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Nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine : educational policy and the response ofthe Russian-speaking population

Janmaat, J.G.

Publication date2000Document VersionFinal published version

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Citation for published version (APA):Janmaat, J. G. (2000). Nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine : educational policy and theresponse of the Russian-speaking population. KNAG.

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Jann Germen Janmaat

Nation-Buildingg in Post-Soviett Ukraine Educationall Policy and the Response of thee Russian-Speaking Population

Nation-Buildingg in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Nederlandsee Geografische Studies / Netherlands Geographical Studies

Redactiee / Editorial Board

Prof.. Dr. J.M.M, van Amersfoort Dr.. HJ.A. Berendsen Drs.. J.G. Borchert Prof.. Dr. A.O. Kouwenhoven Prof.. Dr. H. Scholten Dr.. P.CJ. Druijven

Plaatselijkee Redacteuren / Associate Editors

Drs.. J.G. Borchert, Faculteitt der Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht Dr.. D.H. Drenth, Faculteitt Beleidswetenschappen Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen Dr.. A.C.M. Jansen, Economisch-Geografischh Instituut Universiteit van Amsterdam Drs.. F.J.P.M. Kwaad, Fysisch-Geografischh en Bodemkundig Laboratorium Universiteit van Amsterdam Dr.. P.CJ. Druijven, Faculteitt der Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Dr.. L van der Laan, Economisch-Geografischh Instituut Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam Dr.. J.A. van der Schee, Centrumm voor Educatieve Geografie Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Dr.. F. Thissen, Instituutt voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam

Redactie-Adviseurss / Editorial Advisory Board

Prof.. Dr. G.J. Ashworth, Prof. Dr. P.G.E.F. Augustinus, Prof. Dr. G.J. Borger, Prof.. Dr. J. Buursink, Prof. Dr. K. Bouwer, Dr. C. Cortie, Dr. J. Floor, Drs.. J.D.H. Harten, Prof. Dr. G.A. Hoekveld, Dr. A.C. Imeson, Dr. A.C.M. Jansen, Prof.. Dr. J.M.G. Kleinpenning, Dr. W.J. Meester, Prof. Dr. F.J. Ormeling, Prof.. Dr. H.F.L Ottens, Dr. H. Reitsma, Dr. H.Th. Riezebos, Drs. P. Schat, Dr. J. Sevink, Dr.. W.F. Sleegers, T.Z. Smit, Drs. P.J.M, van Steen, Dr. J.J. Sterkenburg, Drs.. HAW. van Vianen, Prof. Dr. J. van Weesep

ISSNN 0169-4839

Netherlandss Geographical Studies 268

Nation-Buildingg in Post-Soviett Ukraine Educationall policy and the response of the Russian-speakingg population

Jann Germen Janmaat

Utrecht/Amsterdamm 2000

Royall Dutch Geographical Society Facultyy of Social and Behavioral Sciences Universiteit van Amsterdam

Lay-out:: AGIDS Universiteit van Amsterdam Figures:: UvA Kaartenmakers Englishh Correction: Ann Reeves Translationn of the Summary into Ukrainian and Russian: Ella Begliarova

ISBNN 90-6809-291-X

Copyrightt © Jan Germen Janmaat, Universiteit van Amsterdam 2000

Nietss uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd en/of openbaar gemaakt door middel vann druk, fotokopie of op welke andere wijze dan ook zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemmingg van de uitgevers.

Noo part of this book may be reproduced in any form of print, photoprint, microfilm or any otherr means without written permission by the publishers.

Printedd by Elinkwijk b.v., Utrecht

CONTENTS S

PREFACEE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S 9

11 INTRODUCTIO N 11

1.11 UKRAINE ' s REGIONAL DISPARITIES : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL

CONSEQUENCESS 14

1.22 STATE-MINORITY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE: THE ROLE OF THE STATE 23

1.33 STATE-MINORITY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE: THE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIANS AND

RUSSIAN-SPEAKINGG UKRAINIAN S 27

1.44 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 29

1.55 THE ROLE OF RUSSIA 30

22 STATES AND ETHNI C GROUPS 32

2.11 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS: THEIR APPLICABILITY FOR UKRAINE 32

2.1.11 Nations, ethnic groups and nationalities 32 2.1.22 The Russianss and Russian-speaking Ukrainians of Ukraine 34 2.1.33 Nationalism and state nationalism 36 2.1.44 State nationalism in Ukraine 37 2.22 THE RESPONSE OF THE UKRAINIA N STATE TO ETHNIC PLURALISM 37

2.2.11 Consociational democracy 37 2.2.22 Overt majority ethno-nationalism 41 2.33 THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO NATION-BUILDIN G 43

2.3.11 Three options 43 2.3.22 Independent variables 45

33 NATION-BUILDIN G IN EDUCATIO N 53

3.11 EDUCATION IN UKRAINE DURING CZARIST AND SOVIET RULE 53 3.22 EDUCATION IN UKRAINE SINCE GLASNOST 58

3.2.11 The Glasnost years 58 3.2.22 The Kravchuk years 64 3.2.33 The Kuchma years 68 3.33 THE MOTIVES OF THE ARCHITECTS OF UKRAINIA N NATION-BUILDIN G 69 3.44 CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION 70

3.4.11 Curriculum changes in Ukrainian schools 71 3.4.22 Curriculum changes in Russian schools 74 3.4.33 Curriculum changes in higher education 75 3.55 POSSIBILITIES FOR PRIVATE EDUCATION 76

3.66 AN EXPLANATION OF THE NATION-B UILDING PROJECT 77

3.77 CONCLUSION 82

44 HISTORY OF UKRAINE , UKRAINIA N LITERATUR E AND GEOGRAPHY OF UKRAIN EE 85

4.11 HISTORY OF UKRAINE 85

4.1.11 Introduction 85 4.1.22 KyivRus' 89 4.1.33 The Cossack era and Hetman Ivan Mazepa 91 4.1.44 The awakening of the Ukrainian nation in the second half of the 19th Century 93 4.1.55 The Bolshevik Revolution and the ukrainianization of the 1920s 94 4.1.66 The collectivisation of agriculture and the 1930s famine 97 4.1.77 World War II and the role of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) 98 4.1.88 Conclusion 100 4.22 UKRAINIA N LITERATURE 101

5 5

4.2.11 Ukrainian literature in Soviet times 101 4.2.22 Ukrainian literature in contemporary Ukraine 103 4.33 GEOGRAPHY OF UKRAINE 105

4.44 CONCLUSION 106

THEE IM PLEMENTATIO N OF CENTRAL POLICY 108

5.11 THE RUSSIFICATION OF SCHOOLS IN POST-WAR SOVIET UKRAINE 108

5.22 THE UKRAINIANEATIO N OF SCHOOLS IN THE POST-GLASNOST ERA 111

5.33 THE UKRAINIANEATIO N OF HIGHER EDUCATION 114

5.44 REASONS FOR THE PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL LANGUAGE POLICY 117

5.55 CONCLUSION 119

THEE ROLE OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIE S 121

6.11 THEClTYOFL'VrV 121 6.22 THE CITY OF KYÏV 124

6.33 THE CITY OF ODES A 125

6.44 THE CITY OF DONETS ' K 127

6.55 HIGHER EDUCATION 128 6.66 SIMFEROPOL 129

6.77 CONCLUSION 131

THEE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIANS AND RUSSIAN-SPEAKING UKRAINIAN S 133

7.11 METHOD OF RESEARCH AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 133

7.22 SURVEY RESULTS 138 7.2.11 School choice 138 7.2.22 The language parents speak to their children 143 7.2.33 The two cohorts 147 7.2.44 Language use of respondent 148 7.2.55 Summary of results 157 7.33 EXPLAINING THE RESULTS 159 7.3.11 Independent variables 159 7.3.22 Fear of cultural loss 162 7.3.33 The influence of other factors 164 7.44 CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS 166

7.4.11 Nationwide societies 167 7.4.22 Societies in the four cities 167 7.55 LINGUISTIC AND POLITICAL RESPONSE: A ONE OR TWO DIMENSIONAL MODEL? 169

7.66 CONCLUSION 172

CONCLUSIONN 174

8.11 How DOES THE CURRENT NATION-BUILDIN G PROJECT DM THE EDUCATIONAL SPHERE

COMPAREE TO THAT IN SOVIET TIMES? 174

8.22 How CAN THE CURRENT NATION-BUILDIN G POLICIES BE EXPLAINED? 176

8.33 To WHAT EXTENT HAVE EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITIES SUCCEEDED IN IMPLEMENTING THE

NATION-BUILDIN GG PROJECT IN THE VARIOUS REGIONS? 178

8.44 WHAT HAS BEEN THE ROLE OF LOCAL STATE ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE NATION-BUILDIN G

PROGRAM?? 181

8.55 How DO THE LOCAL RUSSIANS AND RUSSIAN-SPEAKING UKRAINIAN S RESPOND

LINGUISTICALLYY TO THE CURRENT NATION-BUILDIN G POLICIES IN EDUCATION? 181

8.66 How CAN THE PATTERN OF RESPONSES OF THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATION BE

EXPLAINED?? 182

8.77 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 184

8.88 FUTURE SCENARIOS 187

REFERENCESS 191

SAMENVATTIN GG 201

PE3IOMEE (SUMMARY IN UKRAINIAN ) 208

PE3K>MEE (SUMMARY IN RUSSIAN) 215

APPENDIXX 1 223

APPENDIXX 2 226

APPENDIXX 3 229

7 7

8 8

PREFACEE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S

Myy interest in state-minority relations was born during my Human Geography studies at thee University of Amsterdam. I remember having writing about the growth of Walloon consciousnesss in reaction to the ascension of Flemish national sentiment and about the riserise and decline of ethnic parties in several West European countries. However, not only havee problems of sub-state nationalism in Western Europe been so well documented that theree is not much new to write about them, they also appear to have subsided over the last twoo decades making them more or less a non-issue (the Scottish case being the exception).. For these reasons, my attention shifted to Eastern Europe and the former Soviett Union, where post-communist chaos has proved to be a fertile breeding ground for thee resuscitation of long-dormant ethnic hatreds. My MA thesis pondered on the question off why some ethnic tensions in this region had escalated into armed conflict while others weree resolved peacefully. Two of my case studies were in former Yugoslavia: Croatia (violentt conflict) and Macedonia (until now peaceful).

Afterr my graduation in April 1994 I still had to do military service. As there was thee opportunity to volunteer as a UN soldier in Bosnia, I decided to take the risk and join thee forces, although I had serious doubts about the army as an institution. My time as a truckk driver transporting goods for UNHCR from the Dalmatian coast to the Bosnian interiorr allowed me to see what the ethnic conflicts I had examined in my thesis actually lookedd like in reality: destroyed homes, roadblocks, bad roads, people dressed as lumpen proletariat. .

Uponn returning home I found that a Ph.D. position had become vacant on the fate off the Russian minority in Ukraine. I considered this right up my alley, applied for the job andd got it. In joint consultation with my supervisors I decided to confine myself to nation-buildingg policies in the educational sphere and the reaction of the Russian-speaking population,, as one particular aspect of state-minority interaction. My first acquaintance withh Ukraine in May 1996 was disillusioning: everyone I interviewed in the capital Kyïv feltt that ethnic problems between Ukrainians and Russians were non-existent and that it wouldd be much more productive to devote my attention to the serious economic problems Ukrainee has faced since independence. I came back full of doubts. Were the Russians in Ukrainee just as much a non-issue as for instance the Bretons in France? Only after my visitss to L'viv, Donets'k and Odesa did I become convinced that the interwoven issues of ethnicc identity and language reflected powerful divisions in society after all.

II was also surprised by the lack of detailed academic literature on minority and languagee policies when I started my research project in January 1996. Reviewing the literaturee I got the impression that much was written about only a few sides of contemporaryy Ukrainian society while many other aspects were left completely unexplored.. One very positive exception to this pattern was Dominique AreFs 1995 articlee in Nationalities Papers, which provided an extensive overview of the language politicss in the first few years following Ukraine's independence. This experience convincedd me that a sound empirical study is just as valuable as some prestigious theoreticall exercise, if not more so.

Despitee initial doubts and a limited knowledge of Russian and Ukrainian I am gladd I persevered and completed the project successfully. Not only have I gained more

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insightt into state-minority relations and in problems of developing societies in general, myy fieldwork experiences in Ukraine have also made me a more complete person. Whetherr I have made a valuable contribution to the pool of scientific knowledge is of coursee for others to decide. Personally, my greatest satisfaction was to be operating right onn the frontier of empirical knowledge and to uncover hitherto non-researched areas of Ukrainiann society.

II would not have been able to carry on with this project, had it not been for the supportt of my friends, colleagues and supervisors both here and in Ukraine. Special thankss go to Dominique Arel who was indispensable in my becoming acquainted with the scholarlyy circles on Ukraine. My colleagues Judith and Frank with whom I shared an officee were invaluable mediators between me and my computer, with which I was constantlyy at war. More importantly, they shared with me a sense of seeing things in perspectivee and not taking everything too seriously. The atmosphere in room 3.55 I will probablyy - and regrettably - never experience again in a future work place.

Inn addition, I would like to thank the many Ukrainians whose unconditional help wass crucial in producing good results in my fieldwork activities. Special thanks go to Tetianaa Antoniuk, Nina Tchaikovs'ka, Svitlana Gomeniuk, Ilona Podolian, and Andrii Hrabann and his parents in Kyi'v; Yuri Demura, Nelli Kamennova, Irina Radianova, Alexanderr Tumanov and Yulia Bahilova and her mother in Donets'k; Marina Maskaleva, Vladikk and Ira, Marat Yakupov and his wife Zhanna in Odesa; Serhii Kudelia, Anatolii Romaniuk,, Yuri Kliuchkovs'kyi, Vladimir Kravchenko and the Kushnirets'kyi family in L'viv ;; and Tamara Yakovleva in Simferopol.

II would also like to express my gratitute to NWO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijkk Onderzoek) and UC (Stichting Internationale Informatie en Communicatie).. Without their generous financial support, I would not have been able to doo the fieldwork as extensively.

Myy parents and my dear friends Peter, Niels, Radboud and Daniel I admire for theirr support, suggestions and patience. They have generously put up with my endless monologuess on issues concerning Ukraine. Being persons I could always rely upon, they madee me feel that I wasn't working on the project all alone.

Lastt but not least I would like to thank my supervisors Herman van der Wusten andd Hans Knippenberg for their solid encouragement, especially in the initial period of myy project when I had strong doubts about the salience of the national and the language factorr in post-Soviet Ukraine. Without their direct no-nonsense guidance, my doctoral researchh would most certainly have dragged on well into the first decade of the third millenium. .

10 0

11 INTRODUCTIO N

Thee disintegration of the multinational Soviet Union into a large number of ethnically heterogeneouss successor states sparked a plethora of violent ethnic conflicts that took manyy scholars by surprise. Thus, the Trans-Dniestrian Russians in Moldova, the Abkhazianss in Georgia, the Armenians in Azerbaijan and, recently, the Chechens in the Russiann Federation, not happy with their minority status in the new successor states, all rosee up in arms against their new masters. These examples show that, despite modernizationn and the Soviet Union's attempts to create a 'Homo Sovieticus,' the phenomenonn of multinationality is still alive in the post-Soviet world, continuing its destabilizingg role in the new successor states.

However,, problems of multinationality have not been confined to the (post-) Soviett world. Many Western European countries have, over the past thirty years, also had too cope with regionally concentrated populations who, claiming an incompatible "ethnos" andd language, have challenged the existing state structure. Although not embarking on a coursee of open warfare and by generally opting for peaceful means of reaching their goals,, these challenging national groups have had a significant impact on the states they weree part of. A number of states, for instance, have granted considerable political-territoriall autonomy to the nationalities' homelands to accommodate ethnic demands: in Spain,, the Basque country, Galicia and Catalonia now enjoy considerable autonomy; in Italy,, the region of South Tirol has a number of special powers; and only recently, in the Unitedd Kingdom, the new Labour government granted Scotland a significant extension of itss autonomy. In Belgium, ethnic demands have even resulted in the transformation of a unitaryy state into a federal one. There, the so-called language battle between the overwhelminglyy Dutch-speaking north and homogeneously French-speaking south resultedd in a complex transfer of power from the central level to newly created regional bodiess of administration (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) and community organs of administrationn (for Dutch, French, and German speakers).

Thee Mediterranean and the Balkans have recently also had their share of ethnic conflicts.. The breakdown of Yugoslavia led to open warfare in the successor states of Croatiaa and Bosnia, with the Serbs in both states rejecting their new status as minorities. Inn rump Yugoslavia, a traumatized Albanian minority sees the UN administration of Kosovoo as the first step to casting off the perceived Serbian yoke completely and attainingg full independence. Further east in the Mediterranean, the bitter conflict between thee Greeks and the Turks on the island of Cyprus still rages. Finally, there are numerous casess of violent ethnic conflict in other parts of the world, leading in their most extreme formss to thousands of refugees, genocide and a complete collapse of the economy and of centrall state authority. The following short list of cases can serve as a vivid and ominous reminder:: the bloody war in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the central government; thee guerrilla war fought by the Kurds against the Turkish army; the collapse of central statee authority in Somalia due to warring clans; and mutual mass killings by Hutus and Tutsii s in Rwanda.

Al ll these examples demonstrate that multinational states still have problems similarr to those they had fifty or hundred years ago. They also show that whatever the challengee an ethnic group poses, it invariably has a great impact on the central state, if not

11 1

inn terms of its political structure (unitary with autonomous regions/federal/breakup), then inn terms of its economic resources or political stability in cases of open warfare. Given thee far-reaching consequences that this so-called political mobilization of ethnic groups cann have, a whole body of academic literature has developed on the concept. Observers whoo seek to explain the rise of ethno-national movements have generally been classified intoo those arguing from a primordialist perspective and those embracing a mobilizationist orr instrumentalist view on ethnic phenomena (e.g. McKay, 1982; Amersfoort, 1991). Primordialistss see ethnic groups as static givens and contend that ethnic awareness is heightened,, with the risk of becoming politicized, when ethnic groups come into close contact.. Mobilizationists, on the other hand, argue that ethnic attachments are variable andd contingent on political and economic interests. In their view, ethnic identities are generatedd and mobilized when groups compete with each other over scarce resources.'

Too muster the support of an ethnic group for some ambitious program, political entrepreneurss either appeal to existing national consciousness or try to construct an entirelyy new identity. Again a difference of opinion surfaces between primordialists and mobilizationists.. The former would argue that a random collection of people cannot be ethnicallyy mobilized if they do not possess a separate identity based on cultural markers thatt distinguish them from other groups. Smith (1988), for instance, contends that modern Europeann nations, though being constructed entities, have distinct cultural origins. For instrumentalists,, in contrast, cultural differences are not important for the creation and politicizationn of group identities (Amersfoort, 1991). However, the proponents of both perspectivess would agree with the statement that national identity is vital for an elite seekingg to mobilize a group on an ethnic platform, whether it is a necessary condition for groupp action (primordialists) or something that has to be created in the process of mobilizationn (instrumentalists). Given the centrality of national identity for the political manifestationn of ethnic groups, it is surprising to find relatively few scholarly works addressingg this issue, although there is now growing academic consensus on the changeablee nature of identities to the detriment of the primordialist perspective. If nationall identities are indeed open to flux, then how do they change and how do new ones emerge?? What are the components of this change and what factors trigger it? What is the rolee of the state in this? Is it not likely that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the nationalizingg programs of the post-Soviet successor states have had an impact on the nationall outlook of ethnic minorities? The answers to these questions have remained far fromm complete. This study hopes to contribute to the understanding of the problem of nationall identity by focusing on the identity issue in post-Soviet Ukraine. It examines the nation-buildingg policies of the central state and analyzes the response of the Russian-speakingg population. The term 'Russian-speaking population' in this respect refers to Russianss and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Ukrainee captures our attention for a number of reasons. First of all, this large successorr state, the second most populous after the Russian Federation, is home to more thann eleven million Russians. These Russians form, in absolute terms, the biggest non-

Chapterr Two gives an overview of the authors associated with the two perspectives and elaborates on the differencess between the two approaches.

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titularr national group in all the successor states, the Russian Federation included.2 The sizee of the non-titular Russian population is, moreover, in a way compounded by the large groupp of titular Ukrainians who prefer to communicate in Russian and thus speak the correspondingg titular language, Ukrainian, only as a second language. According to a recentt survey referred to by Arel (1996, pp. 76,77) even more than 50 percent of Ukraine'ss population uses Russian "as a language of convenience" (20% Russians and 33%% Russian-speaking Ukrainians).3 This brings us to a third interesting feature: the linguisticc similarity of Ukrainian and Russian. With a littl e effort, Ukrainians and Russianss can understand each other's languages even if they have never heard the other languagee before. It is this fact that made it possible for large numbers of Ukrainians to changee to speaking Russian during the long period of Russian/Soviet rule when Russian wass the dominant language and Ukrainian was regarded as a simple peasant dialect of Russian.. According to Arel (1995a), this linguistic closeness produces two opposite predictions.. On the one hand, just as it took Ukrainians littl e effort to learn Russian in the past,, so Russian speakers should not have difficulty in learning Ukrainian now, if languagee policies oblige them to do so. Yet, "on the other hand, the fact that so many Ukrainianss are linguistically russified means that language politics is, first and foremost, ann intra-group phenomenon in Ukraine, and we know from the study of religious and ideologicall factionalism that internecine conflicts can be the most intense" (ibid, p. 598). Thus,, it wil l be interesting to see how not only the Russians but also the Russian-speaking Ukrainianss relate to the new Ukraine.

However,, the most important reason to choose Ukraine is that its constituting regions,, each having had their own particular historical background, have never before formedd an entity as an independent state. It is these different historical backgrounds of the regionss that have left Ukraine with a widely varying share of Russophones in the regional populationn as one crosses the country. The diverging historical backgrounds, in addition, havee shaped the national consciousness and political outlook of the Ukrainians as the titularr nationality. Thus, Ukrainians in western Ukraine tend to be more nationalist in outlookk than Ukrainians in the rest of Ukraine (see next section). Wilson (1997, p. 1) sumss it up well in the first line of his new book: "Modern Ukraine is a deeply divided societyy with a pronounced pattern of regional diversity." The social cultural characteristicss of a certain region can be expected to frame the responses of the Russian speakerss to the changed political circumstances. For this reason, I consider the concept of regionall diversity to be of pivotal importance, using it as a basis for the structure of this researchh (see the last section of Chapter Two). Because of the centrality of regional differentiation,, I tum to it in further detail in the next section, showing how it came about andd what its consequences are for political lif e in contemporary Ukraine.

22 Titular refers to the name-giving quality of a national group. Thus, a titular nationality is a nationality after whichh the corresponding Union Republic was named. For instance, the Ukrainian SSR was named after the Ukrainians,, the Estonian SSR after the Estonians, and so on. 33 The category of Ukrainian-speaking Russians is virtually non-existent, as very few Russians adopted Ukrainiann as their first language in Soviet times.

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1.11.1 Ukraine's Regional Disparities: Historical Background and Political Consequences Consequences

Thee key player responsible for Ukraine's pronounced regional diversity is Russia. In general,, there is a correlation between the time of the incorporation of Ukrainian lands intoo the Russian and later Soviet Empire, and the proportion of Russian speakers in the regionall population: the earlier the time of incorporation, the larger the proportion of Russianss and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The following four regions can be discerned inn a descending order of Russian influence on the region: eastern Ukraine, southern Ukraine,, central Ukraine and western Ukraine (see Figure l).4

"^ "^

JJ BEL A R U SS 0 2S0 LL r - ' ^ X t I'm I

II A rin % Vo 'vn ' '' Rivne.'

// WEST I

'' v v Chetnihiv «-.»» r » « j j ^ . ^ :: Kyïv\ ": Sumy ^

Zhytomyrr ( ^ / " " , .- -, \j-< —

jj i Kyiv CENTER V N / \ « _ '' L"v,v - ; Khmel'/ ' b l a s t ; "-., Poltava ' l Kharkiv " " " " w

" ' -- \ , :"\Terno-\nyts 'kyi\ ^

2v^J>N N / /

r

&<*,&<*, ' ' " v . . . / ' " - - / \ < vinnytsiaa , r~-< - ' N j / '

^ .. ,- ' "" Kirovohrad ;' ,0petrov s> EAST v

^^ \ . , ^ - ' j - Donets'k ir?r-** VV ^ V Mykolaiv V ' ^ — T f

\\ <£. f " ' «n i iTH *'< Z a r i 2 h - >"' ? \\ O. 1. . SOUTH ^ 2 h ! a _

.. ^ J M.<* ~~^r~ Kherson \ ' ' V ii ****.-! >?/ ? V ' ;; / / x ^ R > ' ' Af :.

,;_ƒƒ V" ' Crimea , \ L . « * \\ Aut. Rep.

'\\ HUÏs ïs iA : u . '' Sevastopol] ,.—-' ;'' City ~<l / *S%«:f«

CC ! S-ACK ST/J

Figuree 1. Ukraine: Territorial Administrative Structure

Thee lands of eastern Ukraine were finally conquered by the Russian Empire after a period off conflict lasting three centuries, from the end of the 15th to the end of the 18th century, whenn the last tracts of land along the Azov Sea were wrested from Ottoman control. For somee parts of this region, notably for the heavily industrialized Donbas, comprising the oblastss of Donets'k and Luhansk, there is considerable debate among historians as to who settledd there first. Ukrainian historians claim that because the area was under the control off Kyïvan Rus' in the early Middle Ages and later, in the 16th century, under the influencee of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, it should be considered as native Ukrainian

Thee division of regions is based on that proposed by Arel and Wilson (1994). They define western Ukrainee as the oblasts of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Temopil, Volyn, Rivne, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia. Centrall Ukraine comprises the oblasts of Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, Kyiv Oblast, Kyivv City, Kirovohrad, Sumy, Poltava and Chernihiv. Eastern Ukraine comprises Donets'k, Luhans'k, Kharkiv,, Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia. Southern Ukraine is made up of Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv andd Crimea.

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territory.. Russian historiography, however, argues that the Donbas was never in the spheree of influence of either Ky'ivan Rus' or the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, that the area wass largely an empty no-man's land between Slav and Tatar areas of control and that Russianss together with Ukrainians started settling the area from as early as the 16th centuryy onwards (Wilson, 1995). Be that as it may, there is consensus about the fact that industrializationn both from the 1860s onwards and after World War II attracted huge numberss of Russian migrants, giving the whole region a distinctly Russian urbanized character. .

Thee conquest of the Ottoman-ruled Crimean Khanate in 1775 and its subsequent absorptionn into the Russian Empire in 1783 meant that all the lands of southern Ukraine felll into Russian hands. From then on, southern Ukraine, in many ways, followed the samee path of development as eastern Ukraine. Here also, industrialization and the growth off commerce and harbour activities resulted in many Russians and other nationalities flockingg to the rapidly developing cities of hitherto empty lands (Subtelny, 1988). As in easternn Ukraine, the cities became focal points of Russian culture and language. The differencee was that, while in the east the Russian language could to a certain extent be consideredd indigenous, it functioned more as a lingua franca in the cities of the south due too the many foreign nationalities already residing there or pouring in, such as Germans, Moldovans,, Serbs, Bulgarians, Jews, Armenians and Greeks. Also many Ukrainians migratedd to the newly conquered lands, which came to be known as Novorossiya (New Russia).. Most settled in the countryside as peasant serfs, attracted by favorable labor conditions.. The ones that did go to the cities soon lost their Ukrainian language and quicklyy assimilated into the Russian culture.

Thee vast lands of central Ukraine were incorporated into the Russian Empire in a piecemeall fashion from the 15th to the 18th centuries. Using their northeast strongholds (thee modern-day oblasts of Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv) as a springboard, the Russians managedd to wrest the whole of Left Bank Ukraine from the Poles in the treaty of Anrusovoo in 1667.5 Finally, after the third partition of Poland in 1795, the entire Right-bankk fell into their hands (Subtelny, 1988). Although the lands of central, eastern and southernn Ukraine were more or less simultaneously conquered by the Russian Empire, the formerr were much more Ukrainian in outlook than the latter two. Unlike the territories in muchh of the east and south, the whole of the central region had always been inhabited by Ukrainiann peasant masses, toiling under the yoke of either a Polish, Russian or indigenous Cossackk nobility, central Ukraine remained relatively rural in character due to a lack of mineralss and a poor infrastructure on which industrial and commercial activities could be based.. The cities remained small, Russian-speaking islands with a mixed Russian-Jewish-Ukrainiann population in a sea of Ukrainian-speaking village communities.

55 Left Bank Ukraine refers to all Ukrainian lands east of the Dnipro river, Right Bank Ukraine to Ukrainian landss west of this river.

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Inn theory, the sharp social contrast in central Ukraine between the poor Ukrainian peasantt masses on the one hand and the rich Russian or russified Polish and Ukrainian gentryy on the other was an ideal breeding ground for a Ukrainian-nationalist liberation movement.. However, the nationalist appeal had only a limited audience for several reasons.. First of all, widespread illiteracy among the peasants hindered the few nationalist activistss in propagating the Ukrainian national idea and turning the peasants into nationallyy conscious Ukrainians. According to Krawchenko (1985, p. 23), Czarist policy inn particular was to blame: "The social and national policies of czarism had led to a situation,, probably unique in Europe, where Ukrainians had higher rates of literacy in the mid-eighteenthh century than at the turn of the twentieth". Secondly, the official Czarist dogmaa which considered Ukrainians as part of the true Russian nation was translated into aa 'carrot and stick' policy that undermined the development of a Ukrainian-nationalist intelligentsiaa and bourgeoisie who could 'guide the nation' (ibid, p. 31). On the one hand, Ukrainianss wanting to move up in society were not discriminated against as long as they gavee up their Ukrainian background and assimilated into Russian culture (the carrot). In thee cities, where everybody was expected to speak Russian in the public sphere, this, indeed,, led to many Ukrainians switching to Russian. On the other hand, those propagatingg the idea of Ukrainian singularity were subject to persecution (the stick). The latterr policy was embodied in several Czarist decrees banning firstly the Ukrainian languagee both as a subject and as language of instruction in schools in 1804, and secondly bookss and other publications in the Ukrainian language in 1863 and 1876. The social predicamentt of the peasant masses, the minuscule Ukrainian intelligentsia and bourgeoisiee and the Czarist policies thus combined to prevent a Ukrainian nationalist movementt from entering the scene and to keep Ukrainian in its stigmatized confinement off a 'Malo-Russian' (small-Russian) peasant dialect.

Thee three chaotic years of Ukraine's independence from 1917 to 1920, the ensuingg period of relatively liberal Bolshevik rule, and Stalin's backlash in the 1930s did littl ee to change the pattern of differences between central, eastern and southern Ukraine thatt had been laid down in the Czarist era.6 The only thing that did leave its mark was the urbanizationn drive of Ukrainians all over Soviet Ukraine, which turned the Russian/Jewishh majorities into minorities in most of the cities despite the continuing influxx of large numbers of Russians into the rapidly developing industrial centres of the eastt and south.

Westernn Ukraine took no part in any of the aforementioned events.7 Its biggest, andd from the point of view of the rise of national consciousness, most important part, easternn Galicia, comprising the modem-day oblasts of L'viv, Temopil and Ivano-Frankivsk,, was successively part of Poland until its partition at the end of the 18th century,, Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I, and again Poland until thee Soviet invasion of 1939. By the mid-19th century, the Galician Ukrainians were in moree or less the same situation as their eastern compatriots. The overwhelming majority

66 For a discussion on the 1920s policy of Ukrainianization and Stalin's backlash, see Arel (1994) and Shevelovv (1989). 77 This is not entirely true. The two northern oblasts of Rivne and Volyn become part of Czarist Russia after thee partition of Poland.

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(overr 95%) were poor illiterate peasants caught in an economic stranglehold by Polish estate-owners.. Yet, unlike their eastern brothers, the west Ukrainians lived "in a constitutionall monarchy that allowed much greater freedom of association and expression thann was possible in the Russian Empire" (Subtelny, 1988, p. 323). Moreover, the better organizedd Czechs and Poles, who were at least one stage ahead of Ukrainians in their social-nationall advancement, proved fine examples for the Galician Ukrainians. Mobilizationn of the peasantry by the small Ukrainian intelligentsia principally occurred as aa reaction to Polish attempts to monopolize the political and educational institutions of easternn Galicia. Hence, west-Ukrainian intellectuals managed to accomplish what their easternn colleagues had failed to achieve. By means of an extensive network of cultural organizations,, sports clubs, societies and cooperatives in the countyside, they raised the sociall and national consciousness of a peasantry whose sense of separateness had already beenn encouraged by its affiliation with the Greek Catholic church. What is more, the bitterr competition with the Poles for political, cultural and economic resources only reinforcedd the depth of nationalist sentiment, making Galicia the centre of the Ukrainian nationall movement and posing many problems for future rulers, like the Poles in the interbellum,, in the decades to come.

Worldd War n, the Holocaust and its aftermath of Ukrainian-Polish population exchangess made west Ukraine's previously mixed Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish-German populationn almost homogeneously Ukrainian. Newcomers were Russian experts, sent by Moscoww to administer the newly acquired territories and rebuild the infrastructure destroyedd during the war. However, unlike their eastern compatriots in eastern and southernn Ukraine, who proved quite vulnerable to being russified, the nationally consciouss western Ukrainians retained their language in the decades after World War II.8

Theyy sharply distinguished themselves from the recently arrived Russian immigrant, who formedd only a tiny minority of the local population, compared to Russians elsewhere in Ukraine.. As before the war, Russians continued to immigrate to the industrial areas of the eastt and south, strengthening the already pronounced Russian character of these regions (Arel,, 1994). Thus, with the population in the west turning more Ukrainian, and the populationn in the east and south becoming more Russian, the historically inherited regionall differences did not level off, but actually became more acute in the decades after Worldd War n.

Inn short, diverging historical experiences set the regions apart on two dimensions: aa rural, predominantly Ukrainian-speaking - urban, predominantly Russian-speaking dimensionn on the one hand and a weak Ukrainian national consciousness - strong UkrainianUkrainian national consciousness dimension on the other (see Figure 2).

88 A person is considered 'Russified' if he or she claims Russian as his/her mother tongue.

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Strong g National l

Consciousness s

Weak k National l

Consciousness s

Westernn Ukraine

Centrall Ukraine Southernn Eastern Ukrainee Ukraine

Rural, , Predominantly y

Ukrainian-speaking g

Urban, , Predominantly y

Russian-speaking g

Figuree 2. A Typology of Ukraine's Regions

Regionall differences in the relative numbers of Ukrainian and Russian inhabitants are presentedd by Table l.l.9 The percentage of Russians in the regional population ranges fromm 5.1% in the seven oblasts of western Ukraine to 36.1% in the five oblasts of eastern Ukraine,, with central Ukraine (8.6% - excluding Kyïv city as a special case) and southern Ukrainee (23.6% - excluding The Crimea as a special case) falling in the middle. Thus, the proportionn of Russians in eastern Ukraine is more than seven times that of Russians in westernn Ukraine. This regional concentration of Russians is compounded by the fact that thee southern and eastern oblasts are the most populous, leading to a situation in which 80%% of all Ukrainian Russians live in eastern and southern Ukraine (Arel, 1994). The tablee further shows that, as there are only three oblasts with sizeable non-Ukrainian, non-Russiann minorities (Odesa - 18.0%; Zakarpattia - 17.6% and Chernivtsi - 17.6%), Ukraine cann essentially be regarded as a bi-national state, made up of Ukrainians and Russians. Thee last column, which presents the percentage of Russians in the population of oblast capitals,, confirms the observation that, besides being regionally skewed, the Russian presencee in Ukraine is indeed an urban phenomenon: Without exception the proportion of Russianss living in the oblast capitals exceeds that in the surrounding oblasts.

Thee distribution of Russian-speaking Ukrainians is strikingly similar to that of the Russianss (compare Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Thus, in the regions where Russians record the highestt percentages, so do the Russophone Ukrainians, and in the regions where Russians recordd the lowest percentages, so do the Russophone Ukrainians. Moreover, Russian-speakingg Ukrainians show the same tendency as the Russians to form a higher percentage

Thee data in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 are based on the 1989 census, which, although old, is the only source of reliable,, large-scale, demographic data. One may safely assume that since 1989 the number of Russians has declinedd relative to the number of Ukrainians because of the large-scale emigration of Ukrainian Russians too the Russian Federation from 1994 onwards when the differences in living conditions between Ukraine andd Russia began to be felt. A new census was planned for 1999.

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Tablee 1.1 Ethnic Composition of Population by Oblast and the Russian Population in Oblastt Capitals inn Ukraine in

Ukrainians s Oblast t EasternEastern Ukraine Donets'k k Luhans'k k Kharkiv v Dnipropetrovsk k Zaporizhzhia a TotalTotal in Eastern Ukraine

SouthernSouthern Ukraine Crimea a Mykolaiv v Odesa a Kherson n TotalTotal in Southern Ukraine (excluding(excluding The Crimea)

Kyrvv City

CentralCentral Ukraine Kirovograd d Chernihiv v Sumy y Kyïvv Oblast Poltava a Cherkasy y Zhytomyr r Vinnytsia a Khmel'nytskyi i TotalTotal in Central Ukraine

WesternWestern Ukraine Rivne e Volyn n Ivano-Frankivsk k L'viv v Ternopil l Zakarpattia a Chernivtsi i TotalTotal in Western Ukraine

Totall for all Ukraine

50.7 7 51.9 9 62.8 8 71.6 6 63.1 1 59.3 59.3

25.8 8 75.6 6 54.6 6 75.7 7

65.0 65.0

72.5 5

85.3 3 91.4 4 85.5 5 89.4 4 87.9 9 90.5 5 84.9 9 91.5 5 90.4 4 88.7 88.7

93.3 3 94.6 6 95.0 0 90.4 4 96.8 8 78.4 4 70.8 8 88.5 88.5

72.7 7

Sources:: Zastavnyi (1993) and Arel (1994)

19891989 (in percentage)

Russians s

43.6 6 44.8 8 33.2 2 24.2 2 32.0 0 36.1 36.1

67.0 0 19.4 4 27.4 4 20.2 2

23.6 23.6

20.9 9

11.7 7 6.8 8

13.3 3 8.7 7

10.2 2 8.0 0 7.9 9 5.9 9 5.8 8 8.6 8.6

4.6 6 4.4 4 4.0 0 7.2 2 2.3 3 4.0 0 6.7 7 5.1 5.1

22.1 1

Other r nationalities s

5.7 7 3.3 3 4.0 0 4.2 2 4.9 9 4.6 4.6

7.2 2 5.0 0

18.0 0 4.1 1

11.4 11.4

6.6 6

3.0 0 1.8 8 1.2 2 1.9 9 1.9 9 1.5 5 7.2 2 2.6 6 3.8 8 2.7 2.7

2.1 1 1.0 0 1.0 0 2.4 4 0.9 9

17.6 6 22.5 5

6.4 6.4

6.2 2

Russianss in oblastt capitals

53.6 6 54.2 2 43.6 6 31.0 0 34.2 2 42.3 42.3

71.6 6 31.2 2 39.4 4 29.2 2

40.8 40.8

20.9 9

19.5 5 15.8 8 19.0 0

--17.5 5 20.5 5 16.7 7 16.4 4 14.2 2 17.5 17.5

13.1 1 11.9 9 16.6 6 16.1 1 7.2 2

14.3 3 17.7 7 14.6 14.6

30.4 4

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off the population of the oblast capitals than that of the corresponding oblasts. In summary,, one can safely speak of a perfect positive correlation between the percentage of Russianss and the percentage of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the regional/local population,, leading to the obvious conclusion that the more Russian the environment, the

10 0 moree likely Ukrainians are to have or to adopt Russian as their first language.

Tablee 1.2 Russophone Ukrainians by Region in 1989 (in percentage of total population)

Total l Urban n Capitals s Eastt and South* Kyfvv city Central l West t

Totall Ukraine

Source:: Arel (1994)

25.7 7

3.5 5 0.9 9

12.2 2

32.4 4

6.2 2 1.9 9

19.0 0

42.9 9 21.3 3 10.3 3 3.5 5

25.2 2

** Unfortunately the data for the east and south could not be shown separately since they were quoted together in the originall source

Ukraine'ss regional diversity has had a profound impact on its post-independence political landscape,, as many authors have noticed (Bojcun, 1995; Holdar, 1995; Arel and Khmelko,, 1996; Birch, 1998; Craumer and Clem, 1999). In general the people of western Ukrainee consistently vote for nationalist candidates, while the population of the east and southh back leftist and center-left forces. Nationalists are opposed to closer ties with Russia,, favor Ukraine's present unitary status and single state language (Ukrainian) and generallyy back the idea of economic reform. The leftist bloc (to which communists, socialistss and agrarians are usually allied), on the other hand, favors strong ties with Russia,, advocates the adoption of Russian as a second state language and opposes economicc reform.

Thee 1994 parliamentary elections witnessed particularly dramatic regional differencess (Holdar, 1995). The people in the west sent 39 nationalist candidates to parliamentt as opposed to 27 independent candidates and only one candidate from the bloc off leftist parties. By contrast, the people in the five eastern oblasts, expressing their dissatisfactionn with the deepening economic crisis and the nation-building project, voted overwhelminglyy left-wing, electing 68 candidates from the communist-socialist bloc, 45 independentt candidates and not a single nationalist candidate to the new parliament. In centrall and southern Ukraine, independent candidates captured most of the votes (71 seats inn the new parliament), but the communist-socialist bloc came in as a good second (46 seats),, leaving the nationalists in third place (20 seats). Because the communists and socialistss emerged victorious in demographically important eastern Ukraine and performedd well in the south and the center, the new 1994 parliament leaned decidedly

100 Dostal and Knippenberg (1979) noted the same patterns for the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1970: the higherr the percentage of Russians and the higher the percentage of urbanites in an oblast population, the largerr the proportion of members of an ethnic minority who have Russian as their first language.

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towardss the left (even though independent candidates made up the largest group in parliament). .

Thee regional pattern of the 1994 elections resurfaced to a great extent in the 1998 parliamentaryy elections (Craumer and Clem, 1999). Nationalist parties again principally reliedd on support from the seven western oblasts, and notably from L'viv, Ivano-Frankivskk and Ternopil, the three oblasts constituting the Galician heartland. Communists,, socialists and agrarians, however, succeeded in significantly strengthening theirr base of support in the southern and central oblasts. As a result, regional differences inn voting patterns between the east, the center and the south became less pronounced. The left-wingg victories in all but the western oblasts and Kyi'v city produced a parliament in whichh the political left predominated.

Thee regional divide was also evident in the presidential elections of 1991 and 1994.. In 1991 Chornovil, Kravchuk's nationalist contender, only obtained a majority of thee vote in the western oblasts of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil (Kuzio and Wilson,, 1994). In the 1994 elections, incumbent president Kravchuk, who in his term of officee had focused on issues of Ukrainian state- and nation-building, rather than on economicc reforms, noticed that his support base had shifted to the west: six of the seven westernn oblasts delivered overwhelming majorities and all of the Right Bank central oblasts,, except for Kirovohrad, voted for him as well, albeit with small majorities. Kuchma,, Kravchuk's opponent and the eventual winner, who called for closer ties with Russia,, was victorious in all the other oblasts (Holdar, 1995). Thus, the presidential electionss of 1994 effectively split Ukraine in two, with the western half of the country supportingg Kravchuk and the eastern half backing Kuchma, the river Dnipro being the dividingg line.

Thee similarity between the territorial distribution of votes and the territorial distributionn of Russians and Russian speakers leads one to assume that ethnic variables (nationalityy and native language) are the principle determinants of electoral behavior. Combiningg the results of the 1994 presidential elections with survey data, Arel and Khmelkoo (1996, p. 81) argue that there is indeed a strong correlation between voting patternss and the "language of convenience," i.e. the language people use with a survey interviewerr at home when they are asked to choose the language they feel more comfortablee in - Ukrainian or Russian. Recently, however, it has been claimed that there aree other variables at least as, if not more, important influencing voting conduct. Focusing onn the 1994 parliamentary elections, Birch (1998) found that the percentage of retirement-agee voters in a constituency had the largest effect on support for the left, with ann interaction effect between ethnicity and education coming in second. Moreover, ethnic variabless were not significantly correlated with votes for the nationalist camp overall, althoughh being weakly significant in explaining votes for Rukh and the Ukrainian Republicann Party individually. The preliminary results of the November 1999 second roundd of the presidential elections only add to the impression that ethnic variables may indeedd not be the main determinant of the electoral process, as the east-west split has by andd large disappeared in comparison to that seen in earlier elections.11 Incumbent

111 See UKL # 65 of 23 November 1999, in which Taras Kuzio (1999c) presents and discusses the election resultss broken down by oblast. This mailing list is maintained and distributed by Dominique Arel.

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presidentt Leonid Kuchma, who presented himself as a reform-minded defender of Ukrainiann independence (much as Kravchuk did in the 1994 elections), received more votess than his communist challenger, Petro Symonenko, in all of the western oblasts and inn Kharkiv, Donets'k, Dnipropetrovs'k and Odesa, heavily urbanized (and Russian-speaking!)) oblasts of the east and south. Symonenko emerged victorious in most of the rurall oblasts of the center and the south. The rural/urban split thus seems to have become thee dominant dividing factor.

Yet,, it would be a serious mistake to dismiss language and nationality as irrelevantt factors. The results of the last presidential election also showed that the western oblasts,, where support for Kuchma was overwhelming (in the three oblasts of Galicia as highh as 92% in each), sharply contrasted with other oblasts, where the contest between the twoo contenders was much closer. Hence, the regional divide is still there, suggesting that thee ethnic factor is of continued importance. In their analysis of the 1998 parliamentary elections,, Craumer and Clem (1999) found that language and sex ratio could explain as muchh as 74% of the variation in the total left-wing vote. In addition, language correlated significantlyy with support for the nationalists, accounting for 28% of the variation in this variable. .

Givenn that language and ethnicity continue to operate as regionally manifested divisionss in politics, visible in conflicts over issues of national sovereignty and state/nation-building,, doubts can be raised about Kyiv's chances of establishing a strong unitaryy Ukraine. Indeed, Wilson (1993) shows how dissatisfaction with Kyiv's "anti-Russian"" foreign policy and fear of ukrainianization prompted the Donets'k and Luhans'k Oblastt Councils to vote for regional autonomy during the mass miners' strike of June 1993.. By far the strongest calls for self-governance or even outright secession came from Thee Crimea, however, where the regional parliament provoked the national authorities fromm the very onset of Ukraine's independence (Solchanyk, 1994). The Crimea's extraordinaryy resistance to Kyiv can be explained by its peculiar history. Although the areaa was already incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 18th century, it only became partt of (Soviet) Ukraine in 1954 when Khrushchev ordered the transfer by decree to commemoratee the 300th anniversary of the 'reunification' of Ukraine with Russia. This, andd the fact that 67% of its present population is Russian (making it the sole region in Ukrainee in which Russians constitute a majority) gave rise to a sense of belonging to Russia,, rather than Ukraine.

Inn sum up, Ukraine's ethno-linguistic regional diversity, as expressed in the nationall parliament and in secessionist movements, make Ukraine a highly interesting casee for the student of state- and nation-building. Two compelling questions can be raised:: (1) Given the fact that Ukraine's regional diversity complicates the development off a strong stable state, what strategies does the central state follow in its attempts to reducee this regional diversity? (2) What is the response of the regional population, in particularr that of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, to these attempts?

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1.21.2 State-Minority Relations in Ukraine: The Role of the State

Thee centrality of the above-mentioned questions is enhanced by the fact that many scholarss have come to realize the autonomous role of the state in either diluting or triggeringg (and sustaining) ethnic identities (e.g. Rothschild, 1981; Breuilly, 1982; Rudolphh and Thompson, 1985; Gurr, 1993; Roessingh, 1996). Some authors have argued thatt this so-called institutionalist approach is of special relevance to the post-Soviet world,, in a sense that the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union is thought to have unintentionallyy contributed to the rise of ethno-national movements in the late 1980s (e.g. Brubaker,, 1994; Kaiser, 1994; Knippenberg, 1996,). As Brubaker (1994, p. 53) argues: 'Thee significance of the republics as institutional crystallizations of nationhood [in the 1920ss the most populous Soviet nationalities were granted 'their own' so-called Union Republics,, de jure the most far-reaching form of political-territorial autonomy] lay...in thee durable institutional frame the republics provided for the long-term cultivation and consolidationn of national administrative cadres and national intelligentsias...and for the long-termm protection and cultivation of national languages and cultures." More specificallyy in the same article, Brubaker proposes that the Soviet policy of granting nationalitiess both a political-territorial form of autonomy and a strictly non-territorial ethnoculturall kind of autonomy - in which individuals were assigned a certain nationality thatt was stamped in their internal passports - led to a mismatch between the two that ultimatelyy gave rise to considerable ethnic tension both in the Soviet Union and in its successorr states. This mismatch became particularly evident after World War n when largee numbers of Russians, according to their passport nationality, emigrated to the non-Russiann Union Republics. In the late 1980s and certainly after independence, the titular nationalitiess of the Union Republics came to view the republics as 'their own', utilizing institutionss to further their political goals, a move the non-titular Russians took as an encroachmentt on their ethnocultural autonomy.

Thee institutional approach elaborated by Brubaker to account for the nationality problemss in the post-Soviet world is, of course, most relevant for Ukraine, being the secondd largest post-Soviet state with, as we have seen, both a large titular Ukrainian majorityy and a huge non-titular Russian minority that is disproportionately living in the southh and the east of the country. Thus, whatever policy the Ukrainian central state pursuess vis-a-vis its Russians, this policy most certainly provokes some reaction, the naturee of which is being difficult to assess beforehand. This once more underlines the importancee of the two questions posed at the end of the previous section. Obviously, the state'ss cultural policies are also relevant for Russian-speaking Ukrainians. A program of ukrainianization,, for instance, would force them to choose sides, just as it would also forcee the Russians to do so.

Statess can choose from a whole range of strategies to deal with ethnic pluralism withinn their boundaries. Mikesell and Murphy (1991) provide a short but useful overview off these strategies. However, to my knowledge, neither Mikesell and Murphy nor other scholarss studying central-state responses to national groups have yet come up with a comprehensivee theory accounting for the differences between states in their dealings with thesee groups. This is surprising given the growing acknowledgement that central state policyy has a profound impact on the ethno-national sentiment of minority groups. Such a

23 3

theoryy is all the more necessary given that central state policy can change the very conceptss that scholars employ to describe state-minority relations. Thus, in the case of Ukraine,, scholars can no longer rely on an official categorization of Russians as a nationalityy since the law on citizenship of November 1991 removed the nationality stamp fromm internal passports and declared all those resident in the territory of Ukraine to be statee citizens. Since other ethnic markers, such as religion, language and family names cannott be used to objectively distinguish Russians from Ukrainians (both groups share thesee attributes), it is only through old Soviet passports or by current national self-identificationn that we can still consider Russians and Ukrainians as separate nationalities. Thiss is, therefore, something for the reader to keep in mind whenever Russians in Ukraine aree categorized as such.

Goingg back to the options the Ukrainian central authorities have in combating regionall diversity, it is important at this point to stress that every multinational state practicess some degree of nation-building. In other words, every multinational state tries in somee way to integrate regionally-based national groups to strengthen the state's unity. To myy knowledge, no state has so far willingly and voluntarily ceded parts of its territory. In thiss respect, territorial integrity in conjunction with legitimacy is considered an inviolable attributee by every state (Unwin, 1982; Mikesell and Murphy, 1991). Only when states are forced,, either by violent means or by other pressures, will they permit a more flexible territoriall structure ranging from some form of political-territorial autonomy to secession off a part of its territory. Given the fact that state nation-building is universal, it is worth takingg a closer look at what its elements are and exactly how it is being practised.12

Onee of the most important aspects of nation-building is state policy aimed at promotingg the use of one standardized language in the public domain. This official state languagee may be a lingua franca that is not spoken as a first language by any of the state's inhabitants.. Such a situation can typically be found in former colonial multinational states comprisingg more than two ethnic groups. In such cases it is usually the language of the formerr colonizing state that is chosen as the new state language. Yet, it is far more commonn for states to adopt the language of the dominant or titular nationality as the sole officiall language. Linguistic homogenisation is believed to promote a single national identityy that will strengthen the state's cohesion. To reach this aim, the promotion of the languagee of the dominant nationality usually goes hand in hand with the neglect or suppressionn of languages spoken by members of non-titular minorities. This in turn often leadss to these minorities protesting against what they see as a deliberate attempt by the statee to eradicate their language and culture. In many cases they also resent the fact that

Att this point it is important to stress that in the literature generally, a broader conception of nation-buildingg can be found than presented here. In addition to embracing a nationalizing element, nation-building iss usually said to have a modernizing component (see, for instance Deutsch, 1963; Knippenberg and de Pater,, 1988; Zwaan, 1989). In other words, for these authors nation-building does not only involve homogenizingg the population in terms of language and national identity but also integrating it in society in a social-economicc way by providing education for all, by stimulating farmers to produce for the market, and byy persuading redundant farm workers to work in industry. In this study, this latter part of the definition is disregardedd because Ukraine is a state with an already modernized population. Also, nation-building is usuallyy considered to be a partially autonomous process independent of state action. Here it shares an elementt of definition with modernization. This 'autonomous' element of the definition is also ignored. I definee nation-building here as state policy intended to nationally homogenize the population.

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statee promotion of the language of the titular nationality gives this nationality an unfair advantagee over the non-titular minorities in the competition for scarce resources.

Fromm the point of view of the state, another essential ingredient of the nation-buildingg process is the remodeling of its history and geography in a fashion that legitimizess the present independent state. This remodeling usually involves portraying statee inhabitants and their ancestors as always having felt as 'one' together, as a nation thatt has eternally and courageously fought to obtain independence for its territorial homeland,, the dimensions of which are often depicted in as broad a manner as possible. Often,, the state will not rest until the last inhabitant is made to believe the desired version off its history and geography.

Finally,, nation-building always involves creating central political institutions and nationall symbols that serve as focal points of identification for state inhabitants. Attention iss directed to a national parliament, government and/or presidency that claims to represent thee whole population and all of its interests. Gathered at special ceremonies, schoolchildrenn and military recruits swear allegiance to the fatherland, whilst looking at thee national flag and singing the national anthem.

Thee state has a number of 'tools' at its disposal to enhance the use of the state language,, impose its desired version of history and geography on the population and strengthenn identification with central institutions and national symbols. One of these tools iss the central media. By means of state television, radio, newspapers and magazines, the statee can profoundly influence the information flow to its citizens and hence contribute to thee nationalization of its population. In some cases, states are so 'enthusiastic' in their nation-buildingg that they infringe upon the freedom of the press, which prompts non-titularr minorities to accuse the state of violating human rights. Another tool used by the statee is military service. Drafted for a considerable period of time, young men from all overr the country are forced to use the state language to communicate with each other. In thiss respect, the army provides the state with an ideal setting to convey its ideology to still pliablee young men as it is a highly disciplined organization that does not leave much roomm for individual freedom of thought.

However,, by far the most effective instrument the state employs to nationalize its populationn is education. After all, in most states, every citizen without exception has to followw at least 10 years of school education at an age when a person's character and social andd professional skills are being formed and he or she is particularly susceptible to state propaganda.. Many authors stress education's pivotal role in the nation-building process (e.g.. Bourdieu, 1967; Bock, 1971; Gellner, 1983; Knippenberg and De Pater, 1988; Simon,, 1991). Thus, Knippenberg and De Pater (1988, pp. 135,136), describing the modernizationn and integration process in the Netherlands after 1800, argue that "Subjects likee history and geography raise school pupils' national consciousness. Moreover, when pupils,, regardless of their regional background, leam the standardised state language at school,, they are automatically socialised into the national culture." Also Bock (1971, p. 18),, specifically studying the role of education in the nation-building process of developingg Malaysia, underlines its centrality: "In these nations where the family and otherr primary groups tend to socialize the child toward competing subgroup loyalties and transmitt a message which is incongruent with the emergent goals of the national government,, the political elite often feels compelled to undertake the resocialization of

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largee masses of its citizens in order to reorient them to cope with the emergent patterns of society.. It is largely due to this set of circumstances that the secondary agencies of socialization,, particularly the schools, assume such critical importance in the new nations."" The issue of developing countries using education as a means to construct nationall identities has also been identified by Makulu (1971) for the African context. Finally,, Simon (1991), addressing the role of education in the nationalities policy of the Soviett Union, shows how greatly education contributed to the success of the 1920s policy off korenizatsia (stimulating the national consciousness and social-economic development off the non-Russian peoples constituting the early Soviet Union). In addition, the author discussess in detail how education was used by the Soviet authorities in the 1970s as a principall tool in reaching the goal of slyianie (merging) of the Soviet nationalities into a singlee Soviet Narod (people).

Nott only for the nationalizing state, but also for its opponent, namely the non-titularr nationality, education is of crucial importance as it represents the prime institution forr the nationality to pass on its language and culture to the next generation. Not surprisingly,, there are many examples of national groups accusing states of alleged attackss on non-titular language education and of forced assimilation into the dominant nationalityy by providing education only in the titular language. Thus, Schöpflin (1978) arguess that the significant reduction in Hungarian language instruction in both secondary andd university education in Romania in the 1960s and 1970s was one of the most importantt grievances felt by the Hungarian minority. Similarly, Poulton (1993) holds that thee decision by the Serb authorities in 1976 to reduce the amount of Hungarian language teachingg in the Vojvodina because of a supposed lack of qualified teachers greatly disturbedd the Yugoslav Hungarian minority. Moreover, when the Serb government amendedd the Law on Education in 1992 to make Serbian the sole language of instruction (Hungariann language instruction could only be maintained if specifically requested by individuall school authorities), the Hungarians responded immediately by setting up their ownn cultural organizations to provide their children with native language instruction (ibid.).(ibid.). The conflict in Belgium in 1969 between the two language communities about the languagee of instruction in Leuven/Louvain University proved to be particularly volatile, causingg the university to actually split up into a Dutch-speaking section, which remained inn the old town, and a French-speaking counterpart, which had to move across the languagee border to build its own university complex (Roessingh, 1996). In Finland betweenn the two world wars, the bilingual Finnish-Swedish status of Helsinki University ledd to much antagonism between the small Swedish-speaking community and the Finnish-speakingg majority. Roessingh (1996) recalls how the issue was solved peacefully byy a compromise that guaranteed continued Swedish language instruction despite a petitionn against it signed by 300.000 Finns. These latter two examples in Belgium and Finlandd show how explosive the language issue can be in higher education. It does not comee as a surprise, however, since higher education is of equal importance for the dominantt and the non-titular nationality in producing an intelligentsia able to raise the statuss of a language and culture threatened with being marginalised.

Havingg confirmed the crucial role that central state policy and its most important element,, education, play in the nationality question, it is surprising to find that scholars havee paid almost no attention to issues of education in the post-Soviet successor states,

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whichh all face difficulties with non-titular minority nationalities. For Ukraine this is all thee more surprising since, contrary to most other Soviet republics, it saw a considerable numberr of its titular nationality (Ukrainians) send their children to non-titular (Russian) languagee schools in Soviet times. In fact, while the titular Ukrainians make up a solid majorityy of the population (72.7%), only a minority of Ukraine's pupils were taught in Ukrainiann in 1989 (47.5%) and a majority in Russian (51.6%).13 Arel (1995a), who is one off the few authors to concentrate on educational issues in the process of nation-building, notess that this situation was much resented by the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia of thee late 1980s. Therefore, in an attempt to gain a better understanding of this almost virginn field of research, this study will explicitly focus on education as the central state's mainn instrument of nation-building, although other aspects of nation-building wil l not be ignoredd when they are deemed of interest.

1.31.3 State-Minority Relations in Ukraine: The Response of the Russians and Russian-speakingRussian-speaking Ukrainians

Muchh academic attention has focused on the political attitudes (surveys) and conduct (elections)) of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in post-independence Ukraine.. Using 1994 survey data, Arel and Khmelko (1996) found that Ukraine was deeplyy split along linguistic, national and regional lines regarding attitudes towards the issuess of disarmament and Ukraine's relations with Russia. Guboglo (1996, p. 100) also discoveredd significant differences between the nationalities in their evaluation of Ukraine'ss independence (with 60.5% of Ukrainians displaying a positive attitude toward Ukraine'ss independence as opposed to only 35.7% of Russians).14 Miller et al. (1998) foundd pride in national symbols, identification with the Soviet Union, and support for communistss to correlate strongly with region and ethnic identification (nationality). Peoplee from west Ukraine and people identifying themselves as Ukrainians showed much moree of pride when seeing the national flag and expressed a substantially weaker Soviet identificationn than people from eastern Ukraine and people identifying themselves as non-titulars.. While support for communists correlated with ethnic identification in westernn Ukraine, it was primarily governed by class identification in eastern Ukraine.15

Bremmerr (1994) also encountered both a regional and a national dimension to the politicall opinion process in his 1992 survey, carried out in the cities of L'viv, Kyi'v and Simferopol.. Attempting to classify the responses of Russians, he used the typology of Exit,Exit, Voice and Loyalty, as developed by Hirschman (1970), with 'exit' referring to rejectionn of the new state and a demand for territorial autonomy or secession, 'voice' pertainingg to participation in the new system with accompanying demands for ethnic recognition,, and 'integration' (which Bremmer used instead of 'loyalty') meaning a

133 For the 1989 data on pupils, see: Rozpodil zahalnoosvitnykh ... rik (unpublished document of the Ministryy of Education). 144 Guboglo's data are based on a survey administered in the cities of Ky'fv and Donets'k in the summer of 1994.. Therefore, his data are not representative of all Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine. 155 The data of Miller et al. were based on nationwide representative surveys held in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuaniaa in 1992, 1995 and 1997.

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justificationn of and full compliance with the new order. His main finding was that the Russianss in Kyi'v showed the highest propensity to integrate. This was a surprising result givenn that Bremmer's ethnic attachment model expected the highest level of Russian integrationn to occur in places where their numbers were smallest and their residential historyy was shortest (i.e. in L'viv and not in Kyi'v). The highest inter-ethnic difference wass found in Simferopol with high rates of 'exit' among Russians contrasting sharply withh the more moderate attitudes of Ukrainians.

Ass to political conduct, Section 1.1 has already discussed extensively the regional dimensionn in the voting patterns of the parliamentary and presidential elections. In addition,, Arel and Wilson (1994) found a rural-urban cleavage (with the peasantry in all regionss except the west supporting left-wing forces) to operating alongside an increasinglyy more pronounced regional division (east and south versus center and west).

Ass rich as the literature is on the political response of the Russians (and Russophonee Ukrainians) as scant it is on their specific cultural response. Littl e is known aboutt the linguistic attitudes and behavior of both groups in the various regions of Ukraine.. To what extent do Russians and Russophone Ukrainians send their children to titular-languagee schools? Are they making a conscious effort to raise their children in Ukrainian?? Do we already see a language shift occurring between two generations? The almostt complete neglect of the cultural dimension is all the more remarkable in view of thee likelihood of a strong link between linguistic behavior and identity formation. Thus, Kolstoee (1996, pp. 613, 617) asserts that "An identification with the dominant culture in thee state of residence" is in most cases accompanied by assimilation. In his view, Russianss who adopt the titular language as their mother tongue wil l "shed their identity as beingg ethnic Russians" and wil l at most have "a hazy memory of the distant origin of their forebears."" Conversely, language retention is most likely related to "an identification with thee dominant culture in the external homeland," or to "the development of a new but still basicallyy Russian self-understanding." Laitin (1998, p. 23) sees a similar close connection betweenn language and identity:

Onee might argue that adopting a new language does not automatically mean one has adoptedd a new identity. Yet if Liuba Grigor'ev [a member of thee Russian minority in Estonia,, GJ] had felt like a traitor or fool for taking Estonian language lessons, her motivationn would have been sapped. Her identity was becoming "a Russian who has accommodatedd to the realities of Estonian sovereignty." This was the real "Liuba." Butt these microadjustments in identity (...) alter the identity possibilities of a followingg age. In this sense, Liuba's quest to keep her family intact lays the foundationn for a constructed Estonian identity for her grandchildren.

Hence,, the type of linguistic response is an important clue for the development of (new) identities.. For this reason, the emphasis is on the particular linguistic response of the Russiann speakers (Russians and Ukrainians) in the present study.

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1.41.4 Research Questions

Thee two central questions at the end of Section 1.1 can now be reformulated into the followingg research questions, taking into account the considerations of the previous sections. .

1.. What kind of nation-building policies did the national authorities introduce in the fieldd of education in the post-Glasnost era?

Thiss question is subdivided into: a.. How do the current policies compare to those in Soviet times? b.. How can the current policies be explained? c.. To what extent have these policies been implemented in the various regions? d.. What has been the role of local state administrations in this implementation?

(i.e.. have these administrations accelerated or diluted the implementation of centrall policies and to what extent have they developed their own policies?)

2.. How do the local Russians and Russophone Ukrainians react to the current nation-buildingg policies in education?

Thiss question is subdivided into: a.. How do the local Russians and Russophone Ukrainians respond linguistically?

(i.e.. in terms of school choice, language use and attitudes, and cultural self-organization) )

b.. How can the pattern of responses be explained?

Chapterss Three and Four examine question la. Chapter Three discusses the structure of thee educational system as it determines the amount of freedom regional or city bodies of administrationn and schools have in following their own policies. Attention will focus in particularr on language policies as these prove to be the source of much heated debate. Regulationss are discussed concerning the language of instruction in schools and institutionss of higher education and the number of hours in the curriculum devoted to Ukrainiann and Russian as subjects. In the concluding section I seek to explain Ukraine's nationalizingg programme by comparing it to nation-building and education policies of otherr Soviet successor states (question lb). This attempt at interpretation will have a largelyy exploratory character due to the scarcity of academic works developing a theoreticall framework for the comparative study of post-Soviet nationalizing projects. Chapterr Four is entirely devoted to history, geography and literature teaching because of thee role these subjects play in instilling a form of national consciousness into the pupil's mind.. Chapter Five deals specifically with the implementation of central state policy in thee regions (question lc). It will present detailed low-aggregate statistical data on the languagee of instruction in schools and in institutions of higher education. Chapter Six addressess question Id - the autonomous role of the local state. Attention will focus on the strategiess local state administrations use to stimulate or attenuate the implementation of centrall policies.

Chapterr Seven discusses the linguistic reaction of the local Russian-speaking populationn (question 2a), and how it can be explained and interpreted (2b). To measure thiss reaction, a survey was done among pupils of two batches at both Russian and

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Ukrainiann schools in four cities, one in each of Ukraine's four regions. Pupils were asked too state the nationality of their parents and answer questions about their language behaviorr at home and at school, which enabled us to draw conclusions about the willingnesss of Russophone parents to send their children to Ukrainian-language schools andd about the patterns of language use of parents and pupils both in public and private andd settings. Interviews with state and school officials provided information about the degreee of self-organization among Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (to what extentt they established their own private schools and cultural or political societies). The twoo cohorts of pupils allowed us to check the dynamics of school choice and language behavior.. Finally, as research was done in Kyïv (central Ukraine), L'viv (western Ukraine),, Odesa (southern Ukraine) and Donets'k (eastern Ukraine), the country's regionall diversity, which has left it with varying proportions of Russians and Russian-speakingg Ukrainians in the local population, was maximally accounted for.

Comparingg the same cultural groups in four places within one country is, in fact, unusual.. Nearly all comparative studies involve cross-border comparisons of ethnic phenomena.. However, Bremmer (1994) in his elucidating article on the political outlook off Russians in Ukraine also compared Russians and Ukrainians in three Ukrainian cities, thee choice of which was motivated by a theoretical framework that has served as a guidelinee for this research as well. Chapter Two, which gives an overview of the theoreticall approaches to ethnic pluralism, elaborates on this framework in further detail andd shows how it shapes the methodology of this research.

1.51.5 The Role of Russia

Thiss study has been couched in a two-actor model of a central state versus a non-titular nationalityy (Russians) and non-titular language-speaking group (Russian-speaking Ukrainians).. Obviously a third actor, which Brubaker (1995, pp. 109,110) calls the "externall national homeland", may also exert a considerable influence over both actors. Thus,, in the case of Ukraine, Russia, as the external national homeland of the Russian minority,, can put pressure on the Ukrainian central state to ease ukrainianization policies. Att the same time, Russia can support the Russian minority and thereby encourage it to raisee its demands for some degree of cultural or political autonomy. The Ukrainian governmentt may respond to pressure from Russia by making concessions to the Russian minority.. In contrast, the central government could also be irritated by Russia's attempts too "meddle in Ukraine's internal affairs" and react by speeding up ukrainianization. Lastly,, the Russian minority might respond in different ways to support from Russia. It couldd be encouraged to raise its demands, but it could 'sit back and relax' as well, reassuredd by the idea that 'Mother' Russia wil l always be there to help in case of emergency.. Conversely, a lack of support from Russia might also stimulate Ukraine's Russianss to raise their demands, knowing that without external help they are forced to standd up for themselves.

Clearly,, therefore, Russia is likely to influence Ukraine's central policy making andd the Russian minority's demands. However, for a number of reasons this research does nott pay attention to Russia as a factor of some influence. First, the specific field of

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educationn is almost always a state's internal affair. Cases in which one state is permitted too play a role in another state's educational system are rare indeed and usually only surfacee in extreme circumstances. During the course of this research project I found no indicationn of Russia being in any way involved in Ukraine's educational system. Second, iff Russia were at all influential, it would be difficult to ascertain its precise role. At this pointt we have to make a distinction between any influence of the central government in Moscoww and influence of local or regional actors operating along Ukraine's borders. To getget a clear overview of the influence of the latter, one would have to engage in measuring cross-borderr contacts, which, even if at all feasible, requires a separate research project in itself.. To determine the influence of the Russian government one could concentrate on publicc statements and concrete policy steps of prominent Russian office-holders and on Ukraine'ss response to these statements and/or actions. However, whether Russian pressuree is indeed effective in influencing certain Ukrainian policies would still be a difficul tt question to answer since Ukrainian politicians wil l never openly admit to bowing too Russian pressure. Finally, the fact that nearly all Soviet successor states have Russian minorities,, who naturally all consider Russia to be their external national homeland, makess comparisons between these states easier, as the influence of the 'external national homeland'' factor can be controlled.17 To put it differently, because the Russian minorities inn the successor states all share the same external national homeland, one can compare successorr states on their central state - Russian minority relations independently of the influencee of the external homeland factor.18

166 For such an example, see Hin and Sigaloff (1996), who found that the national authorities in war-torn Georgiaa were not able to prevent Armenia from providing the Armenian minority in Georgia with Armenian schoolbooks. . 177 We assume that Russia behaves in more or less the same way towards all successor states with Russian minorities. . 188 Though admittedly, conclusions about central state - Russian minority relations would then only be valid inn the post-Soviet context.

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22 STATES AND ETHNI C GROUPS

Thee two central questions introduced in the previous chapter focused on two interrelated issues:: (1) the response of the state to ethnic pluralism within its boundaries, and (2) the responsee of ethnic groups to state action. As to the former, it has already been argued that despitee a growing awareness that central state policy has a considerable impact on the politicall mobilization of ethnic groups (and even on their very survival), the construction off theories explaining the variety of central state approaches to ethnic pluralism has so far receivedd littl e academic attention. In contrast, the latter phenomenon has attracted considerablee academic attention, resulting in several theories on the political mobilization off ethnic groups. This chapter starts with a discussion on frequently used terminology and onn the applicability of terms like nation, national/ethnic group and nationalism in the Ukrainiann context. Then I concentrate on the ill-developed body of theory on state responsess to multi-ethnicity, followed by a discussion on its relevance for post-Soviet Ukraine.. Next, attention shifts to the specific linguistic response of the Russians and Russophonee Ukrainians to the nation-building project. The chapter concludes by extractingg a number of variables from the body of theory on ethnic mobilization that are thoughtt to frame these responses. The last section also identifies the cities where the responsee of the groups wil l be examined, and explains why these cities were selected.

2.12.1 Concepts and Definitions: Their Applicability f or Ukraine

2.1.11 Nations, ethnic groups and nationalities

Thee concept of nation has been the source of much academic debate. Bakker (1997) lists aa number of scholars who have looked for objective cultural markers, such as a common language,, religion, myth of ancestry, sense of homeland, and values and traditions, in theirr efforts to define a nation and distinguish one nation from another. Usually, these authorss are associated with the primordialist perspective on ethnic phenomena. Authors whoo are labeled as primordialists point to the significance of tangible cultural characteristicss as the foundations on which strong, essentially unchanging national identitiess and feelings of belonging rest (e.g. Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1963; Isaacs, 1975). Yet,, this primordialist approach to the problem of defining a nation runs into considerable difficulties.. There is, for instance, the question of why in one case a particular cultural traitt distinguishes one nation from another, while in others it does not. Why is it that in Spainn language is such a crucial factor in determining membership of a nation and in Switzerlandd it is not? Another problem is that some groups of people consider themselves too belong to different nations while they do not differ on any cultural markers. The Walloonss are a case in point. They share their language and religion with their southern neighbours,, but they do not think of themselves as being French. In this particular case, thee modern phenomenon of state citizenship appears to have moulded national identity. Finally,, proceeding from the assumption that a person is bound to a nation by the characteristicss of the culture he grew up in, this approach cannot explain why individuals adoptt new cultural traits and change national allegiances in the course of their lifetime.

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InIn reaction, it has been argued that a nation is nothing more than an 'imagined community'' (Anderson, 1991) consisting of members who share a sense of belonging to thiss nation and who are identified by others as being part of it. Scholars subscribing to thiss subjective notion of a nation are often categorized as mobilizationists. For scholars classifiedd as such, nations are the products of elites who have mobilized heretofore amorphouss masses on a national platform in accordance with their political and economic interestss (e.g. Glazer and Moynihan; 1975; van den Berghe, 1976). It is argued that nationall identities are the outcome of rational decision-making processes and are subject too change if people are confronted with altered circumstances. Obviously, this line of thoughtt is of special relevance to certain categories of immigrants, who in their endeavor too adapt as quickly as possible to the conditions of their new host society cast off any culturall traits and allegiances that hinder them in this.

Yet,, the instrumentalist argument has again elicited the criticism that it ignores the relativee longevity of nations and the strong emotional bonds among people based on a sensee of common descent, culture and ethnic homeland. Acknowledging the imperfectionss of both approaches, some authors have sought to combine the two in definitionss of nation that capture both objectively verifiable traits and the subjective sentimentss of belonging (Smith, 1986; Scott, 1990). However, one particular aspect of nationss that the instrumentalist argument points at should not be ignored: nations invariablyy have some political program aimed at enhancing or maintaining a system of individuall and/or collective rights and privileges in a distinct territory. These political demandss may range from calls for more cultural autonomy on an individual basis to claimss for far-reaching kinds of territorial autonomy, including appeals for outright independence.. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, mobilizationists would even arguee that the very fact that group spokespeople start promulgating a political program givess rise to a national consciousness among a group of people hitherto unaware of 'the tiess that bind them together' (e.g. Smith and Wilson, 1997). Hence, the perception of beingg a member of a nation and the promotion of a political program appear to be interrelatedd phenomena.

InIn summary, this study defines a nation as a group of people with one or more specificspecific cultural traits whose members (1) think of themselves and are thought of by othersothers as being part of it and (2) endorse a political program aimed at enhancing or maintainingmaintaining a system of individual and/or collective rights and privileges.

Thee concepts of ethnic group, nationality and national minority can be treated as synonymss and are used in this study to denote a group living in a state dominated by a differentt group. This minority group may or may not be part of a larger nation. Hence, Hungarianss in Slovakia constitute both a national minority and a part of the larger Hungariann nation, which, in addition to living in Slovakia, is also to be found in Hungary, Ukraine,, Romania and Yugoslavia. Although ethnic groups share many of the characteristicss of nations, such as specific cultural traits and a strong national consciousness,, they usually have a political program of only moderate demands, proposingg some form of cultural or (minimal) territorial autonomy instead of total independence.. It is likely that these modest demands are in relation to the minority status off ethnic group. It is the fear among ethnic groups that the state, which is dominated by ann ethnic other, might retaliate that keeps them from making more radical demands.

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2.1.22 The Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainian s of Ukrain e

Att first sight it does not seem problematic to label Ukraine's Russians as an ethnic group sincee they are indeed in a minority position, but if we look closely at their situation, the applicabilityy of the concept can be called into question. First, as noted in the introduction, manyy of them are (descendants of) migrants who came from Russia. This is most notably thee case in western Ukraine where a Russian presence was virtually non-existent before thee war. This migrant status may have induced some Russians to give up their cultural traitss and Russian identity in an effort to participate fully in Ukrainian(-speaking) society. Consequently,, it would no longer be appropriate to speak of Ukraine's Russians as an ethnicethnic group. However, Russian migrants to Ukraine are different than, for instance, migrantss to the United States. Whereas the latter realized they were going to another country,, where they would have to learn English in order to find a place in American society,, the former, who migrated to Ukraine when it was part of the Russian Empire and laterr the Soviet Union, did not experience this as migrating to a foreign state. As memberss of the dominant nation speaking the language that dominated all aspects of Soviett lif e and that was fostered officially by the authorities, these Russians did not feel thee need to learn Ukrainian. In addition, many Russians did not recognise Ukraine to be anythingg other than an integral part of Russia, their ethnic homeland, calling Ukraine "Littl ee Russia" (Malorossiya) and considering Ukrainians to be a branch of the larger all-Russiann nation (Solchanyk, 1994, p. 49). In conclusion, the migrant status of the Russians iss not likely to have affected their cultural and national outlook to any great extent.

However,, if migrant status did not contribute very much to ethnic reidentification, thee intermingling of Russians with Ukrainians probably did. Pirie (1996) argues that the exceptionallyy high rate of mixed marriages found in Ukraine, especially in the south and eastt (e.g. 25% of all marriages for Ukraine as a whole, 41.7% for Donets'k oblast and 36.4%% for The Crimea), has greatly contributed to mixed self-identification, blurring traditionall Ukrainian and Russian national consciousness. Indeed, referring to an all-Ukrainiann sociological survey conducted between 1993 and 1994, he shows that 25-26% off respondents considered themselves as being Russian and Ukrainian simultaneously, whereass only 11% regarded themselves to be exclusively Russian. Citing a 1991 sociologicall poll conducted in Donets'k he also finds that a plurality of 36.5% of respondentss declared themselves to be both Russian and Ukrainian and only 27.5% exclusivelyy Russian. It should be remembered that these figures contrast markedly with thee census data, which register 22.1% of the population as Russians for Ukraine as a wholee and 44% as Russians for Donets'k oblast. Surely, therefore, ethnic intermingling hashas had an impact on the national consciousness of Russians, refuting the assertion that thesee Russians constitute a clear-cut ethnic group.

Iff Ukraine's Russians cannot easily be categorized as an ethnic group, then what aboutt the Russian-speaking Ukrainians? At first sight this seems to be an inappropriate questionn since the Russophone Ukrainians are, as Ukrainians, part of the dominant nation. However,, if the use of Russian has affected their national outlook, the question clearly is relevant.. Have Russophone Ukrainians changed their national affiliation and adopted, for instance,, a strong Russian identity or some distinct identity of their own, which would in eitherr case qualify them as (part of) an ethnic group? The literature on this subject

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indicatess that very few Russophone Ukrainians actually dropped their Ukrainian identity inn the post-war years.19 Consequently, with almost all Russian-speaking Ukrainians consideringg themselves as belonging to the dominant nation, it would indeed be inapt to labell them as an ethnic group. Yet, Pirie (1996, p. 1083) argues that if they possess a Ukrainiann identity at all it is likely to be weak as they find themselves in a situation similarr to that of mixed couples: "In the case of southern and eastern Ukraine, for example,, the dominance of the Russian language and other aspects of Russian culture mayy also lead to a state of ethnic marginality among individuals, including those who do nott have mixed ethnic heritage. This is because the tension between Ukrainian heritage andd Russian ethnic markers (i.e. language etc.) draws the individual's allegiances in differentt directions in the same way that mixed parentage does." Although Pirie does not supportt this argument with survey data showing that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are indeedd in 'a state of ethnic marginality,' we know from the discussion in the introduction thatt in the lands formerly part of Czarist Russia (where almost all Russian-speaking Ukrainianss live nowadays) national consciousness remains fledgling among Ukrainians. Inn the same vein, it has been argued that the inability of many Ukrainians to distinguish Russophonee Ukrainians from Russians, precisely because of their continued use of Russian,, has made it impossible to draw clear-cut nationality boundaries separating Russian-speakingg Ukrainians from Russians.20

Thee fact that neither the Russians nor the Russian-speaking Ukrainians make up sharplyy demarcated ethnic groups endowed with strong national identities is most interestingg from the point of view of this study as that might have consequences for the politicall program of both groups. In other words, given our expectation that national consciousnesss and the promotion of a political program are interrelated phenomena, does aa weak ethnic identity among (many) Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians also meann that they lack a political agenda? Does it mean that they wil l easily drop their culturall traits and adopt new ones and change national allegiances accordingly, if changed politicall circumstances (Ukraine obtaining independence) oblige them to do so? Section Threee of this chapter, which is devoted to the specific linguistic response of the Russian-speakingg population goes into this matter in further detail.

Forr now, suffice it to say that, weak as the national consciousness among many Russianss and Russian-speaking Ukrainians may be, this has certainly had no effect on theirr political attitudes. Election results (as discussed in the introduction) and numerous opinionn polls have consistently shown support for the idea of Russian as a second state languagee and for closer ties with Russia and/or some reinstitution of the Soviet Union in thee east and south, where the two groups predominate. But voting and expressing one's viewss to interviewers is one thing, organizing interest groups and setting up one's own institutions,, such as schools, churches and cultural societies, is quite another. The

199 See Anderson and Silver (1990) who estimate that, between 1959 and 1970, less than three percent of Ukrainianss in the USSR, including those living in republics other than Ukraine, ethnically reidentified to Russian.. Ukrainian scholars, moreover, have noted that national consciousness among Ukrainians does not appearr to depend on language use (Arel, 1994). 200 See Arel (1996, p. 86) where he notes that "Kyïvans can easily identify the regional, but not the ethnic backgroundd of Eastern Slavs they meet, unless the region identifies the ethnicity".

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questionn is thus whether Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians are prepared to activelyy pursue some cultural or political program of their own.

Too come back to the identity markers separating the two groups, one could argue thatt it may not be very productive to employ the two categories of Russophone Ukrainianss and Russians if it is not clear whether these groups identify themselves as distinctt groups in reality. This argument must be qualified. First of all, using survey data, Barringtonn (1997) found that - other factors being equal - nationality was one of the three statisticallyy significant factors (the others being religion and region, but not language!) shapingg attitudes in Ukraine towards Ukraine's independence and relations with Russia. Contraryy to other research findings, therefore, Barrington 's study suggests that nationality formss an important social cleavage after all. Second, precisely by distinguishing the two groupss and analyzing their individual linguistic reactions we can determine whether the distinctionn has any basis in reality.

2.1.33 Nationalism and state nationalism

Lik ee Gellner (1983, p. 1), we define nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holdss that the political and national unit should be congruent." As such, it is the most radicall political program an ethnic group living in a state together with one or more ethnicc groups can have, since its fulfilment would automatically entail the breakup of that state.. Obviously, this ethnic group nationalism collides with the nationalism of a nation inn control of the state. The latter, so-called state nationalism seeks to centralize decision-makingg and culturally homogenize the population in the state's territory (Roessingh, 1996).. Strong state nationalism relies heavily on strategies of control or dominance in theirr dealings with ethnic pluralism. Conversely, weak state nationalism expresses itself inn strategies to accommodate ethnic demands.

