workers were women, but they constituted only 1.9 percent of collective farm chairpersons

• Women were also underrepresented in the CPSU and its leadership• In 1983 women constituted only 27.6 percent of the membership of

the party and only 4.2 percent of the Central Committee• in 1986 women were totally absent from the Politburo

Marriage• Soviet citizens may marry at age eighteen without parental

permission• Latvian, Estonian, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Kazakh, and

Kirgiz republics have lowered this age to seventeen years• In 1980 approximately 73 percent of the brides and 62 percent of

the grooms were under twenty-five years of age• One third of all marriages involved persons under twenty years of

age• in 20 percent of the marriages involving persons under that age the

bride was pregnant • About 70 percent of childless young couples lived with parents during the first years of marriage

because of low income or a shortage of housing

Homework• Most married women in the Soviet Union worked outside the

home in addition to fulfilling their roles of wife, mother, and homemaker

• As in other industrialized countries, women had difficulty reconciling the demands of career and home “double societal role”

• At home, Soviet women spent more than twice as much time on housework as men: 28 hrs per week, men: 12 hrs.

• Before marriage, the average woman has had 42 hrs. rs a week of free time; after marriage 21 hrs.

• Soviet research shows that marital happiness was directly connected to the extent a husband shared in domestic work

Soviet women’s dual burden• Women encouraged into the workforce to become

economically independent of men and into education to achieve their full human potential

• position of women was characterised primarily by the dual burden — women’s responsibility for paid labour and domestic labour

• their work in the domestic sphere was regarded as secondary to that of paid labour

• Heitlinger suggested that, ‘the production of children has a paradoxical effect on the position of women in state socialist countries’ arising from ‘the contradiction between the private nature and collective consequences of biological reproduction’ (Heitlinger 1979: 29)

Homework• Husbands and wives from the elite tended to share decisions and

housework to a greater extent than those from other social strata• In blue-collar and agricultural families, the husband was considered head

of the household • Nationality appeared to be less of an influence on marital roles than social

status and place of residence- In mid-1970s, even most Muslim husbands were willing to share in some

housework with their wives- the higher the socioeconomic status of the family, the more the husband

shared the work- In Muslim families and in other nationality groups where the patriarchal

system has remained strong, the husband was regarded as the head of the family and made most of the major family decisions

- in the European part of USSR, the husband and wife shared in the decision making

Divorce• with a rate of 3.4 divorces per 1,000 people, USSR was second

only to the US (4.8 divorces) among industrialized countries in 1986

• Soviet divorce rate varied according to region and population density

• In Soviet Central Asia, it was two to three times lower than in European areas

• the rate was also higher in cities and in newly developed regions

• Divorce rates in rural areas averaged about 40 percent of those in cities.

Divorces• variety of reasons for divorces:- drunkenness, incompatibility, infidelity, separation, physical

incompatibility- Regional differences: acceptance of divorce in Muslim areas

for families with children was opposed by 87 percent of urban and 84 percent of rural Uzbeks

- In contrast: only 54 percent of urban Russians and 51 percent of urban Estonians held this view

• Housing problems and the lack of privacy • 20 percent of divorces occurring during the first years of

marriage due to housing problems• 18 percent of divorces occurring during the first years of

marriage due to conflicts with parents

Divorces

In 1973 in Leningrad- 31.7 percent of divorcing couples had lived with

parents or in a hostel- 62.3 percent in a shared apartment- only 5.1 percent in a separate apartment • Divorces cost between 60 and 200 rubles depending

on income and were granted more quickly if the couple had no children

• In general, divorces were relatively simple to obtain

Sex and Contraception• Soviet society in general did not approve of unmarried couples

living together• lack of suitable contraceptive devices and lack of public

discussion about contraception, led to a large number of unwanted pregnancies

• Studies in Leningrad have shown that 38 percent of all babies born in Leningrad in 1978 were conceived before marriage

• Although women were officially discouraged from having abortions, they were legal and were the chief form of birth control in the country: 8 million each year

• Abortions were free for working women and cost 2 to 5 rubles for other women, depending on where they lived

• In Muslim regions, the rate of abortion was much lower than in the European part of the country

Family Size• depended mainly on the place of residence--urban or rural--

and ethnic group• also influenced by housing and income limitations, pensions,

and female employment outside the home• typical urban family consisted of a married couple, two

children, and, in about 20 percent of the cases, one of the grandmothers

• Rural families had more children and often three generations under one roof

• Families in Central Asia and the Caucasus tended to have more children than families elsewhere in the Soviet Union

Family Size• From 1960s to late 1980s, number of families with more than

one child decreased by about 50 percent and in 1988 totaled 1.9 million

• In the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian republics, families with one and two children constituted more than 90 percent of all families

• in Central Asia those with three or more children ranged from 14 percent in the Kirgiz Republic to 31 percent in the Tadzhik Republic

Family and Kinship Structures

• extended family was more prevalent in Central Asia and the Caucasus than in other regions

• Deference to parental wishes regarding marriage was particularly strong in these areas, even among the Russians residing there

• Extended families helped perpetuate traditional life-styles• younger and better educated Uzbeks and working women,

however, were more likely to behave and think like their counterparts in the European areas

8. Meeting:Lebensführung, Lifestyles in Global Cities and Metropoles



Global city • A global city (also called world city) is a city deemed to be an

important node point in the global economic system• The concept comes from geography and urban studies• concept rests on the idea that globalization can be understood

as largely created, facilitated and enacted in strategic geographic locales according to a hierarchy of importance to the operation of the global system of finance and trade

• most complex of these entities is the "global city," whereby the linkages binding a city have a direct and tangible effect on global affairs through socio-economic means

• terminology of "global city", as opposed to megacity, is thought to have been first coined by Saskia Sassen in her 1991 work The Global City

80

Global Cities

• highly concentrated command points of the world economy and nodes in the network/hierarchy of world cities;

• key locations for finance and service firms which have overtaken the importance of the manufacturing sectors;

• sites of production and innovations in the leading industries; and

• markets for the products and innovations which they produce.

2004 GaWC studies • One of the first attempts to define, categorize, and rank

global cities was made in 1999 by the Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC)

• cities are ranked on their provision of "advanced producer services" such as accountancy, advertising, finance, and law

• The GaWC inventory identifies three levels of global cities and several sub-ranks

• roster generally denotes cities in which there are offices of certain multinational corporations providing financial and consulting services rather than denoting other cultural, political, and economic centres

Ranking• (1) Global Cities

– Well rounded global cities – Very large contribution: London and New York City

• Smaller contribution and with cultural bias: Los Angeles, Paris, and San Francisco

– Incipient global cities: Amsterdam, Boston, Chicago, Madrid, Milan, Moscow, Toronto

– Global niche cities — specialised global contributions – Financial: Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo – Political and social: Brussels, Geneva and Washington, D.C.

• (2) World Cities– Subnet articulator cities

– Cultural: Berlin, Copenhagen, Melbourne, Munich, Oslo, Rome, Stockholm – Political: Bangkok, Beijing, Vienna – Social: Manila, Nairobi, Ottawa

Ranking

– (3) Worldwide leading cities • Primarily economic global contributions:

Frankfurt, Miami, Munich, Osaka, Singapore, Sydney, Zurich

• Primarily non-economic global contributions: Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Atlanta, Basel, Barcelona, Cairo, Denver, Harare, Lyon, Manila, Mexico City, Mumbai, New Delhi, Shanghai

Rank Population of city (proper) Population of metropolitan area Percentage foreign born[30]

1 Mumbai Tokyo Dubai

2 Shanghai Mexico City Kuwait City

3 Karachi Seoul Doha

4 Istanbul New York City Manama

5 Delhi São Paulo Miami

6 São Paulo Mumbai Toronto

7 Moscow Delhi Macau

8 Seoul Shanghai Muscat

9 Mexico City Jakarta Hong Kong

10 Tokyo Moscow Vancouver

Statistics of World Cities

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet

Top 10 rail systems by length

Annual by passenger in a single airport [31]