Aimedd at the eradication of ethnic differences within the state's boundaries, the strategiess of control or dominance vary from extreme policies, such as genocide and ethnicc cleansing, to milder but still restrictive policies including the monopolization of thee police and juridical systems by the titular nation, ethnic discrimination in the allocationn of economic resources, the prohibition of ethnic parties and movements, and compulsoryy educational homogenization (including the prohibition of the use of the languagee of non-dominant ethnic groups in schools) (McGarry and O'Leary, 1993).

Inn contrast, the strategy of accommodation acknowledges and cultivates ethnic pluralismm in an effort to enhance the legitimacy of the state among members of minority groups.. A distinction can be made between non-territorial and territorial policies of accommodation.. The former include policies like anti-discrimination laws, government subsidiess for ethnic organizations and educational establishments, proportional political representation,, veto rights for minorities, positive discrimination, and quotas for employmentt in the public sector (Bakker, 1997). Territorial policies involve the creation off a level of government controlled by an ethnic group with specific authority, mostly overr cultural matters, over the residential area of that ethnic group (regional autonomy), orr the establishment of a federation or even confederation.

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2.1.44 State nationalism in Ukraine

Itt can be proposed that the intensity of state nationalism correlates positively with the depthh of nationalist sentiment among the elite and masses of titular nation. In line with thiss argument, we can then hypothesize that the Ukrainian central state is unlikely to embarkk on a course of strong state nationalism. After all, in the introduction it was mentionedd that for a variety of historical reasons strong nationalist feelings are only prevalentt among western Ukrainians, reducing the prospect of a Ukrainian nationalist elitee ever dominating the state apparatus and determining its policies.21 In fact, the introductionn also showed that Ukrainian nationalist parties have not been very successful inn mustering much support: the results of the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections revealedd that only in the western oblasts and in Kyïv city did nationalist parties capture a largee percentage of the votes. It is to this limited appeal of Ukrainian nationalism that Andreww Wilson refers in the title of his new book: "Ukrainian Nationalism: a Minority Faith"" (Wilson, 1997).

Yet,, the strength of nationalist sentiment among the members of the nation in controll may not be the only factor shaping the response of the state to ethnic pluralism. Thee next section discusses two approaches predicting the likelihood of either an accommodatingg strategy or a strategy based on domination and control.

2.22.2 The Response of the Ukrainian State to Ethnic Pluralism

2.2.11 Consociational democracy

Consociationall democracy is generally considered to be one of the accommodating strategiess a state can follow in its dealings with ethnic groups. Introduced by Lijphart (1977,, p. 25), this concept refers to a specific political way of coping with ethnic cleavagess in society. Its basic elements are in Lijphart's words:

1.. A government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments off the plural society;

211 One could counter the assertion that strong nationalist feelings only prevail among western Ukrainians by arguingg that the limited appeal of Ukrainian nationalism was apparently not limited enough to prevent Ukrainee from attaining independence. Yet, it must be borne in mind that all former Soviet Union Republics becamee independent states whatever the strength of titular nationalism, and that pro-independence sentimentss in the early 1990s were not always an expression of strong indigenous nationalism. It has been argued,, for instance, that in the fall of 1991, Ukraine's Russians supported independence because they believedd an independent Ukraine would have better economic prospects than a Ukraine still subordinate to Moscoww (opinion polls in October 1991 consistently showed that a majority of Russians backed independence;; the December 1991 referendum on independence further showed that in the Russified oblasts off the east an overwhelming majority supported independence (Donets'k 83.9%; Dnipropetrovsk 90.3%; Kharkivv 86.3% and Luhansk 83.8%) (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996)). However, after three years of economic hardship,, support for independence had sunk dramatically: an April 1994 poll indicated that 40 percent of respondentss were willing to make concessions on sovereignty to improve living conditions, while only 32 percentt were not.

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2.. The mutual veto or concurrent majority rule, which serves as an additional protection off vital minority interests;

3.. Proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments,, and allocation of public funds; and

4.. A high degree of (non-)territorial autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. .

Lijphartt can be credited for the fact that he put forward a number of conditions conducive too the development and sustainability of consociational democracy. Naturally, the first andd foremost condition must be democracy itself. Because Ukraine has indeed been a democracyy (at least formally) since its independence, we can now apply Lijphart's model too Ukraine and see whether any of the conditions are prevalent there. Accordingly, we cann assess the prospects of consociational democracy in this large successor state. Lijphartt considers the following six conditions to be particularly important:

1.. The balance of power 2.. State size 3.. The structure of cleavages (crosscutting or coinciding) 4.. Overarching loyalties 5.. Segmental isolation 6.. Traditions of elite accommodation

Thee concept of a balance of power relates to a situation in which there are at least three (ethnic)) groups in society of more or less equal size. It logically follows that each group wil ll be in a minority position. The advantage of such a configuration is that no one group cann win a majority of votes in a party system along ethnic lines, which excludes the possibilityy of one group dominating the others. Hence, a coalition of two or more groups becomess unavoidable, reducing the prospect that one or several groups feel neglected or oppressedd by an indifferent or hostile government.

Iff one takes the Russian-speaking Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group, one couldd argue that the balance of power condition would indeed seem to apply for Ukraine: thee introductory chapter mentioned a survey that showed that Ukraine's population is composedd of 47% Ukrainians who prefer to speak Ukrainian, 33% Ukrainians who prefer too speak Russian, and 20% Russians. However, as noted in the previous section, Russian-speakingg Ukrainians cannot really be considered an ethnic group since there is evidence thatt they still possess a (weak) Ukrainian identity and have not developed a distinct identityy of their own. Because of this, the ethno-linguistic map of Ukraine cannot be seen ass a triangular configuration of clear-cut ethnic groups delineated by sharp cultural boundaries.. Instead, it is the intermediate position of the Russophone Ukrainians with theirr blurred national identity that might give rise to a situation in which they either side withh their Ukrainian-speaking co-nationals or Russian co-linguals. This dual with intermediaryintermediary group pattern could produce dominant majority rule. Ukraine, therefore, doess not really appear to meet the balance of power condition.

Forr three reasons a small country has increased prospects of consociational democracy.. First, in small states "elites are more likely to know each other personally and

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too meet often; this increases the probability that they wil l not regard politics as a zero-summ game and hence...that they wil l choose coalescent instead of adversarial styles of decision-making"" (ibid. p. 65). Another internal effect of small states is that the number andd variety of interest groups is much smaller than in large states. Consequently, small statess can afford to have many elites participating in the decision-making process without itt turning into an unmanageable political machine. In contrast, in large states, the participationn of the many interest groups can overburden the policy-making process. The externall effect of a state being small is that it enhances feelings of insecurity vis-a-vis otherr states. These feelings produce a strong drive to sustain internal solidarity. Large states,, feeling relatively more secure, lack this incentive.

Withh its 52 million inhabitants and 600,000 square kilometres Ukraine clearly doess not satisfy the small size criterion. One could argue, though, that the perceived externall threat coming from Russia as Ukraine's big and powerful neighbor provides a greatt impetus for elites to cooperate. Yet, for elites to unite there must be consensus amongg them about what constitutes a threat and in Ukraine one can seriously doubt whetherr 'the Russian factor' is really conceived of as a common danger by all elites. Indeed,, as already stated in the introduction, the communists actually favor closer ties withh Russia. For them Russia's political fencing with Ukraine over issues such as the Blackk See Fleet and the status of Sevastopol (and that of the entire Crimean peninsula) mayy not constitute a threat at all, but rather a welcome sign of involvement. In conclusion,, therefore, Ukraine's size does not appear to be beneficial to consociational democracy. .

Althoughh Lijphart is inconclusive about the exact effect of the structure of cleavagescleavages (crosscutting or coinciding) on consociational democracy, he does argue that "thee only unambiguously favorable types of crosscutting are the crosscutting of class cleavagess with various kinds of segmental cleavages - producing segments with approximatee economic equality" (ibid. p. 87). The logic of this argument is that if ethnic groupss are all more or less equally represented in the classes of society, they tend to feel equallyy treated, which in turn moderates attitudes and policy stances.

Inn Ukraine, social cleavages can indeed be said to be crosscutting ethnic ones. Althoughh before the Revolution Ukrainians were still over-represented in the peasantry andd underrepresented in the urban-based middle and upper classes, seventy years of communistt rule effectively removed this imbalance. Ukrainians are now almost as educatedd and urbanized as the Russians and have roughly the same occupational structure.222 Therefore, as Ukraine does not have the kind of class divisions exacerbating ethnicc tensions, one would expect the structure of cleavages to favor consociational democracy. .

Elitee cooperation is further enhanced by overarching loyalties, particularly those thatt operate at the level of society as a whole and thus dampen inter-elite conflict in the centrall state institutions. Lijphart considers nationalism to potentially provide these loyalties,, although he admits that instead of unifying a society it can also lead to more discordd "by providing a loyalty to a nation that is not coterminous with the state" (ibid. p. 82). .

Forr a comparison of Soviet nationalities on indicators of social mobilization, see Kaiser (1994).

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Obviously,, in the case of Ukraine one cannot really speak of nationwide overarchingg loyalties. The fact that Ukraine has never before had a period of sustained independencee means that many of its inhabitants, certainly the Russian-speaking populationn in the east and south, have littl e affinity with the concept of an independent Ukraine.. In politics this is reflected in the continuing debate over issues of state and nation-building.. Thus, whereas in other countries elites at least agree on state independencee and the character of the main political institutions, in Ukraine there is nothingg that binds the elites together. Moreover, for many Russian speakers Ukrainian nationalism,, as a potential unifying force, is not only associated with attaining and strengtheningg Ukraine's independence, but also with a relentless promotion of the Ukrainiann language and Ukrainian customs. As such it is more a dividing force than an ideologyy bringing people together.

Accordingg to Lijphart, segmental isolation increases the chances of consociational democracyy in that "clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantagee of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-presentt potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility" (ibid. p. 88). He interprets thesee boundaries not only in a territorial sense (segregation of cultural groups by area) but alsoo in a personalistic or institutional way. Boundaries of the latter nature refer to groups who,, though living together, are strongly endogamic and isolate themselves from other groupss by maintaining their own institutions (schools, churches, unions, sports clubs, etc.). .

Neitherr of the two conceptions of boundaries applies in contemporary Ukraine. In aa geographical sense, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russianss do not live in linguistically and nationally homogeneous territories. This makes aa territorial arrangement of accommodating ethnic demands alongside impossible. It is hardlyy surprising therefore that the new constitution adopted in June 1996 formally institutess Ukraine as a unitary state, notwithstanding the autonomy it granted to The Crimea.. In the personalistic/institutional sense, the boundaries between the three groups aree hazy at best. As wil l be shown hereafter, intermarriage rates among Ukrainians and Russianss were exceptionally high in Soviet Ukraine compared to exogamy degrees in otherr Soviet republics. In addition, institutions and organizations along ethnic lines are stilll a marginal phenomenon, which is not surprising given that a civil society has yet to emergee in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Incidentally,, it can be questioned whether segmental isolation in a territorial sense iss conducive to ethnic peace and harmony. One could argue that ethnically homogeneous territoriess actually encourage secession by providing the ethnic groups in question with usefull tools (shelter, local power base and material resources) in their effort to reserve the territory'ss assets for themselves. Conceived in this way, geographically concentrated groupss are not conducive to consociational democracy, but rather to the opposite: ethnic conflictt and civil war (one may safely assume that in a majority of cases attempts to secedee result in violent conflict). Coakley (1993, p. 7) argues in this vein: 'The extent to whichh an ethnic group makes territorial demands on the state is clearly related to the absolutee size of the group and to the pattern of territorial distribution of the group itself. Otherr things being equal, a group's territorial claims become stronger as (1) the group

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increasess as a proportion of the population of 'its' territory and (2) the proportion of the totall membership of the group within this territory increases".

Ass a last important factor, prior traditions of elite accommodation can be said to contributee significantly to consociational democracy. Thus, if countries have a pre-modern,, pre-democratic history of decentralized rule, characterized by compromise-seekingg elites at various levels of government, they are more likely to adopt the consociationall model. Conversely, the longer the periods of centralized absolutist rule a countryy endured, the smaller the chances of consociational democracy.

Neitherr under the Russian czars nor under communist rule did Ukraine develop a traditionn of elite accommodation for the simple reason that state power was in the hands off an elite, first the Czarist bureaucracy/Russian nobility and later the communist party elite,, that did not allow others to participate in the political process. As in many countries withh absolutist rule it was dangerous in Ukraine for an elite excluded from state power to interferee in the decision-making process as persons or groups criticizing the regime and seekingg a change in the status quo were relentlessly persecuted. Needless to say, with suchh a history the prospects for consociational power-sharing are minimal in Ukraine.

Givenn that Ukraine has a negative score on four of the six conditions, we can safelyy assume that the chances are very small that Ukraine wil l develop consociational democracyy as an accommodating strategy in its dealings with ethnic pluralism. Yet, does thiss automatically predispose Ukraine to adopt a policy of dominance or control! The nextt section gives a preliminary answer to this question.

2.2.22 Overt majorit y ethno-nationalism

Wee proceed, as Chinn and Kaiser (1996) did, from Hennayake's model of overt-/exclusionary/exclusionary majority ethnonationalism in assessing the likelihood of Ukraine developingg strategies of dominance and control. Overt majority ethno-nationalism refers too a state of affairs in which the majority nation openly seeks to monopolize state power, soo we can take overt majority ethno-nationalism and strategies of dominance and control ass synonyms. According to Hennayake (1992, p. 529) overt majority ethno-nationalism is stimulated: :

1.. When the present majority nation has been subordinated previously under colonialism and/orr imperialism - for example, the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka;

2.. Where majority ethno-nationalism, especially its popular element, has been suppressedd as was the case in Iran prior to the 1979 Revolution;

3.. When the majority nation is threatened by external forces - for example, pre-Bangladeshh East Pakistan - or by internal forces - for example, growing Hindu nationalismm in India in the face of growing Islamic fundamentalism;

4.. When the economic resources of a multiethnic nation-state are limited - for example, thee situation of the Malays in Malaysia (this condition includes economic inequalities betweenn ethnic groups);

5.. To solicit support for the adventurist policies of a state - as in Nazi Germany; 6.. To regain lost pride - as in post-war France; and 7.. When the survival of the majority nation is threatened - as in Israel today.

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Interestingly,, Hennayake's model and Lijphart's favorable conditions seem to have only onee factor in common: Lijphart's crosscutting/coindicing cleavages and Hennayake's limitedd economic resources. However, even this coincidence is partial as Hennayake's conceptt covers more than just economic imbalances between ethnic groups. The lack of overlapp of the two models suggests that a country's failure to satisfy the conditions for consociationall democracy does not necessarily induce it to take an exclusionary nationalismm course and vice versa. Thus, instead of making up a simple dichotomy, Lijphart'ss consociational democracy and Hennayake's overt nationalism seem to constitutee the extremes of a continuum embracing a large grey area of all kinds of more orr less accommodating or overt nationalist policies. Let us now turn to Ukraine and see whetherr it fits Hennayake's model.

Ukrainee obviously meets the first condition. The Ukrainians as the majority nation have overr the past five centuries been subordinated to successively the Polish, Russian-Czarist andd Soviet-communist Empires. Although one can doubt the applicability of the term subordinationsubordination for the Soviet era (as many Ukrainians made great socio-economic progresss then and actively participated in the communist regime), what matters is that Ukrainiann nationalists label this period as such, as a time of oppression of the Ukrainian languagee and culture and thus of the Ukrainian national identity itself. It is this perceived subordinationn that Ukrainian nationalists used to legitimize Ukraine's independence and thee assertion of dominance or hegemony of the titular nation in "its national homeland".

Thee second condition applies much less to Ukraine because, as was argued in the introduction,, Ukrainian nationalism has only limited appeal among the majority of Ukrainians.. Only in western Ukraine do we find the typical mass-based nationalist sentimentt of a people feeling oppressed by a "foreign" regime. Many inhabitants of L'viv ,, for instance, take pride in the fact that L'viv was the first town in the Soviet Union too tear down its statue of Lenin. In contrast, in the rest of Ukraine there have been few similarr expressions of popular discontent with the Soviet era: some statues of Soviet heroess still stand, street names have generally remained unchanged and nationalist uproarss and demonstrations are rare.

Thee third condition - an external and internal threat to the majority nation - is clearlyy present in the Ukrainian case. For Ukrainian foreign-policy specialists Russia undoubtedlyy constitutes a major external threat to Ukrainian security. Of paramount concernn to them is the rise of political movements in Russia such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky'ss LDPR and, to a lesser extent, Gennadi Zyuganov's Communist Party whichh seek to restore the Russian-Czarist Empire or the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Russianss in The Crimea and in the eastern oblasts are seen as a serious internal threat to Ukraine'ss stability, pleading as they do for more autonomy or even secession (especially Thee Crimean Russians). Many Ukrainian nationalists tend to see these Russians as a fifth columnn from Moscow.

Despitee the depth of the economic crisis in Ukraine, one cannot say with certainty whetherr the fourth condition applies as the distribution of economic resources through Ukraine'ss ethnic groups is not uneven. As the previous section showed, Ukrainians have quicklyy caught up with the Russians on a number of social mobility indicators. Consequently,, an exclusionary nationalist policy of economic discrimination favoring the

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titularr majority, which is justified by referring to past inequalities, is unlikely to find muchh support.

Conditionss number five and six are obviously missing in Ukraine. At present Ukrainee does not have any charismatic political leaders who could incite people to supportt adventurist politics. Even if it did, these leaders (or leader) would have difficulty mobilizingg the masses on the grounds of regaining lost pride. Ukraine has very few momentss in its history from which it can derive a sense of lost pride. Ukrainian historians couldd argue that the medieval kingdom of Kyi'v Rus constitutes such a moment, claiming ass they do that it was an embryonic Ukrainian state inhabited by a proto-Ukrainian nation andd that modem Ukraine is its sole successor. However, Russian historiography and popularr image dispute this version of history, arguing that Kyïv Rus was the cradle of all threee East Slav nations, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Russians. The Zaporizhzhan Cossackk era could constitute another source of pride in Ukraine's history, but the Cossackss also raise controversy. For Ukrainian nationalists they symbolise the brave, democraticc and freedom-loving soul of the Ukrainian nation, but others see them as simplyy a gang of undisciplined outlaws, murdering and pillaging the countryside.

Inn contrast, condition number seven is again of particular relevance to Ukraine in thatt Ukrainian nationalists considered the russification policies and spontaneous assimilationn of many Ukrainians to Russian in the late Soviet times as major threats to the survivall of the Ukrainian nation. This fear of the Ukrainian nation becoming extinct was clearlyy present in Rukh's original program. It holds that the Rukh's main goal was "to wagee a relentless struggle against the policy of de-nationalization and demand the creationn of all conditions for the unfettered development and self-preservation of the Ukrainiann people on the territory which has been theirs from time immemorial" (cited in Kaiserr 1996, p. 30). Similarly, during the parliamentary session debating the Ukrainian Languagee Law in October 1989, Dmytro Pavlychko, a renowned poet and chairman of thee Shevchenko Ukrainian language society, proclaimed that "[if ] The Ukrainian language doess not exist, in ten years... (the) nation (will ) perish... (quoted from Arel 1994, Ch. 5, p. 6).

Ann overview of all seven conditions shows that three are indeed present, that three clearlyy do not apply, and that the presence of one is arguable in Ukraine. This indecisive outcomee makes it impossible to hypothesize about the strategy the Ukrainian central state wil ll follow in its relations with minority ethnic groups. Thus, although Ukraine is unlikelyy to adopt the accommodating strategy of consociational democracy, it cannot be saidd that this automatically induces Ukraine to opt for a strategy of domination. In fact, it iss this ambiguity that makes Ukraine a particularly interesting case.

2.32.3 The Russian Response to Nation-Building

2.3.11 Three options

Thiss research focuses on the cultural (or linguistic) responses of Russians and Russophonee Ukrainians. It identifies three options - assimilation, language integration andd language retention - and uses parental school choice (for either a Russian or Ukrainiann school for their children), the language parents raise their children in, and the

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linguisticc conduct of children themselves as indicators for these choices (for a complete operationalization,, see Chapter 7). These three options can be viewed as a scale that rangess from assimilation at one end to language retention at the other.

Onee could argue that the distinctions in linguistic responses that are introduced heree obscure the dynamic nature of these responses. In this line of reasoning, language integrationn is simply a stage in the assimilation process that members of a minority group adaptingg to a host society pass through. Laitin (1998) takes up this position, arguing that itit is more appropriate to talk about rates of assimilation than to distinguish various linguisticc reactions. He sees the linguistic conformation of Russophones as a typical S-curve-likee process with language retention as a stable initial phase and full assimilation as aa stable final phase. In his view, once people "take off' from the initial phase of language retentionn (for example, Russians or Russophone Ukrainians sending their children to Ukrainiann schools but continuing to raise them in Russian), they are inevitably on the roadd to full assimilation, if not in one generation then in the generations that follow. However,, by considering language integration as something transitional, inexorably leadingg to assimilation, one implies that this process is somehow irreversible. This, of course,, need not be the case. Changed (political) circumstances could give Russians and Russophonee Ukrainians a reason to reconsider their choices and send their children to Russian-languagee education once more, no matter how far they have "progressed on the S-curve." "

Yet,, even if Laitin's "tipping game" or "cascade" model is valid, there is still the possibilityy of large segments of the minority group never entering the cascade, i.e. clingingg to their language and culture. Moreover, among those who do enter, some may goo for assimilation right away while others may first wait to see which way the cat jumps andd then hesitatingly opt for language integration. Because of Ukraine's considerable regionall contrasts (giving rise to very different local circumstances), it is more than likely thatt all three responses occur simultaneously in contemporary Ukraine. This likelihood justifiess the use of the aforementioned distinctions and the effort to explain the pattern of responsess found. It is not denied, however, that language integration could indeed be a transitionall phase towards full assimilation.

Davidd Laitin can be credited for the fact that he is one of the few scholars (or perhapss the only one) who has investigated in depth the cultural side of the adaptation process.. Analyzing the "openness to assimilation" of the Russians in post-Soviet Estonia, Latvia,, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, he notes that the diaspora Russians have generally come too accept the nationalizing projects of the titular regimes (his observations rest on survey dataa gathered in 1994). Thus, 93.4% of all Russian respondents in his survey fully or partiallyy agreed to the statement that the titular language should be a compulsory subject inn schools; 86.9% expressed support for street signs being only in the titular language or inn both Russian and the titular language; and 91.7% were fully or partially convinced that itit is useful to learn the titular language. On the openness to assimilation index (construed fromm answers to twelve questions), Ukraine's Russians ranked third (with a mean of .51) behindd Latvia (.72), Estonia (.63), but in front of Kazakhstan (.38). Laitin proposes the fledglingg support for the nationalizing project among the Ukrainians themselves (and mostt certainly among the Russian-speaking Ukrainians) as a tentative explanation for this

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reaction.. Because of this, he argues, Ukraine's Russians are in doubt as to whether the titularr language wil l ever gain primacy and thus whether assimilation wil l pay off.

AA drawback of Laitin's research is that it ignores the regional dimension in Ukraine.233 Given the strength of this factor in explaining the political response of the Russians,, one may assume that it leaves its mark on the cultural response as well. As Bremmerr (1994) did take the regional factor into account (his survey was administered in thee cities of L'viv , Kyi'v and Simferopol) and he included some questions on language proficiencyy and attitudes in his 1992 survey, we can get a first glimpse at the regional variationn in cultural reactions. His findings show that the aforementioned pattern (with Russianss in Kyi'v taking the lead in openness to assimilation) also applies to titular languagee attitudes. For instance, Kyïvan Russians are in first place in saying they preferredd their children to study in Ukrainian schools (65% expressed full or partial agreementt to this statement); the L'vivan Russians are a close second (54%); and the Russianss in Simferopol trail far behind (9%). The Kyïvan Russians also rank first in their usee of the Ukrainian media (Ukrainian radio 70%; television 75% and newspapers 68%); theyy are followed by the Russians in L'viv (radio 64%; television 74% and newspaper 58%);; and the Russians in Simferopol report the least interest in the Ukrainian media (radioo 27%: television 33% and newspaper 17%). For reported language proficiency we seee a perfect linear correlation with the demographic weight of Russians in the local population:: in Simferopol, where Russians make up 71.6% of the population, just 16% claimm to speak Ukrainian fluently; Russians in Kyi'v (22.3% of the population) are second withh 51% claiming fluency; and the Russians in L'viv (16.1% of the population) are clearlyy first with 77%. The same pattern emerges when Ukrainian reading and writing abilitiess are studied: reading - Simferopol 27%, Kyi'v 75% and L'viv 87%; writing -Simferopoll 11%, Kyiv 43% and L'viv 64%.

2.3.22 Independent variables

Bremmer,, Kolstoe and Laitin list a multitude of factors that they consider influential in shapingg the options open to the diaspora Russians. Of these many determinants, I considerr the following to play an important role in influencing their particular linguistic response:: (1) ethnic proportion; (2) ethnic schism; (3) ethnically mixed marriages; (4) nationall and local policy.24

233 Laitin's Ukrainian data are based on samples from the cities of Kyi'v and Donets'k. Yet, instead of analyzingg the data of these cities separately, he aggregates the data to the national level to reflect the group off Ukraine's Russians as a whole (at least this is how the reader can interpret it). 244 Being school pupils, the respondents in this survey could only be asked simple and factual questions.

Therefore,, the more complicated factors put forward by Laitin, who also focused specifically on the linguisticc response of the Russians, could not be addressed.

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EthnicEthnic proportion and selection of cases

Byy far the most important feature of Ukraine's regional divisions is the uneven spread of thee Russians and Russophone Ukrainians over Ukraine's territory. As the introduction has amplyy demonstrated, the share of both groups in the local population varies from a tiny minorityy in the western region to a majority in the eastern and southern regions. It could bee expected that the more numerous the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians are in a certainn area relative to Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the greater the chance that they wil ll opt for language retention. The logic behind this proposition is clear: the larger the sharee of both groups in the local population, the stronger the position of the Russian languagee vis-a-vis the Ukrainian language. This in turn will reduce the incentive to assimilatee for both groups. To test this hypothesis I selected the cases (cities) for the surveyy study in a manner that provided for nearly maximum variance on the ethnic proportionn agent (see Table 2.1).25 They are:

1.. L'viv (west) - small Russian minority; very small Russophone Ukrainian minority; largee Ukrainian-speaking majority;

2.. Kyïv (center) - medium size Russian minority; small Russophone Ukrainian minority; smalll Ukrainian-speaking majority;

3.. Odesa (south) - large Russian minority; medium size Russophone Ukrainian minority; largee Ukrainian-speaking minority; several small groups of other nationalities;

4.. Donets'k (east) - small Russian majority; medium size Russophone Ukrainian minority;; medium size Ukrainian-speaking minority.

Tablee 2.1 Ethno-linguistic Composition of four Oblast Centers in 1989

L'viv v Kyïv v Odesa a Donets'k k

Totall number off inhabitants (inn thousands)

781 1 2,572 2 1,115 5 1,133 3

Ukrainian--speaking g Ukrainians* * (percentage) )

76.6 6 57.0 0 24.4 4 17.3 3

Russophone e Ukrainians* * (percentage) )

2.5 5 15.4 4 24.5 5 22.1 1

Russians s (percentage) )

16.1 1 20.9 9 39.4 4 53.6 6

Other r nationalities s (percentage) )

4.8 8 6.7 7

11.7 7 7.0 0

Source:: Dominique Arel (1994) *Thee data on language refer to census data on mother tongue

'' A selection of cases including a Crimean city would ensure a maximum variance, but since one of our researchh criteria - the availability of Ukrainian schools - was almost absent (there is only one Ukrainian schooll on the entire peninsula), none of The Crimean cities qualified. Thee idea of a selection of cases that ensures a maximum variance on (one of) the independent variables wass taken from Bremmer. His case selection included L'viv, Kyïv and Simferopol. The use of the term "cases"" to refer to the selected cities is actually inappropriate since it is the respondents in the survey who aree the real cases here. A selected city is no more than a collection of case properties in this research.

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Eachh of these cities can be said to be typical of the region listed in parentheses. As such, thee cities do not only vary in ethnic proportion, but also in the date of incorporation into thee Russian/Soviet Empire (see Introduction) and in the other variables this section will discuss. .

Followingg the rationale of the ethnic proportion hypothesis, we would expect the Russianss and Russophone Ukrainians to (1) assimilate in L'viv ; (2) opt for language integrationn in Kyi'v; and (3) retain their language in Donets'k and Odesa, with those in Odesaa showing rates slightly more favorable to language integration.

Ann important caveat that has to be made here is that the census data in Table 2.1, whichh refer to mother tongue, are a poor indicator of the actual use of Russian (or Ukrainian).. As Arel (1995b) argues, one's mother tongue could well have been conceived ass the language that one first learned as a child, which is not necessarily the language one knowss best. Indeed, measuring the linguistic conduct of respondents by means of an indicatorr called "language of preference," which refers to the language a respondent actuallyy preferred to use in a survey interview, the Kyi'v International Institute of Sociologyy (KTIS) found large differences with the census data (ibid. p. 169). Compared to thee latter, the percentage of Russian speakers jumps from 57.9% to 85.4% in the east, fromm 59.2% to 88.7% in the south, from 42.5% to 76.4% in Kyïv, and from 16.6% to 50.4%% in the center-east (which comprises the Left Bank oblasts of Chernihiv, Poltava andd Sumy). In the western oblasts and in those of Right Bank central Ukraine, on the otherr hand, the KUS language data almost match those of the census.26 Thus, in all but the latterr two regions, the census data greatly underestimated the actual use of Russian.

Thiss conclusion is corroborated by a casual observation of the language climate in thee four cities of this research. As I noticed on my fieldwork trips, not a word of Ukrainiann could be heard on the streets and in the shops and offices of Donets'k and Odesa.. Although employees produced documents in Ukrainian and teachers gave lectures inn Ukrainian in these cities, in conversations with colleagues and students they immediatelyy switched to Russian. Even in Kyïv with its large Ukrainian majority, Russianss had apparently left their mark on the language regime. Very rarely could the authorr hear Ukrainian being spoken in the center of town, and only in the suburban marketplacess did he observe it more often. L'viv turned out to be the only place where Ukrainiann was found to dominate the public sphere, although even there the author regularlyy heard people conversing in Russian in the streets (especially in the center of town).. Obviously, the pervasive use of Russian in Donets'k and Odesa (and to a large extentt in Kyïv as well) provides the local Russians and Russophone Ukrainians with littl e incentivee to adopt Ukrainian as their first language.

266 Arel listed data on Ukrainian as mother tongue and Ukrainian as language of preference. For the sake of convenience,, we simply took the inverse of these percentages to refer to Russian as mother tongue and languagee of preference. Our data thus have the small bias of overlooking those who reported a third languagee as mother tongue or had a third language as language of preference. The KIIS data were gathered inn 1994.

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EthnicEthnic schism

Introducedd by Bremmer (1994), the concept of ethnic schism refers to cultural differences betweenn ethnic groups, as expressed by markers such as race, religion, language and history.. One may assume that the more a minority group differs on these markers from thee dominant group, the tighter it will cling to its language. Bremmer expects "a high tendencyy throughout Ukraine of Russian integration" as Russians and Ukrainians "are raciallyy indistinguishable; their languages are distinct but mutually comprehensible; their culturess and histories are closely intertwined; and their religious affiliations, where applicable,, are both Christian in orientation" {ibid, p. 264). Insofar as data on attitudes towardss ethnic others can tell us something about the depth of cultural cleavages, Bremmer'ss observation of a small cultural divide is supported by survey data. Golovakha etet al. (1994), for instance, found that Russians and Ukrainians expressed high rates of acceptancee towards each other on the Bogardus scale of national intolerance. Ukrainians rankedd Russians highest of all nationalities in answer to the question of whether they wouldd be prepared to marry a person of another nationality. Russians, in their tum, even placedd Ukrainians in first place, ahead of fellow Russians.27

Althoughh being correct for eastern, southern and central Ukraine, Bremmer's claimm of low ethnic schism does not adequately describe the cultural conditions in the westernn part of Ukraine. In this region, religious differences between Russians and Ukrainianss - western Ukrainians tend to be Uniate Catholics, whereas Russians and all otherr Ukrainians are mostly Orthodox - are compounded by diverging histories.28 As explainedd in the introduction, western Ukraine was only incorporated into the Soviet Unionn in 1939, after having been part of Poland for centuries (until its partition at the end off the 18th century), the Austro Hungarian Empire (until the end of World War I), and againn Poland (in the interwar period).29 By contrast, the rest of Ukraine has been part of thee Russian Empire for 200 years or more. An important consequence of these diverging histories,, it was argued, is that western Ukrainians, under relatively liberal Austrian rule, developedd a much stronger national consciousness than their brethren in the rest of the country.. Considering Russians as the nation imposing Soviet rule on other nations, the nationalismm of western Ukrainians, like that of the Baltic nations, is distinctly anti-Russiann in character.30 This lingering anti-Russian sentiment surfaces in ethnic stereotypes.. Surprisingly, it is Bremmer (1994) himself who shows with his survey data thatt the Ukrainians in L'viv stand out in their disapproval ratings towards Russians, in comparisonn to Ukrainians in Kyiv and Simferopol (with a full 45.7% of L'viv Ukrainians attributingg negative character traits to Russians). Interestingly, among the Russians in the

277 Their survey data stem from a nationwide representative public opinion poll conducted by the Ukrainian Institutee of Sociology in April 1992. 288 In a note, Bremmer acknowledges the religious difference but trivializes it. He does not go into the divergentt histories. 299 From the end of the 18th century to the end of World War I, the western oblasts of Rivne and Volyn were partt of Czarist Russia. In the interwar years, the Transcarpathian oblast belonged to Czechoslovakia, and thee Chernivtsi oblast to Romania. 300 Thus, it is no coincidence that the Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas fighting the Soviet forces in and after Worldd War II used western Ukraine as their home base.

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threee cities, the Russians in L'viv are also the most critical of Ukrainians (with a 31.1% otherr disapproval rating; the figure for Kyïv Russians being 24.9% and for Simferopol Russianss 28.4%). Somehow, Bremmer failed to notice that the strong mutual ethnic stereotypingg in L'viv reflects a possibly deeply felt cultural cleavage between Ukrainians andd Russians. In any case, thee anti-Russian sentiment (and concomitant stereotyping) wil l mostt likely make the Russians, who as post-war immigrants helped secure Soviet power, feell like unwelcome members of the local community, which in turn can be expected to negativelyy affect their willingness to assimilate.

Too summarize, according to the logic of ethnic schism, we would expect the Russianss in Donets'k, Odesa and Kyïv to assimilate, and the Russians in L'viv to either optt for linguistic integration or linguistic retention. Interestingly, this contradicts the predictionn of the ethnic proportion thesis.

Naturally,, it seems inappropriate to talk about ethnic schism between Russophone Ukrainianss and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians as members of both groups belong to the titularr group. Yet, within the titular group people may still perceive large cultural differences.. Arel (1995b, p. 159), for instance, submits that Ukrainian nationalists increasinglyy view Russophone Ukrainians as people "who like to defer to and be dominatedd by the 'elder brother,' the Great Russians," and thus as people who constitute aa threat to Ukrainian state security. The Russophone Ukrainians, in their turn, are likely to seee Ukrainian nationalists as dangerous radicals fully supporting a forceful ukrainianizationn campaign. In fact, because of tensions within the titular group, Russophonee Ukrainians may find themselves being grouped together with Russians. Describingg various family histories, Arel (1996, p. 79) recounts how a Russophone Ukrainiann family who was living temporarily in western Ukraine was stereotyped as "Moskaly,"" a term of abuse for Russians meaning "occupiers." The repeated calling of namess by schoolmates, he goes on to say, even led to a change of school for the family's children.. Similarly, Kyïvan Ukrainians, many of whom are Russian-speaking, tend to feel muchh closer to Ukrainian Russians than to western Ukrainians, he argues. Thus, ethnic schismm may be as relevant for Russophone Ukrainians as for Russians, predicting the samee pattern of responses for the former as for the latter.

EthnicallyEthnically mixed marriages

Itt could be anticipated that Russians in mixed marriages would have a stronger propensity too assimilate than Russians in purely Russian couples.31 This variable is very relevant for Ukrainee as the Russians in this successor state had one of the highest rates of mixed marriagee in comparison to other former Union republics in late Soviet times: 57.2% of Russiann men and 56.7% of Russian women married Ukrainians or other nationalities in 1988;; only in Belarus and Moldova did Russians have a higher proportion of mixed

Obviously,, the variable of ethnically mixed marriages could also be conceived of as referring to marriagess between members of different language groups. In this concept, a marriage between a Russian-speakingg Ukrainian and a Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian would constitute a 'mixed marriage.' This research willl not examine linguistically defined mixed marriages as our survey data are not specific enough to distinguishh this type of marriage.

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marriages.. Moreover, of all the titular nationalities in their own republics, Ukrainians had thee highest relative number of mixed marriages: 20.9% for men and 22.4% for women in thee Ukrainian SSR (Kaiser 1994).

Inn addition, Pirie (1996) found that within Ukraine the phenomenon of mixed familiess (i.e. the mother and father are of different nationalities) is much more prevalent inn the east and south than in the west and center. Thus, the eastern oblast of Donets'k had thee highest number of mixed families (41.7% of all marriages) in 1989, and the western oblastt of Ivano Frankivs'k had one of the lowest (less than 8% of all marriages). Consequently,, one is tempted to hypothesize that Russians in areas with the highest percentagess of mixed families (i.e. the south and east) wil l show the strongest propensity too assimilate. However, this would be jumping to conclusions since it is precisely in these areass that Russians make up the largest segments of the population. In fact, if one takes thee number of Russians in mixed families as a proportion of the total number of Russians inn a given area, the west and central regions will show the highest rates of Russians in mixedd families.32 This would then lead us to the opposite conclusion: following the mixedd marriages hypothesis, the Russians in L'viv would be expected to assimilate the mostt and the Russians in Donets'k the least; those in Kyïv and in Odesa are assumed to takee the middle positions with the former more likely to assimilate than the latter.

NationalNational and local policy

Thee previous chapter has already pointed out that many scholars have come to realise the independentt role of state policy in framing the response of minority ethnic groups. This responsee has mostly been conceived in a political fashion, i.e. attention tends to focus on ethnicc groups engaging in collective protest to secure certain group rights. The theory on thee interrelationship between state policy and the political mobilization of ethnic minoritiess is instructive for the cultural response of ethnic groups as well, which is the focuss of this study. The following four paragraphs therefore briefly discuss this body of theory. .

Inn line with Hennayake's argument, Chinn and Kaiser (1996, p. 28-33) contend thatt state policy is likely to elicit a reactive nationalism among non-dominant ethnic groups,, expressing itself in Bremmer's responses of voice or exit (see Section 1.3) if it is "overt"" and "exclusionary" on behalf of the dominant ethnic group (i.e. if the dominant ethnicc group openly seeks to monopolize state power). The logic behind this so-called "interactivee nationalism" argument is that the more exclusionary state policy is, the more difficultiess non-dominant ethnic groups will have in identifying with the state, perceiving itit instead to display a hostile attitude to their own rights and interests. With state power perceivedd to be antipathetic, or at best indifferent, to the needs and demands of minority ethnicc groups, these groups wil l seek alternative ways to protect and further their group interests.. Attempts are made to set up 'one's own' institutions (schools, unions, churches, culturall societies) and establish political parties on an ethnic basis. If the state in response embarkss on a policy of repression, forbidding and dismantling ethnic institutions and

Ibid.Ibid. p. 1086. The figure on this page is not clear enough to discern the actual percentages.

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parties,, minority ethnic groups may feel forced to go underground and start a terrorist/guerrillaa war.

Chinnn and Kaiser argue that reactive nationalism is likely to be particularly strong amongg Russians in the Soviet successor states (and thus among the Russians of Ukraine) ass these Russians have experienced a dramatic loss of status. Their argument is that, beingg the dominant nation during Soviet times in cultural, political and economic realms, Russianss enjoyed a high status, which gave them high expectations and the concomitant capabilitiess to realise these expectations. Yet, after independence "Russian expectations havee remained relatively high but their capabilities have been declining - in some places precipitouslyy [due to discriminatory state policies favoring the dominant or titular ethnic group]"" (ibid. p. 27). It is claimed that, as a consequence, Russians have developed a sensee of relative deprivation, which in tum has stimulated Russian reactive nationalism. Thee faster the implementation of discriminatory (or exclusionary) state practices, the greaterr this feeling of relative deprivation is said to be, and thus the greater the potential forr a strong reactive nationalism to erupt among Russians. In this way, the relative deprivationdeprivation argument serves as an augmentation and refinement of the interactive nationalismnationalism approach, as it stipulates when and under exactly what conditions exclusionaryy state policy can be expected to spark reactive nationalism among ethnic groups. .

However,, many authors have pointed out that, paradoxically, accommodating strategiess may also stimulate voice and exit as group responses. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972)) for instance argue that a democratic polity, which itself can be considered an accommodatingg arrangement, stimulates the formation of political parties along ethnic lines,, and in this way leads to a proliferation of ethnic demands. Similarly, Smith and Wilsonn (1997), who discuss the potential for political mobilization of Russians in eastern Ukrainee and northeast Estonia, feel that collective action among non-dominant ethnic groupss is greatly influenced by the opportunity structure of the state. If this structure is relativelyy open (i.e. if all the state's inhabitants enjoy state citizenship and voting rights andd if there are no restrictions on office-holding or party/institution formation by memberss of minority ethnic groups), collective action wil l be greatly facilitated. In addition,, as stated in the introduction, a number of authors have argued that some of the accommodatingg aspects of the Soviet nationalities policy (such as the stimulation of minorityy languages and the formation of Union republics) unintentionally contributed to thee political mobilization of non-dominant ethnic groups or nations in the late 1980s.

Differencess of opinion on the effects of particular state policy are a reflection of thee academic debate on grievance and opportunity as factors sparking group mobilization. Thosee who view grievance to be the prime cause argue that it is feelings of indignation, frustrationn and relative deprivation that incite people to collective action (e.g., Gurr, 1970;; 1993). It is proposed that factors that influence the success of collective action, suchh as the opportunity structure provided by the state, are only of secondary importance sincee it is primarily on the grounds of strong emotions that people mobilize and not on thee basis of rational calculation. In contrast, 'opportunists' claim that it is rational calculationn that lies at the basis of collective action: before people organize in groups they assesss the costs and benefits and the prospect of success of collective action. Only if prospectss look good and benefits are seen to outweigh the costs do people mobilize in

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groups.. It logically follows that factors facilitating and obstructing collective action are accordedd prime causal value (Smith and Wilson, 1997).ï3 Thus, whereas for grievance theoristss repressive state policy forbidding minority ethnic groups from setting up schools,, societies and political parties would constitute a major source of discontent encouragingg people to engage in collective protest, for opportunity theorists it would meann an important obstacle for collective action since repressive policy dramatically increasess the costs of group mobilization (people can end up in jail for being involved in whatt the authorities would label 'illegal activities that threaten the security of the state'). Onn the other hand, accommodating state strategies are seen by grievance theorists as a wayy of dissolving feelings of indignation and thus as a way of removing incentives for groupp mobilization. For opportunity proponents, however, they constitute arrangements thatt facilitate collective action in that they increase its benefits and the chances of a successfull outcome.

Intuitively,, one would expect assimilation to strongly correlate with Bremmer's politicall response of integration, and likewise presume language integration and languagelanguage retention to be connected to voice and exit. Chapter Seven examines whether thee political and cultural dimensions of the adjustment process of the Russian-speaking populationn are indeed closely related. If we for the moment assume this correlation to exist,, then the aforementioned theoretical conjectures translate to our framework of linguisticc responses in the following way. The grievance model would expect that the moree exclusionary state policy becomes, the tighter Russians and Russophone Ukrainians wouldd hold on to their language and culture. Conversely, the opportunity interpretation wouldd predict both groups to increasingly see no other choice but to linguistically integratee or assimilate, the more restrictive state policy grows.

Sincee this research examines and compares the responses of the Russians and Russophonee Ukrainians in four cities within one country, both national and local policy needd to be analyzed. The relevance of the latter is underlined by the fact that a clear divisionn of powers between central and local levels of government has not yet crystallized inn a young state like Ukraine. Indeed, Nordberg (1998) noted that the adoption of the constitutionn in June 1996 did not bring clarity on this issue. Administrative uncertainties andd obscurities in the immediate post-independence years have therefore possibly led to widelyy diverging local state practices. Chapter Six is dedicated to the impact of these practicess on the nation-building process. The following three chapters discuss aspects of centrall policy.

Smithh and Wilson draw upon the works of Tarrow (1994) and other authors who have developed ideas andd theories on the rise of 'new social movements' in the West in the 1960s (i.e. ethnic, regional, environmentall and feminist groups).

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33 NATION-BUILDIN G IN EDUCATIO N

Thee central theme of this chapter is nation-building policy in education. Both Soviet and contemporaryy policy is discussed, and both linguistic and structural aspects are highlighted.. The chapter opens with a review of educational policy in the Czarist and Soviett times to familiarize ourselves with Ukraine's point of departure at the onset of Glasnost.. To compare Ukraine to other Soviet republics, attention is paid to the history of educationn in the Baltic provinces and in Central Asia. The next section offers a detailed accountt of educational policy in Ukraine since 1989, when the Ukrainian central leadershipp began to follow its own course independent from Moscow. This account, whichh focuses on language regulations, makes small excursions into other policy areas as welll in order to arrive at an appreciation of the state's overall nation-building (i.e. not onlyy that in the sphere of education). The third section briefly discusses the possible motivess of the architects of contemporary language policy. The fourth section is dedicated too the changes in the structure of the educational system, and is followed by a section on thee possibilities for private education. Section 3.6 determines the character of the overall nation-buildingg project (accommodating or exclusionary) and evaluates the applicability off the explanatory models of the previous chapter. The chapter ends with a concise evaluationn of the changes in educational policy.

3.13.1 Education in Ukraine during Czarist and Soviet Rule

Ass noted in the introduction, Czarist policy was meant to deny the existence of Ukrainian ass a separate language and the Ukrainian people as a distinct nation. This policy found its inceptionn in Alexander I's educational reform law of 1804, which permitted the teaching off the non-Russian languages of the Empire but did not mention Ukrainian as one of them (Krawchenko,, 1985). As a consequence, Ukrainian was banned from schools both as a languagee of instruction and as a subject. However, primary schools functioning in local languagess were allowed and established in the Baltic provinces, the Caucasuses and Centrall Asia (Arel, 1994). In the 1890s, fearing that the Baltic Germans would use local languagee instruction as a covert means of germanizing the local peasant population, the Russiann authorities imposed Russian in the Baltics as the sole language in all state spheres,, including schools. Yet, in contrast to Ukraine, this decision was lifted after the 19055 Revolution. Of the eight universities, four functioned in Russian (Kazan, Kharkov, Moscoww and St. Petersburg), two in Polish (Vilnius and Warsaw; the former was transferredd to Kyi'v in 1834 where it was russified), one in German (Tartu, in Estonia) and onee in Swedish (Helsinki) (Thaden, 1981).

Inn addition to the generally held view among Russian elites that Ukrainians as Malo-Russianss were truly part of the Russian nation, another reason why Czarist policy wass so insistent in its rejection of anything Ukrainian was that Russian rulers feared a possiblee polonizing effect by yielding to Ukrainian cultural demands. In fact, the Polish insurrectionn of 1863, in which the Poles voiced claims to the Ukrainian lands formerly underr the Polish crown, clearly triggered the 'Valuev Circular', which outlawed the use off educational materials in Ukrainian (Arel, 1994; Solchanyk, 1985). This instruction was

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followedd several years later in 1876 by the Ems Ukaz, which reiterated the ban on teachingg school subjects in Ukrainian. Both decrees not only left their mark on education, butt also forbade Ukrainian books and newspapers, and public cultural events performed inn Ukrainian.

Arell (1994, Ch. 2, p. 5) points out that the ethnic mobilization of Ukrainians was greatlyy hampered by discriminatory Czarist policies, in comparison to the situation of the Balticc peoples:

Thee absence of Ukrainian schools most often meant simply no school at all for the Ukrainiann peasantry, and the result generally was that Ukrainians had lower literacy ratess than Russians. This impeded the development of a national intelligensia, and taxedd the capacity of this incipient intelligentsia to reach out through the printed wordd to the largely illiterate peasantry. Ukrainian historians are thus prone to accusingg the Czarist state of deliberately preventing a renaissance of Ukrainian ethnicc consciousness, at a time when nationalism, as a tool of collective identity, wass on the rise throughout central Europe, the Balkans and the Russian borderlands.

Nonetheless,, coming from across the border in Galicia, where the Austrian authorities allowedd the use of minority languages in schools, newspapers and churches, the Ukrainiann national idea did manage to penetrate certain small sectors of the population in Russian-heldd Ukraine on the eve of World War I.

Havingg emerged from the devastating civil war as the ultimate victors, the Bolshevikss radically broke with the russification of the Czarist era and introduced a generall nationality policy which intended to make the non-Russian languages and peoples equall in status to Russian and the Russians. There were three reasons for this dramatic shiftt in the treatment of non-Russians. First, still feeling uncertain about the strength and stabilityy of their recently established state, the Bolsheviks were eager to secure the loyalty off the non-Russian peoples, who having gone through World War I, the October Revolutionn and the civil war and being encouraged by the successful independence strugglee of the Baltic peoples had increasingly become infected with the nationalist ideology.. Second, by showing the colonial peoples how the Soviet Union treated its nationall minorities, the Bolshevists hoped to incite these peoples to rise up against their coloniall masters and spread the Proletarian Revolution (Shevelov, 1989). Lastly, to sociallyy mobilize the non-Russian peasant masses and implant the Bolshevik ideology it wass deemed imperative to approach them in their native language (Arel, 1994).

Thee nationality policy had three dimensions. In the political sphere the Bolsheviks grantedd the larger groups of non-Russian peoples living in the border areas their own so-calledd 'Union Republics'. Although this made the Soviet Union officially a federal state, inn practice real power was still in the hands of the centralized Communist Party, which significantlyy constrained the actual policy freedom of the republics. Socially nationality policyy meant staffing the republican party and state organs, which had previously been dominatedd by Russians, with titulars, whereby the Bolsheviks sought to create loyal non-Russiann cadres. The cultural element of nationality policy, called Korenizatsiia (going to nationall roots), aimed to stimulate the use of non-Russian languages by providing educationn and media in the titular language, making its use compulsory in republic

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administrationn and setting language requirements for jobs in the state and party apparatus (ibid). (ibid).

Althoughh Korenizatsiia was officially introduced in 1923, the policy only began to bee implemented in Ukraine (where it was called Ukrainizatsiia) in 1925 following personnell changes at the top of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). The Education Lawss of 1923 and 1924 were the embodiment of this policy. They stipulated that (1) wheree Ukrainians predominated, school pupils were to be instructed in Ukrainian (only wheree national minorities formed a compact group were they guaranteed education in theirr native tongue), and that (2) both Ukrainian and Russian be made compulsory subjectss in all schools, regardless of the language of instruction.

Aidedd by these laws, the ukrainianization of elementary education was a great successs (Krawchenko, 1985). Thus, despite dire shortages of Ukrainian language teachers andd Ukrainian textbooks, by 1927 already 94% of Ukrainian schoolchildren and 76% of alll pupils were enrolled in Ukrainian language schools. In the Russian-dominated cities thee latter figure stood at 42% (this figure does not include the pupils instructed in Ukrainiann in mixed schools). Particularly telling is the example of the heavily Russophonee Donbass region where in 1923 there was only one Ukrainian-language schooll in the urban areas, and where by 1929 already half of all children were receiving Ukrainian-languagee instruction (ibid.). In 1927 a quarter of Russian and Jewish children weree enrolled in Ukrainian classes by their parents, pressed as these parents were by languagee requirements for state employment and the 1927 decree that established Ukrainian-languagee entrance exams for admission to higher education. According to Krawchenko,, the large-scale introduction of Ukrainian-language schools greatly reduced illiteracyy among the Ukrainian peasant masses: in just 6 years, from 1920 to 1926, literacyy rates of Ukrainians jumped from 24 to 42 percent (ibid.).

Inn higher education ukrainianization proceeded more slowly due to firm resistance fromm the almost completely Russian or russified body of university lecturers. Yet, by the endd of the decade, 27.4% of students were already following lectures in Ukrainian institutions,, 53.6% in bilingual ones (with some courses in Ukrainian and some in Russian),, 8.4% in Russian institutions and 10.6% in institutions teaching in other minorityy languages. Still, because it inherited a well-entrenched system of Russian-languagee higher education from the Czarist era, Soviet Ukraine compared unfavorably in termss of titular language instruction to Armenia, Georgia and Tatarstan, where institutionss of higher education (vuzy) were established that functioned in the titular languagee (Arel, 1994).

Althoughh ukrainianization proved to be highly successful in the media (90% of all newspaperss sold were Ukrainian in 1933, up from virtually zero in 1922), it failed to achievee its goals in the party and state organs, where Ukrainian never held the same status ass Russian. Thus, despite numerous language decrees and the use of Ukrainian as a languagee of documents in two-thirds of state institutions as early as 1926, and in close to halff of industrial enterprises in 1929, state employees rarely used to talk to each other in thee language, especially in the cities of the south and east. Moreover, only a third of the Communistt Party members stated that Ukrainian was their mother language in the late 1920s,, even though a majority of party members were Ukrainian (ibid.). Most telling is a commentt by Shevelov (1989, p. 126): "The stigma attached to the use of Ukrainian in

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largee cities did not dissipate; instead it acquired new dimensions. Well-educated people weree to speak Ukrainian in public when prescribed, but not spontaneously. Those who wantedd to succeed were expected to pass examinations in Ukrainian, but not to use it any moree than required." Yet, despite its failure in administration (the Russian-dominated partyy and state bureaucracy saw ukrainianization as something being forced upon them), ukrainianizationn was a blessing for the Ukrainian language as it standardized the language'ss grammar, spelling and vocabulary (an orthographic commission was set up to doo so in the mid-1920s) and greatly stimulated its use.

Stalin'ss rise to absolute power at the beginning of the 1930s signaled the end of thee Bolsheviks' relatively liberal nationality policy. Subordinating the aim of safeguardingg the loyalty of non-Russian citizens to that of modernizing the state (Arel 1994),, he launched an anti-Korenizatsiia campaign which culminated in the relentless persecutionn of all those who had promoted it in the non-Russian republics. In Ukraine this ledd to massive purges of Ukrainian state and party officials, one of the first victims being Skrypnykk who, as head of the Commissariat of Education, had been the architect of ukrainianizationn from 1925 to 1933.

Inn school education a renewed emphasis on Russian was clearly embodied in a 19388 decree which made Russian a compulsory subject from the second class onwards, greatlyy increased the number of hours for this subject, and introduced courses in Russian culturee and literature in all schools (Krawchenko, 1985). At the same time the content of Ukrainiann literature and history courses was thoroughly revised and in secondary schools thee latter ceased to be taught at all. The proportion of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian schools felll from 88.5% in 1933 to 79% in 1940.

Thee change in central policy was particularly felt in higher education because in 19366 the control over institutions of higher learning was taken away from the Commissariatss of Education in the various republics and given to the newly created Committeee for Higher Education in Moscow, which was transformed in the Ministry of Higherr Education in 1946 (ibid). In Ukraine many vuzy were rerussified. According to Krawchenkoo (1985, p. 138), no specific order was needed to persuade university teachers too switch to Russian: "Given the prevailing hysteria against 'nationalist counter-revolution'' and 'linguistic wrecking', many lecturers undoubtedly followed the example off the Luhansk pedagogical staff, who interpreted the new policies introduced in 1933-4 too mean that Russian was to be used as the medium of instruction."

Unlikee the Bolsheviks in Soviet Ukraine, the Poles, who had been granted most of formerr Austro-Hungarian Ukraine after World War I, sought to discourage expressions of aa separate Ukrainian nationhood from the onset. Due to bureaucratic obstacles to opening andd maintaining Ukrainian schools and hostile local administrations, which were entirely inn Polish hands, the number of Ukrainian elementary schools declined from 2,510 (or 41%% of all elementary schools) in Galicia alone to 804 for Poland as a whole (Shevelov, 1989).. In addition to the 10 state and 35 private Ukrainian high schools (himnaziji and liceji),liceji), only one institution of higher education was allowed to function in Ukrainian, the Greekk Catholic Theological Academy in L'viv , founded in 1928. However, Shevelov concedess that the Polish state did grant its Ukrainian subjects a rudimentary level of rightsrights and liberties: Ukrainian political parties were permitted (and were in fact elected in variouss legislative bodies) and the Ukrainian press was not subject to preliminary

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censorship.. In fact, he argues that "The peculiar combination of suppression with certain liberties,, of legal regulations with total arbitrariness of some officials, had an impact on thee status of the Ukrainian language and on the psychology of its speakers in Polish Ukraine.. Not only was the Ukrainian language a vehicle of communication among farmers,, clergy, and intellectuals; it was also a means of national self-assertion and defiancee against the existing political regime (ibid. p. 183)." Instead of assimilating the Galiciann Ukrainians to the Polish language and culture, the Polish regime thus, unintentionally,, only radicalized Ukrainian national sentiment, which had already permeatedd the Galicians at the beginning of Polish rule.

Afterr World War n when the western Ukrainian lands were finally united with Soviett Ukraine, centralization and russification policies continued, despite the temporary relaxationn of central control during the Khrushchev era. In fact, in 1959 it was Krushchev himselff who accelerated russification by introducing a controversial law that granted parentss the right to choose the language of instruction for their offspring. As a result, the Bolsheviks'' policy of having the language of instruction in schools determined by the nationall composition of the local population was abandoned (Arel, 1994). Given that in Ukrainee many vuzy functioned exclusively in Russian, the law had the intended effect of encouragingg Ukrainian parents to send their children to Russian-language schools. As Chapterr Five will discuss in more detail, the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils declinedd from 74% in 1956 to 47.5% in 1988 (and the percentage of Russian-instructed pupilss increased, accordingly). It was this creeping russification of the school network thatt would anger many nationally conscious Ukrainians in the Glasnost years. In the Caucasusess and the Baltic republics, in contrast, where titular-language higher education wass retained, the law could not change the tendency of titulars to enroll their children in native-languagee schools (ibid).

Anotherr much-criticized political act of the late 1950s was the Kremlin's move to pressurizee individual republics into making the titular language an optional subject in Russiann schools, whilst retaining the compulsory status of Russian language and literature forr titular schools (Krawchenko, 1985; Solchanyk, 1985; Bakalo, Pliushch and Struminsky,, 1984). In addition to seeing this as a prime example of russification, for manyy it also signaled creeping centralization, a process which in the mid-1960s was formalizedd with the creation of a ministry of education at the Union level. This ministry tookk over many of the powers of the republican ministries, turning them de facto into branchh offices, and standardized the curricula of elementary and secondary schools throughoutt the Soviet Union (Bilinsky, 1968). In the 1970s it took further steps to expand andd improve the teaching of Russian in titular schools, among other things by paying teacherss of Russian fifteen percent more than the salary earned by titular language teacherss (Arel, 1994).

Inn higher education the trend that was set in the late 1930s was continued after the war,, notwithstanding the restoration of the republican Ministry of Education in Kyïv in 1955.. Russian language and literature, for instance, became compulsory vuz entrance exams.344 Furthermore, the entrance exams for special subjects, such as physics, were also heldd in Russian. For many, the 1954 measure which dropped Ukrainian as a compulsory

VuzVuz is singular and \uzy is plural for institutions of higher education.

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entrancee requirement but kept up Russian signaled a further degrading of the Ukrainian languagee (Krawchenko 1985). Moreover, as in the school system, centralization set in when,, in 1966, the USSR Council of Ministers decreed that a large number of vuzy in the republicss should be brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Higher Education in Moscoww (Bilinsky, 1968). In Ukraine this reduced the number of vuzy subordinated to the republicann ministry in Kyïv to a mere 50 out of 132 vuzy in total. Centralization was even moree pronounced in post-graduate education: only with Moscow's permission could post-graduatee programs be set up and as of 1975 all dissertations, including those discussing non-Russiann languages or cultures, had to be written in Russian (Krawchenko, 1985; Arel,, 1994).

Inn the post-war years, instead of catching up with the proportion of Ukrainians in thee republic's population (1959 census data show that Ukrainians make up 76.8%, Russianss 16.9% and Jews 2% of Ukraine's population), the percentage of Ukrainians in thee student population actually declined from 63.8% in the 1955-6 academic year to 59.9%% in 1970-1. According to Krawchenko (1985), this was a direct consequence of the russificationn policies which put Ukrainians at a natural disadvantage vis-a-vis Russians in thee struggle for vwz-entrance. Yet, he admits that the increased competition for vwz-places wass another important factor as it left the Ukrainians, because of their low social origins (mostt of them had a working class or collective farm background), with insufficient meanss and skills to vie with the Russians and Jews, who disproportionately came from an intelligentsiaa or middle-class milieu.

3.23.2 Education in Ukraine since Glasnost

3.2.11 The Glasnost years

Inn the 1980s, Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika gave ordinary citizens and opposition groupss previously in hiding an unprecedented opportunity to openly criticize the Communistt Party. The people of the Baltic republics were among the first to take advantagee of the changing political climate in the center by founding civic forums, which quicklyy turned into mass nationalist movements seeking to restore state independence for thee Baltic republic in question. The communist leadership in these countries felt compelledd to meet the demands of these groups and to listen to popular sentiment, fearing otherwisee being totally wiped out in the March 1990 elections, in which, for the first time, non-partyy candidates were allowed to stand for office. In Ukraine, the opposition movement,, Rukh, found it much more difficult to mobilize the titular population on the nationall issue as a large part of its potential following had been assimilated into the Russiann language. As Furtado and Hechter (1992, p. 185) argue: "The more ...[Rukh] soughtt to exalt the Ukrainian language, culture and identity, the more it risked alienating aa significant element of its own national constituency." Moreover, the ruling officials of thee CPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) were unwilling to compromise with Rukh as that wouldd have harmed their prospects of being promoted to positions within the central party apparatus.. The indigenous party elite of the Baltic republics, on the other hand, lacked

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thiss incentive to ignore local nationalist demands because the central party organs only rarelyy allowed non-Slavs to join their ranks (ibid).

Inn Ukraine the political landscape also started changing after the retirement of the conservativee First Secretary of the CPU Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi in September 1989. In fact,, no sooner than a month later the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the "Law on Languagess in the Ukrainian SSR," which made Ukrainian the sole state language. Apparently,, the vested political elite felt threatened to some extent by the opposition movement,, as the law, according to Arel (1995a, p. 599), "was a defensive reaction of the communistt old guard, which could no longer justify the status quo, since eight Soviet republicss had enacted Language Laws earlier in that fateful year." The Language Law introducedd a whole series of provisions intending to curb russification and make Ukrainiann the dominant language in all spheres of public life. As such, it meant a clear breakk with the past. Yet, the lawmakers were careful not to alarm the Russian speakers of thee south and east by issuing strict language regulations, judging from the great number of exceptionss granting Russian a continued, albeit reduced, role in public life. As an importantt basic law, the law on languages has remained in force to the present day withoutt amendments.

Forr education the law established the following regulations (VVRURSR, 1989, No. 48,, pp. 64, 65):35

1.. The free choice of the language of instruction is an inalienable right of the citizens of thee Ukrainian SSR;

2.. The Ukrainian SSR guarantees each child the right to be brought up and to receive educationn in its national language;

3.. In the schools of the Ukrainian SSR, teaching wil l be done in Ukrainian. In places of compactt settlements of civilians of other nationalities, schools can be established in whichh the language of teaching will be their national language or another language;36

4.. In schools, separate classes can be created in which the language of teaching is Ukrainiann or the language of people of a different nationality;

5.. In all schools, the study of the Ukrainian language and the Russian language is compulsory; ;

6.. In institutions of special secondary, professional technical, and higher education of the Ukrainiann SSR, Ukrainian is the language of teaching. In places of settlement of a majorityy of citizens of other nationalities, the language of teaching is in their national language,, alongside Ukrainian;

7.. In the above-mentioned institutions, groups can also be created with the Russian languagee of instruction in cases determined by the appropriate organs of state administration; ;

355 Before independence, laws, decrees and all other official decisions of the legislature and the executive weree listed in the state weekly Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrains 'koi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky, here abbreviatedd as VVRUSR. After independence, the name of this weekly changed to Vidomosti Verkhovnoi RadyRady Ukrainy, here abbreviated as VVRU. 366 The law did not specify what was meant by "compact settlement".

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8.. In all groups with the Russian language of instruction and in non-Ukrainian institutions,, irrespective of their departmental subordination, the study of the Ukrainiann language is guaranteed;

9.. Students wishing admission to an institution of higher or specialized secondary educationn have to take a Ukrainian-language entrance exam on a competitive basis. Thee manner in which entrance exams are taken by persons not having been attested in Ukrainiann is determined by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educationn of the Ukrainian SSR.

Readingg these measures, one can immediately spot the friction between the first regulation,, on the one hand, and stipulations nos 2, 3 and 4 on the other. The first is a reiterationn of Krushchev's decree and implies that the amount of Ukrainian- and Russian-languagee instruction is actually determined by parental need. In contrast, the three other principless state that it is nationality and not parental need which should be the guiding principle.. If rules nos 2, 3 and 4 are followed, it is possible that, in places of almost purelyy Ukrainian settlement, parental demands for Russian-language education may be denied,, rendering the first regulation void. If the first regulation is adhered to, one could imaginee situations in which the share of Russian-language education in the total educationn of a certain place far exceeds the share of Russians in the local population, whichh runs counter to the other rules. According to Arel (1995), the first regulation was nott in the draft version of the law, and was added only during parliamentary debates precedingg its adoption. For the nationally conscious activists of the Rukh movement this wass a great disappointment, since they specifically held the freedom-of-choice clause responsiblee for the fact that over the last thirty years so many Ukrainians sent their childrenn to Russian-language schools in the south and east.

Interestingly,, the way the first stipulation is formulated makes one believe that it couldd be applied to higher education as well. Yet, it is doubtful whether the authors of the laww truly intended to give students the right to choose the language of instruction as that wouldd sharply contradict rule six. This rule, which states that the language of instruction inn institutions of higher education (or vuzy) is Ukrainian, made the exception rule allowingg for continued Russian-language instruction very strict: only in "places of settlementt of a majority of citizens of other nationalities" was a language other than Ukrainiann permitted to function as the language of instruction, and then only "alongside Ukrainian."" Since residents Russian by nationality are only in a majority in Donets'k city (53.6%),, Luhans'k city (54.2%) and The Crimean peninsula (63%), it is only there that Russian-languagee instruction in vuzy would still be allowed to continue, according to stipulationn no. 6.37 Given that an overwhelming majority of the vuzy taught in Russian, thee law, if implemented, would truly have drastic consequences. However, since a majorityy of the Ukrainian vuzy were directly subordinated to the all-Union Ministry of Higherr Education in Moscow, the implementation of republican language regulations was neverr likely to occur.

Inn the second paragraph of Article 3, "places" are defined as districts, cities and administrative-territorial unitss smaller than that.

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Thee emphasis on the ukrainianization of higher education does not come as a surprisee if one realizes the impact the language of higher education can have on the schooll choice of parents. Clearly, with the recent Soviet experience in mind of Russian-languagee higher education inducing many Ukrainian parents to send their children to Russiann schools, the authors of the law must have been aware of the value of Ukrainian-languagee vuzy in raising the numbers of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian schools. One can doubtt whether the Ukrainian lawmakers were really determined to push ukrainianization through,, since stipulation no. 7 gives the "appropriate organs of state administration" the rightright to decide on the creation of groups instructed in Russian in vuzy. Undoubtedly, this wass a concession to the many Russian-language vuzy, for whom switching to Ukrainian wouldd pose great difficulties.

Thee law further sought to end the practice of allowing pupils on Russian schools andd vuzy to be exempted from Ukrainian language and literature teaching by making the Ukrainiann language a compulsory subject at all schools and vuzy (see principles 5 and 8). Inn addition, it established a Ukrainian-language entrance exam on a competitive basis for studentss wanting admission to an institution of higher or specialized secondary education. Obviously,, this measure was also intended to attract children to Ukrainian schools. However,, the measure lost some of its power due to an exception rule exempting those pupilss who had been excused from learning Ukrainian in the Soviet era (rule no. 9).

Thee ukrainianization drive was not just confined to education. The Law on Languagess sought to curb russification in other public spheres as well. The provisions madee by Articles 11 and 18 on the language of work, administration, documentation and thee administration of justice, for instance, mirrored those in the language of higher education.. Only in places where a majority of the inhabitants were members of another nationalityy was the language of that nationality allowed to be used along with Ukrainian. Inn all other places Ukrainian was meant to function as the sole language. The language of legall acts was regulated by Article 10. Acts issued by the highest organs of state power weree to be adopted in Ukrainian and published in Ukrainian and Russian. All other acts, i.e.. acts of republican ministries and local organs of state power, were to be passed and publishedd in Ukrainian, and in the case of necessity also published in another national language. .

Obviously,, for employees to work in Ukrainian, they would have to know the language.. Article 6 of the Language Law requires them "to master the Ukrainian and Russiann languages.. .to the extent that is necessary for the fulfillment of their duties." Yet, thee Article continues by saying that not knowing one of the two languages cannot be a reasonn to reject someone applying for a job, and that after accepting a job the applicant hass to learn the language of his work so that he can work efficiently. Clearly, these provisionss were meant to reassure the many Russian speakers not speaking Ukrainian that theyy would not find themselves in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis those that did know Ukrainiann and the Ukrainian speakers, who for the most part had an excellent command off Russian.

Thee Language Law left the mass media largely untouched. Article 33 only states thatt "in the Ukrainian SSR Ukrainian is the language of the official mass media. One of thee languages of other nationalities can be the language of the official mass media as well."" This is surprising given the extent to which the Ukrainian mass media were

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russifiedd in the late 1980s. For instance, on the one republican TV channel Ukraine had at itss disposal, the great majority of movies were in Russian, apparently because cultural bureaucratss believed that given the linguistic closeness of Ukrainian to Russian, Ukrainianss would be able to understand Russian without dubbing or subtitles.38 As for newspapers,, by the 1980s the circulation of Russian provincial (oblast) dailies was much higherr than that of their Ukrainian counterparts (Arel, 1995). Possibly, the authors of the laww did not want to intervene in a sensitive sphere of public lif e like the mass media, fearingg a sharp confrontation with Moscow.

Passingg a law is one thing, implementing its regulations is quite another. Accordingg to Arel (1995, p. 600), not much changed in the two years after its adoption owingg to the inactivity of leading state and party officials, who not only feared public protestt but also considered the strict implementation of the law in a country where "a criticall mass among the population - Russians and ethnic Ukrainians alike - were not fluentt in Ukrainian" an impossible task anyway. The law itself was also partly to blame forr its slow execution as it failed to list penalties for those who ignored its stipulations. Moreover,, simultaneously with the law, a decree was issued which gave employees three too five years to master Ukrainian and start using it as the sole language of work and documents.. Schools and vuzy were granted a period of 10 years to switch to Ukrainian. Naturally,, these delays did not stimulate people to start complying with the rules of the law.. The lack of change can most clearly be seen in school education. In the school year followingg the adoption of the law, the number of pupils instructed in Ukrainian had only increasedd by 0.4 percent nationwide, as compared to the year before (47.5% in 1989-90 andd 47.9% in 1990-91). Only in Kyïv did this number grow significantly in the same period,, from 21.7% to 25.1% (Janmaat, 1998).

Fromm January 1990, when Rukh managed to organize a human chain stretching fromm Kyïv to L'viv in commemoration of the seventy-first anniversary of the unification off Ukraine, the ruling CPU was increasingly willin g to let Rukh have a say in policy matters.. It was the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet elections of March 1990 that really triggeredd this change. Although the elections did not provide the Democratic Bloc - the groupp of candidates allied to Rukh - with a substantial number of seats (only 111 out of 450),, they did make the CPU aware that there were "unmistakable political costs for failingg to address issues of national sovereignty (Furtado and Hechter, 1992, p. 192)." Anotherr event that boosted the nationalist movement was the death of Shcherbytskyi in earlyy 1990. It permitted the hitherto monolithic party elite to split up into a reformist wing,, led by Leonid Kravchuk, who was elected chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviett in mid-1990, and a conservative faction under the leadership of Stanislav Hurenko (Motyl,, 1993). The power struggle that evolved between the two made Kravchuk side withh the non-Communist opposition and adopt an increasingly nationalist stance. The legall repercussion of these events was the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty on Julyy 16 1990, which announced the primacy of Ukrainian laws over Soviet laws. Ukraine hadd caught up with the Baltic republics, who had already declared sovereignty in 1988-19899 (ibid). Later, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet took even more radical steps, by passing

Inn addition to their own republican channel, Ukrainians could watch two all-Union channels which originatedd from Moscow and which were of course in Russian.

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resolutionss affirming its supreme control over natural resources and the economic apparatuss of the republic, stating its intention to become a neutral and non-nuclear power, forbiddingg the use of its forces outside the republic without its permission, and establishingg its own currency (in the form of coupons) available only to republican residentss (Furtado and Hechter, 1992).

Inn the cultural domain, the increasingly nationalist position of the Ukrainian lawmakerss was embodied in the State Program on the Development of the Ukrainian Languagee of February 1991.39 Although this document only served to specify the terms of implementationn of the Articles of the Language Law, it actually changed some regulations andd added some new. For instance, instead of repeating the freedom of choice principle, thee program urged state organs to "create conditions to ensure the constitutional right of citizenss to educate their children in their native language [my italics]" (Article 21). Clearly,, native was meant to be interpreted here as national, because the next sentence calledd for the introduction of a "network of educational institutions in accordance with thee national composition and the needs of the population [my italics]" (Article 22).40 In otherr words, this measure foresaw that the amount of Ukrainian-language and Russian-languagee school education should correspond to the number of Ukrainians and Russians inn the local population, i.e. in places where, for example, 60% of the population was Ukrainian,, 60% of the pupils should be taught in Ukrainian. The program laid down a detailedd timetable, which specified when the optimal network of Ukrainian-language kindergartenss and schools had to be reached in each oblast. Not surprisingly, the oblasts off the east and south were given the most time to do this - ten years.

Evidently,, the measure stated above was based on the idea that pupils should receivee instruction in the language of their parents' nationality in order to preserve their ownn national identity. Statements in the introduction of the program leave no doubt about this:: "Language shapes national consciousness, it is the basis of a nation's spirituality." Thesee statements also reflect the general preoccupation of Ukrainian nationalists with languagee and their fear that the Ukrainian nation wil l cease to exist if it no longer uses Ukrainian.. Taking this into account, one can safely argue that the real intention of this measuree was to make the large group of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east and southh send their children to Ukrainian schools. Naturally, the freedom of choice principle (whichh possibly was repeated in the above-mentioned measure by the word "needs") workedd against this intention. To neutralize its possible undesirable effects, i.e. Ukrainianss sending their children to Russian schools, the Ministry of Education sought to makee Ukrainian-language education more attractive. Shortly after the adoption of the statee program, it announced that Russian schools were to open Ukrainian classes if they

Thee full title of the document is Derzhavna prohrama rozvytku Ukrains'koi movy ta inshykh natsionalnatsional 'nykh mov v Ukrains 'kii RSR na period do 2000 roku. It was put into force by the Cabinet of Ministers'' Decree No. 41 of 12 February 1991 {VVRURSR, 1991, No. 4). 400 Intending to quell concerns of radical titular nationalism among the small minorities, the State Program exhaustedd itself in listing measures designed to create schools and academic groups with the language of smallerr national minorities (Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Poles, Jews, Crimean Tatars) as the language off instruction.

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receivedd 8-10 requests from parents to have their child instructed in Ukrainian.41 Given thatt the average size of classes was about 30 pupils, the ministry clearly speculated that smalll classes would persuade parents to enroll their children in Ukrainian classes. Interestinglyy but also understandably, the reverse case did not hold: Ukrainian schools weree not obliged to open Russian classes.

Att the same time as the measure requiring the opening of Ukrainian classes in Russiann schools, the ministry ordered all Russian schools formerly Ukrainian by status to onlyy open Ukrainian first-grade classes as of the next school year. If implemented, this measuree would truly have drastic consequences as many of the Russian schools in the largerr cities, especially in those of the east and south, were indeed erstwhile Ukrainian schools.. Although the measure is seemingly strongly at odds with the freedom of choice principle,, education officials could rightly point out that it does not in any way forbid parentss to choose the language of instruction for their child. The only effect it could have iss that for those parents wishing to send their child to Russian-language education the nearestt Russian school might be further away from home than before. And yet it is this increasedd distance that could have acted as a powerful incentive for parents to reconsider theirr choice and enroll their child in the nearest (Ukrainian) school, as for many of them proximityy is the main determinant of school choice.

Lastly,, by omitting any reference to freedom of choice in higher education, the Statee Program made it more than clear that the right to choose the language of instruction wouldd not be reserved for students at institutes of higher education. For vuzy, the program announcedd the elaboration of a timetable specifying when a particular vuz would have to switchh to Ukrainian as the language of instruction. In an effort to increase Kyiv's hold overr the vuzy on Ukrainian territory, the program also proposed bringing back some vuzy, notablyy the state universities of Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkiv, from an ail-Union to a republicann subordination.

3.2.22 The Kravchuk years

Afterr the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991, Kravchuk and the Ukrainian Supreme Soviett quickly cast off their communist allegiance, and declared Ukraine an independent state.. However, their newly found patriotism did not turn into an exclusionary nationalismm favoring the titular nation, as Kravchuk and his allies were careful not to alienatee the Russians and other minorities. Legislation bore witness to this attitude. In Octoberr 1991 the national parliament, renamed the Supreme Rada, adopted the Law on Ukrainiann Citizenship, which made all persons resident in Ukraine state citizens and removedd the nationality line in the internal passport (VVRU, 1991, No. 50). By embracing aa territorial principle instead of an ethnic one, the law drew praise from European human

411 This measure was part of a Ministry of Education plan intended to implement the provisions of the State Program.. It can be found in the 1991, no. 14 (July) edition of Informatsiinyi zbirnyk Ministerstva narodnoi osvityosvity URSR: a bi-weekly magazine of the Ministry of Education which is distributed to all schools and whichh lists orders, recommendations, curricula and more general comments. After independence it changed too Informatsiinyi zbirnyk Ministerstva Osvity Ukrainy (hereafter abbreviated as Zbirnyk Minosvity). The measuree was repeatedly issued after independence, see Minosvity Ukrainy nakaz (Order of the Ministry of Eductionn of Ukraine) Nos 132 of 7-9-1993 and 415 of 7-10-1996.

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rightsrights watchdogs, such as the CSCE and the Council of Europe (Deychakiwsky, 1994). Anotherr legislative act designed to convince the national minorities that the Ukrainian lawmakerss had an inclusive and not a narrowly ethnic conception of nationhood in mind wass the November 1991 Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine. It guaranteedd all nations and national groups the right to use their mother tongue in all spheress of public life, including education, administration and the reception and dispersal off information (VVRU, 1991, No. 53, pp. 1554, 1555). In addition, it softened the Articles off the Language Law on higher education, work and administration by stating that instead off a majority of citizens of another nationality only their compact settlement was needed inn order for their language to be permitted to function on a par with Ukrainian in these domains.. Although the declaration, like the Language Law, failed to specify what was meantt by 'compact settlement', one may assume that this concept also provided for cases wheree 20 or 30% of the population, i.e. less than a majority, belonged to a different nationality.42 2

Thee careful approach of the authorities towards the national question paid off: an unexpectedlyy high percentage of voters (90.3%) supported Ukraine's independence in the Decemberr 1991 referendum with a turnout of 84.1%. All oblasts delivered overwhelming majorities,, and even thoroughly Russian Crimea produced a 54% pro-independence vote (Holdar,, 1995). Moreover, Kravchuk was rewarded for his policy of combining the consolidationn of Ukraine's independence with a multinational vision of its population in thee presidential elections held at the same time as the referendum. He emerged victorious, capturingg a comfortable 61.6% of the total vote. His main contender, Chornovil, who was supportedd by Rukh, managed to defeat him only in the three western oblasts of L'viv , Ivano-Frankivskk and Ternopil (ibid).

Thee next year, the legislation on national minorities was further elaborated. The announcementss of the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities were refined and given legall force in the June 1992 Law on National Minorities (VVRU, 1992, No. 36), which wass widely praised for its liberal provisions. In this law, the state committed itself to givingg national minorities financial support and educating a national staff (Articles 7 and 17).. The law further permitted national minorities and their organizations to establish ties withh and receive help from co-nationals and their associations abroad (Article 15). In addition,, it stated that the stipulations of international treaties would have priority over thosee of the Ukrainian legislation (Article 19). Most importantly, however, the law establishedd the principle of the subjective definition of national belonging (Article 3; see alsoo Scheu, 1997). In other words, it was left to the individual citizen to decide whether he/shee considered him/herself a Ukrainian, Russian or any of the other nationalities inhabitingg Ukraine. Hereby, the law broke with the rigid communist practice of using the nationalityy of a person's parents to assign his/her nationality (only persons from mixed familiess were permitted to choose their nationality in Soviet days).

422 Liberal as this declaration may seem, it also made the nationality of a person and not his first language thee criterion for the use of a language other than Ukrainian in public spheres. It, thus, only recognized minoritiess on national grounds and not on linguistic ones. As such, it implicitly approved the intention of thee state program to ukrainianize Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

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However,, some measures also curtailed the scope of minority language use and thee freedom of movement of national-cultural associations. For instance, the very same laww on national minorities turned the declaration's compact settlement criterion for the officiall use of minority languages in the domains of work and administration back into a majoritymajority condition (Article 8; see also Arel, 1995a). Second, the 1993 Electoral Law forbadee representatives of minority organizations to stand for parliamentary election; only individuall citizens, political parties, political alliances and labor collectives were allowed too do so (Stewart, 1994). In addition, the June 1992 Law on the Association of Citizens prohibitedd political parties from receiving any financial support from abroad, whether fromm state or private foreign organizations or individuals (VVRU, 1992, No. 34). It also declaredd illegal those political parties whose goals were to "undermine state security with activitiess that foreign states could exploit" or to "stir up national and religious tensions (ibid,(ibid, Article 4, pp. 1158, 1159)." Although these measures did not explicitly forbid ethnically-basedd political parties, they did, of course, greatly handicap the political mobilizationn of national minorities. In particular, the unspecified regulations of Article 4 couldd be used by the state to accuse political parties of threatening state security, which wouldd give the state a pretext to prosecute and disband them. Lastly, many Russians resentedd the fact that dual Ukrainian/Russian citizenship was not possible.43

Anotherr element of post-independence policy-making perceived as threatening by manyy non-Ukrainians - and certainly Russians - was the regime's serious efforts to ukrainianizee the public domain. The role of Russian was meant to be sharply reduced as it wass considered to be merely one of the minority languages of Ukraine, on equal footing withh Hungarian, Bulgarian or Tatar. The appointment by Kravchuk of nationally-consciouss Ukrainians, many of whom were Rukh members, in key positions set this policyy in motion. In the sphere of defense, the newly appointed minister Mozorov pursuedd a strict ukrainianization of the army, in an effort to secure the loyalty of the predominantlyy Russian officer corps. He also founded a psychological service to instill a Ukrainiann nationalist spirit into the servicemen. Markus (1995, p. 28) reports that "its allegedlyy bizarre methods led to complaints and finally to Mulyava's dismissal" [Hetman Colonell General Volodymyr Mulyava was the head of the service]. In the mass media, Zivoniii Kulik, the new director of the state-owned Ukrainian television company, decided too give half of the air time of the second all-Union (now called Rossiia) channel to the secondd studio of Ukrainian TV (UT-2) (Arel, 1995). As a result, a number of popular programss from Russian television were replaced by televised sessions of the Supreme Radaa and broadcasts of Ukrainian folk music. Later, after Ukraine's failure to sign a CIS agreementt designating the first all-Union channel (called Ostankino) as a CIS-wide televisionn station, Ukraine stopped receiving most of the Ostankino-broadcasled programss as well, changing its name Ostankino into Inter (Dunlop, 1993). The ukrainianizationn drive in the mass media was clearly reflected in the Law on Television andd Radio Broadcasting of December 1993, which stated that Ukrainian be the language off radio and TV and allowed a certain minority language to function in the mass media

Thee law on citizenship stated that dual citizenship could only be granted to citizens of a state with which Ukrainee had signed a bilateral treaty (VVRU, 1991, No. 50). Ukraine has until the present day refused to enterr into such an agreement with Russia.

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onlyy in those places where the corresponding nationality "lives compactly" (VVRU, 1994, No.. 10, p. 249). As such, this law clearly contradicted the Language Law, which did not imposee any restrictions on the use of minority languages in the mass media.

However,, by far the most drastic measures were taken in the realm of education afterr the appointments of Minister Talanchuk and his radical deputy Anatolii Pohribnyi (Arel,, 1995). Unsatisfied with the slow growth rate of Ukrainian-language instruction -thee percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils only increased from 47.9% in 1990-91 to 49.3%% in 1991-92 - and accusing the heads of vuzy and schools of ignoring the stipulationss of the State Program, these officials tried to find new ways to reach the goals laidd down in existing legislation. They decreed that the network of first graders should be broughtt in line with the national composition of the population in each region by 1 Septemberr 1993 {Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1992, No. 19; Arel, 1995). By focusing on first-gradee pupils instead of all pupils, this order informed local authorities that those children alreadyy enrolled in Russian classes would be allowed to continue their Russian-language education,, i.e. they need not change their language of instruction. Using this gradual - and thereforee less radical - approach, the two educational officials clearly hoped to persuade locall educational authorities to comply with the order. At the same time, they suggested givingg teachers who switch to Ukrainian "moral and material encouragement", and orderedd the financial department of the ministry to come up with a concrete proposal. Evidently,, this measure was inspired by the Soviet practice of the late 1970s of giving Russiann language teachers a 15% higher wage than titular language teachers {Zbirnyk Minosvity,Minosvity, 1992, No. 19, pp. 6, 8). In addition, by ordering his deputy ministers to prepare "necessaryy additions and changes" to the Language Law, Talanchuk expressed his dissatisfactionn with some of the law's regulations, most probably with the freedom of choicee clause {ibid. p. 8).

Yet,, despite these measures, the Ministry of Education remained deeply unsatisfiedd with the achievements of ukrainianization. In July 1993 Talanchuk wrote a letterr to schools in which he complained that local educational authorities in the south andd east obstructed ukrainianization by allowing too many Russian schools to obtain prestigiouss titles of lyceum, gymnasium or college {Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1993, No. 19). To stopp this practice, the minister proposed that these new types of schools should as a rule bee opened with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. The significance of this measure liess in the fact that the new school types are very popular because they prepare their studentss for a certain vuz for which the students do not have to sit entrance exams. By permittingg local authorities to open only Ukrainian lyceums and gymnasiums, the Ministryy of Education surely hoped to encourage Russian schools to switch to Ukrainian, beforee applying for a higher status (Arel, 1995). Another administrative incentive for Russiann schools to open only Ukrainian classes was Talanchuk's order to give schools transferringg to Ukrainian priority in receiving textbooks. Given the omnipresent shortage off textbooks, this measure could truly act as a strong stimulus.

Thee minister further denounced the fact that many schools presented bureaucratic obstacless for parents wishing to send their children to Ukrainian classes or schools. He forbadee schools from demanding official written requests from these parents. In his opinion,, only parents wanting to put their children in schools with other languages of instructionn could be asked to write a special letter of application. With these measures he

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clearlyy wanted to indicate that Ukrainian schools and schools with other languages of instructionn were not to be treated as equals: the former were to be the norm, the latter the exception.. For admittance to the former, there would be no obstacles whatsoever, i.e. if parentss have not applied for a specific language of instruction, their child should automaticallyy be assigned to a Ukrainian school, for admittance to the latter a special applicationn would be required. Obviously, the Ministry hoped that parental passivity wouldd result in many children being enrolled in Ukrainian schools.

Thee changes in schools were not just restricted to the language of instruction, but alsoo had an impact on Russian language and literature teaching. In January 1993, deputy ministerr Pohribnyi informed educational authorities that as of the beginning of the 1993-944 school year Russian literature would cease to exist as a separate subject in Ukrainian schoolss {Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1993, No. 5). It would become part of the "world literature" course,, taking up no more than one-fourth of the course's total time. Ukrainian schools weree further allowed to cease Russian language teaching altogether. This in fact strongly contradictedd the Language Law, which holds that Russian is a compulsory subject in all schoolss in addition to Ukrainian.

Higherr education did not escape the attention of the authorities either. Determined too implement pre-independence legislation, Talanchuk repeated the clause in the Languagee Law calling for the institution of a Ukrainian language exam for vuz entrance. Onlyy students not having had five years of Ukrainian language as a subject were allowed too do a Russian language entrance exam. Together with the order on entrance exams, a measuree was announced declaring that "As from 1 September 1993 teachers in vuzy shouldd teach all the basic subjects in Ukrainian in the first year, but taking into account thee language situation in the south and east parallel groups can be organized in Russian [myy italics] for first-year students in these regions" (Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1992, No 19, p. 7).. Surprisingly, here the exception rule for Russian language instruction is much more lenientt than in the Language Law: instead of only in places with a majority Russian population,, now, in the whole of the south and east, Russian teaching could be continued. Thee authorities in Kyïv probably realized that a quick ukrainianization of higher educationn in the south and east would have catastrophic consequences for the quality of teaching,, not to mention the protests it would evoke. Still, the ministry made it more than clearr that vuzy or students were not to decide on the language of instruction themselves: condemningg cases of vuzy who had determined the language of education by doing a surveyy among students, Talanchuk explicitly prohibited solving this issue by voting (Zbirnyk(Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1993, No 19).

3.2.33 The Kuchma years

Inn the 1994 presidential elections Kravchuk was punished for three years of sharp economicc decline and drastically falling living standards. Leonid Kuchma, a Russian-speakingg Ukrainian from Dnipropetrivs'k, who advocated closer ties with Russia and favoredd granting Russian an official status,44 defeated Kravchuk with a seven percent

444 Kuchma did, however, favor the retention of Ukrainian as the only state language. Even before the presidentiall elections he had begun learning Ukrainian (Kuzio, 1997a).

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margin,, after having captured a majority of votes in all the oblasts of the populous east andd south and in three Left Bank center oblasts. Earlier that year, voters had elected a parliamentt that, though containing many independent members, was clearly left-wing withh a pro-Russian communist-socialist bloc of 115 seats and a group of nationalist partiess holding only 59.45 With both a pro-Russian president and a pro-Russian, left-wing parliament,, many political observers expected the central authorities to soon give up ukrainianization.. However, after being elected president, Kuchma failed to keep his promisee to lif t the status of Russian. The officials appointed by him, such as the new educationn minister Zgurovs'kyi, neither revoked strict language regulations, nor issued neww orders, whereby they basically consolidated the ukrainianization policy of the Kravchukk years.

Languagee politics under Kuchma found a legal foundation in the Constitution of Ukraine,, which was adopted in June 1996. Although out of necessity a compromise document,, it nevertheless confirmed the status of Ukrainian as the sole state language (Markus,, 1996). The constitution further guaranteed "the free development, use and protectionn of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine" (Constitution(Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, art. 10, p. 9). As before, Russian was thus only granted thee status of a national minority language. In addition to the constitution, the government hass tried several times to get a new and much harsher Language Law adopted by parliament,, but so far these efforts have proved futile.46 Furthermore, a cabinet of ministers'' decree of September 1997 did littl e to make language legislation stricter as a constrictionn of the language regime would have inevitably led to contradictions with the oldd Language Law which was still in force. Although the decree complained about the lackk of social prestige of Ukrainian and the mismatch of the use of Ukrainian with the Ukrainiann element in the population, it contained only one demanding provision: state bodiess were told to ensure that knowledge and fluency of the state language be necessary conditionss for the attestation of state employees, servicemen and teachers in schools and higherr education (if a person cannot be attested, he or she wil l lose qualifications and receivee a lower salary) (Verkhovna Rada website, Post. Kab. Min. No. 998, 1997).

3.33.3 The Motives of the Architects of Ukrainian Nation-Building

Noww that an overview has been given of post-independence language politics, it is necessaryy to ask why the promotion of the titular language was and is so important for the rulingg elite. Because this elite's true motive for its language policy may not be explicitly articulated,, it is not surprising to find diverging opinions among scholars addressing this

455 In additional elections in almost 120 districts where participation had been below 50 percent in the secondd round of the parliamentary elections (which had invalidated the result), independent candidates filledd most of the seats. As a result, the new parliament, which convened in September 1994, contained moree independent members than members representing political parties (Holdar, 1995). 466 The project law, for instance, left out the clause giving citizens the right to choose the language of instruction,, instituted penalties for employees failing to meet language requirements, and obliged private TVV and radio stations to broadcast no less than 70% of their time in Ukrainian. The law, called "Law of Ukrainee about the Development and Use of Languages in Ukraine", can be found in one of the issues of VisnykVisnyk FSMM. (Unfortunately, I was unable to trace the exact issue of this magazine.)

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question.. Arel (1994), for instance, holds that it was the fear of extinction of the Ukrainiann nation that prompted the Ukrainian nationalist elite, who took over the state apparatuss in the late 1980s, to start the ukrainianization policy. Considering the Ukrainian languagee as the foundation on which the Ukrainian national identity rests, this elite was alarmedd by the russification of the post-war period, which had pushed the Ukrainian languagee back into the private domain of family and friends, and had thus, according to thiss elite, significantly marginalized Ukrainian nationhood itself. Only a vigorous ukrainianizationn campaign could, in their view, restore a strong and proud Ukrainian nationall consciousness.

However,, while 'fear of extinction' may have indeed impelled the ruling nationalistt elite to take up ukrainianization during the Kravchuk years, one can hardly imaginee that to be the main concern of the entirely different elite from Dnipropetrivs'k, whichh started dominating the central state apparatus under Kuchma. What motive could thiss Russian-speaking 'clan' have to continue the ukrainianization policy of their Ukrainian-mindedd predecessors? Kolsto (forthcoming) gives a meaningful explanation:

Thee members of this elite [the ruling elite from Dnipropetrivs'k] have already made upp their minds: Ukraine is to remain independent of Russia. They nurture no illusionss that this can be possible unless the country has a cultural identity distinct fromm that of Russia. And the clearest, most obvious cultural marker at their disposal?? - language, of course.

Thus,, it is Kolsto's contention that the ruling elite is convinced that, by propagating the ideaa that Ukraine is inhabited by a separate nation speaking a separate language distinct fromm Russian, the existence of Ukraine itself as an independent state is justified and safeguarded.. If true, it carries an interesting implication: the central rulers, whatever their originn and wherever they come from, are likely to back ukrainianization as long as they wantt Ukraine to remain an independent state (which, once in office, they are almost sure too want). This, in turn, would lead one to believe that ukrainianization is most probably a permanentt feature of central state policy.

3.43.4 Changes in the Structure of Education

Ukrainee inherited an over-centralized unified school regime from the Soviet era. Introducedd in 1934 throughout the USSR, this regime informed teachers in detail of the subjectt matter, by means of programs, and the textbooks to be used (Stepanenko, 1999).47

Forr a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union the principal function of education was to inculcatee pupils with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Teachers were not allowed to express theirr opinion freely, parents were denied a say in school matters, and founding a private schooll on ideological or religious grounds was out of the question.

Afterr independence the authorities pledged to introduce sweeping reforms. Thus, thee state national program entitled Education: Ukraine of the 21st Century mentions as

AA program provides the teacher with a brief description of the subject matter. It also offers a timetable specifyingg when what subject matter has to be taught.

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onee of the policy objectives: "an elimination of uniformity in education and the sweeping awayy of the prevailing practices of authoritarian pedagogy" (cited in Stepanenko, 1999, p. 99).488 Another official publication puts it more strongly: 'The state monopoly in the branchh of education is ruined, its multistructurality is guaranteed, (...) the forms of administratingg become more democratic and perfect, the rights of educational institutions broaden,, wide autonomy is given to them" (The Development of Education in Ukraine, 1994,, p. 71). In practice, however, the centralized system of the Soviet era basically continuedd with school education remaining almost totally in state hands. As I observed duringg my periods of fieldwork, schools were and are obliged to work according to the programss developed by the Ministry of Education and use its "recommended" schoolbooks.. There was a brief interlude at the beginning of the 1990s when parents, teacherss and regional school authorities were granted more freedom to determine their ownn subject matter (by developing their own programs and being given a free choice of textbooks)) (Kliuchkovs'kyi, 1997, interview). But this temporary relaxation of the regime mayy have sprouted more from Kyiv's inability to quickly restore central control than from aa genuine desire to give schools more freedom of movement. The Ministry of Education providess proof of this: it quickly resumed control over schools and regional authorities oncee it had prepared new programs and procured sufficient new textbooks in the mid-1990s.. According to Stepanenko (1999), the authorities still regard education as the prime instrumentt for ideological indoctrination, despite promises of political neutrality.

Itt would be misleading, however, to argue that nothing has changed. The number off hours, for instance, that schools and individual pupils or parents can decide upon has increasedd dramatically. Teachers can express their opinions freely now, and they have completee liberty to choose whatever additional materials they deem necessary in lessons, alongsidee the prescribed textbooks. Thus, schools, teachers, parents and pupils do have moree autonomy now than in Soviet times.

3.4.11 Curriculu m changes in Ukrainia n schools

Givenn that the structure of school education has remained virtually the same, one can makee a comparison between the old and new curricula to appreciate the changes in school subjectss since independence. As we can see in Table 3.1, Russian language and literature havee disappeared from the 1997-98 curriculum for state-sponsored Ukrainian schools, whilee still being prominent subjects in the 1985-86 curriculum (see total number of hours).. As already pointed out, Russian literature is included in the new course of world literatureliterature in the 1997-98 curriculum. However, this does not mean that the Russian languagee is now banned from Ukrainian schools. The 1997-98 curriculum shows that Ukrainiann schools have three possibilities for continuing with Russian language teaching; eitherr as the compulsory foreign language of the state component, or as an optional subjectt chosen by the school or the individual pupil (for an explanation of state and schoolschool component, see the note under Table 3.1). In practice, few schools wil l choose the firstt option because of heavy pressure from parents and society in general to utilize the

488 This official document was put into force by a cabinet of ministers' resolution of November 1993 (Verkhovna(Verkhovna Rada website, Post, Kab. Min. No. 896, 1993).

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compulsoryy foreign language hours for teaching a western language like English or German.. But many Ukrainian schools, especially in the south and east, have indeed includedd the Russian language (and additional Russian literature hours) in the school timetable,, teaching it either as a compulsory subject chosen by the school or as an optionall subject available for individual pupils.

Tablee 3.1 Curriculum of state-sponsored schools with the Ukrainian language of instruction n

1985-19866 school year

Subject t

Ukrainiann language

Ukrainiann literature

Russiann language

Russiann literature

Foreignn language

Soviett law and state

History y

Geography y

Finee arts

Music c

Otherr subjects

Subjectss or extra hourss chosen by pupil

Total l

Total l week k

no.. of hours a inn all grades*

42 2

16 6

26 6

16 6

14 4

1 1

18.5 5

10.5 5

6 6

6.5 5

149.5 5

12 2

318 8

1997-19988 school

Subject t

StateState component

Ukrainiann language and literature e

Foreignn language

Worldd literature

History,, history of Ukraine e

Law w

Geography y

Musicc and fine arts

Otherr subjects

SchoolSchool component

Subjectss or extra hourss chosen by school Subjectss or extra hours chosenn by pupil

Total l

year r

Totall no. of hours a weekk in all grades*

56-57 7

12-15 5

14 4

15-16 6

1-2 2

10 0

13 3

113-121 1

21-23 3

41 1

304 4

Sources:: Zbimyk Minosvity, 1985, No. 10 and Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1997, No. 10. •• In Soviet times, schools included both elementary and secondary education, and had grades going from one to ten.

Alll pupils followed one and the same curriculum from the first to the eighth grade. After that, those who could not keepp up with the pace of education or had good manual or technical skills were taken out of schools and sent to a technikumtechnikum or uchilishche (vocational schools). The others continued school education in the ninth and tenth grades. Afterr graduating from the tenth grade pupils could enter an institution of higher education, in independent Ukraine thiss system has been largely left untouched. The authorities did introduce an eleven-grade system but because of a shortagee of money this was only partially implemented. As a result, schools now have grades going from one to eleven,, but many miss the fourth grade. In practice, therefore, the ten-grade Soviet system has basically continued, withh pupils starting school at age seven and finishing at age seventeen. Only a few schools have a fourth grade, whichh means that they admit children to the first grade at age six. Grades two, three and four in these schools equal gradess one, two and three, respectively, of schools that skip the fourth grade.

•• A comparison is made between the 1985-86 six-day regime and the 1997-98 five-day regime. In the late 1980s, mostt schools switched from a six-day regime to a five-day working week. Only schools with special status (lyceum orr gymnasium) or with specialized teaching in foreign languages or mathematics/physics continued operating on a six-dayy schedule.

•• The subjects of the state component are compulsory for alt schools and pupils. The subjects and extra hours of the schoolschool component fall into two categories: those chosen by the school and those chosen by the pupil. The former aree optional for the school and - once chosen by the school - compulsory for all pupils at the school. The latter are optionall for the individual pupil.

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Itt is these optional hours that constitute a clear break with the past; whereas the 1985-86 curriculumm lists only 12 such hours, the 1997-98 curriculum gives schools and pupils a totall of 62-64 optional hours. Moreover, as educational officials and school personnel weree quick to point out, schools and pupils have total freedom in deciding how to use thesee hours (Director of School 49; Rachkovs'ka; Tchaikovs'ka, 1998, interviews). Most off the schools use the optional hours to teach Russian or another Western language, or as additionall hours of mathematics or English, but some also include an optional subject like RidnyiRidnyi Krai (Home Region) in the school curriculum. In this course, pupils are taught aboutt the folklore and history of their own region by means of programs and educational materialss developed by the teacher himself (Demura, 1997, interview).49 Naturally, with thee subject matter being determined by the teacher, Ridnyi Krai may present historical factss or offer interpretations of history that are at odds with the version of history prescribedd by Kyiv in the history of Ukraine course. Other schools may use some of the optionall hours to teach subjects like the folklore and ethnography of Ukraine and UkrainoznavstvoUkrainoznavstvo (knowledge of Ukraine), which were created after independence to acquaintt pupils with Ukrainian habits, costume, and song and dance. Although clearly helpfull in the nation-building process - in all four cities the author attended folklorist theaterr in schools, and noticed how much the performing pupils enjoyed singing and dancingg in traditional Ukrainian costume in specially prepared classrooms - these subjects,, like Ridnyi Krai, have never been compulsory subjects in the state component.50

Ass optional subjects, they remain relatively unimportant and vulnerable to being cut from thee curriculum in exchange for more hours of teaching in subjects like English, law or mathematics. .

Thee status of the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian literature courses contrasts stronglyy with that of the above-mentioned subjects. Not only are these two subjects includedd in the state component, they are also two of the four subjects in which pupils of thee 11th grade have to do a central state exam - the other two being Ukrainian language andd mathematics - before graduating from school.51 Clearly, therefore, history of Ukraine andd Ukrainian literature have been made the backbone of nation-building activities in schooll education. As can be seen from Table 3.1, Ukrainian literature was mentioned as a separatee subject even in the Soviet curriculum. Although this curriculum said nothing aboutt history of Ukraine as a distinct subject, specific sections of the Soviet program on historyy were devoted to the "History of the Ukrainian SSR", for which pupils used separatee textbooks.52 Because of the significance of the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian literaturee for the current curriculum and the fact that both were part of the Soviet curriculumm as well, it is interesting to look at these subjects in further detail, and analyze

Thesee so-called teacher or author programs have to be approved by the oblast administration. 500 For a comment bemoaning the sorry state of these subjects, see Osvita (16-23 April 1997) {Osvita is a weeklyy opinion magazine of the Ministry of Education). The aforementioned subjects could also partly be includedd in the compulsory Music and Fine Arts course. 511 Minosvity Ukrainy nakaz, No. 24 of 29-1-1996 lists Ukrainian Language and Literature, Mathematics and Historyy of Ukraine as compulsory central exams for the 11th grade. In addition, 11th grade pupils had to take twoo optional exams. 522 See the Soviet history program (Prohramy dlia serednikh navchal'nykh zakladiv: istoriia, 5-11 klasy, 1989). .

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exactlyy what subject matter is being taught at present and how it compares to that presentedd in Soviet times. This is covered in the next chapter. Chapter Four wil l also brieflyy examine how geography, another subject central to nation-building, is taught in contemporaryy Ukraine.

3.4.22 Curriculu m changes in Russian schools

Tablee 3.2 Curriculum of state-sponsored schools with Russian/non-Ukrainian language off instruction

1985-19866 school year Schoolss with Russian lang. of instr

Subject t

Russiann language Russiann literature

Ukrainiann language

Ukrainiann literature Foreignn language

Soviett law and state History y Geography y Finee arts Music c Otherr subjects Subjectss or extra hours chosenn by pupil

Total l

Total l week k

no.. of hours a inn all classes

48 8 16 6

18 8

16 6 14 4

1 1 18.5 5 10.5 5

6 6 6.5 5

150.5 5

12 2

317 7

1997-19988 school Schoolss with non-Ukrainian

Subject t

StateState component Motherr language and literature e Ukrainiann language and literature e Foreignn language History,, History of Ukraine e Law w Geography y Musicc and fine arts Otherr subjects

SchoolSchool component Subjectss or extra hours chosenn by school Subjectss or extra hours chosenn by pupil

Total l

Tota a weel< <

year r lang.. of instr

no.. of hours a ii in all classes

46-55 5

32-37 7 12-15 5

15-16 6 1-2 2 10 0 13 3

100-120 0

15-16 6

40 0

304 4

Sources:: see Table 3.1

Thee 1997-98 curriculum for schools with Russian (or another) language of instruction doess not differ much from that of Ukrainian schools (see Table 3.2). As we can see, pupilss in Russian schools are also taught the nation-building subjects that are part of the statee component, i.e. Ukrainian language and literature, history of Ukraine, geography and law.. Moreover, Russian and other schools are obliged to work with the same programs andd books as Ukrainian schools, the only difference being that for the former a Russian translationn is available of the course books for history of Ukraine and geography.

533 As the author found out on his many visits to schools throughout Ukraine.

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Clearly,, this shows the central authorities' determination to achieve a maximum degree of uniformityy in the teaching of these sensitive subjects. At the same time it may reflect strongg feelings of insecurity, as educational authorities might suspect that Russian schools,, if left totally free, would start teaching an 'unpatriotic' version of Ukrainian historyy and geography.

Anotherr equally remarkable feature of the 1997-98 curriculum for Russian schoolss is that it no longer bears the title of 'curriculum for schools with the Russian languagee of instruction', as the 1985-86 curriculum still did, but is now called 'curriculumm for schools with a non-Ukrainian language of instruction' (see Table 3.2). Likewise,, pupils in Russian schools are no longer taught Russian language and literature butt native language and literature. This subtle change in wording is once again a reflectionn of the decline in status that Russian has suffered since Ukraine's independence. Fromm the ministry's point of view, Russian schools were merely one type of minority school,, equal in standing to Bulgarian, Romanian or Hungarian schools. Moreover, the numberr of hours reserved for Russian (native) language and literature teaching has been reducedd by at least 14 percent when the two curricula are compared (46-55 hours in 1997-988 as opposed to 64 hours in 1985-86). At the same time, the amount of Ukrainian languagee and literature instruction - from which many pupils were excused in Soviet timess (!) - has remained almost unchanged. Given that in the 1997-98 curriculum Russian schoolss are obliged to teach at least three languages (Russian, Ukrainian and a foreign language),, instead of the minimum of two languages that Ukrainian schools teach, there is lesss room on their curriculum for the free hours of the school component than in Ukrainiann schools. In other words, Russian schools do not have as much freedom to choosee optional subjects and extra hours as Ukrainian schools.

3.4.33 Curriculu m changes in higher education

Higherr education was subject to changes as well. Unlike institutions of higher education inn many Western countries, the vuzy in Ukraine, irrespective of their profile, were requiredd to give a number of humanitarian courses in the Soviet era. It was precisely this blockk of compulsory disciplines that was thoroughly revised after independence (Table 3.3). .

Subjectss like the history of Ukraine, Ukrainian business language, Ukrainian and foreignn culture and various social sciences were put in place of disciplines that could typicallyy be associated with the communist regime, such as the history of the communist party,, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, scientific communism and scientific atheism. After independencee vuzy were thus, like schools, obliged to teach several specific nation-buildingg subjects. However, unlike schools, they were guaranteed complete autonomy in determiningg the subject matter of these disciplines (see Article 46 of the new Education Law,, VVRU, 1996, No. 21), and they indeed appeared to use this discretion by elaborating theirr own programs and syllabi and by making their own selection from available textbooks.544 Naturally, freedom like this could very well lead to widely diverging

544 Interviews with university lecturers in the history of Ukraine departments of the polytechnical universities off Donets'k, Odesa and L'viv in October and November 1998, and personal observations by the author.

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practicess in the instruction of, for instance, the history of Ukraine, which would probably displeasee the educational authorities in Kyïv.

Tablee 3.3 Compulsory humanitarian disciplines in Ukrainian vuzy before and after Ukraine'ss independence

Beforee independence After independence Historyy of the Communist Party of the USSR History of Ukraine Politicall economy Ukrainian business language Marxist-Leninistt philosophy Ukrainian and foreign culture Scientificc communism Philosophy Scientificc atheism Principles of psychology and pedagogy Basicc principles of Soviet law Theology Foreignn language (usually German) Political science Physicall education Sociology

Principless of law Principless of constitutional law Foreignn language Physicall education

Sources: : Too find the subjects taught in Soviet times, I examined the diploma of Michail Khraban, who graduatedd from the Kyïv Institute of Architectural Engineering in 1982. Michail Khraban is the fatherr of the host family the author stayed with many times during his visits to Kyiv. For the subjectss taught after independence, see, for instance, the 1998 Navchal'nyi plan (curriculum) of thee Kyiv Institute of Economics, Public Administration and Company Law.

3.53.5 Possibilities for Private Education

Withh state-financed schools being proscribed to teach alternative versions of history, literaturee and geography, private education may be an attractive option for those Russian (orr other) parents who do not agree with the uniform, predetermined education of state schools.. Yet, although the authorities permitted the foundation of private schools as early ass 1988, private education has remained a marginal phenomenon since independence: in thee 1997-98 school year only 0.2 percent of all pupils studied at private schools (Statystychnyi(Statystychnyi zbirnyk ...Ukrainy, 1998). This poor attendance may partly be explained byy the high fees that these schools ask parents to pay: at the private schools visited by the authorr fees could go up to US$500 a month (Spivakovs'kyi; Ovchinikova; Matveeva, 1998,, interviews). Naturally, in a poverty-stricken country like Ukraine only a happy few cann afford these prices. However, another reason why parents show so littl e enthusiasm forr private education may very well be that private schools, as a matter of fact, have to teachh the subjects of the state component of the curricula for state schools, and are obligedd to use the programs and textbooks prescribed by the Ministry of Education for

Intervieww with Volodymyr Spivakovs'kyi, Director of the private Lyceum Grand, in Kyïv in September 1998.. The lyceum was founded as a private school in 1988.

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thesee subjects. Naturally, private schools could always include alternative history or literaturee courses in their large school component, the hours of which they can dedicate to thee teaching of any kind of subject, but the three private schools visited by the author usedd all these hours for sport, music, chess and additional foreign-language teaching. The schoolss probably do not want to risk confrontation with the authorities, being dependent onn them for a license and official acknowledgment of their diplomas.57 Private schools, therefore,, appear to have as littl e freedom of movement as state schools. Taken as a whole,, this means that Russians and members of other national minorities have almost no opportunity,, either in state or in private schools, to have their children become acquainted withh historical and cultural domains that differ from the ones presented by the state, unlesss they send their children to illegal, underground schools. However, to the knowledgee of the author, no such schools exist in present-day Ukraine.

Inn contrast to the insignificance of private schools, private vuzy have blossomed in post-independentt Ukraine: as many as 94 out of a total of 348 vuzy were privately owned inn 1997-98 (Dovidnyk dlia ...rik, 1999). Like state-sponsored institutions of higher education,, private vuzy had to teach the compulsory humanitarian disciplines (see Table 3.3)) but were free to develop their own programs and educational materials for these coursess (Finikov; Zhomiak, 1998, interviews). However, given the profile of these vuzy, mostt of which specialized in training their students in commercial skills {Donets 'k, 1997),, it appears that many students opted for a private vuz primarily for instrumental reasons,, and not out of concerns for cultural preservation or national identity reinforcement. .

3.63.6 An Explanation of the Nation-Building Project

Ass this chapter also examined nation-building policies in spheres other than education, it iss now possible to evaluate the state's nation-building policies of the post-glasnost era in theirr entirety, and formulate an answer to the question posed in Chapter Two: to what extentt independent Ukraine has pursued a strategy of accommodation or domination in its dealingss with Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The specific character of Ukraine'ss overall nation-building scheme (i.e. accommodating or dominating) can then bee compared to that of other Soviet successor states to arrive at an appreciation of some off the factors that predispose states to opt for a certain strategy. The following paragraphs aree devoted to this exercise.

Ass mentioned above, Russians and other national minorities resident in Ukraine weree immediately granted state citizenship after independence; they have not been purged

Interviewss with Tchaikovs'ka and with private-school directors (1998). See also Article 18 of the Educationn Law (VVRU, 1996, No. 21), which states that "institutions of education, independent of their statuss or character, guarantee a quality of education that corresponds to the demands of the state standards off education" (the state standards are elaborated by the Ministry of Education and contain criteria on the quantity,, level and content of teaching). 577 The oblast administration has the authority to issue licenses, assess teachers and conduct school inspectionss in all schools, independent of type or ownership (Cabinet of Ministers' Decree no. 327 of Marchh 1996, Vekhorna Rada website). In their turn, the oblast administrations are checked by the National Statee Inspection (Cabinet of Ministers' Decree no. 110 of January 1997, Vekhorna Rada website).

11 11

fromm state institutions and companies (althoug western Ukraine to some extent is an exception);; they are free to establish national-cultural societies and stand as candidates of politicall parties, and they can exercise the right to have their children instructed in their nativee language. These features of national policy indicate that Ukraine has opted for an accommodatingg approach to tackle the nationality question.

Yet,, examples have also been found of central (and local) regulations that restrict thee cultural and political freedom of movement of national minorities. Thus, the 1989 Laww on Languages limited the use of minority languages, especially Russian, in the publicc domain and made the titular language, Ukrainian, the dominant language instead. Thee 1996 Constitution confirmed this unequal standing of languages by instituting Ukrainiann as the sole state language. Moreover, in the sphere of education, the parental rightright to choose the language of instruction for their children was severely curtailed by nationall and local ukrainianization measures that to a large extent predetermined the networkk of Ukrainian- and Russian-language schools. It was found that not only state sponsored,sponsored, but also private minority language schools were required to use the central programss and textbooks recommended by the Ministry of Education, leaving national minoritiess with littl e opportunity to determine the content of their children's education. Lastly,, clauses in the legislation forbidding national cultural societies to put forward candidatess for parliamentary elections and outlawing political parties whose activities 'underminee state security' or 'stir up national and religious tensions' have impeded the foundationn of ethnically-based political parties. Naturally, these elements of central policy doo not match the fourth characteristic of Lijphart's consociational democracy - a high degreee of (non)-territorial autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. Still, thesee restrictions on the cultural and political freedom of national minorities cannot removee the impression that Ukraine's handling of its national minorities can indeed be labeledd fairly accommodating and inclusive. After all, the granting of state citizenship and thee absence of job discrimination on an ethnic or language basis has effectively given nationall minorities the same rights and opportunities as ethnic Ukrainians. The aforementionedd restrictions cannot change this basic state of affairs.

Kyïv'ss inclination to opt for an accommodating strategy is perhaps surprising givenn that the previous chapter did not anticipate a clear choice for either an inclusive approachh or a strategy based on domination. The next step, therefore, is to explain the outcome.. A factor that clearly contributed to the establishment of an inclusive minority policyy was the lack of depth of national sentiment among large segments of the Ukrainian masses.. As we have seen, this underdeveloped national consciousness left its mark on politicss when the nationalist candidates failed to muster as much support as the (more) left-wing,, pro-Russian contestants in three consecutive parliamentary elections. Consequently,, the legislature repeatedly torpedoed nationalist-inspired project laws that wouldd have made Ukraine's minority policy more exclusionary.

Too assess the influence of the other factors introduced in the previous chapter, (i.e.,, the factors of the explanatory models of Lijphart and Hennayake), we could check themm one by one and see if they predicted the result. However, an analysis of the explanatoryy value of certain variables based on a single case, namely Ukraine, is not very convincing.. To make a sound judgment about the impact of a factor, the minority policies off at least several states have to be determined. As Chinn and Kaiser (1996) have done

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exactlyy this for the post-Soviet context, there is no sense in repeating their research. A summaryy of their conclusions suffices. In brief, they found that only in Estonia, Latvia andd Georgia did titular nationalists succeed in implementing and holding on to a strategy off dominance. In the other post-Soviet states nationalists have either never entered the rankss of power at all (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), held power just briefly (Azerbaijan andd Tajikistan), have had to seek compromises (Ukraine), have been in power since the latee 1980s but have moderated their stance since independence (Lithuania and Moldova), orr have only recently made their influence felt on minority policy (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). .

Chinnn and Kaiser note that this pattern of post-Soviet minority policies does not correspondd with the predictions of the internal colonialism/uneven development model. Thiss theory proposes that the more underdeveloped a republic is and the more subordinate aa nation was in relation to the former center, the more exclusionary and nationalistic its policiess will be towards the former "oppressor" nation. But for the post-Soviet context thee reverse applies: the most advanced republics and the most assertive titular nations (Estonianss and Latvians) have proven to be the most dominating and exclusionary, and thee least advanced republics/nations, the least exclusionary (the Central Asian republics).

Intriguingly,, the failure of the internal colonialism model to predict the nature of minorityy policy in post-Soviet states indicates that Lijphart's structure of cleavages conditionn and Hennayake's economic resources condition may not have much explanatoryy value in this context. According to Lijphart, the more cleavages coincide (i.e.,, the more skewed the representation of ethnic groups in the strata of society is), the fewerr chances there are for consociational democracy as an accommodating strategy. Hennayakee argues in much the same way: the more uneven the distribution of economic resourcess over ethnic groups, the more likely the formerly 'oppressed' majority nation is too develop a strategy of exclusion when it captures state power. Coinciding cleavages, or unevenlyy divided economic resources, can, of course, typically be found in underdevelopedd regions such as the Central Asian republics, where the majority nation wass in a subordinate position in Soviet days.58 Given that it has just been demonstrated thatt these republics have actually refrained from adopting an exclusionary political programm after independence, one may conclude that Lijphart's structure of cleavages and Hennayake'ss economic resources cannot explain the pattern of minority policies.

Chinnn and Kaiser deem three factors to be particularly relevant for explaining the variationn in minority policy among the former union republics: mass-based national consciousness;; a history of independence; demographic trends.

Thee extent to which national consciousness penetrated the masses well before the disintegrationn of the Soviet Union, Chinn and Kaiser hold to be of primary importance. It iss asserted that, in republics where the national idea had become well entrenched among thee titular population by the beginning of the 20th century, nationalist elites managed to gett the support of the titular masses to implement exclusionary policies in the early 1990s.. In republics where this was not the case, elites have been unable to push through a radicallyy nationalist program.

588 Michael Hechter, the architect of the internal colonialism theory, would label coinciding cleavages as a "culturall division of labor" (Hechter, 1975).

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Thiss conclusion is in line with our finding that the shallow national sentiment of ethnicc Ukrainians prevented nationalists from dominating the political agenda in the 1990s.. As was argued in the introduction, nineteenth-century Austrian rule enabled westernn Ukrainians to develop a strong national awareness, but their nationally conscious descendantss are too small in numbers to leave their mark on the politics of contemporary Ukraine.59 9

AA history of recent independent statehood is considered to be another salient factorr as it provided titular nationalists with a historical justification for their movement towardss national independence in the late 1980s. Thus, nationalists were highly successfull in mobilizing the titular population in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, independentt states in the inter-war period, but faced difficulties in mustering the support off the titular peoples of the Central Asian republics, which had not experienced a period off recent state independence. The perceived illegality of the Soviet incorporation of the Balticc states in 1939 only added to the nationalist fervor of the titular nations and was usedd by the Estonian and Latvian elites to legitimize a policy of exclusion directed at post-warr Russian immigrants. In western Ukraine and Moldova, the other incorporated territoriess of 1939, indignation at the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also significantly strengthenedd the nationalist movement.

Thee independent statehood factor has indeed explanatory value for Ukraine as this post-Soviett state combines a lack of recent state independence with an accommodating strategyy towards national minorities. Ukrainian historians could claim that the three years followingg the October 1917 Revolution constituted a period of recent independence, but it iss unlikely that Ukrainians remember this short and chaotic period as one of stable Ukrainiann statehood. Other historical periods embracing regimes that allegedly represent thee forerunners of the modern Ukrainian state all precede the nationalization wave of the 19thh century. According to Chinn and Kaiser, this makes it difficult for Ukrainian nationalistss to use these periods to mobilize the indigenous masses.

Hennayake'ss 'lost pride' is obviously related to the independent statehood factor. Chinnn and Kaiser use it to account for the restorative nationalism among Russians both in andd outside Russia, but it could equally well apply to the Baltic nations. These nations are likelyy to interpret the loss of independence in 1939 as a degradation in status that hurt theirr national self-esteem. Ukrainians, on the other hand, do not suffer from the lost pride syndrome,, as the previous chapter already indicated. Given that the Baltic nations have indeedd adopted exclusionary policies (except for the Lithuanians) and the nations who weree not tormented by feelings of wounded pride have not (except for the Georgians), lostt pride has clear relevance for the post-Soviet context.

Thee demographic trends variable and Hennayake's threat to the survival of the majorityy nation can be held to be one and the same. Chinn and Kaiser demonstrate that thiss variable is crucial for explaining why Lithuania opted for an accommodative approachh and Estonia and Latvia did not. In the post-war period, Estonians and Latvians

Inn his suppressed majority ethnonationalism condition (see Chapter Two), Hennayake (1992) appears to concedee the importance of mass-based national consciousness as an explanatory variable, but as he does not clarifyy what he means by the condition, it is not clear whether he truly foresaw the impact of mass-based nationall consciousness.

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saww their numbers decline steadily in relation to the Russian population whose numbers weree augmented by a constant inflow of migrants. Consequently, after independence titularr nationalists saw no other way than to exclude Russians from public life as a means off attaining titular hegemony and ensuring cultural survival. Lithuanians, on the other hand,, never felt a serious demographic threat as Russian in-migration was compensated fprr by high titular birth rates. They did not feel the need to deny Russians a role in society.. The authors suggest that the case of Kyrgyzstan can be explained in much the samee way. Although the Kyrgyz were as meagerly represented in the total population of theirr republic as the Latvians were in theirs (52 percent), their high natural increase, whichh more than compensated for Russian in-migration, gave them no grounds to opt for aa strategy of dominance. Chinn and Kaiser therefore conclude that "indigenous demographicc dominance, or a trend in that direction, reduces the degree to which memberss of the titular nation perceive the nontitular population as a threat, and makes inter-nationall accommodation more likely (ibid, p. 275)."

Thoughh generally valid in the post-Soviet context, demographic trends have no explanatoryy value for Ukraine. Despite the 'threat' to the Ukrainian nation that the Russiann in-migration and significant russification of Ukrainians constituted after World Warr n, Ukraine has not embarked on a policy of exclusion.

Lijphart'ss state size and segmental isolation factors appear to have no explanatory valuee at all for the post-Soviet world. Lijphart postulated that small states are more likely too opt for consociationalism than larger states. Ironically, the reverse is true for the Soviet successorr states: in Estonia, Latvia and Georgia, three small states, minority policy has beenn the most exclusionary, and in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the two largest states except forr Russia, fairly accommodative. The same conclusion applies to segmental isolation. Insteadd of isolated groups developing consociational arrangements, the diaspora Russians inn (near to) homogeneously Russian areas have actually pressed for greater autonomy (the Narvaa region in Estonia) or outright secession (The Crimea). In the Slav-inhabited region off Transdniestria, conflict between the titular Moldovans and the Russian minority even escalatedd into a short-lived war. Segmental isolation thus seems to work more in the directionn proposed by Coackley (see previous chapter): the more isolated an ethnic group, thee stronger its territorial claims and therefore the greater the chance of an interactive nationalismm developing between the titulars and the minority group, with all the exclusionaryy strategies that this entails.

Nonee of the former Soviet republics can be said to meet any of the other conditionss Lijphart holds to be conducive to consociational democracy. No successor statee has traditions of elite accommodation, in no successor state do all interest groups havee overarching loyalties towards the state, and in no successor state do we find a triangularr configuration of ethnic groups balancing each other out. (Kazakhstan is to somee extent the exception with Kazakhs numbering 43.2% of the total population, Russianss 36.4% and other nationalities 20.4%). As minority policies have been found to differr substantially between these republics, the last three conditions cannot account for thee pattern of outcomes either. Taken together, the six conditions of Lijphart's model may thuss only have explanatory value for consociational democracy as a specific type of accommodativee policy, and not for accommodative strategies in general.

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Thiss leaves the first three factors proposed by Hennayake: (1) majority nation previouslyy subordinated by colonialism and/or imperialism; (2) suppressed majority ethnonationalism;; (3) external or internal threat to the majority nation. Chinn and Kaiser arguee that the first condition is met by all titular nations of the former USSR. As such, it cannott explain the differences in minority policies between the successor states. The secondd condition can roughly be equated with the aforementioned mass-based national consciousnessconsciousness factor, assuming that titular nations that developed an early national awarenesss experienced the Soviet Union as an oppressive regime crushing their national aspirations.. Consequently, suppressed majority ethnonationalism is likely to produce the samee effect as mass-based national consciousness. This effect has already been discussed. Thee third condition, an external or internal threat to the majority nation, is an element in manyy of the titular nationalist ideologies. According to Chinn and Kaiser, titular nationalistss in Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine feel threatened both externallyy by Russia and internally by the Russian minority as a potential fifth column. Yet,, policies towards the Russian minorities vary strongly within these five countries. Thee third condition, therefore, does not have much interpretative power either.

Too summarize, of all the factors put forward by Lijphart and Hennayake, only Hennayake'ss conditions of suppressed majority ethnonationalism (mass-based national consciousness),, lost pride (history of independence), and, leaving out Ukraine, threat to thee survival of the majority nation (demographic trends) can shed light on the overall patternn of minority policies in the Soviet successor states. Naturally, to arrive at a completee appreciation of the explanatory value of the aforementioned factors, the analysis off state-minority relations should not be restricted to the post-Soviet orbit. However, a globall analysis falls outside the scope of this research.

3.73.7 Conclusion

Inn Czarist times Ukrainians were regarded as an offshoot of the Russian nation and the Ukrainiann language as a peasant dialect of Russian. The use of Ukrainian in the public domainn was outlawed. The Bolshevik policy of Korenizatsiia interrupted the russification off the imperial era. The new communist rulers promoted the use of Ukrainian in education,, the media and the republic administration in order to combat illiteracy and ensuree the compliance of ethnic Ukrainians with the new regime. Stalin quickly abandonedd Korenizatsiia, however, when he assumed power at the beginning of the 1930s.. In education this led to a renewed emphasis on Russian, both as a language of instructionn (mainly in institutions of higher education) and as a compulsory subject for whichh the number of hours were continually expanded. After World War II a combination off specific circumstances and policy measures further russified the school network in Ukraine.. Russian-language higher education encouraged many Ukrainian parents to send theirr children to Russian schools once Khrushchev granted parents the right to choose the languagee of instruction in the late 1950s. The institution of Russian language and literaturee as a compulsory vuz entrance exam only reinforced this tendency. The status differencee between Russian and Ukrainian was further underlined by Moscow's endeavor too make Ukrainian language and literature an optional subject in Russian schools whilst

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retainingg the compulsory status of Russian language and literature in Ukrainian schools, andd by the practice of paying Russian-language teachers a fifteen percent higher wage thann Ukrainian-language teachers.

Afterr the onset of Glasnost, the newly empowered titular elite made use of the samee strategies to turn the tables and accord primacy to the Ukrainian language. It was declaredd that vuzy would have to switch to Ukrainian as the medium of instruction within tenn years, that students would have to do a Ukrainian language and literature exam for vuz entrance,, and that Russian language would no longer be a compulsory subject in Ukrainiann schools. Moreover, the right to choose the language of instruction was curtailedd by a decree that ordered local authorities to establish a network of first graders (i.e.. a distribution of Ukrainian- and Russian-instructed pupils) that would optimally correspondd to the national composition of the local population. If implemented, this measuree would truly result in a massive ukrainianization of the school network. The Ministryy of Education further announced that only Ukrainian schools should be granted thee prestigious titles of lyceum, gymnasium or college, a measure which was clearly intendedd to encourage Russian schools to switch to Ukrainian before applying for a raise inn status. The ministry also sought to urge Russophone parents of the east and south to sendd their children to Ukrainian-language education by making the threshold for the openingg of Ukrainian classes in Russian schools as low as possible (eight to ten parental requestss sufficed).

Thee new Ukraine followed the Soviet model not only in language regulations but also,, to a large extent, in the structure of the educational system. School education remainedd as centralized as ever, with schools being obliged to follow the national curriculumm set out for each type of school, work according to the programs developed by thee ministry, and use the ministry's "recommended" textbooks. Interestingly, the few of privatee schools (which educated just 0.2% of the student population) were subject to the samee strict regulations as the state-sponsored schools. Nonetheless, the substantial increasee in the number of optional hours, of which schools and pupils could freely dispose,, did mark a clear break with the past. Thus, schools and pupils have more freedomm of movement in contemporary Ukraine than in Soviet times. Compared to schools,, vuzy have decidedly more autonomy. Although the ministry obliged them to teachh a block of humanitarian disciplines, which replaced a number of disciplines imbued withh communist ideology, the vuzy are free to determine the subject matter of these discipliness (i.e. by developing their own programs and teaching materials). As this was unthinkablee in the Soviet past, independence has constituted a major change for institutes off higher education.

Thee restrictions in the sphere of language and education notwithstanding, Ukraine'ss general treatment of its minorities can be described as quite accommodating afterr independence, as Russians and other minorities were granted equal civil rights, were nott systematically excluded from the state and private sector, and were guaranteed a numberr of collective rights by the Law on National Minorities. The amorphous national identityy of many Ukrainians was clearly instrumental in the establishment of this liberal minorityy policy. Because of the shallowness of national sentiment, nationalist forces couldd not find the backing they needed to dominate the political agenda and introduce moree restrictive legislation. Of the many factors put forward by Lijphart and Hennayake,

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onlyy Hennayake's 'lost pride' appeared to be relevant for the Ukrainian context. The fact thatt Ukraine had never had a period of sustained independence "cruelly" interrupted by Russian/Soviett "occupation" meant that no justification could be found for an exclusionaryy policy (i.e. there was no "historical injustice" to be resolved). This makes thee choice for an inclusive approach understandable.

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44 HISTORY OF UKRAINE , UKRAINIA N LITERATUR E AND GEOGRAPHYY OF UKRAIN E

Thee three school subjects mentioned in the title of this chapter lend themselves pre-eminentlyy to nation-building purposes. It is these subjects that teach pupils the distinguishingg features of Ukrainian national identity, instill a national spirit into them, andd offer justifications for current state independence. For this reason, they are the exclusivee subject matter of this chapter. The first section, which takes up the bulk of the chapter,, discusses the history of Ukraine. The ensuing section is devoted to Ukrainian literature.. As both subjects were also part of the Soviet curriculum, the present subject matterr wil l be compared to that of Soviet times in order to evaluate the changes. The third sectionn briefly reports on the current teaching of the geography of Ukraine, a subject whichh is apparently of lesser concern to the central authorities as it is not one of the compulsoryy central exams of the 11th grade. The final section offers some brief conclusions. .

4.14.1 History of Ukraine

4.1.11 Introductio n

Historyy has always played a pivotal role in the formation or disintegration of national identities.. To promote group cohesion and give citizens a sense of self-esteem, political entrepreneurss emphasize common ancestry and experiences, and exaggerate the significancee of certain historical events to such an extent that these assume mythical proportions.600 To achieve group breakdown the opposite is stressed: inter/intra group conflict,, suppression and injustice. Given Ukraine's considerable linguistic and religious differences,, it is not surprising to find the present-day authorities turning to history to enhancee national unity.61 Yet, in doing so, they face two major problems.

600 Discussing the structure of Ukrainophile and Belarusophile historiography, Andrew Wilson (1998) distinguishess as many as 15 kinds of historical myths. 611 Stephan Velychenko argues that the 'poorer, authoritarian' societies 'east of the Elbe' assign much greaterr weight to national historiography than the 'wealthier, pluralist and constitutional societies' of the west.. In his view, this is because the eastern societies consider national identity, which heavily relies on historiography,, an end in itself, rather than a means to pursue their material interests. Thus, "insofar as historiographyy preserves collective national memory, it becomes essential for group survival [for the societiess of the East] (Velychenko, 1993, p. 18)." Inn a comment on this section, Joanna Paraszczuk counters Velychenko's argument by asserting that Western statess have made equal use of historiography to promote national cohesion. In her view, it is the early successs of the Western nation-building projects that obscures the fact that identity politics is still going on inn the established societies of the West. See Paraszczuk (1999). Thee discussion on the use of historiography is a reflection of the wider debate on the distinction between an ethnicc and a civic variety of nationalism. According to Kuzio (1997b; 1999b), this distinction serves no empiricall purpose since historically both varieties have become intricately intertwined in the nation-buildingg programmes of liberal democratic states, homogenizing the societies internally and accentuating theirr differences.

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Firstly,, the 'heroic' moments or periods in history from which Ukrainians can derivee a feeling of pride appear to be few and far between. Ever since the collapse of the medievall state of Kyïv Rus' in the 13th century, the Ukrainian lands were dominated by neighbouringg powers and its population subjugated to foreign noblemen and administrators.. This is not to say that Ukrainians have nothing to fall back on. Ukrainian historians,, for instance, appropriate the legacy of Kyïv Rus' by seeing contemporary Ukrainee as the direct successor to that empire. Likewise, the Cossacks of the 16 century aree considered brave Ukrainians who fought a national liberation war against the Poles andd Tatars.62

However,, it is precisely on these few moments of glory that Ukrainian historiographyy clashes with the Russian/Soviet version. In the Russian imperial scheme, Kyïvv Rus' was the precursor of the Russian Czarist Empire. It was seen as the first state governedd by and dominated by Russians, with Ukrainians and Belorussians not being recognizedd as distinct peoples. The Soviet view basically endorsed this idea. It only departedd from it to the extent that the inhabitants of the Kyïv Rus' state were seen as East Slavs,, who consisted of proto-Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. From the 14th

century,, Soviet historians acknowledged these proto-Ukrainians as a separate people, but assertedd that the one and only aim of Ukrainians was to be reunified with their 'elder' Russiann brethren. For them, the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654, in which the Cossack Hetman Bohdann Khmel'nyts'kyi recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite Czar in exchange for autonomy,, served as convenient proof of this endeavor (Kohut, 1994). In the Soviet view, thee Cossack military campaigns of the 16th century thus represented merely an effort to 'reunite'' with Russia, and not a national liberation struggle.

Secondly,, the contradictions between the Ukrainian and the Russian/Soviet view off history place nation-building architects in a dilemma. On the one hand, state officials mayy find it hard to communicate a radical Ukrainian-nationalist version of history as that couldd well be unacceptable to the Russian-speaking population of the east and south, who mayy still feel part of the Russian cultural world.63 On the other hand, the propagation of a historicall scheme much closer to the Russian/Soviet version would undermine the claim thatt Ukraine is a territory with a history and population distinct from that of Russia.64

Givenn the centrality of this claim for the legitimacy of independent Ukraine, it is obvious whyy the latter scheme, as a potential threat to state independence, enjoys littl e popularity amongg Ukrainian elites.

622 The early 20th-century historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi is generally credited for his contribution to the Ukrainiann nation-building project. In his framework Ukrainians constitute a separate nation with their own originn and history (Kuzio, 1998). 633 Wilson has argued that, "because it [the Ukrainian version of history] excludes or caricatures genuinely complexx aspects of the Ukrainian-Russian historical relationship, it runs the risk of alienating the Russian-speakingg half of the population of Ukraine." Quoted from Paraszczuk (1999, p. 39). Accordingg to Kuzio (1999a), it is inappropriate to consider language to be the main cleavage in Ukrainian society.. In his opinion, political attitude and generation are at least as important dividing lines, with reform-mindedd people and the younger generation (who are generally pro-western, anti-communist and pro-reform inn outlook) much more likely to support the Ukrainian scheme of events than people with communist sympathiess and the elderly. 644 Naturally, the Russian imperial and Soviet versions of history are no less 'nationalist' than the Ukrainian schemee as they also served to forge specific national identities. I owe this point to Joanna Paraszczuk.

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Itt is interesting to contrast the history of Ukraine as taught in schools at present withh the Soviet era.65 This will enable us to see how current textbooks present sensitive historicall topics - Kyïv Rus', the Cossack era, the rise of national consciousness in the latee 19th century, the attempts to establish independence after the February 1917 Revolution,, the famine of the 1930s, and World War II and the role of the Organization off Ukrainian Nationalist (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Are Ukrainianss consistently portrayed as victims of Russian/Soviet rule? Is the Bolshevik Revolutionn presented as something foreign and hostile, or is it considered a partly domestically-inducedd turn of events with Ukrainians participating in it? Are Ukraine and itss population described as neutral victims of both warring parties in World War n, or are theyy seen as active participants in the Soviet army and as subjects of German aggression only?? The answers to these questions are highly relevant because a whole generation of schoolchildrenn is now being taught in a new fashion.

Ass mentioned in the previous chapter, school education has remained highly centralizedd in post-independence Ukraine, with schools using the programs and 'recommended'' textbooks of the Ministry of Education. For the compulsory course of historyy of Ukraine, the ministry offers schools a choice of two recommended textbooks perr grade, books which are also available in a Russian translation for Russian schools (Zbirnyk(Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1996, No. 12). However, all the schools, both Russian and Ukrainian, thatt I visited on my fieldwork travels throughout Ukraine make use of the same textbook forr a certain grade because only this particular textbook closely follows the program in structuree and content.66 This uniform use of a limited number of textbooks, which is reminiscentt of the Soviet era, makes it easy to do a comparative content analysis of the Soviett and the new textbooks on the history of Ukraine, as only a few books have to be studied.677 At the same time, the widespread use of these books underlines the relevance of analyzingg them. One has to keep in mind, however, that no matter how uniform their geographicalgeographical distribution, their dispersal in time may vary, as the ministry sometimes issuess a limited number of new textbooks for trial in specially selected schools in two of Ukraine'ss 26 oblasts. After having used these books for a year, the teachers give their comments,, which (at least in theory) are taken into account and incorporated in the new books.. Subsequently, these books are distributed to all schools (Zerkalo Nedeli, 26 Septemberr 1998).

655 In Soviet times, the history of Ukraine was taught as part of a general history course. 666 In the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 I made several fieldwork trips to the cities of Kyi'v, Odesa, L'viv and Donets'k.. In each of these cities, I visited 12 schools and simply asked the teachers to show me the books thatt were used. On one of these trips, Simferopol, the capital of The Crimea, was visited. To my surprise, evenn the schools there had begun to use the programs and recommended textbooks. Efforts to consolidate thee state thus appear successful (at least in the sphere of education), which is remarkable given the depth of thee economic crisis. 677 In contrast to the Soviet era, history teachers are now free to use all sorts of books as additional material inn their lessons. In this respect there has been some structural change.

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Thee following textbooks were used in the Soviet era: Grades 7-8: V.H. Sarbei, H.Ya. Serhienko and V.A. Smolyi, lstohia

UkrainskoiUkrainskoi SSR (Kyiv: Radians'ka Shkola, 1984), 158 pp. This textbook describess Ukrainian history up to the 20th century.

Grades 9-10: V.H. Sarbei, and V.E. Spytskyi, Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR. (Kyiv: Radians'kaa Shkola, 1987), 183 pp. This textbook describes Ukrainian history duringg the 20th century.

Thee textbooks used in post-Soviet Ukraine are: Grades 7-8: H.Ya. Serhienko and V.A. Smolyi, Istoriia Ukrainy: s

drevneishikhdrevneishikh vremen do kontsa XVIII veka) (Kyiv: Osvita, 1995), 256 pp. A historyy of Ukraine from ancient times to the end of the 18th century.

Grade 9: V.H. Sarbei, Istoria Ukrainy: XlX-nachalo XXveka (Kyiv: Heneza, 1996),, 223 pp. A history of Ukraine in the 19th century and at the beginning of thee 20* century.

Grade 10: F.H. Turchenko, Noveishaia istoriia Ukrainy: Chast' pervaia (1917-1945(1917-1945 rr.) (Kyiv: Heneza, 1994), 340 pp. A history of Ukraine from 19177 to 1945.

Grade 11: F.H. Turchenko, P.P. Panchenko and CM. Tymchenko, NoveishaiaNoveishaia istoria Ukrainy: chast' vtoraia (1945-1995 roky) (Kyiv: Heneza, 1995),, 342 pp. A history of Ukraine from 1945 to 1995.68

Itt is using these six books that a comparative content analysis will be applied.69 Two pointss are immediately apparent when the books are compared. Firstly, three of the authorss (Sarbei, Serhienko and Smolyi) wrote both the old and new textbooks. This may bee an indication of the difficulties the Ministry of Education has faced in finding experts too write new textbooks. More importantly, it may also testify to the ministry's approval of lettingg scholars associated with the old regime participate in the teaching of the new historyy of Ukraine. It must be noted here that other post-communist states were not as tolerantt in their treatment of scholars and officials who occupied important positions in thee communist era. In East Berlin, for instance, almost all school directors were changed afterr 'Die Wende' (den Hertog, 1999, interview).70 Yet, a continuity of personnel need, of course,, not by itself stand in the way of a revised content of the history books. Much will dependd on the severity of ministerial prescriptions and on the flexibilit y of the authors. In vieww of these considerations, it wil l be interesting to see to what extent the authors of the Soviett textbooks have adjusted the content of the new books to the new political circumstances. .

Gradess 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the Soviet era equal grades 8, 9, 10 and 11 in post-Soviet Ukraine respectively. 699 The attentive reader will have noticed that titles are given in a transcription from Russian. This is because thee author read the Russian translations. Remarkably, the Russian translation of the grade 11 textbook has a sectionn on the Ukrainian diaspora, which the Ukrainian original does not have. No reason is given for the inclusionn of this section in the Russian translation. 700 In Ukraine, I only found significant personnel changes in the schools in the western Ukrainian city of L'viv . .

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Secondly,, the study load has increased dramatically. Not only did the number of textbookss expand from two to four for each pupil while at school, the number of pages in eachh textbook has also almost doubled.

4.1.22 Kyïv Rus'

Beginningg with Kyïv Rus', we see that the old textbook for grades 7-8 indeed echoes the Soviett notion of the (pursuit of) unity, brotherhood and friendship of the three East Slavic peoples: :

Sincee the creation of the state [Kyïv Rus'], the differences between the Slavic tribes quicklyy faded away. Their intensive contacts were greatly aided by the development off the Old Russian language, which was understandable for the whole population of Kyïvv Rus'. (...) The Old Russian proto-nation was based on a communality of economicc relations, territory, language and culture. In addition to this, certain particularitiess remained in the language, culture and customs of people living in the northeastern,, western and southwestern parts of the territory of Kyïv Rus'. Later thesee particularities became more pronounced and formed the basis for the evolution off the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian proto-nations. Subsequently, out of these oldd Russian proto-nations crystallized the three brotherly nations - Russians, Ukrainianss and Belorussians, who forever retained a feeling of relatedness, communalityy and historical unity (Sarbei et al., grades 7-8, p. 19).

Itt was this passage that was thoroughly revised in the new textbook for grades 7-8. Instead,, we now read that:

Thee main state, political, religious and cultural center of Kyïv Rus' developed, of all places,, on the territory of present-day Ukraine, and the Slavic tribes living on these landss founded political alliances, constituted the Ukrainian proto-nation, and were at thatt time the state-building force of Kyïv Rus'. Kyïv, as the historical center of the Ukrainiann proto-nation, became the unifying beginning for the other tribes of the Russiann lands, as well. For this reason, many scholars consider Kyïv Rus', where thee leading role was taken by one particular ethnic community, the Ukrainian proto-nation,, to be a Ukrainian state. (...) Each proto-nation living on the territory of Kyïv Rus'' developed in isolation and aspired independent state life. Moreover, as we shalll see, the union of East Slavic tribal alliances in the state of Kyïv Rus' was far fromm voluntary: often the Kyi'van kings had to subjugate them by means of military forcee (Serhienko and Smolyi, grades 7-8, p. 47).

Claimingg that the Ukrainian proto-nation was in fact the ruling group in Kyïv Rus' and by statingg that many experts label Kyïv Rus' as a Ukrainian state clearly appeals to modern Ukrainiann historiography, which considers Kyïv Rus' to be the forerunner of present-day Ukraine.. Moreover, in another contrast to the first extract, not the brotherhood but the animosityanimosity between the East Slavic proto-nations is stressed. The problematic relationship withh Russia is also highlighted when the Russian imperialist view of Kyïv Rus' is implicitl yy attacked: "Al l this leads to the proper conclusion that the Russian Empire in laterr times did not have the right to present itself as the sole successor of Kyïv Rus' and

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too subject Ukraine and Belarus to Czarist rule" (ibid. pp. 75,76). To underline the Ukrainiann scheme, Hrushevs'kyi, the doyen of 20th century Ukrainian historiography, is quoted:: "Kyïv Rus' appears to be the first form of Ukrainian statehood" (ibid. p.76).

Anotherr difference with the old textbook is the way the introduction of Christianityy is evaluated. Although the new book admits that Christianity strengthened thee authoritarian power of the king, it generally appreciates it as a positive phenomenon, bringingg civilisation, literacy and culture to Ukraine and giving it closer ties with western Europe.. Later in the book, the Orthodox Church is even mentioned as, "the spiritual base off the Ukrainian proto-nation" (ibid. p. 97). The Soviet book, in contrast, sees Christianityy as bringing more harm than good. It is said to have contributed to the "exploitationn of the popular masses" by the king and the nobles and to have been unable too stop the feudal quarrels, which significantly weakened Kyïv Rus'. Moreover, literacy is claimedd to have preceded Christianity.

Inn addition to these differences, the books also show remarkable similarities. For example,, much of the content of the old book was literally copied in the new book, especially,, and quite surprisingly, the section on the origins of the names Rus' and RusskaiaRusskaia zemlia as alternative names for the Kyi'van state. Like the old book, the new bookk (its Russian translation) simply uses the adjectival form russkii (Russian) in, for instance,, Russkaia zemlia. Although Serbyn (1999, p. 7) argues that russkii is indeed the appropriatee adjective for Rus' in the Russian language, the term could lead to confusion ass it carries the meaning of 'ethnically Russian' in normal usage. Pupils reading the Russiann translation could thus interpret Russkaia zemlia as 'Russian land,' (i.e. the 'land inhabitedd by ethnic Russians'). Surely, this is not the interpretation the Ministry of Educationn would like pupils to make. Moreover, as Serbyn points out, the terms russkii andd rossiiskii (the adjective for Rossiia - Russia) are often used interchangeably in Russiann literature, which undermines the distinction between Russia and Rus' (ibid. p. 7). Inn view of the confusion russkii evokes, it seems strange that the authors did not choose (orr invent) another Russian term as an adjective for Rus'. Incidentally, the Ukrainian equivalentt - rus 'kiy - does not lead to any misunderstanding as it only refers to Rus' and nott to Russia or Russian ethnicity - the adjective for the latter two being rosiis 'kyi.

AA second remarkable similarity concerns the new book's focus on issues of social injusticee and class conflict. Copying the old book, it asserts that: "The king and nobles conqueredd community land and acres and violently forced the peasant serfs not only to payy tribute but also to work a certain amount of days on their country estates" (Serhienko andd Smolyi, grades 7-8, p. 49), and that: 'The city poor paid the king heavy taxes, fulfille dd several duties and had to maintain churches and monasteries. The most cruel exploitationn the serfs suffered, who did not own land" (ibid. p. 53). It continues: "Profiteerss and merchants thrived on the destruction and poverty of the people. All this ledd to explosions of popular rage" (ibid. p. 61). These and other excerpts show that the neww book was still to a certain extent written in the communist spirit. Given that the authorss (Serhienko and Smolyi) of the new edition were also co-authors of the Soviet book,, one has to conclude that they certainly did not change all of their historical views withh the arrival of Ukraine's independence.

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4.1.33 The Cossack era and Hetman Ivan Mazepa

Thee accounts of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, the Pereyaslav Treaty and the controversial Cossackk leader Mazepa in the Soviet textbook are predictably in line with the Soviet schemee of Ukrainian history. In brief, it argues that in the 16th and 17th centuries the Ukrainiann popular masses were suppressed by Polish nobles and Tatar warlords, and that duee to the courageous military campaigns of the Cossacks (free farmer-soldiers who had fledd serfdom) and the unconditional support of their Russian brethren, the Ukrainians managedd to cast off their foreign yoke and realize their long-cherished dream of uniting withh Russia. Mazepa, the Cossack Hetman who in the early 18th century sided with Charless XII of Sweden in his power struggle with Russia's Peter I, is depicted as a traitor whoo received only minimal support from his own troops. In particular the signing of the Pereyaslavv Agreement of 1654, which united the Cossack lands with Russia in exchange forr autonomy, is exalted as a wonderful display of Russian-Ukrainian friendship:

Alongg the whole way the population of Ukraine greeted the ambassadors of the brotherlyy Russian people with festivities and happiness. (...) All the participants of thee council unanimously voted for the union of the brotherly nations into one state. (...)) the oath 'that all forever be one' was supported by the whole Ukrainian nation (Sarbeii et al., grades 7-8, p.64).

Inn its discussion of early modern times, the old textbook continues to stress social issues. Itt contends that only during the war of liberation of 1648-1654 did the 'popular masses' off peasants and lower-class Cossacks manage to abolish serfdom and take large areas of landd for their own use. Very soon afterwards, the Cossack higher circles (the so-called starshyna)starshyna) "began attacking the social conquests of the laborers" {ibid. p. 70). With the passingg of time, peasants and workers, it is argued, were deprived of more and more rightss and were pushed back into serfdom and conditions of slavery. The book considers thee destruction of the Zaporizhzhian Sich, the most important Cossack stronghold, by Czarinaa Catherine II in 1775, as another lamentable victory of the Czarist regime over the 'revolutionaryy anti-feudal' forces. No reference is made to the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks or too the several peasant uprisings of the 18th century as specific Ukrainian phenomena. Similarly,, the book makes no mention of the Ukrainian language, leaving the reader mystifiedd about its fate. Only on two occasions does it give examples of a specific culturall interference by foreign powers: "[i n 18th-century Polish-held Ukraine] Ukrainian schools,, which were persecuted by the Catholic church and the royal powers, led a pitiful existence"" {ibid. p. 102); while "German, Austrian and Hungarian nobles introduced languagess that were foreign to the Ukrainian people" {ibid. p. 101). Thus, if we are to believee this book, only powers other than Russia culturally oppressed Ukrainians.

Understandably,, the new textbook has a rather different view of the events of the 17thh and 18th centuries. The Liberation War is presented not only as a social but also as a nationall uprising, with the Cossacks identified as Ukrainian freedom fighters who attemptedd to shed Polish rule and found an independent Ukrainian state. It follows that thee Pereyaslav Treaty with Russia is described as an unfortunate but necessary event, as it

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meantt that the young Cossack state had to surrender some authority in order to safeguard thee gains of the Liberation War:

Thee Pereyaslav Treaty and the subordination to Russia was not at all a coincidental step,, but a painful decision by Hetman [Khmel'nyts'kyi] after long contemplation. Hee realized that the temporary respite for the young Ukrainian state would not be long-lived,, taking into account the temporary nature of the alliance with The Crimeann Khan, the unreliability of the Sultan of Turkey and the still-powerful Polish kingdomm (Serhienko and Smolyi, grades 7-8, p. 169).

Too justify why Russia in particular was chosen as a protector, the book says that: "Ukrainee and Russia were bound together by long historical ties, the ethnic closeness of bothh peoples and the orthodox faith" (ibid. p. 169).

AA similar, rather subtle account is given of Hetman Mazepa. Calling him neither a traitorr nor a national hero, the book presents him as an educated man who came to his decisionn after much deliberation: "restlessness and contradicting feelings tore his soul" (ibid.(ibid. p. 203). The increasing demands of the Czar on the Hetman to deliver soldiers and food,, the high tax burden on the peasants and on the lower-ranking Cossacks, and the lackk of respect with which the Czarist governors treated the Cossacks are seen as the directt causes for the Mazepa's switch in allegiance. Yet, the textbook does not leave unmentionedd the fact that Mazepa received only minimal support from the Ukrainian peoplee and that the population began resisting the pillaging army of Charles XH As in the oldd book, there is an account on how bravely the citizens of L'viv defended their city againstt the Swedes. This rather balanced version of the Mazepa years is surprising if one realizess that nation-building architects could use Hetman Mazepa to present evidence of thee 'eternal endeavor of the Ukrainian nation to achieve state independence.'

Anotherr perhaps remarkable aspect of the new edition is that Ukraine under Cossackk rule is not idealized. In a straight copy from the old book, the social situation thatt developed after 1654 is criticized, with the Cossack higher circles being accused of enrichingg themselves at the expense of the lower classes by taking much of their land and increasingg their duties. Similarly, examples can be found of the terminology that can typicallyy be associated with a Soviet account of history: "toiling masses" (ibid. p. 195); "sociall oppression;" "exploitation by entrepreneurs" and "social struggle of the laboring masses"" (ibid. p. 236).

Yet,, in clear contrast to the Soviet textbook, the new book does address the issue off the Ukrainian language. More than once it mentions how in the 18th century the Ukrainiann language was pushed out of the public domain by a conscious policy of russificationn in Left Bank Ukraine, and of polonization in Right Bank Ukraine: "(...) the spirituall state of mind of the community was negatively affected by the policy of russification,, which was enforced by the Czarist government" (ibid. p. 197) and "gradually,, the Ukrainian language was driven not only from the administration, but also fromm literature and from schools. In its place, Russian was introduced everywhere" (ibid. p.. 243). Interestingly, by focusing on the introduction of Russian and Polish on Ukrainian territoryy by neighbouring powers, the book clearly implies that these languages are foreignforeign to Ukrainians and that only the Ukrainian language can rightfully be called a

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constituentt element of Ukrainian national identity. Although this stance strongly supports thee claim of Ukrainian distinctiveness, it may also lead to feelings of estrangement among Russian-speakingg pupils as they might start to question whether they are in fact true Ukrainianss if they speak the language of the 'elder brother.'

4.1.44 The awakening of the Ukrainian nation in the second half of the 19' Century

Ass expected, the old Soviet textbook interprets the growing dissatisfaction with Czarist rulee in Ukraine in the second half of the 19th century as, above all, a class struggle of the Ukrainiann proletariat and peasantry against the bourgeoisie and the nobility. Nonetheless, itt argues that, as a result of the development of capitalism, the Ukrainian 'capitalist' nationn came into being: "Because of the development of capitalism, the accelerated processs of the economic, territorial, linguistic and cultural unification of the population of thee Ukrainian lands created the conditions for the completion of the long process of the formationn of the Ukrainian nation" (Sarbei et al, grade 7-8, p. 144). The book continues byy contending that the Ukrainian nation can truly be called 'capitalist', with all its inherentt conflicts, since there were many Ukrainians, either Ukrainian or Russian-speaking,, who entered the ranks of the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie. Consequently, itt is argued, these Ukrainians found themselves in a class struggle with fellow Ukrainians off the lower classes. As regards the Ukrainian language, the book claims that local dialectss gradually merged into a literary and nationwide language and that the evolution off this language was greatly aided by the works of the classical authors of Ukrainian literature.. These authors, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko especially, are portrayed as anti-Czarist/Habsburgg (not anti-Russian!) social revolutionaries.

Perhaps,, quite surprisingly, the old textbook mentions the Czarist crackdown on thee Ukrainian language and culture: "by means of a special order, Czar Alexander II prohibitedd the publication of books in the Ukrainian language, and theatre plays for a Ukrainiann audience could only be performed in Ukraine by special permission of the governor"" (ibid. p. 155). Yet, it fails to note that as a consequence of this Czarist ban theree may not only have been pronounced anti-Czarist sentiments among Ukrainian intelligentsiaa circles, but also a strong desire to separate from Russia and found an independentt Ukrainian state. Instead, the book takes every opportunity to underline the 'eternall striving of the Ukrainian nation to unite with their Russian brethren.' In this respect,, the Galician writer Ivan Franko is singled out as a "great revolutionary democrat" thatt dedicated his life and works to the unification of the west Ukrainian population (whichh was under Austrian rule) with the Czarist-ruled Ukrainians "within the structure off Russia." The textbook quotes him as saying that "we love the Russian people and wish themm all the best, we love and learn their language" (ibid. p. 144).

Inn contrast to the Soviet textbook, the new book (for the ninth grade) contributes thee awakening of the Ukrainian nation not to the growth of capitalist economic relations butt to the abolition of serfdom and the incessant efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to spreadd the Ukrainian national idea among the peasantry. These peasants are regarded as thee "bearers of the ethnic features of the Ukrainian nation" (Sarbei, grade 9, p. 104), and thee Ukrainian language as the, "cementing force of unity of the national culture" (ibid. p. 106).. In fact, the new textbook argues that imperialism and capitalism actually frustrated

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thee consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and the creation of a national economy. It states that:: 'The road to a normal development of the Ukrainian nation was closed because of thee merciless colonizing exploitation of the national economies of the Russian and Austro-Hungariann Emp\res"(ibid. p. 107). To illustrate this point, the textbook contends thatt Ukraine traded at an unfavorable exchange rate with Russia, exchanging cheap raw materialss for expensive finished products. Moreover, it is asserted that the trade sector in Ukrainee fell almost completely into the hands of Russian, Jews, Armenians, and Greeks "whoo often did not operate as civilized merchants, but as barbaric predatory wholesale buyerss and sellers" (ibid. p. 108). Thus, the new book refutes the old textbook's claim thatt Ukrainians participated in the emerging bourgeoisie.

Nott surprisingly, the new textbook sees the particular Czarist policy towards the Ukrainiann language and culture as another obstacle to the development of the Ukrainian nation.. In a full four pages, it recounts how the Czar successively issued orders forbidding Ukrainiann textbooks, education, literature, theatre plays and songs, and how the imperial authoritiess started persecuting members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The Russian-Austriann border, which separated Ukrainians into two halves and significantly hampered theirr economic, political and cultural ties, is seen as a last impediment to the full realizationn of Ukrainian nationhood.

Proceedingg from the carefully reasoned economic and cultural 'exploitation' of thee Ukrainian lands by foreign peoples and powers, the new book considers the anti-Czaristt movement of the late 19th century to not only be social-revolutionary in character butt also, and above all, national-emancipatory in outlook. It provides eleven pages of discussionn on the Ukrainian intelligentsia circles in both the Russian and the Austrian Empire,, and describes how these intellectuals sought to disseminate the idea of an independentt Ukrainian state under the threat of deportation. Yet, in an echo of the old textbook,, the new volume concedes that the advocates of Ukrainian independence were greatlyy inspired by the revolutionary appeal of Marxism. In a similar vein, using typical Soviett phraseology, it more than once recalls how Ukrainian peasants and laborers were exploitedd by foreign nobles and industrials.

Comparingg the two textbooks, we can conclude that, despite being written by the samee authors, the old and the new volumes show remarkable contrasts in their account of thee late 19th century. These contradictions concern the participation of Ukrainians in 'the oppressingg classes' and the particular outlook of Ukrainian intellectual circles. However, inn spite of differences with the old textbook, the new book continues to a significant extentt the Soviet tradition of interpreting historical events in a materialistic way.

4.1.55 The Bolshevik Revolution and the ukrainianizatio n of the 1920s

Inn the Soviet textbook for grades nine and ten, the narrative on the October Revolution andd the ensuing Bolshevik conquest of Ukraine is equally straightforward. The Bolshevikss are presented as heroes who liberated the Ukrainian workers and peasants fromm the tyranny of the bourgeoisie, the nobles and the Central Rada. These 'anti-revolutionaryy forces' took control over most of Ukraine in the months after the Revolutionn and demanded the autonomous status of Ukraine within a federal Russia. The participationn of the Ukrainian proletariat in the Revolution is stressed more than once.

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Thee rebellion of the Arsenal factory workers in enemy-occupied Kyi'v is given as a particularlyy illustrative example: 'The Arsenal workers fought bravely, although there wass not enough ammunition and food. Women and children helped by providing the workerss with food and first-aid equipment for the seriously wounded, which were brought inn under heavy fire" (Sarbei and Spytskyi, grades 9-10, p. 48).

Yet,, the old textbook admits that the transition to Bolshevik power was not easy. Itt even concedes that in a number of city Soviets the Bolsheviks captured only a minority off seats:

Inn Ukraine the struggle for the victory of the Proletarian Revolution met with differentt rates of success in the various regions, and depended on the actual class relationships.. Thus, Soviet power was established without armed struggle in the Donbas,, where the Bolsheviks predominated in the Soviets and the proletariat was moree organized. But a fierce and tense battle erupted in Kharkiv, Ekatarinoslav (Dnipropetrovs'k),, Vinnytsia and Odesa, where the majority of seats in the Soviets weree captured by Mensheviks, SRs (socialist revolutionaries) and bourgeois nationalistss (ibid. p. 45).

Theree is also an implicit acknowledgment that initially not all of Ukraine's workers supportedd the Bolsheviks until they confirmed the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determinationn up to the point of secession. This was described as "encouraging the workerss of Ukraine to take the side of the Bolshevik party" (ibid. p. 47).

Quitee noteworthy is the old book's complete omission of the Bolshevik-induced ukrainianizationn campaign of the 1920s. Although there is mention of the massive operationn to combat illiteracy, there is no reference to the indigenization of administrative andd party executives or to the growing number of Ukrainian-language schools, vuzy (institutionss of higher education) and periodicals. On the other hand, the book does report thee communist alternative to the Czarist 'cultural oppression'. It discloses that: "During thee tenth session [of the Russian Communist Party] much attention was paid to the nationall question. The October Revolution had proclaimed the equality of all nations inhabitingg Russia. The task consisted of eliminating the economic and cultural arrears of thee nations that had been oppressed by the Czars" (ibid. p. 74).

Thee question is why the book fails to address the ukrainianization of the 1920s whenn it could serve as an outstanding illustration of the proclaimed endeavor to establish thee equality of all Soviet nations. Considering that the book was published in 1987, the yearr that saw the beginning of national revival movements in the Baltics, one could postulatee that the Soviet educational authorities wanted to direct attention away from the sensitivee nationality issue. Another reason could be that the educational powers sought to makee pupils believe that from the beginning of the existence of the Soviet Union the constituentt nations were actually in the process of merging into a larger Soviet nation. A confirmationn of this argument can be found:

Thee common economy and culture, which was international in spirit and character, providedd the conditions for an intensification of the friendship and brotherly cooperationn of the Soviet republics. This contributed to the creation of a new historicall community of people - the Soviet Nation (ibid. p. 96).

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Ass could be expected, the new edition for grade 10 presents an entirely different picture off the Bolshevik period. The Bolshevik ideal of absolute equality, social harmony and economicc prosperity is portrayed as a Utopian dream for which there was not even enoughh support among the population of Russia. It is also seen as an ideological movementt foreign to Ukraine, as reportedly only a small minority of Ukrainians sided withh the Bolsheviks. Very cleverly, the book quotes V. Zatonskii, one of the early Bolshevikk leaders, as saying that: 'The Bolshevik party had the Russian or russified proletariatt as its backbone" (Turchenko, grade 10, p. 35). The book continues by asserting that,, given these circumstances, Soviet power could only be established by force in Ukraine.. To underline this, it is stressed that: 'The social base of the Bolsheviks was weak,, and their authority insignificant" (ibid. p. 36), with the sole exception of the Donbass where the Bolsheviks captured power peacefully. Moreover, to corroborate the claimm that the Central Rada was the only political body that legitimately represented the Ukrainiann population, the book discloses the results of the November 1917 elections for thee first session, which purportedly show that the Ukrainian national parties captured aboutt 75 percent of the votes, while the Bolsheviks received only 10 percent.

Yet,, the Central Rada is also criticized for not addressing the critical issue of land reform.. Although it is admitted that a radical redistribution of land would have had disastrouss consequences for agrarian productivity, its postponement is seen as the principlee reason why the rural poor turned their backs on the Central Rada. Interestingly, byy quoting the historian Viacheslav Lypins'kyi, who "with bitterness stated that the notionn of Ukraine (...) was replaced by the notion of the desiatina zemli [a specific measuree of land]71" (ibid. p. 41), the book quite explicitly acknowledges that a Ukrainian nationall consciousness appears to have been quite shallow among the peasantry. Likewise,, it is conceded that most of the urban poor chose the Bolshevik side. The textbookk even mentions the Arsenal uprising and how it contributed to the defeat of the armyy of the Central Rada in its defense of Kyïv. Taken as a whole, however, the work maintainss its position that the arrival of Soviet power in Ukraine was deplorable, accusing thee Bolsheviks of eliminating democracy, indulging in cruel terror, persecuting Ukrainian culturee and confiscating food and other products. It ends a section with a strong condemnation:: 'The establishment of Bolshevik power in Ukraine, by means of deceit, violencee and direct interference from abroad, inevitably had to become and became the objectt of nationwide opposition" (ibid. p. 58).

Givenn the new textbooks' preoccupation with the Ukrainian language - the book forr the ninth grade even explicitly states that "the membership of which [the Ukrainian nation]] was before all determined by the native [i.e. Ukrainian] language" (Sarbei, grade 9,, p. 107) - it is interesting to see how the ukrainianization of the 1920s is portrayed. Yet, thee book for the tenth grade is ambiguous about this period. On the one hand, ukrainianizationn is appreciated as it "attracted many representatives of the national intelligentsiaa to the process of cultural rebuilding, who sincerely attempted to serve the nationn and to contribute to its social-economic and spiritual revival" (Turchenko, grade 10,, p. 194). In a similar manner, the book values achievements such as the reduction of

711 This land measure refers to the heated debate on whether estates of less than 40 desiatina would be subjectt to redistribution as well.