Number of billionaires (U.S. dollars)[32][33][34]

London Atlanta Moscow

New York City Chicago New York City

Berlin London London

Madrid Tokyo Istanbul

Moscow Los Angeles Hong Kong

Seoul Paris Los Angeles

Shanghai Dallas Mumbai

Paris Frankfurt San Francisco

Beijing Beijing Dallas

Tokyo Denver Tokyo

Rank

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Statistics about World Cities

Metro systems by annual passenger ridership

Tokyo

Moscow

New York City

Seoul

Mexico City

Paris

Hong Kong

London

Osaka

São Paulo

Rank

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Statistics of World Cities

Rank 2008

Rank 2007

City CountryScore 2008

Score 2007

1 1 Moscow Russia 142.4 134.4

2 4 Tokyo Japan 127.0 122.1

3 2 London UK 125.0 126.3

4 10 Oslo Norway 118.3 105.8

5 3 Seoul South Korea 117.7 122.4

6 5 Hong Kong China 117.6 119.4

7 6 Copenhagen Denmark 117.2 110.2

8 7 Geneva Switzerland 115.8 109.8

12 13 Paris France 109.4 101.4

13 14 Singapore Singapore 109.1 100.4

18 12 St. Petersburg Russia 103.1 103.0

19 19 Vienna Austria 102.3 96.9

20 20 Beijing China 101.9

The world's most expensive big cities – (on cost of living expressed in US dollars)

Chart : Urban and Rural Population of the World 1950-2030

Source: United Nations

0

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Mill

ion

Rural Urban

Chart: Urban and Rural Population of More Developed and Less Developed Regions of the World 1950-2030

0

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Mill

ion

More developed regions, urban population

More developed regions, rural population

Less developed regions, urban population

Less developed regions, rural populationSource: United Nations

Chart: Share of World Population Residing in Urban Areas by Size of Urban Area 1975, 2003, 2015

23

8

4

20

5

3

11

5

25

54

13

5

27

01

02

03

0

Pe

rce

nt

1975 2003 2015

10 million or more 5 million to 10 million 1 million to 5 million

0.5 million to 1 million Fewer than 500,000


Chart: Urban Areas with 10 Million Inhabitants or More (Millions)1950 1975 2003 2015

Urban Area Popu-lation




1 New York, USAa 12.3 1 Tokyo, Japan 26.6 1 Tokyo, Japan 35.0 1 Tokyo, Japan 36.2

2 Tokyo, Japan 11.3 2 New York, USAa 15.9 2 Mexico City, Mexico 18.7 2 Mumbai, India 22.6

3 Shanghai, China 11.4 3 New York, USAa 18.3 3 Delhi, India 20.9

4 Mexico City, Mexico

10.7 4 Sao Paulo, Brazil 17.9 4 Mexico City, Mexico 20.6

5 Mumbai, India 17.4 5 Sao Paulo, Brazil 20.0

6 Delhi, India 14.1 6 New York, USAa 19.7

7 Calcutta, India 13.8 7 Dhaka, Bangladesh 17.9

8 Buenos Aires, Argentina 13.0 8 Jakarta, Indonesia 17.5

9 Shanghai, China 12.8 9 Lagos, Nigeria 17.0

10 Jakarta, Indonesia 12.3 10 Calcutta, India 16.8

11 Los Angeles, USAb 12.0 11 Karachi, Pakistan 16.2

12 Dhaka, Bangladesh 11.6 12 Buenos Aires, Argentina 14.6

13 Osaka-Kobe, Japan 11.2 13 Cairo, Egypt 13.1

14 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 11.2 14 Los Angeles, USAb 12.9

15 Karachi, Pakistan 11.1 15 Shanghai, China 12.7

16 Beijing, China 10.8 16 Manila, Philippines 12.6

17 Cairo, Egypt 10.8 17 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 12.4

18 Moscow, Russia 10.5 18 Osaka-Kobe, Japan 11.4

19 Manila, Philippines 10.4 19 Istanbul, Turkey 11.3

20 Lagos, Nigeria 10.1 20 Beijing, China 11.1

21 Moscow, Russia 10.9

22 Paris, France 10.0

a Refers to the New York-Newark urbanized areas; b refers to the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana urbanized areas