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illiteracy,, the increase of Ukrainian-language schools, vuzy and publications, and the mass admissionn of Ukrainians into the student population. On the other hand, it is argued that ukrainianizationn was not strong enough to have a lasting impact on the language regime inn the most important sphere of public life, the Communist Party bureaucracy, where Russiann remained the dominant language. However, the harshest criticism of the policy of ukrainianizationn was that its initiators did not see it as a goal in itself:

Fromm its very first beginning this process was subordinated (...) to the construction off a culture on the ideological foundation of Marxism, ukrainianization (...) was onlyy permitted to the extent that it did not collide with the interests and ideological orientationss of the leadership of the highest state and party organs (ibid. p. 194).

4.1.66 The collectivisation of agricultur e and the 1930s famine

Obviously,, the old and the new textbooks completely differ in their narratives on the collectivizationn of agriculture and its consequences. The Soviet textbook appreciates the collectivizationn drive as the campaign that broke the last elements of capitalist, anti-revolutionaryy resistance. It argues that: "The socialist restructuring of the countryside eliminatedd the class stratification of the peasantry, humility and poverty" (Sarbei and Spytskyi,, grades 9-10, p. 87), and it claims that people valued the expression that "people livee well on those places where they sow and harvest together" (ibid. p. 85). The Kulaks (well-to-doo farmers) are blamed for all the wrongs on the collective farms: the low morale off the workers, the lack of discipline, theft and sabotage of Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz property and evenn terror against party activists and farm personnel. Yet, there is an acknowledgment thatt the authorities were responsible for certain excesses as well: "In some places, the principlee of voluntary cooperation was violated (...) The exaggerations in the Kolkhoz campaignn led to dissatisfaction among some peasants, which had a negative influence on thee solidity of the union of the working class with the peasantry" (ibid. p. 87). The book iss quick to point out that the Communist Party took appropriate measures to prevent similarr mistakes from happening again. However, it is completely silent about the consequencee of these 'exaggerations' i.e. the 1930s famine.

Ass would be expected, the new textbook strongly condemns the collectivization andd the ensuing famine. It asserts that the former can be equated with a "pillaging of the countryside"" (Turchenko, grade 10, p. 221), which served to speed up industrialization. Detailedd accounts are given of the confiscation of food and private property, of the forcefull incorporation of peasants into kolkhozes, and of the dramatic decline in productionn levels. All this is said to have resulted in the artificial famine of 1932-1933, whichh is characterized as: "One of the most cruel crimes organised by Stalinism against thee Ukrainian nation" (ibid. p. 225). The book even claims that the authorities deliberatelyy induced the famine to crush the resistance of peasants and nationalist forces. Too substantiate this claim, the textbook quotes a communist official who reportedly said that:: "A bloody war is fought between the peasants and our powers. This is a war of life andd death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. The hunger showed themm who is the boss here. It cost millions of lives, but the kolkhoz system will exist forever.. We won the war!" (ibid. p. 227). Nonetheless, the book does not go as far as to

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accusee the authorities of specifically targeting the Ukrainians as it discloses how the hungerr not only affected the Ukrainian lands but also other regions of intensive agriculture,, such as the northern Caucasus, the Kuban and Volga regions and northern Kazakhstan. .

4.1.77 Worl d War II and the role of the Organization of Ukrainia n Nationalists (OUN) )

Inn its account of World War n, the Soviet textbook pictures the Ukrainians as a people whoo greatly suffered from the German occupational regime and who supported and participatedd in the Soviet Army struggle against the 'fascist aggressor.' For instance, to givee the impression that the people of western Ukraine welcomed the Soviet invasion of Polandd in September 1939, the book reports the local population as saying that: "When thee Red Army crossed the river Zbruch, the sun started shining over the Galicians" (Sarbeii and Spytskyi, grade 9-10, p. 105). It is stressed that Ukrainians, both on Soviet territoryy and in other countries, both as partisans and as regular Soviet Army servicemen, courageouslyy fought on the Soviet side to defeat the German occupiers:

Underr terrible wartime conditions, the Ukrainian people together with all nations of thee USSR honorably fulfilled its holy obligation towards the Socialist Fatherland. Forr their participation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, about 2.5 million Ukrainiann servicemen were awarded with combat medals and more than a thousand amongg them were granted the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (ibid. p. 124).

Thee book pays remarkably littl e attention to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),, a branch of which, the Stepan Bandera wing, fought against both the Soviet and thee German armies. It only briefly states that the German forces relied on "Ukrainian bourgeoiss nationalists, former Kulaks and criminals (...) for the pillaging of the Ukrainiann lands" (ibid. p. 113). The Uniate Church in western Ukraine, under Metropolitann Andriy Sheptyts'kyi, is singled out as having particularly ardently collaboratedd with the Germans. According to the book, it played an active role in the creationn of the "fascist" army division SS Halychyna.

Thee new textbook's version of World War II matches the Soviet one on two accounts.. The first concerns the presentation of the Soviet invasion in Poland: in an echo off the Soviet volume, it is argued that: " The west Ukrainian population met the Red Armyy with enthusiasm and hope" (Turchenko, grade 10, p. 278). However, the new editionn is quick to point out that this reaction was quite understandable in view of the precedingg period of Polish oppression and widespread Soviet propaganda which explainedd the Soviet attack as a successful attempt to ward off German occupation of Galicia.. It holds that this sympathy quickly turned into hate once the Soviets started disbandingg political parties and cultural associations and began persecuting members of thee Ukrainian intelligentsia. The second case of resemblance between the Soviet and post-Soviett volumes constitutes the presentation of lif e in the German occupied zone, which is reportedd to have been full of suffering and hardship: "It [the German occupation] brought

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suchh agony, terror on such a scale (...) that the recent Soviet past appeared almost like paradise"" (ibid. p. 296).

Nonetheless,, it is the pronounced contradictions with the Soviet account of events thatt are most conspicuous. One of these pertains to the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviett army. In contrast to the Soviet textbook, the new book does not once mention the inclusionn of large numbers of Ukrainians in the regular Soviet forces, although it does admitt that many Ukrainians were active as partisans in the Soviet underground. Similarly, thee narrative on the OUN is entirely different. On reading it one obtains the impression thatt the new textbook makes a conscious effort to rehabilitate this organization — and its militaryy wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — as it dedicates many pages (8 out off a total of 30 dealing with World War II) to the Bandera-led underground wing which turnedd against the German army in the early stages of the war. The volume emphasizes a secrett German order of December 1941 that reportedly said: "Except for the OUN-Banderaa group, there is not one resistance movement in Ukraine that is capable of presentingg a serious danger to us" (ibid. p. 302). The book even claims that the OUN-Banderaa forces were far more effective in combating the Germans than the Soviet underground.. In addition to this, the OUN is portrayed as an organization that embraced democraticc values (freedom of speech, press and religion, and the equality of all nationalitiess living on Ukrainian territory). In another contrast with the Soviet textbook, noo mention is made of any possible collaboration between the Uniate Church and the Germans.. The new book only acknowledges that another wing of the OUN, headed by Andriyy Melnyk, did cooperate with the Germans, as it mentions that the Melnyk branch supportedd the creation of the Waffen SS Halychyna division.

Itt is perhaps surprising to find the new account of World War II differing so radicallyy from the old version. The complete lack of any reference to the participation of Ukrainianss in the Soviet Army is likely to give these veterans the impression that they are deniedd a role as the liberators of Ukraine. Moreover, attempts to rehabilitate the OUN-UPAA could give veterans the idea that this new historiography actually portrays them as thee 'bad guys* who, as servicemen of a foreign army, fought the 'good guys' of the OUN-UPA.. What is more, this perception of having been part of a foreign army is reinforced by excerptss in the book that accuse the Soviet authorities, after their recapture of the Ukrainiann lands, of forcefully confiscating food and other products, sending millions of Ukrainiann youth to the front as cannon fodder, and reinstating the totalitarian regime of thee past (ibid. pp. 310,311). To make matters even worse, the new book says the following: :

Afterr the 20th session of the CPSU (in 1956), it became known that (Jozef) Stalin hadd very seriously considered a plan to deport all Ukrainians, in addition to Crimean Tatars,, Kalmuks and some Caucasus peoples. And, as (Nikita) Khrushchev remarkedd (...), the only reason that this had not happened was that there were too manyy Ukrainians, there were no places to send them to, otherwise Stalin would have deportedd them too (ibid. p. 325).

Clearly,, this extract leaves the reader no other impression than that the Soviet army was partt of a regime that was alien and hostile to Ukraine and Ukrainians.

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4.1.88 Conclusion

Fivee conclusions can now be made. Firstly, the new accounts of Ukrainian history are clearlyy more balanced than the version laid down in the Soviet editions. The new textbooks,, for instance, do not hesitate to point to the shortcomings, especially in the socio-economicc sphere, of the regimes that are seen as the predecessors of contemporary Ukrainee (i.e. Kyïv Rus', the Cossack state and the different governments attempting to foundd an independent Ukrainian state after the Bolshevik Revolution). The Soviet editionss lack this element of self-criticism.

Secondly,, another feature that Soviet textbooks miss is a certain individuality of character.. Among the new textbooks, there is quite a difference between the book for gradess 7-8 and that for grade 10. Whereas the former dedicates many pages to class conflictt and uses some of the terminology and even whole extracts from the old textbook, thee latter presents a chronicle of Ukrainian history that sharply contrasts with the old versionn on most points. It appears, therefore, that the educational authorities in post-independencee Ukraine granted the authors of schoolbooks more individual freedom of movementt than the authorities in Soviet times did. This comparison of books also shows thatt Serhienko and Smolyi, as the authors of the new book for grades 7-8, did not change alll the content and outlook of the old textbook. One can therefore conclude that the continuityy of personnel (remember that both the authors also wrote the Soviet textbook) hass resulted in a perpetuation of content and interpretation. In this light, it may not be a coincidencee that the present educational authorities ordered that the textbooks dealing withh 20th-century history be written by new authors. They may well have considered the modernn period too crucial and too sensitive for authors associated with the old regime (notablyy Sarbei) to write them.

Thirdly,, the old and the new editions diverge most notably in their accounts of matterss related to the sensitive topics of Ukrainian national identity or Ukrainian statehood.. The old textbooks, for instance, hardly touch upon the issue of the Ukrainian language,, and when they do, it is only to accuse other imperial powers (Poland, Czarist Russiaa and Austria-Hungary) of culturally subduing the Ukrainians. In fact, the old book forr grades 9-10 is completely silent about the fate of the Ukrainian language in Soviet times.. In the new books, on the other hand, the Ukrainian language is a much-discussed topic.. It is asserted that the Ukrainian language is the principal determinant of Ukrainian nationall identity, and it is implied that Russian and Polish are foreign languages, introducedd by neighboring powers bent on eliminating the use of Ukrainian in public spheres.72 2

Fourthly,, another noteworthy difference of opinion concerns the degree of involvementt of Ukrainians in the Bolshevik conquest of Ukraine and in the Soviet fight

722 Motyl (1993) asserts that after independence the ruling elites began propagating the image of the Ukrainiann nation as a people multiethnic in character who had internalized the Cossack-ascribed values of freedom,, equality and democracy. Although the spread of this image may have occurred in some policy areas,, it certainly, as we have seen, has not touched the teaching of history in schools. Instead, a rather narroww conception of the Ukrainian nation is communicated; it is implied that only those that speak Ukrainiann are 'real Ukrainians'. The new textbooks make no reference to particular Cossack virtues as constituentt elements of Ukrainian national identity.

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againstt German invaders. According to the Soviet textbook, Ukrainians fully participated inn both struggles, side by side with their Russian 'brethren'. The message the book sends iss clear: the Bolshevik Revolution is as much a Ukrainian phenomenon as a Russian one, andd it further strengthened the 'bonds of friendship between the two brotherly nations.' In contrast,, the new textbook argues that only a small minority of Ukrainians supported the Bolshevikk Revolution, and it makes no mention of Ukrainians as regular Soviet army servicemen.. Consequently, the new edition portrays the Bolshevik regime as a foreign power,, in which Ukrainians had no part. Moreover, its hostility towards the Ukrainians is stressed,, as the book seizes every opportunity to discredit the Soviet regime.

Finally,, an important contrast can also be found in the narratives on the role of the OUNN in World War II. While the Soviet textbook considers the OUN a 'Ukrainian bourgeoiss nationalist' organization that 'shamelessly' collaborated with the Nazis, the neww book makes a calculated effort to rehabilitate the OUN. Among other things, it presentss the Bandera-led wing of the OUN as an underground group that combated the Germanss quite effectively and which stood up for democratic values and the ideal of an independentt Ukrainian state.

Too a certain extent, the particular version of history advanced by the new textbookss is understandable. After all, the emphasis on Ukrainian as the sole native language,, on the Bolshevik regime as a foreign power, and on the OUN as a genuine nationall liberation movement firmly upholds claims of Ukrainian distinctiveness. However,, at the same time this version runs the risk of alienating both the Russian-speakingg part of the population and people who cherish the Soviet past, such as Soviet armyy veterans. The former are likely to ask themselves whether they can ever call themselvess - and be accepted as - 'authentic Ukrainians' if they continue to speak Russian.. The latter may very well take the new historiography as an insult because it degradess the status of Soviet army veterans. They used to be portrayed as soldiers who 'courageouslyy fought to liberate Ukraine from fascist occupation' but are now presented ass soldiers who 'contributed to the reinstitution of a foreign and oppressive regime that deniedd the Ukrainian nation its sacred right to self-determination.' An intriguing question forr further study, therefore, is whether Russian speakers and people with communist sympathiess will accept or reject the new version of history which their children are being taught. .

4.24.2 Ukrainian Literature

Thiss section is restricted to a comparison of old and new Ukrainian literature programs. Sincee programs offer a short description of the compulsory subject matter and the authors andd their works, this overview provides only a sketchy appreciation and summary of the changes. .

4.2.11 Ukrainian literatur e in Soviet times

Ass could be expected from a regime that sought to monopolize all spheres of life, there wass one standardized program for all schools in Soviet Ukraine. Each grade had its own

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textbookk and corresponding Khrestomatiia (collection of book excerpts). However, many pupilss in Russian schools did not study Ukrainian literature in Soviet times since they had beenn excused, on parental request, from learning the titular language and its literature.

Accordingg to the old program, the objective of Ukrainian literature education is to createe "a Marxist-Leninist world outlook of the thoroughly and harmoniously developed personalityy of a constructor of a communist society" (Prohramy serednoi ...IV-X kl., 1984,, p. 1). Given this aim, it is not surprising to find Soviet Ukrainian literature educationn being heavily politicized. The following themes recur frequently in the program:: (1) the poverty and exploitation of serfs by (foreign) noblemen and landowners; (2)) the common struggle of peasants and workers to overthrow the oppressive, exploitativee regime in the 19th century; (3) the realization in the 17th century of the long-cherishedd dream of the Ukrainian people of reuniting with Russia; (4) the closeness of Ukrainiann literature with Russian and Belorussian literature in style and content; (5) the churchh as a collaborator with the Czarist and Austrian exploitative regimes and the hypocrisyy of its leaders; (6) the people's happiness about the unification of all Ukrainian landss in one Ukrainian socialist republic within the structure of the Soviet Union in 1939; (7)) the exaltation of Lenin and the Communist Party leadership; (8) the glorification of thee Red Army in its heroic fight with fascist invaders; and (9) the brotherly cooperation of alll Soviet nations in the Red Army and in the post-war years of reconstruction.

Thee designers of the Soviet program had a large supply of 19Ih-century, socially committedd Ukrainian writers at their disposal to address the first two themes in particular. Tarass Shevchenko, for instance, the most famous of them all and the national hero of contemporaryy Ukraine, dedicated many of his works to the fate of the serfs and to the role off the Czarist authorities in consolidating social inequalities. Ivan Franko, the Galician intellectuall of the late 19th and early 20th century, was no less revolutionary in his appeals too the working class to fight for freedom and to overthrow the exploitative regime. In additionn to Shevchenko and Franko, Marko Vovchok, Leonid Hlibov, Ivan Nechui-Levyts'kyi,, Lesia Ukrainka, Mykhailo Kotsiubyns'kyi, and many other 19th-century writerss who identified with the Ukrainian peasantry and depicted the birth of social protestt were used by educational officials to underpin Soviet ideology. For the glorificationn of Lenin and the Communist Party, the Soviet educators could rely on the workss of Maksym Ryls'kyi, Pavlo Tychyna, Volodymyr Sosiura and Ostap Vyshnia, who (perhapss forcibly) wrote enthusiastic works in support of Bolshevik rule. It goes without sayingg that authors and individual works critical of (aspects of) the Soviet regime cannot bee found in the old program.

Thee extent to which Ukrainian literature was politicized in Soviet days can best be analyzedd by determining how many of the works listed in the program are addressing one off the aforementioned themes. For the fourth grade (the first grade that teaches Ukrainian literature),, we find that 17 out of 30 works convey a political message. Under the genre of fairyy tales, the young pupils of this grade were given narratives of Lenin as the leader "whoo showed workers the road to liberation from the oppression of exploiters" and of "thee contrasting interests of workers with landowners and rich people" (ibid. p. 10). Pupilss were taught both the all-Union and the Soviet Ukrainian anthems at the start of the

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course.733 In the seventh grade, as much as 19 of the 21 books discuss issues like the class strugglee and the achievements of communist society, according to the short description in thee program. In the tenth grade at least 40 of the 51 compulsory works cited in the programm have a politicized content.

AA last noteworthy feature of Soviet Ukrainian literature education is that only fromm grade eight onwards is there a systematic chronological build-up of the curriculum. Inn the first four grades (grades four to seven), the curriculum lacks a clear structure as in eachh grade the emphasis is on the 19th and early 20th centuries, with writers seemingly arbitrarilyy selected from this period.

4.2.22 Ukrainia n literatur e in contemporary Ukrain e

Thee new literature teaching is different from the old in a number of ways, both in structuree and in content. First, there is no one new program to replace the old one, but three,, and teachers are allowed to choose freely between the three and combine materials fromm them at their own discretion. Second, the foreword to the new programs states that "Everyy teacher must approach the content of the program creatively, introducing changes andd additions to the hours and the materials and reallocating them" (Prohramy serednoi ...8-11...8-11 klasy, 1995, p. 2). Third, teachers are permitted to add hours to the curriculum for thee education of literature of the "home region" (ridnyi krai: i.e. the oblast, rayon or city thee school is located in). Thus, although the subject matter is still to a large extent predeterminedd in the new Ukrainian literature course, the teacher can leave a much greaterr mark on the content of the lessons than he/she could in Soviet days.

Ass in Soviet days, there is one textbook and one corresponding collection of book excerptss per grade. These textbooks and collections, moreover, are used throughout Ukraine,744 with the geographical distribution of these materials being as uniform as that off the textbooks of history of Ukraine. Several of the authors of the new textbooks also wrotee the old ones, which is a phenomenon we know from the teaching of history of Ukraine.. However, whereas the Soviet-era writers of history of Ukraine wrote the new bookss for grades eight and nine which discuss Ukrainian history up to the 20l century, thee Soviet-era writers of Ukrainian literature wrote the new books for grades ten and elevenn which deal with literature from the end of the 19th century to the present -Neporozhniii and Semenchuk for current grade eleven and corresponding grade ten in Soviett days, and Khropko for current grade ten and Soviet grade nine.

Thee new program prepared by the Institute of Pedagogy of the Academy of Sciencess of Ukraine was compared with the old program. A study of this program reveals thatt the proposed subject matter was much less politicized and covered a wider range of themess than that of the Soviet program, especially concerning literature from the 20th

century.. Thus, many works discuss topics like the beauty of nature, country life, good and badd character traits, human yearnings, the raising of children, love, the passing of time,

733 Naturally, Soviet Ukraine is no exception in teaching the national anthem in schools. In fact, nearly all countries,, including the United States, make pupils learn the national anthem by heart. Thus, almost all nationall curricula are politicized to at least some degree. 744 As I discovered in the schools in Kyi'v, L'viv, Odesa and Donets'k.

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andd other themes that have no specific ideological or nationalizing content. Subjects that didd carry a strong political message included, among other things, (1) the rise and fall of Kyi'vann Rus', (2) the heroic deeds of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks and their efforts to foundd an independent Ukrainian state, (3) the misery of the Ukrainian serfs, peasants and workerss and their exploitation by foreign landowners, industrials and merchants, (4) the fatee of the Ukrainian language under Russian-Czarist and Austrian cultural oppression, (5)) the Ukrainian language as the bearer of Ukrainian national consciousness, (6) the totalitariann character of the communist regime and the Stalinist crackdown on Ukrainian writers,, (7) the collectivization of agriculture and the ensuing famine, (8) the suffering of thee Ukrainians under German fascist occupation and the struggle of the Red Army and the partisann movement to liberate Ukraine. All in all, just 22 out of the 73 works from 20th-centuryy literature contain an overt political message.

AA remarkable finding is that the new program presents few works critical of the Soviett regime. Of the 73 20th-century works that the pupils of the 10th and 11th grades havee to study, only seven denounce aspects of Soviet society, according to the short descriptionn in the program. Moreover, just one of these six works, Iurii Mushketyk's Sud (justice),, is devoted to the 1930s famine, and none of them address the steady post-war retreatt of Ukrainian from public spheres (which is a popular theme among Ukrainian nationalistss and dissidents). Another noteworthy finding is that none of the 73 works takess up the theme of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and role of the Bandera-ledd underground wing during World War II . There are, on the other hand, three works praisingg the heroic deeds of the Red Army and Soviet partisans against the fascist invaders.. The scarcity of works critical of the Soviet regime and the complete lack of workss focusing on opposition groups (such as the OUN) may be an indication that works onn these topics simply do not exist, due to decades of Soviet censorship. The program's introductionn to the literature of the 20th century seems to suggest this as it draws the reader'ss attention to the persecution of Ukrainian writers during the Stalin era (the programm speaks of "the extermination of the nation's flower") and to the devastating impactt this had on the development of Ukrainian literature in the pre-war years (ibid. p. 97).. Yet, the paucity of critical works may also reflect the preferences of the authors of thee 10th and 11th grade textbooks as both authors also wrote the Soviet manuals and can thuss be associated with the Soviet past.

Perhapss equally astounding is how closely the new program follows the old programm in its treatment of ^^-century authors and their preoccupation with social inequalityy and class conflict.75 As many as 13 of the 16 authors and 36 of the 61 works cann also be found in the old program, and 24 works (more than one-third!) discuss the plightt of the peasantry and/or make revolutionary appeals to overthrow the "exploitative" regime.. What is more, the new program impudently copies much of the Soviet rhetoric andd terminology from the old program. Thus, it speaks of "the contrast of the healthy moralee of the working people with the degeneration and egoism of the privileged classes,"" "the pseudo-liberalism of the Ukrainian nobility, the treason to their people," "thee common struggle of the progressive activists of the Ukrainian and Russian theater art,"" "... employees and businessmen, the exposure of their immorality (hypocrisy, deceit,

Nineteenthh century literature is taught to grades nine and ten.

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blackmail,, cynicism and theft)," and "the attempt to contrast the predatory exploiters with thee representatives of the people's intelligentsia."(/6/d. pp. 62, 67, 77, 79). Panteleimon Kulishh is the only writer the new program introduces who does not speak in pejorative termss about the middle and upper classes. In his work Ridne Slovo (native word), he calls forr inter-class unity in order to achieve "the state and national revival of Ukraine" (ibid. p.. 70).

Thee focus on social injustice and class conflict does not mean that national issues aree disregarded. In the new program, we find 7 of the 61 works of 19th-century Ukrainian literaturee discussing the plight of the Ukrainian language under foreign oppression and its importancee as the primary building block of Ukrainian national consciousness. Another 100 works are devoted to the heroism of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks and to the suppressionn of Ukraine by foreign powers. Interestingly, the new program also presents hithertoo unknown works by famous authors like Shevchenko, Franko and Tychyna. Obviously,, these works were deemed unfit by the Soviet educators for the propagation of communistt ideology and the idea of the "brotherhood of Soviet nations," and were withheldd accordingly. The newly found legacy of Pavlo Tychyna, which is highly critical off early Soviet society, stands out as the same author also wrote works praising Lenin and thee Communist Party (with revealing titles like Lenin; The Party Leads; Lenin Sun) (Prohramy(Prohramy serednoi ...IV-Xkl, 1984, p. 68).

Anotherr remarkable finding is that the structure of the curriculum has remained thee same. As in the old system, the first four grades (grades five to eight) all present 19 andd lO^-century literature indiscriminately, with each devoting several hours to a special literaryy genre (fifth grade - fairy tales and riddles; sixth grade - folk songs; seventh grade -folkk ballads; eighth grade - lyric poetry). From grade nine, the curriculum is built up chronologically.. The periodization, however, differs from the old program, and the titles off the periods have been modified. Thus, "Ukrainian literature of the third stage of the liberationn movement in Russia" is now given the neutral label 'The literary process at the endd of the 19th century - beginning of the 20th century." Likewise, 'The formation and developmentt of Ukrainian Soviet literature" has been changed into simply "Literature of thee 20th century: 1900 - 1940" (ibid. pp. 58, 66, and Prohramy serednoi ...8-11 klasy, 1995,, pp. 83, 89). The fact that the new titles no longer carry any ideological content is anotherr indication that the new literature teaching has become less politicized.

4.34.3 Geography of Ukraine

Thee thematic content of geography courses was altered dramatically with independence. Thee sections in the geography program devoted to the geography of the USSR were replacedd by sections on world geography and geography of Ukraine (compare Prohramy dliadlia ...5-9 kl, 1983 with Prohramy dlia...5~10 klasy, 1996). By omitting any reference to thee CIS as a separate geopolitical or socioeconomic unit in the new program, the authoritiess may have wanted to emphasize Ukraine's distinctiveness vis-a-vis the Russian Federation. .

Remarkably,, the new geography textbook does not emphasize geographical featuress in order to legitimize Ukraine's independence. For instance, no argument is made

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off Ukraine having somehow natural borders with Russia or of an early settlement pattern off Ukrainians corresponding exactly to the territory of contemporary Ukraine. Instead, the neww book relies on the origin of the name Ukraine, on history, and on an economic argumentt in order to justify post-Soviet independence. As for the origin of the name of Ukraine,, it is argued that the word of Ukraine was already used in 12th-century chronicles off Kyïvan Rus' to denote the northern part of present-day central Ukraine. From the 16th

century,, it is claimed, the name of Ukraine began to be used widely in state documents, diplomaticc acts and literary sources, with its population being increasingly identified as Ukrainianss (Syrotenko et al., 1994). The book maintains that the names Malorosiia, Mala Rus'Rus' and Malorosiis'kyi krai only appeared in the 18th century and "reflected the social andd national politics of the Czarist government towards the Ukrainian people" (ibid. p. 9).

Ass regards history, the emphasis is on past attempts to found a "Ukrainian state" (thee Cossack era in particular is highlighted) and on the Czarist policies, which "attemptedd to destroy everything that was left of Ukrainian statehood, Ukrainian freedom andd those democratic customs by which Ukraine distinguished itself from Russia" (ibid. P-9). .

Thee economic argument focuses on the structure of the Soviet Ukrainian economy andd on its dependency on Moscow as the center of decision-making and how this preventedd Ukraine from realizing its economic potential: "The command methods of administratingg the economy and the rigid centralization manacled the initiative and creativityy of the masses and slowed down the development of the economy. Since the economyy of Ukraine was subordinated to the economic complex of the USSR, Ukraine's economyy worked to fulfil l its needs, often at the expense of its own interests" (ibid. p. 123). .

4.44.4 Conclusion

Ann analysis of old and new history books shows us that the current teaching of the history off Ukraine teaching has created new myths (Kyïvan Rus' and the Cossack state are depictedd as early forms of Ukrainian statehood) and has sought to maximize Ukrainian distinctivenesss vis-a-vis Russia by an emphasis on Ukrainian as the sole native language, thee portrayal of the Bolshevik Revolution as a foreign phenomenon in which Ukrainians hadd no part, and the characterization of the OUN as a genuine national liberation movement.. The comparison further reveals that the new book for grades seven and eight too some extent echo the old book, especially as far as social issues are concerned. Given thatt the authors of the old book also wrote the new book, it is concluded that a continuity off personnel did indeed to some degree lead to a perpetuation of content. This conclusion iss confirmed by the finding that the new author of the current textbook for the 10th grade (whichh deals with the crucial period of the first half of the 20th century) produced a book thatt strongly contrasted with the corresponding old book for grades nine and ten in its interpretationn of events.

AA study of the old and new Ukrainian literature programs reveals that the new coursee of Ukrainian literature of the 20th century is much less politicized than the old course.. The great majority of the works the new program presents are dedicated to topics

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thatt have no specific ideological or nationalizing content. Moreover, remarkably few workss have been introduced that are critical of the Soviet regime. This paucity of faultfindingg works, it is argued, could well reflect the preferences of the authors of the 10thh and 11th grade textbooks since both authors also wrote the Soviet manuals. Perhaps equallyy surprising is the finding that the new program closely follows the old program in itss treatment of l^-century literature. Not only does the new program rely heavily on workss discussing social inequality and class conflict, it also shamelessly copies much of thee Soviet rhetoric and terminology from the old program.

Whenn the new teaching of 20th-century Ukrainian literature is compared to that of 20th-centuryy history of Ukraine, the former appears to contrast markedly with the latter. Whereass the former is largely apolitical and presents few works critical of the Soviet regime,, the latter is strongly nationalizing in content and misses no opportunity to criticizee aspects of Soviet society. This difference could well be attributed to the varying backgroundss of the authors: whereas the new Ukrainian literature textbooks for the 10 andd 11th grades were written by authors who also wrote the old books, the new Ukrainian historyy books for the last two grades were written by new authors with no association withh the Soviet past. Thus, for whatever reason, modern Ukrainian literature teaching has beenn far less modified than modern Ukrainian history teaching in post-Soviet Ukraine. Thiss is an indication that policies of nation-building are not consistent in all fields of state

activity. . Thee revised geography of Ukraine course contributes to the nation-building

projectt by touching on history, on the origin of the name Ukraina, and on economic relationss during the Soviet era as arguments that legitimize Ukraine's independence. In thee economic argument, the subordination of the Ukrainian economy to that of the USSR heldd back the development of Ukrainian society. Surprisingly, the new geography textbookk does not present typical geographical features, such as natural borders or settlementt patterns of the titular population, as elements of distinction that justify state independence. .

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55 THE IMPLEMENTATIO N OF CENTRAL POLICY

Thee previous chapters showed that the Ministry of Education has been quite successful in implementingg changes in school and vuzy curricula. Using the centralized structure of the Soviett era, it has managed to introduce new subjects, programs and textbooks in educationall establishments all over Ukraine. Yet, it is doubtful whether the ministry was ass effective in reaching the aims of its language policy: with the proportion of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils still only 49.3% at the onset of independence, two years after the adoptionn of the Language Law. This chapter describes in detail the implementation of this policy.. It presents statistics on the language of instruction in schools and vuzy, and ends withh a short discussion of the possible causes of the patterns found. It begins, however, withh an overview of developments in post-war Soviet Ukraine. The data wil l show that Ukraine'ss school system was heavily russified compared to that of the other Soviet republics,, and that the increase in the number of Russian-instructed pupils varied widely withinn Ukraine.

5.77 The Russification of Schools in Post-War Soviet Ukraine

Tablee 5.1 presents statistics on the percentage of pupils in titular-language schools in the post-warr Soviet republics. The most obvious conclusion one can draw is that Ukraine did indeedd experience a sharp decline in the percentage of pupils studying in titular-language schoolss in comparison to the other republics. Only in Belarus was this fall even more dramatic.. Another, more important feature that distinguishes these two Slavic republics fromm the others is that the percentage of pupils at titular schools lags far behind the titular elementt in the population (using the 1988 school data, in Ukraine by 25.2% and in Belaruss by 57.1%). This is a clear indication that many titulars enrolled their children in Russian-languagee classes in these republics.76 Interestingly, Estonia and Latvia also show aa substantial and steady decline in the proportion of pupils in titular-language schools, but theree the 1988 school data and the 1989 census data almost match, which is a sign that Estonianss and Latvians still clung to native-language instruction. The only possible explanationn for the (relative) decline in titular-language instruction in these republics mustt be the ongoing immigration of Russians in the post-war years, causing a steep rise inn the number of Russian-educated immigrant children.

Inn Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the percentage of pupils in native-languagee schools is actually higher than the proportion of titulars in the population. This cann be explained by the higher birth rate of the Central-Asian natives as compared to that off Slavic immigrants, inflating the numbers Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks in the school-agee population (Arel, 1994). Thus, it may very well be the case that the percentage of titularss in the school-age group is higher than the percentage of pupils in native-language schools,, which would indicate that there are some Central-Asian titulars 'defecting' to Russiann schools.

Thiss conclusion is warranted by the fact that instruction in languages other than Russian and the titular languagee was virtually non-existent in Ukraine and Belarus.

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Lastly,, it can be seen that in Kazakhstan, Moldova and the three Caucasian republicss as well the proportion of pupils in titular schools trails slightly to moderately trailss behind the titular weight in the population, suggesting some titular presence in Russian-languagee schools. Yet, compared to these republics, Ukraine and Belarus stand outt so much that one can safely argue that linguistic closeness to Russian must have been thee decisive factor causing so many Ukrainians and Belorussians to enroll their children inn Russian-language classes.

Tablee 5.1 Percentage of pupils in titular-language schools in Union Republics, in three schooll years, and percentage of titulars in population, 1989

Russiann Fed. Ukraine e Belarus s Moldova a Kazakhstan n Kyrgyzstan n Uzbekistan n Tajikistan n Turkmenistan n Azerbaijan n Armenia a Georgia a Latvia a Lithuania a Estonia a

%% of pupils 1956-57* *

94 4 74 4 78 8 67 7 34 4 51 1 80 0 84 4 79 9 77 7 91 1 80 0 67 7 89 9 78 8

inn titular-language 1980-81 1

97.0 0 54.6 6 35.0 0 63.1 1 36.0 0 52.7 7 77.7 7 64.4 4 78.0 0 83.4 4 79.8 8 67.6 6 55.9 9 84.6 6 67.5 5

schools s 1988-89 9

98.2 2 47.5 5 20.8 8 59.1 1 30.2 2 52.4 4 76.8 8 66.0 0 76.9 9 79.5 5 80.5 5 66.6 6 52.4 4 82.2 2 63.5 5

%% of titulars in population 1989 9 81.5 5 72.7 7 77.9 9 64.5 5 39.7 7 52.4 4 71.4 4 62.3 3 72.0 0 82.7 7 93.3 3 70.1 1 52.0 0 79.6 6 61.5 5

Source:: Arel (1994) 'Includess enrollment in titular and non-Russian minority schools. Decimals for the 1956 figures were not available.

Thee decline in Ukrainian-language school education (or vice versa, the russification of schools)) proceeded in an unequal fashion across Ukraine (see Table 5.2). In the urbanized oblastss of the east and south, the areas already heavily populated by Russians and infiltratedd by Russian language and culture, Ukrainian schools suffered most. Whereas in 1951-22 some three-quarters of pupils still received Ukrainian-language instruction in the oblastss of Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia, in 1985-6 this had fallen to justt a quarter; in the easternmost oblasts of Donets'k and Luhans'k the percentage of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils fell in the same period from just over 40% to less than 10%. Onlyy the more Ukrainian and rural oblasts of Mykolaiv and Kherson retained a substantiall amount of Ukrainian-language education (in the former the percentage of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils declined from 73.6% in 1951-2 to 40.0% in 1985-6; in the latterr from 83.2% to 50.6%). Comparing the 1985-6 school data with the 1989 census dataa we find that in all these oblasts the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils lagged farr behind the Ukrainian element in the population. In all but one of the eastern oblasts it

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wass by more than 40 percentage points and in the southern oblasts by 25-36 percentage points.. This means that large numbers of Ukrainians enrolled their children in Russian-languagee classes. In fact, close study of the data reveals that in the oblasts of Odesa, Kharkiv,, Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia a large majority of Ukrainians put their offspringg in Russian schools, and that in Donets'k, Luhans'k and The Crimea almost all didd so.

Tablee 5.2 Language of instruction of pupils, in four school years, national composition off population and percentage of urban population, 1989, by oblast

EasternEastern Oblasts Donets'k k Luhans'k k Kharkiv v Dnipropetrovs'k k Zaporizhzhia a

SouthernSouthern Oblasts Crimea a Mykolaiv v Odesa a Kherson n

CentralCentral Oblasts Kyïvv City Kirovohrad d Sumy y Chernihiv v Kyïvv Oblast Poltava a Cherkasy y Zhytomyr r Vinnytsia a Khmel'nyts'kyi i

WesternWestern Oblasts Volyn n Rivne e Ivano-Frankivsk k L'viv v Ternopil l Zakarpattia a Chernivtsi i

%of f 1951-52 2

44.6 6 40.5 5 71.8 8 76.7 7 65.0 0

--73.6 6 62.0 0 83.2 2

32.7 7 93.0 0 82.0 0 90.2 2 97.1 1 97.0 0

---94.5 5 96.4 4 96.1 1

97.5 5 97.9 9 96.6 6 90.2 2 98.7 7 81.9 9 72.0 0

pupilss in Ukrainian schools 1958-59 9

24.6 6 30.3 3 61.4 4 70.3 3 55.4 4

0.3 3 72.2 2 45.1 1 76.5 5

30.1 1 89.2 2 78.2 2

--96.4 4 93.9 9 94.3 3 91.5 5 94.6 6 94.0 0

94.6 6 95.0 0 95.4 4 81.0 0 97.7 7 80.1 1 65.5 5

1971-72 2

11.1 1 14.0 0 44.9 9 46.9 9 39.0 0

0.1 1 60.8 8 38.4 4 63.9 9

37.3 3 80.5 5 69.3 3 83.5 5 92.5 5 83.3 3 88.1 1 87.2 2 90.4 4 91.1 1

94.6 6 95.0 0 95.5 5 89.9 9 97.7 7 81.8 8 68.9 9

1985-56 6

3.8 8 8.5 5

27.9 9 26.4 4 22.5 5

« « 40.0 0 23.4 4 50.6 6

22.3 3 68.2 2 49.7 7 66.6 6 84.7 7 69.6 6 75.0 0 75.6 6 81.0 0 77.8 8

91.0 0 89.8 8 93.4 4 85.0 0 95.7 7 77.8 8 62.4 4

%% Ukr in pop 1989 9

50.7 7 51.9 9 62.8 8 71.6 6 63.1 1

25.8 8 75.6 6 54.6 6 75.7 7

72.4 4 85.3 3 85.5 5 91.5 5 89.4 4 87.9 9 90.5 5 91.5 5 91.5 5 77.8 8

94.6 6 93.3 3 95.0 0 90.4 4 96.8 8 78.4 4 70.8 8

%% urban pop 1989 9

90.2 2 86.3 3 78.4 4 83.2 2 75.6 6

69.3 3 65.5 5 65.7 7 61.1 1

100 0 59.5 5 61.5 5 53.1 1 53.3 3 56.1 1 52.5 5 52.9 9 43.9 9 47.1 1

48.6 6 45.2 2 41.7 7 59.1 1 40.5 5 40.7 7 41.9 9

Source:: Arel (1994)

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Thee decline in Ukrainian-language schools was most visible in the oblast centers of the southh and east. In 1986-87 no Ukrainian school was left in the cities of Donets'k and Luhans'k.. In the cities of Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv and Odesa only one, two, and three such schoolss remained, respectively {ibid. 1994). The almost total disappearance of Ukrainian schoolss from the major cities of the south and east meant that parents had lost the de facto rightt to choose the language of instruction for their children, as there were only Russian schoolss to send them to.

Inn addition, the oblasts of the center, which were all Ukrainian and rural in characterr except for Kyi'v city, experienced a universal and steady decline in Ukrainian-languagee education in the post-war years. Yet, in contrast to the east and south, this drop wass not as steep, and the great majority of pupils continued to be instructed in Ukrainian inn each of these oblasts (except for those in Sumy and Kyi'v city). As a consequence, the dataa on Ukrainian-language education do not deviate as much from the population data as thosee of the east and south (in all but three oblasts, i.e. Kyïv city, Sumy and Chemihiv, thee gap between the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils and the proportion of Ukrainianss in the population is less than 20 percentage points). It follows that overwhelmingg majorities of Ukrainians in the central oblasts continued to send their childrenn to Ukrainian schools, which contrasts sharply with the school choice behavior of theirr eastern and southern co-nationals.

Thee newly incorporated western oblasts, both Ukrainian and very rural in outlook, showedd only small decreases in percentages of Ukrainian-instructed pupils and thereby retainedd an almost full-Ukrainian school system.77 In the oblasts of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivskk and Ternopil, comprising the Ukrainian heartland of Galicia, this decline was 5%% or less; in Volyn and Rivne, territories formerly part of Czarist Russia, and in Zakarpattiaa and Chernivtsi, where the Ukrainian element in the population is weaker, the falll was 4-10%. A brief glance at the school and population data shows that almost all of thee Ukrainians had their children follow Ukrainian-language education in each of these oblasts.. Thus, the russification of the post-war period has left the school system of westernn Ukraine largely untouched.

Too sum up, it appears that three factors, (1) history (western Ukraine's late incorporationn in the USSR), (2) the proportion of Ukrainians in the oblast population, and (3)) the rural-urban character of oblasts, have significantly shaped the success of school russificationn within Ukraine.

5.25.2 The Ukrainianization of Schools in the Post-Glasnost Era

Dataa in Table 5.3 provide an opportunity to assess to what extent the post-Glasnost languagee policies have made an impact on schools in the various oblasts. We can see that forr Ukraine as a whole the central authorities have already come a long way in reaching thee stated policy aim of bringing the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed schoolchildren in concordancee with the Ukrainian element in the population. They are, nonetheless, still

777 Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi are the exceptions, but these oblasts never had a near homogeneous Ukrainian schooll system.

I l l l

somee 10 percentage points short of their goal (compare the Ukraine total data of column fourr with those of column six). The data further show that since 1994 the ukrainianization off school education has continued unabatedly, which runs counter to the expectations of manyy who thought that president Kuchma, as the candidate of the Russian-speaking east andd south, would slow down ukrainianization during his term of office.

However,, the most remarkable aspect of these data is undoubtedly the enormous regionall variation in the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed schoolchildren. Thus, whereass in the oblasts of the west and in most oblasts of the center this percentage equals orr even exceeds the share of Ukrainians in the oblast population, in the oblasts of the east andd south it still trails behind the percentage of Ukrainians in the population (compare columnn four with column six). Moreover, also within regions, between oblasts, we find appreciablee differences. The eastern oblast of Dnipropetrovs'k, for instance, records a spectacularr increase in the percentage of Ukrainian-educated pupils over the last nine years.. By contrast, the eastern oblasts of Donets'k and Luhans'k and the southern oblast (autonomouss republic) of The Crimea show only minimal growth. As a result, the proportionn of Ukrainian-instructed schoolchildren falls markedly behind the percentage of Ukrainianss in the population in these oblasts. The other oblasts of the east and south demonstratee moderate to strong percentage growth, with the southern oblasts of Kherson andd Mykolaiv almost achieving the stated policy aim. In this regard, the spectacular growthh of the proportion of Ukrainian-taught pupils in Kyïv must be mentioned too: in lesss than ten years it grew from 20.1% to 82.2%, surpassing the share of Ukrainians in the population.. Undoubtedly, the authorities sought to present the capital as a showcase.

Tablee 5.3 The proportion of pupils instructed in Ukrainian and the share of Ukrainians inn the local population (in percentage)

WesternWestern Oblasts Chemivtsi i Ivano-Frankivsk k L'viv v Rivne e Ternopil l Zakarpattia a Volyn n

CentralCentral Oblasts Cherkasy y Chernihiv v Khmel'nyts'ky y Kyïvv City Kyïvv Oblast Kirovohrad d Poltava a Sumy y

All l grades s 1989-90 0

62.6 6 95.2 2 90.0 0 91.1 1 97.0 0 81.0 0 94.0 0

74.5 5 65.2 2 77.7 7 21.7 7 83.4 4 61.4 4 73.2 2 46.1 1

All l grades s 1991-92 2

67.7 7 96.0 0 91.8 8 93.6 6 97.6 6 81.7 7 94.6 6

75.8 8 67.1 1 81.5 5 30.9 9 84.6 6 62.2 2 74.3 3 48.5 5

All l grades s 1994-95 5

77.4 4 97.7 7 95.4 4 98.4 4 98.7 7 83.8 8 97.3 3

83.7 7 77.9 9 89.6 6 63.5 5 91.1 1 72.0 0 80.5 5 59.6 6

All l grades s 1997-98 8

80.3 3 98.9 9 97.3 3 99.4 4 99.4 4 85.2 2 98.8 8

90.1 1 86.4 4 95.1 1 82.2 2 94.2 2 80.8 8 87.3 3 71.3 3

First t grade e

1993-94 4

80.0 0 98.3 3 97.3 3 99.5 5 98.9 9 86.9 9 97.8 8

91.5 5 93.6 6 97.3 3 90.7 7 95.0 0 86.7 7 89.7 7 77.7 7

Ukrin n pop p 1989 9

70.8 8 95.0 0 90.4 4 93.3 3 96.8 8 78.4 4 94.6 6

90.5 5 91.4 4 90.4 4 72.5 5 89.4 4 85.3 3 87.9 9 85.5 5

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Vinnytsia a Zhytomyr r

EasternEastern Oblasts Dnipropetrovs'k k

Donets'k k Kharkiv v Luhans'k k Zaporizhzhia a

SouthernSouthern Oblasts Crimea a Kherson n Mykolaiv v Odesa a

Ukrainee total Ukrainee urban Ukrainee rural

All l grades s 1989-90 0

79.0 0 75.9 9

24.7 7 2.8 8

25.3 3 7.7 7

21.4 4

--50.9 9 41.5 5 24.1 1

47.5 5 ----

All l grades s 1991-92 2

81.3 3 76.7 7

31.1 1 3.3 3

28.0 0 6.7 7

22.7 7

--51.7 7 43.5 5 24.5 5

49.3 3

----

All l grades s 1994-95 5

89.9 9 85.1 1

41.8 8 5.4 4

35.1 1 8.7 7

29.7 7

0.1 1 59.8 8 53.3 3 30.1 1

56.5 5 43.8 8 83.7 7

All l grades s 1997-98 8

94.9 9 91.4 4

55.0 0 8.6 6

43.1 1 11.3 3 35.7 7

0.3 3 68.0 0 61.8 8 35.3 3

62.8 8 52.3 3 84.8 8

First t grade e

1993-94 4 97.2 2 95.1 1

68.3 3

10.0 0 44.6 6 14.8 8 42.6 6

0.14 4 78.7 7 74.4 4

38.0 0

66.0 0

----

Ukrin n pop p 1989 9 91.5 5 84.9 9

71.6 6

50.7 7 62.8 8 51.9 9 63.1 1

25.8 8 75.7 7 75.6 6

54.6 6

72.7 7 65.8 8 86.5 5

Sources: : Forr the 1989-90 data, see: Vidomostipro ...RSR (unpublished document) Forr the 1991 -92 data, see: Statystychnyi byuleten' ...Ukrainy (1995) Forr the 1994-95 data, see: Statystychnidani ...(seredni... zaklady) (1996) Forr the 1997-98 data, see: Statystychnyi zbirnyk .. Ukrainy (1998) Forr the 1993-94 first-grade data, see: Zbirnyk Minosvity (1993, No. 24) Forr the 1989 census data, see: Naselennia Ukrainy 1992 ...(1993)

Lookingg more closely at the data of the eastern and southern oblasts, we find that there is aa strong correlation between the presence of Ukrainians in the local population and the percentagee of Ukrainian-instructed pupils and also its percentage point increase: the strongerr the former, the higher the latter, and the greater the percentage point increase of thee latter. The critical value appears to be 60 percent. If the share of Ukrainians in the populationn exceeds this figure, ukrainianization progresses rapidly, if it falls short of this percentage,, it proceeds only (very) slowly. Given that in the oblasts with a Ukrainian populationn of less than 60% the gap between the proportion of Ukrainian-taught pupils andd the Ukrainian element in the population is widest, one could argue that in oblasts wheree - from the point of view of the authorities - ukrainianization is most needed, it fails too make inroads into Russian-language school education.

Perhapss even more important than the all grades combined data are the data on firstt graders. Chapter Three stated that the authorities aimed to ukrainianize the school systemm by replacing the older largely Russian-instructed batches with new predominantly Ukrainian-taughtt cohorts of pupils and not by simply switching the language of instructionn of existing classes. Unfortunately, to the knowledge of the author, data on the languagee of instruction of first graders have not been aggregated and collected at the

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However,, despite the considerable progress made in most eastern and southern oblasts, it iss alongside impossible for vuzy to comply with the stipulation of the Language Law whichh required them to completely switch to Ukrainian-language instruction by the end of thee 1990s - and only allowed those vuzy that were located in places where the majority of thee population was non-Ukrainian to continue Russian-language instruction. Recent data onn the percentage of academic groups that are instructed in Ukrainian (see Table 5.5) confirmm this impression: in 1997-98 still only 57% of academic groups in state universities,, 38.6% of academic groups in polytechnical universities, 24.9% of groups in mining-metallurgicall institutes and 61.9% of those in economic-commercial institutes weree instructed in Ukrainian. Although the number of these groups has risen quite steeply inn the last seven years - especially in the more humanities oriented state universities (from 29.3%% in 1991-92 to 57.0% in 1997-98) and economic-commercial institutes (from 17.3%% in 1991-92 to 61.9% in 1997-98) - it is not likely that these percentages wil l jump too 90% or more in the two years following 1997-98. This is all the more improbable in vieww of the fact that the percentage point increase of Ukrainian-instructed academic groupss was much smaller between 1994-95 and 1997-98 than between 1991-92 and 1994-955 for state universities and economic-commercial institutes. In fact, for mining-metallurgicall institutes, the percentage of these groups shows a slight decline after 1994-95.. This could be an indication that institutes of so-called exact science, where Russian as thee language of instruction has always predominated, find it very difficult to change their languagee regime. It must be admitted, though, that polytechnical universities did manage too significantly increase the relative number of Ukrainian-instructed academic groups, especiallyy in the 1994-95 -1997-98 period.

Tablee 5.5 Proportion of Ukrainian-instructed academic groups in institutes of higher educationn (in percentage)

Typee of vuzy Statee universities* Polytechnicall universities Mining-metallurgicall institutes Economic-commerciall institutes

Alll vuzy**

1991-1992 2 29.3 3 20.1 1 8.6 6

17.3 3

23.5 5

1994-1995 5 46.7 7 28.1 1 26.4 4 50.7 7

42.4 4

1997-1998 8 57.0 0 38.6 6 24.9 9 61.9 9

Sources: : Forr the 1991-92 and 1994-95 data, see: Statystychni dani... (vyshchi navchal'ni zaklady) (1996) Forr the 1997-98 data, see: Statystychni dani... (vyshchi navchal'ni zaklady) (1998) 'Thee State University of Cherkasy and the Odesa State Juridical Academy are excluded from the 1991-92 and 1994-95 dataa of state universities. "Thee attentive reader might wonder why in 1994-95 the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed academic groups (42.4%) is smallerr than the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed students (47.1%: see Table 5.4). The answer is that Ukrainian-instructedd groups can be disproportionately found in the humanities, where the academic groups are on average larger in termss of numbers of students than in the exact sciences, where Russian as the medium of instruction predominates.

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5.45.4 Reasons for the Partial Implementation of the Central Language Policy

Wee have seen that the schools and vuzy of the oblasts of the east and south fall short of thee post-independence policy objectives. The question is how the language of instruction patternss of these oblasts can be explained. A factor that seems to be of paramount importancee is the role played by local educational authorities and school directors. For instance,, in Osvita, a periodical produced by the Ministry of Education, school officials in Russian-speakingg areas have repeatedly been accused of not taking ukrainianization seriouslyy and ignoring ministerial guidelines (see issues of 12 April 1995; 12 September 1995;; 13 December 1995; 27 March 1996). One of the issues focuses on the city of Odesa andd asserts that some Ukrainian schools, classes and kindergartens were actually closed down,, that most of the local bureaucrats do not even know Ukrainian themselves, that the Odesaa city soviet abolished the local commission that oversees the implementation of the Languagee Law, and that the educational authorities reinstalled the requirement that parentss provide a written request if they want to enroll their child in a Ukrainian language classs {ibid. 13 December 1995). Given its obvious relevance, the independent influence off local state organs on the policy process will be the exclusive subject matter of the next chapter. .

Relatedd to the autonomous conduct of local administrations is the fact that the politicall culture of Ukraine does not have a law-abiding tradition. As Arel (1995a, p. 614) putss it: "In a society emerging from seven decades of communism, where the law, as a matterr of principle, was deemed subordinate to the expediency of party decrees, public policyy still operates on rules not always firmly grounded in the rule of law." One may assumee that if officials in the national state bureaucracy do not respect the basic aspects off the law - as we have seen, the Ministry of Education made the Russian language an optionall subject in Ukrainian schools, which was in clear violation of the Language Law -thenn neither will employees at the local level do so. According to one observer, instead of thee law, it is direct orders from above that are followed (Komilov, 1998, interview). In vieww of the obscure nature of some of these orders, notably telephoned instructions, it is exceedinglyy difficult to determine their precise impact on policy outcome. However, that theyy leave their mark goes without saying.

Onee could argue that it seems strange that autonomous local policy and a political culturee based on orders from the top go hand in hand because local state officials are unlikelyy to embark on an autonomous course of action if this contradicts with a lUkaze fromm the boss.' For Ukraine, this argument has special relevance, as it is a state with a strongg centralized executive. Unlike Russia, the president of Ukraine has the power to appointt the governors of oblasts and districts, who in their turn determine the compositionn of the local state administration (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, Art. 118). However,, in the cities the chain of direct subordination breaks as the mayor, who as head off the city executive appoints the aldermen, is not appointed by some higher state official butt elected by the people (ibid. Art. 141). Being dependent on reelection for the continuationn of his job, he will above all be responsive to the needs of the local

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population,, even if this means risking a possible confrontation with higher powers. It is thereforee in the cities that we can expect to see the strongest influence of local-administrationn decisions on the execution of central policy.

Anotherr factor that has clearly acted as a brake on the growth of Ukrainian-languagee education in the Russian-speaking oblasts of the east and south is a shortage of Ukrainiann textbooks and a scarcity of teachers able to conduct lessons in Ukrainian. Ever sincee the beginning of the ukrainianization campaign this has been a major, much discussedd problem, which was only exacerbated by the severe economic crisis.80 Yet, the Ministryy of Education does appear to be doing everything it can to fulfil l the need for qualifiedd Ukrainian-language teachers. It managed to step up the relative number of Ukrainian-instructedd academic groups at pedagogical academies from 40.7% in 1991-92 too 84.0% in 1997-98.81

Lastly,, it is of course parents who determine the outcome of the language policy in schoolss to a significant extent. Having the formal right to choose the language of instructionn for their offspring, parents have continued to send their children to Russian schoolss in most of the oblasts of the east and south. As we have seen, the Ministry of Educationn hoped to convince parents to do the opposite by introducing a Ukrainian-languagee entrance exam for students wishing admission to a vuz, by making the threshold forr the creation of Ukrainian classes in Russian schools as low as possible (8 to 10 parentall requests), and by decreeing that prestigious school types, like lyceums, gymnasiumss and colleges, should as a rule be opened with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.. Another regulation encouraging parents to enter their children in Ukrainian-languagee classes was the clause in the constitution making Ukrainian the sole state languagee and granting Russian the status of merely a national minority language. Yet, for manyy parents in Russian-speaking areas, these incentives could not take precedence over theirr concern that the quality of teaching in Ukrainian classes suffered due the teachers' poorr command of Ukrainian. Moreover, with much of higher education continuing to functionn in Russian in the oblasts of the east and south, many parents living in these areas didd not (yet) feel the need to have their children attend Ukrainian schools.

Inn an interview with me, Mykola Nesterchuk, the First Secretary of the all-Ukrainian "Prosvita" organizationn (a cultural society that ardently promotes the Ukrainian language and culture), conceded that in Leftt Bank Ukraine (i.e. Russian-speaking Ukraine) there were frequent conflicts between the oblast administrationss (Kuchma-appointed governors) and city executives (elected mayors). 800 See, for instance, Zerkalo Nedeli (26 September 1998). A full-page article predicts a cloudy future for thee Ukrainian textbook. 811 For the 1991-92 data, see: Statystychni danï... (vyshchi navchal'ni zaklady) (1996). Forr the 1997-98 data, see: Statystychni dani... (vyshchi navchal'ni zaklady) (1998). 822 When I visited schools in the cities of Donets'k and Odesa, this argument was mentioned frequently as a reasonn for parents to send their offspring to Russian schools. In Odesa, a father of a first-grade pupil confidedd to me that, when he and his partner decided to enroll their child in a Ukrainian class in a school thatt had only recently started Ukrainian classes, he was shocked to find the director making a speech in a languagee that was meant to be Ukrainian, but sounded to him more like Belorussian.

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Inn the sphere of higher education, local state organs have no opportunity to influencee policy since vuzy are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Education. The outcomee of the ukrainianization process in higher education seems, instead, to be largely aa function of the so-called material base - i.e. the availability of lecturers having a sufficientt command of Ukrainian and the presence of Ukrainian-language teaching materials.. According to two university officials in Odesa, the Ministry of Education, especiallyy in recent years, has come to realize that the material base simply does not permitt a drastic ukrainianization of higher education, or only at the expense of quality teaching.. Because of this, they argued, the ministry is now accepting a much slower pace off ukrainianization (Vice Rector for Educational Matters; Koval, 1997, interview). These impressionss are substantiated by the aforementioned decision of Education Minister Talanchukk permitting the creation of Russian academic groups, parallel to Ukrainian ones,, for first-year students in the vuzy of the south and east in view of the particular languagee situation in these regions. In a similar vein, a ministerial inspection report on the levell of education of 19 vuzy in the oblasts of Zaporizhzhia and Chemihiv makes no mentionn of improved Ukrainian-language instruction in its list of recommendations, althoughh it did notice the omnipresence of Russian-instructed academic groups in these vuzyvuzy (Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1996, No. 14). This is clearly another indication that the ukrainianizationn of vuzy has been given a low priority. Nonetheless, it must have occurred too the authorities in Kyïv that continued Russian-language education in the vuzy of the southh and east is not exactly the stimulus parents need to send their children to Ukrainian-languagee classes.

5.55.5 Conclusion

Inn comparison to other Union Republics, Soviet Ukraine experienced a dramatic russificationn of the school network in the post-war years. This was mainly the result of increasingg numbers of titular nationals sending their children to Russian schools. Latvia andd Estonia also faced a significant decline in the proportion of pupils in titular-language schools,, but this was a direct effect of the ongoing immigration of Russians. Within Ukraine,, russification was most successful in the urbanized oblasts of the east and south, areass already densely populated by Russians and influenced by the Russian language and culture,, but it could not make inroads into the full-Ukrainian school system of the newly incorporatedd western oblasts. These regions were rural in character and had a virtually homogeneouss Ukrainian population.

Sincee 1989 a renewed ukrainianization drive has steadily reduced the proportion off Russian-instructed pupils. Although this campaign continued during the Kuchma term off office, it fell some 10 percentage points short of the stated policy aim by 1997-98. This policyy objective, which was first formulated in February 1991, stated that the proportion off Ukrainian-instructed pupils should be brought into line with the proportion of Ukrainianss in the population. The success of ukrainianization has shown marked regional

833 In addition to streamlining the subject matter of vuzy, in terms of content, quality and quantity, the Ministryy of Education finances (state) vuzy and appoints their rectors (see Articles 15, 20 and 61 of the Marchh 1996 Law on Education, WRU, 1996, No. 21).

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variationss within Ukraine. While the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils has equaledd or exceeded the share of Ukrainians in the population in the western and most centrall oblasts, it has trailed behind the Ukrainian segment in the population in the southernn and eastern oblasts.

Thee data on the language of instruction in higher education made it clear that vuzy wouldd not be able to meet the stipulation of the Language Law that required them to switchh completely to Ukrainian-language instruction by the end of the 1990s. The same patternn emerged as in schools: nearly all students were receiving Ukrainian language instructionn in the western oblasts, but only (small) minorities of students were instructed inn Ukrainian in the oblasts of the east and south. However, the ukrainianization of higher educationn has progressed much faster than that of the schools, which is surprising given thatt higher education was much more russified than school education in the late 1980s. Byy 1995-96 (and probably in the years that followed) the percentage of Ukrainian-instructedd students had, however, not yet caught up with the percentage of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils.

Ass reasons for the partial implementation of central language policy in both schoolss and institutes of higher education, the previous section pointed to (1) the autonomouss conduct of local administrations (especially in places with elected mayors); (2)) the absence of a law-abiding tradition; (3) the shortage of Ukrainian teaching materialss and a scarcity of teachers able to conduct lessons in Ukrainian; (4) the choice behaviorr of parents, and (5) the realization of the central authorities that a drastic ukrainianizationn of higher education would result in reduction of the quality of teaching.

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66 THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Fieldworkk in the four cities of this study enabled the author to examine to what extent locall state bodies shape the implementation of centrally announced policies. This chapter wil ll show that the local impact on school education matters has indeed been substantial. Thee next four sections discuss the cities individually while the fifth is dedicated to differingg practices in higher education. The subsequent section reports on the state of educationn in Simferopol, the capital of The Crimea, in order to examine to what extent thee central state has managed to implement its policies in this monolith of Russian languagee and culture. The chapter ends with a short conclusion in which the local policies off the four cities are compared.

6.16.1 The City of L'viv

Inn L'viv, the center of nationalist western Ukraine, the turnaround of local policy came in Marchh 1990, when Rukh captured the majority of the votes in the city soviet elections (Hentosh,, 1998, interview). Until then, the number of Russian schools had grown to 24, andd thereafter it declined year by year until in 1997-98 only five were left out of a total of 1088 schools. At the same time the number of mixed schools, where instruction is in both Russiann and Ukrainian, increased from seven in 1989-90 to twenty-one in 1993-94, after whichh the number declined again to seventeen in 1997-98.84 Taken together, these figures indicatee that many of the former Russian schools are now in the transitional stage of becomingg fully Ukrainian.

Accordingg to leaders of the Russian community, this sharp reduction in Russian-languagee education is a consequence of the power politics of the nationalist city authorities.. Local school administrations reportedly pressurized directors of Russian schoolss into opening only Ukrainian-language first-grade classes. It is asserted that directorss who refused to give in to this pressure were fired.86 A local educational periodical,, for instance, tells the story of Ali a Pozdniakova, the Director of School no. 17 andd chairman of the Association Russkaia Shkola, who was fired by the local authorities forr offering alcohol at a school meeting of vice-directors of the schools of the city district. Thiss particular attempt to change the director failed as a district court overturned the dismissall and reinstated Mrs. Pozdniakova (Pedagogicheskii Kaleidoskop, 1996, No. 41). However,, a personal check by the author found that in at least six of the seventeen former Russiann and now (1997-98) mixed schools lasting personnel changes had occurred.

844 Vidomosti pro movy navchannia ta vyvchennia movy iak predmeta u serednikh zahal 'noosvitnikh navchal'no-vykhovnykhnavchal'no-vykhovnykh zakladakh (1997-98), (statistical data on a standard form which was provided by thee L'viv Department of Education. All regional and local bodies of the state executive use this form to keepp track of the Ukrainianization process), hereafter Vidomosti + city + school year; private notes of Vladimirr Kravchenko, Director of school no. 45 in L'viv. 855 Due to the sensitivity of the topic, these leaders asked not to be named (interviews in May and November 1997). . 866 Here it must be remembered that Article 84 the March 1996 Law on Education gave local authorities the powerr to appoint and dismiss school directors {WRU, 1996, No. 21).

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6.26.2 The City of Kyïv

Ass noted before, Kyïv witnessed a spectacular growth of the proportion of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils: from an all-time low of 21.7% in 1989-90 to 82.2% in 1997-98. As theree was no instruction in languages other than Ukrainian and Russian, the percentage of Russian-taughtt schoolchildren, conversely, declined from 78.3% in 1989-90 to 17.8% in 1997-98.. Even more astounding is the decrease in the number of Russian schools: from 1511 out of a total of 299 schools in 1989-90 to a mere 16 schools out of a total of 376 in 1997-98.. In fact, the decline has been so dramatic that by 1997-98 Ky'iv had proportionallyy fewer Russian schools (4.25%) than L'viv (4.63%).91 The decrease is reflectedd in the percentage of first graders taught in Russian: whereas Kyi'v has a Russian populationn of 20.9%, the latter figure stood at a meager 6.4% in 1997-98.92 This means thatt many Russian children must have been enrolled in Ukrainian first-grade classes in thatt year.

Thee question is how these trends can be explained. Part of the answer may lie in thee fact that the Kyivan population, though using Russian as the language of conversation inn the street and at work, has consistently shown support for nationalist parties and candidatess both in national (parliamentary and presidential) and in local elections.93

Nonetheless,, the initiative to ukrainianize the school system in Kyi'v may well have come fromm the national authorities instead, as in May 1992 Kravchuk-appointed Mayor Ivan Salyii appears to have simply ordered the vast majority of Russian school directors to changee the status of their schools (Tchaikovs'ka, 1996, interview).94 One of these directorss recalled how he and his colleagues were summoned to a meeting at the Mins'ka city-districtt office, where the educational authorities told them to start opening Ukrainian classess (Hlushchenko, 1996, interview). But, whereas the authorities claim that this order wass based on the results of a survey which allegedly indicated that a large majority of bothh Russian and Ukrainian parents wanted Ukrainian-language education for their childrenn (Tchaikovs'ka, 1996, interview), others argue that no such survey was ever carriedd out, characterizing the order of the mayor as a Ukaze from above and as coming in responsee to actual parental requests (Gratchev; Shurov, 1997, interviews). Thus, it is doubtfull whether the current proportions of Ukrainian and Russian-instructed pupils are ann accurate reflection of parental preferences. Furthermore, in contrast to L'viv, the local educationall authorities in Kyïv do not allow the parallel opening of Russian classes alongsidee Ukrainian ones.95 As a result, a great number of former Russian schools started

9191 For the 1989-90 Kyïv data, see: Vidomostipro ... RSR (unpublished document); for the 1997-98 Kyïv data,, see: Statystychnyi zbirnyk ... Ukrainy (1998).

Thee percentage of first graders instructed in Russian is calculated from statistics that can be found in Vidomosti,Vidomosti, Kyïv (1997-98). As in L'viv, this document was provided by the local education office.

Inn the 1990 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Bloc gained a majority of the votes in Kyïv at the expensee of the communist anti-reform Group of 239; in the 1994 parliamentary elections Kyi'v elected four RukhRukh representatives and no left-wing; in the 1994 presidential elections Leonid Kravchuk, the nationalist incumbentt president and losing candidate, gained 60% of the Kyïv vote (Arel, 1990; Holdar, 1995). In the 19944 city soviet elections, the communists captured only four seats and the socialists a meagre two out of a totall of seventy seats (Grachev, 1996, interview).

Thee mayors of Kyi'v and Sevastopol are appointed by the president. 955 Interview with Hlushchenko (1996) and personal observations. See also Arel (1995a).

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thee process of becoming fully Ukrainian. (In 1992-93, when the mayor's order was implementedd on a large scale, as many as 238 schools out of a total of 330 were in the processs of changing; by 1997-98, this number had declined to 156 out of 376 schools, sincee many of the schools previously in transition had become Ukrainian.)

AA closer look at the spectacular pace of ukrainianization in Kyïv reveals that the year-to-yearr change in the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils was so dramatic - 13 percentagee points alone between the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years: from 41.7% to 54.7%% {Statystychni danipro ..., unpublished document) - that it is doubtful whether this wass caused solely by the replacement of old Russian-instructed batches by new Ukrainian-instructedd cohorts. Indeed, personal observations revealed that classes had actuallyy switched the language of instruction in at least three of the Ukrainian and mixed schoolss that were visited.97 It could not be determined whether this was the result of pressuree from the local authorities or whether overzealous directors or parents had broughtt this about. However, it is known for certain that the practice of switching the languagee of instruction was not just confined to Kyïv. Elsewhere, however, the change of languagee of instruction does not seem to have happened on the same scale and at the samee speed as it did in Kyïv.98

Inn Kyïv the state of the Russian language as a subject appears to be better than in L'viv.. As many as 27% of the Ukrainian-instructed pupils were still taught Russian as a compulsoryy state or school component subject in 1997-98, and another 3% of these pupils (orr 8,111 in absolute numbers) chose it as a facultative subject (Vidomosti, Kyïv, 1997-98).. The Ukrainian schools in Kyïv thus seem to appreciate the subject much more than inn L'viv.

6.36.3 The City ofOdesa

Despitee its multinational, thoroughly Russian-speaking population and the politically neutrall color of its city soviet, Odesa, the famous seaport of the south, has witnessed a strongg ukrainianization campaign in education since independence. This campaign has proceededd in a stop-go manner. From 1991-92 to 1993-94 the number of Ukrainian schoolss by status (i.e. including mixed schools) jumped from four to twenty out of a total off 124 schools, from 1993-94 to 1995-96 it declined to 16, and after that it once more rocketedd to 51 schools out of a total of 133 schools in 1997-98 (Dynamika rozvytku ... Odesy,Odesy, unpublished document).100 The two periods of rapid ukrainianization coincide withh the terms of office of one man: Serhii Kozyts'kyi, a physicist and strong supporter of

Forr the 1992-93 data, see: Statystychni dani pro ... (unpublished document); for the 1997-98 data, see: StatystychnyiStatystychnyi zbirnyk ... Ukrainy (1998). 977 This had occurred in school no. 20, school no. 170 and school no. 240, which were all located in the Mins'kaa district. 988 I discovered that in some of the schools in Donets'k and Odesa classes had switched from Russian to Ukrainiann as well. 999 Neither nationalists nor communists had seats in the 1994-98 city soviet. All but five of the 62 seats were inn the hands of independent deputies (Yakupov, 1997, interview). 1000 The number of 51 includes so-called beginner schools (only grades one, two and three), which serve as preparatoryy schools for gymnasiums and lyceums.

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Rukh.Rukh. From 1991 to 1994 he was head of the Department of Education of the Odesa Oblastt Administration, and in 1995 the independent-minded anti-communist mayor, Eduardd Hurvitz, appointed him Head of the Education Office of the Odesa City Administration. .

Intendingg to 'bring the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils into concordance withh the Ukrainian element in the population,' Kozyts'kyi proudly told me how he had managedd to raise the proportion of Ukrainian-taught first-graders from 8% in 1991-92 to 39%% in 1997-98, just ten percentage points short of the Ukrainian element in the populationn (Kozyts'kyi, 1997, interview).101 According to an inspector working in the samee department, the procedure of ukrainianization had been as follows (Maskaleva, 1997,, interview). First, their department determined how many schools would have to becomee Ukrainian in each city district in order for the network of schools to correspond too the national composition of the population. Next, the material base of schools (i.e. the availabilityy of Ukrainian teaching materials and teachers with a sufficient command of Ukrainian)) was checked and the school directors and parent committees were consulted. Uponn receiving the assent of the latter, the local authorities then proceeded to change the statuss of a school.102 Thus, it was claimed that ukrainianization had been implemented in aa democratic way, in accordance with the preferences of parents and school directors.103

Inn a similar vein, it was denied that any pressure was used on the side of the authorities to 'persuade'' schools to switch status. However, a year later, when the author visited Odesa againn and the new mayor, Ruslan Bodelan, had replaced Kozyts'kyi, the same inspector disclosedd that those schools that had refused to become Ukrainian during Kozyts'kyi's firstt term of office "regretted their decision" when Kozyts'kyi became Head of the City Educationn Office.

Otherr aspects of local policy only confirm the impression that the ukrainianization campaignn was not so liberal and considerate after all. As in Kyïv, for instance, it was forbiddenn for Russian schools that had changed status to open Russian first-grade classes alongsidee Ukrainian ones, no matter how many parents with school-aged children applied forr Russian-language instruction at these schools.104 These parents who often began to takee an interest in school matters at a very late stage, were thus, to their surprise, confrontedd with a fait accompli, namely a predetermined network of schools. For many, thee ensuing choice was to send their child either to the closest school, which had suddenly becomee Ukrainian and only had Ukrainian classes first-grade classes, or to a Russian schooll further away. Another, equally strict measure obliged all schools (i.e. including Russiann ones) to only use Ukrainian in internal documentation and at school meetings fromm 1 September 1997.x 5 In addition, all schools were ordered to teach humanitarian

Thee Figure of 39% can also be calculated from data found in Kontynhenty uchniv... roku (unpublished document). .

AA document given to me called Prohrama rozvytku merezhi navchal'no-vykhovnykh zaktadiv z derzhavnoiuderzhavnoiu movoiu navchannia do 2000 roku specified, year by year, which schools would change status andd open Ukrainian first-grade classes. 1033 This version of events was confirmed by several school directors.

Accordingg to Kozyts'kyi, a parallel opening of Russian language classes would have a negative impact onn the 'language regime', leading to an impaired acquisition of Ukrainian by the child.

Inn October 1998,1 noticed how all the signs and inscriptions in Russian school no. 8 were in Ukrainian.

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subjectss (history, geography and law) in Ukrainian in the 1998-99 school year. Moreover, byy the 1 September 1999 all new and existing gymnasiums and lyceums would have to functionn in or switch to Ukrainian as the language of instruction.106

Thee changes in Odesa seem not to have affected the teaching of the Russian languagee as a subject in Ukrainian schools. Although precise data were not collected, the authorr found that in all four Ukrainian schools that were visited the Russian language was stilll taught.

6.46.4 The City of Donets 'k

Left-wingg political forces have dominated both the Donets'k city council and the Donets'kk oblast council since independence.107 In contrast to Odesa, there have not been personnell changes in the department of education of the city administration. These featuress of local politics have caused local educational policy to markedly differ from that inn the other three cities. Whereas in L'viv, Kyïv and Odesa local policy strives to make thee proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils correspond to the Ukrainian element in the populationn (or make it even larger), in Donets'k it only aims at bestowing the status of Ukrainiann school on at least one school in each of the nine city districts (Kamennova, 1997,, interview).108 Naturally, this was not a difficult task to fulfill : in 1997-98 Donets'k hadd 15 schools which were Ukrainian by status and each city district had at least one.109

Yet,, given that there were 163 schools in total, it is clear that the network of schools did nott correspond to the share of Ukrainians in the local population (39.4%). Asked whether thiss did not contradict national policy, a local official answered:

Thee decree(s) stipulating that the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed first-grade pupilss should be brought into line with the percentage of Ukrainians in the populationn only has the character of a recommendation. Until we receive orders fromm Kyïv obliging us to do something, we proceed from the Language Law. Since thee first clause of the Article on school education states that parents have the right to choosee the language of instruction for their children, this is what we follow (Demura,, 1997, interview).

Locall policy in Donets'k further completely deviated from that in Kyïv and Odesa in that itit allowed schools which were Ukrainian by status to open parallel Russian classes, because,, as the same official told the author: "It does not say anywhere in the Language

Thesee last three measures can be found 'mNakaz (order) No. 481 of 28-8-1997 of the education office. 1077 Although independent candidates captured the majority of the seats in both councils in the 1994 elections,, most of these candidates allied with the Left, i.e. the Communist Party, the Labor Party, and the Socialistt Party, which occupied the remainder of the seats (Rybakov, 1997, interview). Data on the compositionn of both councils was obtained from the local authorities. 1088 According to Kamennova, her boss Valentin Lukianov, Head of the City Education Office, had until that momentt managed to resist pressure from Kyïv, the oblast authorities and various nationalist parties to speed upp Ukrainianization. 1099 The Department of Education of the Donets'k Oblast Administration provided me with a list of Ukrainiann schools.

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Laww that Ukrainian schools cannot open Russian classes. What is more, the whole conceptt or status of Ukrainian school does not have any legal basis." Moreover, unlike thee authorities in Odesa, the local powers in Donets'k did not require schools to use Ukrainiann as the language of internal documentation and meetings. Schools' correspondencee and communication with the district and city administrations was still mostlyy in Russian as well (Kamennova, 1998, interview). The oblast administration, however,, issued and accepted only documentation in Ukrainian.

Ass could be expected from a thoroughly Russian-speaking city like Donets'k, the relativee number of pupils studying the subject of Russian in Ukrainian schools was much higherr than in the cities of Kyiv and L'viv . Data show that 78% of the Ukrainian-instructedd pupils were taught Russian as either a state component or compulsory school componentt subject in the 1997-98 school year.110

Nonetheless,, it would be a mistake to conclude that local policy in Donets'k completelyy ignored central regulations as it appeared from detailed statistics provided by thee educational department that the ministerial decree obliging Russian schools to open Ukrainiann classes when there were 8-10 parental requests was carefully followed. In fact, thiss particular policy can help explain why 10.1% of Donets'k's first graders were taught inn Ukrainian in 1997-98, compared to only 4.2% of the pupils of all grades (Vidomosti, Donets'k,, 1997-98). Given that many schools which were Russian by status opened one orr two parallel Ukrainian classes and some schools which were Ukrainian by status openedd one or two parallel Russian classes, one could argue that, though different in status,, 'Russian' and 'Ukrainian' schools can in practice be identical in Donets'k (with bothh of them opening Ukrainian and Russian classes simultaneously and thus qualifying ass bilingual schools in our conception).

6.56.5 Higher Education

Althoughh institutions of higher education are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Education,, I found some differences between cities, between vuzy within a city, and betweenn disciplines within one vuz regarding the implementation of language regulations. Thus,, whereas the emphasis in Donets'k seemed to be on the creation of Ukrainian-instructedd academic groups running parallel to Russian groups, in Odesa there appeared too be a preference for a gradual increase in the number of subjects taught in Ukrainian, resultingg in a growing number of bilingually-instructed academic groups (Ivanitsyn, 1997, interview).1111 Odesa also provides an example of differences between vuzy within one city:: while some faculties of the State University of Odesa showed no real hurry in increasingg the number of Ukrainian-instructed subjects or academic groups, the Odesa Economicc Institute and the Polytechnical University seemed to aim for a complete ukrainianizationn of the vuz within five years, using the transition method known from

1100 Vidomosti of the city of Donets'k (1997-98). 1''' Interviews with Ivanitsyn, the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the State University of Odesa, and withh the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnical University of Odesa (1997).

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schooll education (i.e., an annual phasing out of Russian-instructed cohorts). The State Universityy of Donets'k offers an example of variations between disciplines within one university:: an inspection report contrasts the Faculty of Chemistry, where 8 of the 21 academicc groups received all their subjects in Ukrainian, with the Faculty of Accounting andd Financing, where all academic groups were still exclusively instructed in Russian in thee 1997-98 university year (Dovidka ... Universiteti, unpublished document).

However,, despite these differences, the university officials in Odesa and Donets'k weree unanimous in their opinion that the Ministry of Education did not exert strong pressuree on vuzy and lecturers to cease the practice of allowing students to vote on the languagee of instruction.113 Hereby they implicitly acknowledged that this practice still occurred.. Several students at the Donets'k State University and the Polytechnical Universityy of Odesa confirmed that they had indeed been given the opportunity to determinee the language of instruction. In fact, voting on the language of education in combinationn with the presence of lecturers with an impaired command of Ukrainian can accountt for the fact that many of the subjects that should already have been taught in Ukrainiann (according to some internal university decree) were still given in Russian.114 At thee same time, this is an indication that university statistics on the language of instruction mayy not be very reliable.115

Thee difficulties with the introduction of Ukrainian as the language of instruction notwithstanding,, it appeared that all vuzy visited by the author in Odesa and Donets'k (andd in L'viv and Kyi'v as well) fulfilled the obligation of administering a Ukrainian-languagee entrance exam to students wishing admission to a vuz. Thus, at least one importantt aspect of central policy, intended to encourage parents to send their children to Ukrainian-languagee schools, was followed up in the south and east.

6.66.6 Simferopol

Althoughh The Crimea falls somewhat outside the scope of this research for the simple reasonn that Ukrainian-language education was and is virtually non-existent on the peninsula,, it is interesting to see to what extent the central state has managed to

1122 Interviews with Khmarsky, Koval, Matveev and with the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnicall University of Odesa (1997). The first two university officials asserted that a majority of the first-gradefirst-grade subjects in their faculties were still instructed in Russian and that there was no real pressure from thee central administration of the university to increase the number of Ukrainian-instructed subjects. 1133 According to Khmarsky (see above), the Ministry of Education understood that if vuzy imposed strict languagee regulations on their personnel, they would lose many qualified lecturers. 1144 Matveev and the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnical University of Odesa (see above)) claimed that first- and second-year students should receive all subjects in Ukrainian in the 1997-98 educationall year. However, the teaching staff of both vuzy appeared not to be able to live up to this demand ass a first-grade student at the Odesa Economic Institute conceded that still about 50% of subjects were taughtt in Russian while two first-grade students of the Polytechnical University told the author that as many ass 5 out of 7 subjects were given in Russian in the first semester. Moreover, the two students of the Polytechnicall University stated that several teachers had given the students a choice in language of instruction. . 1155 Khmarsky (see above) disclosed that if only one subject in a certain year is given in Ukrainian then all thee students of that year are considered to be receiving instruction in Ukrainian.

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implementt its policies in this stronghold of Russian resistance. An analysis of the sphere off education is particularly worthwhile as the constitution does not grant the autonomous republicc special powers in this domain (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996).116 Thus, The Crimeann authorities formally have to do what the Ministry of Education tells them to. Whetherr they in reality obey Kyïv is, of course, another matter and one worth investigating.. For this reason, Simferopol, the capital of The Crimea, was paid a visit.

Ass it turned out, school education in The Crimea had its peculiarities. This starts withh the imbalance between the offer of Ukrainian-language education and the proportion off Ukrainians in the population: whereas Ukrainians constitute 25.8% of The Crimean population,, only 0.3% of all pupils were instructed in Ukrainian in 1997-98. In fact, there wass only one full-fledged Ukrainian school on the whole of the peninsula in this year (Statystychnyi(Statystychnyi zbirnyk...Ukrainy, 1998)."7 Obviously, this state of affairs flouts the centrall policy aim of bringing the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils in line with thee Ukrainian element in the population. Consequently, the national authorities have frequentlyy accused The Crimean republic of sabotaging central instructions. Yet, the republicc authorities could always mask their unwillingness to open Ukrainian classes -andd therefore their defiance of central rule - by arguing that there simply were not enough parentall requests for Ukrainian-language instruction. Nonetheless, the negative attitude of Thee Crimean administration towards ukrainianization was clearly reflected in a legal documentt dedicated to the development of minority (Ukrainian and Tatar) language schools.. In its final version, two crucial clauses of the project paper, which would have foreseenn a year-by-year ukrainianization of 150 of the 587 schools of the peninsula, were omitted,, leaving the adopted document as a toothless piece of hollow rhetoric.118

Ann aspect of local policy that plainly violated central legislation was the substitutionn of the compulsory history of Ukraine exam in the 11th grade by a self-preparedd exam on world history. According to a local education official, The Crimean authoritiess refused to administer a central history of Ukraine exam "that was prepared by thosee nationalist maniacs from L'viv " (Yakovleva, 1997, interview). In addition to the worldd history exam, the local powers produced a Russian language exam and offered it as ann alternative to the central Ukrainian language exam in the 11th grade. Consequently, the overwhelmingg majority of the 11th grade pupils chose the Russian exam. As a result of thesee practices, many 11th grade pupils took only one of the three prescribed central exams,, namely mathematics. Hereby they sharply deviated from the program of the 11th

graderss in the remainder of Ukraine, who all had to take the three central exams. However,, the aforementioned executive expected Kyïv to put an end to the independently preparedd exams in the near future.

Thesee particularities notwithstanding, the same official informed the author that fromm 1 September 1997 all Crimean schools had started to work with the Kyïv curricula,

Seee Article 137 for matters on which the autonomous republic has special authority. 1177 For an article denouncing this situation, see Zerkalo Nedeli, 7-8-1999.

Thee document was called Programma formirovania i razvitia sety obrazovatel 'nykh uchrezhdenii, klassovklassov s Ukrainskim, Krymskotatarskim iazykami obuchenia, shkol i kiassov s dvumia iazykami obuchenia,obuchenia, and was given legal force by Decree no. 260 of 27 August 1997 of the Council of Ministers of Thee Crimean Republic. Unfortunately the author could not trace the periodical(s) that had published the text off the project paper.

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programss and textbooks.119 A personal check in Schools 3, 21 and 25 in Simferopol revealedd that this indeed seemed to be the case. The schools even used the new history of Ukrainee textbooks, which, as we have seen, present an account of history that sharply contrastss with the Russian-Soviet version. The teaching staff conceded that they were actuallyy glad to have received these textbooks—which were available in a Russian translationn (!)— as until that time they had constantly been tormented by a lack of teachingg materials. The introduction of Ukrainian language and literature as a school subjectt appeared to have been an equally successful campaign: whereas in Soviet days onlyy a few schools offered Ukrainian language and literature, in 1997-98 as many as 99.7%% of Crimean pupils studied the subject, according to the aforementioned state employee.. Thus, under Kuchma the national authorities appear to have significantly strengthenedd their grip on this recalcitrant region in the sphere of school education.

Ass could be expected, there were peculiarities in higher education too. Thus, the authorr was surprised to find that vuzy in Simferopol appeared to grant future students a choicee between a Ukrainian-language entrance exam, which is compulsory in the rest of Ukraine,, and a Russian one.121 Obviously, in Russian-dominated Crimea, more than 90% off the students chose the Russian version. Moreover, the other entrance exams (in mathematics,, physics or biology) had to be taken in Russian as the university staff could nott prepare them in Ukrainian.

6.76.7 Conclusion

AA brief overview of local educational policy reveals that ukrainianization practices in Donets'kk were the least radical. There, local policy obviously acted as a break on and evenn contradicted central policy. It is difficult to determine in which of the other three citiess local ukrainianization programs are more severe. Although L'viv had relatively liberall provisions compared to Kyiv and Odesa, there are indications that it has embarked onn a policy of systematically purging directors of Russian schools, a radical element of locall policy not found in Kyiv or Odesa.

1199 Until the introduction of the Kyiv curricula and programs, the schools in The Crimea had funktioned on aa Crimean curriculum, using programs prepared by the Ministry of Education of The Crimea. Iakovleva also disclosedd that their department had stopped abiding by The Crimean Law on Education and had started followingg the Ukrainian Law on Education. 1200 In an article in a local newspaper it is asserted that the introduction of the Kyiv programs and textbooks inn the schools in Sevastopol presented the families of the personnel of the Russian part of the Black Sea Fleett with a huge problem. Given that these programs and textbooks strongly deviated from those of the Russiann Federation, the school leavers from these families would face difficulties when entering vuzy in Russia.. The article foresees a rush of pupils, not only from the families of Russian navy personnel but also fromm ordinary Crimean families, to attend the only official Russian school in Sevastopol (i.e., a school underr the authority of the Russian Federation), which is currently being set up (Krymskoe Vremia, 12 Novemberr 1997). 1211 Denis Shevchenko, a second-year student of journalism at the Tavrian Ecological University proudly toldd the author that he was one of the few who had taken a Ukrainian-language entrance exam. Roman Monasypov,, a second-year student at the Institute of Environmental Protection and Health Resort Building, alsoo spoke to the author on this subject (interviews in November 1997).

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Thee differences between the cities in local policy, especially those between Odesa andd Donets'k, appear to have mostly sprung from the persons in charge of the local educationn departments. It is remarkable that one official could leave his mark on the ukrainianizationn process in Odesa to such an extent especially since the local population, givenn its political preferences, is unlikely to have supported ukrainianization. In Kyïv the influencee of the local population on local politics appeared to be marginal as well, since thee order requiring the vast majority of Russian schools to only open Ukrainian classes wass issued by a mayor who was appointed by the president. However, in contrast to the inhabitantss of Odesa, Kyïvans, with their nationalist-leaning voting behavior, may well havee welcomed the order.

Fromm this account it is obvious that the degree to which the cities implemented elementss of central policy varied widely. Yet, in addition to these variations, there were alsoo similarities. For instance, in none of the four cities did the local authorities follow the centrall recommendation of paying teachers giving classes in Ukrainian higher salaries thann teachers teaching in Russian. Similarly, examples have not been found of Ukrainian andd mixed schools receiving more textbooks or receiving them sooner than Russian schools.1222 Clearly, the distressing lack of financial means must have been as important as aa possible unwillingness of local authorities to realize this policy objective.

Schooll personnel in all four cities denied that this was the case.

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77 THE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIANS AND RUSSIAN-SPEAKINGG UKRAINIAN S

Chapterr Five presented data on the language of instruction in schools and vuzy revealing howw the population at large welcomed the nation-building project in the different regions. However,, as these data were not broken down by nationality or language group (I know off no official data that are), I had to conduct a survey to gather data on the specific responsee of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. This chapter presents the resultss of that survey. The first section goes into the methodological details of the survey andd discusses the conceptual framework and the operationalization of concepts. The secondd section presents the results of the survey. It seeks to determine the pattern of the linguisticc responses of the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians. The following section evaluatess possible explanations for this pattern of responses. The fourth section explores too what extent a cultural mobilization has taken place among Russians and Russophone Ukrainians.. It assesses the number, the activities, and the impact of cultural societies. The fifthh section examines the correlation between the linguistic responses of the Russians andd their political responses, and assesses the validity of Kolstoe's two-dimensional model.. The concluding section summarizes the chapter's main findings.

7.11 Method of Research and Conceptual Framework

Inn order to measure the response of the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians, I carried outt a survey among school pupils in the four selected cities of this research project over a periodd of 14 months from September 1996 to November 1997 (see Appendix No. 1). In eachh city, four Ukrainian, four Russian and four mixed schools were selected. In each chosenn school, the pupils of two classes that had started in 1990-91 (before independence)) and two classes that had started in 1994-95 (after independence) were surveyed.. This approach made it possible to explore some of the dynamics of parental choicee for a particular language of instruction. In the mixed schools, the two 1990-91 classess were taught in Russian and the two 1994-95 classes in Ukrainian. In the Ukrainiann schools all four selected classes were instructed in Ukrainian, and in the Russiann schools all four selected classes were instructed in Russian. Two schools were selectedd in the city center and two in neighborhoods outside the center for each type of schooll (Ukrainian, Russian, mixed). It was presumed that the four Ukrainian, four Russiann and four mixed schools in one city would be representative of all the Ukrainian, Russiann and mixed schools in that city. The total N of this survey was 4,400 pupils, or approximatelyy 1,100 in each city. The nationality of the parents, their linguistic behavior andd the linguistic conduct of the respondents themselves was determined by reportage -i.e.. in the questionnaire the author asked pupils to state the nationality of their parents and too answer questions about their own linguistic behavior and that of their parents. It was

1233 These schools are thus in the process of becoming Ukrainian schools. 1244 Although the pupils' birth certificates, which are kept in the school files, list the passport nationality of

thee parents, the Ministry of Education has never ordered local bodies and schools to aggregate these data.

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assumedd that legitimate conclusions could be made about parental choices based on a samplee of schoolchildren since parents are normally the ones who decide on matters such ass school choice and the language children are raised in.

Thee choice of pupils as the respondents of this survey has a number of advantages. First,, it allows one to amass a large number of respondents easily and at relatively littl e costt and effort. Second, the organized setting of a class and the social pressure entailed makee it virtually impossible for pupils to refuse to cooperate. As a result, non-response is neglligible.. Indeed, only one single pupil out of a total of 4,400 declined to fil l out the questionnairee in our survey. Finally, being naive by nature, schoolchildren are likely to givee more honest answers than adults (especially young pupils, who are the respondents inn this survey). To put it differently, the bias produced by social desirability can be expectedd to be smaller if the respondents are pupils than if they are adults. The issue of sociall desirability is important in the context of this study since our data on reported languagee use could in principle be affected by it. For instance, a difference in language statuss could lead to a situation in which the number of people claiming to speak a particularr language is much higher than the number of people using it in reality. We believee that the choice of (young) schoolchildren as respondents minimizes the impact of sociall desirability. However, even if pupils exaggerate the use of a particular language in thee questionnaire, the claim to be speaking this language is socially significant as it suggestss an aspiration to become fluent in that language.

Itt further has to be noted that we consciously chose not to apply statistical significancee tests to the data presented in the ensuing tables (Tables 7.2 to 7.18). The first reasonn is that we drew a clustered sample from the pool of pupils instead of a randomized samplee (i.e. only pupils in particular classes and schools were selected, not individual pupilss from many different classes and schools). This complicates the application of significancee tests, especially in cases where the analyses of interest are based on only a partt of the sample. In these cases the number of clusters of repondents (classes, schools) mayy become so small that it would be inappropriate and irresponsible to utilize significancee tests. Second, as the cross-tabulations in the following tables include variabless of a nominal nature, we can only employ significance tests suitable for nominal variables,, such as the X2 test. The significance scores these tests produce merely tell us somethingg about the association between two variables in general. In other words, they do nott allow us to assess whether one specific difference between two groups on the dependentt variable is statistically significant or not.

Ass Chapter Two already mentioned, this research identifies a number of linguistic responsess which range from assimilation at one end of the scale to language retention at thee other. Russian-speaking parents are considered to opt for assimilation if they send theirr children to Ukrainian schools and speak Ukrainian to them at home. However, even iff these parents do so, the desired language shift among their offspring may not occur as

Inn Latvia, on the other hand, the authorities have gathered data on the nationality of pupils (see Karklins, 1998). . Ass this survey relied on the nationality of parents as reported by pupils, there may be a small bias in the samplee data caused by pupils not knowing their parents* nationality. However, only 6.8% of the pupils indicatedd that they did not know their parents' nationality.

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childrenn do have some autonomy. It is, for instance, essentially up to them what language theyy speak to their friends in a place like school, where parents cannot exert control. Therefore,, the use of Ukrainian by the respondent him- or herself in different settings and hiss or her consumption of Ukrainian-language media is an indicator of assimilation as well.. Language retention is seen as the opposite of assimilation. It refers to children from Russiann and Russophone Ukrainian families who study in Russian schools, who are raisedd in Russian and who speak Russian to their peer group, watch Russian TV and read Russiann books. The responses between these two poles are classified under the label languagelanguage integration—i.e. children from Russian and Russophone Ukrainian families in Ukrainiann schools who (1) are raised in Russian and use Russian themselves, (2) are raisedd in Russian and use Ukrainian themselves, or (3) are raised in Ukrainian and use Russiann themselves. Theoretically, there also exists the category of Russophones raising theirr children in Ukrainian but enrolling them in a Russian school. However, the survey dataa found just one instance of this category. Therefore, this possibility is not considered.

Inn principle, the choice for either a Ukrainian or a Russian school is a suitable indicatorr for the linguistic response of the Russophones since Article 25 of the 1989 Languagee Law grants parents, as we have seen, the right to choose the language of instructionn of their children. Because the state finances not only titular-language schools butt also almost all of the Russian schools and the other minority-language schools parents have,, in theory, a free choice regarding schools, with equal conditions applying for all schools.. However, the language of instruction indicator is not without its problems. As thee previous chapter showed, radical local policies in the towns of L'viv and Kyiv have, sincee independence, severely curtailed the parental right to choose the language of instruction.. As a result, parents in these cities have had difficulties in finding a Russian schooll for their children. Conversely, Soviet inertia has made Ukrainian-language educationn a rare phenomenon in Donets'k. Naturally, circumstances like these could very welll force parents to make certain choices. They could, in other words, predetermine the responsee of the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians. To see what choice parents are left withh in detail, it is necessary to once again turn to local policy and analyze its effects.

Ass we saw in the previous chapter, the number of Russian schools in L'viv declinedd from 24 in 1989-90 to five in 1997-98 out of a total of 102 schools. In the same periodd the number of mixed and bilingual schools increased from seven to seventeen, whichh indicates that many of the former Russian schools are now in a the transitional stagee of becoming fully Ukrainian (except for the five bilingual schools). Kyiv presents a similarr picture. There, the fall in the number of Russian schools was more dramatic: from 1511 out of a total of 299 schools in 1989-90, to a mere 16 out of a total of 376 schools in 1997-98.. Thus, the opportunity for parents to send their offspring to Russian schools has becomee increasingly limited in both cities. Still, it would be wrong to state that Russians inn L'viv and Kyi'v are left with almost no choice. First, there is at least one Russian school inn each of the city districts of L'viv (five) and Kyiv (fourteen), which gives parents the opportunityy to send their child to a Russian school relatively close to where they live. Second,, some school directors conceded that they actually had problems fillin g Russian first-gradee classes as parents had, reportedly, simply lost interest in Russian-language educationn (Director of Russian school no. 244 in Kyiv; Director of bilingual school no. 84 inn L'viv, 1996 and 1997, interviews). This, of course, would substantiate the claims of the

135 5

Kyïvv and L'viv authorities that the network of Ukrainian and Russian-language schools is aa true reflection of parental demand. Third, parents had ample opportunity to switch the languagee of instruction of their child (i.e. to switch between Ukrainian and Russian classes).1255 Fourth, and most importantly, analysis of the survey shows that the Russians inn L'viv behave very differently from those in Kyïv regarding school choice, despite havingg to cope with similar constraints.

Whereass Russian-language instruction has become less readily available in Kyïv andd L'viv in recent years, Donets'k and Odesa had hardly any Ukrainian-language educationn in the early 1990s. The situation was particularly clear-cut in Donets'k, with onlyy five schools having one or more Ukrainian classes out of a total of more than 150 schoolss in 1991-92. In this regard, Odesa compared favorably as it already had 20 schools withh Ukrainian classes in the same year (16 bilingual, 2 mixed and 2 genuine Ukrainian schools)) located all over town, out of a total of 117 schools. Thus, in Donets'k, parents indeedd had almost no other choice but to send their children to Russian-language schools. Yet,, in the years that followed the situation changed rapidly: in 1992-93 Donets'k already hadd 23 schools with one or more Ukrainian classes and by 1997-98 this number had grownn to 61 schools with 270 Ukrainian classes out of a total of 163 schools (Analiz razvitiarazvitia ... Donets'ka, unpublished document; Vidomosti, Donets'k, 1997-98). Moreover, ass a consequence of central policy requiring Russian schools to open Ukrainian classes uponn receiving 8-10 requests, many of these classes were very small in size (see Set' ukrainskikhukrainskikh ...uch. g, unpublished document) and parents did not run the risk of them beingg overcrowded or full. In addition, parents had the possibility to transfer their childrenn from Russian to newly created Ukrainian classes. For instance, when the 1990-911 cohort of pupils began its school career, only one school offered Ukrainian classes, but inn 1997-98 there were nine schools with one or more Ukrainian classes for this batch of pupils.. This means that many Ukrainian classes must have been created out of former Russiann classes. Thus, in the course of the 1990s the prospect of Ukrainian-language instructionn not only widened for parents with children beginning their school career but alsoo increased for parents whose children were already in the school system. In Odesa, ukrainianizationn took a more pronounced character: by 1997-98 89 out of the 133 schools hadd one or more Ukrainian classes (38 bilingual, 37 mixed and 14 Ukrainian schools) (Dynamika(Dynamika rozvytku ...Odesy, unpublished document). Since the arrival of Kozyts'kyi, parentss in Odesa have had no difficulty finding Ukrainian-language education for their sonss and daughters. To summarize, the conditions in the four cities seem to provide parentss with a sufficient measure of choice for language of instruction to be a valid indicatorr for the linguistic response of the Russian speakers.

Att first sight, the second indicator—raising children in Russian or Ukrainian—is problematicc as well. One could argue that it is premature to ask whether Russophones (especiallyy the Russians among them) are raising their children in the titular language as theyy probably have not yet developed a good command of Ukrainian themselves. (As notedd above, Russians living in the Union Republics did not feel the need to learn the titularr languages in the Soviet days.) However, Ukraine appears to be a special case in

Inn my survey 8.1% of the Russian-instructed respondents in L'viv and Kyïv stated that they began their schooll career in a Ukrainian class.

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thatt Ukrainian and Russian are closely related languages, as was mentioned in Chapter One.. With a littl e effort, Ukrainian speakers and Russophones can understand each other'ss language even if they have never heard the other language before. Because of this, Russiann speakers should be able to learn Ukrainian relatively quickly. In addition, this linguisticc closeness probably explains why a substantial number of Ukraine's Russians claimedd fluency in Ukrainian (34.0%) in the 1989 Soviet census, compared to Russians in thee other republics (only in Lithuania did Russians claim a higher percentage of titular fluency:: 37.5%) (Kolstoe, 1996). In two of the cases in this study a majority of the local Russianss even considered themselves to be fluent in Ukrainian (in L'viv - 77%; in Kyïv -51%)) (Bremmer. 1994). Thus, it seems that for many Russians a poor command of Ukrainiann cannot be used as an excuse for raising their children in Russian. While Russianss should not have many difficulties in learning and speaking Ukrainian as a secondd language, Russophone Ukrainians should not have them at all. Many of them were raisedd in Ukrainian in their early childhood, which means that they have most likely retainedd a rudimentary knowledge of the language, and one that can quickly be revitalized.. Even those Russophone Ukrainians who never heard a word of Ukrainian spokenn at home are liekly to have some Ukrainian-speaking grandparents or other relativess in the countryside.126

Inn addition to linguistic similarity, Russophones are, of course, encouraged to speakk Ukrainian to their children by the particular language policies of the national authorities,, which the previous chapter discussed in detail and which thus need not be repeated. .

Thee third indicator—the language use of the respondent and his or her consumptionn of Russian or Ukrainian-language mediae—may be as important as the languagee parents raise their children in. Not only do children have some autonomy vis-a-visvis their parents, they are also much more susceptible to language policies than adults, becausee of both the age difference and the difference in surroundings. Russophone childrenn studying in a Ukrainian school, i.e. in a place where they read Ukrainian materialss and constantly hear the teacher speaking Ukrainian, wil l certainly adopt Ukrainiann much faster as their first language than their Russophone fathers and mothers whoo may only have to prepare documents in Ukrainian at their workplace. A part of the analysiss will therefore focus on the effect the language of instruction has on the language usee of the respondent.

1266 As Arel (1994) pointed out, the urbanization of large numbers of Ukrainians, which was the great acceleratorr of linguistic russification, only began in the 1930s. Given the novelty of this experience, many urbann Russian-speaking Ukrainians must have preserved ties with Ukrainian-speaking relatives in the countryside. .

137 7

indicatee that while Russian families in Donets'k, Odesa and Kyïv have become more preparedd to enroll their children in Ukrainian schools, Russian couples in L'viv have not changedd their attitude or have even become more dismissive of Ukrainian-language education. .

Tablee 7.2 Schoolchildren by Parent Nationality and Language of Instruction in 1996-19977 (in percentage)

Nationalityy of parents

L'viv L'viv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Kyïv Kyïv

Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

1990-91 1

Ukrainian n

97.4 4 64.1 1 35.4 4

74.9 9 46.8 8 31.6 6

9.6 6 8.6 6 4.3 3

1.8 8 1.5 5 1.0 0

cohort t

Russian n

2.6 6 35.9 9 64.6 6

25.1 1 53.2 2 68.4 4

90.4 4 91.4 4 95.7 7

98.2 2 98.5 5 99.0 0

1994-95 5

Ukrainian n

97.5 5 80.3 3 15.0 0

94.9 9 84.5 5 78.1 1

19.8 8 13.7 7 11.5 5

7.2 2 3.5 5 1.7 7

cohort t

Russian n

2.5 5 19.7 7

85.0 0

5.1 1 15.5 5 21.9 9

80.2 2 86.3 3 88.5 5

92.8 8 96.5 5 98.3 3

Source:: Survey data NB:: The data in this table are the result of a weighting procedure using statistics from Table 7.1. Please refer to Appendix no.. 2 for an extended version of this table and a detailed explanation of the weighting procedure.

Inn all four cities and in both cohorts the proportion of mixed-family children attending Ukrainiann classes is higher than the proportion of Russian-family children attending Ukrainiann classes. In the 1990-91 cohort, the responses of mixed couples were also much moree varied than those of the Russian families: in L'viv a majority of mixed couples (64.1%)) send their children to Ukrainian classes as opposed to only 35.4% of Russian couples,, while in Donets'k both parent groups show almost the same response (1.5% and 1.0%,, respectively). Another difference with Russian parents is that not in three, but in all fourr cities, mixed couples send their children in relatively higher numbers to Ukrainian classess in the youngest cohort. This suggests that mixed couples have become more enthusiasticc for Ukrainian-language education throughout Ukraine. The question remains: whyy do mixed couples behave so differently from Russian parents in L'viv while they respondd in almost the same way and show the same trends in the other cities? Incidentally,, it must be noted that the group of mixed couples is over four times as large

140 0

ass the group of Russian parents in L'viv, according to my survey data (see extended table inn Appendix no. 2). The implication is that, for the group of L'vivan Russians as a whole, theree are many Russians who send their children to Ukrainian-language classes (probably moree than 50%). Bremmer found more or less the same result in his 1992 survey in which hee asked adults to state whether they agreed with the statement "I would prefer that my childrenn study in Ukrainian schools." Of the Russians in L'viv 54% said they (fully) agreedd (Bremmer, 1994, p. 277). Interestingly, the Kyivan Russians expressed a higher ratee of agreement in his survey (65%). This result is also in accordance with our finding thatt the Kyi'van Russians send their children in much higher numbers to Ukrainian schoolss than the L'vivan Russians in the 1994-95 cohort.

Nott only do the responses of Russian parents and mixed couples diverge strongly inn the different contexts, also those of Ukrainian parents (i.e. both parents are Ukrainian) differr markedly between the four cities. Thus, while L'viv and Kyïv show overwhelming majoritiess of Ukrainian parents enrolling their children in Ukrainian classes in both cohorts,, Odesa and Donets'k have only small minorities of Ukrainian parents doing so. Forr Ukrainian nationalists it must come as an unpleasant surprise to find that so few Ukrainiann parents in these two important industrial cities are having their children educatedd in their "natural" language. Nonetheless, a comparison of the two cohorts shows thatt the proportion of Ukrainian parents with children in Ukrainian classes did increase (inn Odesa from 9.6% to 19.8% and in Donets'k from 1.8% to 7.2%).

Briefly,, in three of the four cities the different groups of parents (both Ukrainian, mixed,, and both Russian) all more of less show the same behaviour. In Donets'k and Odesaa overwhelming majorities of all groups of parents send their children to Russian-languagee classes in both cohorts, and in Kyïv, despite substantial inter-group differences inn the oldest cohort, the parent groups of the youngest batch all enroll their children in Ukrainian-languagee classes in majority numbers. Thus, the only really deviant case is the groupp of both parents Russian in L'viv, which sharply contrasts with the other groups in thiss city.

RussophoneRussophone Ukrainians

Forr the sake of convenience, this research project defines Russophone Ukrainian couples ass parents who are Ukrainian by nationality and who speak only Russian to each other. Thiss is of course not to say that that there are no Russophone Ukrainians in mixed couples.. In fact, data from the survey indicate that large majorities of mixed couples in Kyïv,, Donets'k and Odesa speak only Russian to each other, regardless of whether they havee children in Ukrainian or Russian classes. L'viv is the only city which has a substantiall group of mixed couples speaking only Ukrainian to each other. There, a strikingg contrast in the language use of parents can be found between mixed couples with childrenn in Ukrainian classes (32% speaking only Ukrainian; 46.7% speaking both languages;; 21.3% speaking only Russian) and those with children in Russian classes (0.9%% speaking only Ukrainian; 19.2% speaking both languages; 79.8% speaking only Russian).. For the mixed couples in L'viv , therefore, the language spoken by parents at homee seems be a strong determinant of school choice.

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Russophonee Ukrainian parents send their children in (slightly) higher numbers to Ukrainiann classes than Russian parents across the board and in both cohorts (compare Tablee 7.3 to Table 7.2). The exception to this pattern are the Russophone Ukrainians in L'vivv with children in the 1990-91 cohort. However, given the small number of cases in thee sample data for this group (which was the case for the Russian parents as well), one cannott state with certainty whether the Russophone Ukrainians sent their children in smallerr numbers to Ukrainian classes than Russian parents in the 1990-91 cohort in L'viv . .

Tablee 7.3 Schoolchildren by the Language that Parents Speak to Each Other (Only Parentss of Ukrainian Nationality) and Language of Instruction in 1996-1997 (inn percentage)

Languagee parents speak to eachh other L'viv L'viv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Kyïv Kyïv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Odesa Odesa Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Donetsk Donetsk Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

1990-911 cohort Ukrainian n

99.8 8 84.2 2 28.2 2

85.1 1 76.7 7 64.9 9

--10.9 9 8.8 8

--2.9 9 1.5 5

Russian n

0.2 2 15.8 8 71.8 8

14.9 9 23.3 3 35.1 1

--89.1 1 91.2 2

--97.1 1 98.5 5

1994-955 cohort Ukrainian n

99.8 8 95.0 0 73.5 5

98.3 3 90.5 5 85.1 1

--31.7 7 17.5 5

--11.0 0 5.9 9

Russian n

0.2 2 5.0 0

26.5 5

1.7 7 9.5 5

14.9 9

--68.3 3 82.5 5

--89.0 0 94.1 1

NB:: To arrive at the data in this table the same weighting procedure was followed as that in Table 7.2

Inn the youngest cohort, Kyïv records the highest percentage of Russophone Ukrainian parentss enrolling their children in Ukrainian classes (73.5%), and Donets'k the lowest (5.9%),, as was the case with Russian parents. However, whereas only a minority of Russiann parents put their offspring in Ukrainian classes in L'viv, a majority of Russophonee Ukrainians parents do so in this batch of pupils (73.5%). Consequently, quite unlikee the unchanged dismissive attitude of the Russians parents, the Russophone Ukrainianss parents seem to have largely come to accept Ukrainian-language education in thiss city, when the two cohorts are compared. As this pattern—i.e. relatively more Russophonee Ukrainian parents sending their children to Ukrainian classes in the 1994-95

142 2

cohortt than in the 1990-91 cohort—was also found in the other three cities, it seems that thee same conclusion applies as for mixed couples: Russophone Ukrainian parents have becomee more enthusiastic for Ukrainian-language education throughout Ukraine. Like mixedd couples, Russophone Ukrainian parents show only slight increases in Donets'k and Odesa,, up from almost negligible levels of Ukrainian-instructed children in the 1990-91 cohort,, and substantial increases in Kyïv and L'viv, where there was a much greater offer off Ukrainian-language schools from the start. To sum up, the pattern of responses of Russophonee Ukrainian parents closely resembles that of mixed couples, in further contrastt to that of Russian parents.

Anotherr clear finding is the absence of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians sending theirr children to Russian-language schools in L'viv (0.2% in both cohorts). This provides furtherr support for the contention that the language spoken by parents indeed affects the choicee of language of instruction. Kyïv presents a similar picture, although a small group off Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians still have children in Russian classes there (14.9% in thee oldest batch and just 1.7% in the youngest batch). In Donets'k and Odesa the group of Ukrainian-speakingg Ukrainians is virtually non-existent in both batches (the hyphens in thee table and in the tables that follow indicate that there are fewer than 10 respondents on averagee in the cells of the relevant row). This last result, in fact, strongly supports Arel andd Khmelko's claim that the census data on mother tongue underestimate the actual use off Russian (see Chapter Two).

7.2.22 The language parents speak to their children

Thee reader wil l notice that the data presented in Tables 7.4 to 7.14 (with the exception of Tablee 7.6) are all broken down by language of instruction. This was done to avoid having too weigh the data. It was assumed that the respondents instructed in one particular languagee would be representative of all the pupils instructed in that language in any of the fourr cities of this research project. On several occasions in the following sections I wil l speakk of a 'language of instruction effect.' At first sight this is misleading since this surveyy data do not allow me to assess whether differences in some indicator between Ukrainian-- and Russian-instructed respondents are caused by the language of instruction off these respondents. After all, these differences may have already existed before the respondentss started their school careers. Nonetheless, there are strong arguments to assumee that the language of instruction must have left its mark on, for instance, the languagee the respondent speaks in the breaks or the language the respondent reads books in,, especially if one compares these indicators to others. Therefore, I assume the language off instruction to have a (carefully circumscribed) impact.

Russians Russians

Inn none of the cities do Russian parents speak much Ukrainian to their children: overwhelmingg majorities (77.5% and more) speak solely Russian and the remainder speakk both languages, which leaves almost none speaking only Ukrainian to their children (seee Table 7.4). The data, thus, suggest that Russian parents have not yet begun to raise

143 3

theirr sons and daughters in Ukrainian. Surprisingly, differences between the language of instructionn groups are only small as regards the language in which children are raised. Onlyy in Kyi'v and Donets'k do Russian parents who have enrolled their children in Ukrainiann classes speak slightly more Ukrainian to their offspring than Russian parents whoo have enrolled their children in Russian classes. It must be noted, however, that given thee very small number of Russian parents who have children in Ukrainian classes (see Tablee 7.2), Donets'k only has a handful of Russian parents making an effort to raise their childrenn in Ukrainian.

Tablee 7.4 Respondents by Nationality of Parents and the Language Parents Speak to Respondentt in 1996-1997 (in percentage)

Nationalityy of parents L'viv L'viv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Ky'fv Ky'fv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Languagee used by parents to respondent Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

90.3 3 35.5 5

--

35.9 9 6.1 1 2.1 1

2.8 8 1.2 2 1.2 2

5.3 3 1.3 3

0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

7.2 2 50.0 0

--

33.2 2 35.7 7 17.0 0

37.4 4 18.3 3 4.9 9

44.7 7 35.6 6 22.5 5

Russian n

2.5 5 14.5 5

--

30.0 0 58.2 2 78.7 7

59.9 9 79.9 9 93.9 9

50.0 0 63.1 1 77.5 5

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

6.8 8 0.5 5

0 0

11.8 8 2.1 1

0 0

0.9 9 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

22.3 3 23.8 8 8.6 6

31.6 6 23.7 7 5.9 9

23.0 0 15.7 7 3.8 8

11.0 0 7.1 1 3.5 5

Russian n

70.9 9 75.7 7 91.4 4

55.3 3 72.2 2 92.2 2

76.1 1 84.3 3 96.2 2

89.0 0 92.9 9 96.5 5

Source:: survey data NB:: This table presents the bare sample data. Because of the small numbers of Ukrainian-instructed children from purely Russiann families in L'viv, data for this group have been omitted.

Thee mixed couples behave in much the same way as the Russian parents. Although they speakk slightly more Ukrainian to their children, the number speaking only Ukrainian is negligible.. As with the Russian parents, mixed families who only speak Russian are in the majority.. The exception are the mixed couples in L'viv. There, mixed families having childrenn in Ukrainian classes contrast strongly with mixed couples having children in Russiann classes. In the latter group only 0.5% speak solely in Ukrainian to their children, 23.8%% speak both languages and 75.7% speak exclusively in Russian. In the first group as manyy as 35.5% only speak in Ukrainian, 50.0% use both languages and just 14.5% only

144 4

Russian,, which means that this group gravitates towards Ukrainian. Moreover, since the groupp of mixed families with children in Ukrainian classes is twice as large as the group off mixed families with children in Russian classes in the 1990-91 cohort and more than fourr times as large in the 1994-95 cohort (see Table 7.2), one could argue that for the groupp of mixed families as a whole there may already be as many parents raising their offspringg exclusively in Ukrainian as parents raising their children exclusively in Russian.

Whyy do the mixed families in L'viv not only send their children to Ukrainian-languagee education in large numbers but also raise them in Ukrainian to a more significantt extent than mixed couples in the other cities? Part of the answer may lie in the factt that, according to the data, approximately 60% of the Russians in mixed couples marriedd western Ukrainians in L'viv. These Ukrainians tend to have a much stronger nationall consciousness than Ukrainians in other parts of the country.1 Thus, one could veryy well imagine that, while Ukrainians in mixed couples in the rest of the country may easilyy "give in" to their Russian partner's wish to raise their child in Russian, the Ukrainianss in L'viv may prove to be much more of a match for their Russian partners, insistingg on raising their children in Ukrainian.

Althoughh not as stark as in L'viv, there is a certain language of instruction effect inn Kyïv and Donets'k as well: mixed families having children in Ukrainian schools tend too raise their children in Ukrainian more than mixed couples with children in Russian schools.. In Odesa, the language of instruction hardly matters.

AA final point worth noting is that even among the titulars (i.e. both parents are Ukrainian)) raising children solely in Russian appears quite popular, especially in Odesa andd Donets'k where clear majorities do so. In Kyïv, the groups speaking only Ukrainian, onlyy Russian and both languages to their sons and daughters seem to balance each other out.. This leaves L'viv as the only city where an overwhelming majority of Ukrainian parentss speak solely Ukrainian to their children. Yet, even here a large majority of the few Ukrainianss who enrolled their children in Russian classes raise them only in Russian.

RussophoneRussophone Ukrainians

Ass was the case with Russian parents, Russophone Ukrainian parents do not speak much Ukrainiann to their children in any of the cities (see Table 7.5). Overwhelming majorities speakk solely Russian, a few speak both languages and almost none are exclusively Ukrainiann speakers. Surprisingly, it is in russophone Donets'k that the language of instructionn appears to have the strongest effect: 29.5% of the Russian-speaking Ukrainianss with children in Ukrainian classes speak both languages to their children, as opposedd to only 1.9% of those with children in Russian classes.130 In Kyïv, the same figuress are 19.6% and 9.0% respectively, which indicates that the differences between the languagess of instruction are smaller there (although 8.1% of the Russophone Ukrainians

1288 In the survey I asked the pupils to state their parents' place of birth. 1299 According to my survey data, a majority of the Ukrainians who sent their children to Russian classes

weree not born in western Ukraine. 1300 Unfortunately, the average number of respondents in the cells representing the Russophone parents in L'vivv with children in Ukrainian classes was too small to make statements about this group.

145 5

withh children in Ukrainian classes raise their children exclusively in Ukrainian in Kyi'v, as opposedd to only 2.3% in Donets'k). An explanation for the larger difference in Donets'k mayy be that Ukrainian-language education is still a rare phenomenon in this city, possibly attractingg children only from the small group of nationally conscious Ukrainians. In contrast,, Ukrainian-language education in Kyi'v has become mass-based, recruiting childrenn not only from nationally conscious, but also from nationally indifferent Ukrainiann families (and from many Russian families, for that matter). The next section on thee language use of the respondents themselves will further show remarkably high scores off Ukrainian-instructed pupils in Donets'k claiming to speak Ukrainian in the breaks, watchh Ukrainian TV and read Ukrainian books, as compared to the Ukrainian-instructed pupilss in Odesa and Kyi'v. This confirms the impression that the few Ukrainian schools in Donets'kk may well draw pupils from a special group of parents.

Tablee 7.5 Respondents by the Language Parents Speak to Each Other (Only Parents off Ukrainian Nationality) and the Language Parents Speak to Respondent in 1996-19977 (in percentage)

Languagee parents speakk to each other L'viv L'viv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Kyiv Kyiv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Odesa Odesa Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Donets'k Donets'k Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Languagee used by parents to respondent Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

99.0 0 27.8 8

--

91.9 9 8.2 2 8.1 1

--1.2 2 0.5 5

--4.3 3 2.3 3

Ukrainian n && Russian

1.0 0 69.4 4

--

8.1 1 85.6 6 19.6 6

--92.9 9 12.5 5

--89.1 1 29.5 5

Russian n

0 0 2.8 8

--

0 0 6.2 2

71.6 6

--6.0 0

87.0 0

--6.5 5

68.2 2

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

----0 0

71.4 4 4.6 6

0 0

--0 0 0 0

--0 0 0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

----

8.3 3

17.1 1 87.7 7 9.0 0

--82.4 4

1.9 9

--60.0 0

1.9 9

Russian n

----

91.7 7

11.4 4 7.7 7

89.6 6

--17.6 6 98.1 1

--40.0 0 98.1 1

Anotherr important finding is that mixed couples speak relatively more Ukrainian to their childrenn than Russophone Ukrainian parents in all four cities and in both language of instructionn groups (compare Tables 7.4 and 7.5). The difference is due to the (few) mixed coupless speaking only Ukrainian or both languages to each other: in Kyi'v 50 of the 60 mixedd couples speaking both language to each other also spoke both languages to their children;; in L'viv 68 out of 76 did so, and in the same city 23 of the 26 mixed couples

146 6

speakingg only Ukrainian to each other also spoke only Ukrainian to their children. This patternn of obvious linguistic continuity between the generations also applies to Ukrainian parents.. As Table 7.5 shows, large majorities of every language group speak the same languagee to their children as to their partners.

Nonetheless,, it is interesting to see whether a small intergenerational language shiftt is occurring. In this regard, the group of Ukrainian parents speaking both languages iss of particular importance as this group can give an indication of the direction the shift is goingg over time.132 In L'viv the trend is clearly towards more Ukrainian: 27.8% of the parentss with children in Ukrainian classes raise their children only in Ukrainian as opposedd to just 2.8% raising their children only in Russian (see Table 7.5). In Kyi'v there aree slightly more parents with children in Ukrainian classes speaking only Ukrainian to theirr children (8.2%) than those speaking only Russian to their children (6.2), and slightly fewerr parents with children in Russian classes speaking only Ukrainian to their children (4.6%)) than those speaking only Russian to their children (7.7%). Both groups therefore appearr to balance each other out in this city. However, as the group of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils is much larger than the group of Russian-instructed pupils (and the difference,, as we have seen, is getting larger each year), there may well be a small shift towardss speaking more Ukrainian in Kyi'v. In Donets'k and Odesa the trend is towards Russian:: there are (many) more parents raising their children exclusively in Russian than thosee raising their children only in Ukrainian, regardless of the language of instruction of thesee children. Interestingly, therefore, the cities seem to be drifting further apart in terms off language shift across generations.

7.2.33 The two cohorts

Thee conclusion of the previous section on intergenerational language shift is not corroboratedd by Table 7.6 which presents data on the language parents speak to their childrenn by cohort. The results for both Russians (those in purely Russian couples and thosee in mixed couples) and Russophone Ukrainians are listed. It must further be noted thatt only the group of Ukrainian-instructed respondents is shown here. The Russian-instructedd group was omitted because differences between the batches turned out to be negligible.. As we can see, despite overall levels of Ukrainian language use being very low,, there is a trend across the board towards speaking more Ukrainian to one's offspring whenn the two cohorts are compared. This tendency is most visible among mixed couples andd Russophone Ukrainians. Curiously, it is Russophone Donets'k, of all places, that standss out as the city where the difference between the batches is largest (note the significantt rise of the number of Russian parents and mixed couples speaking both languagess to their children). This lends further support to the observation in the previous sectionn that the Ukrainian schools in Donets'k may well recruit pupils from the special groupp of nationally conscious parents. Nonetheless, even in Kyi'v the number of parents

1311 As indicated by the respondents of the survey. 1322 Although the survey measured the response of the Russophones at one point in time, I assumed that statementss could be made on changes over time by comparing the language parents use to each other to the languagee conduct of parents with their children.

147 7

speakingg only Ukrainian or both languages to their children is substantially higher in the 1994-955 group than in the 1990-91 group, particularly among Russophone Ukrainians. Thiss is surprising given that Ukrainian-language instruction has rapidly become the dominantt mode of education in the Kyi'v school system over these two years, having increasinglyy attracted children from not particularly patriotic Russian-speaking circles. Onee would thus have expected the relative number of Russophone parents speaking Ukrainiann to their children to actually decline between the 1990-91 and 1994-95 school years.. As precisely the reverse has happened, one can assuredly speak of a genuine growthh in the numbers of Russophones raising their children in Ukrainian.

Tablee 7.6 Ukrainian-instructed Respondents by Parent Group and the Language Parentss Speak to Respondent in 1996-1997 (in percentage)

Languagee used by parents to respondent 1990-911 cohort 1994-95 cohort

Ukrainiann Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian Ukrainian Russian Parentt group & Russian & Russian L'viv L'viv Bothh parents Russian Mixedd couples Russophonee Ukrainians

Kyi'v Kyi'v Bothh parents Russian Mixedd couples 0 40.6 Russophonee Ukrainians 2.2 13.3

Odesa Odesa Bothh parents Russian Mixedd couples 0 10.6 Russophonee Ukrainians 0 5.9

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh parents Russian 0 6.1 Mixedd couples 0 23.2 Russophonee Ukrainians 0 15.4

7.2.44 Language use of respondent

Russians Russians

Thee language pupils speak during breaks at school can be expected to be strongly influencedd by the language of instruction of pupils. Table 7.7 shows that this is indeed the casee for children from Russian and mixed families: in all four cities those who are instructedd in Ukrainian speak more Ukrainian in the breaks than those who are instructed inn Russian. The difference is largest among the group of mixed-family children in L'viv : 73.3%% of the Ukrainian-instructed pupils only speak Ukrainian during breaks, as opposed

35.0 0

2.4 4 59.44 9.1 84.44 10.7

1.6 6 89.44 2.0 94.11 0.8

93.99 0 76.88 2.2 84.66 3.2

51.77 13.3

17.11 78.0 33.33 57.6 22.33 66.0

6.33 92.1 23.55 73.5 16.11 83.1

36.88 63.2 45.11 52.7 35.55 61.3

148 8

too 81.8% of the Russian-instructed pupils who speak only Russian. However, this contrast iss probably not only caused by the language of instruction, but also by the language parentss speak to each other. (Section 7.2.1 revealed that mixed couples with children in Ukrainiann classes spoke much more Ukrainian to each other than the mixed couples with childrenn in Russian classes.)

Tablee 7.7 Respondents by Nationality of Parents and Language Spoken during Breaks att School in 1996-1997 (in percentage)

Nationalityy of parents L'viv L'viv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Kyïv Kyïv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Language e usedd by respondent during breaks Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

86.9 9 73.3 3

--

26.2 2 20.6 6 13.0 0

4.2 2 4.3 3 6.2 2

16.0 0 5.7 7

16.7 7

Ukrainian n && Russian

12.7 7 25.3 3

--

28.3 3 25.8 8 19.6 6

30.8 8 29.2 2 12.3 3

42.5 5 45.3 3 25.0 0

Russian n

0 0 1.3 3

--

45.5 5 52.6 6 67.4 4

64.7 7 66.5 5 80.2 2

41.4 4 49.1 1 58.3 3

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

1.0 0 0 0 0 0

0.7 7 1.1 1

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

16.7 7 18.2 2 17.7 7

11.3 3 13.2 2 5.4 4

8.4 4 7.6 6 5.7 7

7.1 1 3.3 3 2.1 1

Russian n

82.4 4 81.8 8 82.3 3

88.0 0 84.6 6 94.6 6

91.6 6 92.4 4 94.3 3

92.9 9 96.7 7 97.9 9

Inn the other three cities the differences due to the language of instruction are not as large butt nonetheless substantial. In Kyïv and Donets'k, sizable numbers of Ukrainian-instructedd children from Russian and mixed families speak only Ukrainian or both languagess in the breaks. Russian-instructed children, in contrast, speak almost exclusively Russian.. However, the distinctions between the language of instruction groups notwithstanding,, a majority of the children from both Russian and mixed families continuee to speak only Russian during breaks in the Ukrainian schools in each of the three citiess of Kyïv, Odesa and Donets'k. Thus, despite the obvious influence of the language off instruction, Russian still predominates in the breaks in the Ukrainian schools in these cities. .

Thee language of instruction clearly has less of an impact on the language respondentss speak with friends (see Table 7.8). In Kyïv, Odesa and Donets'k large majoritiess of children from Russian and mixed families report that they only speak Russiann with their friends, regardless of the language in which they are instructed. In

149 9

comparisonn to the language spoken during breaks, only a very small number of pupils claimm to speak only Ukrainian with their friends in these cities, even those studying in Ukrainiann classes. Looking at this variable, therefore, assimilation has not yet occurred to anyy extent among children with (partial) Russian backgrounds in Kyi'v, Donets'k and Odesa. .

Tablee 7.8 Respondents by Nationality of Parents and Language Spoken to Friends in 1996-19977 (in percentage)

Nationalityy of parents L'viv L'viv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Kyi'v Kyi'v Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Languagee used by respondent to friends Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

70.8 8 36.8 8

--

13.3 3 8.2 2 2.2 2

2.1 1 1.2 2

0 0

2.7 7 0.6 6 2.8 8

Ukrainian n && Russian

29.0 0 59.2 2

--

35.5 5 26.8 8 19.6 6

22.5 5 14.6 6 11.3 3

35.6 6 24.4 4 25.0 0

Russian n

0.2 2 3.9 9

--

50.4 4 64.9 9 78.3 3

75.1 1 84.1 1 87.5 5

61.7 7 75.0 0 72.2 2

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

6.8 8 2.3 3 1.4 4

0.8 8 0.5 5

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

0.8 8 0 0 0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

68.0 0 62.6 6 70.9 9

25.0 0 17.9 9 5.9 9

14.9 9 12.1 1 4.7 7

7.0 0 4.4 4 4.9 9

Russian n

25.2 2 34.6 6 27.7 7

73.7 7 81.5 5 93.1 1

85.1 1 87.9 9 95.3 3

92.2 2 95.6 6 95.1 1

Itt is worth noting that children from Ukrainian families also speak only Russian to their friendss in large numbers, both those instructed in Russian and those instructed in Ukrainian.. It, thus, seems that the particular language environment of a city (which in all threee of the aforementioned cities is Russian) is a much more powerful factor in shaping thee language children speak with their friends than the language of instruction. This conclusionn is corroborated by the findings in L'viv , especially those that relate to the groupp of Russian-instructed pupils. In total contrast to the other cities, an astonishing 70.9%% of the Russian-family children claim to speak both languages with their friends, andd an equally surprisingly high number of 62.6% of children from mixed families report doingg so. Assimilation, thus, seems to be well under way in L'viv with Russian-language educationn unable to put a halt to this process. The fact that so many Russian-instructed, Russiann family children speak both languages with their friends may well testify to the ethnicallyy mixed nature of circles of friends which include children from Ukrainian

150 0

schools.. This, of course, is a promising sign of inter-ethnic harmony and something that bodess well for the future integration of L'vivan Russians.

Tablee 7.9 Respondents by Nationality of Parents and Language of Television in 1996-19977 (in percentage)

Languagee respondent watches television in more often Instructedd in Ukrainian Instructedd in Russian

Nationalityy of parents L'viv L'viv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Kyi)/ Kyi)/ Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Ukrainian n

75.2 2 67.1 1

--

27.5 5 14.3 3 10.9 9

26.0 0 23.2 2 21.3 3

27.4 4 17.5 5 25.4 4

Ukrainian n && Russian

9.4 4 10.5 5

--

21.1 1 21.4 4

8.7 7

7.6 6 7.3 3

13.8 8

7.0 0 6.9 9 5.6 6

Russian n

11.3 3 18.4 4

--

41.7 7 61.2 2 67.4 4

64.7 7 65.9 9 57.5 5

64.0 0 73.1 1 67.6 6

Ukrainian n

50.5 5 46.9 9 48.2 2

12.2 2 8.7 7 2.0 0

11.6 6 12.6 6 6.7 7

8.6 6 3.8 8 3.5 5

Ukrainian n && Russian

6.8 8 6.6 6

10.8 8

16.5 5 21.5 5 8.9 9

5.6 6 8.8 8 7.7 7

11.7 7 3.8 8 7.0 0

Russian n

36.9 9 42.7 7 38.8 8

65.0 0 66.2 2 82.2 2

78.1 1 73.6 6 81.7 7

73.4 4 89.7 7 86.7 7

Whatt can be said for the language respondents speak to friends also applies to the respondents'' choice of Ukrainian or Russian-language television (see Table 7.9). It seems thatt it is not so much the language of instruction as the language environment of the city andd specific local broadcasting regulations that affect the viewing habits: in Kyïv, Odesa andd Donets'k clear majorities of children from Russian and mixed families watch only Russian-languagee television, irrespective of their language of instruction. The numbers of Ukrainian-instructedd children watching Ukrainian-language television are, however, slightlyy to moderately higher than the numbers of Russian-instructed children watching Ukrainiann television in these cities. Quite a surprising result is that Odesa and Donets'k showw higher rates of Russian and mixed-family children watching Ukrainian television thann Kyi'v in the Ukrainian-instructed group. Possibly, the supply of (commercial) Russiann television stations is higher in Kyïv.

Inn the Russian-instructed group in L'viv, children from both Russian and mixed familiess watch Ukrainian-language television in slightly higher numbers than Russian-languagee television, and in the Ukrainian-instructed group the children from mixed familiess watch the former in much higher numbers than the latter. However, one has to be cautiouss in interpreting these findings as evidence of assimilation since Russian-language

151 1

televisionn is constrained by local regulations, leaving people with almost no choice but to watchh Ukrainian-language programs. For several years, the L'viv authorities blocked the transmissionn of Inter, the only state channel that dedicates half of its airtime to programs inn Russian. Now Inter is back on the air, but it is still the only channel with regular Russiann programs that all L'viv residents can receive (the other three public channels beingg one local and two national Ukrainian-language TV stations).133 People wanting to watchh Russian-language programs therefore have to resort to satellite dishes in order to receivee the many commercial Russian-language TV stations from southern and eastern Ukrainee or from Russia itself.

Tablee 7.10 Respondents by Nationality of Parents and Language of Books in 1996-1997 (inn percentage)

Nationalityy of parents L'viv L'viv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

KyYv KyYv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian

Languagee respondent reads books in more often Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

80.1 1 72.4 4

--

48.7 7 31.9 9 40.4 4

26.0 0 23.9 9 16.0 0

40.7 7 28.8 8 24.3 3

Ukrainian n && Russian

5.6 6 6.6 6

• •

17.2 2 18.1 1 14.9 9

8.0 0 4.3 3 4.9 9

5.8 8 7.7 7 5.7 7

Russian n

13.2 2 19.7 7

--

31.2 2 50.0 0 42.6 6

64.4 4 68.7 7 72.8 8

52.4 4 62.2 2 68.6 6

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

3.9 9 3.8 8

0 0

6.8 8 5.7 7 1.0 0

3.7 7 1.9 9 1.0 0

0.8 8 0.5 5

0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

3.9 9 2.8 8 3.6 6

14.0 0 11.4 4 10.9 9

2.8 8 1.9 9 4.8 8

2.4 4 3.8 8 2.1 1

Russian n

92.2 2 91.5 5 93.5 5

78.7 7 81.3 3 84.2 2

93.0 0 94.9 9 91.4 4

96.9 9 95.1 1 97.1 1

Thee language of instruction would again seem to be of prime importance for the language pupilss read books in (see Table 7.10). As we can see, Ukrainian-instructed pupils read Ukrainiann books in much higher numbers than Russian-instructed pupils do across the board.. In fact, among the latter the number of pupils claiming to read Ukrainian books is minimal,, regardless of the city they live in or the nationality of their parents. (The highest scoree of Russian-instructed pupils reading Ukrainian books is in Kyi'v, among the group off pupils whose parents are both Ukrainian - 6.8%.) In contrast, in the group of

Ass the author noticed during his stay with his host family in L'viv in the spring of 1996 and on regular visitss thereafter.

152 2

Ukrainian-instructedd pupils, the percentages of pupils reading Ukrainian books range fromm 16.0% (the respondents from Russian families in Odesa) to 80.1% (the respondents fromm Ukrainian families in L'viv). The respondents have probably also included schoolbookss in their conception of books, and these are, of course, in Ukrainian in Ukrainiann schools and in Russian in Russian schools. This would explain the large differencee between the language of instruction groups.

Nonetheless,, despite the impact of the language of instruction, the Ukrainian-instructedd pupils in the cities of Kyïv, Odesa and Donets'k still read more Russian than Ukrainiann books. Among the children from Russian and mixed families, clear majorities indicatedd that they read Russian books more often (the exception being the Russian-familyy children in Kyïv with 42.6% of them saying they more often read Russian books andd a surprisingly high 40.4% saying they more often read Ukrainian books). Once again L'vivv stands out with 72.4% of the Ukrainian-instructed children from mixed families sayingg they read Ukrainian books more often. Thus, only in this city does assimilation seemm to be well under way.

RussophoneRussophone Ukrainians

Thee pattern of responses of Russophone Ukrainian children on the language they speak duringg breaks variable is strikingly similar to that of the Russian-family children (comparee Tables 7.11 and 7.7). As was the case with the latter, it is only in Ukrainian schoolss in Kyïv and Donets'k that non-negligible numbers of Russophone Ukrainian childrenn speak only Ukrainian or both languages in the breaks (like Russian-family children,, there were too few Russophone Ukrainian children in the Ukrainian-instructed groupp in L'viv, which explains the hyphens in the tables). In Russian schools, the Russophonee Ukrainian children speak almost exclusively Russian throughout Ukraine (i.e.. in all four cities). The fact that the Russophone Ukrainian children and the Russian-familyy children show almost the same (reported) behavior in all regional contexts is anotherr indication that the language situation at home indeed matters (we may assume thatt Russian parents speak almost exclusively Russian to each other).

Thee group of children with parents speaking both languages to each other once againn allows us to see in which direction a language shift is likely to occur. As was the casee in Table 7.5, the trend clearly is towards more Ukrainian in L'viv: in the Ukrainian classess 70.6% of the children of this group of parents speak only Ukrainian in the breaks. Inn the other three cities (i.e. also in Kyïv!), the direction seems to be towards Russian as theree are more Ukrainian-instructed children speaking only Russian than speaking only Ukrainiann during breaks (in Kyïv 34.0% speaking only Russian to 19.0% speaking only Ukrainian;; in Odesa 29.8% only Russian to 3.6% only Ukrainian; in Donets'k 28.6% only Russiann to 19.0% only Ukrainian). In the Russian classes, large majorities speak solely Russiann in the breaks (in Kyïv 75.6%; in Odesa 78.4%). The data in this table thus suggestt that not only Odesa and Donets'k but also Kyïv is moving in an opposite

1344 Although the survey measured the response of the Russophones at one point in time, I assumed that statementss could be made on changes over time by comparing the linguistic conduct of the older generation (parents)) to that of the younger (children).

153 3

directionn to L'viv , which is contrary to the finding of Table 7.5 where there was a small shiftt towards speaking more Ukrainian in Kyiv. In fact, even a substantial proportion of childrenn from Ukrainian-speaking families claim they only speak Russian in the breaks in Ukrainiann schools in Kyiv (27.2%).

Tablee 7.11 Respondents by the Language Parents Speak to Each Other (Only Parents off Ukrainian Nationality) and Language Spoken during Breaks at School 1996-19977 (in percentage)

Languagee parents speakk to each other

L'viv L'viv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Kyiv Kyiv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Odesa Odesa Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Donets'k Donets'k Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Languagee used by respondent during breaks

Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

89.3 3 70.6 6

--

47.2 2 19.0 0 13.1 1

--3.6 6 3.7 7

--19.0 0 12.3 3

Ukrainian n && Russian

10.2 2 29.4 4

--

25.6 6 47.0 0 18.6 6

• • 667 7 147 7

• • 52.4 4 40.0 0

Russian n

0 0 0 0 --

27.2 2 34.0 0 68.3 3

--29.8 8 81.1 1

--28.6 6 47.7 7

Instructedd in Russian

Ukrainian n

----0 0

--0 0 0 0

--0 0 0 0

----0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

----

12.7 7

--24.4 4

6.5 5

--21.6 6

4.5 5

----

2.9 9

Russian n

----

87.3 3

--75.6 6 93.5 5

--78.4 4 95.5 5

----

97.1 1

Thee pattern of responses of the Russophone Ukrainian children on the language spoken to friendss indicator is an exact copy of that of the Russian-family children (compare Tables 7.122 and 7.8). Only in L'viv do these children claim to speak both languages to their friendss in large numbers (65.3% in the Russian-instructed group!). Large majorities of themm only speak Russian to their friends in the other three cities, irrespective of the languagee of instruction. As to the group of children with parents speaking both languages too each other, the conclusion drawn from Table 7.11 can be stated more strongly: in L'viv thesee children gravitate towards Ukrainian (27.7% speaking only Ukrainian to friends as opposedd to 0% speaking only Russian) and in the other three cities towards Russian (in Kyivv 3.0% speaking only Ukrainian to 36.4% speaking only Russian; in Odesa 3.6% only Ukrainiann to 50.0% only Russian; in Donets'k 6.5% only Ukrainian to 47.8% only Russiann respectively, in the Ukrainian-instructed group).

Althoughh this research does not present nationwide data, the observation that in threee of the four cities the trend is towards Russian among children of bilingual Ukrainian

154 4

familiess indicates that the linguistic assimilation to Russian has not stopped since independencee in this group, despite government efforts to curb the process. Data from otherr surveys only confirm this impression. An all-Ukrainian opinion poll carried out by SotsisSotsis (Sociological Service) in October 1996, for instance, found that the proportion of respondentss claiming to speak Russian at home was much higher in the younger cohorts thann in the older cohorts (in the 16-19 age group 53% said they spoke only Russian as opposedd to 33% in the 60+ group; just 32% of the former said they only spoke Ukrainian ass against 50% of the latter) (Den', 17 January 1997). The 'Russian' character of Ukrainiann youth is not only reflected in reported behavior, but also in language attitudes. AA nationwide survey administered by the Service & Market Research Agency in August 19988 found that 46% of the 15-20-year-olds wanted Russian to be the second state language,, as opposed to 39% of the 50-59-year-olds (the other cohorts showing percentagess in between) (Donets 'kii Kriazh, 24 September 1998).

Tablee 7.12 Respondents by the Language Parents Speak to Each Other (Only Parents off Ukrainian Nationality) and Language Spoken to Friends in 1996-1997 (in percentage) )

Languagee parents speakk to each other L'viv L'viv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Kyi'v Kyi'v Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Odesa Odesa Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Donets'k Donets'k Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Languagee used by respondent to friends Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

76.3 3 27.8 8

--

32.8 8 3.0 0 4.1 1

--3.6 6 0.5 5

--6.5 5 0.8 8

Ukrainian n && Russian

23.7 7 72.2 2

--

32.8 8 60.6 6 20.4 4

--46.4 4 12.5 5

--45.7 7 29.5 5

Russian n

0 0 0 0 --

33.6 6 36.4 4 75.5 5

--50.0 0 86.5 5

--47.8 8 69.7 7

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

----

5.6 6

2.9 9 0 0

0.8 8

--0 0 0 0

----0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

----

65.3 3

34.3 3 47.7 7 12.0 0

--35.3 3 9.0 0

----

3.7 7

Russian n

----

29.2 2

62.9 9 52.3 3 86.5 5

--85.0 0 91.0 0

----

96.3 3

155 5

Regardingg the language of television, Table 7.13 is a clear echo of Table 7.9. The Russophonee Ukrainian children have almost the same viewing habits as the Russian-familyy children: in the Russian-instructed group in L'viv, they watch Ukrainian television inn higher numbers (50.0%) than Russian television (34.7%) and in the other cities clear majoritiess watch Russian programs, irrespective of the language of instruction. Compared too the Russian-family children, however, Russophone Ukrainian children watch Ukrainiann television in somewhat higher numbers in both language of instruction groups inn Kyi'v. As regards the group of children whose parents speak both languages to each other,, Table 7.12 shows almost the same pattern of responses as the previous table: in L'vivv the direction is towards Ukrainian and in the other cities towards Russian in both languagee of instruction groups. Yet, the children watching Ukrainian programs (30.6%) andd Russian television (34.7%) almost balance each other out in the Ukrainian-instructed groupp in Kyi'v.

Tablee 7.13 Respondents by the Language Parents Speak to Each Other (Only Parents off Ukrainian Nationality) and Language of Television in 1996-1997 (in percentage) )

Languagee parents speakk to each other L'viv L'viv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Kyiv Kyiv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Odesa Odesa Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

DonetsDonets 'k Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Languagee respondent watches TV in more often Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

75.8 8 74.3 3

--

40.7 7 30.6 6 15.4 4

--25.0 0 25.0 0

--34.0 0 24.0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

9.7 7 8.6 6

--

24.4 4 23.5 5 16.8 8

--8.3 3 7.8 8

--4.3 3 8.5 5

Russian n

10.4 4 14.3 3

--

26.0 0 34.7 7 59.1 1

--64.3 3 65.6 6

--57.4 4 66.7 7

Instructedd in Russian Ukrainian n

----

50.0 0

22.9 9 20.0 0 6.0 0

--25.5 5

7.1 1

----

8.4 4

Ukrainian n && Russian

----

8.3 3

14.3 3 18.5 5 16.5 5

--5.9 9 5.8 8

----

9.3 3

Russian n

----

34.7 7

62.9 9 56.9 9 69.9 9

--64.7 7 82.1 1

----

74.8 8

Tablee 7.14 resembles Table 7.10 in the strong effect that the language of instruction can bee said to exert on the language in which children read their books. Again, the patterns of responsess of the Russophone Ukrainian and Russian-family children are almost identical, thee former reading slightly fewer Ukrainian books than the latter in Kyi'v (36.1% to 40.4%)) and slightly more Ukrainian books in Donets'k (34.8% to 24.3%) in the

156 6

Ukrainian-instructedd group. In the Russian-instructed group, the responses are similar: likee the Russian-family children, the Russophone Ukrainian children read Ukrainian bookss in very small numbers indeed, with percentages below 2.5% across the board. Unlikee Table 7.9, however, which showed minimal differences between the nationality groups,, Table 7.13 presents a large variation between the language groups. The difference iss largest in Kyiv: the 66.1% of Ukrainian-speaking children reading Ukrainian books contrastss strongly with the 36.1% of Russophone Ukrainian children reading Ukrainian bookss among the Ukrainian-instructed group of pupils. This is another indication that the languagee parents speak to each other is more important than the nationality of parents in determiningg the linguistic behavior of their offspring.

Tablee 7.14 Respondents by the Language Parents Speak to Each Other (Only Parents off Ukrainian Nationality) and Language of Books in 1996-1997 (in percentage) )

Languagee parents speakk to each other L'viv L'viv Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Ky/V V Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Odesa Odesa Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Donets'k Donets'k Ukrainian n Ukrainiann and Russian Russian n

Languagee respondent Instructedd in Ukrainian

Ukrainian n

83.6 6 61.1 1

--

66.1 1 45.4 4 36.1 1

--34.5 5 18.8 8

--51.1 1 34.8 8

Ukrainian n && Russian

5.1 1 11.1 1

--

16.1 1 25.8 8 12.9 9

--13.1 1 6.3 3

--6.4 4 5.3 3

Russian n

10.0 0 27.8 8

--

15.3 3 25.8 8 48.3 3

--50.0 0 73.4 4

--42.6 6 59.1 1

readss books in more often Instructedd in Russian

Ukrainian n

----

1.4 4

20.0 0 10.8 8 1.5 5

--7.8 8 2.5 5

----0 0

Ukrainian n && Russian

----

1.4 4

17.1 1 20.0 0 9.9 9

--3.9 9 2.5 5

----

1.9 9

Russian n

----

97.2 2

62.9 9 69.2 2 88.5 5

--88.2 2 94.3 3

----

98.1 1

7.2.55 Summary of results

Thee results revealed that in Donets'k and Odesa, Russian parents and mixed couples neitherr raised their children in Ukrainian nor showed much interest in Ukrainian-language education.. In addition, their children did not speak Ukrainian to their peers in any large numberss nor did they absorb much Ukrainian media (although there was a clear differencee between the Russian and Ukrainian-instructed groups). The Russians can thereforee be said to demonstrate language retention in these cities. In Kyiv the numbers

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off Russian parents and mixed couples sending their children to Ukrainian classes increasedd dramatically when one compares the 1994-95 cohort to the 1990-91 group. However,, both parent groups do not speak much Ukrainian to their children, not even thosee Russian parents and mixed families who have children in Ukrainian classes. Their childrenn show similar linguistic conduct: on three of the four indicators, they gravitate towardss Russian. It is only on the language of books indicator that a significant number of childrenn answered Ukrainian (and then only those instructed in Ukrainian). In summary, thee response of the Russians in Kyi'v is one of language integration. In L'viv mixed coupless sharply contrast with purely Russian families. The former make up increasingly largee majorities who enroll their children in Ukrainian classes and a substantial number whoo raise their children exclusively in Ukrainian. Their children (at least those in the Ukrainian-instructedd group, which comprises the vast majority of pupils, as we have seen)) clearly lean towards Ukrainian: on three of the four indicators, they answered Ukrainiann in large numbers. The Russian parents, in contrast, reject Ukrainian-language educationn and make no effort to speak to their children in Ukrainian. The behavior of theirr children is ambivalent. On the one hand, they claim to watch Ukrainian television andd speak both languages to their friends in large numbers, but, on the other hand, they do nott read any Ukrainian books nor speak much Ukrainian during breaks at school. Given thee differences between the mixed couples and Russian families, L'viv is a case where a distinctionn has to be made between the Russians in mixed families who may be said to havee assimilated, and the Russians in purely Russian couples who appear to be opting for languagelanguage retention (though the behavior of their children is somewhat equivocal).

Thee pattern of responses of the Russophone Ukrainians closely resembles that of thee purely Russian families on all indicators, which is once more a confirmation of the claimm that the language spoken at home indeed matters. The only difference can be found inn L'viv where the majority of Russophone Ukrainians, unlike the Russian families, do sendd their children to Ukrainian schools. The pattern can, thus, easily be established for Russophonee Ukrainians: they may be said to opt for language integration in L'viv and Kyi'vv (in the former slightly more towards assimilation than in the latter) and for language retentionretention in Odesa and Donets'k. The next step is how the set of responses of Russians andd Russian-speaking Ukrainians can be explained.

However,, before concluding this section, an important qualification that has to be notedd is that ethnic re-identification may have skewed the pattern of responses. As stated inn Chapter Two, identity formation and linguistic behavior are likely to be strongly related.. It is not inconceivable that some respondents, notably those who followed Ukrainian-languagee education and who were raised in Ukrainian, claimed that their parentss were Ukrainian while some years ago they would have answered that their parents weree Russian. If this was indeed the case, many (former) Russians who opted for assimilationn wil l have dropped out of sight, and, as a result, the pattern of responses wouldd be biased towards the language retention end of the scale. One could argue that the nationalityy indicated in the internal Soviet passport would serve as a useful yardstick to determinee which self-proclaimed Ukrainians were originally Russians (or, conversely, whoo among the Russians were originally Ukrainians). Yet, passport nationality may not bee a reliable indicator of former ethnic affiliation since there was a marked divergence betweenn national self-identification and nationality by passport in the Soviet days and in

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thee early 1990s. In his 1992 survey, Bremmer (1994), for instance, found that by passport, 11%% of those who considered themselves Russians in Kyïv, 5% in Simferopol and 47% in L'vi vv were registered as Ukrainian. The new internal passports issued after independence noo longer mention the nationality. Thus for the youngest generation, i.e. those without Soviett passports, nationality can only be established by self-reportage. Given these insights,, the best strategy to keep track of processes of identity formation and linguistic reorientationn in the future would be to subject ethnic groups to a longitudinal study, in whichh respondents are repeatedly asked to answer questions about their ethnic affiliation andd linguistic behavior.

7.37.3 Explaining the Results

7.3.11 Independent variables

Chapterr Two introduced a number of variables that were considered important in shaping thee responses of the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians: 1.. Ethnic proportion. It was expected that the larger the groups of Russians and of

Russophonee Ukrainians are in a certain area relative to other groups, the more they wil ll opt for language retention.

2.. Ethnic schism. It was predicted that the more Russians and Russophone Ukrainians differr on cultural markers from Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the tighter they wil l clingg to their language.

3.. Mixed marriages (only valid for Russians). I expected Russians in mixed marriages to havee a stronger propensity to assimilate than Russians in purely Russian couples.

4.. National and local policy. In the 'opportunity' interpretation of this variable, it was proposedd that the more restrictive local policy is towards the use of Russian in public spheres,, the more Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians are prone to assimilate. Inn the 'grievance' interpretation, the direction of the correlation was expected to be turnedd around: the more restrictive local policy, the stronger Russians and Russophone Ukrainianss would hold on to their language.

Thee ethnic proportion thesis obviously holds much, if not most of the explanatory value forr the pattern of responses of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. For the Russians,, it can account for the dramatically high rates of language retention in Donets'k andd Odesa, for language integration in Kyïv and for the assimilation of mixed couples in L'viv .. The odd ones out are the Russian parents in L'viv who show a response opposite to thatt predicted by the ethnic proportion hypothesis. In that regard, the pattern of responses off the Russophone Ukrainians matches the expected outcome of this hypothesis much better:: in the cities where Russophone Ukrainians make up a substantial part of the population,, they opt for language retention (Donets'k and Odesa) and in the cities where theirr numbers are relatively small they settle for language integration (Kyïv and L'viv) .

Att first sight, the ethnic schism explanation holds the answer to the surprising behaviorr of the group of Russian parents in L'viv. Although ethnic schism cannot account forr language retention in Donets'k and Odesa given the small cultural distance between

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Russianss and titulars in these cities, it can explain why Russian parents in L'viv cling to theirr language, because cultural differences between western Ukrainians and Russians are indeedd substantial (i.e. in comparison to cultural distinctions between Russians and Ukrainianss in central, eastern and southern Ukraine). However, this hypothesis can providee no answer to the assimilation of mixed families in L'viv . What is more, ethnic schismm cannot clarify why so many L'vivan Russians married western Ukrainians in the firstt place, as one would expect the number of mixed marriages to be minimal in places wheree the cultural boundaries between ethnic groups are quite marked.135 Possibly, in vieww of their common Slavic origins, Russians and western Ukrainians do not experience aa strong cultural divide after all. In this case, however, the response of the Russian parentss remains a mystery.

Obviously,, ethnic schism has no explanatory value at all for the Russophone Ukrainians.. Their set of responses is almost opposite to the one the ethnic schism hypothesiss predicted (i.e. L'viv - language integration or retention; Kyïv, Odesa and Donets'kk - assimilation).

Thee mixed marriages variable is clearly another relevant factor, as the responses off mixed families were closer to the assimilation end of the scale than those of Russian parentss in all four contexts and in both language of instruction groups. The fact that the differencee between the responses of the mixed couples and those of Russian parents increasess as the proportion of Russians in a city diminishes indicates that there is a combinedd effect of mixed marriages with the proportion of Russians.

NationalNational and local policy is of particular relevance for school choice as one of the indicess of the linguistic responses. On the face of it, the 'opportunity' interpretation of thiss variable can explain the outcomes found. After all, in the cities where Russian-languagee education is still widely available, overwhelming majorities of Russians and Russophonee Ukrainians send their children to Russian schools (Donets'k and Odesa), and inn the cities where the opportunite to follow Russian-language education has been sharply reducedd and local policy is highly restrictive, they do so in small numbers (Kyïv and L'viv—thee exception, as we know, being the Russian parents in L'viv) . However, this conclusionn ignores the fact that the offer of schools with one or more Ukrainian classes hass increased dramatically in Odesa and Donets'k since independence, as the previous chapterr disclosed. Thus, in 1994-95, when the youngest cohorts of our survey began their schooll careers, Odesa already had half of its schools offering one or more Ukrainian classess (Dynamika rozvytku ...Odesy, unpublished document), and Donets'k had more thann a quarter of its schools doing so (Analiz razvitia...Donets'ka, unpublished document).. Moreover, as we have seen, the local authorities stimulated parents to send theirr children to Ukrainian classes by obliging Russian schools to open Ukrainian classes

1355 For L'viv the validity of inter-ethnic marriages as an indicator of cultural distance is to some extent qualifiedd by the rather unbalanced sex ratio of the mixed couples. My survey data indicate that in slightly moree than 60% of the cases the father is Russian and the mother Ukrainian. The situation in L'viv vaguely resembless colonial conditions in which young male professionals deployed by the center marry indigenous women.. In these conditions mixed marriages are of course not a good indicator of cultural distance. The sex ratioo in L'viv is nonetheless not so extreme that it makes L'viv contrast sharply with the other cities. In Kyïv thee sex ratio of mixed couples is 58% Russian fathers - Ukrainian mothers; in Odesa the ratio is approximatelyy 50%; in Donets'k the ratio is 43% Russian fathers - Ukrainian mothers).

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uponn receiving at least eight to ten requests. And yet, despite the increased possibilities andd the prospect of small classes, the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians did not send theirr children to Ukrainian classes in substantially larger numbers in the 1994-95 cohort. Thus,, the increased opportunity seemingly had no effect on parental choice.

Thiss having been said, the previous chapter also mentioned that as many as 39% off Odesa's first graders were instructed in Ukrainian in 1997-98, up at least 23 percentage pointss from 1994-95.136 Given that Russians and Russophone Ukrainians comprise nearly thee whole population of Odesa, a large number of them must have enrolled their children inn Ukrainian classes in that year. This suggests that there may be a time lag of several yearss before both groups start responding to the expanded availability of Ukrainian-languagee education (and concomitant reduction in Russian-language education). If this is indeedd true, the 'opportunity' interpretation may after all have explanatory power. Donets'kk is a test case, in this respect. If it experiences the same dramatic increases as Odesaa within several years, national and local policy would indeed appear to have the abilityy to mold parental responses. Paradoxically, the economic crisis may be beneficial in thiss process as it is likely to make ordinary people place cultural matters at the bottom of thee agenda. Consequently, parents may not make the effort to send their child to the nearestt Russian school if this school is further away than the nearest Ukrainian school, let alonee that they wil l spend time protesting against the ukrainianization of the school system. .

Naturally,, the explanatory power of the opportunity interpretation undermines that off the grievance theory of national and local policy. Indeed, we see that the actual set of responsess is completely opposite to that predicted by the latter. Grievance may explain thee particular response of the Russian parents in L'viv , but it cannot account for the reactionss of any of the other groups, Russian or Russophone Ukrainian, regardless of the city. .

Too briefly summarize, it appears that ethnic proportion (in a combination with mixedd marriages) and the opportunity interpretation of local policy explain equally well explainedd the mosaic of responses (leaving aside the particular response of the Russian parentss in L'viv) . Unfortunately, it could not be determined which of these two hypothesess had superior explanatory power as the variation in local policy ran parallel withh that of ethnic proportion over the four cities in this research project. A choice of citiess which, for instance, had maintained ethnic proportion constant while allowing local policyy to vary would have enabled one to assess which of the two conjectures had the upperr hand in accounting for the set of responses. However, as the nature of local policy inn any given city could only be ascertained during the course of fieldwork (i.e. not beforehand),, an ideal choice of cities would not have been possible from the beginning anyway. .

Inn similar vein, it is arguable that the impact of ethnic schism could not be judged too the fullest extent by means of this choice of cities. Ethnic schism would be an importantt explanatory variable after all if it turned out that, for example, ethnic proportionn only had explanatory power in a context where cultural differences between groupss are minimal, and not in a context where these differences are pronounced. It

Tablee 4.1 shows that 15.8% of the 1994-95 group of pupils were instructed in Ukrainian.

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wouldd have been possible to check the validity of this conclusion if a choice of cities had beenn made that included not one but several cities in western Ukraine (i.e. where cultural differentiationn is substantial) with varying proportions of Russians and Russophone Ukrainianss in the local population. However, a choice of this kind would have been impossiblee anyhow since there are no cities in western Ukraine where Russians and Russian-speakingg Ukrainians make up more than small minorities. Thus, as is so often the casee in comparative social research, the realities of the field excluded an optimal choice off cities in advance, i.e. a choice that would have enabled one to assess the interpretative valuee of the independent variables exhaustively.

7.3.22 Fear of cultural loss

Thee assessment of the explanatory value of the four factors indicates that one group behavess in a way that cannot be accounted for by one variable or a combination of variables.. This is the group of Russian parents in L'viv . Their particular response, languagee retention, is likely to have been prompted by some other factor. I suggest that t henarr of cultural loss may have played a decisive role. It is feasible that the reluctance off Russian parents to enroll their children in Ukrainian classes stems from a concern that inn the totally Ukrainian-speaking environment of L'viv, Ukrainian-language education wouldd affect the language use of the child in private settings, making the child lose his or herr Russian roots. Conversely, the Russian-speaking character of the other three cities mayy ease a possible fear among local Russians that Ukrainian-language education ukrainianizess their sons and daughters.

Too examine whether cultural concerns indeed played a role, a small follow-up surveyy was done among Russian parents.137 One of the questions asked parents with childrenn in Russian classes whether they thought that Ukrainian-language education wouldd ukrainianize their children. Differences between the cities turned out to be substantial.. In L'viv 11 out of 18 respondents said it would; in Kyïv 9 out of 25 said so; inn Odesa just 1 out of 17, and in Donets'k 3 out of 10. Thus, only in L'viv did a majority off the respondents think that Ukrainian-language education would indeed make their childrenn speak more Ukrainian in everyday life. This confirms the conjectures of the previouss paragraph. Moreover, when asked whether Ukrainian-language education would alsoo make their children lose their Russian roots, 8 out of 17 L'vivan Russians not only saidd it would but also expressed disapproval (only Russian families in L'viv with childrenn in Russian classes were asked this question).

Inn another, open-ended question, parents were asked why they had enrolled their childd in a Russian class. The answers to this question also showed variations between the cities.. In L'viv 11 out of 18 parents who sent their child to a Russian class responded that theyy had done so because "we are Russians" or "our native language is Russian." An additionall two couples said their choice was motivated by a wish for their children "to

Whilee visiting Ukrainian and Russian schools in the four cities, I asked pupils from Russian families to takee questionnaires home for their parents to fil l out. After a few days the pupils returned the questionnaires (seee Appendix No. 3). In addition, I interviewed parents personally. Given the small total (just 141 questionnaires),, the data of this mini-survey can provide no more than broad indications of opinions.

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learnn Russian and Russian literature to the degree of perfection," an answer that can clearlyy be associated with a desire to preserve one's cultural traditions. Just three parents gavee instrumental reasons for the choice of school, such as the school's vicinity, its good qualityy of education or its specialization in the teaching of foreign languages. In Kyïv the parentss responded rather differently. Eleven out of 28 couples said that they were afraid theyy would not be able to help their child if (s)he followed Ukrainian-language education becausee of their own poor command of Ukrainian, or that they had had to put their child backk into a Russian class because (s)he could not become accustomed to Ukrainian-languagee education. This answer, which was not found in L'viv at all, indicates that there iss a genuine desire among Kyïvan Russians to send their children to Ukrainian schools, butt that specific circumstances or experiences have prevented them from doing so. In addition,, 5 parents gave instrumental reasons, just 9 stressed their Russian(-language) backgroundd and 2 parents mentioned the preservation of the Russian language and literaturee as a reason. Odesa showed a pattern of responses similar to that found in Kyïv. Justt 5 out of 16 couples justified their choice for a Russian class by pointing to their Russian(-language)) background, 8 stated instrumental reasons, and 2 mentioned the inabilityy to help their children as a motive. No parents expressed a concern for cultural survival.. Taken as a whole, results from the three cities suggest that Russian parents in L'vivv are indeed motivated primarily by a desire to preserve their own culture regarding schooll choice, while Russian parents in Kyïv and Odesa seem to have other considerationss for sending their children to Russian schools. However, this conclusion hass to be stated with care because of the difficulty in interpreting the answers that point to thee Russian (-language) background of the family. After all, the statement "because we aree a Russian (-speaking) family" could mean that parents are indeed determined to pass theirr language and culture on to the next generation, but it could also mean that parents doo not feel confident enough to send their child to Ukrainian-language education, no matterr how much they would want to.

Incidentally,, in L'viv of all places, Ukrainian-language education could dramaticallyy increase the social and economic prospects of children since public life in thiss city operates exclusively in Ukrainian (the local state administration, state companies, higherr education, hospitals, courts, etc.). The fact that Russian families in spite of this sendd their children to Russian-language education indicates that other considerations take precedencee over instrumental concerns among these families. This once more supports thee argument that the Russian families in L'viv may well be motivated primarily by a desiree to preserve their own culture.

Finally,, with reference to the discussion at the end of the previous section, it must bee noted that the scope of the fear of cultural loss account could not be fully assessed by meanss of the present choice of cities, nor its relation to other independent variables. For instance,, it is not clear whether fear of cultural loss is a valid explanation for the Russians'' linguistic response only in a context where Russians make up a small minority andd their cultural identity is consequently under pressure (ethnic proportion variable), or onlyy in a context where differences on cultural markers are substantial (ethnic schism variable),, or only in places where these two conditions are combined. Nonetheless, there aree grounds for assuming that it is first and foremost in a context where their relative numberss are small that the fear of cultural loss explanation applies, and not in a context of

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pronouncedd cultural differentiation. After all, had cultural differences indeed played a primaryy role, we would not only have seen language retention in L'viv among Russians butt also next to no Russian-Ukrainian mixed families. The fact that there are a great numberr of Russians married to western Ukrainians, Russians, moreover, who demonstratee assimilation, suggests that cultural differentiation (and therefore ethnic schism)) is of only secondary importance as an explanatory variable.

7.3.33 The influence of other factors

Thee previous two sections assessed the explanatory power of five variables that were deemedd important in shaping the linguistic response of Russians and Russophone Ukrainians.. It was found that a combination of three of them could adequately explain the patternn of responses. Although the rule of parsimony prescribes that additional variables needd not be included in the analysis if a minimal number of factors can already fully accountt for a certain outcome, it would, nonetheless, be interesting to see whether the outcomee is related to other variables and to what extent.

Bremmerr (1994) and Kolstoe (1996) both mention rootedness as an important variable.. It can be expected that the longer Russians and Russophone Ukrainians have livedd in a certain area, the more they will feel that this area is 'theirs', and, consequently, thee less prone they wil l be to adapting to their surroundings by linguistically assimilating orr integrating. For Donets'k and Odesa the results match the prediction: Russians and Russophonee Ukrainians have lived there for centuries and both, indeed, opt for language retention.. Kyïv and L'viv , however, do not show the expected outcome. The former has a historyy of Russian settlement - and with it a russification of Ukrainians - that dates back too the 17th century, and yet Russians and Russophone Ukrainians opt for language integrationn in this city. In L'viv one would expect Russians and Russophone Ukrainians too assimilate given that they only appeared there after World War n, but, although the Russianss in mixed couples do show assimilation, the Russians in purely Russian couples optt for its opposite - language retention, and the Russophone Ukrainians prefer to integratee linguistically.

Ass the respondents were asked to state their parents' place of birth in the survey, thee impact of rootedness could also be determined at the individual level. The results, however,, indicated that place of birth was not correlated to linguistic response in any meaningfull way. Odesa and Donets'k, for instance, showed contrasting responses on the languagee of instruction indicator.138 In Odesa, Russian parents who were bom locally sent theirr children in higher numbers to Ukrainian-language education than Russian parents whoo were bom outside Ukraine. In Donets'k, the reverse was the case with locally born Russiann parents sending their children in smaller numbers to Ukrainian-language educationn than Russian parents born abroad. Rootedness, moreover, did not have any effectt on the language parents speak to their children. In L'viv, Odesa and Donets'k, Russiann parents all spoke Russian to their children in equally high numbers, regardless of theirr own origin. In addition, Russophone Ukrainian parents showed a pattern of

1388 Results are not available for Kyïv. In L'viv the number of Russian parents sending their children to Ukrainiann schools was too small to give a meaningful result.