Chart: Median Age of Population in Selected Cities

242525

262727

283131

3232

34343434

3535

363737

393939

4147

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

ManilaCairo*

JakartaIstanbul

JohannesburgMexico CitySao Paulo*

SeoulDubai

ChicagoLos Angeles

SydneyNew YorkSingapore

LondonLas Vegas

WashingtonBuenos Aires

TorontoBeijing *

Hong KongTokyo

MoscowFrankfurt

Paris

Source: Compiled from national agencies

* Estimated

Chart: Annual Population Growth Rates for the World’s 20 Largest Urban Areas

-1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

New York

Shanghai

Osaka-Kobe

Beijing

Tokyo

Los Angeles

Moscow

Buenos Aires

Rio de Janeiro

Cairo

Calcutta

Mexico City

Sao Paulo

Metro Manila

Mumbai

Jakarta

Karachi

Delhi

Lagos

Dhaka

Percent per Annum

1975-2000 annual growth rate

2000-2015 projected annual growth rate


Chart:Office Space in Selected Central Business Districts

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

MumbaiBangalore

IstanbulJohannesbu

MoscowHong Kong

ManilaBeijing

ShanghaiLos

JakartaBuenos

SingaporeSydney

SeoulToronto

Sao PauloMexico CityWashington

Frankfurt ChicagoLondon

ParisNew York

Tokyo

Millions of Square Meters

Existing inventory Space under construction

Source: Colliers International

Note: The number at the end of each bar indicates space under construction as a percent of the existing inventory.

Chart: Office Space Construction in Selected Central Business Districts

Cities with the Most Office Space Under Construction in the Central Business District (CBD) in 2004

• Beijing 2,136,000 square meters• Paris 1,290,000• Shanghai 944,000• Tokyo 878,000• Moscow 740,000• Washington 582,000

Cities with the Most Office Construction in the CBD as a Percent of Existing Space in 2004 • Beijing 75 %• Moscow 36 %• Shanghai 33 %• Jakarta 10 %• Bangalore 10 %• Istanbul 9 %• Paris 7 %

Source: Colliers International.

5

11

11

12

13

13

13

16

17

17

17

18

20

21

22

24

24

26

26

33

34

40

44

47

95

89

89

88

87

87

87

84

83

83

83

82

80

79

78

76

76

74

74

67

66

60

56

53

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

WashingtonParis

New YorkBuenos Aires

LondonSydney

Las VegasFrankfurt

Hong KongJakartaChicago

Los AngelesJohannesburg

Mexico CityTokyo

TorontoManila

MoscowSeoulCairo

SingaporeDubai

BeijingShanghai

Goods producing Services producing

Source: Compiled from various national agencies

Chart: Share of Workers Employed in Goods and Services Producing Sectors in Selected Urban Areas

97

Sassen’s 4 general trends in Global Cities

• The locational concentration of major growth sectors with either sharp earnings dispersion or disproportionate concentration of either low- or high-paying jobs in major cities

• A proliferation of small, low-cost service operations made possible by the massive concentration of people in such cities, in addition to a large daily inflow of non-resident workers and tourists

• A tendency toward increased economic polarization: polarization in the use of land, in the organization of labor markets, in the housing market, and in the consumption structure

• The growth of economic and social inequalities

98

Sassen’s social and economic restructuring and the

emergence of new social forms

• The growth of an informal economy in large cities in highly developed countries,

• High-income commercial and residential gentrification, and

• The sharp rise of homelessness in rich countries

99

General Trends in Global Cities • The locational concentration of major growth sectors

with either sharp earnings dispersion or disproportionate concentration of either low- or high-paying jobs in major cities

• A proliferation of small, low-cost service operations made possible by the massive concentration of people in such cities, in addition to a large daily inflow of non-resident workers and tourists

• A tendency toward increased economic polarization: polarization in the use of land, in the organization of labor markets, in the housing market, and in the consumption structure