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responsess that closely resembles that of Russian parents. In L'viv and Odesa, the locally bornn Russian-speaking Ukrainians sent their children in higher numbers to Ukrainian-languagee education than the Russian-speaking Ukrainians born elsewhere, while the reversee applies in Donets'k. As with Russian parents, Russophone Ukrainian parents almostt all spoke Russian to their offspring across the board, whatever their place of birth.

Thee educational background of parents is another interesting variable as it can tell uss something about the importance of Laitin's expected economic returns condition, whichh he regards as one of the principle determinants of the linguistic response of the diasporaa Russians (Laitin, 1998). After all, one could argue that well-educated people wouldd be the first to realize that Ukrainian-language education and upbringing increased thee social and economic prospects of children, if it ever came to this realization among a largee audience. The survey results indicate that the educational level of parents is not correlatedd in any way to the language of instruction of children or to the language parents raisee their children in. The differences between the education groups is not more than a feww percent points for both Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in all four cities. Thesee results can be interpreted in two ways: either expected economic returns do not playy a role at all in the Ukrainian context, or Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians doo not see much benefit in assimilating to Ukrainian throughout Ukraine. Given the overalll economic crisis, which has sharply diminished the prospects in both the private andand public sector (the latter of which requires language skills for certain jobs) in all of Ukraine'ss regions, the interpretation regarding the perceived lack of benefit in assimilatingg seems to have more validity.139 Empirical evidence substantiated this conjecture:: many parents in Odesa and Donets'k confided to me that their children would soonerr learn to speak English than proper Ukrainian, which suggests that these parents saww more opportunities for their children outside Ukraine than within its borders. Yet, evenn if the latter interpretation holds true (and Laitin's variable would thus play a role in a negativee sense), then expected economic returns would predict a uniform reaction among thee Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Given that I, to the contrary, found substantiall regional differences in the linguistic response of these groups, expected economicc returns appear to be of little value for explaining the variations within Ukraine.

Lastly,, a factor that could have a strong distorting impact on the cultural response off the Russian-speaking population is outmigration. It is to be expected that Russians (andd Russian-speaking Ukrainians) who leave Ukraine for Russia are those most attached too their language and culture. Considerable Russian (-speaking) outmigration would thus implyy that the remaining Russian-speaking population were biased towards the assimilationn end of the cultural response continuum. If this mechanism were indeed at work,, then the original Russian-speaking population on the eve of Ukraine's independencee was much less inclined to assimilate than the collectivity of Russian speakerss currently living inside Ukraine's borders.

1399 Using the United Nations Human Development Report for Ukraine, O'Loughlin and Bell (1999) found substantiall differences in economic performance within Ukraine between oblasts. However, they could not detectt a "consistent divide between west and East that suggests that one macroregion is uniformly more developedd than the other (ibid. p. 239)."

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Evidencee on migration movements between the republics of the former USSR suggestss that outmigration has not produced much of a side-effect: between 1991 and 19944 the net migration of Russians from Ukraine to Russia was 102,800, which is an insignificantt number compared to the total number of Russians in Ukraine—11,355,600. Moreover,, Ukraine still had a net inflow of Russians (12,300) in 1992 when nationalist sentiment,, as expressed in language policies, was at its peak. Russians only began leaving Ukrainee in perceptible numbers (101,300) in 1994 when the difference in economic performancee with Russia began to be felt (Naselenie Rossii 1995, 1996). This suggests thatt the economic crisis more than the nationalizing project has been the push factor spurringg Russian outmigration. It is, therefore, unlikely that the group of migrants containss a disproportionate number of ethnically conscious Russians who cite cultural oppressionn and an unwillingness to assimilate as the main reasons for leaving Ukraine.

Naturally,, migration may have also occurred within Ukraine between regions. Thiss is in fact more than likely given the pronounced regional contrasts and widely divergingg local policies and practices. An obvious direction one would expect Russian migrationn to go in is from the nationalist west to the Russophone east. The scant data availablee (we could only find information on the L'viv Oblast) indicates that some Russiann outmigration has taken place but not in substantial numbers: from 1990 to 1996 theree has been a net outflow of 15,954 Russians from the L'viv Oblast, amounting to 8.2%% of the total number of Russians in this oblast (Romaniuk, 1997). Thus, even in westernn Ukraine outmigration does not seem to have affected the character of the local Russiann community to a great extent.

7.47.4 Cultural Associations

Russianss and Russophone Ukrainians opting for language retention need not confine themselvess to sending their children to Russian schools and raising them in Russian in orderr to safeguard their language and identity. To further their interests and organize culturall events, they may set up cultural associations and societies. If this happens, the switchh to more radical political demands is easily made, as the cultural mobilization of ethnicc groups is usually the first stage of their political emancipation drive. It has to be rememberedd here that legislation has not put any obstacles in the way of Russians organizingg themselves culturally as national minorities. They were not only granted the rightt to set up national-cultural associations (Article 6 of the Declaration of Rights of Nationalitiess of Ukraine, WRU, 1991, No. 4), but also to establish ties with and receive helpp from co-nationals and their associations abroad (Article 15 of the Law on National Minorities,, WRU, 1992, No. 36).

Thee attentive reader wil l have noticed that the legislation on cultural rights only speakss of national minorities, and not of cultural or language groups. This suggests that Russophonee Ukrainians, being considered part of the majority population, are not recognizedd as a separate group. However, whether the total absence of societies specificallyy tailored to the cultural needs of Russophone Ukrainians (to the author's knowledgee no such societies can be found in contemporary Ukraine) can be attributed to legall flaws is doubtful. Russian-speaking Ukrainians may simply not feel the need to set

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upp cultural associations given the presence of Russian cultural societies. Possibly, the (few)) Russophone Ukrainians with a cultural interest have joined the latter. Incidentally, thee lack of Russophone Ukrainian societies adds to the argument that one cannot (yet) speakk of a distinct Russophone Ukrainian identity evolving in Ukraine. The following paragraphss therefore discuss only Russian cultural societies.

7.4.11 Nationwide societies

Theree are at least two cultural societies operating at the national level in Ukraine: the Russiann cultural society, called Rus', which claims to have 19 regional branches and 3,0000 members nationwide, and the Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature,, reportedly having 22 regional branches. The former sees its goals as the preservationn and development of Russian culture and language in Ukraine and the protectionn of the rights of the Russophone population. By its own account, it participates inn the preparation of laws, decrees, programs and other official acts of state bodies, issues severall periodicals, and organizes conferences, lectures and theater and music performancess (Russkii Vestnik, August 1997). From this enumeration of activities, one wouldd get the impression that Rus' is not only active at a cultural level, but at a political levell as well.

Itt would be a serious misrepresentation of reality, however, to assert that Rus' has successfullyy mobilized the Russian (-speaking) population on a cultural agenda (and has developedd a strong lobby as a result), since the author was struck by the amateurish appearancee of the association. For instance, with its meager, largely non-paying membership,, it couldd not afford to rent or buy office space, nor even buy itself an entry in thee Kyïv yellow pages. As a result, the organization was hard to locate. The impression of incompetencee was only reinforced by the lack of cooperation or open conflict with other Russiann cultural societies. Russkoe Sobranie, a literary society, for instance, was held in contempt,, as it had supposedly been founded by Rukh. Moreover, there appeared to be (at least)) two shadowy associations claiming to operate as umbrella organizations for all Russiann societies in Ukraine: the Koordinatsionnyi sovet russkikh obshchestv Ukrainy (Coordinatingg Council of Russian Societies of Ukraine), in which Rus' took part, and the KongresKongres russkikh obshchestv (Congress of Russian Societies), which was linked to the Civicc Congress of Ukraine (a pro-Russian political party) and had ties with the Russian Duma.1400 This discord among Russian societies has clearly hampered the mobilization of Russianss and Russian speakers on cultural matters.

7.4.22 Societies in the four cities

Whatt can be said for the societies operating nationwide also applies for those working at thee Kyïv level: none of the presumed five societies had their own office or entry in the yelloww pages, and none were known to the telephone information service. Moreover, due

1400 Interviews with A. V. Lusan, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of Russian Societies, withh M.V. Diatlova, Chairman of the Kyïv branch of Rus', and with other members of Rus' in Kyïv in Novemberr 1997. See also Smith & Wilson (1997).

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too the impenetrable nature of the local state bureaucracy, I was unable to check whether thesee societies were registered at the juridical department, and, thus, whether they officiallyy existed at all. However, whatever their obscure and (possibly) ephemeral character,, their number has grown the last few years as two of the societies were recently established,, the Russkaia obshchina Kyiva (Russian Community of Kyi'v) and the ObshchestvoObshchestvo russkogo yazyka (Society of the Russian Language). The chairman of the former,, K.V. Shurov, labeled his organization pravozashchitnoi (for the defense/protectionn of rights), and indeed struck me as particularly active in standing up forr the cultural interests of the Russian (-speaking) population. He showed me several exampless of petitions of parents who demanded that Russian classes be opened for their children,, and disclosed that he regularly staged demonstrations in front of the city administrationn building to protest against the closing of Russian schools (Shurov, 1997, interview).. Despite the minimal turnout of some 25 people each time (I was present at onee of these demonstrations, on 1 October 1998), the local media covered these actions, givingg the society the opportunity to voice its grievances. One of these complaints pertainedd to the aforementioned rule that provided for the opening of Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar,, Hebrew and other small minority language classes upon the receipt of eight to ten parentall requests, while failing to specify any number for a request to open Russian classess (Kyïvskie Vedomosti, 2 October 1997).141 Though still insignificant, these signs of protestt could very well mark the beginning of a rallying of Kyi'van Russians and Russian speakerss round cultural themes.

Thee Russians in L'viv were the first to organize themselves culturally. In 1988 theyy had already established the Pushkin Society, and two years later they managed to accommodatee it in an old building in the center of town (Alekseev et al., 1998). In 1998 it wass still the only Russian cultural association in the whole of Ukraine that had its own housing.. With its alleged 1,500 membership, which also included collective members, it wass also one of the largest of the country. According to Valeri Provozin, a professor of art historyy and chairman of the organization at the time of the interview, the Pushkin Society consciouslyy refrained from becoming (too) involved in politics so as not to risk a confrontationn with the local authorities or provoke right-wing nationalist groups, such as UNSOO activists, who have repeatedly attacked the society's premises in the past few years.. The society considered the maintenance of a library, the publication of a monthly periodical,, the organization of congresses and meetings, and the staging of theater, music andd literary performances as its main tasks (Provozin, 1997, interview).

Inn addition to the Pushkin Society, the premises housed eight other Russian societies.. These included societies varying from a Russian youth center, a club for journalists,, an organization standing up for the interests of the Russian (-speaking) populationn with close ties to the communist and socialist parties, to an association which wass specifically concerned with the preservation of Russian-language education in the L'vi vv oblast.142 Seven of these societies, moreover, coordinated their actions in weekly meetingss (in the so-called Koordinatsionnyi sovei). This gave the author the impression

Inn an (unfortunately unknown) issue of Den' one of these demonstrations was even front-page news. 1422 These associations were found to be registered at the juridical department of the L'viv Oblast Administrationn in November 1997.

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thatt the Russian community in L'viv was much better organized than their Kyi'van counterparts.. In support of this perception, Provozin argued that the stabilization of the numberr of Russian schools (remaining at a total of five in 1998-99), as compared to the ongoingg decline in Kyi'v, is the crowning glory of the Russian cultural societies, providing ass they did for a vibrant community life (Den', 25 September 1998).

Accordingg to a directory of officially registered NGOs in Ukraine, the Russian (-speakers)) of Donets'k have just one organization specifically promoting their cultural interests,, while those in Odesa have none whatsoever.143 Moreover, in Donets'k only politicall parties championed the cultural cause of the Russian diaspora.144 When interviewedd by the author, conversation partners in these cities almost unanimously declaredd that Russians and Russophone Ukrainians generally did not feel the need to establishh cultural societies as the dominant position of the Russian culture and language wass not perceived to be endangered.

Takenn together, the data from the four cities lead one to believe that a specific culturalcultural mobilization of Russians and/or Russian speakers only occurs when their languagee and culture are threatened by a particular linguistic environment and/or the local policyy of a city. Interestingly, the case of L'viv suggests that such a threat is causing the locall Russian community to split into a group opting for assimilation (the Russians in mixedd Russian-Ukrainian families) and a group ever more tenaciously holding onto their languagee and culture through the establishment of cultural associations.

7.55 Linguistic and Political Response: a One or Two Dimensional Model?

Itt is of course tempting to presume a strong correlation between a group's political responsee and its cultural reaction, with linguistic assimilation being a likely component of Bremmer'ss political response of integration and language retention an almost certain ingredientt of Bremmer's exit option (for Bremmer's typology of political responses, see thee introductory chapter). Yet, to conceive a group's options in this one-dimensional way iss open to doubt. For instance, one can more than likely find minority groups combining languagee preservation with political accommodation to the new state. For this reason, Kolstoee (1996) recognizes both a political and a cultural dimension to the adaptation processs of the Russian minorities in the Soviet successor states. Describing the possible identityy trajectories of this Russian diaspora, he proposes four political and three cultural options,, which he plots in a two-dimensional matrix. The introductory chapter already mentionedd the three cultural options : (1) identification with the dominant culture in the externall homeland (i.e. Russia); (2) development of a new but still basically Russian self-understanding;; (3) identification with the dominant culture in the state of residence (i.e.

1433 Doviknyk neuriadovykh organizatsii Ukrainy (1998). I would like to thank John O'Loughlin for providingg me with this directory. Remarkably, the directory lists just three Russian cultural societies for L'viv,, instead of the nine found above. This mismatch casts doubt upon the completeness of the directory andd on the reliability of data provided by the L'viv juridical department. As to the former, O'Loughlin concedess that it is unclear "precisely how representative the directory data are." (O'Loughlin and Bell, 1999,, p. 246). Unfortunately, the lack of reliable, exhaustive and non-contradictory data is one of the symptomss of the economic crisis and administrative chaos in contemporary Ukraine. 1444 For a good overview of political life in the Donbas region, see Smith & Wilson (1997).

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thee new nationalizing state). The four political choices are: (1) loyalty towards the historicall boundaries of the Russian state up to and including attempts to resurrect it; (2) loyaltyy towards the present and much reduced Russian state, the Russian Federation; (3) aspirationss for the creation of a new nation-state; (4) loyalty towards the nationalizing statee of residence (ibid. p. 613). The fact that Kolstoe speaks about cultural options in termss of identity choices and not types of linguistic conduct—as we do—does not diminishh the suitability of his model for current purposes as identity choice and linguistic behaviorr are likely to be strongly related (as the introductory chapter suggested). This sectionn wil l explore whether linguistic responses are somehow related to political reactions.. If the two types of responses are indeed strongly correlated, the validity of the two-dimensionall model can be called into question. To my knowledge, scholars have not yett linked the cultural-linguistic responses of the Russian diaspora to their political reactions,, despite the numerous works discussing the effect of nationality and language onn political attitudes.

Thee reader is reminded that the following analysis is based on the results of the smalll follow-up survey. Therefore, the conclusions are tentative and indicative at best. Moreover,, the survey only asked about attitudes. These opinions may not reflect political responsess (i.e. actual behavior), as people do not necessarily vote for the party or candidatee that expresses their (reported) opinions. In addition, the analysis is confined to Russiann parents as Ukrainians and mixed couples were not surveyed. It further has to be notedd that the tables below present the aggregate data of the four cities of this research only.. Thus, the data are not representative of the population of Ukraine's Russians as a whole. .

Russiann parents who sent their children to Russian classes do not differ substantiallyy from those with children in Ukrainian classes in their opinions on the politicall status of Ukraine (see Table 7.15). Although the proportion among the former assertingg that Ukraine should remain an independent state is slightly lower than that of thee latter (49.3% to 54.1% respectively), the percentage among the latter arguing that Ukrainee should fully unite with Russia is higher than that of the former (18.0% to 4.5% respectively).. These results suggest that there may indeed be two dimensions to the habituationn process of the Russians, with their cultural-linguistic response relatively unrelatedd to their political reply.

Onn the question of the status of the Russian language, the language of instruction groupss do vary, although the percentage differences are only small (see Table 7.16).145 As wee can see, the share of parents with Russian-instructed children who feel that Russian shouldd become the second state language in Ukraine is slightly higher than that of parents withh children in Ukrainian classes (71.2% to 64.6%), and the share of the former thinking thatt Ukrainian should be the sole state language is slightly lower than that of the latter. Thee results on this question thus show a small correlation: parents with children in

Thee issue of the official status of Russian is not necessarily linked to the question of state loyalty because Russianss who favor the institution of Russian as a second state language may still be ardent supporters of Ukrainiann independence. As such, the language issue need not be connected to the four political responses outlinedd above. However, the demand for the institution of Russian as a second state language does imply a demandd for official recognition of the separate identity of Russian speakers, which indicates that integration in—and,, related to it, loyalty towards— the host society is not pursued at all costs.

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Russiann classes are more likely to demand some official status for Russian than parents withh children in Ukrainian classes.

Thee impression from Table 7.16 that the linguistic response and the political reactionn are, after all, interrelated is reinforced by the results of the last two tables. In Tablee 7.17 we see a clear contrast between the parents who said they never speak Ukrainiann to their children and those who stated they seldom do (due to an insufficient numberr of respondents, the other categories were left out). The former are much less supportivee of the statement that Ukraine should remain an independent state than the latterr (42.5% to 62.5%, respectively). As to the status of Russian, the difference between thee two groups is not as large, but nonetheless substantial: 74.0% of the parents who neverr speak Ukrainian to their children think that Russian should become the second state languagee as opposed to 61.1% of those who seldom speak Ukrainian to their offspring (seee Table 7.18).146

Givenn that three of the four tables indeed show a correlation between linguistic andd political responses, one could doubt whether the two-dimensional model has any basiss in reality. Yet, the correlation was not particularly strong in any of the three tables. Inn other words, there were still many Russian parents sending their children to Russian classess (or never speaking Ukrainian to their children) who expressed support for prolongedd Ukrainian independence. Moreover, as already mentioned, the evidence this surveyy produced was only scant because of the small number of respondents and the fact thatt the sample of Russian parents is not representative of the Russian population at large. Muchh more research is required to make final conclusions about the applicability of Kolstoe'ss model.

Tablee 7.15 Russian Parents by Language of Instruction of their Children and Opinion on thee Political Status of Ukraine (in percentages and absolute numbers)

Ukrainee should remain Ukraine should unite Ukraine should fully ann independent state with Russia, but retain unite with Russia

aa degree of autonomy Ukrainiann class ~54/l% (33) 27.9% (17) " 18.0% (11) Russiann class 49.3% (33) 46.3% (31) 4.5% (3)

1466 These tables (7.17 and 7.18) show Russian parents by the extent to which they speak Ukrainian to their children.. Since it can be expected that parents who never speak Ukrainian to their children can disproportionatelyy be found in Kyi'v, Odesa and Donets'k and parents who seldom speak Ukrainian are over-representedd in L'viv, one could argue that the correlation between linguistic and political response is spurious,, with region being the underlying explanatory variable. However, a regional breakdown of the surveyy data revealed that there were Russian parents in Kyi'v and Odesa claiming they seldom spoke Ukrainiann to their children (in Kyi'v as many as those claiming they never spoke Ukrainian). This group of parents,, moreover, contrasted strongly in their political attitudes with those parents who said they never spokee Ukrainian to their children, in both cities. Thus, the correlation between linguistic and political responsee still stands when region is controlled for.

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Tablee 7.16 Russian Parents by Language of Instruction of their Children and Opinion on thee Status of the Russian Language (in percentages and absolute numbers)

Russiann should become Ukrainian should be the Ukrainian should be the thee second state state language, but only state language in languagee in Ukraine Russian should have a Ukraine

recognizedd official status Ukrainiann class Russiann class

64.6%% (42) 71.2%% (52)

29.2%% (19) 26.0%% (19)

6.2%% (4) 2.7%% (2)

Tablee 7.17 Russian Parents by the Language They Speak to their Children and Opinion onn the Political Status of Ukraine (in percentages and absolute numbers)

Howw often do you speakk Ukrainian to yourr children? Never r Seldom m

Ukrainee should remain ann independent state

42.5%% (31) 62.5%% (30)

Ukrainee should unite with Russia,, but retain a degreee of autonomy

42.5%% (31) 31.3%% (15)

Ukrainee should fully unitee with Russia

15.1%% (11) 6.3%% (3)

Tablee 7.18 Russian Parents by Language They Speak to their Children and Opinion on thee Status of the Russian Language (in percentages and absolute numbers)

Howw often do you speakk Ukrainian to yourr children? Never r Seldom m

Russiann should become thee second state languagee in Ukraine

74.0%% (57) 61.1%% (33)

Ukrainiann should be the statee language, but Russiann should have a recognizedd official status

22.1%% (17) 37.0%% (20)

Ukrainiann should be thee only state languagee in Ukraine

3.9%% (3) 1.9%% (1)

7.67.6 Conclusion

Thiss chapter introduced three concepts to classify the linguistic response of the Russians andd Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the four cities of this research project: (1) language retention,, (2) language integration, and (3) assimilation. The language of instruction in schools,, the language parents speak to their children and the linguistic behavior of the respondentss themselves were used as indicators for these concepts. The survey data from schooll pupils showed that the Russians opted for language retention in Donets'k and Odesa,, and for language integration in Kyi'v. In L'viv a distinction had to be made betweenn the Russians in mixed families who could be said to have assimilated, and the Russianss in purely Russian couples who seem to have opted for language retention.

Thee pattern of responses of Russophone Ukrainians echoed that of the purely Russiann families on all indicators. The only difference was found in L'viv where Russophonee Ukrainians sent their children to Ukrainian schools in majority numbers, unlikee Russian families. Given the similarity of the patterns of responses, these findings seemm to suggest that Russian families and Russophone Ukrainians have developed new

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commonn identities in three of the four surveyed cities, provided that linguistic responses aree indeed an accurate reflection of new evolving identities. While both groups would seemm to acquire (or have already acquired) a distinct Russophone identity in Odesa and Donets'k,, they both seem to drift towards a Ukrainian (-speaking) identity in Kyi'v (that is,, if their response in this city—language integration—can indeed be regarded as a transitionall phase). It is only in L'viv that their identity trajectories seem to go in different directions.. Taken as a whole, these data indicate that the language spoken at home is an importantt determinant of both linguistic reaction and identity development (insofar as the formerr is a valid indicator of the latter)

Thee analysis of independent variables disclosed that a combination of the ethnic proportionn and mixed marriages variables could best account for the overall set of responsess (of both Russians and Russophone Ukrainians). It was argued that the pattern off responses was more in line with the predicted outcome of the opportunity interpretationn of national and local policy than with that of the grievance interpretation of thiss variable. It was further suggested that a fear of cultural loss prompted Russian familiess in L'viv to opt for language retention, a response that could not be accounted for byy the aforementioned combination of variables. An examination of the results of a small follow-upp survey among Russian parents confirmed that Russian families in L'viv could welll be motivated in the school choice for their children primarily by a desire to preserve theirr own culture and language.

Inn the fourth section it was observed that a specific cultural mobilization of Russianss and/or Russian speakers only seems to occur when their language and culture aree threatened by a particular linguistic environment and/or the local policy of a city. The casee of L'viv suggests that such a threat has caused the local Russian community to split intoo a group opting for assimilation (the Russians in mixed Russian-Ukrainian families) andd a group ever more tenaciously holding onto their language and culture through the establishmentt of cultural associations.

Thee last section sought to test the empirical validity of Kolstoe's two-dimensional modell (Kolstoe identified both a political and a cultural dimension to the adjustment processs of the Russian diaspora). The results from the small follow-up survey showed thatt the linguistic response and the political reaction were to some extent interrelated. Thiss led to the conclusion that it is doubtful whether the two-dimensional model has any basiss in reality. Yet, this conclusion was at best tentative as the correlation between the twoo responses was not particularly strong, the number of respondents in the survey was insufficientt and the sample of Russian parents was not representative of the Russian populationn at large.

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88 CONCLUSION

Thiss research project aimed to delineate the nation-building project in education and the responsee of the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians in post-Soviet Ukraine. The focus wass on nation-building policies as they affect the social-cultural position of national minorities.. All states are engaged in nation-building schemes to some extent, deeming themm necessary to enhance the unity, legitimacy and, therefore, the stability of the state. Butt states vary greatly in the scale and depth of these policies. Some states have relatively mildd nation-building projects, permitting the national minorities within their borders to freelyy develop their cultures and languages. Other states, however, seek to ethnically homogenizee the country, eliminating groups that have a language, culture and/or identity differentt from that of the dominant core group. National minorities, in their turn, can respondd in a variety of ways to nation-building projects. In extreme cases, they either fullyy assimilate into the language and culture of the dominant group (and by doing so adoptt the identity of this group) or tenaciously cling to their own cultural heritage and identity. .

II specifically looked at education as this sphere represents both the most important instrumentt of nation-building for a state and the prime institution for national minorities too pass their language and culture on to the next generation. Ukraine was chosen for its largee Russian minority (22.1% of Ukraine's total population of 52 million) which is disproportionatelyy living in the eastern and southern parts of the country, and for the manyy members of the titular nation who speak Russian as their first language (the so-calledd Russian-speaking Ukrainians). The resulting intricate mosaic of nationality and languagee groups complicates the implementation of the nation-building project and makess Ukraine a fascinating case to study.

Thiss concluding chapter wil l discuss the answers to the research questions that weree formulated in the opening chapter.

8.18.1 How does the current nation-building project in the educational sphere comparecompare to that in Soviet times?

Thee language component of the Soviet nation-building policy was highly variable. In the firstt decade of its existence, the Soviet Union stimulated the use of minority languages in orderr to remove the social and economic arrears of the non-Russian peoples vis-a-vis the Russianss as the dominant nationality. In Soviet Ukraine this meant that the titular languagee became the main medium of instruction in the schools and, to a somewhat lesser extent,, in higher education. In addition, Ukrainian was made the compulsory language of thee republican administration and applicants for jobs in the state and party apparatus had too show a certain level of proficiency in it. The 1930s witnessed a complete turnaround in thee Soviet nationalities policy. Stalin began persecuting state and party officials who had participatedd in the campaign to elevate the titular languages. Russian was reintroduced as thee language of instruction in Ukraine's institutes of higher education, and the Russian languagee and literature became compulsory subjects in all schools in the Soviet Union in thee late 1930s. Russification continued in the post-war years. The Khrushchev decree of

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thee late 1950s which granted parents the right to choose the language of instruction of theirr children had the intended effect of encouraging many Ukrainian parents to send their childrenn to Russian schools. Consequently, the proportion of Russian-instructed schoolchildrenn grew from 26.3% in 1955-56 to 47.0% in 1989-90, and the proportion of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils conversely declined from 72.8% in 1955-56 to 47.5% in 1989-90. .

Whenn Glasnost' finally became well entrenched in Ukraine, the newly empowered titularr elite once again accorded primacy to the Ukrainian language. In education, the changee was embodied in the 1989 Law on Languages which granted institutions of higher educationn a period of ten years to switch to Ukrainian as the medium of instruction, and obligedd students applying for admission to an institute of higher education to do a Ukrainiann language and literature exam. After independence, measures further restricting thee use of Russian in the education system soon followed. Educational authorities, for instance,, decreed that the network of pupils (i.e. the distribution of Ukrainian- and Russian-instructedd pupils) should be brought into optimal accordance with the national compositionn of the local population. Since the proportion of Ukrainian-taught pupils laggedd far behind the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the local population in all the oblastss of the east and south, this decree truly foresaw a massive ukrainianization of the schooll network in these Russian-speaking regions. Another ministerial decree made the Russiann language an optional subject for Ukrainian schools whilst including Russian literaturee in the new course of world literature. This decree plainly violated the Article in thee Law on Languages that declared the Ukrainian language and the Russian language to bee compulsory subjects in all schools. Yet another measure deprived Russian schools of thee possibility to apply for and obtain prestigious titles like lyceum, gymnasium or college.. The 1996 Constitution finalized the unequal standing of languages by declaring Ukrainiann to be the sole state language whilst granting Russian the status of a national minorityy language.

Nott only was the new educational regime restrictive in terms of language regulations,, it did not entrust Russians and other minorities with much autonomy in determiningg the subject matter either. School education remained as centralized as before, withh schools being required to follow the national curriculum designed for each type of school,, work according to the programs developed by the Ministry of Education, and use itss 'recommended' textbooks. These regulations, moreover, applied to all schools, i.e. irrespectivee of the form of ownership (state-sponsored or private) or language of instructionn (Ukrainian or Russian). Nonetheless, some changes could be noted. After independence,, teachers could state their opinions freely, and it was left to them to decide whichh additional materials to use in lessons. The number of free hours increased more thann fourfold, and schools and individual pupils could choose from a whole series of new subjectss how to spend these hours. One of these subjects was Ridnyi Krai (home region), whichh acquainted pupils with the culture and history of their own region by means of programss and educational materials prepared by the teacher of the subject him/herself. Comparedd to schools, institutions of higher education (vuzy) were granted much more autonomyy in post-Soviet Ukraine. Although they were required to teach a block of humanitariann disciplines, which replaced a number of disciplines associated with the communistt past, vuzy were free to determine the subject matter of these disciplines (i.e.

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byy creating their own programs and teaching materials). As this was unthinkable in the Soviett past, independence did constitute a major change for institutes of higher education.

Afterr independence the educational powers had the school subjects of the history off Ukraine, Ukrainian literature and the geography of Ukraine at their disposal to disseminatee the Ukrainian national idea. Not only are the three courses compulsory subjectss in all schools, the students of the 11th grade also have to do a compulsory central examm in the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian literature. The post-Soviet history of Ukrainee course clearly advances the Hrushevs'kyi scheme of Ukrainian history, i.e. a versionn of history that maximizes Ukrainian distinctiveness vis-a-vis Russia. (The famous historiann Hrushevs'kyi is cherished for providing the Ukrainian nation with a distinct past.)) Thus, the medieval empire of Kyïvan Rus' is depicted as an early form of Ukrainiann statehood, and not as the precursor of the Russian Empire. Similarly, the Cossackss of the 17th century are portrayed as Ukrainian freedom fighters eager to establishh an independent state, and not as warriors wishing to unite with 'big brother' Russia.. To further underline Ukrainian individuality, the new course presents Ukrainian ass the sole native language and describes the Bolshevik Revolution as a foreign phenomenonn in which Ukrainians took no part. Moreover, the OUN, the nationalist militi aa from western Ukraine which fought both the Soviets and the Germans in World Warr II , is characterized as a genuine national liberation movement.

Surprisingly,, the post-Soviet course on Ukrainian literature is much less politicizedd than its Soviet predecessor. Most of the works the new program briefly discussess have no ideological or nationalizing content. Moreover, the new Ukrainian literaturee course introduces remarkably few works critical of the Soviet regime. In this, thee new Ukrainian literature teaching strongly contrasts with the new history of Ukraine teaching.. Whereas the content of the history of Ukraine course was completely revised in orderr to discredit the Soviet scheme of history, the content of the Ukrainian literature coursee was largely left untouched. The revised geography of Ukraine course does not contributee much to the nation-building project either. It is telling, for instance, that the neww geography textbook does not rely on typical geographical features, such as natural borderss or settlement patterns of ethnic Ukrainians, as elements that differentiate Ukraine fromm Russia and that thus legitimize Ukraine's independence. The national authorities thereforee clearly concentrate on the history of Ukraine as the subject intended to arouse nationall fervor in schoolchildren.

8.28.2 How can the current nation-building policies be explained?

Inn view of the restrictive language regulations and the unified constrained nature of the educationn system, it is tempting to label post-Soviet Ukraine as a nationalizing state that seekss to allocate the spoils of independence to the dominant titular group and eliminate culturall diversity. This, however, would be a serious misrepresentation of reality. First of all,, the newly empowered elite consciously sought to include Russians and other minoritiess by offering citizenship to all persons resident on Ukrainian territory. Second, non-Ukrainianss were not systematically purged from state offices, nor did they face seriouss discrimination in the job market (western Ukraine to some extent being the

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exception).. Third, specific legislation (notably the Law on National Minorities) granted ethnicc minorities extensive rights. Fourth, by accepting that the language regulations were implementedd only gradually and certain targets could not be met (see next section), the nationall authorities showed consideration for Ukraine's linguistic profile. Ukraine's overalll strategy in dealing with ethnic pluralism can therefore best be characterized as one thatt is fairly liberal/permissive with a mild but nonetheless incessant drive to culturally homogenizee the country.

Thee choice for an accommodating strategy is surprising given that Ukraine meets onlyy one of the six conditions that Lijphart holds to be conducive to consociational democracy,, a political arrangement that can be regarded as a special kind of accommodatingg strategy. Lijphart's conditions may thus only have illuminative value for thiss specific type of accommodating policy and not for liberal policies in general. Ukraine,, on the other hand, satisfies three of the seven qualifications which in Hennayake'ss view contribute to the establishment of a strategy of domination or control. Thee question is thus how Ukraine's unexpected choice for an accommodating approach cann be explained.

Accordingg to Chinn and Kaiser, the differences in minority policy between the post-Soviett states can essentially be accounted for by three factors: early mass-based nationall consciousness; a history of independence; and demographic trends. They argue thatt post-Soviet nationalist elites succeeded in establishing exclusionary policies in states wheree the titular population had already acquired a national consciousness by the beginningg of the 20th century. This argument indeed applies for Ukraine. The absence of aa Ukrainian middle class and repressive Czarist policies prevented the national idea from spreadingg among the peasantry in Russian-held Ukraine before the 1917 Revolution. Only inn Austrian-ruled western Ukraine did the Ukrainian national movement flourish. After independencee the pattern laid down in the first decades of the 20th century resurfaced. Thee nationalist movement could merely count on the support of western Ukrainians and thee residents of Kyi'v, which was not enough to become the dominant political force and changee minority policy in an exclusionary direction. Hence, Ukrainian nationalism is labeledd a "minority faith" by Andrew Wilson.

Thee absence of a history of independence only added to the weakness of the nationalistt cause. Because Ukraine had not experienced a period of relatively recent state independencee 'illegally eliminated by the Soviet regime,' the nationalist claim that a 'historicall injustice' had to be rectified lacked persuasiveness. This undermined the legitimacyy of an exclusionary strategy. To put it differently, the Ukrainian elite could not exploitt a 'wounded pride' syndrome, unlike the titular elites in the Baltic States who capitalizedd the public indignation about the Soviet occupation of 1939.

Chinnn and Kaiser hold a steady decline in the relative numbers of titulars vis-a-vis non-titularss (i.e. demographic trends) to be the third risk factor encouraging indigenous elitess to opt for restrictive policies. Though generally valid for the post-Soviet context, thiss regularity cannot be observed for Ukraine. Despite the 'threat' to the Ukrainian nationn that Russian in-migration and the significant russification of Ukrainians constitutedd after World War n, post-Soviet Ukraine has not embarked on a policy of exclusion. .

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8.38.3 To what extent have educational authorities succeeded in implementing the nation-buildingnation-building project in the various regions?

Ass regards language politics, we have seen that the national authorities formulated ambitiouss policy goals after independence. For schools, the objective was to make the proportionn of Ukrainian-instructed pupils correspond to the proportion of Ukrainians in thee population. As the percentage of Ukrainian-taught pupils still fell 23.4% short of the Ukrainiann element in the population (the 1989 census listed 72.7% of Ukraine's populationn as Ukrainians) at the time of independence, this objective, which was first statedd in February 1991, anticipated a substantial ukrainianization of the school network. Afterr independence the government was determined to elevate the status of Ukrainian and makee it the sole or at least the dominant language in all public spheres. Specifying the aforementionedd objective, the Ministry of Education decreed in October 1992 that the networkk of first graders studying in Ukrainian should be brought in line with the national compositionn of the population in each region by 1 September 1993. By focusing on the firstt grade instead of on all pupils, the national authorities indicated that they favored a graduall approach, permitting those children already enrolled in Russian classes to continuee their Russian-language education.

Interestingly,, this decree was hard to reconcile with the clause in the 1989 Languagee Law which granted parents the right to choose the language of instruction of theirr children. This discrepancy between the two stipulations has led some observers to postulatee that the national authorities may have assumed that parents' preferences concerningg the language of education would automatically coincide with their ethnicity (Arel,, 1995a; Jackson, 1998). Yet, to make doubly sure that a maximum number of Ukrainianss would enroll their children in Ukrainian schools, the Ministry of Education tookk several measures to make Ukrainian-language education more appealing than Russian-languagee instruction. One of these measures sanctioned the opening of small (andd therefore attractive) Ukrainian classes in Russian schools, whilst not providing for thee reverse case, i.e. the opening of (small) Russian classes in Ukrainian schools. Another onee established the previously mentioned Ukrainian-language entrance exam for higher education.. Yet another measure proclaimed, as we have seen, that prestigious school types,, like lyceums, gymnasiums and colleges, should as a rule be opened with Ukrainian ass the language of instruction.

Thee policy aim for higher education was particularly strict: institutions of higher educationn would have to switch to Ukrainian as the medium of instruction within ten years.. Given that Russian had come to dominate higher education almost completely in post-warr Soviet Ukraine (in 1992-93 still only 36.8% of all students were instructed in Ukrainian),, the task these institutions of higher education had to fulfil l was truly formidable. .

Whatt then was the effect of these measures? Have the national authorities been successfull in achieving their goals? For schools it can be observed that, despite considerablee progress in reaching the aforementioned policy objective, the proportion of Ukrainian-instructedd pupils was still some 10 percentage points short of the proportion of Ukrainianss in the population in 1997-98. Most remarkable, however, was the enormous regionall variation in the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed schoolchildren. In the western

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oblastss and in most oblasts of the center, where Ukrainian-language education had traditionallyy been strong, this percentage equaled or even exceeded the share of Ukrainianss in the oblast population. In the Russian-speaking oblasts of the east and south, byy contrast, the percentage trailed behind the Ukrainian segment in the population. Withinn the Russian-speaking regions marked differences could be found between oblasts wheree Ukrainians make up a sizeable majority of the population and oblasts where Ukrainianss constitute a small majority or a minority of the population. The former recordedd steep increases in the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils to the point that thiss percentage was well on the way to reaching the Ukrainian element in the population (i.e.. the oblasts of Dnipropetrovs'k, Kherson and Mykolaiv). The latter, in contrast, showedd only minimal growth figures (i.e. the oblasts of Donets'k and Luhans'k and the autonomouss republic of The Crimea). As it is precisely in the latter oblasts that the gap betweenn the proportion of Ukrainian-taught pupils and the Ukrainian element in the populationn was widest, one could argue that in those oblasts where ukrainianization was urgentlyy needed from a policy perspective it failed to make substantial inroads on Russian-languagee school education.

Forr data on first graders, the oblasts of the east and south show nearly the same patternn as for the all grades combined data. Once more it is the oblasts of Dnipropetrovs'k,, Kherson and Mykolaiv that came close to realizing the October 1992 decree:: in the 1993-94 school year the local authorities in these oblasts established networkss of first graders that nearly corresponded to the national composition of the local population.. In the other oblasts the local administrations were not able to execute the Octoberr 1992 decree. Some formed networks of Ukrainian-instructed first graders that laggedd moderately behind the Ukrainian segment in the population (i.e. the oblasts of Kharkiv,, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa), while others created networks that were still remote fromm the demographic weight of the Ukrainians (i.e. Donets'k and Luhans'k oblast and Thee Crimean).

Forr institutes of higher education it was clearly impossible to meet the requirementt of the Language Law and totally switch to Ukrainian-language instruction by thee end of the decade. Nonetheless considerable headway was made: the proportion of Ukrainian-instructedd students nationwide rose from 36.8% in 1992-93 to 51.2% in 1995-96.. The same regional divide could be observed as in schools. While in the western oblastss nearly 100% of the students were studying in Ukrainian by 1995-96, only a minorityy of the students were doing so in the oblasts of the east and south. Donets'k, Luhans'kk and The Crimea once more stand out due to their low numbers of Ukrainian-instructedd students (7.5%, 8.4% and 0% respectively). More recent data on the percentage off Ukrainian-instructed academic groups lend further support to the observation that vuzy wouldd not be able to comply with the Language Law stipulation: in 1997-98 still only 57%% of academic groups in state universities and 38.6% of these groups in polytechnical universitiess were instructed in Ukrainian.

Severall reasons can be cited for the failure of the national authorities to bring the networkk of schools in concordance with the national composition of the population. One off these concerns the autonomous conduct of local state administrations. It can be argued thatt the absence of a law-abiding tradition in conjunction with the system of elected mayorss only reinforced the impact of the local state on the policy outcome. The shortage

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off Ukrainian teaching materials and a scarcity of teachers able to conduct lessons in Ukrainiann can be seen as another factor frustrating the policy objectives of the central governrhent.. Lastly, the choice behavior of parents surely is an important determinant shapingg the mosaic of schools. The incomplete implementation of the Language Law stipulationn on higher education is largely a function of the material base—i.e. of the availabilityy of lecturers having a sufficient command of Ukrainian and the presence of Ukrainian-languagee teaching materials. The constraints in this sphere forced the Ministry off Education to content itself with a much slower pace of ukrainianization in higher education. .

Disseminationn of the new textbooks and programs to the farthest corners of the countryy appears to have largely been completed, as I found all the schools I visited in the fourr cities using the new teaching materials. This suggests that the imposition of new subjectt matter in the school system has been a much greater success than the observance off the language regulations. An education official told me that even in The Crimea, the hotbedd of Russian nationalism, the schools began to work with the Kyïv-prepared curricula,, programs and textbooks from 1 September 1997 onwards. A personal check in somee of the schools in Simferopol, the capital of The Crimea, revealed that these schools weree indeed using the new textbooks for the history of Ukraine course, the crucial subject forr nation-building purposes. The consolidation of the state regarding the uniform instructionn of revised subject matter is remarkable since one would expect the current severee economic crisis to deprive the state of the necessary means to fulfil l its state and nation-buildingg program.

Thee triumph of the central state regarding the preparation and distribution of new textbooks,, programs and curricula thus contrasts markedly with the piecemeal implementationn of the central language policy. Whether the discrepancy between these twoo levers of nation-building was unintentional or consciously planned remains unclear. Naturally,, switching the language of instruction requires a much greater effort from teacherss than teaching a revised thematic content of humanitarian courses in the same language.. From this point of view, the discrepancy is likely to be unintentional as it emanatess from the constraints set by the material base (i.e. the shortage of teachers qualifiedd to teach in Ukrainian). Yet, there is some evidence that the national authorities att least foresaw the differential success of the two sides to the nation-building project. For instance,, I found many schools using official Russian translations of the new history textbooks,, which can hardly be called compatible with the campaign to ukrainianize the schooll system. Clearly, this suggests that the absorption by pupils of a new version of history,, geography and literature had absolute priority for the central policy makers, so muchh so that these officials were willin g to compromise over the language issue.

Thee successful spread of the new history of Ukraine textbooks in Russian-speakingg southern and eastern Ukraine is all the more remarkable given that the authors off the new books presented the Hrushevs'kyi version of Ukrainian history. This particular versionn of history firmly upholds the claim of Ukrainian distinctiveness vis-a-vis Russia, andd runs the risk of alienating - and thus being rejected by - both Russian speakers and peoplee with a longing for the Soviet past, such as the Red Army veterans.

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8.48.4 What has been the role of local state administrations in the nation-building program? program?

Afterr independence, local educational offices had a profound impact on central policy. Differencess between the cities in local policy primarily resulted from the persons in chargee of the education departments. Thus, in the city of Donets'k a continuity of personnell from the Soviet era meant that pressure from Kyïv to ukrainianize the local schooll system was effectively resisted. As a result, by 1997-98 still only 10.1% of Donets'k'ss first graders were being taught in Ukrainian, a figure that trails far behind the 39.4%% of Ukrainians in the Donets'k population. In Odesa, by contrast, the appointment off Serhii Kozyts'kyi, a strong supporter of Rukh, as Head of the Department of Education off the Odesa city administration, signaled a surge of ukrainianization. During his term of office,, the number of Ukrainian schools jumped from 16 in 1995-96 to 51 in 1997-98 out off a total of 133 schools. Likewise, the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils rose fromm 8% in 1991-92 to 39% in 1997-98, just ten percentage points short of the Ukrainian elementt in the population.

Inn L'viv and Kyïv, the other two cities in this research project, the local educationall offices so zealously embraced national language policy that they contributed too a situation in which the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed first graders actually exceededd the share of Ukrainians in the population (in L'viv the former stood at 93.7% in 1997-988 compared to a 79.1% Ukrainian presence in the population; in Kyïv the figures weree 94.0% and 75.4% respectively). In nationally conscious L'viv, radical local policy foundd its inception in the Rukh victory in the city soviet elections of March 1990. Once in power,, Rukh began replacing Soviet-style apparatchiks in state institutions with their own nationalist-leaningg candidates. In Kyïv the change in local policy seems to have been preparedd by the national authorities as it was the Kravchuk-appointed Mayor Ivan Salyi whoo initiated the ukrainianization of the Kyïv school network in May 1992.

Educationn departments used different strategies to ukrainianize the school system. Inn L'viv indications were found of the local authorities firing school directors who did not boww to pressure and open Ukrainian classes, and substituting these directors with more malleablee persons. By contrast, in Kyïv the vast majority of Russian school directors were simplyy instructed to change the status of their schools by decree of the mayor. In both Kyïvv and Odesa, (but not in L'viv! ) school directors were told that they could not open Russiann classes parallel to Ukrainian ones. Consequently, many former Russian schools foundd themselves in a transition period with the need to become fully Ukrainian within tenn years.

8.58.5 How do the local Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians respond linguisticallylinguistically to the current nation-building policies in education?

Ourr survey among schoolchildren in the cities of Donets'k, Odesa, Kyïv and L'viv revealedd that Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians exhibit marked regional variationss in their linguistic responses. In Donets'k and Odesa, only negligible numbers off Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians raise their children in Ukrainian and enroll

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theirr children in Ukrainian schools (as reported by these children). In addition, their children'ss use of Ukrainian in private settings and their consumption of Ukrainian media remainss marginal. In these cities, therefore, the response of the Russians and Russian-speakingg Ukrainians is clearly one of language retention. In Kyïv, Russians and Russian-speakingg Ukrainians are sending their offspring to Ukrainian schools in increasingly largerr numbers, but they do not speak much Ukrainian to their children (yet). These children'ss own linguistic conduct resembles that of their parents. Thus, in Kyïv Russians andd Russophone Ukrainians may be said to show the response of language integration.

Inn L'viv a sharp contrast can be found within the Russian community, between Russianss in mixed couples and those in purely Russian families. The former are now enrollingg their children in Ukrainian classes in increasingly larger majorities and a substantiall number are raising their children exclusively in Ukrainian. Their children now leann towards Ukrainian: on three of the four indicators measuring the linguistic behavior off the child, they answered Ukrainian in large majorities. The Russian parents, on the contrary,, appear to reject Ukrainian-language education and make no effort to speak to theirr children in Ukrainian. The behavior of their children is ambivalent. On the one hand,, they claim to watch Ukrainian television and speak both languages to their friends inn large numbers, but on the other hand, they reported not reading any Ukrainian books or speakingg much Ukrainian during breaks at school. In L'viv , therefore, the Russians in mixedd families can be said to show the response of assimilation, while the Russians in purelyy Russian couples seem to opt for language retention (though the behavior of their childrenn is somewhat equivocal). Russophone Ukrainians closely follow the purely Russiann families in their linguistic conduct. Unlike the latter, however, they enroll their childrenn in Ukrainian schools in large numbers. Thus, Russian-speaking Ukrainians may bee said to exhibit the response of language integration in L'viv .

8.68.6 How can the pattern of responses of the Russian-speaking population be explained? explained?

Thee pattern of responses is clearly related to the ethnic proportion variable. The responses off the Russophone population generally move up the scale (i.e. from language retention to assimilation)) as their percentage in the local population diminishes (from 75.7% in Donets'kk to 18.6% in L'viv) . Likewise, the nature of local policy is helpful in understandingg the set of responses. As policy shifts from restrictive (L'viv and Kyïv) to accommodatingg (Donets'k), the response moves from assimilation to language retention. Thee direction of this correlation supports the 'opportunity' conception of the effect of policy.. National minorities wil l increasingly see no other option but to reconcile themselvess with majority rule, as the state constrains opportunities for groups to express themselvess culturally. Unfortunately, due to the particular choice of cities, it cannot be determinedd which of these two variables has the upper hand in explaining the responses, ass the variation of the one keeps pace with that of the other over the four cities in this research. .

Thee mixed marriages variable also provides important explanation because the responsess of mixed families lean more towards the assimilation end of the scale than

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thosee of purely Russian couples in all four cities. There appears to be a combined effect off mixed marriages with the proportion of Russians because the difference between the responsee of the mixed couples and that of the Russian couples increases as the proportion off Russians in a city decreases.

Thee purely Russian couples in L'viv demonstrate a response (language retention) thatt would not be foreseen by the ethnic proportion and local policy propositions. At first sight,, the ethnic schism hypothesis, which assumes that the more a minority group differs onn cultural markers from the dominant group the tighter the minority group will cling to itss language, holds the key to explaining the surprising behavior of this group. After all, thee cultural difference between Russians and Ukrainians is larger in L'viv than in any of thee other three cities in this research. Yet, in the context of substantial cultural differentiationn one would not expect the Russians in mixed couples to assimilate, nor to findfind so many mixed marriages between Russians and western Ukrainians in the first place.. In similar vein, the language integration of the Russophone Ukrainians in L'viv is leftt unaccounted for. Thus, it is doubtful whether ethnic schism has any interpretative valuee at all.

Thee unexpected response of the Russian parents in L'viv seems, instead, to be relatedd to a concern for the preservation of their language and culture. It can be argued thatt the aversion of these Russians to enrolling their children in Ukrainian classes and to speakingg Ukrainian to them emanates from a fear that, in the totally Ukrainian-speaking environmentt of L'viv , Ukrainian-language education would influence the language use of thee child in private settings, making the child lose his or her Russian roots. In the other threee cities, in contrast, Russians need not be alarmed at Ukrainian-language education 'ukrainizing'' their offspring due to the Russian-speaking character of these cities.

Too test this proposition, a small follow-up survey was done among Russian parents.. The results of this survey confirmed the hypothesis: Russian parents in L'viv indeedd appear to be primarily motivated by a wish to preserve their own language and culturee regarding school choice, while Russian parents in Kyi'v and Odesa seem to have otherr considerations for sending their children to Russian schools. Data on the cultural self-organizationn of Russians lent further support to the claim that the Russians in L'viv aree very much involved in safeguarding their language and identity. No fewer than nine Russiann cultural societies are active in the L'viv oblast, seven of which coordinate their activitiess in weekly meetings. In none of the other cities are Russians as well organized culturally. .

Itt must be noted that the scope of the concern for cultural preservation account cannott be fully assessed by means of the present choice of cities, nor the relation of this factorr to the other independent variables. It can assuredly be stated, however, that anxietiess over language and identity among Russians seem first and foremost to apply in a contextt where their relative numbers are small (ethnic proportion), and not in a context of pronouncedd cultural differentiation with the majority group (ethnic schism). Interestingly, ourr research data suggest that an environment, such as the city of L'viv , where the Russiann language and culture are indeed (perceived to be) under threat has caused the locall Russian community to split into a group opting for assimilation (the Russians in mixedd Russian-Ukrainian families) and a group ever more tenaciously clinging to their languagee and culture (the Russians of purely Russian couples).

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8.78.7 Theoretical Implications

Thee findings of this research project have a number of important implications. The first is thatt as the relative number of a minority group in the population of a given area decreases,, more members of this group wil l opt for assimilation. However, this correlationn seems to hold up only to a certain point. Beyond this point, i.e. in an environmentt where the numerical strength of a minority group becomes so weak that its languagee and culture are (perceived to be) threatened with extinction, the group splits in twoo with one segment settling on assimilation and the other frenetically retaining its identity. .

Thee validity of the first part of the generalization is confirmed by Laitin's research onn the identity trajectories of the "beached" Russian diaspora in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine andd Kazakhstan. In his survey, he found that the size of the titular population in the respondents'' city of residence was the only coefficient statistically significant for all four republics,, with Russians displaying a more positive stance towards assimilation as their relativee number diminishes vis-a-vis the titular nation (Laitin, 1998). Hin (1999) observed aa similar regularity among the Armenian minority in post-Soviet Georgia. In the Signagi region,, where Armenians make up a meager 8% of the overwhelmingly Georgian population,, Armenians reported to be thinking mostly in Georgian, while those in Javacheti,, a homogeneously Armenian region, claimed to be thinking only in Armenian. Interestingly,, the political response of ethnic minorities can correlate in much the same wayy with ethnic proportion as their cultural response. Comparing predominantly Swedish Ostrobothniaa to the more ethnically mixed Uusimaa in Finland at the time of the Bolshevikk Revolution, Hamalainen (1966) found that the Swedish speakers of the former hadd more radical political demands than the latter. This suggests that the cultural and the politicall dimensions of minority group responses are strongly interrelated after all, which oncee again undermines the validity of Kolstoe's two-dimensional model (see previous chapter). .

Thee second part of the generalization, i.e. the phenomenon of a (part of a) small minorityy group which, aware of its cultural fragility, fervently protects its cultural heritage,, has received much academic attention in the context of diaspora studies. These studiess have demonstrated how diaspora communities maintain their cultural assets and groupp boundaries, and keep alive a collective memory of their original homeland, despite beingg cut off from it by several generations in time and by thousands of kilometers in space.. In fact, it is these features that scholars think of as the very defining elements of a diaspora,, distinguishing a diaspora from other migrant communities (e.g. Safran 1991; Chaliandd and Rageau, 1995; Laitin, 1998; Wahlbeck, 1999). However, to my knowledge, theree are no academic studies citing the mechanism of a minority group being more prone too disintegration (with one segment rejecting assimilation) as the demographic weight of thiss group decreases. Possibly, therefore, the survey results of L'viv present a unique finding. finding.

Andd yet it must be remembered that the particular language climate in L'viv may havee played an important role in shaping the linguistic responses. Day-to-day interaction withh Ukrainian speakers has more than likely made the L'vivan Russians feel different andd see themselves as a distinct minority or diaspora group (let us not forget that the

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Russianss in L'viv constitute a recently established immigrant community). By contrast, thee Russians in Kyiv, though comprising only a slightly larger minority than the Russians inn L'viv, are not likely to see themselves as any different from the titular majority due to thee prevailing use of Russian as the language on the streets and at work. Thus, it may very welll be language climate and not so much the ethnic proportion that explains why the Russianss in L'viv and Kyiv behave so differently.

Off course, language climate and ethnic proportion are strongly interrelated: the smallerr the percentage of Russians in the local population, the less these Russians have leftt their mark on the language pattern in a given city. Yet, this language pattern has been influencedd by other factors as well. As the introduction mentioned, diverging historical experiencess explain why the Ukrainian language has retained its dominant position in westernn Ukraine, while Russian has pushed Ukrainian ever further into the countryside in otherr parts of the country. To assess which of the two variables, language climate or ethnicc proportion, can best account for cases of minority groups splitting into assimilating andd non-assimilating parts, it would be necessary to determine the response of the Russianss in oblast centers such as Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr and Chernihiv. The Russians theree constitute the same proportion in the local population as in L'viv, but the language patternss in these cities differ from that of L'viv.147 It would, moreover, be interesting to examinee the linguistic conduct of the Ukrainian minority in The Crimea as this group findss itself in a situation similar to that of the Russians in L'viv. If the same patterns were observedd among this group as among the L'vivan Russians, then our previously mentionedd conclusion would surely have predictive value.

Anotherr important finding of this research is that the role of the (local) state indeedd matters. It would appear that the opportunity interpretation has superior explanatoryy power: the more restrictive local policy is towards a minority language, the moree a minority group is prone to seek language integration or assimilation into the languagee of the titular group. This mechanism was particularly well illustrated by the case off Odesa. There, due to the efforts of the man in charge of the local educational office, the proportionn of pupils instructed in Ukrainian jumped from 8% in 1991-92 to 39% in 1997-98.. There is much evidence outside the Ukrainian context to substantiate the opportunity understandingg of state approaches to multi-ethnicity. For instance, in Laitin's four-countryy study, Russian speakers had the highest scores on the openness to assimilation indexx in Latvia and Estonia where the policy towards the Russian speakers was most exclusionaryy (Laitin, 1998). Similarly, citing the Belgian and Scottish cases, Rudolph and Thompsonn (1985) argued that accommodating devices did not lead to an abatement of ethnoterritoriall sentiment there, although they did undercut support for nationalist parties. Likewise,, Coakley (1992) contends that all-union arrangements to sooth the ethnonational demandss of one group unintentionally stimulated those of groups whose members had hithertoo acquired only a weak national consciousness, or none at all. (He mentions Soviet Belorussianss and Yugoslav Macedonians as examples.)

Andd yet, the grievance interpretation of the role of the local state was given some credencee by the protests that the restrictive policies in Kyiv and L'viv elicited. In L'viv

1477 Russian can be expected to play a more prominent role in these cities than in L'viv as the percentage of Ukrainianss stating Russian to be their mother tongue was much higher there than in L'viv. See Arel (1994).

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thee local Russian community has organized itself in several cultural societies, the leaders off which accused the local educational authority of pressurizing Russian school directors too open Ukrainian classes under penalty of dismissal. In Kyiv one Russian cultural associationn regularly organized demonstrations in front of the city hall to protest against thee closing of Russian schools. However, these opposition groups have never evolved intoo a mass-based protest movement (the demonstrations in Kyiv, for example, never attractedd more than about 25 people), handicapped as they were by internal strife and insufficientt skills and financial resources to set up a professional organization (above all thosee in Kyiv). Thus, as a whole the Russian (-speaking) counter movement to restrictive policiess remained a marginal phenomenon, making the grievance interpretation of littl e value. .

Still,, the grievance line of reasoning may have some interpretative power in the contextt of southern and eastern Ukraine. There, the absence of organized protest could welll be related to the hesitant and incomplete implementation of the nation-building projectt (as we have seen, higher education in Odesa and Donets'k was most resistant to centrall regulations). It is thus not inconceivable that a cultural mobilization among southernn and eastern Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians would have occurred if nation-buildingg policies had been pursued more vigorously. The lack of opposition in the aforementionedd regions may, alternatively, be explained by the severe economic crisis. In conditionss of material deprivation, the most people are likely to place matters of a more immateriall nature (such as anxieties over cultural survival) at the bottom of the agenda. This,, in turn, can be expected to greatly handicap opposition movements agitating against nation-buildingg objectives that have been realized (such as the establishment in Odesa of aa network of schools that corresponds to the national composition of the population). Followingg this logic, one would expect the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians to startt mobilizing on cultural matters as soon as the economy picks up. In a context of economicc prosperity, the grievance model might, therefore, have explanatory power after all.. However, this presumption is not borne out by Laitin's empirical evidence: Estonia andd Latvia, the countries showing the highest openness to assimilation scores among Russiann speakers, not only have the most restrictive policies but also the best performing economiess of the four countries under study.

Chapterr Two posed two questions that lead to two other important implications of thiss study. These questions were (1) whether the amorphous national identity of the Russian-speakingg Ukrainians and (to a lesser extent) Russians somehow predisposes thesee groups to assimilation, and (2) whether it is at all appropriate to make a distinction betweenn Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians. The answer to the former is succinct:: judging from the linguistic responses of both groups, a weak national identity doess not impel them to assimilate to the titular language and culture. On the contrary, in thee regions where "ethnic marginality" among Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians iss said to be strongest (see once more Pirie, 1996), i.e. in the south and east, they retain theirr language in massive numbers. Instead, it appears to be their demographic weight (andd consequently the language environment of a given area) that to a large extent determiness their linguistic response in the place of residence.

Usingg the linguistic conduct of the Russians and Russophone Ukrainians as a yardstickk to assess the validity of distinguishing between the two groups provides an

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intriguingg answer to the second question. Proceeding from our survey results, it would seemm that such a distinction is only justifiable in a context where the Russian language andd culture are (perceived to be) in danger of disappearing. After all, it is only in L'viv thatt marked differences were found between Russophone Ukrainians (language integration)) and Russians (one section showing assimilation, the other language retention).. In the other three cities in this research project the two groups responded in an equall manner.

Doess the observation that nationality only seems to matter in the west-Ukrainian contextt mean that language is the more important social cleavage in the other parts of the country,, i.e. that Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians should be grouped together too clearly distinguish them from Ukrainian speakers? Looking exclusively at the linguistic responsee of both groups would seem too narrow a base from which to answer this questionn in the affirmative. Indeed, Chapter Two cited a study that found not language , butt nationality, religion and region to be the significant factors determining political attitudess in Ukraine. In similar vein, Kuzio has recently argued that political ideology (pro-- or anti-communist) and generation are at least as important cleavages as language, substantiatingg his claim by pointing out that there is currently no "ethnic" political party specificallyy promoting the interests of Russian speakers (Kuzio, 1999a). Others, however, insistt that language is a weighty determinant of political attitudes and an identity marker off growing importance. Using representative survey data collected by KUS in May-June 1994,, Arel and Khmelko (1996) noted that Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakingg Ukrainians differed significantly in their opinions on language status, the status off Ukraine vis-a-vis Russia and the CIS, disarmament, political freedom and private property.. They observed that the territorial split, evident in the 1994 presidential elections,, perfectly matches the uneven spread of language groups, while it appears unrelatedd to attitudes on market reform which are not regionally polarized. Laitin (1998) alsoo observed that the use of the term "Russian-speaking population" in Ukraine's media increasedd from 1994 to 1996, suggesting that a new Russian-speaking identity is in the making.. Given all this contradictory evidence, further research is required to determine whetherr language has indeed become the most important dividing factor or whether other identitiess have assumed more salience.

8.88.8 Future Scenarios

AA most intriguing question is owhether Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians wil l assimilatee into the Ukrainian language and culture in the long run, provided that Ukraine retainss its independence and that the current language policy of mild but determined ukrainianizationn is continued. If one understands the three linguistic responses in this studyy as stages in a process leading to full assimilation, or as trajectories along which Russianss and Russian speakers are moving towards full assimilation at different speeds, onee would certainly expect them to.

Thee evidence of this survey suggests that there is indeed a trend towards assimilationn among (many) Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. This could most clearlyy be seen in the domain of school choice. A comparison of the 1994-95 cohort of

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pupilss with that of 1990-91 revealed that Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians were enrollingg their children in Ukrainian schools in increasingly larger numbers across the board.. This growth was spectacular in Kyi'v and L'viv, small to moderate in Odesa and minimall in Donets'k. The only group that demonstrated an actual decline in the relative numberr of parents sending their children to Ukrainian schools was the group of purely Russiann parents in L'viv . The results of the survey are upheld by official statistics on the languagee of instruction of schoolchildren (which are not broken down by parental nationalityy or the language spoken at home). These data show an unabated growth of Ukrainian-languagee education during Kuchma's term of office. When the 1994-95 and 1997-988 cohorts are compared, the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils jumps from 91.0%% to 94.0% in L'viv , from 90.7% to 94.2% in Kyïv, from 15.8% to 39.5% in Odesa, andd from 3.8% to 10.1% in Donets'k.

However,, the actual use of Ukrainian by Russians and Russophone Ukrainian to theirr children was still minimal in all four cities. Only the Russians in mixed couples in L'vi vv were found to speak Ukrainian to their offspring in substantial numbers. Nonetheless,, something of a change could be noted in the Ukrainian-instructed group of pupils:: relatively more mixed couples and Russophone Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian to theirr children in the 1994-95 cohort than in the 1990-91 group. In Russophone Donets'k, off all places, this trend was most pronounced.

Comparedd to their parents, the children themselves were found to speak much moree Ukrainian (although there was evidence that the reverse applied for children with Ukrainiann parents who spoke both languages to each other). The context, however, appearedd to be important: in thoroughly Ukrainian-speaking L'viv a substantial number off children at Russian schools indicated that they spoke both languages to their friends (percentagess as high as 60 and 70%). In the other three cities the school environment seemedd to make the difference: the children who studied in Ukrainian schools reported to bee speaking only Ukrainian (Kyi'v) or both languages (Odesa and Donets'k) during breaks inn much higher numbers than those who studied in Russian schools. Likewise, the consumptionn of Ukrainian-language television and books was much higher among Ukrainian-instructedd pupils than among Russian-instructed children. One has to be cautious,, though, in attributing these findings solely to the language of instruction as Ukrainian-instructedd children may have come from more Ukrainian-minded families from thee start (where much more Ukrainian is spoken at home) than Russian-instructed pupils. Generallyy speaking the conclusion seems warranted that the process of switching languagess from Russian to Ukrainian has indeed started in schools. Moreover, even in the privatee setting of the family a minimal but nonetheless perceptible change can be seen. Althoughh the pace of this process varies widely across the country, there is a general transitionn to Ukrainian, also in thoroughly Russian-speaking Odesa and Donets'k.

Thee question that surfaces now is whether Russians and Russophone Ukrainians wil ll allow the language switch to happen inside their homes. The results from L'viv , wheree pressure from the Ukrainian-speaking environment is strong, suggest that Russophonee Ukrainians will permit their children to speak Ukrainian at home and will takee for granted the fact that their children wil l gradually lose their ability to speak Russian.. Russians seem to be split on this issue. The majority and most notably those in mixedd marriages not only accept but even appear to encourage the full assimilation of

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theirr children, while a substantial minority, principally those in purely Russian couples, wouldd seem to reject the idea of their children losing their Russian cultural roots and adoptingg a Ukrainian identity instead. The size of this minority suggests that the number off Russians resisting assimilation is definitely greater than the few "half-forgotten poets andd lonely philologists," whom Laitin regards as the sole members of a community holdingg onto "languages and rituals in desuetude" (ibid. p. 30). Yet, with the passing of generationss their numbers can be expected to gradually diminish.

Itt is doubtful, however, whether the people of the south and east will ever face the momentt when Ukrainian 'comes knocking on the door of their houses.' In these solidly Russian-speakingg regions language attitudes would appear particularly hard to change. It seemss that a decisive language shift is only conceivable there under a sustained policy of ukrainianization.. That language policies aimed at reversing linguistic trends and revitalizingg low status languages do indeed have the ability to mold the linguistic conduct off the citizenry is illustrated by evidence from outside the Ukrainian context. Thus, citing thee case of Quebec, Arel (1999) maintains that the Péquiste language project of the late 1970ss to this day has fundamentally changed the image of Quebecois French as a low statuss language, and has greatly enhanced the incentive to learn it. Similarly, it can be arguedd that the creation of sharply demarcated unilingual areas in Belgium has effectively stoppedd the advance of French to the north, and has eliminated the French-speaking pocketss in major Flemish cities. And yet, the examples of Quebec and Flanders may not bee very instructive for eastern and southern Ukraine, as the language revival programs in thee former two regions were in essence defensive. They merely sought to preserve and resuscitatee a threatened language in an area where the vast majority of the population still spokee this language. By contrast, the Ukrainian renaissance project aims at introducing thee vulnerable language in regions where the high status language is dominant, in regions moreoverr with sizable urban populations. I know of no historical precedent of a state successfullyy infusing a language formerly held in low esteem into millions of urbanites whoo homogeneously spoke a high status language before.

Inn addition, the prospects for a steady policy of ukrainianization are highly uncertain.. As Andrew Wilson sought to evince in his book, the nationalizing project can onlyy count on the support of a minority of the population. Opinion polls have repeatedly shownn a majority of Ukraine's citizens to be in favor of granting Russian some official status.. If this wish is indeed fulfilled, the incentive to achieve a refined command of Ukrainiann will be critically diluted. A change in policy is unlikely to happen in the near futuree as President Kuchma defeated the divided left-wing opposition in elections in the falll of 1999. But if the political left unites and fields one single candidate in the elections scheduledd for 2004, the political landscape may well alter, resulting in a turn-around in languagee policies.

Howeverr even if the current language politics are continued for the next several decades,, an economic recovery could well remove any stimulus for the Russian speakers off the south and east to assimilate. The impact of an economic upswing on linguistic trendss is likely to be related to the region(s) this recovery originates from. If the initiative forr the upturn comes from the Ukrainian-speaking west or central regions (including Kyi'v),, economic growth is likely to be beneficial for assimilation, as many Russians and Russian-speakingg Ukrainians will then feel a strong incentive to acquire a comprehensive

189 9

commandd of the titular language. In this scenario, Ukraine would resemble Estonia and Latvia,, where Russian speakers vie with one another to obtain a place in the prospering titularr economy. However, if the initiative comes from the south and east, the Russian speakerss of these regions could well experience the rule of the center as a burden obstructingg their region's further development. In this scenario, they are likely to hold ontoo their language and press for a severance of ties with the center, a response which mayy well be reinforced by grievances emanating from restrictive nation-building policies. Ann economic recovery could actually be expected to come from the south and east becausee it is these regions that generate the bulk of Ukraine's agricultural and industrial productionn and commercial activities. If such a future materializes, Ukraine's south and eastt could be on the way to becoming a second Catalonia, the economically most advancedd region of Spain where the Catalans as the titular group constantly press for moree autonomy.

190 0

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Diatlova,, M. V. Chairman of the Kyiv branch of Rus'. Kyiv city, November 1997. Directorr of School no. 244 in Kyiv. Kyiv city, September 1996. Directorr of School no. 84 in L'viv. L'viv city, April 1997. Directorr of School no. 49. Donets'k city, November 1998. Finikov,, T. First Vice Rector of the Kyiv Institute of Economics, Public Administration

andd Company Law. Kyiv city, September 1998. Grachev,, O. First Secretary of the Kyiv Branch of the Communist Party. Kyiv city,

Octoberr 1996. Hertog,, F. den. PhD Candidate at the AGIDS Research Institute of the University of

Amsterdam.. Amsterdam, February 1999. Hentosh,, L. Research Associate at the Institute of Historical Studies of the L'viv State

University.. L'viv city, November 1998. Hlushchenko,, O. Director of School no. 268 in Kyiv. Kyiv city, October 1996. Ivanitsyn,, N. Vice Rector for International Relations and Educational Matters of the State

Universityy of Donets'k. Donets'k city, September 1997. Kamennova,, N. School Inspector of the Department of Education of the Donets'k City

Administration.. Dontes'k city, September 1997 and October 1998. Khmarsky,, V. Vice Dean of the Faculty of History of the State University of Odesa.

OdesaCity,, October 1997. Khobsei,, P. Head of the Department of Education of the L'viv City Administration. L'viv

City,, April 1996.

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Kliuchkovs'kyi,, Y. Head of the Department of Education of the L'viv Oblast Administration.. L'viv city, April and November 1997.

Kozyts'kyi,, S. Head of the Department of Education of the Odesa City Administration. Odesaa City, October 1997.

Kornilov,, D. Journalist for the newspaper Donetskii Kriazh. Donets'k city, October 1998. Koval,, I. N. Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the State University of Odesa.

Odesaa city, October 1997. Lusan,, A. V. Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of Russian Societies.

Kyivv city, November 1997. Maskaleva,, M. School Inspector at the Department of Education of the Odesa City

Administration.. Odesa city, October 1997. Matveeva,, T. Director of Private School "Evrika" in L'viv . L'viv city, November 1998. Matveev,, S. Head of the Department of Sociology and Political Sciences of the Odesa

Economicc Institute. Odesa city, October 1997. Nesterchuk,, M. First Secretary of the All-Ukrainian "Prosvita" Organization. Kyiv city,

Septemberr 1998. Ovchinikova,, V. Director of Private School "Sovremennik" in Donets'k. Donets'k city,

Octoberr 1998. Perun,, O. Director of School no. 8. L'viv city, November 1997. Provozin,, V. Chairman of the Pushkin Society of L'viv . L'viv city, November 1997. Rachkovs'ka,, L. Specialist at the Department of Education of the L'viv City

Administration.. L'viv city, April and November 1997 and November 1998. Rybakov,, O. Y. Vice Chairman of the Donets'k Oblast Council and deputy of the

Socialistt Party. Donets'k city, September 1997. Shurov,, K. V. Chairman of the Russkaia Obschina Kieva, one of the Russian cultural

associations.. Kyiv city, November 1997. Slichna,, H. School Inspector at the Department of Education of the L'viv City

Administration.. L'viv city, November 1998. Spivakovs'kyi,, V. Director of the Private Lyceum "Grand" in Kyiv. Kyiv city, September

1998. . Tchaikovs'ka,, N. Specialist at the Department of Education of the Kiev City

Administration.. Kyiv city, September 1996 and September 1998. Vicee Rector for Educational Matters of the State University of Odesa. Odesa city, October

1997. . Vicee Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnical University of Odesa. Odesa city,

Octoberr 1997. Victorivna,, V. World Literature Teacher in School no. 9. L'viv city, November 1997. Yakovleva,, T. Head of the Program-Methodical Department of the Ministry of Education

off the Crimea. Simferopol, November 1997 Yakupov,, M. Chairman of the Odesa Branch of the KDP (Constitutional Democratic

Party).. Odesa city, October 1997. Zhomiak,, T. First Vice Rector of the Donets'k Institute of Economics and Company Law.

Donets'kk city, October 1998. Zubryts'ka,, S. Director of School no. 11. L'viv city, November 1997.

200 0

SAMENVATTIN G G

Sindss de opkomst van het nationalisme als dominante staatsideologie in de 19e eeuw streeftt elke staat in meer of mindere mate naar interne culturele homogenisering en externee culturele differentiëring van haar bevolking om het gewenste eindproduct te bereiken,, de natie, die iedere staat ziet als de basis voor legitiem gezag. Maar er zijn grote verschillenn tussen de staten in de manieren waarop zij deze homogenisering (of natievorming)) gestalte geven. Sommige staten voeren de natievorming niet ver door en staann de ontwikkeling en institutionalisering van talen en religies van minderheidsgroepenn toe. Andere staten proberen culturele diversiteit binnen hun grenzen tee elimineren, hetzij door gedwongen assimilatie van groepen die een andere taal spreken off religie aanhangen dan die van de meerderheid, hetzij door de verbanning of—in het ergstee geval—fysieke uitroeiing van deze groepen. Op hun beurt kunnen nationale minderhedenn op verschillende manieren reageren op natievorming. In culture zin kunnen zijj ofwel volledig opgaan in de dominante groep waarbij zij hun taal en identiteit verliezenn (het ene extreem) ofwel krampachtig vasthouden aan de eigen culturele wortels enn identiteit (het andere extreem).

Dezee studie analyseert de politiek van natievorming in de Oekraïne en de culturele reactiee van de twee grootste minderheidsgroepen, de etnische Russen en de Russischtaligee Oekraïners. De Oekraïne als prille onafhankelijke staat is een interessante casee omdat de twee grootste minderheden niet alleen absoluut maar ook relatief van groot demografischh gewicht zijn (volgens recent opinieonderzoek prefereert iets meer dan de helftt van de bevolking het Russisch boven het Oekraïens). Deze Russischtaligen wonen bovendienn geconcentreerd in het oosten en zuiden van het land wat de kans op de ontwikkelingg van een eigen culturele of regionale identiteit vergroot. Nog een obstakel voorr de architecten van de Oekraïense natievorming vormt het statusverschil tussen de Oekraïenss en Russisch, ontstaan door de eeuwenlange overheersing van de Oekraïne door tsaristischh Rusland (en later de Sovjet Unie). Het Oekraïens heeft zich nooit kunnen ontdoenn van zijn stigma als boerendialect van het Russisch.

Dee nadruk is komen te liggen op een analyse van het onderwijs. Voor de staat is dezee sector bij uitstek het instrument van culturele homogenisering en voor de nationale minderheidd is onderwijs de belangrijkste institutie om de eigen taal en cultuur aan de volgendee generaties door te geven.

Omm de aard van Oekraïnes politiek van natievorming te kunnen voorspellen is gebruikk gemaakt van de theorieën van Lijphart en Hennayake. Lijphart heeft een aantal gunstigee voorwaarden opgesomd voor het ontstaan van consociational democracy, een manierr van omgaan met culturele pluriformiteit door de centrale overheid die als liberaal off tegemoetkomend kan worden opgevat. Na de Oekraïne aan de voorwaarden van Lijphartss model te hebben getoetst is de verwachting uitgesproken dat de machthebbers in Kyï'vv waarschijnlijk niet tot een politiek van consociationalism zullen overgaan. Hennayakee heeft een aantal factoren geformuleerd die juist tot een strategie van uitsluitingg of ontkenning van etnische heterogeniteit zouden moeten leiden, het tegenovergesteldee van consociationalism. De beoordeling van de Oekraïne aan de criteria vann Hennayake levert een onduidelijk beeld op: het valt niet te voorspellen wat voor strategiee de centrale staat zal volgen ten aanzien van etnische minderheden. Het feit dat

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dee Oekraïne niet voldoet aan de criteria van Lijphart en evenmin aan die van Hennayake maaktt haar tot een ambigue case en daarom tot een interessant studieobject.

Omm inzicht te krijgen in de culturele reactie van de Russen en Russischtalige Oekraïnerss zijn vier variabelen geïntroduceerd die gedacht worden van invloed te zijn op dezee reactie:

1.. Etnische proportie. Men mag aannemen dat hoe groter de groep van Russen en Russischtaligee Oekraïners is in verhouding tot andere groepen in een bepaald gebied, hoee sterker zij zullen vasthouden aan de eigen taal en identiteit.

2.2. Etnische afstand. Het valt te verwachten dat hoe kleiner de culturele verschillen zijn tussenn Russischtaligen (Russen en Russischtalige Oekraïners) en Oekraïenstaligen, hoee meer de eerstgenoemden geneigd zullen zijn te assimileren.

3.. Gemengde huwelijken. Men kan veronderstellen dat Russen in gemengde huwelijken eenn grotere bereidheid tot assimilatie vertonen dan Russen in zuiver Russische paren.

4.. Nationaal en lokaal beleid. De opportunity interpretatie van deze variabele stelt dat hoee restrictiever het lokale beleid is ten aanzien van het gebruik van het Russisch in hethet openbare leven, hoe meer Russischtaligen geneigd zullen zijn te assimileren. De grievancegrievance lezing van deze variabele beweert het omgekeerde: hoe restrictiever lokaal beleid,, hoe sterker Russischtaligen zich zullen vastklampen aan de eigen taal en cultuur. .

Hoofdstukkenn drie en vier analyseren het onderwijsbeleid van voor en na Oekraïnes onafhankelijkheid.. Afgezien van de liberale jaren twintig waarin het gebruik van minderheidstalenn voor officiële doeleinden werd gestimuleerd, hebben de communistischee machthebbers stelselmatig geprobeerd het onderwijsstelsel in de Oekraïnee te russificeren. Dit heeft ertoe geleid dat in 1989, aan de vooravond van Glasnost,, nog slechts 47.5% van de scholieren les kreeg in het Oekraïens. In het hoger onderwijss was het Oekraïens als voertaal reeds teruggedreven naar de non-exacte disciplines,, die over het algemeen niet in hoog aanzien stonden.

Hett keerpunt was de intrede van Glasnost in de herfst van 1989. Het communistischh regime in de Oekraïne zag zich gedwongen toe te geven aan de eisen van dee nationaal-democratische oppositie, die geïnspireerd door de brede nationalistische volksbewegingenn in de Baltische republieken steeds meer aan kracht won. De belichamingg hiervan was de taalwet van 1989 die het Oekraïens en enkel deze taal als staatstaall uitriep. Haar bepalingen voorzagen in een herinvoering van het Oekraïens in allee sectoren van het openbare leven ten koste van het Russisch. Op het gebied van onderwijss werd onder meer afgekondigd dat instituten van hoger onderwijs tien jaren de tijdd kregen om volledig op het Oekraïens over te schakelen en dat aankomende studenten eenn toelatingsexamen Oekraïense taal en literatuur moesten afleggen. Na onafhankelijkheidd werd de taalpolitiek verder aangescherpt. In 1992 beval het Ministerie vann Onderwijs de lagere overheden om met ingang van het schooljaar 1993-94 de nieuwe lichtingg eerstejaars leerlingen zodanig over Oekraïense en Russische scholen te verdelen datt deze lichting in optimale overeenstemming zou zijn met de samenstelling van de lokalee bevolking naar nationaliteit. Aangezien in de meeste oblasten (provincies) het percentagee Oekraïens onderwezen leerlingen ver achterbleef bij het aandeel van

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Oekraïnerss in de bevolking (vooral in het zuiden en het oosten), zou een geslaagde uitvoeringg van deze maatregel een ingrijpende oekraïnisering van het schoolsysteem betekenen.. In 1993 werd Russische taal en literatuur als verplicht vak voor Oekraïense scholenn afgeschaft. Deze maatregel stond in lijnrechte tegenspraak met een bepaling in de taalwett die stelde dat zowel Oekraïense als Russische taal en literatuur verplichte vakken warenn voor alle scholen. Naast deze besluiten kondigde het Ministerie van Onderwijs nog anderee maatregelen af die ofwel het gebruik van het Oekraïens nog meer bevorderden ofwell de rol van het Russisch verder beperkten.

Niett alleen op het gebied van taalregulering maar ook op het punt van de inhoud vann onderwijs liet de centrale overheid na de onafhankelijkheid weinig ruimte over aan nationalee minderheden om een stempel op het schoolonderwijs te drukken. Ondanks mooiee beloften van democratisering en autonomie voor lagere overheden, scholen en ouderss bleef het gecentraliseerde systeem van de Sovjet periode intact. Zoals voorheen schreeff het ministerie scholen de curricula, programmaas en schoolboeken voor, waarbij well gezegd moet worden dat leraren vanaf de onafhankelijkheid vrij werden gelaten in de keuzee van additionele leermiddelen. Ook werd het aantal uren waar de school en/of de individuelee leerling vrijelijk over konden beslissen substantieel uitgebreid. Opmerkelijk genoegg leerde een rondgang langs particuliere scholen mij dat de strenge richtlijnen ten aanzienn van de inhoud van onderwijs ook voor privé onderwijs golden.

Dee uniforme gecentraliseerde pedagogische praktijk komt de staat goed van pas bijj het onderwijs in geschiedenis van de Oekraïne, Oekraïense literatuur en geografie van dee Oekraïne, schoolvakken die zich bij uitstek lenen voor natievorming. In de nieuwe versiee van de geschiedenis, die de centrale machthebbers tot in de verste uithoeken van de Oekraïnee propageren, worden kosten noch moeite gespaard om de Oekraïners als een apartt volk af te schilderen met een eeuwenlange wens tot het stichten van een eigen staat. Voorall de profilering ten opzichte van Rusland en de Sovjet Unie is belangrijk. Er wordt bijvoorbeeldd gesteld dat het vroegmiddeleeuwse rijk van Kyïv Rus' een voorloper is van dee huidige onafhankelijke Oekraïense staat en niet van het in de late middeleeuwen opgekomenn tsaristisch Rusland. Tevens wordt beweerd dat er weinig animo was onder de Oekraïnerss voor de Bolsjewistische Revolutie en dat de nationalistische beweging in de roerigee jaren na 1917 op veel meer steun kon rekenen. Tenslotte valt in de nieuwe versie opp dat de door Stepan Bandera geleide tak van de Oekraïense nationalistische guerrilla, diee niet collaboreerde met de Duitsers in de Tweede Wereldoorlog en zowel tegen het Rodee Leger als tegen de Duitsers vocht, volledig gerehabiliteerd wordt. Het nieuwe geschiedenisboekk voor klas 10 presenteert Bandera als een echte Oekraïense vrijheidsstrijderr wiens organisatie democratische waarden en de gelijkheid van alle nationaliteitenn hoog in het vaandel had staan. Opmerkelijk is verder dat de participatie vann vele Oekraïners in het Rode Leger helemaal verzwegen wordt. Met dit alles bakent de nieuwee lezing zich scherp af van de oude communistische interpretatie van de geschiedeniss waarin het idee wordt gepredikt dat het Oekraïense volk altijd heeft gestreefdd (en zal streven) naar vereniging met het broederlijke Russische volk in één groott socialistisch vaderland.

Vergelekenn met scholen hebben instellingen van hoger onderwijs beduidend meer autonomiee gekregen na onafhankelijkheid. Alhoewel het Ministerie van Onderwijs hen verplichttee om een aantal humanitaire disciplines te onderwijzen (waaronder Oekraïense

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taal,, literatuur en geschiedenis), die in de plaats kwamen van vakken doordrenkt met communistischee ideologie, werd het instellingen van hoger onderwijs toegestaan om eigenn curricula, programmaas en leermiddelen voor deze disciplines te ontwikkelen en gebruiken. .

Ondankss het restrictieve beleid op het gebied van onderwijs zowel wat betreft taaireguleringg als de inhoudelijke kant kan Oekraïnes behandeling van haar minderheden omschrevenn worden als redelijk tolerant en tegemoetkomend. Russen en andere minderhedenn hebben immers gelijke burgerrechten gekregen, zijn niet het slachtoffer van discriminatiee op de arbeidsmarkt en weten zich verzekerd van een aantal collectieve rechtenn gegarandeerd door de Wet op de Nationale Minderheden. Er kan gesteld worden datt het zwak ontwikkelde nationale bewustzijn van veel Oekraïners een rol heeft gespeeld bijj de totstandkoming van dit liberale minderhedenbeleid. Door het oppervlakkige nationalee gevoel konden nationalistische politieke krachten niet voldoende steun mobiliserenn om de politieke agenda te domineren en dus om meer beperkende wetgeving tee introduceren. Oekraïnes keuze voor een tamelijk tolerant beleid is verrassend omdat hethet op basis van Lijpharts model onwaarschijnlijk leek dat consociational democracy als speciaall type liberaal minderhedenbeleid van de grond zou komen in het huidige Oekraïne.. Mogelijkerwijs heeft Lijpharts model alleen voorspellende waarde voor consociationalconsociational democracy zelf en niet voor tolerante minderhedenpolitiek in het algemeen. .

Maatregelenn afkondigen is snel gedaan maar ze uitvoeren is een ander verhaal. Hoofdstukk vijf bestudeert de uitvoering van taalregulering in het onderwijs in postsovjet Oekraïne.. Statistieken van Ministerie van Onderwijs laten zien dat de Oekraïniseringspolitiekk vanaf 1989 geleidelijk aan het aandeel Russisch-onderwezen leerlingenn heeft teruggedrongen. Toch bleef in 1997-98 het percentage Oekraïens-onderwezenn leerlingen nog steeds tien procentpunten achter bij het aandeel van Oekraïnerss in de landelijke bevolking (72%). Binnen de Oekraïne traden grote regionale verschillenn op. Terwijl het percentage Oekraïens-onderwezen leerlingen in de oblasten vann het westen en in de meeste oblasten van centrum overeenkwam met het aandeel van Oekraïnerss in de lokale bevolking of dat zelfs oversteeg, liep dat percentage in de oblastenn van het zuiden en oosten ver achter op het aandeel Oekraïners in de bevolking.

Statistiekenn over de taal van onderwijs in instellingen van hoger onderwijs (ook well vuzy genoemd) laten zien dat vuzy bij lange na niet konden voldoen aan de bepaling vann de taalwet die hen verplichtte om binnen tien jaren volledig op het Oekraïens over te schakelen.. Hetzelfde regionale patroon tekende zich af als in de scholen: in de westelijke oblastenn kregen bijna alle studenten les in het Oekraïens, maar in de oostelijke en zuidelijkee oblasten werden slechts kleine minderheden halverwege de jaren negentig in hett Oekraïens onderwezen.

Al ss redenen voor de onvolledige uitvoering van de taalpolitiek kunnen worden genoemd: :

1.. Het autonome gedrag van lokale overheden (vooral in steden met gekozen burgemeesters) )

2.. De afwezigheid van een rechtstaat waarbij de wet het richtsnoer van handelen vormt.

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3.. Het tekort aan Oekraïenstalige leermiddelen en het gebrek aan leraren die in het Oekraïenss les kunnen geven.

4.. Het schoolkeuzegedrag van ouders (in dit verband dient opgemerkt te worden dat de taalwett ouders het recht gaf om de taal van onderwijs voor hun kind te kiezen)

5.. Het besef van de rijksoverheid dat een drastische Oekraïnisering van de vuzy ten kostee zou gaan van de kwaliteit van onderwijs.

Dee rol van de lokale overheid wordt onder de loep genomen in hoofdstuk zes. Na de onafhankelijkheidd blijken lagere overheden inderdaad van grote invloed te zijn geweest opp de uitvoering van nationaal beleid. Verschillen tussen steden in gemeentelijk beleid zijnn vooral terug te voeren op de personen die aan het hoofd staan van de onderwijsdiensten.. In de oostelijke stad Donets'k bijvoorbeeld wist de wethouder onderwijs,, die onafgebroken op zijn post zat vanaf de late Sovjet tijd, druk van Kyïv te weerstaann om het lokale school systeem te oekraïniseren. Hierdoor werd in 1997-98 nog steedss maar 10,1% van Donets'ks eerstejaars in het Oekraïens onderwezen, een getal dat sterkk achterblijft bij het aandeel van de Oekraïners in de bevolking van deze stad (39,4%). Inn de zuidelijke havenstad Odesa daarentegen kwam de oekraïni sering in een stroomversnellingg na de benoeming van Serhii Kozyts'kyi, een fanatieke aanhanger van dee nationalistische partij Roech, tot wethouder onderwijs van het Odesa stadsbestuur. In zijnn ambtstermijn sprong het aantal Oekraïense scholen van 16 in 1995-96 naar 51 in 1997-988 op een totaal van 133 scholen. Hieraan gerelateerd nam het percentage Oekraïens-onderwezenn eerstejaars toe van 8% in 1991-92 tot 39% in 1997-98, krap tien procentpuntenn verwijderd van het aandeel Oekraïners in de plaatselijke bevolking. In de westelijkee stad L'viv en de hoofdstad Kyiv hebben de lokale onderwijsdiensten de nationalee taalpolitiek zo enthousiast opgepakt dat zij een situatie hebben gecreëerd waarbijj het percentage Oekraïens-onderwezen eerstejaars leerlingen het aandeel van de Oekraïnerss in de bevolking van de beide steden zelfs oversteeg. In L'viv stond dit percentagee op 93,7% in 1997-98 tegenover een 79,1% Oekraïense aanwezigheid in de bevolking.. In Kyïv waren deze getallen respectievelijk 94% en 75,4%.

Dee plaatselijke onderwijsdiensten gebruikten verschillende strategieën om het schooll systeem te oekraïniseren. In L'viv zijn aanwijzingen gevonden dat de lokale autoriteitenn schooldirecteuren hebben ontslagen die niet toegaven aan druk om Oekraïensee klassen te openen. In Kyïv daarentegen werden veel directeuren van Russischee scholen simpelweg gesommeerd op decreet van de burgemeester om de status vann hun scholen te wijzigen. In Kyïv en Odesa werd het schooldirecteuren bovendien verbodenn om Russische eerstejaarsklassen te openen parallel aan Oekraïense klassen. Als gevolgg hiervan kwamen veel Russische scholen in een overgangsfase terecht waarin zij binnenn tien jaren geheel zouden zijn overgeschakeld op het Oekraïens. In het kort kan gezegdd worden dat de autoriteiten in Donets'k het meest tegemoetkomend waren ten aanzienn van Russischtalig onderwijs. In Kyïv en L'viv was het lokaal beleid duidelijk het meestt restrictief en in Odesa werd het in snel tempo strenger in de tweede helft van de jarenn negentig.

Omm de culturele reactie van de Russischtalige bevolking te kunnen bepalen zijn de leerlingenn van 48 Russische, gemengde en Oekraïense scholen geënquêteerd in vier

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steden.. Deze steden zijn zodanig gekozen dat de verklarende kracht van de bovengenoemdee vier variabelen nagegaan kon worden. De steden zijn:

1.. L'viv (westen) - kleine Russische minderheid; zeer kleine Russischtalige Oekraïense minderheid;; grote Oekraïenstalige meerderheid;

2.. Kyïv (centrum) - middelgrote Russische minderheid; kleine Russischtalige Oekraïensee minderheid; kleine Oekraïenstalige meerderheid;

3.. Odesa (zuiden) - grote Russische minderheid; middelgrote Russischtalige Oekraïense minderheid;; grote Oekraïenstalige minderheid; verschillende kleine andere minderheden; ;

4.. Donets'k (oosten) - kleine Russische meerderheid; middelgrote Russischtalige Oekraïensee minderheid; middelgrote Oekraïenstalige minderheid.

Dee schoolkeuze van de ouders (voor een Russischtalige of Oekraïenstalige school/klas), hethet taalgebruik van ouders tegen de leerling en het taalgebruik van leerling zelf zijn als indicatorenn genomen voor de drie onderscheiden culturele reacties, te weten assimilatie, taaiintegratietaaiintegratie en taaibehoud.

Dee resultaten van de enquête wijzen uit dat de culturele reactie van de Russischtaligenn sterk verschilt van plaats tot plaats. In Donets'k en Odesa kiezen zowel Russenn als Russischtalige Oekraïners op alledrie de indicatoren voor taaibehoud. In Kyïv latenn de beide groepen taaiintegratie zien, wat concreet betekent dat zij hun kinderen wel massaall naar Oekraïenstalig onderwijs zijn gaan sturen maar dat de voertaal thuis tegen hunn kinderen en van hun kinderen zelf ongewijzigd Russisch blijft . In L'viv tenslotte zijn sterkee verschillen gevonden binnen de Russischtalige gemeenschap. Terwijl de Russen in puurr Russische paren taaibehoud demonstreren, kiezen de Russen in gemengde paren voorr assimilatie. De Russischtalige Oekraïners vertonen taaiintegratie als reactie.

Alss dit patroon van culturele reacties gerelateerd wordt aan de variabelen valt op datdat etnische proportie veel van de variatie kan verklaren: over het algemeen geldt dat hoe kleinerr het aandeel Russischtaligen in de bevolking is hoe meer deze bevolkingsgroep geneigdd is voor assimilatie te kiezen. Het antwoord van de Russischtaligen is ook gerelateerdd aan de aard van het lokale beleid. Naarmate het beleid verschuift van beperkendd (L'viv en Kyïv) naar tegemoetkomend (Donets'k) verschuift het antwoord van assimilatiee naar taaibehoud. De richting van het verband ondersteunt de opportunity lezingg van het effect van beleid, die stelt dat nationale minderheden zich in toenemende matee zullen schikken in het bewind van de meerderheid naarmate de staat de mogelijkhedenn voor deze groepen om zich cultureel te manifesteren verder begrenst. Helaass stelde de keuze voor deze vier steden ons niet in staat om te bepalen welke van de tweee variabelen de meeste verklaringskracht zou hebben omdat de variatie op de ene gelijkk opging met die op de andere over de vier steden van onderzoek.

Gemengdee huwelijken is eveneens een belangrijke verklarende variabele: de reactiee van gemengde ouderparen ging in alle vier steden meer richting assimilatie dan diee van puur Russische ouderparen. Er blijkt een gecombineerd effect op te treden van gemengdee huwelijken met etnische proportie aangezien het verschil tussen de reactie van gemengdee ouderparen en die van Russische ouderparen opliep naarmate het aandeel van dee Russen in de lokale bevolking kleiner werd.

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Dee Russische ouderparen in L'viv laten een reactie zien—taaibehoud—die niet is voorzienn door de etnische proportie en lokaal beleid hypothesen. Op het eerste gezicht lijk tt de culturele afstand hypothese, die de keuze voor taaibehoud door een minderheid verklaartt uit grote(re) culturele verschillen met de meerderheid, opgeld te doen. Het is tenslottee van de vier steden alleen in L'viv dat de Oekraïners verschillen van de Russen in religiee (de lokale Oekraïners zijn er Grieks Katholiek, de Russen Orthodox) en historischee achtergrond (het westen van de Oekraïne heeft Polen en Oostenrijk-Hongarije toebehoord).. Maar in deze context van aanzienlijke culturele verschillen zou men niet verwachtenn dat de Russen in gemengde ouderparen assimileerden, noch dat er überhaupt veell gemengde huwelijken zouden zijn tussen Russen en plaatselijke Oekraïners.

Alss alternatieve verklaring voor het gedrag van de Russische ouderparen in L'viv iss de angst voor cultureel uitsterven voorgesteld. Het is denkbaar dat dominantie van het Oekraïenss in L'viv (in de andere drie steden is Russisch de dominante taal) bij de lokale Russischee gemeenschap de bezorgdheid heeft gewekt dat haar nakomelingen hun Russischee culturele wortels zouden verliezen als zij onderwijs zouden volgen op Oekraïensee scholen. Een vervolgonderzoek onder Russische ouderparen bevestigde dit vermoeden:: in L'viv liet men zich vooral leiden door culturele motieven in de schoolkeuze,, terwijl in de andere drie steden materiële overwegingen de doorslag gaven.

Eenn en ander leidt tot de interessante conclusie dat de richting van het verband vann etnische proportie met culturele reactie wellicht maar tot een bepaalde waarde op de eerstgenoemdee variabele standhoudt. Na deze waarde, d.w.z. in een context waarin de minderheidd getalsmatig zo zwak staat dat haar taal en identiteit met uitsterven bedreigd worden,, desintegreert de minderheid in een deel dat assimileert (de Russen in gemengde ouderparenn in L'viv) , een deel dat kiest voor taaiintegratie (de Russischtalige Oekraïners inn L'viv) en een deel dat krampachtig vasthoudt aan taal en culturele tradities (de Russen inn Russische ouderparen in L'viv) .

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PE3IOME E

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3anponoHyBaBB 4>aKTopH, aid noBHHHi CTHMyjnoBaTH cipaTeriio BHKJiiOHeHHa a6o 3anepeneHHHH eTHinHoi' pi3HopizmocTi, nporajie»CHy KOHCouiam3My. Oumica yicpaÏHH 3riflHOO 3 KpHTepiaMH XeHHafiHice flajia HeBH3HaneHHH pe3ynbTaT, ocicijibKH HCMOHCJIHBO nepe^öaHHTH,, «Ka cTpaTeria Bi HOCHO emvmux MCHHIHH 6yae BHÖpaHa IJeHTpanbHoio Bjiaaoio.. OaKT TOTO, mo YicpaiHa He BiflnoBmae KpirrepijiM Hi JlefinxapTa, Hi XeHHafiaKee poÖHTb mo Kpamy HeBH3HaHeHHM i TOMy uiicaBHM O6'GKTOM AJW BHBHCHH».

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209 9

yKpaÏHCbKoïï MOBH y Bcix c4>epax cycnijibHoro HCHTTA Bi^noBi^Ho Ha inxo^y pocificbKiH. HanpHKJiaa,, BHHTHM HaBnajibHHM 3aKJiaaaM (BY3aM) juin noBHoro nepexoay Ha BHiüiaaaHHHH yKpaÏHCbKoio MOBOK) 6yB BH3HaHeHHH nepioa B 10 pOKiB. TaKoac, 3ri,zmo i3 3aKOHOM,, aöiTypieHTH noBHHHi 6yjiH 3flaBaTH eK3aMeH 3 yKpaÏHCbKoï MOBH Ta jiiTepaTypHH npn BCTyni y B Y 3 H . üicjia nporojiouieHH« He3ajie»CHOCTi MOBHa nojiiTHKa Haa YKpaiHi CTana öijibin acopcTKoio.

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210 0

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MOBoio,, jiiTepaTypoio, icTopieio), HKÏ 3aMiHHjiH HHCJIO npe^MeiiB, HacHneHHX KOMyHicTHHHOK)) meojiorieio, B Y 3 H Moacyrb caMocriÖHO BH3HanaTH npe^MeT BHBHCHHH UHXX ^HcunnjiiH (IHJMXOM cTBOpeHHa BJiacHHx nporpaM i ^H^aKTHHHHX MaTepiajiiB). BpaxoByioHHH Te, mo ne 6yjio He^onycTHMHM B pa^aHCbKOMy MHHyjioMy, MoxcHa CKa3aTH,, mo He3ajie»cHicTb npHHecjia 3HaHHi 3MiHH njw BY3ÏB.

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rapaHTOBaHii piBHi cycnijibHi npaBa. BOHH He Bi^nyjiH CHcreMaTHHHHX BHKJUOHeHb 3 aepacaBHoroo i npHBaraoro ceicropiB, TaKoac 3axoHOM npo HanjoHajmi MCHIUHHH ÏM 6yB rapaHTOBaHHHH paa KOJICKTHBHHX npaB. IlpHHHflTni TaKoï jiiöeparibHoï noniTHKH no Bi^HomeHHioo no HanjoHanHHx MCHLUHH B 3HaHHin Mipi BH3HaHanocb aMop$HHM HanioHajibHHMM caMoycBiaoMjieHHAM 6aran>ox yxpaiHitiB.

Hepe33 noBepxHeBi HanjoHanbHi HacTpoï, HanioHanicTHHHi CHJIH He 3MorjiH 3HafiTHH onopy, Heo6xi,zmy ÏM win flOMmyBaHHJi y nojiiTHHHOMy xcHTri i BCTaHOBJieHH» öijibii ii oÖMOicyioHoro 3aKOHO,aaBCTBa. BpaxoByiOHH BHme3raaaHy rinoTe3y e MaJIOHMOBÏpHH MM (|>aKT BHÖOpy YKpaÏHOK ) KOHCOUiaJIbHO Ï fleMOKpariï, SIK nOJliTHHHO Ï

MipH,, «Ka Moace BBaacaTHca OCOÖJIHBHM BH^OM noMipHOÏ CTpaTeriï. MOHUIHBO, mo Moaejibb KOHCOLtiani3My JlefinxapTa Mac noacmoBajibHy uiHHicTb JiHine juw m>oro ocoöJiHBoroo BH^y noMipHoï nojiiTHKH, ane He una. jiiöepanbHoï nojiiraKH B3arani.

riporojiouieHHaa 3axoaiB - ue o,zme, a ïx 3^ificHeHH« - 30BciM iHine. I I 'STHH po3fliJii aHani3ye iMnjieMeHTanjio MOBHOÏ nojiiTHKH B ocBiTHiii ceicrop nocTpaoJiHCbKoï YKpaÏHH.. CTaTHCTHKa MimcTepcTBa OCBÏTH noKa3ye, mo noHHHaiOHH 3 1989 p. nojiitHKa yKpaÏHi3aiiiïï craöijibHO 3MeHinye KijibKicT b ynmB, mo HaBHaiOTbCfl B pocincbKHX mKOJiax.. Ane, 3iï,mio 3 aamiMH Ha 1997-98 HaBHajibHHH piK, BUÏCOTOK ynHÏB, mo HaBHaiOTbcaa yKpaÏHCbKoio MOBOK) Bce me Ha 10% MeHine, B nponopnioHajibHOMy BiflHOiueHHi,, BiacoTKa yKpaÏHuiB B HacejieHHi (72%). Ycnix npouecy yKpaïHi3auiï noKa3üBB perioHanbHy pi3HHino B Meacax YKpaÏHH. B TOH nac AK B 3axi^HHX i B öijibmocTi ueHTpanbHHXX oöJiacTefi B^COTOK yHHiB, mo HaBHaioTbca B yKpaÏHCbKHx mKOJiax, Ha6jiH3HBC«« a6o flocar KijibKOCTi yKpaÏHuiB B HaceneHHi, B cxi^HHX i niB^eHHHx oÖJiacTaxx BiH Bee me "fi^ e no cjimy" yKpa'ÏHCbKoro cerMeHTy.

J\a.niJ\a.ni npo MOBy BHKnaaaHHH y BY3ax noKaiyioTb, mo B Y 3 H He MO»yrb BHKOHaTHH 3aKOH npo MOBy, »KHH BHMarae noBHoro nepexo y AO Kmna 1990-HX poxiB Ha yKpaÏHOMOBHee BHKjiaaaHH«. AHanorinHa CHTyauin cnocTepiraeTbca i B mKOJiax: npHÖJiH3HOO Bei yHHi 3axmHHX oÖJiacTefl OTpHMajra ocBiiy yKpaÏHCbKOK) MOBOK) i rijibKH Manaa nacTHHa yHHiB HaBHajiaca yKpaÏHCbKoio B cxi^HHX i niB^eHHHx oójiacrax. Jljisi

211 1

nacKOBoi'' iMiuieMeHTaiïiï ueHTpajibHoï MOBHOÏ nojiiraKH UK &TOÏ UIKIJI TaK i AJIA BY3iB

MO»cyTbb 6>TH npHHHHTi ao yBarH HacTynHi npHHHHH:

1.. ABTOHOMHa noBeaiHKa MicueBoï BJia H (OCOÖJÏHBO B MicTax ne BHÖHpaioTbca MeHpH). .

2.. BiacynricTb Tpa^auifi BHKOHaHH» 3aKOHiB. 3.. HecTana yKpa'ÏHOMOBHHx HaBHajibHHx MaTepiajiiB Ta BHRJiaaaniB, RKÏ Moxcyrb

npOBOflHTHH ypOKH yKpaÏHCbKOK) MOBOIO 4.. BH6ip iiiKOJiH 6aTbKaMH (noTpiÖHo Bi 3HaHHTH, mo 3aicoH npo MOBy rapaHTye

öaTbKaMM npaBO BHÖopy MOBH, HKOIO öyae HaBHarHC» ÏXHH ziHTHHa). 5.. YcBi^oMJieHHa ueHTpajibHoio BJianoio TOTO, mo panHKaribHa yKpaÏHi3auifl BHIUOÏ

OCBiTHH n p H B e ^ e flO 3HaHHOr O 3HHHCeHHf l HKOCTÈ BHKJiaaaHHH .

Pontt MicueBHX BizmLiiB ocBira po3nM,naeTbCfl y inocTOMy po3flijii . Ilicj w OTpHMaHHfl He3ajie»cH0CTi,, MicueBi BUUÜJIH HapoaHoï OCBÏTH oTpHMajiH öijibinnö BmiHB Ha ueHTpajibHyy nojiiTHKy. BioMiHHOcri B MicueBifi noniTHui oKpeMHx Mier öyjiH, B ocHOBHOMy,, pe3yjibTaTOM piineHb KOHKpeTHHx noca^OBHx oci6, BwnoBi^anbHHx 3a poöoTyy BizmijiiB OCBITH. TaK, y floHenucy, Ka^pH, mo 3ajiHuiHJiHca 3 paAXHCbKHX qaciB ycniuiHOO nporacTOHTb racicy 3 6oKy KneBa no BÜmouieHHio ao yKpaÏHi3auiï CHCTCMH MiciieBHxx uiKiji . Pe3ynbTaT0M 6yjio Te, mo Ha 1997-98 HaBH. pp. jiHine 10,2% nepiuoKJiacHHKiBB JJoHeiïbKa HaBnajiHC» yKpaÏHCbKOK) MOBOIO, Ha npoTHBary 39,4% yKpaÏHiiiB ,, mo npoacHBaioTb y MICTI. Y Oaeci npH3HaneHHa Cepria Ko3HHbKoro, aKTHBHoroo HJieHa PYXy, HanajibHHKOM ynpaBJiiHH» OCBITH OaecbKoï MICBKOI a^MÏHicTpaiïiï,, 03Hanajio CHjibHy XBHJHO yKpaÏHi3au.iï. ïliji nac fioro ynpaBJiiHH», npH 3arajibHÏHH KiübKOCTi 133 UIKOJIH, KinbKicTb yxpamcbKHX UIKIJI pi3K0 36ijibUiHJiaca 3 16 B 1995-966 pp. ji o 51 B 1997-98 pp. BizmoBiflHO 3pic i BI^COTOK THX, mo HaBHaiOTbca yKpaÏHCbKOK)) MOBOIO, 3 8% B 1991-92 pp. ,zjo 39% B 1997-98 pp., mo JiHine Ha 10% MeHuiee Bia 3arajibHoï KiJibKOCTi yKpanmiB y HacejieHHi MicTa. Y JIbBOBi i KneBi, .HBOX iHiiiH xx MicTax uboro flocjiiflaceHHS, MiciieBi OCBITHI ycTaHOBH HacTijibKH CTapaHHo peajii30ByBajiHH nojiiraKy HauioHajibHOÏ MOBH, mo 3M1HHJIH BiacoTKOBe cniBBiflHOiiieHHf l nepmoKJiacHHKis,, mo HaBHaioTbCH yKpaÏHCbKOK» MOBOIO, TaK, mo BOHO nepeBHcejio KijibKicT bb yKpaÏHCbKoro HacejieHHH (y JIbBOBi piBeHb 6yB 93,7% y 1997-98 pp. nopiBHHHoo 3 79 ,1% yKpaÏHuiB y HacejieHHi; y KneBi un^pn 6yjiH CXOHCHMH: 94,0% i 75,4%% BuuioBi/mo).

OcBiTHii ycTaHOBH BHKopncTOByBajiH pi3HOMaHJTHi cnocoÖH yKpaÏHi3auiï uiKijibHoïï cHCTeMH. Y JIbBOBi, öyjin 3aMineHi BHna^KH, KOJIH MicueBa BJiaaa 3BijibHJUia ^HpeKTOpi BB UIKIJI , HK i He 3MHpHJIHC H 3 BHMOraM H BÏ^KpHT H yKpaÏHCbK i KJiaCH , 1 3aMlHHJi a

ïxx Ha 6ijibm "nizmaTJiHBHx". IHHIOIO CHTyauia 6yjia y KneBi, ^e ^HKpeTOM Mepa npHMyCHJiHH öiiibmicTb flHpeKTOpiB pocincbKnx uiKij i 3MiHHTH ïxHiö CTaiyc B KneBi i O,oecii (aJie He y JIbBOBi!) jijipeKTopaM niKij i 6yjio HaKa3aHO He BizycpnBaTH pocificbKi KjiacHH napanejibHo 3 yKpaÏHCbKHMH. BimioBÜmo, 6ijibmicTb KOJiamHix pocificbKHx mKiji npOTaroMM aecara poKiB CTaHyTb noBHicno yKpaÏHCbKHMH. A B OHeubicy MicueBa BJiaaa öyjiaa Gijibui TepnHMOio CTOCOBHO pocificbKOMOBHoi' OCBITH. B KneBi i y JIbBOBi MicueBa noitiTHKaa 6yjia Hanöijibiii Hcopcncoio, B Oaeci TK B ocraHHi poKH BOHa CTana 6ijibii i o6Me«yioHoio. .

212 2

UJo66 OUÏHHTH KyjiLTypHy peaKiiiio pocificbKOMOBHoro HaceneHHfl, a onHTaB ynHiBB i3 48 pociöcbKHx, 3MiuiaHHx i yKpai'HCbKHx uiKin B norapbox MicTax. MicTa 6yjiH BHÖpamm Tax, mo6 nam MOHCJiHBicTb BH3HaHHTH noacHiOBajibHy cHjiy norapbox BHmeBKa3aHHXX BapiaimB. LJHMH MicTaMH 6yjiH:

1.. JïbBiB (3axifl) — MajioHHcejibHa pociöcbKa MemiMHa; .nyace MajioHHcejibHa pociöcbKOMOBHaa yxpaiHCbKa MemiiHHa; öaraTOHHcejibHa yxpamcbKa öijibiuicTb;

2.. KHÏ B (ueHTp) — cepe^Hboi' HHcejibHOCTi pociöcbKa MeHuiHHa; MajioHHcejibHa pociöcbKOMOBHaa yxpaiHCbKa MemiiHHa; MajioHHcejibHa yKpaÏHCbKOMOBHa öijibuiicTb;

3.. Oaeca (niBfleHb) — 6araTOHHcejibHa pociöcbKa MemiiHHa; cepczmboï HHcejibHOCTi pociöcbKOMOBHaa yKpaïHCbKa MeHuiHHa; öaraTOHHcenbHa yKpaÏHOMOBHa MeHuiHHa; ^eKÏJIbK aa ÏHIDH X MaJIH X MeHUIHH ;

4.. JJpHeubK (cxifl ) — MajioHHcejibHa pociöcbKa öijibuiicTb, cepczmbo'iMHcejibHocri pociöcbKOMOBHaa yKpaïHCbKa MeHuiHHa; cepezmbOÏHHcejibHOCTi yKpaïHCbKa

MeHIHHHa. .

IloKa3HHKaMHH Tpbox cnocoöiB KyjibTypHoro pearyBaHH» öyjin: BHÖip 6aTbKaMH UIKOJIH (yKpaïHCbKaa HH pociöcbKa niKOJia/ioiac); MOBa, HKOIO 6aTbKH cnijiKyiOTbca 3 onHTamiMH aiTbMH;; MOBa cnijiKyBaHH», aicy BHKopHCTOByiOTb caMÏ onHTaHi a i™. MHOK> 6yno BH3HaneH00 TpH cnocoón KynbTypHoro pearyBaHHa: acimijmifiR, Moena mmezpaifiR, MoeneMoene 3Óepe3KeHHR.

Pe3ynbTaTHH onHTyBaHHa CBianaTb, mo cnocoön KyjibTypHoro pearyBaHH» MaiOTb «CKpaBOO BHpaaceHi TepHTopiajibHi BioMMHOCTi. B /JpHeubKy i O^eci onHTyBaHHfl pociaH ii pociöcbKOMOBHHx yKpaÏHUJB noKa3aB BapiaHT MOBHOZO 3ÓepejfceHHR 3a BciMa TpbOMa noKa3HHKaMH.. B KHCBI OÓH^BÏ rpynH BHÖpajiH Moeuy wmezpaifiio, ue 03Hanae, mo, BianaioqHH CBOÏX aiTeö B yKpaÏHOMOBHi UIKOJIH, 6aTbKH He nonanH PO3MOBJMTH 3 HHMH

yKpaÏHCbKoioo MOBOK). Y JIbBOBi pÏ3KHÖ noflLn icHye B caMiö pociöcbKOMOBHifi O6IHHHÏ. Poci«HHH y MOHoeTHiHHHx uiJiioöax npo^eMOHCTpyBajiH Moene 3ÓepeoKeHHR. Ti pociflHH, «Kii 3Haxo,0HTbCfl y 3MiinaHHX nmioöax, cxHJibHi JXO acuMijimjiï. PociöcbKOMOBHi yKpaÏHui yy JIbBOBi BHÖpajiH Moeny mmezpaijifo. AKIH O pe3yjibTaTH nboro onmyBaHHa CTOcyiOTbca BHiiie3ra^aHHXX BapiaHTÏB, TO MoacHa 3po6nTH OHeBHjmHÖ BHCHOBOK npo Te, mo errnHHa nponopuiaa Moxe Mara pi3HOMaHiTHe noacHeHHa. PeaKiiia pociöcbKOMOBHoro HacejieHHa npocyBaeTbcaa BBepx no imcajii (BÜI MOBHOZO 3ÓepeofceHHR #o aciwijimfiï), BÜHIOBWHO i3 3MeHineHH5MM öoro nponopuioHajibHoro cniBBi^HouieHHa 3 MicueBHM HacejieHHJiM (BIA 75,7%% y (Q.OHeubKy jjjo 18,6% y JIbBOBi).TaKOHc, cxoace 3 njeio 3aKOHOMipHÏCTio, npnpoaa MiciieBOïï nojiiTHKH flonoMarae 3po3yMiTH npoBcaem onHTyBaHHs. TaK, npH 3Mmi nojiiTHKHH Bifl oÖMeacyiOHOÏ ( KHÏB , JïbBiB) AO noMipHoi' (ZJoHeubK), KyjibTypHa peaKuja npocyHyjiacbb BIR acuMijiRtiiï mo MOBHOZO 36epeotceHH%. HanpaMOK nieï 3ane»CH0CTi niflTBepfl»cyee KOHuenniio "MOHüiHBOCTi" SIK e<J>eKTy noniTHKH, «Ka CBiflHHTb npo Te, mo HaujoHajibHii MCHUIHHH He öyayrb MaTH iHinoro BHxo^y, Hi» «K 3MHPHTHC» 3 npaBHJiaMH,, sad ^Hioye öijibinicTb, THM 6ijibine, mo aepacaBa oÖMeacye MoauiHBOCTi HauioHajibHHXX MeHmHH KyjibTypHO ceöe BHpaacara. Ha»cajib, nepe3 OCOÖJIHBHH Biflöi p MicTT Ta Toro, mo xapaKTep 3MÏHH o^Hiei 3MÏHHOÏ (MicijeBa nojiiTHKa) aHajiorineH xapaKTepyy 3MJHH .zipyroï 3MÏHHOÏ (eTHÏHHa nponopiiiÖHicTb) y Bcix HOTHpbox MicTax

213 3

Hboroo AocjiiflaceHHa, He MOHCJIHBO BH3HaiHTH, «Ka 3 UHX ^BOX 3M1HHHX 6yae nepeBaacaTH yy noacHeHHi xapaKTepy peaKuiï.

3MiinaHii UUIIOÖH — ue ine OOTH BaacjiHBHH noacHioioHHH fyaKTop, OCKIJIBKH,

3riaHOO 3 pe3yjibTaTaMH onHTyBaHb 3MimaHHx ciMefi y Bcix HOTHpbox MicTax, BOHH 6ijiBi nn cxHJibHi RO acuMijiRifiï, mac Ti, mo nepeöyBaiOTb y MOHopociöcbKHx nunoöax. Ha ocHOBii uboro MOJKHa CKa3aTH, mo icHyc KOM6iHOBaHHii e(J>eKT 3MimaHHX nuiioöiB y nponopun"" 3 pocifibKHM HacejieHHHM. Pi3HHna U\M peaKuisMH 3MiuiaHHx Ta

MOHOpOciÖCbKHXX UIJHOÖlB 3pOCTae BiflnOBi^HO 3MeHnieHHK) KijIbKOCTi pOCi»H y MÏCTi.

MoHOpociöcbKii UIJIIOÖH y JïbBOBi noKa3yK)Tb Moeue 36epe3fceHHR, mo, BHXOAJIHH 33 erHiHHOÏ nponopuiï i MOBHOÏ noniTHKH He MOHCHa 6yjio nepeflöaHHTH. Aji e rinoTe3a eTHi^Horoo po3Kony, aKa CTBep^xcye, mo HHM CHJibHime MeHmHHa Bi pi3HHeTbCH KyjibTypHHMHH OCO6JIHBOCTAMH Bifl .noMmyiOHOÏ rpynH, THM CHJibHime BOHa 6y^e HaMaraTHcaa 36eperrH CBOIO MOBy i noacHioe mo flHBHy, Ha nepmnfi norjiaa, noBeaimcy. TaKoac,, Ha BiztMmy BÏR ipbox ÏHHIHX MicT, TijibKH y JlbBOBi yKpaïïmi Bi^pi3H«iOTbca B Ü pociflHH BipocnoBwaHHHM (MicueBi yicpaÏHiij - rpeKOKaTOJiHKH, a pociflHH - npaBocnaBHi) i

iCTOpHHHHMM MHHyjIHM (flO 1939 p. 3axiflHHH perblOH YKpaÏHH 6yB *iaCTHHOK> ABCTpO-

yropcbKOÏÏ iMnepiï i üojibmi). CXzmaK, y ubOMy KOHTCKCTI KyjibTypHOÏ flH^epeHuiauiï He OHiicyBajiocfll Hi, mo pociflHH 6y,oyn> acHMimoBaTHCfl y 3MiuiaHHX uiJiioóax, Hi öaraTOHHcejibHHXX npHKJiafliB nijnoöiB MDK pockHaMH i 3axi^HHMH yKpaÏHUHMH.

AribTepHaTHBHHMM noacHeHHJiM Hecno^iBaHHx pe3yjibTaTiB onHiyBaHHa pocificbKHxx öaTbKiB y JlbBOBi MH BBaacaeMO 3arpo3y KyjibTypHoro 3HHKHeHH«. CynepeHJiHBHMM e Te, mo HeöaacaHHH IIHX pociflH 3anHcyBaTH CBOÏX arren B ynpamcbKi KJiaCHH (HH P03MOBJIHTH 3 HHMH yKpaÏHCbKOK) MOBOK)) npO£HKTOBaHe CTpaXOM TOTO, mo B

noBHÏCTK)) yKpaÏHOMOBHOMy cepeAOBHmi JIbBOBa yicpaÏHCbKa ocBÏTa noBnjiHBae Ha BHÖip .ZÜTbMHH MOBH flJTJI OCOÖHCTOTO CniüKyBaHHfl ï 3MyCHTb ÏX BTpaTHTH CBOG pOClHCbKe

KopiHHfl.. B iHHiHx Tpbox MicTax HaBnaKH: poci»HH He CTypöoBaHi THM, mo yKpaÏHOMOBHaa ocBiTa noBnjiHBae Ha yicpamisauiio ïxHix arren. He noacHioeTbca nepeBajKaHHHMM pocificbKOMOBHoro cepeaoBHina cnijiKyBaHHH y UHX MicTax. HeBejiHKe ^o^aTKOBee onHTyBaHHH pociftcbKHx 6aTbKiB CTBep^HJio 3ra^aHHH 3jxoraff,: y JlbBOBi, npn BHÖOpii IHKOJIH, BOHH, B OCHOBHOMy, M0THByK)TbC5I ÖaHCaHHflM 36epeiTH CBOÏ MOBy i

KyjibTypy,, B TOH nac, HK pocificbKi GaTbKH y KneBi i Oaeci MaiOTb 6ijibm npaKTHHHy apryMeHTauiioo jsjix TOTO, moö nocHJia™ CBOÏX .zrJTefi B pocificbKi UIKOJIH.

Haa OCHOBÏ BHmecKa3aHoro Moacna 3poÖHTH iiiKaBHH BHCHOBOK: Hanp^MOK 3MÏHH

xapaKTepyy B3a3eM03B'fl3Ky MDK erainHoio nponopnieio i KyjibrypHoio peaKujeio Moace flocHTHyTHflocHTHyTH jiHme BH3HaHeH0ï TOHKH. 3a ïï MeacaMH cepe^OBHrne, AC KijibKicH a CHJia MeHuiocTii CTae TaKoio cjiaÖKOio, mo ïï MOBa i Kyjibiypa CTae nm 3arp030io SHHKHCHHA. B TaKOMyy BHnajiKy BiAÖyBaeTbca npouec fle3iHTerpauiï HaiiioHajibHoï MeHinHHH. O^Hy ïï MacTHHyy oniKye acuMijixifix (pocïsmn y 3MimaHHX uuiioöax y JlbBOBi), B TOH nac «K iHina 3Öepejfce3Öepejfce ceoï Moeni ocoöjiueocmi (pociflHH y MOHoeTHÏHHHx uiJiroöax y JlbBOBi). I Hapenrri,, TpeTa Mo^ce BHÖpaTH BapiaHT MOBHOÏ mmezpaifii (pociiicbKOMOBHi ynpaiHiti y

JlbBOBi). .

214 4

PE3IOME E

HaHHHaaa c XI X CT., Koraa HauHOHanHCTHnecKaa Hfleojioraa öojibuiHHCTBa CTpaH 3ai«uia no3HUHHH ^OMHHaHTHofi, Kaamoe rocyaapcTBO CTpeMHJiocb ocymecTBHTb B npeaejiax CBOHXX rpamm KyjibTypHyio roMoreHH3auHK> HaceneHHa H, B TO ace BpeMH, aoÖHTbca ero KyjibTypHoroo BHeuiHero OTJIHHHX. KoHeHHbiM JKejiaeMbiM pe3yjibTaTOM 3Toro npouecca ^OJiïKHaa öbuia CTaTb "Hau.Ha", KaK caHHCTBeHHbifi HCTOHHHK 3aK0HHofi BJiacTH. O^Haxo, rocy^apcTBaa HMCIOT pa3JiHHHbie B3rjM^M Ha pa3Mepw H rnyÖHHy roMoreHH3auHOHHoii (Hapofloo6pa30BaTejibHOH)) nojiHTHKH. HeKOTopbie H3 HHX (rocyaapcTB) npeanpHHHMaioTT oTHOCHTeJibHO cnaöbie Mepw B OTHOineHHH Hapoaoo6pa30BaHH», npeaocTaBJMaa HaunoHanbHbiM MeHbiinmcTBaM B npeaejiax CBOHX rpaHHu. BOSMOXCHOCTB CBOÖO^HOO pa3BHBan> KyjibTypy H H3biK. HHÜH KapTtma BbipHCOBbiBaerca B apyrax cTpaHax,, He npHeMjnomHX KyjibTypHoro pa3Hoo6pa3Ha cBoero HaceneHHa. 3THHHecKHe rpynnbi,, HMeioiime H3MK, KyjibTypy H MeHTajiHTeT, oTJiHHHbie OT flOMHHHpyiomeH 3THHMecKofii rpynnw, npeTepneBaioT pa3JiHHHoro poaa npHTecHeHH» (HacHJibCTBeHHyio accHMHJMUHio,, H3raaHHe, reHou.Hfl). B CBOIO onepeflb, peaKHHa HaimoHajibHbix MeHbinHHCTBB Ha Hapo,aoo6pa30BaTejibHyio nojiHTHKy TaKHce MoaceT öbrrb pa3Hoo6pa3Hoft.. HaHHHaa OT CBoefi 3KCTpeManbHofi <J)opMbi - nojiHofl accHMHJiauHH flo A3biKaa H KyjibTypbi flOMKHHpyjomeö STHHHCCKOÖ rpynnw (npHH«B Bce xapaicrepHwe ocoöeHOCTHH 3TOH rpynnw) H, 3aKaHHHBaa rjiyöoKoii npHBepaceHHOCTbio cBoeMy KyjibTypHOMyy Hacjicomo H HauHOHanbHbix ocoöeHHOCTefi.

^aHHbiee HCCJieaoBaHH» aHajiH3HpyiOT nojiHTHKy Hapoaoo6pa30BaHHa Ha YicpaHHee H, KaK ee cjie^cTBHe, KyjibTypHyio peaKUHio flByx caMbix MHoroHHCneHHwx MeHbHIHHCTB :: 3THHHeCKHX pyCCKHX H pyCCKOH3bIHHW X yKpaHHI|eB. H aÖCOJHOTHblÖ, H

OTHOCHTejibHbifii noKa3aTenn HHCJICHHOCTH 3THX rpynn nopaxcaioume (onpoc oömecTBeHHoroo MHeHHa noBTopHO noKa3aji, HTO HeMHorHM öojiee nojioBHnw HacejieHna CTpaHbii OT^aëT npezuioHTeHHe pyccKOMy a3biKy). /JaHHwft 4>aKT npeflcraBJiaeT YKpaHHy, KaKK MOJio^oe rocyaapcTBO, HHTepecHbiM oöteKTOM juin HccjieaoBaHHa. KpoMe Toro, HMeeTT MecTO reorpa<|>HHecKaa ,nH(|)(|>epeHUHaHHa: öojibuiHHCTBo JHoaeö, pa3roBapHBaioiHHXX Ha pyccKOM «3biKe - 3THHneCKHe pyccKHe H pyccKoa3WHHwe yKpaHHitbi,, npoHCHBaioT B BOCTOHHOM H K))KHOM peraoHax CTpaHbi. 3 TO yBejiHHHBaeT

BepOflTHOCTbb pa3BHTHH apKO BbipaaceHHbix perHOHaJlbHMX KyjIbTypHblX OCOÖeHHOCTefi.

HeOÖXO^HM OO OTMeTHTb , HTO pyCCKHH H yKpaHHCKH Ö H3MKH HMdOT pa3JIHHHbi e

oömecTBeHHbiee CTaTycbi. TaKaa CHTyauna oöycjioBJieHa MHonwieTHHM aoMHHHpoBaHHeM pyccKoroo napH3Ma (no3Hce COBCTCKOH Haeojionui). /JaHHwfi (J>aKT aBJiaerca eme O^HHM npenflTCTBHeMM ana TBOPUOB HOJIHTHKH Hau.HOHajiH3au.HH Ha YKpaHHe. YicpaHHCKHe

HauHOHajiHCTbii CHHTaioT CJI03KHOH 3a,aaHeH H36aBJieHHe yxpaHHCKoro H3bIKa OT no3opHoroo "KJieöMa" cenbCKoro anajieKTa pyccKoro a3WKa.

,0,aHHoee HayHHoe HccjieaoBaHHe cc|>OKycHpoBaHO Ha CHCTeMe o6pa30BaHHa. Oöpa30BaHHee npeacTaBjiaeT coöoii oflHOBpeMeHHo H Hanöojiee 3HaHHMWH ana rocy^apcTBaa HHcrpyMeHT Hapoaoo6pa30BaHHa, H cpe^CTBO nepeaann HauHOHajibHWMH MeHuiHHCTBaMHH CBoero a3biKa H KyjibTypbi nocjie,ayK>mHM noKOJieHHaM.

JXsmJXsm nporH03a npHpoflw yKpaHHCKofi HOJIHTHKH Hapo^oo6pa30BaHHa MM Hcnojib30BajiHH Mo^ejiH Jlefinxapra H XeHHaöaKe. JlefinxapT npHBOziHT nepeneHb ycjioBHH,, KOTopwe OH CHHTaeT npoBOflHHKOM pa3BHTHa KOHCOHHajibHOH (consociationaf)

215 5

aeMOKparHH,, HTO ABJMeTCH OZIHOH H3 CTpaTernfi npHcnocoöJieHHJi, KOTOpyiO rocy^apcTBoo MoaceT Hcnojib30BaTb no OTHOUICHHIO K STHHHCCKHM rpynnaM.

riocjiee npHÖJinaceHHa YicpaHHbi K ycjioBH«M MoaejiH JleönxapTa, MM ^onycTHJiH, HTOO LJeHTpajibHaa BjiacTb B KHeBe BO3MO>KHO He H36epeT KOHCoimajibHyio «qeMOKpaTHio. XeHHaiuiKee npcztJioHoui <J»aicropbi, KOTOpbie, ^OJIXCHH CTHMyjmpoBaTb CTpaTeraio HCKJIIOHeHH HH HJIH OTpHU.aHHJI 3THHHCCKO H pa3HOpOAHOCTH , npOTHBOnOJIOHCHyi O

KOHcoqHajiH3My.. OueHKa YicpaHHbi corjiacHO KpHTepHHM XeHHaöjnce ^ana HeonpcueJiëHHbiHH pe3yjibTaT, nocKOJibKy HCBO3MO»CHO npe^BH^eTb Kaica» CTpaTerH», OTHOCHTeJIbH OO 3THHHCCKH X MeHbUIHHCTB , Öy^eT BblÖpaHa UjeHTpaJIbHblM H BjiaCTSMH .

OaKTT Toro, HTO YKpaHHa He cooTBeTCTByer KpHTepmiM HH JleönxapTa , HH XeHHaöflice, aenaeTT 3Ty CTpaHy Heonpe^ejiëHHbiM H no3TOMy HHTepecHbiM oöbeicroM fljra H3yneHHa.

.ZJJIHH Toro, HToöbi noHATb npnpofly KyjibTypHoro acneKTa peaienHH pyccKOH3biHHoroo HacejieHiM Ha nojiHTHicy Hapo,aoo6pa30BaHHH Ha YicpanHe, MHOIO öbuio npczmoHceHOO neTbipe B03M0»CHbix BapHaHTa, KOTopwe npezuioJioHCHTenbHO, Hanöojiee BjiHjrrejibHbi : :

1.. SmuunecKcm nponoptjua. OacHflajiocb, HTO neM öonbinee KOJIHHCCTBO pyccKHX H pyccK0H3biHHbixx yxpaHHueB npoacHBaeT Ha onpe^ejiëHHOö TepHTopHH no OTHomeHHK)) K KOJinnecTBy npe^cTaBHTejieii apyrnx 3THHHCKHX rpynn, TeM BepoaTHee,, HTO HMH öyaeT Bbi6paHa crpaTenüi coxpaHeHHe «3biKa.

2.. 3mHwecKuü pacxon. ripcaBHaejiocb, HTO neM öojibine pyccKHe H pyccKOA3biHHbie yKpaHHiibii öynyr oTJiHHaTca c TOHKH 3peHH« KyjibTypHbix ocoöeHHOCTeö OT yKpaHH0«3biHHbixx yKpaHHueB, TeM CHJibHee y HHX 6y,qeT pa3BHTa TeHfleHUHa "uenKoro"" coxpaHeHH» «3biKa.

3.. CjueuiaHHbie ópaiat (aeöcTBHTejibHO TOJibKO nnx pyccKHx). MHOK» oacHflanocb, HTO pyccKHee B CMemaHHbix öpaicax HMCÏOT öojibinyio CKJiOHHOCTb K accHMHJiauHH, HeacejiHH pyccKHe B MOH03THHnecKHx 6paKax.

4.. HaifuoHcuibHOM u MecmnoR nonumuKa. 3TOT BapnaHT npe^nojiaraeT ^Ba cneHapna: "BO3MO»CHOCTH"" H "HcajioGbi". B HHTepnpeTannH "BOSMOJKHOCTH" ÖMJIO npe^noMceHo,

HTOO neM öojiee orpaHHHHBaiomeö 6y^eT MecTHaa nojiHTHKa OTHOCHTCJIHO Hcnojib30BaHHfll pyccKoro H3biKa B ccpepax oömecTBeHHoö XCH3HH, TO cooTBeTCTBeHHO,, pyccKHe H pyccicofl3biHHbie yicpaHHUbi öynyr öojiee CKJIOHHM K accHMHJMUHH.. B cjiynae HHTepnperaijHH "acanoöbi", oacHflajiocb, HTO HanpaBneHHe KoppejianHHH óy^eT oöpaTHOö: neM öojiee orpaHHHHTejibHoö 6yaeT Mecraafl nojiHTHKa,, TeM cnjibHee pyccKoa3biHHoe HacejieHHe 6y^eT oTCTaHBaTb coxpaHeHH» CBoeroo «3biKa.

TpeTHHH H HeTBëpTbrii pa3Aejibi aHajiH3HpyioT o6pa30BaTejibHyio nojiHTHKy YicpaHHbi ao HH nocjie npoB03rnanieHH« He3aBHCHMOCTH. ECJIH B TeneHHH 1920-x roaoB Hcnonb30BaHHee AJM o<j)HU,HajibHbix n,ejieö jnbiKOB HauHOHajibHbix MeHbuiHHCTB 6MJIO CTHMynnpoBaHO,, TO B nocjieflyiomee BpeMH, KOMMyHHCTHHecKHe npaBHTejiH MeroaHHecKHH nbrrajincb pycH<pHUHpOBaTb CHCTeMy o6pa3aBaHH» Ha YnpaHHe. Pe3ynbTaTOMM 3Toro HBHJICA TOT 4>aKT, HTO HaKaHyHe npoB03rjianieHHa HiacHOTH jinnib 47,5%% yneHHKOB nojryHHJio o6pa30BaHHe Ha yicpaHHCKOM »3Mice. HTO KacaeTca BMCUIHX

216 6

yneÖHbixx 3aBe,zieHHH, TO B STOM cjiynae Haöjno/iaJiacb flOJiroBpeMeHHaa TeHfleima npeno^aBaHHaa Ha yicpaHHCKOM obnce jminb HenpecraHCHbix ryMaHHTapHbix .HHCUHnjiHH.

üepeBopoTHbiMM coöwmeM 6MJIO npHHATHe TjiacHocTH oceHbio 1989 r. KoMMyHHCTHHecKHiii pe>KHM Ha YKpaHHe He HMen HHoro Bbiöopa, neM KaK noKopHTbca Tpe6oBaHH»MM HaiiHOHajibHOH ^eMOKpaTHMecKofi onno3HUHH, KOTOpaa nocToaHHO Kpenjia,, öyaynH BfloxHOBjieHHofi nonyjiapHbiM nauHOHajiHCTHHecKHM aBHJKeHHeM PecnyÖJiHKK npH6ajiTHKH. BonnomeHHeM 3TOH KOHUCCCHH CTara, npHHaTWH B 1989r "3aKO HH O »3bIKe" , KOTOpblf i npOB03maCHJI JTCpaHHCKH H JI3bIK COHHCTBeHHbl M

rocyflapcTBeHHHMM jnbiKOM. LJejibio ero craTen 6bino BHcapeHHe yKpaHHCKoro »3biKa BO Bcee c4>epbi oömecTBeHHoii HOOHH, cooTBeTCTaeHHO, B ymep6 pyccKOMy. HanpHMep, BbicuiHMM yneÖHbiM 3aBe^eHHaM (BY3aM) &I M nojmoro nepexo a Ha npenoAOBaHHe Ha yKpaHHCKOMM H3biiee 6bui onpeaejieH nepno B 10 jieT. TaKHte, B COOTBCTCTBHH C 3aKOHOM,, a6HTypHeHTbi /JOJDKHH 6buiH caaBaTb 3K3aMeH no yKpaHHCKOMy jnbiKy H jiHTepaTypee npH BcrynjieHHH B BY3bi. üocjie npoB03rjiameHHfl He3aBHCHMOCTH, a3bncoBaaa nojiHTHKa Ha YKpaHHe CTajia öojiee HcëcTKOH. B 1993 r. MHHHCTCPCTBO o6pa30BaHH«« oöjoano MecTHbie opraHbi BJiactH K ceHTaöpio 1993 r co3^aTb ceTb HananbHbixx KJiaccoB (pacnpe^ejieHHe yneHHKOB, KOTopwe oöynajiHCb Ha yKpaHHCKOM H

pyCCKOMM H3bIKax ) TaKHM 06pa3OM, HT06 3TO OnTHMaJIbH O COOTBeTCTBOBaJIO

nauHOHajibHOMyy cocTasy MecTHoro HaceneHHfl. HMnjieMeHTaiiHfl 3THX Mep fleficTBHTejibHOfleficTBHTejibHO noBJiHHna 6w Ha MaccoBoio yKpaHHH3aHHio ceTH IDKOJI, noTOMy KaK BO MHornxx oÖJiacTflx cymecTBOBajia öojibuiaa pa3HHua B nponopuHOHajibHOM COOTHOHieHHHH MeHCy KOJIHHeCTBOM 3THHMCCKHX yKpaHHueB B HacejieHHH H KOJiHHecTBOMM nepBOKjiaccHHKOB, nojiyHHBuiHX yKpaHHCKoe o6pa30BaHHe. B 1993 r. pyccKHÖÖ H3MK H jiHTepaTypa CTajiH HeoÖjnaTejibHbiMH npeflMeTaMH B yKpaHHCKHX uiKOJiax.. TaKHe Mepw npoTHBopeHHHH ycjiOBHüM 3aKOHa o jBbiKe, cornacHo KOTopbiM H yKpaHHCKHfii H3biK H jiHTepaxypa, H pyccKHfi H3MK H JiHTepaTypa «BJiHJiHCb o6a3aTeJibHbiMHH npe^MeTaMH BO Bcex mKOJiax. B flonojraeHHe K 3THM MepaM, MHHHCTepCTB OO 06pa30BaHHfl H3^aJI O HOBbie aKTbl , KOTOpbi e JIHÖO CTHMyjIHpOBajI H

Hcnojib30BaHHee yKpaHHCKoro «3MKa, JIHÖO BbrrecHHJiH pojib pyccKoro. H ee TOJIbK O CBOeÖ a3bIKOBOH nOJIHTHKOH , HO TaK»Ce H MeTO^aM H B OTHOUieHH H

o6pa30BaTejibHbixx nporpaM H aBTOHOMHH, IJeHTpanbHbie Bjiacra npeaocTaBHjra HaiiHOHajibHbiMM MeHbuiHHCTBaM MaJieHbKyio CBo6o,ny mix onpe^ejieHHa COÖCBCHHOH pojiHH B c^epe o6pa30BaHHH. HecMOTpa Ha oóemaHHa aeMOKpaTH3HpOBaTb H aBTOHOMH3HpOBaT bb IHKOJIbl , KOTOpo e ÖbUIO flaHO pOAHTeJWM H MeCTHbl M BJiaCT«M,

ueHTpajiH30BaHHafll CHCTeMa coBeTCKoro nepHo a öbuia innpoKo coxpaHeHa. KaK H H paHbuie,, MHHHCTepcBO o6pa30BaHH» co3flaBajio yHeÖHbiii njiaH H nporpaMMbi juvi UIKOJI, aa Taicace, onpeaejuuio cnncoK peKOMeHflOBaHHbix ^J I« Hcnojib30BaHH« yneÖHHKOB. OjHiaKO,, nocne He3aBHCHM0CTH, yHHTejra nojiynnjiH npaBo caMOCTOtfTejibHO BbiÖHpaxb aononHHTejibHbiee MaTepnajibi jum ypoKOB. ,ZlpyrHM cymecTBeHHMM pa3pbiBOM c npoiHJibiMM CTajio yBejiHHeHHe KOjraneCTBa npeflMeTOB H3ynaeMbix Ha Bbiöop, KOTopue HiKOJibii H yHHTejM MorjiH BbiÖHpaTb caMOCTOHTejibHO. HHTepecHo, HTO Manoe KonHHecTBOO nacTHbix HiKon (B KOTopbix o6ynaeTC« jiHinb 0,2% Bcero KOJinnecTBa yneHHKOB)) CTajio npe^MeTOM TaKHX ace pajiHKajibHbix orpaHHHeHHH KaK H rocyAapcTBeHHbiee HIKOJIW.

217 7

OopMaa ueHTpajiH30BaHHOH ne^arorHHecKOH npaKTHKH uenHKOM no^xo^HT rocy,aapcByy Kor^a penb H^ëT 06 HCTOPHH YKpaHHbi, yKpaHHCKoii JiHTepaType, reorpatpHHH YKpaHHbi - npe^MeTax, KOTopwe cHHTaiOTca Hpe3BbiHaHH0 BaxcHbiMH jtyia Hapojioo6pa30BaTejibHbixx uejieH. B HOBOH TpaKTOBKe HCTOPHH, KOTopyio rocyzjapcTBo pacnpocTpaHHJioo BnnoTb no caMbix oxnanëHHbix yrojiKOB YKpaHHbi, yxpanHuw 6buiH H3o6pa»ceHbi,, KaK OT^enbHaa Hainia, co CTOJICTHHM cTpeMJieHHeM co3flarb cBoë coöcTBeHHoee rocy^apcTBO. Oco6eHHO BaacHbiM aBJiaeTca npoTHBonocTaBjieHHe noHaTHH "YKpaHHa"" H "Poccna H COBCTCKHH C0103". HanpHMep, 3aaBJiaerca, HTO paHHecpe/meBeKOBaaa HMnepna KneBCKaa Pycb aBJianacb npcmiiecTBeHHHKOM coBpeMeHHofii He3aBHCHMOH YKpaHHbi, a He IJapcKOH POCCHH. TaK»ce yTBepacflaeTca, HTO BB xaoTHHecKne rojibi nocjie 1917 r., HannoHajibHoe flBHHceHHe nojiyHHJio HaMHoro 6ojibinee no,zmep)KKH OT yicpaHHCKHx HapoAHbix Mace, HeacejiH öojibuieBHKH. Bojiee Toro, HOBaaa BepcHH HCTOPHH nojiHOCTbio peaÖHJiHTHpyeT BeTBb yKpaHHCKHx napTH3aHOB, Haxo^HBUiHxcaa nofl pyKOBo^cTBOM CienaHa BaH^epbi, KOTopbie 6opojiHCb npoTHB

KpaCHOHH H TepMaHCKOH apMHH BO BpeMeHa BTOpOH MHpOBOÖ BOHHbl. HOBM H yneÖHHK

HCTOPHHH .zjecflToro KJiacca npeacTaBJiaeT BaHflepy KaK HCTHHHOTO yxpaHHCKoro 6opu.a 3a CBOÖo^y,, Mb» ^eaTejibHocTb nponaraHflHpoBajia ^eMOKpaTHHecKHe UCHHOCTH H paBeHCTBOO jma. Bcex HaiiHOHajibHOCTeH. YnacTHe MHOOIX yKpaHHijeB B KpacHOH apMHH Hee ynoMHHaeTca. B 3TOH HHTepnpeTauHH H Bbiöope COÖMTHH, HOBaa Bepena HCTOPHH

CHjibHoo npoTHBopeHHT crapoft KOMMyHHCTHHecKofi, KOTopaa npoB03rjiauiajia H^eH 0 BeHHOMM cTpeMJieHHH yKpaHHCKoro Hapo a K oöte^eHeHHio c 6paTCKHM pyccKHM Hapo^oMM B oaHy öojibinyio coimajracTHHecKyio ceMbio.

Floo cpaBHeHHK) co iiiKOJiaMH, BY3w HMeiOT öojibiiiyi o CBoöoay. XOT« MnHHCTepcTBOO H o6a3ajio HX H3yMaTb KOMnjieKC ryMaHHTapHbix flHCHHnjiHH (BKjnoHaa yKpaHHCKHfii a3biK, jiHTepaTypy H HCTopHio), KOTopbie 3aMeHHJiH HHCJIO npe^MeTOB, HacbiuieHHbixx KOMyHHCTHHecKoo HaeojiorHeii, BY3bi Moiyr caMOCToaTejibHO onpe^enaTbb npe^MeT H3yneHHa 3THX ^HCUHIIJIHH (nyreM co3^aHHa coöcTBeHHbix nporpaMM H H^aKTHHecKHx MaTepnajiOB). YnHTbraaa TO, HTO 3TO 6bmo HenonycraMO B

COBeTCKOMM npOHIJIOM , M03KH0 CKa3aTb, HTO He3aBHCHMOCTb npHHeC^a 3HaHHTeJIbHbi e

nepeMeHbii ^jia B Y 3 O B.

HecMOTpaa Ha orpaHHHeHHa B c<])epe a3biKa H o6pa30BaHHa, oTHomeHHe YKpaHHbi KK CBOHM HailHOHaJIbHbI M MeHbHIHHCTBa M nOCJie OÖpeTeHHa He3aBHCHMOCTH, MOHCeT

6biTbb oxapaKTepH30BaHO KaK aoBOJibHO TepiraMoe. PyccKHM H apyniM MeHbHIHHCTBaM öburaa rapaHTHpoBaHbi paBHbie oönjecTBeHHbie npaBa. OHH He HcnbiTbrnajiH cHCTeMaTHnecKHxx HCKjiioHeHHH H3 rocyaapcTBeHHoro H nacTHoro ceKTopoB, a TaK»ce, 3aKOHOMM o HaitHOHajibHbix MeHbiiiHHCTBax, HM 6bui rapaHTHpoBaH paa KOJineKTHBHwx npaB.. npHHaTHe IIO^OÖHOH jiHÖepajitHOH IIOJIHTHKH B OTHonieHHH HaujiOHajibHbix MeHbuiHHCTB,, B 3HaHHTejibHoii Mepe, onpeaejiajiacb aMop4>HbiM HaiiHOHajibHbiM caMOC03HaHHeMM MHornx yKpaHHueB.

I l oo npHHHH e nOBepXHOCTHM X HaUHOHaJIbHbl X HaCTpoeHHH, HaUHOHaJIHCTHHeCKH e

CHJIWW He cMorjiH HaÖTH onopy, Heo6xoaHMyio HM ^jia AOMHHHpoBaHHa B nojiHTHHecKofi 5KH3HHH H BHeapeHHa öojiee orpaHHHHBaiomero 3aKOHoaaTejibCTBa. ripHHHMaa BO BHHMaHHee BbinieonHcaHHyio ranoTe3y, 6bui MajioBepoaTeH (paKT Bbiöopa YKpaHHOH KOHCouHajibHOHH aeMOKpaTHH, KaK nojiHTHHecKofi Mepbi, KOTopaa MoaceT CHHTaTbCa ocoöeHHbiMM BH^OM yMepeHHoft cTpaTeraH. BO3MO)KHO, HTO Mo^ejib KOHCouHanH3Ma

218 8

JleönxapTaa HMeeT o6ï>flCHHTejibHyio ueHHOCTb TOJIBKO JJJIX 3Toro ocoóeHHoro BH^a yMepeHHofii ÜOJIHTHKH, HO He JUVL JiHÖepajibHofi IIOJIHTHKH Booóme.

IlpoB03rjiauieHHee Mep - 3TO O^HO, ocymecTBJieHHe «e HX - coBepuieHHO apyroe. n^TtiHH pa3^en aHajiH3HpyeT HMiuieMeHTauHio «3MKOBOH HOJIHTHKH B o6pa30BaTejibHbiii CeKTOpp nOCTCOBeTCKOH YKpaHHbl . CTaTHCTHK a MHHHCTepCTB a 06pa30BaHHH

noKa3biBaeT,, HTO HaHHHaa c 1989 r. nojiHTHKa yxpaHHH3aiiHH CTaÓHJibHO yMeHbiiiaeT KOJiHHecTBOO yneHHKOB, oöynaiomHxcfl B pyccKHX iiiKOJiax. OflHaKo, cornacHO flüHHbiM Haa 1997-98 yn.r., npoueHT yneHHKOB, oöynaiomHxca Ha yxpaHHCKOM «3WKe, Bcë emë Ha 10%% MeHbuie, B nponopuHOHajibHOM COOTHOUICHHH, npoueHTa yicpaHHueB B HaceneHHH (72%).. Ycnex npouecca yKpaHHH3auHH noKa3an perHOHanbHbie pa3JiHHHJi B npeaejiax YKpaHHe.. B TO BpeMs, KaK B 3ana,HHbix H B öojibuiHHCTBe ueHTpanbHbix oÖJiacTeii, npoueHTT yneHHKOB, oóynaiomHxcs B yxpaHHCKHX niKOJiax, npHÖJiH3HJica HJIH aocTHr HHCJiaa yxpaHHHeB B HacejieHHH, B BOCTOHHbix H K»KHbix oöJiacTHX OH Bce eme "H^eT no cjieay"" yKpaHHCKoro cerMeHTa.

/JaHHbiee o «3biKe npenoaaBaHH» B BY3ax SCHO noKa3bmaK)T, HTO B Y 3 W He Moiyr HcnoHHTbb 3aKOH o «3biKe, TpeÖyiomHÖ nojiHoro nepexoaa ao KOHiia 1990bix TO^OB Ha yKpaHHO«3biMHoee npeno^aBaHHe. AHanorHHHaa CHTyauH» HaÖJHOflaeTcs H B niKOJiax: npHÖJiH3HTejibHOO Bce yneHHKH 3anaaHbix oÖJiacTefi nojiyHHJiH o6pa30BaHHe Ha yicpaHHCKOMM «3biKe H TOJibKO Majiaa nacTb yneHHKOB oöynajiacb Ha yKpaHHCKOM B BOCTOHHbl XX H K>5KHbI X OÖJiaCTflX .

n p HH OCymeCTBJieHHH HaCTHHHO H HMnjieMeHTaUH H U,eHTpaJIbHOH A3BIKOBO H

nOJIHTHK HH KaK JUW UIKOJ I TaK H JVW B Y 3 0B MOiy r 6bIT b npHH^Tb l BO BHHMaHH e

cjie^yiomHee npHHHHbi:

1.. ABTOHOMHoe noBeaeHHe MCCTHBIX BJiacrefi (ocoöeHHO B ropo^ax me H3ÖHpaiOTbca

M3pbl) . .

2.. OTCyTCTBH e TpaflHUH H HCnOJIHeHHf l 3aKOHOB.

3.. He^ocTaTOK yKpaHH0«3biHHbix yneÖHbix MaTepHaiioB H npenoflOBaTejieii, HMewmnx B03MOaCHOCTbb npOBOAHT b ypOKH Ha yKpaHHCKO M H3bIKe .

4.. Bbi6op uiKOJibi pOflHTejWMH (nyacHO OTMeTHTb, HTO 3aKOH o fl3bnce rapaHTHpyeT poflHTejiaMM npaBO Bbiöopa X3bnca npeno/jaBaHH» mix CBOHX neren).

5.. Oco3HaHHe ueHTpajibHOH BJiacTbio TOTO, HTO pa^HKajibHaa yKpaHHH3aiu«i Bbicinero oöpa30BaHHHH npHBe^ëT K 3HanHTejibHOMy CHHJKCHHIO KanecTBa npenoaaBaHHH.

Pojibb MecTHbix OT^ejioB Hapo^Horo o6pa30BaHHa paccMaTpHBaeTca B mecTOM passene, riocjiee nojiyneHHa He3aBHCHM0CTH, MecTHbie oT^ejiw Hapo^Horo o6pa30BaHH» HMCJIH öojibineee BjiHHHHe Ha ueHTpajibHyio nojiHTHKy. OTJIHHH» B MCCTHOH HOJIHTHKH

OTflejibHbixx ropo^oB 6buio, B OCHOBHOM, pe3yjibTaT0M peuieHHH KOHKpeTHbix ^OJIXCHOCTHbl XX JIHIÏ , OTBeTCTBeHHblX 3a paÖOTy OTflejlO B 06pa3OBaHHH. TaK , B ^ O H d l K e ,

ocTaBumecss c COBCTCKHX BpeMëH Ka^pbi, ycneuiHO npOTHBOCTO«T aaBJieHHio co CTopoHbi KneBaa B oTHonieHHH yKpaHHH3auHH CHCTCMW MCCTHHX IHKOJI. Pe3yjibTaTOM SBHJICH TOT

(JmKT,, HTO Ha 1997-98 yn.r. jraiub 10,2% nepBOKjiaccHHKOB J\oHeiiKa oöynajiocb Ha yKpaHHCKOMM «3biKe, B npoTHBOBec 39,4% yKpaHHueB npoacHBaioinHx B ropoae. HanpoTHB,, B Oaecce, Ha3HaHeHHe Ceprea Ko3Hin<oro, aKTHBHoro HJieHa Pyxa, HanajibHHKOMM ynpaBjieHH» o6pa30BaHH« OaeccKofi ropo^CKOH aaMHHHCTpauHH,

219 9

03Hanajioo cHJibHyio BOJiHy yKpaHHH3auHH. BTeneHHe ero ynpaBJieHH», npH oömeM KOJiHHecTBee 133 UIKOJI, KOJIHHCCTBO yxpaHHCKHX UIKOJI pe3KO B03pocno c 16 B 1995-96

rr .. flo 51 B 1997-98 i r . . CooTBeTCBeHHO B03poc H npoueHT ynaiuHxcfl, KOTopwe oOynajiHCbb Ha yKpaHHCKOM s3biKe, c 8% B 1991-92 rr. no 39% B 1997-98 rr., HTO JIHUIL Haa 10% MeHbuie oömero KOJiHHecTBa yKpaHHueB B HacejieHHH ropo^a. Bo JlbBOBe H KneBe,, ppyx. .upyrux ropo^ax 3Toro HCCJieaoBaHH, ropo^CKHe o6pa30BaTejibHbie ynpeayieHHfll HacTOJibKO ycep^HO peajiH30BbiBajiH nojiHTHKy HauHOHajibHoro jöbiKa, HTO H3MeHHJiHH npoueHTHoe cooTHouieHHe nepBOKJiaccHHKOB, oóynaioinHxcs Ha yKpaHHCKOM 5i3MKee TaK, HTO OHO npeBbicejio KOJIHHCCTBO yKpaHHCKoro HacejieHH» (BO JlbBOBe ypoBeHbb 6bui 93,7% B 1997-98 rr. no cpaBHeHHio c 79,1% yicpaHHueB B HacejieHHH; B KneBee nuippbi 6buiH noxoacHMH: 94,0% H 75,4% cooTBeTCTBeHHo).

06pa30BaTejibHbiee ynpeacaeHHH Hcnojib30BanH pa3Hoo6pa3Hwe cnocoöbi yKpaHHH3auHHH HiKOJibHOH cHCTeMM. Bo JlbBOBe ÖMJIH 3aMeneHbi cjiynaH yBOJibHeHHH MeCTHbIM HH BJiaCTHMH flHpeKTOpOB UIKOJI , KOTOpbi e He CMHpHJIHC b C TpeÖOBaHHSMH

oTKpbiTtt yxpaHHCKHe Kjiaccbi, H 3aMenbi HX Ha öojiee "noaaTJiHBbix". HHOH cHiyauHJi öbuiaa B KneBe, rae aeKpeTOM M3pa 3aciaBHJiH 6OJU>UIHHCTBO ;mpeKTopoB pyccKHx UIKOJI H3MeHHTbb HX CTaTyc. B KHeBe H Oaecce (HO He BO JlbBOBe!) aapeKTopaM UIKOJI 6buio HaKa3aHOO He oTKpwBaTb pyccKHe KJiaccbi napanjiejibHO c yicpaHHCKHMH. CooTBeTCTBeHHo,, MHorne GbiBuiHe pyccKHe UIKOJIM B TeneHHH 10 JieT CTaHyr nojiHocTbioo yxpaHHCKHMH. B /ÏOHeuKe ace, MecTHaa BJiacTb öbuia öojiee TepnuMofi B OTHOuieHHHH pyccKOA3biHHoro o6pa30BaHHfl. B KneBe H BO JlbBOBe MecTHaa nojiHTHKa öbuiaa Hanöojiee HcecTKoii, B O^ecce B nocjie^Hee BpeMa OHa CTajia öojiee orpaHHHHTejibHoii. .

HTOÖHH oueHHTb KyjibiypHyi o peaKUHio pyccKOS3biHHoro HacejieHHH, a onpocHJi yneHHKOBB H3 48 pyccKHx, CMeuiaHHbix H yKpaHHCKHx UIKOJI B neTbipèx ropo^ax. Fopo a 6buiHH Bbi6paHM TaK, HTO6M aaTb B03MO»CHOCTb onpeaejiHTb OÖiaCHHTeJIbHyiO CHJiy HeTbipëxx BbimeyKa3aHHbix BapnaHTOB.

3THMHH ropo^aMH öbuiu:

1.. JIbBOB (3anan) - MajioHHCJieHHoe pyccKoe MeHbuiHHCTBo; oneHb ManoHHCJieHHoe pyCCKO«3bIHHO ee yKpaHHCKO e MeHbUIHHCTBO ; MHOrOHHCJieHHO e yKpaHHO«3bIHHO e

6oJIbUIHHCTBO ; ;

2.. KneB (ueHTp) - cpe^Hefi HHCJICHHOCTH pyccKoe MeHbuiHHCTCBo; MajioHHCJieHHoe pyccKOH3biHHoee yKpaHHCKoe MeHbuiHHCTBo; ManoHHCJieHHoe yKpaHHOfl3briHoe GojibuieHCTBo; ;

3.. Oziecca (lor) - MHoroHHCJieHHoe pyccKoe MeHbuiHHCTBo; cpezmeii HHCJICHHOCTH pyccKoa3biHHoee yxpaHHCKoe MCHMIIHHCTBO; MHoroHHCJieHHoe yKpaHHo«3braHoe MeHbUIHHCTBO ;; HeCKOJIbK O flpyTHX MajIOHHCJieHHbl X MeHbUIHHCTB ;

4.. /JoHeuK (BOCTOK) - ManoHHCJieHHoe pyccKoe 6ojibuiHHCTBo; cpe^Hefi HHCJICHHOCTH pyccKo«3biHHoee yKpaHHCKoe MeHbuiHHCTBo; cpeflHefi HHCJICHHOCTH yKpaHHCKoe MeHbUIHHCTBO. .

IloKa3aTejMMHH Tpèx cnocoöoB KyubTypHoro pearapoBaHHii 6MJIH: Bbióop poaHTejwMH uiKOJiww (yKpaHHCKaa HJIH pyccKaa niKOJia/Kjiacc); «3biK, Ha KOTOPOM po^HTejin oómaiOTcaa c onpouieHHbiMH JieTbMH; H3MK oöiueHHJi, KOTopwö Hcnojib3yK>T caMH

220 0

onpomeHHBiee aera. MHOK) 6MJIO pa3JiHHeHO Tpn cnocoöa KyjibTypHoro pearapoBaHHJi: accuMwiHijUH,accuMwiHijUH, H3UK060R uumespaijUH, H3biK06oe coxpanenue.

Pe3yjibTaTbii onpoca CBH^eTenbCTByiOT, HTO cnocoöw KyjibTypHoro pearnpOBaHHa HMeioTT apKO BtipaaceHHbie TeppHTopHajibHbie pa3JiHHH«. B #0HeuKe H B Oaecce onpoc pyccKHxx H pyccKO«3WHHbix yKpaHHUCB noKa3aji BapnaHT subiicoeoeo coxpaneHux no BceM TpëMM noKa3aTejMM. B KneBe 06e rpynnw H3ÖpajiH f&uKoeyio UHmeepatjuio, 3TO 03HaHaeT,, HTO po/mTejiH, OT^aB CBOHX aeTefi B yKpaHHombiHHbie IHKOJIM, npH STOM He HanajiHH pa3roBapHBarb c HHMH Ha yxpanHCKOM JOKKC Bo JlbBOBe pe3Koe pa3flejieHHe cymecTByeTT B caMofi pyccKOH3biHHOH OÖIHHHC PyccKHe B MOHOSTHHHCCKHX öpaKax npoaeMOHCTpHpoBajiHH x3UK06oe coxpauenue. Te »ce pyccKHe, KOTopbie COCTOHT B cMeniaHHbixx öpaKax, CKJIOHAK>TCJI K accuMwxyuu. PyccKOH3biHHbie yKpaHHuw BO JlbBOBee u3Öpajiu M3biKoeyjo immezpcmwo.

ECJIHH pe3yjibTaTbi 3Toro onpoca HMOOT oTHonieHHe K paHeynoMjmyTbiM BapHaHtaM,TOO MOHCHO caejiaTb oneBHflHoe 3aKJiioHeHHe o TOM, HTO sTHHHecKaa nponopimaa MoaceT HMeTb pa3HOo6pa3Hoe oöbacHeHne. PeaKuna pyccKO»3biHHoro HacejieHHH,, B OCHOBHOM, flBHraercfl BBepx no uiKane (T. e. OT Ü3UKOSOZO coxpaneHUR ao acuuMwiaifUu),acuuMwiaifUu), cooTBeTCTBeHHO c yMeHbmeHHeM ero nponopunoHajibHoro cooTHomeHH»» c MecTHbiM HacejieHHeM ( OT 75,7% B /JpHemce ao 18,6% BO JlbBOBe). TaKMte,, no^oÖHO 3TOH 3aKOHOMepHOCTH, npHpo a MecTHofi HOJIHTHKH noMoraeT noHJiTb npoBeaëHHbiee onpocbi. Tan, npH H3MeHeHHH HOJIHTHKH OT orpaHHHHTejibHofi (KHCB, JlbBOB)) ao yMepeHHOii (JJpHenK), KyjibTypHaa peaKnaa npoflBHHyjiacb OT accuMWisufuu K H3biKoeoMyH3biKoeoMy coxpaueumo, HanpaBJieHHe 3TOÖ 3aBHCHM0CTH noflTBepacnaeT KOHnennHio

"BO3MOÏKH0CTH" ,, KaK 3^«J)eKTa nOJIHTHKH , KOTOpaf l CBHfleTeJIbCTByeT, HTO HaUHOHajIbHbi e

MeHbiiiHHCTBaa He 6yayT BH^eTb HHOTO Bbixo^a, KaK CMHPHTCA C npaBHJiaMH, KOTopbie AHKTyeTT öojibuiHHCTBO, TeM öonee, HTO rocy^apcTCBO orpaHHHHBaer BO3MO)KHOCTH HannoHajibHbixx MeHbniHHCTB KynbiypHO ce6a BwpaacaTb. K coacaneHHio, no npHHHHe ocoöeHHoroo OTÖopa ropo^oB H TOTO, HTO xapaKTep H3MeHeHHS O^HOÖ nepeMeHHofi (MecTHaaa nojiHTHKa) aHajiornneH xapaicrepy H3MeHeHH« flpyroft nepeMeHHoö (3THHHecKa«« nponopHHOHanbHocTb) BO Bcex neTbipëx BbiuieyKa3aHHbix ropoaax 3Toro HCCJieaoBaHH»,, HeB03M03KHO npe,aonpe,ziejiHTb, KaKaa H3 aaHHbix nepeMeHHbix 6yaeT aoMKHHpyiomeftt B oöbacHeHHH xapaicrepa peaKimfi.

CMemaHHbiee öpaxn - 3T0 flpyroö BaacHbra o6b«cH«iomHH 4>aKTop, nocKOJibKy, corjiacHOO pe3yjibTaTaM onpoca cMemaHbix ceMeii BO Bcex neTbipëx ropoaax, OHH Gojiee cKJioHHbii K accuMtuiMtfuu, HOKejiH Te, KTO npeöbraaeT B MOHopyccKHX öpaKax. Ha

OCHOBaHHHH 3TOTO, M05KHO CKa3aTb, HTO CymeCTByeT KOMÖHHHpOBaHHbl H 3$4>eKT

CMeniaHHbixx öpaKOB B nponopuHH c pyccKHM HaceneHneM. Pa3HOCTb Mexmy peaKiiHHMH CMeniaHHbixx H MOHopyccKHX öpaKOB B03pacTaer cooTBeTCTBeHHO yMeHbineHHio KOJiHnecTBaa pyccKHx B ropo^e.

MoHopyccKHee öpaKH BO JlbBOBe noKa3WBaiOT H3biKoeoe coxpaneHue, HTO, VICXOJXH H33 3THHHeCK0Ö nponopUHH H H3MKOBOH nOJIHTHKH, HCJIb3fl ÖbLJIO npe^BH^eTb. OflHaKO,

rHnoTe3aa 3THHHecKoro pacKOJia, KOTopaa yTBep»waeT, HTO HCM CHJibHee MeHbuiHHCTBO OTJiHHaeTC«« KyjibTypHbiMH oco6eHHOCT«MH OT aoMHHHpyiomeH rpynnbi, TeM cnnbHee OHOO 6yaeT cipeMHTbca K coxpaHeHHio CBoero H3biKa, H oöbacHaeT STO HX y^HBHTejibHoe, Haa nepBbiii B3rjifl,a, noBe^eHne. TaK»ce, B OTJIHHHC OT Tpëx flpyrnx ropo^oB, TOJibKO BO JlbBOBee yKpaHHiibi OTHHHaiOTCH OT pyccKHx BepoHcnoBeAaHneM (MecTHbie yKpaHHHbi -

221 1

rpeKOKaTOJiHKH,, a pyccKHe - npaBOCJiaBHtie) H HCTOPHHCCKHM npouiJibiM (^o 1939 r. 3ana^HbiHH perHOH YxpaHHM 6bui nacTbio ABCTO-BenrepcKOH HMnepHH H FIonbuiH). OflHaico,, B no^o6HOM KOHTeKCTe KynbTypHoö ,zm(p(pepeHiuiau.HH, He oaomajiocb HH cpaKTaa accHMHJiaiïHH pyccKHx B cMeuiaHHbix öpaKax, HH (J)aKia HajiHHHH MHoroHHcneHHbixx npHMepoB öpaKOB Meacny pyccKHMH H 3ana,zmbiMH yicpaHHiiaMH.