• The growth of economic and social inequalities

Third World Cities• Generally third world countries have a city that is much larger

than the rest of the cities in the country …called a “primate city”

• why do they form?– colonialism (infrastructure development, especially railroads & ports)– post-colonial investment by outsiders– political and economic instability related directly or indirectly to

external manipulation– population pressure related to external involvement

• Massive influx of people to the primate city leads to squatter settlements and grossly inadequate services

New International Division of Labor

• During “industrial era” leading countries engaged in industry using materials from poor regions

• During “post-industrial era” leading countries have specialized in services and finance

• Poor countries now provide raw materials and industrial labor that benefit consumers in wealthy countries

• Each of the three main world cities is associated with an economic hinterland, though their ties are global



9. Meeting:Housing in Russia and Soviet Union II- The role of „dacha“

Escaping from Appartments –The role of Dacha

Why to go to dacha?

• to spend some time close to nature• To escape from communal appartments• To spend holidays• To meet good friends• To have free-time from husband or wife or children• to grow own fruits and vegetables (second economy)• …..

History of Dacha• The first dachas in Russia began to appear during the reign of

Peter the Great• they were small estates in the country, which were given to

loyal vassals by the Tsar• In archaic Russian, the word dacha means something given• Russian aristocracy used their dachas for social and cultural

gatherings, which were usually accompanied by masquerade balls and fireworks displays

• Industrial Revolution brought about a rapid growth in the urban population, and urban residents increasingly desired to escape the heavily polluted cities, at least temporarily

• dacha became a favorite summer retreat for the upper and middle classes of Russian society

History of Dacha

• After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, most dachas were nationalized• Some were converted into vacation homes for the working class, while

others, usually of better quality, were distributed among functionaries of the Communist Party and the newly emerged cultural and scientific elite

• The period after World War II saw a moderate growth in dacha development

• squatters began occupying unused plots of land near cities and towns, some building sheds, huts, and more prominent dwellings that served as dachas

• The 1955 legislation introduced a new type of legal entity into the Soviet juridical system, a so-called gardeners' partnership (садоводческое товарищество)

• In 1958, another form of organization was introduced, a cooperative for dacha construction (дачно-строительный кооператив), which recognized the right of an individual to build a small house on the land leased from the government

History of Dacha

• dachas were formed as cooperatives supervised by trade unions and could not be sold

• typical size of land given by the state to a family varied from 4 to 12 "sotok", 6 and 8 being the most common

• now a popular newspaper for dacha owners is titled "6 Sotok“

• One "sotka" = 100 square meters, so typical dacha land area of 6 sotok is equal to 0.16 acres

• Statistic says that now more than 30% of Russian families have dachas

History of Dacha

• collapse of communism saw the return to private land ownership

• Most dachas have since been privatized• Russia is now the nation with the largest number of owners of

second homes• growth of living standards in recent years allowed many

dacha owners to spend their discretionary income on improvements

• Thus, many recently built dachas are fully equipped houses suitable for use as permanent residences

• market-oriented economy transformed the dacha into an asset, which generally reflects the prosperity of its owner

Dacha in Germany • the word "dacha" is well-spread here as well• however, the meaning of the word “datscha”, loaned from the

Russian language, differs a lot from its traditional variant• Dachas in Germany started to appear in the mid 19th century• idea of creating a nature oasis for city residents stroke Daniel

Schreber, the citizen of Leipzig• Schreber was a doctor and an active supporter of healthy living• considered that a people should be able to communicate with the

flora and, if lucky, with fauna• he proposed the city authorities to create original ecological

enclaves with small gardens and lawns• clear definition: a small plot of land with a trailer or a small house• German law clearly regulates the size of a plot of land and

permissible activity on it

5. Meeting: Informal Sector and Informal Practices in Everyday Life - The Informal Sector in Russia "Sociology of Everyday life. Lifestyles, образ жизни,

Documents

informal economy

informal activities

informal employment

informal practices

informal basis

types of informal employment

case of russia

russia individuals