AjibTepHaTHBHbiMM oötflCHeHHeM Heo«H^;aHHbix pe3yribTaTOB onpoca pyccKHx po^HTenefii BO JIbBOBe, MM CHHTaeM onacHocTb KyjibTypHoro HCHe3HOBeHHH. ripeanonaraeMMMM HBJiaeTbc» TO, HTO HeacejiaHHe 3THX pyccKHx 3anHCbroaTb CBOHX fleTefi BB yicpaHHCKHe KJiaccbi (HJIH pa3roBapHBaTb c HHMH Ha yKpaHHCKOM) npoflHKTOBaHO CTpaxoMM Toro, HTO B nojmocTbio yKpaHHOJnbiHHofi cpeae JlbBOBa, ynpaHHCKoe o6pa30BaHHee noBjmaeT Ha Bbi6op fleT&MH x3biKa juin jiHHHoro oömeHHfl H 3acTaBHT HX noTepaTbb CBOH pyccKHe KopHH. B flpyrax Tpëx ropo^ax, HanpoTHB, pyccKHe He oöecnoKoeHbii TeM, HTO yicpaHHOjnbiHHoe oöyneHHe noBJiHaeT Ha yKpaHHH3auHK) HX ^eTefi.. 3 TO oö-bacHaeTca npeoÓJiaaaHHeM pyccK033biHHOH cpeflbi oömeHHa B 3THX ropoflOB.. HeöoJibinoö aonojiHHTejibHbiH onpoc cpezm pyccKHx pcmrrejieH no^TBep^HJi BbiuienpHBefleHHoee npe^nojioaceHHe: BO JIbBOBe, npn Bbiöope IHKOJIM, OHH, B OCHOBHOM, MOTHBHpoBaHbii acejiaHHeM coxpaHHTb CBOH H3biK H KyjibTypy, B TO BpeMA KaK pyccKHe poflHTejiHH B KneBe H B O^ecce HMCIOT 6ojiee npaKTHHecKyio apryMeHTaunio AJM Toro, HToGbii OT^aBaTb CBOHX fleTen B pyccKHe niKonbi.

Haa ocHOBaHHH BbiuiecKa3aHHoro MO>KHO cqejiaTb HHTepecHoe 3aiüiioHeHHe: HanpaBJieHHee H3MeHeHHfl xapaKTepa B3aHMOCBfl3H Meayry STHHHCCKOÖ nponopuHefi H KyjibiypHof ii peaKUHefi MoaceTb ^ocTHHb TOJibKO onpcaejiéHHoft TOHKH. 3a ee npe^ejiaMH -- cpejja, r^e KOJiKHecTBeHHaa CHJia MeHbuiHHCTBa cTaHOBHTca TaKofi cjiaöofi, HTO ero «3biKK H KyjibTypa OKa3biBaiOTCH no# yrp03oii HCHe3HOBeHH«. B STOM cjrynae npoHcxozurr npoueccc ^e3HHTerpaHHH HaHHOH&ribHoro MeHbuiHHCTBa. O^Hy ero nacTb oacHaaeT accuMwiHtiwiaccuMwiHtiwi (pyccKHe B CMeuiaHHbix 6paKax BO JIbBOBe), B TO »ce BpeMH, KaK apyraa coxpaHumcoxpaHum ceou ocoöenocmu (pyccKHe B MOHO3THHHCCKHX 6paKax BO JIbBOBe). H, HaKOHeu,, TpeTba, MosceT H3ÖpaTb BapaaHT R3MKO6ÖÜ unmezpaipiu (pyccKOfl3biHHbie yKpaHHijbii BO JIbBOBe).

222 2

APPENDIXAPPENDIX 1

Questionnairee for pupils in Ukrainian , mixed and Russian schools

(translationn of a Ukrainian and a Russian version)

1.11 am ... 0 a boy 0 a girl

2.11 was born in (fil l in oblast or country) Myy mother was born in (fil l in oblast or country) Myy father was born in (fil l in oblast or country)

3.11 speak (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

4.. My mother is 5. My father is 00 Ukrainian 0 Ukrainian 00 Russian 0 Russian 00 A member of another nationality 0 A member of another nationality 00 Don't know 0 Don't know

6.. What is your parents' religion? 00 Orthodox 00 Greek catholic 00 Another faith 00 My parents have different religious affiliations 00 They are non-believers 00 Don't know

7.. Did your parents study at an institute or university? Fatherr 0 Yes 0 No 0 Don't know Motherr 0 Yes 0 No 0 Don't know

8.. What kind of work does your mother do? 00 (fil l in profession) 00 My mother does not work 00 Don't know

9.. What kind of work does your father do? 00 (fil l in profession) 00 My father does not work 00 Don't know

10.. Indicate which of the following products you have at home (you can give more than one answer) 00 Washing machine 00 Telephone 00 Color TV 00 Video cassette recorder 00 Computer 00 Car 223

11.. Which language do you speak at home? (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

12.. With whom do you live? 00 With both parents 00 With mama without papa 00 With papa without mama 00 Only with grandma and grandpa (or with one of them) 00 With different people

13.. Do your parents go to church? 00 Never 00 Seldom 00 Almost every week 00 Often

14.. Which language do your parents speak to each other? (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

15.. Which language do your parents speak to you? (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

16.. Which language do you speak with your brother and sisters? (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

17.. Which language do you speak with your friends? (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

18.. Do you play with children who do not speak your language? 00 Yes 00 No, because I do not have the possibility, but I would like to 00 No, never

19.. Which language do you speak in the breaks at school? (you can give more than one answer) 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian 00 Another language

20.. Which language do you prefer to be speaking? 00 Ukrainian 00 Russian

~~44 0 Another language

21.. Which books do you read more often? 00 Ukrainian books 00 Russian books 00 Books in another language

22.. Which television do you watch more often? 00 Ukrainian-language television 00 Russian-language television 00 Television in another language

23.. Do you like how your teachers speak Ukrainian? 00 Yes 00 Not all of them speak Ukrainian well 00 No, all of them speak Ukrainian badly

24.. How many subjects are taught in Ukrainian in your class? (excluding Ukrainian language and literature) )

00 All 00 More than half 00 About half 00 Less than half 00 Nothing is taught in Ukrainian

25.. How many of the textbooks that you study are in Ukrainian? (excluding Ukrainian language and literature) )

00 All 00 More than half 00 About half 00 Less than half 00 Nothing is taught in Ukrainian

26.. Do you love Ukraine? 00 Yes 00 No 00 Never thought about it 00 Don't know

27.. Did you study in this school from the first class? 00 Yes => Stop! You have completed the questionnaire. 00 No => Answer the following two questions

28.. From which school did you come? 00 From a Russian school 00 From a Ukrainian school 00 From a mixed school (Russian-Ukrainian) 00 From another school

29.. Why did you change school? 00 Because my parents objected to the language of instruction 00 For another reason

225 5

APPENDIXX 2

WeightingWeighting Procedure

Thee weighting procedure can best be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose a sample inn a city consists of 200 respondents instructed in Ukrainian and 100 respondents instructedd in Russian, and that Table A.l presents the distribution of these respondents by nationalityy of parents. However, let's assume that as much as 80% of the pupils are instructedd in Ukrainian and only 20% of the pupils are instructed in Russian for the city ass a whole. To make the proportions in the sample correspond to those in the population, theree should be 240 (80% of 300) respondents instructed in Ukrainian and 60 (20% of 300)) respondents instructed in Russian. For both groups, these respondents must be dividedd over the two nationalities in the same proportion as in the sample. Table A.2 showss the outcome of this procedure. Table A.3 presents the weighted data of Table A.2 inn percentages. These percentages match the proportions of pupils from Russian families taughtt in Ukrainian and in Russian for the city as a whole.

Tablee A.1 Sample

Languagee of instruction Nationalityy of Ukrainian Russian Total parents s Bothh Ukrainian 150 30 180 Bothh Russian 50 70 120 Totall 200 100 300

Tablee A.2 Weighted Sample

Languagee of instruction Nationalityy of Ukrainian Russian Total parents s Bothh Ukrainian 180 18 198 Bothh Russian 60 42 102 Totall 240 60 300

Tablee A.3 Weighted Sample in Percentage

Nationalityy of parents s Bothh Ukrainian Bothh Russian Total l

Languagee of instruction Ukrainiann Russian Total

90.99 9.1 66.0 58.88 41.2 34.0 80.00 20.0 100

Thus,, the sample data of this research underwent a similar weighting procedure. Table A.44 on the next page presents the absolute weighted data, the weighted data in percentagess and the raw sample data (in brackets). The percentages in the column totals, whichh refer to the proportions in the population (see Table 7.1), were used to weight the samplee data. These percentages refer to the 1996-97 school year for Kyiv and L'viv, and too the 1997-98 school year for Odesa and Donets'k, as data was collected in 1996-97 in thee first two cities and in 1997-98 in the latter two.

226 6

Tablee A.4 (extended version of Table 7.2) Schooll Children by Parent Nationality and Language of Instruction in 1996-19977 (in absolute weighted data, in weighted data in percentages and in absolutee sample data)

Thee 1990-91 cohort

Languagee of instruction Nationalityy of parents L'viv* L'viv* Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

Kyiv Kyiv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

[ [

407 7 43 3 8 8

19 9 477 7

284 4 65 5 12 2 12 2

373 3

23 3 14 4 4 4 6 6

47 7

2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 7 7

Ukrainian n

97.4% % 64.1% % 35.4% % 73.4% % 89.0% %

74.9% % 46.8% % 31.6% % 39.2% % 63.5% %

9.6% % 8.6% % 4.3% % 5.7% % 7.8% %

1.8% % 1.5% % 1.0% % 0.9% % 1.4% %

(152) ) (16) ) (3) ) (7) )

(178) )

(140) ) (32) ) (6) ) (6) )

(184) )

(108) ) (66) ) (19) ) (29) )

(222) )

(58) ) (69) ) (33) ) (16) )

(176) )

11 1 24 4 15 5 7 7

56 6

95 5 74 4 27 7 19 9

215 5

215 5 148 8 89 9

101 1 553 3

130 0 184 4 134 4 70 0

518 8

Russian n

2.6% % 35.9% % 64.6% % 26.6% % 10.5% %

25.1% % 53.2% % 68.4% % 60.8% % 36.5% %

90.4% % 91.4% % 95.7% % 94.3% % 92.2% %

98.2% % 98.5% % 99.0% % 99.1% % 98.6% %

(68) ) (153) ) (94) ) (43) )

(358) )

(179) ) (139) ) (50) ) (36) )

(404) )

(147) ) (101) ) (61) ) (69) )

(378) )

(88) ) (124) ) (90) ) (47) )

(349) )

418 8 67 7 23 3 26 6

533 3

379 9 139 9 39 9 31 1

588 8

238 8 162 2 93 3

107 7 600 0

132 2 187 7 135 5 71 1

525 5

Total l

78.0% % 12.5% % 4.3% % 4.7% %

100.0% %

64.5% % 23.6% % 6.6% % 5.3% %

100.0% %

39.4% % 26.9% % 15.5% % 17.9% %

100.0% %

25.3% % 35.6% % 25.7% % 13.4% %

100.0% %

(220) ) (169) ) (97) ) (50) )

(536) )

(319) ) (171) ) (56) ) (42) )

(588) )

(255) ) (167) ) (80) ) (98) )

(600) )

(146) ) (193) ) (123) ) (63) )

(525) )

227 7

Thee 1994-95 cohort

Languagee of instruction

Nationalityy of parents

L'viv* L'viv*

Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

Kyiv Kyiv Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

Odesa Odesa Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination Total l

Donets'k Donets'k Bothh Ukrainian Ukrainian/Russian n Bothh Russian Otherr combination

Total l

\ \

410 0 76 6

3 3 14 4

502 2

322 2

89 9 55 5 32 2

500 0

43 3 23 3 15 5 12 2 93 3

8 8 6 6 2 2 2 2

18 8

Ukrainian n

97.5% % 80.3% % 15.0% % 74.5% % 90.7% %

94.9% % 84.5% % 78 .1% % 86.7% % 90.2% %

19.8% % 13.7% % 11.5% % 16.3% % 15.8% %

7.2% % 3.5% % 1.7% % 3.9% % 3.8% %

(321) ) (60) )

(2) )

(11) ) (394) )

(238) ) (66) ) (41) ) (24) )

(369) )

(183) ) (99) ) (63) ) (50) )

(395) )

(131) ) (92) ) (39) ) (29) )

(291) )

11 1 19 9 14 4

5 5 48 8

17 7 16 6 16 6 5 5

54 4

175 5 147 7 114 4

61 1 498 8

104 4 157 7 138 8 44 4

443 3

Russian n

2.5% % 19.7% %

85.0% % 25.5% %

8.7% %

5 .1% % 15.5% % 21.9% % 13.3% % 9.8% %

80.2% % 86.3% % 88.5% % 83.7% % 84.2% %

92.8% % 96.5% % 98.3% % 96.1% % 96.2% %

(35) ) (62) ) (47) )

(16) ) (160) )

(59) ) (56) ) (53) )

(17) ) (185) )

(69) ) (58) ) (45) ) (24) )

(196) )

(40) ) (60) ) (53) )

(17) ) (170) )

421 1

95 5 17 7

19 9 550 0

339 9 105 5 71 1 37 7

554 4

218 8 170 0 129 9 73 3

591 1

112 2 163 3 140 0 46 6

461 1

Total l

75.8% % 17.2% % 3.0% % 3.4% %

100.0% %

61.3% % 19.1% % 12.8% % 6.9% %

100.0% %

40.0% % 28.9% % 21.9% % 12.3% %

100.0% %

24.4% % 35.2% % 30.5% % 10.0% %

100.0% %

(356) ) (122) )

(49) ) (27) )

(554) )

(297) ) (122) )

(94) ) (41) )

(554) )

(252) ) (157) ) (108) )

(74) ) (591) )

(171) ) (152) )

(92) ) (46) )

(461) )

NB:: The percentages may not precisely match the weighted data because the latter were rounded off.

228 8

APPENDIXX 3

Questionnairee for Russian parents with children on Ukrainia n schools (translationn of a Russian version)

1.. Your age Age of your partner

2.. Your sex M W

3.. Your place of birth: Country Oblast Placee of birth of your partner: Country Oblast

4.. Place of birth of your father: Country Oblast Placee of birth of your mother: Country Oblast Placee of birth of the father of your partner: Country Oblast.. Placee of birth of the mother of your partner: Country Oblast..

5.. Did you study at an institute or university? 0 Yes 0 No Didd your partner study at an institute or university? 0 Yes 0 No

6.. What kind of work do you do? Whatt kind of work does your partner do?

7.. Why did you send your child(ren) to a Ukrainian school?

8.. Do you think that Ukrainian-language education makes children fromm Russian families speak more Ukrainian in everyday life? (i.e.,, Does Ukrainian-language education ukrainize Russian children?) )

00 Yes 00 No if no, why not? 00 Don't know

9.. Do you think that children from Russian families will have better social economic prospects if they studyy on Ukrainian schools than if they study on Russian schools?

00 Yes 00 No ifno,whynot? 00 Don't know

10.. Do you think that a good command of Ukrainian improves the career opportunities of your children? ?

00 Yes 00 No 00 Don't know

11.. Do you want your child(ren) to be fluent in Ukrainian? 00 Yes 00 Partially fluent 00 No 00 Don't know 229

12.. Do you want your child(ren) to know Ukrainian so well, that it will become the language they will feell most comfortable with?

00 Yes 00 They should feel equally comfortable in Ukrainian and Russian 00 No 00 Don't know

13.. Would you mind if your child (children) would come to know Ukrainian better than Russian? 00 Yes 00 No 00 Don't know

14.. Would you mind if your child(ren) lost their Russian roots? 00 Yes 00 No 00 Don't know

15.. Do you ever speak Ukrainian to your husband/wife? 00 Never 00 Seldom 00 About half of the time 00 More Ukrainian than Russian

16.. Do you ever speak in Ukrainian to your children? 00 Never 00 Seldom 00 About half of the time 00 More Ukrainian than Russian

17.11 think that good relations exist between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. 00 Fully agree 00 Agree 00 Disagree 00 Fully disagree

18.. Do you want Russian to be a second state language? 00 Yes 00 Ukrainian should be the state language, Russian should have some official status 00 No 00 Don't know

19.. What status should Ukraine have, according to you? 00 Ukraine should remain an independent state 00 Ukraine should reunite with Russia, but must retain a substantial amount of

autonomy y 00 Ukraine should completely reunite with Russia 00 Don't know

230 0

Questionnairee for Russian parents with children on Russian schools

(translationn of a Russian version)

1.. Your age Age of your partner

2.. Your sex M W

3.. Your place of birth: Country Oblast Placee of birth of your partner: Country Oblast

4.. Place of birth of your father: Country Oblast Placee of birth of your mother: Country Oblast Placee of birth of the father of your partner: Country Oblast. Placee of birth of the mother of your partner: Country Oblast.

5.. Did you study at an institute or university? 0 Yes 0 No Didd your partner study at an institute or university? 0 Yes 0 No

6.. What kind of work do you do? Whatt kind of work does your partner do?

7.. Why did you send your child(ren) to a Russian school?

8.. Do you think that Ukrainian-language education makes children fromm Russian families speak more Ukrainian in everyday life? (i.e.,, Does Ukrainian-language education ukrainize Russian children?) )

00 Yes 00 No if no, why not? 00 Don't know

9.. Do you think that children from Russian families will have better social economic prospects if they studyy on Ukrainian schools than if they study on Russian schools?

00 Yes 00 No ifno,whynot? 00 Don't know

10.. Do you think that a good command of Ukrainian improves the career opportunities of your children? ?

00 Yes 00 No 00 Don't know

11.. Do you want your child(ren) to be fluent in Ukrainian? 00 Yes 00 Partially fluent 00 No 00 Don't know

231 1

12.. Do you want your child(ren) to know Ukrainian so well, that it will become the language they will feell most comfortable with?

00 Yes 00 They should feel equally comfortable in Ukrainian and Russian 00 No 00 Don't know

13.. Would you mind if your child (children) would come to know Ukrainian better than Russian? 00 Yes 00 No 00 Don't know

14.. Would you mind if your child(ren) lost their Russian roots? 00 Yes 00 No 00 Don't know

15.. Do you ever speak Ukrainian to your husband/wife? 00 Never 00 Seldom 00 About half of thee time 00 More Ukrainian than Russian

16.. Do you ever speak in Ukrainian to your children? 00 Never 00 Seldom 00 About half of the time 00 More Ukrainian than Russian

17.11 think that good relations exist between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. 00 Fully agree 00 Agree 00 Disagree 00 Fully disagree

18.. Do you want Russian to be a second state language? 00 Yes 00 Ukrainian should be the state language, Russian should have some official status 00 No 00 Don't know

19.. What status should Ukraine have, according to you? 00 Ukraine should remain an independent state 00 Ukraine should reunite with Russia, but must retain a substantial amount of

autonomy y 00 Ukraine should completely reunite with Russia 00 Don't know

232 2

(questionss 20 and 21 were only asked in L'viv)

20.. Do you think that your child would speak more and more Ukrainian in daily life and at home if he/shee studied at a Ukrainian school?

00 Yes if yes, would you mind? 0 Yes 00 No

00 No ifno,whynot? 00 Don't know

21.. Do you think that your child would lose his/her Russian cultural roots if he/she studied at a Ukrainiann school?

00 Yes if yes, would you mind? 0 Yes 00 No

00 No ifno,whynot? 00 Don't know

233 3

NEDERLANDSEE GEOGRAFISCHE STUDIES / NETHERLANDS GEOGRAPHICAL STUDIES

11 G MIK& J H STIKKELBROEK Verkiezingen in Rotterdam - Amsterdam/Rotterdam 1985: Knag/Economisch-Geogra-Fischh Instituut Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 130 pp, 51 figs, 8 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-009-7 Dfl 17,50

22 s MUSTERD Verschillende structuren en ontwikkelingen van woongebieden in Tilburg - Amsterdam 1985: Knag/Geografischh en Planologisch Instituut VU. 292 pp, 104 figs. 44 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-010-0 Dfl 27,75

33 M J nn is Urbanisatie, integratie en demografische respons in Jakarta — Amsterdam/Utrecht 1985: Knag/Geogra-fischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 380 pp, 14 figs, 202 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-012-7 Dfl 39,50

44 H SCHENK Views on Alleppey -- Amsterdam 1986: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Am-sterdam.. 246 pp, 41 figs. 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-011-9 Dfl 29,50

55 P J BOELHOUWER &. F M DIELEMAN (red) Wonen in de stad - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteitt Utrecht. 138 pp, 41 figs, 32 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-013-5 Dfl 19,50

66 p LUKKES &IH M VAN ROODEN De makelaardij in onroerende goederen in Nederland - Amsterdam/Groningen 1986:: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Universiteit Groningen. 102 pp, 9 fig, 28 tab ISBN 90-6809-015-1 Out of print

77 p p p HUIGEN Binnen of buiten bereik? Een sociaal-geografisch onderzoek in ZW-Friesland ~ Amsterdam/ Utrecht 1986:: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Universiteit Utrecht. 276 pp. 58 figs, 72 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-014-3 Dfl 34,00

88 v M VAN DALEN & L VAN DER LAAN (red) Werken aan de kust; verslag van het Knag-symposium over de plannen tott uitbreiding van de Ned. kust - Amsterdam 1986: Knag. 78 pp, 8 figs, 2 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-016-X Dfl 14,00

99 H KNIPPENBERG Deelname aan het lager onderwijs in Nederland gedurende de 19e eeuw - Amsterdam 1986: Knag/Instituutt Sociale Geografie Universiteit Amsterdam. 268 pp, 29 fig, 81 tab. ISBN 90-6809-017-8 Dfl 29,00

100 H J A BERENDSEN (red) Het landschap van de Bommelerwaard - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/Geografisch In-stituutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 186 pp, 71 figs, 2 maps. ISBN 90-6809-019-4 Out of print

111 M DESMIDT (red) Regionale statistiek: organisatie en onderzoek - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/Geografisch Instituutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 86 pp, 17 figs, 9 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-020-8 Dfl 14,95

122 J M VAN MOURIK Pollen profiles of slope deposits in the Galician area (NW Spain) ~ Amsterdam 1986: Knag/ Fysisch-Geografischh en Bodemkundig Laboratorium Universiteit van Amsterdam. 174 pp, 55 figs, 4 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-018-66 Out of print

133 IJ HARTS & L HINGSTMAN Verhuizingen op een rij - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijks-universiteitt Utrecht. 312 pp, 54 figs, 108 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-022-4 Dfl 38,50

144 A VAN SCHAIK Colonial control and peasant resources in Java — Amsterdam 1986: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografiee Universiteit van Amsterdam. 214 pp, 14 figs, 31 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-021-6 Dfl 27,00

155 L L J M DIRRIX. TK GRIMMIUS & P VAN DER VEEN The functioning of periodic markets in the Bombay Metropolitan Regionn - Amsterdam/Groningen 1986: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 200 pp, 38 figs, 477 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-030-5 Out of print

166 J G BORCHERT, L S BOURNE & R SINCLAIR (eds) Urban Systems in Transition - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/ Geografischh Instituut Rijksuniverseit Utrecht. 248 pp, 41 figs, 48 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-028-3 Dfl 24,90

177 p w BLAUW Suburbanisatie en sociale contacten - Amsterdam/Rotterdam 1986: Knag/Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappenn Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 168 pp, 68 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-024-0 Dfl 25,00

188 H J SCHOLTEN. R J VAN DE VELDE & p PADDING Doorstroming op de Nederlandse woningmarkt; geanalyseerd en gemodelleerdd - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 116 pp, 38 figs, 222 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-025-9 Dfl 13,00

199 F M DIELEMAN, A w p JANSEN & M DE SMIDT (red) Metamorfose van de stad; recente tendenzen van wonen en wer-kenn in Nederlandse steden - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1986: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 1344 pp, 31 figs, 22 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-026-7 Out of print

200 E vos, M NIEUWENHUIS. M HOOGENDOORN & A SENDERS Vele handen; vrouw en werk in Latijns Amerika ~ Amster-damm 1986: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut VU. 210 pp. 9 figs, 7 tabs ISBN 90-6809-027-5 Dfl 30,00

211 J H J VAN DINTEREN & H w TER HART (red) Geografie en kantoren 1985 ~ Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1986: Knag/Geo-grafischh en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Universiteit. 144 pp, 15 fig, 15 tabs ISBN 90-6809-029-1 Dfl 17,00

222 J VIJGEN, R VAN ENGELSDORP GASTELAARS Stedelijke bevolkingscategorieën in opkomst; stijlen en strategieën in hett alledaagse bestaan -- Amsterdam 1986: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 1222 pp, 3 figs, 40 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-031-3 Dfl 15,00

233 H J MÜCHER Aspects of loess and loess-derived slope deposits - Amsterdam 1986: Knag/Fysisch-Geografisch en Bodemkundigg Laboratorium Universiteit v Amsterdam. 268 pp, 42 figs, 9 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-032-1 Out of print

244 p HENDRIKS De relationele definitie van begrippen - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1986: Knag/Geografisch en Planolo-gischh Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 282 pp, 28 figs, 7 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-033-X Dfl 30,00

255 J M G KLEINPENNING (ed) Competition for rural and urban space in Latin America; its consequences for low incomee groups - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1986: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Univer-siteitt Nijmegen. 178 pp, 36 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-034-8 Dfl 22,50

266 l BUURSINK & E WEVER (red) Regio en ontwikkeling -- Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1986: Knag/Geografisch-Planolo-gischh Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 160 pp, 41 figs, 50 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-035-6 Dfl 20,00

277 G CLARK, P DOSTAL A F THISSEN (eds) Rural research and planning: the Netherlands and Great Britain - Amster-damm 1987: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 88 pp, 6 figs, 4 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-037-22 Dfl 10,00

288 w M KARREMAN & M DE SMIDT (red) Redevoeringen en kleine geschriften van Prof A C de Vooys -- Amsterdam/ Utrechtt 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 156 pp, 8 figs, 5 tabs. ISBN 90- 6809-036-4 Dfll 21,70

299 G PEPERKAMP (red) Mens en milieu in de derde wereld -- Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1987: Knag/Geografisch en Pla-nologischh Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 146 pp, 17 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-038-0 Dfl 20,00

300 A R WOLTERS & A PIERSMA Beschermde reservaten? — Amsterdam/Groningen 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteitt Groningen. 184 pp, 47 figs, 4 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-039-9 Out of print

311 w j VAN DEN BREMEN & P H PELLENBARG (red) Het geografisch plechtanker: eenheid in verscheidenheid. Liber amicorumm Rob Tamsma - Amsterdam/Groningen 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 3366 pp, 58 figs. 22 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-040-2 Dfl 35.00

322 G MIK Segregatie in het grootstedelijk milieu - Amsterdam/Rotterdam 1987: Knag/Economisch-Geografisch Insti-tuutt Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 252 pp. 48 figs, 45 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-041-0 Dfl 25,00

333 H I M GOVERDE Macht over de Markerruimt e - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1987: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituutt Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 480 pp. 26 figs. 22 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-042-9 Dfl 57,50

344 p p GROENEWEGEN, J P MACKENBAC H & M H STIJNENBOSCH (red) Geografie van gezondheid en gezondheidszorg -Amsterdam/Utrechtt 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 132 pp, 25 fig. 19 tabs ISBN 90-6809-O43-77 Out of print

355 R TER BRUGGE & E WEVER (red) Energiebeleid; het Nederlandse energiebeleid in ruimtelij k perspectief -- Amster-dam/Groningen/Nijmegenn 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Groningen/Geografisch en Planolo-gischh Instituut Katholieke Universiteit. 132 pp, 21 figs. 18 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-044-5 Dfl 18,00

366 J A VAN DER SCHEE Kij k op kaarten - Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut van de Vrij e Universiteitt Amsterdam. 312 pp, 42 figs, 58 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-045-3 Dfl 39,50

377 o VERKOREN & J VAN WEESEP (eds) Spatial mobility and urban change - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/Geogra-fischfisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 180 pp, 17 figs, 45 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-051-8 Dfl 24,75

388 M w DE JONG New economic activities and regional dynamics - Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Economisch-Geogra-fischfisch Instituut Universiteit van Amsterdam. 200 pp, 26 figs, 27 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-046-1 Dfl 29,00

399 A c M JANSEN Bier in Nederland en België; een geografie van de smaak ~ Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Economisch-Geografischh Instituut Universiteit van Amsterdam. 282 pp, 14 figs, 7 tabs. ISBN 9O-6809-047-X Dfl 37,50

400 Y c J BROUWERS, M c DEURLOO & L DE KLERK Selectieve verhuisbewegingen en segregatie; de invloed van de etnischee samenstelling van de woonomgeving op verhuisgedrag ~ Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografiee Universiteit van Amsterdam. 112 pp, 9 figs. 22 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-048-8 Dfl 16.00

411 R j SCHOUW & F M DIELEMA N Echtscheiding en woningmarkt - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/Geografisch In-stituutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 98 pp, 8 figs, 21 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-049-6 Dfl 14,95

422 j G GROENENDIJK De positie van dorpen in het beleid van Nederlandse plattelandsgemeenten - Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Instituu tt Sociale Geografie Universiteit Amsterdam. 314 pp, 22 fig, 55 tab ISBN 90-6809-050-X Dfl 31,50

433 J G BORCHERT & j BUURS1NK (red) Citymarketin g en geografie -- Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1987: Knag/Geografisch enn Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Universiteit. 172 pp, 32 figs, 14 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-052-6 Out of print

444 j J M ANGENENT SL A BONGEN AAR (eds) Planning without a passport: the future of European spatial planning ~ Amsterdamm 1987: Knag/Siswo. 184 pp, 26 figs, 7 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-053 Dlf 24,90

455 R c VAN DER MARK , A H PERRELS & J J REYNDERS Kansen voor het Noorden; een beleidsstrategisch onderzoek naar nieuwee technologie - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht/Econo-mischee Faculteit Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 168 pp, 54 figs, 41 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-054-2 Dfl 22,50

466 J J STERRENBURG Rural development and rural development policies: cases from Afric a and Asia - Amsterdam/ Utrechtt 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 196 pp, 13 figs, 14 tabs. ISBN 90- 6809-055-00 Out of print

477 c CORTIE Alkmaar, van streekcentrum naar groeikern - Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteitt van Amsterdam. 204 pp, 28 figs, 39 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-056-9 Dfl 25,00

488 J A A M KOK & P H PELLENBARG (red) Buitenlandse bedrijven in Nederland - Amsterdam/Groningen 1987: Knag/ Geografischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 112 pp,. 17 figs, 30 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-059-3 Out of print

499 T DIETZ Pastoralists in Dire Straits; survival strategies and external interventions in a semi-arid region -- Amster-damm 1987: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 332 pp, 34 figs, 66 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-057-77 Out of print

500 F J J H VAN HOORN Onder anderen; effekten van de vestiging van Mediterranen in naoorlogse wijken -- Amster-dam/Utrechtt 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 226 pp, 36 figs. 55 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-060-77 Dfl 29,70

511 M J DIJST SL C CORTIE Universiteit en revitalisering - Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteitt van Amsterdam. 140 pp, 6 figs, 13 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-058-5 Dfl 17,00

522 Planologie als kleurbepaling; de rol van toonaangevende instellingen en bedrijven op de ontwikkeling van de Amsterdamsee Museum- en Concertgebouwbuurt - Amsterdam 1987: Knag/Centrum Beleidsadviserend Onder-zoek.. 164 pp. 2 figs, 23 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-061-5 Dfl 25,00

533 J VERHORST k M H STIJNENBOSCH Bedrijvigheid en stadsvernieuwing; analyse van de bedrijvigheidsontwikkeling in enkelee stadsvernieuwingsgebieden in Utrecht en Den Haag - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/ Geografisch Insti-tuutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 112 pp, 47 figs, 25 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-063-1 Dfl 15,70

544 B G J DRIESSEN, R VERHOEF & J G P TER WELLE-HEETHUI S Overheid en bevolkingsontwikkelingen; een onderzoek naarr autonome en niet-autonome bevolkingsontwikkelingen in Arnhem en Utrecht ~ Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/Geografischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 166 pp, 53 figs, 42 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-O64-X Dfl 23,30

555 0 A L e ATZEMA , P P P HUIGEN, A G A DE VOCHT SL C R VOLKERS De bereikbaarheid van voorzieningen in Noord-Nederlandd ~ Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 220 pp, 49 figs, 1222 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-065-8 Dfl 24,00

566 P c BEUKENKAMP , G A HOEKVEL D & A MUDDE (red) Geografie en onderwijstelevisie - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1987: Knag/Geografischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 222 pp, 29 ftgs, 6 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-066-6 Dfl 26,50

577 G CARDOL Ruimte voor agribusiness-complexen; structuur, positie en dynamiek van het Noordlimburgse tuin-bouwcomplexx - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1988: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.. 312 pp, 34 figs, 57 tabs.. ISBN 9O-6809-O67-4 Dfl 30,00

588 M JANSEN-VERBEKE Leisure, recreation and tourism in inner cities -- Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1988: Knag/Geogra-fischfisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Universiteit. 316 pp, 61 fig. 51 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-068-2 Out of print

599 A H H M KEMPERS-WARMERDA M Vergrijzen in het groen; het bereik van ouderen en de bereikbaarheid van voorzie-ningenn in landelijke gebieden - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 2366 pp, 47 figs. 70 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-069-0 Dfl 29,50

600 PJ BOELHOUWER De verkoop van woningwetwoningen - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteitt Utrecht. 208 pp, 49 figs, 122 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-070-4 Dfl 29,30

611 A G J DIETVORST& M c JANSEN-VERBEKE De binnenstad: kader van een sociaal perpetuum mobile; een literatuur -studiee naar tijdsbesteding en binnenstadsgebruik - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1988: Knag/Geografisch en Planolo-gischh Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 240 pp, 10 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-071-2 Dfl 30.00

622 H SCHRETTENBRUNNER & J VAN WESTRHENEN Empirische Forschung und Computer im Geographie-unterricht -Amsterdamm 1988: Knag/Centrum v Educatieve Geografie VU. 120 pp, 27 figs. ISBN 90-6809-072-0 Out of print

633 H J A BERENDSEN & H VAN STEUN (red) Nieuwe karteringsmethoden in de fysische geografie ~ Amsterdam/ Utrechtt 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Utrecht. 176 pp, 56 figs, 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-073- 9 Dfl 22,50

644 A G J DIETVORST A i P M KWAA D (eds) Geographical research in the Netherlands 1978-1987 - Amsterdam. 1988: Knag/IGUU Netherlands. 262 pp, 7 figs, 2 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-074-7 Dfl 33,00

655 J VAN WEESEP Appartementsrechten; het gebruik van het splitsingregime - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1988: Knag/ Geografischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 94 pp, 4 figs, 16 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-075-5 Dfl 14,50

666 T w A EPPINK Choice of mathematical models in geographic research considering alternatives ~ Amsterdam/ Nijmegenn 1988: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 244 pp, 74 figs, 499 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-076-3 Dfl 30,00

677 j HINDERIN K & E SZULC-DABROWIECK A (eds) Successful rural development in Third World Countries - Amster-dam/Utrechtt 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 256 pp, 14 figs, 20 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-077-11 Dfl 31,50

688 s BARENDS. J D H HARTEN, J RENES, J VERHORST& K E VAN DER wtELEN (red) Planning in het verleden - Amsterdam /Utrechtt 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Universiteit Utrecht. 192 pp, 71 figs. ISBN 90-6809-078-X Dfl 26,00

699 J MANSVELT BECK The rise of a subsidized periphery in Spain — Amsterdam 1988: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografiee Universiteit van Amsterdam. 286 pp. 15 figs, 28 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-079-8 Dfl 37,50

700 s SMITH Kleinschalige industrie in Latijn s Amerika; een studie van de ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden in Aguasca-lientes,, Mexico - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1988: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Univer-siteitt Nijmegen. 422 pp, 4 figs, 16 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-080-1 Dfl 42,50

711 w DWARKASING . D HANEMAAYER , M DE SMIDT 4. P P TORDOIR Ruimte voor hoogwaardige kantoren; onderzoek naar toplocatiess voorde commerciële kantorensector ~ Amsterdam/Utrecht/Leiden/Delft 1988: Knag/Geografisch In-stituutt Utrecht/Research voor Beleid/Inro-tno. 112 pp, 7 figs, 44 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-081-X Out of print

722 p J KORTEWEG Dynamiek en immobilitei t in naoorlogse woonwijken in Alkmaar, Haarlem en Purmerend - Am-sterdam/Utrechtt 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 144 pp, 21 figs. 34 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-082-88 Dfl 20,90

733 P J WUERS Land prices in Tokyo - Amsterdam 1988: Knag/Economisch-Geografisch Instituut Universiteit van Amsterdam.. 84 pp, 12 figs, 8 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-084-4 Dfl 47,50

744 J VAN MOURIK (red) Landschap in beweging; ontwikkeling en bewoning van een stuifzandgebied in de Kempen --Amsterdamm 1988: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit van Amsterdam. 197 pp, 95 figs, 1 tab.. ISBN 90-6809-083-6 Dfl 30,00

755 w j M OSTENDORF Het sociaal profiel van de gemeente; woonmilieudifferentiatie en de vorming van het stadsge-westt Amsterdam - Amsterdam 1988: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 1922 pp, 12 figs, 26 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-085-2 Dfl 23,00

766 J DE BRUIN & J A KOETSIER (red) De kracht van de regio; sociaal-economische ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden van de regioo -- Amsterdam 1988: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 104 pp, 12 figs, 6 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-086-0 Dfl 15,00

777 A G M VAN DER SMAGTA p H J HENDRIKS (red) Methoden op een keerpunt; opstellen aangeboden aan prof drs P J WW Kouwe - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1988: Knag/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.. 170 pp, 29 figs, 10 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-087-9 Dfl 25.00

788 c VAN DER POST, Migrant s and migrant-labour absorption in large and small centres in Swaziland - Amsterdam/ Utrechtt 1988: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Utrecht. 310 pp, 32 figs, 84 tabs. ISBN 90- 6809-088-7 Dfl 35,00

799 L J DE HAAN Overheid en regionale integratie van de savanne in Togo 1885-1985 -- Amsterdam 1988: Knag/Insti-tuutt v Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 304 pp, 31 figs, 65 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-089-5 Dfl 33,00

800 L H VAN WUNGAARDEN-BAKKE R & IJ M VAN DER MEER (eds) Spatial sciences, research in progress: Proceedings of diee symposium 'Spatial sciences, research in progress* - Amsterdam 1988: Knag/ Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Weten-schappenn Universiteit van Amsterdam. 112 pp, 16 figs, 2 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-091-7 Dfl 24,00

811 F M H M DRIESSEN & J H VAN HOUWEUNGEN Vrij e tijd en korte verblijfsrecreatie - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1988: Knag/Bureauu Driessen. 256 pp, 25 figs, 146 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-095-X Dfl 15,00

822 G HOEKVELD-MEUE R &. G i SCHUTTE Aardrijkskund e gebiedenderwijs; tekst en uitleg bij het schrijven, lezen, denkenn en leren over gebieden en verschijnselen in gebieden - Amsterdam 1988: Knag/Centrum voor Educa-tievee Geografie Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 252 pp, 76 figs, 12 tabs. Out of print

833 P K DOORN Social structure and spatial mobility: composition and dynamics of the Dutch labour force - Amster-dam/Utrechtt 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 262 pp, 72 figs, 41 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-092-55 Dfl 31,50

844 A LOEVE Buitenlandse ondernemingen in regionaal perspectief; vestigingsstrategieën en regionale effecten van buitenlandsee bedrijven in Nederland - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.. 272 pp. 49 figs, 78 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-093-3 Dfl 32,00

855 D H DE BAKKE R Ruraal nederzettingenpatroon en beleid; ontwikkelingen in ZW-Friesland - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989:: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Universiteit Utrecht. 230 pp, 32 figs, 68 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-094-1 Dfl 29,00

866 L J PAUL (ed) Post-war development of regional geography; with special attention to the United Kingdom, Bel-gium,, and the Netherlands - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 88 pp,, 15 figs, 5 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-096-8 Dfl 14,00

877 p HOEKSTRA River outflow, depositional processes and coastal morphodynamics in a monsoon-dominated deltaic environment,, East Java, Indonesia - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.. 220 pp, 77 figs, 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-097-6 Dfl 28,50

888 E LENSINK Intermediair e diensten in landelijke gebieden - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1989: Knag/Faculteit Beleids-wetenschappenn Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 246 pp, 21 figs, 65 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-098-4 Dfl 30,00

899 p p p HUIGEN & M c H M VAN DE VELDEN (red) De achterkant van verstedelijkt Nederland; de positie en fiinkti e vann landelijke gebieden in de Nederlandse samenleving - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Insti-tuutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 181 pp, 25 figs, 46 labs. ISBN 90-6809-100-X Out of print

900 J H J VAN DINTEREN Zakelijk e diensten en middelgrote steden, een onderzoek naar dienstverleningsbedrij ven in Noord-Brabant,, Gelderland en Overijssel - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1989: Knag/Faculteit der Beleidswetenschap-penn Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 312 pp, 28 figs. 84 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-099-2 Dfl 40,00

911 L VAN DER LAAN. H SCHOLTEN & G A VAN DER KNAAP Het regionaal arbeidsaanbod in Nederland -- Amsterdam/ Rotterdamm 1989: Knag/Economisch-Geografisch Instituut Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 128 pp, 27 figs, 28 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-101-8 Dfl 17,50

922 c CLARK, p HUIGEN & F THISSEN (eds) Planning and the future of the countryside: Great Britai n and the Nether-landss - Amsterdam 1989: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 240 pp, 25 figs, 433 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-102-6 Dfl 35.00

933 J A VAN DEN BERG Variabilit y of parameters for modelling soil moisture conditions; studies on loamy to silty soilss on marly bedrock in me Ardêche drainage basin, France - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 214 pp, 76 figs, 16 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-103-4 Dfl 28,50

944 o VERKOREN Huizen op de hoogvlakte; een residentieel-geografische verkenning van La Paz, Bolivia - Am-sterdam/Utrechtt 1989: Knag/Geograftsch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 210 pp, 29 figs, 16 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-104-22 Dfl 32,00

955 G MIK (red) Herstructurerin g in Rotterdam; modernisering en internationalisering en de Kop van Zuid - Am-sterdam/Rotterdamm 1989: Knag/Economisch Geografisch Instituut Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 324 pp. 86 figs.. 54 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-105-0 Dfl 30,00

966 p BEEKMAN , P VAN LINDERT , i POST &. W PRINS Huisvestingsbeleid en informele bouw in de derde wereld - Am-sterdamm 1989: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 174 pp, 9 figs, 25 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-106-9 Dfl 30,00

977 j G L PALTE Upland farming on Java, Indonesia -- Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuni-versiteitt Utrecht. 256 pp, 15 figs, 38 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-107-7 Dfl 34,50

988 P VAN GENUCHTEN Movement mechanisms and slide velocity variations of landslides in varved clays in the Frenchh Alps - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 160 pp, 70 figs, 177 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-108-5 Dfl 25,00

999 M DE SMIDT & E WEVER (eds) Regional and local economic policies and technology - Amsterdam/Utrecht/ Nijmegenn 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht/Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut Katholiekee Universiteit Nijmegen. 156 pp, 53 figs, 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-109-3 Dfl 24,00

1000 p j H RIEMENS On the foreign operations of mird world firms - Amsterdam 1989: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografiee Universiteit van Amsterdam. 148 pp, 20 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-110-7 Dfl 30,00

1011 G B M PEDROLI The nature of landscape; a contribution to landscape ecology and ecohydrology with examples fromm the Strijper Aa landscape - Amsterdam 1989: Knag/Fysisch-Geografisch en Bodemkundig Laboratorium Universiteitt van Amsterdam. 164 pp. 43 figs, 18 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-111-5 Dfl 25,00

1022 H LEENAERS The dispersal of metal mining wastes in the catchment of the river Geul, Belgium-the Netherlands ~~ Amsterdam/Utrecht 1989: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 230 pp, 95 figs, 52 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-112-3 Dfl 30,00

1033 G A HOEKVELD . G SCHOENMAKER & j VAN WESTRHENEN Wijkende grenzen -- Amsterdam 1989: Knag/Centrum voorr Educatieve Geografie VU. 216 pp, 38 figs, 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-113-1 Out of print

1044 p c j DRUUVEN Mandenvlechters en Mexcalstokers in Mexico -- Amsterdam 1990: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografiee Universiteit van Amsterdam. 294 pp, 21 figs, 55 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-114-X Out of print

1055 w BLEUTEN De verwatering van meststoffen; analyse en modellering van de relaties tussen landgebruik en waterkwaliteitt in het stroomgebied van de Langbroeker Wetering - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geogra-fischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 262 pp, 80 figs, 31 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-115-8 Dfl 37,00

1066 J VAN WEESEP & p KORCELL I (eds) Residential mobility and social change; studies from Poland and the Nether-landss - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 182 pp. 46 figs, 34 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-116-6 Out of print

1077 M VAN HERWUNEN, R JANSSEN ft P RIETVEL D Herbestemming van landbouwgrond -- Amsterdam 1990: Knag/Insti-tuutt Milieuvraagstukken Vrij e Universiteit. 110 pp, 33 figs, 12 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-117* Dfl 25,00

1088 D H DRENTH De informatica-sector in Nederland tussen rij p en groen - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1990: Knag/Fa-culteitt Beleidswetenschappen Katholieke Universiteit. 268 pp, 24 figs, 87 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-118-2 Dfl 37,50

1099 H KNOL & w MANSHANDEN Functionele samenhang in de noordvleugel van de Randstad - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990:: Knag/Economisch-Geografisch Instituut Universiteit van Amsterdam/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversi-teitt Utrecht. 112 pp, 26 figs, 27 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-119-0 Dfl 19,50

1100 C D EYSBERG The Californian wine economy ~ Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuni-versiteitt Utrecht. 272 pp, 64 figs, 26 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-121-2 Dfl 29,75

1111 J w A DUKMAN S Aspects of geomorphology and thermoluminescence dating of cold climate eolian sands ~ Amsterdam/Utrechtt 1990: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 256 pp, 119 figs, 19 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-120-4 Dfl 36,50

1122 H TER HEIDE <ed) Technological change and spatial policy - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geografisch Insti-tuutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 218 pp, 9 figs, 31 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-122-0 Dfl 29,00

1133 i L M VAN HEES De ontwikkeling van een woningmarktmodel en zijn toepassing op Itali ë - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1990:: Knag/Faculteit der Beleidswetenschappen Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 196 pp, 12 figs, 26 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-123-9 Dfl 35,00

1144 M R HENDRIK S Regionalisation of hydrological data: effects of lithology and land use on storm runoff in east Luxembourgg - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 174 pp, 23 figs, 500 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-124-7 Dfl 26,00

1155 PH RENOOY The informal economy -- Amsterdam 1990: Knag/Regioplan. 204 pp, 12 figs, 21 labs. ISBN 90-6809-125-55 Dn 35,00

1166 J H T KRAME R Luchthavens en hun uitstralin g - Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1990: Knag/Faculteit der Beleidsweten-schappenn Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 312 pp, 47 figs, 60 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-126-3 Dfl 55,00

1177 M DE KWAASTENIE T Denomination and primary education in the Netherlands 1870-1984 - Amsterdam/ Florence 1990:: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam/European University Institute Florence.. 268 pp, 28 figs, 39 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-127-1 Dfl 36,00

1188 w p M F IVENS Atmospheric deposition onto forests: an analysis of the deposition variabilit y by means of throughfalll measurements - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 1566 pp, 53 figs, 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-128-X Dfl 25,00

1199 R HASSINK Herstructurerin g en innovatiebevordering in het Ruhrgebied - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1990: Knag/Geografischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 122 pp, 20 figs, 18 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-120-8 Dfl 24,00

1200 p p SCHOT Solute transport by groundwater flow to wetland ecosystems; the environmental impact of human activitiess - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1991: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 136 pp, 27 figs, 9 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-130-1 Dfl 25,00

1211 s DEN HENGST 4. B DE PATER (red) Externe relaties en regionale ontwikkeling: voorbeelden uit Spanje en Portugal -- Amsterdam/Utrecht 1991: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 198 pp, 31 figs, 27 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-131-X Dfl 29,50

1222 j KROES Onvolledige opstrek op de Nederlandse zandgronden - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1991: Knag/Geografisch Instituutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 256 pp, 65 figs. ISBN 90-6809-132-8 Dfl 35,00

1233 H s VERDUIN-MULLE R Serving the knowledge-based society: research on knowledge products - Amsterdam/ Utrechtt 1991: Knag/Geografisch Inst. Universiteit Utrecht. 116 pp, 3 figs. ISBN 90-6809-133-6 Dfl 24,00

1244 F MULDER Assessment of landslide hazard - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1991: Knag/Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniver-siteitt Utrecht. 156 pp, 59 figs, 25 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-134 Dfl 29,50

1255 M vis Processes and patterns of erosion in natural and disturbed Andean forest ecosystems - Amsterdam 1991: Knag/Fysischh Geografisch en Bodemkundig Laboratorium Universiteit van Amsterdam. 190 pp, 70 figs, 40 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-136-0 Dfl 12,00

1266 v EIFF Beleid voor bedrijfsterreinen ~ Amsterdam 1991: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam.. 214 pp, 13 figs, 18 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-135-2 Dfl 37,50

1277 o ATZEM A Stad uit, stad in; residentiele suburbanisatie in Nederland - Amsterdam/Utrecht 1991: Knag/ Geo-grafischh Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 274 pp, 57 figs, 80 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-137-9 Dfl 37,50

1288 M HULSHOF Zatopec moves; networks and remittances of US-bound migrants from Oaxaca, Mexico ~ Am-sterdamm 1991: Knag/lnstituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 106 pp, 6 fics, 14 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-138-7 Dfl 18,50

1299 JMJ DOOMERNIK Turkse moskeeën en maatschappelijke participatie; de institutionalisering van de Turkse Islam inn Nederland en de Duitse Bondsrepubliek - Amsterdam 1991: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Univer-siteitt van Amsterdam. 200 pp, 30 figs, 1 tab. ISBN 90-6809-139-5 Dft 32,50

1300 M DESMIDT, A GRANBERGA E WEVER (eds) Regional development strategies and territoria l production complexes; aa Dutch-USSR perspective -- Amsterdam 1991: Knag. 216 pp, 25 figs., 40 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-140-9 Dfl 29,50

1311 p MISDORP Centrale begrippen in de sociale geografie; een conceptuele analyse van engelstalige leerboeken -Amsterdamm 1991: Knag/Ipart o 316 pp. 39 figs, 51 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-141-7 Dfl 39,50

1322 M DESMIDT& E WEVER (eds) Complexes, formations and networks - Utrecht/Nijmegen 1991: Knag/ Geogra-fischfisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht/ Faculteit Beleidswetenschappen Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 150 pp,, 32 figs, 17 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-142-5 Out of print

1333 i i Y CASTEL Late Holocene eolian drif t sands in Drenthe -- Amsterdam/Utrecht 1991: Knag/Geografisch Insti-tuutt Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 162 pp, 49 figs, 15 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-143-3 Dfl 29,50

1344 I G BORCHERT & M DE KRUYF Bevolkingsgroei ter wille van het voorzieningenniveau? - Utrecht 1991: Knag/ Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 78 pp, 4 figs, 15 tabs ISBN 90-6809-144-1 Dfll 18,00

1355 R VAN DER VAART Educatief ontwerpen met geografie; een studie betreffende de structurering van geografische kenniss voor educatieve doeleinden ~ Utrecht 1991: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.. 256 pp, 84 figs. ISBN 90-6809-I45-X Dfl 36.00

1366 PVAN UNDERT Huisvestigingsstrategieën van lage-inkomensgroepen in La Paz - Utrecht 1991: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 320 pp, 34 figs, 26 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-146-8 Dfl 34,50

1377 J M M VAN AMERSFOORT & H KNIPPENBERG (eds) States and nations: the rebirth of the 'nationalities question' in Europee - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1991: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 198 pp,, 20 figs, 12 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-147-6 Out of print

1388 PVAN TEEFFELEN Dienstencentra en rurale ontwikkeling; een onderzoek naar het aanbod en gebruik van over-heidsdienstenn in Mali , Afrik a - Utrecht 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.. 256 pp, 70 figs, 40 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-148 Dfl 34.50

1399 T H M VAN DER LOOP Industrial dynamics and fragmented labour markets. Construction firms and labourers in Indiaa - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1992: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 350 pp, 300 figs, 71 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-149-2 Dfl 49,50

1400 H VAN DER WUSTEN (ed) The urban political arena; geographies of public administration - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1992:: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 192 pp, 28 figs. 12 tabs ISBN 90-6809-150-66 Dfl 35,00

1411 B D HOEKSTRA Informatienetwerken rondom bedrijven; de bibliotheek als informatieleverancier voor het bedrijfs-levenn - Utrecht/Groningen 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 112 pp,, 16 figs, 8 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-151-4 Dfl 25,00

1422 H SCHRETTENBRUNNER & i VAN WESTRHENEN (eds) Empirical research and geography teaching ~ Utrecht/Am-sterdamm 1992: Knag/Centrum voor Educatieve Geografie Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 190 pp, 48 fics 38 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-152-2 Dfl 30,00

1433 J VAN BECKUM &. c VAN DER BURG Naar een online videotex geografisch informatiesysteem voor educatieve toe-passingen;; het Giset Project 1987-1992 - Utrecht 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuni-versiteitt Utrecht. 224 pp, 19 figs, 30 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-153-0 Dfl 29,50

1444 c P TERLOUW The regional geography of the world-system: external arena, periphery, semiperiphery, core -Utrechtt 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 240 pp, 74 figs, 39 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-156-5 Out of print

1455 R HASSINK Regional innovation policy: case-studies from the Ruhr Area, Baden-Wurttemberg and the North East off England - Utrecht 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 196 pp, 27 figs,, 28 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-155-7 Out of print

1466 H REITSMA, T DIETZ & L DE HAAN (eds) Coping with semiaridity; how the rural poor survive in dry season envi-ronmentss - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1992: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 202 pp,, 18 figs, 19 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-154-9 Dfl 32,00

1477 M HESSELS Locational dynamics of business services; an intrametropolitan study on the Randstad Holland -Utrechtt 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 232 pp, 25 figs, 79 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-157-3 Dfl 34,50

1488 J KANT Geografen en planologen op de arbeidsmarkt; het succes op de arbeidsmarkt van geografen en plano-logen,, afgestudeerd in de periode september 1987 - augustus 1990 - Utrecht 1992: Knag/Stichting Geografen-werk.. 176 pp, 39 figs, 41 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-158-1 Dfl 26,00

1499 R VAN DER VAART (red) Aardrijkskund e in de basisvorming - Utrecht 1992: Knag/ Faculteit Ruimtelijk e We-tenschappenn Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 176 pp, 44 figs, 2 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-159-X Dfl 32,50

1500 M R SCHEFFER Trading places; fashion, retailers and the changing geography of clothing production - Utrecht 1992:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 270 pp, 37 figs, 34 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-160-33 Out of print

1511 p p GROENEWEGEN & p p p HUIGEN (eds) Micro-macro vraagstukken in de sociologie en de sociale geografie -Utrechtt 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 140 pp, 15 figs, 9 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-161-1 Dfl 25,00

1522 p VAN TEEFFELEN. L VAN GRUNSVEN & O VERKOREN (eds) Possibilities and constraints of GIS applications in developingg countries - Utrecht 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 126 pp.. 16 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-162-X Out of print

1533 L J PAUL, p p p HUIGEN & c R VOLKERS (eds) The changing function and position of rural areas in Europe -Utrechtt 1992: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. 192 pp, 34 figs, 16 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-163-8 Out of print

1544 p LUCAS & G M R A VAN OORT Dynamiek in een stadsrandzone; werken en wonen in de stadsrandzone van de agglomeratiee Utrecht - Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 396 pp, 1055 figs, 41 tabs, 20 photographs. ISBN 90-6809-164-6 Dfl 48,00

1555 E DIRVEN, J GROENEWEGEN & s VAN HOOF (eds) Stuck in the region? Changing scales for regional identity -Utrechtt 1993: Knag/Vereniging van Utrechtse Geografie Studenten Vugs. 126 pp, 17 figs, 2 tabs. ISBN 90 6809-16544 Out of print

1566 G DRAAIJERS The variabilit y of atmospheric deposition to forests; the effects of canopy structure and forest edges -- Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 54 figs, 26 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-166-2 Dfl 34,00

1577 A P i DE ROO Modelling surface runoff and soil erosion in catchments using Geographical Information Systems --Utrechtt 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 295 pp, 84 figs, 85 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-167-00 Out of print

1588 R VERHOEFF De weg naar de podia; ruimtelijk e aspecten van het bezoek aan podiumkunsten in Nederland ~ Utrechtt 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 20 figs, 48 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-168-99 Dfl 35,00

1599 H ZONDAG Regio en bedrijfseconomische vitaliteit - Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteitt Utrecht. 208 pp. 17 figs. 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-169-7 Dfl 34,50

1600 T SPIT Strangled in structures; an institutional analysis of innovative policy by Dutch municipalities - Utrecht 1993:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 192 pp, 36 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-170-00 Dfl 32,50

1611 J HAUER &. G HOEKVEL D (eds) Moving regions -- Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteitt Utrecht. 280 pp, 74 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-173-5 Out of print

1622 A BARENDREGT Hydro-ecology of the Dutch polder landscape - Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e We-tenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 34 figs, 31 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-175-1 Dfl 34,50

1633 G B M HEUVELINK . Error propagation in quantitative spatial modelling applications in GIS - Utrecht 1993: Knag/ Faculteitt Ruimt Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 160 pp, 37 fig, 8 tab ISBN 90-6809-176-X Out of print

1644 J R RITSEMA VAN ECK Analyse van transportnetwerken in GIS voor sociaal-geografisch onderzoek - Utrecht 1993:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 206 pp, 56 figs, 17 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-177-88 Dfl 35,00

1655 P VAESSEN Small business growth in contrasting environments - Utrecht/Nijmegen 1993: Knag/Faculteit Be-leidswetenschappenn Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. 228 pp, 9 figs, 3 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-178-6 Dfl 35,00

1666 T E TÖRNQVIST Fluvial sedimentary geology and chronology of the Holocene Rhine-Meuse delta, The Nether-landss - Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 176 pp, 66 figs, 13 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-179-4 Dfl 32,00

1677 p j M VAN STEEN (red) Geografie in beweging; liber amicorum Pieter Lukkes ~ Utrecht/Groningen 1993: Knag/ Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 216 pp, 36 figs, 17 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-180-88 Dfl 35,00

1688 E J A HARTS-BROEKHUI S &. A A DE JONG Subsistence and survival in the Sahel; responses of households and enter-prisess to deterioriating conditions and development policy in the Mopti Region of Mali — Utrecht 1993: Knag/ Faculteitt Ruimt. Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 464 pp, 42 figs, 69 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-181-6 Dfl 49,50

1699 F FILIUS Huishoudensopheffing en woningverlating in een vergrijzende samenleving - Utrecht 1993: Knag/ Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 224 pp, 28 figs, 37 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-182-4 Dfll 32,50

1700 v SCHUTJENS Dynamiek in het draagvlak; huishoudensontwikkelingen en winketbestedingen in oudere na-oorlogsee wijken - Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 240 pp, 19 figs,, 31 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-183-2 Dfl 34.50

1711 j KWADUK The impact of climate change on the discharge of the River Rhine - Utrecht 1993: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 80 figs, 20 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-184-0 Dfl 30,00

1722 E c A BOLSIUS. G CLARK & J G GROENENDIJK (eds) The retreat: rural land-use and European agricultur e - Utrecht/ Amsterdamm 1993: Knag/Department of Human Geography Faculty of Environmental Sciences University of Amsterdam.. 168 pp. 12 figs, 26 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-185-9 Dfl 33,50

1733 p HOOIMEUER, G A VAN DER KNAAP, J VAN WEESEP & R I WOODS (eds) Population dynamics in Europe; current issuess in population geography — Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht.. 192 pp, 29 figs, 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-187-5 Dfl 35,00

1744 j w H VAN DE MEEN E The shoreface-connected ridges along the Dutch coast - Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 246 pp, 83 figs, 28 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-188-3 Dfl 44,00

1755 F R BRUINSMA De invloed van transportinfrastructuu r op ruimtelijk e patronen van economische activiteiten -Utrecht/Amsterdamm 1994: Knag/Vakgroep Ruimtelijk e Economie Vrij e Universiteit. 272 pp, 33 figs, 64 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-189-1 Dfl 42,50.

1766 H CLOUT (ed) Europe's cities in the late twentieth century - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1994: Knag/Department of Humann Geography University of Amsterdam. 218 pp, 50 figs, 39 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-190-5 Dfl 35,00.

1777 s M DE JONG Applications of reflective remote sensing for land degradation studies in a Mediterranean environ-mentt - Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 256 pp, 64 figs, 31 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-191-3 Dfl 39.00.

1788 A KROON Sediment transport and morphodynamics of the beach and nearshore zone near Egmond, the Nether-landss - Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 284 pp, 138 figs, 9 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-192-1 Dfl 39.00.

1799 c p TERLOUW (eds) Methodological exercises in regional geography: France as an example - Utrecht/Amster-damm 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht/Centrum voor Educatieve Geografie Vrij ee Universiteit Amsterdam. 226 pp, 96 figs, 15 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-193-X Dfl 36,00.

1800 H HUISMAN Planning for rural development: experiences and alternatives; Cases from Indonesia and Lesotho -Utrechtt 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 240 pp. 9 figs. 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-194-88 Dfl 37,00.

1811 P DICKEN & M QUÉVIT (eds) Transnational corporations and European regional restructurin g — Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 168 pp, 5 figs, 54 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-195-6 Dfll 30,00.

1822 H TER HEIDE & D WUNBELT Tussen kennen en kunnen: over de verbinding van onderzoek en ruimtelij k ontwerp; verslagg van een verkenning en van een symposium - Utrecht/Den Haag 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e We-tenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht/Rijksplanologische Dienst. 160 pp, 11 figs, 1 tab. ISBN 90-6809-196-4 Dfll 29,00

1833 M GROTHE. H J SCHOLTEN & M VAN DER BEEK GIS, noodzaak of luxe? Een verkenning naar het gebruik van geo-grafischee informatiesystemen bij private ondernemingen in Nederland -- Utrecht/Amsterdam 1994: Knag/ Vakgroepp Ruimtelijk e Economie Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 128 pp, 21 figs, 27 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-199-9 Dfll 49.95

1844 M F p BIERKENS Complex confining layers; a stochastic analysis of hydraulic properties at various scales -Utrechtt 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschapoen Universiteit Utrecht. 272 pp, 102 figs, 29 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-200-66 Dfl 39,00

1855 F BARNHOORN. R JANSEN. H TH RIEZEBOS & J J STERKENBURG Sustainable development in Botswana; an analysis of resourcee mangement in three communal development areas -- Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e We-tenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 160 pp, 21 figs, 46 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-201-4 Dfl 35,00

1866 A HARTS-BROEKHUI S A O VERKOREN (eds) No easy way out; essays on Third World development in honour of Jan Hinderinkk ~ Utrecht 1994: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 392 pp, 21 figs, 16 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-202-2 Dfl 59,00

1877 AC M VAN WESTEN Unsettled: low-income housing and mobility in Bamako, Mali - Utrecht 1995: Knag/Facul-teitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 336 pp, 31 figs, 48 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-203-0 Dfl 43,00

1888 F VAN DAM Meer voor minder; schaalverandering en bereikbaarheid van voorzieningen in landelijke gebieden in Nederlandd - Utrecht 1995: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 346 pp, 119 figs, 566 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-204-9 Dfl 45,00

1899 F VAN REISEN & M TACKEN (eds) A future of telework; towards a new urban planning concept? - Utrecht/Delft 1995:: Knag/Faculteit Bouwkunde TU Delft. 194 pp. 46 figs, 22 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-205-7 Dfl 37,50

1900 w p A VAN DEURSEN Geographical Information Systems and Dynamic Models; development and application of a prototypee spatial modelling language - Utrecht 1995: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht.. 206 pp, 44 figs. 8 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-206-5 Dfl 38,00

1911 FTHISSEN Bewoners en nederzettingen in Zeeland: op weg naar een nieuwe verscheidenheid - Utrecht/Amster-damm 1995: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam, ca 200 pp. ISBN 90-6809-207-3 Dfll 37,50

1922 A ROMEIN Labour markets and migrant absorption in small towns: the case of northern Costa Rica - Utrecht 1995:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 190 pp, 24 figs, 47 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-208-11 Dfl 36,00

1933 G J ASH WORTH & J WAALKEN S (red) Geografie en milieu: trend of traditie? - Utrecht/Groningen 1995: Knag/ Faculteitt der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 152 pp, 14 figs, 9 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-209-XX Dfl 32.50

1944 A FEDDES Woningmarkt, regulering en inflatie: het na-oorlogse volkshuisvestingsbeleid van tien Noordwest-Europesee tanden vergeleken - Utrecht 1995: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 4644 pp, 69 fïgs, 75 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-210-3 Dfi 60,00

1955 K M WIJNBERG Morphologic behaviour of a barred coast over a period of decades - Utrecht 1995: Knag/Facul-teitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 254 pp, 131 figs, 25 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-211-1 Dfi 45,00

1966 M DUST Het elliptisch leven; actieruimte als integrale maat voor bereik en mobiliteit - modelontwikkeling met als voorbeeldd tweeverdieners met kinderen in Houten en Utrecht - Utrecht/Delft 1995: Knag/Faculteit Bouwkunde Technischee Universiteit Delft. 264 pp, 32 figs, 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-213-8. Out of print

1977 L BLOEMBERG Tussen traditi e en verandering; Hindostaanse zelforganisaties in Nederland - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1995:: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 244 pp, 13 fig, 17 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-214-66 Dfl 38,00

1988 M K BANDMAN . v MALOV , G A VAN DER KNAAP & E WEVER <eds) Lower Angara Region: A new approach to re-gionall development in Russia — Utrecht/Rotterdam 1995: Knag/Faculty of Geographical Sciences Utrecht Uni-versity/Economicc Geographical Institut e Rotterdam. 144 pp. 37 figs, 18 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-215-4. Out of print

1999 E; PEBESMA Mapping groundwater quality in the Netherlands - Utrecht 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e We-tenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 128 pp, 35 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-216-2 Dfl 29,50

2000 M VAN DER PERK Muddy waters; uncertainty issues in modelling the influence of bed sediments on water compo-sitionn - Utrecht 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 190 pp, 38 figs, 51 tabs.. ISBN 90-6809-218-9 Dfl 34,00

2011 G F GLAS Industriële netwerken; ruimte, regio's, cultuur en beleid ~ Utrecht/Groningen 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 276 pp, 37 fig, 37 tab. ISBN 90-6809-219-7 Dfl 39,95

2022 R M HOOTS MANS Fuzzy sets and series analysis for visual decision support in spatial data exploration - Utrecht 1996:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 192 pp, 50 figs, 8 colour plates, 19 figs. ISBNN 90-6809-220-0 Dfl 34,50

2033 H DE MARS Chemical and physical dynamics of fen hydro-ecology ~ Utrecht 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 176 pp, 40 figs, 23 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-221-9 Dfl 35,00

2044 M GROTHE& H J SCHOLTEN GIS in de publieke sector; een inventarisatie naar gebruik van geo-informatie en GIS bijj de Nederlandse overheid ~ Utrecht/Amsterdam 1996: Knag/Vakgroep Ruimtelijk e Economie Vrij e Univer-siteitt Amsterdam. 268 pp, 24 figs, 173 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-222-7 Dfl 35,00

2055 w MANSHANDEN Zakelijk e diensten en regionaal-economische ontwikkeling; de economie van nabijheid -Utrecht/Amsterdamm 1996: Knag/Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie Universiteit van Amsterdam.. 182 pp, 20 figs, 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-223-5 Dfl 32,50

2066 v BERDOULAY & J A VAN GINKEL (eds) Geography and professional practice -- Utrecht 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 270 pp, 5 figs. ISBN 90-6809-224-3 Dfl 55,00

2077 G A VAN DER KNAAP & E WEVER (eds) Industrial organization: die firm and its labour market ~ Utrecht/Rotter-damm 1996: Knag/Faculty of Geographical Sciences Utrecht University/Economic Geographical Institute Rotter-dam.. 126 pp, 33 figs, 22 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-227-8 Dfl 45,00.

2088 J VAN DER SCHEE, G SCHOENMAKER, H TRIM P & H VAN WESTRHENEN (eds) Innovation in geographical education --Utrecht/Amsterdamm 1996: Knag/IGU Commission on Geographical Education/Centrum voor Educatieve Geo-grafiee Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 280 pp, 41 figs, 1 tab. ISBN 90-6809-228-6 Dfl 45,00

2099 J MARKUSSE Zuid-Tirol : de pacificatie van een multi-etnische regio - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1996: Knag/Instituut voorr Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 246 pp, 21 figs, 42 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-229-4 Dlf 38,50

2100 A COERTS Analysis of static cone penetration test data for subsurface modelling; a methodology ~ Utrecht 1996: Knag/Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Utrecht. 272 pp, 110 figs. 47 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-230-8 Dfl 49,50

2111 P GROOTE Infrastructur e and Dutch economic development; a new long run data set for the Netherlands 1800-19133 -- Utrecht/Groningen 1996: Knag/Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 2400 pp, 36 figs, 74 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-231-6 Dfl 30,00

2122 TVA N DERZIJPP Het trainen van kaartvaardigheden; de effecten van inhoudelijke differentiati e en strategische hulpp op het verwerven van kaartvaardigheden door leerlingen in het eerste jaar van het voortgezet onderwijs -Utrecht/Amsterdamm 1996: Knag/Centrum voor Educatieve Geografie Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 192 pp, 29 figs,figs, 12 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-232» Dfl 35,00

2133 H J T WEERTS Complex confining layers; archtecture and hydraulic properties of Holocene and Late Weichselian depositss in the fluvial Rhine-Meuse delta, the Netherlands - Utrecht 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e We-tenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 198 pp. 86 figs, 20 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-233-2 Dfl 44,50

2144 P H PELLENBARG, F SCHUURMANS A J DE VRIES (red) Reisgenoten; liber amicorum prof dr W J van den Bremen -Utrecht/Groningenn 1996: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 606 pp, 71 figs.figs. 51 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-234-0 Dfl 62.50

2155 J B NYAKAAN A Kenya's development centre policy: the case of Eldoret; an assessment of its implementation and impactt -- Utrecht/Amsterdam 1996: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam. 312 pp, 933 figs, 55 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-235-9 Dlf 47,50

2166 T BÉNEKER "Buscar mejor ambiente" - Migrati e naar, uit en langs een kleine stad in Costa Rica - Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 45 figs, 32 figs. ISBN 90-6809-236-7 Dfll 29,50

2177 H RENSSEN The climate during the Younger Dryas stadial; Comparing global atmospheric simulation experi-mentss with climate reconstructions based on geological evidence - Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 192 pp, 59 figs, 6 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-237-5 Dfl 38,00

2188 I VAN DER WAAL Vrouwen en werk in Hulu Terengganu, Maleisië; arbeidsinzet van vrouwen in een verande-rendee plattelandseconomie - Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht, ca. 1922 pp. 12 figs, 63 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-238-3 Dfl 39,50

2199 c o OMBURA Towards an environmental planning approach in urban industrial siting and operations in Kenya: Thee case of Eldoret town - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1997: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteit van Amsterdam.. 276 pp, 68 figs, 42 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-239-1 Dlf 46,50

2200 F VAN STEENBERGEN Institutional change in local water resource management: Cases from Balochistan - Utrecht 1997:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 240 pp, 19 figs, 6 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-240-55 Dfl 47,00

2211 A A VAN DER WOUDEN Three small towns in Central Java; A comparative study of their economic structure and regionall importance -- Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 266 figs, 41 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-241-3 Dfl 36,50

2222 M J DOUGLAS A change of system: Housing system transformation and neighbourhood change in Budapest -Utrechtt 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 236 pp, 24 figs, 57 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-242-11 Dfl 48,50

2233 P J F TERHORST & J c L VAN DE VEN Fragmented Brussels and consolidated Amsterdam; A comparative study of thee spatial organization of property rights - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1997: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteitt van Amsterdam. 382 pp, 3 figs, 6 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-243-X Dlf 60,00

2244 H MIDDELKOO P Embanked floodplains in the Netherlands; Geomorphological evolution over various time scales -- Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 352 pp, 154 figs, 49 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-244-8 Dfl 69,00

2255 S VAN BEURDEN Hydrology, soil mechanics and kinematics of slow mass movements in the Widenbach catch-ment,, Switzerland - Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 262 pp, 1077 figs. 78 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-245-6 Dfl 52,00

2266 F VAN REISEN Ruim baan door telewerken? Effecten van flexibele werkvormen op ruimtelijk e ordening en mobi-liteitt als gevolg van veranderend tijd-ruimtegedrag - Utrecht/Delft 1997: Knag/Faculteit Bouwkunde TU Delft. 2400 pp, 55 figs, 34 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-2464 Dfl 42,50

2277 G p WESTERT & R N VERHOEFF (eds) Places and people: multilevel modeling in geographical research — Utrecht 1997:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 128 pp, 39 figs, 18 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-247-22 Dfl 27,50

2288 J KLAVE R From the land of the sun to the city of the angels; The migration process of Zapotec Indians from Oaxaca,, Mexico to Los Angeles, Californi a - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1997: Knag/Instituut voor Sociale Geografie Universiteitt van Amsterdam. 270 pp, 15 figs. 46 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-248-0 Dfl 39,00

2299 RISARIN The climate in north-western Europe during the Younger Dry as; A comparison of multi-prox y climate reconstructionss with simulation experiments - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1997: Knag/Faculteit der Aardwetenschap-penn Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 168 pp, 26 figs, 11 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-249-9 Dfl 32,00

2300 w HOEK Palaeogeography of Lateglacial vegetations; Aspects of Lateglaciai and Early Holocene vegetation, abioticc landscape, and climate in The Netherlands - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1997: Knag/Faculteit der Aardwe-tenschappenn Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 156 pp, 34 figs, 7 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-250-2 Dfl 32,00

2311 w HOEK Atlas to palaeogeography of Lateglacial vegetations; Maps of Lateglacial and Early Holocene land-scapee and vegetation in The Netherlands, with an extensive review of available palynological data -Utrecht/Amsterdamm 1997: Knag/Faculteit der Aardwetenschappen Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 174 pp, 66 figs,, 6 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-251-0 Dfl 38,00

2322 F c J WOLF Hydrodynamics, sediment transport, and daily morphological development of a bar-beach system — Utrechtt 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 276 pp, 124 figs, 21 tabs . ISBN 90-6809-252-9,, Dfl 40,00

2333 B VAN DER WATEREN-DE HOOG Quantification of catchment discharge sensitivity to climate variabilit y - Utrecht 1997:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 160 pp, 44 figs, 27 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-253-77 Dfl 41.00

2344 N E M ASSELMAN Suspended sediment in the river Rhine; the impact of climate change on erosion, transport, and depositionn — Utrecht 1997: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 266 pp, 96 figs, 255 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-254-5. Dfl 42.00

2355 R GOETGELUK Bomen over wonen; woningmarktonderzoek met beslissingsbomen - Utrecht 1997: Knag/Facul-teitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 186 pp, 29 figs. 33 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-255-3, Dfl 38,50

2366 B G RUESSINK Infragravit y waves in a dissipative multipl e bar system - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 256 pp, 120 figs, 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-256-1, Dfl 55,00

2377 C A W VAN DER BURG Nieuwe informatietechnologie in het aardrijkskunde-onderwijs; over de vakinhoudelijke aspectenn van een innovatie — Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 2366 pp, 20 figs, 27 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-258-8, Dfl 48,00

2388 R i VAN HOEK Postponed manufacturing in European supply chains; A triangular approach ~ Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 270 pp, 65 figs, 73 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-259-6, Dfll 52,00

2399 H VAN DIJK Kaarten kiezen; onderzoek naar de effecten van keuzevrijheid van leerlingen op het verwerven van kaartvaardighedenn in het eerste leerjaar van het voortgezet onderwijs - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1998: Knag/Insti-tuutt voor Didactiek en Onderwijspraktij k Vrij e Universiteit. 160 pp., 39 figs, 21 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-260-X, Dfll 20,00

2400 L DE HAAN & P BLAIKI E (eds) Looking at maps in the dark; Directions for geographical research in land manage-mentt and sustainable development in rural and urban environments of the Third World (IGU, Third World Committee)) - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit van Amster-dam.. 176 pp, 8 figs. 13 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-261-8, Dfl 40,00

2411 s G E GRAVESTEIJN, S VAN GRIENSVEN &. M c DE SMIDT (eds) Timing global cities - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Verenig-ingg van Utrechtse Geografie Studenten VUGS. 128 pp, 3 figs, 3 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-262-6, Dfl 39,00

2422 H J SCHOLTEN & R J VAN DE VELDE (red) Ruimtescanner: informatiesysteem voor de lange termijn verkenning van ruimtegebruikk - Utrecht/Amsterdam 1998: Knag/Vakgroep Ruimtelijk e Economie, Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappenn en Econometrie, Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam, ca 150 pp, ISBN 90-6809-263-4, Dfl 40,00

2433 H M G KRUSE Deformation of a river dyke on soft soil - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschap-penn Universiteit Utrecht. 218 pp, 76 figs, 15 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-264-2, Dfl 45,00

2444 i R BOWLER, c R BRYANT & p p p HUIGEN (eds) Dimensions of sustainable rural systems - Utrecht/Groningen 1998:: Knag/Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 272 pp, 38 figs, 22 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-265-0, Dfl 49.00

2455 A c D ERTSEN Ecohydrological response modelling; predicting plant species response to changes in site condi-tionss - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 156 pp, 21 fig, 25 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-266-9. Dfl 34,50

2466 H BLUENBERG Rolling stones? Triggering and frequency of hillslope debris flows in the Bachelard Valley, south-ernn French Alps - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 240 pp. ISBNN 90-6809-268-5, Dfl 54.50

2477 T J DE LIGT Werken in distribuerend Nederland; een onderzoek naar locationale en functionele veranderingen in dee distributiesector in West-Europa en de consequenties hiervan voor de werkgelegenheid in Nederland -Utrechtt 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 200 pp, 30 fig, 33 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-269-3,, Dfl 34,50

2488 M VAN DER GLAS Gaining ground; Land use and soil conservation in areas of agricultural colonisation in South Brazill and East Paraguay - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht, ca 2000 pp, 24 figs. 19 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-270-7, Dfl 37,50

2499 B MAKASK E Anastomosing rivers; Forms, processes and sediments - Utrecht 1998: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 298 pp, 128 figs. 26 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-271-5, Dfl 53,00

2500 T VAN RIETBERGEN The internationalization of European insurance groups - Utrecht 1999: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 206 pp, 35 figs, 53 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-272-3. Dfl 45,00

2511 M M BOER Assessment of dryland degradation: linkin g theory and practice through site water balance modelling -- Utrecht 1999: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 304 pp, 86 figs, 17 tabs. ISBNN 90-6809-273-1. Dfl 45,00

2522 w R EISNER Climate change and spatial diversity of vegetation during the Late Quaternary of Beringia -- Utrecht 1999:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 168 pp, 45 figs, 15 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-274-X,, Dfl 41,00

2533 A DE BOER Housing and care for older people: a macro-micro perspective - Utrecht 1999: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk ee Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 12 figs, 36 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-275-8, Dfl 42,00

2544 c RIEMERS Functionele en ruimtelijk e dynamiek in de groothandel ~ Utrecht/Groningen 1999: Knag/Faculteit derr Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 300 pp, 54 figs, 46 tabs ISBN 90-6809-276-6 Dfll 45,00

2555 A P VAN LANGEVELD E Bilingualism and regional economie development: a Dooyeweerdian case study of Fryslan --- Utrecht/Groningen 1999: Knag/Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 200 pp, 88 figs, 16 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-277-4, Dfl 40,00

2566 H VAN HASTENBERG Foreign direct investment in Hungary: the effects on the modernization of the manufacturing industryy and the demand for labor - Utrecht 1999: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht.. 208 pp, 25 figs, 35 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-279-0, Dfl 43,50

2577 c KANE Representations spatiales et mobiiités des jeunes a Dakar - Utrecht 1999: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 246 pp, 78 figs, 34 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-280-4, Dfl 45,00

2588 T HERNANDEZ . H J SCHOLTEN, D BENNISON, M BIASIOTTO . S CORNELIU S & M VAN DER BEEK Explainin g retail GIS: thee adoption, use and development of GIS by retail organisations in the Netherlands, the UK and Canada -Utrecht/Amsterdamm 1999: Knag/Vakgroep Ruimtelijk e Economie Vrij e Universiteit Amsterdam. 126 pp.. 15 figs.. 57 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-281-2, Dfl 49,00

2599 M DE WIT Nutrient fluxes in the Rhine and Elbe basins - Utrecht 1999: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschap-penn Universiteit Utrecht. 174 pp, 59 figs, 51 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-282-0, Dfl. 38,50

2600 E ENNEN Heritage in fragments; the meaning of pasts for city centre residents - Utrecht/Groningen 1999: Knag/ Faculteitt der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 270 pp, 47 figs, 24 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-283-9,, Dfl 39,90

2611 w j MEESTER Subjectieve waardering van vestigingsplaatsen door ondernemers - Utrecht/Groningen 1999: Knag// Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 240 pp, 23 figs, 44 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-284-7,, Dfl 45.00

2622 J VAN DIJK & P H PELLENBARG (eds) Demography of firms; spatial dynamics of firm behaviour - Utrecht/Gronin-genn 1999: Knag/ Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, ca 242 pp. ISBN 90-6809-285-5.. Dfl 45,00

2633 s VAN DUCK Effects of agricultural land use on surface runoff and erosion in a Mediterranean area - Utrecht 2000:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 256 pp, 147 figs, 68 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-286-3,, Dfl 45.90

2644 M H KRAGTEN Viable or marginal? Small-scale industries in rural Java (Bantul District) - Utrecht 2000: Knag/Faculteitt Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp, 18 figs, 31 tabs. ISBN 90-6809-287-1, Dfll 43,50

2655 A M F BIO Does vegetation suit our models? Assessing species distributio n in environmental space - Utrecht 2000:: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp. ISBN 9O-6809-288-X, Dfl 34.50

2666 A VAN DIEPEN Households and their spatial-energetic practices, searching for sustainable urban forms -Utrecht/Groningenn 2000: Knag/ Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, ca 200 pp.. ISBN 90-6809-289-8. Dfl 39.00

2677 B VAN HOVEN-IGANSK I Made in the GDR; the changing geographies of women in the post-socialist rural society inn Mecklenburg-Westpommeranta - Utrecht/Groningen 2000: Knag/Faculteit der Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappen Rijksuniversiteitt Groningen, ca 240 pp. ISBN 90-6809-290-1, Dfl 40,00

2688 J G JANMAA T Nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine; educational policy and the response of die Russian-speak-ingg population ~ Utrecht/Amsterdam 2000: Knag/Faculteit Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen Univer-siteitt van Amsterdam, ca 240 pp. ISBN 90-6809-291-X, Dfl 53,00

2699 T A DIJKSTRA Loess slope instability in the Lanzhou region, China ~ Utrecht 2000: Knag/Faculteit Ruimtelijk e Wetenschappenn Universiteit Utrecht. 208 pp. ISBN 90-6809-292-8, Dfl 59,50

Publicationss of this series can be ordered from KNAG / NETHERLANDS GEOGRAPHICAL STUDIES. P.O. Box 80123,, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands (Fax +31 30 253 5523; E-mail KNAG @geog.uu.nl). Prices includee packing and postage by surface mail. Orders should be prepaid, with cheques made payable to "Netherlandss Geographical Studies". Please ensure that all banking charges are prepaid. Alternatively, Americann Express, Eurocard, Access, MasterCard, BankAmericard and Visa credit cards are accepted (pleasee specify card number, name as on card, and expiration date with your signed order).

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ISSNN 0169-4839