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Social Capital, Panchayats and Grass Roots Democracy: Politics of Dalit Assertion in UttarPradeshAuthor(s): Sudha PaiReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 8 (Feb. 24 - Mar. 2, 2001), pp. 645-654Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410321 .

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S o c i a l Capital, Panchayatsa n d G r a s s R o o t s Democracy

P o l i t i c s o f D a l i t Assertion i n U t t a r P r a d e s hA study of the newpanchayatsof UP providesan opportunityor understandinghe roleplayedby social capital in thefunctioning of democratic institutions in segmentedsocieties.A key finding of the study in two districts of UP, Meerut and Azamgarh,is that segmentationarising out of caste/class divisions is a significantcontextual variable in determiningthedevelopmentof trust, social capital between groups and democratic unctioning.

SUDHAPAIIn recentyearsattentionhas been fo-cuseduponthe new panchayats irstmootedby theRajivGandhigovern-ment n the late 1980sandcreatedby the73rdConstitutionalmendment ct 1992.This is becausean earliergenerationofpanchayatsn the 1960s afteran initialperiod foptimismailed ogenerate itherparticipation r implementation f pro-posed programmes.Lack of funds, ab-sence of regularelections, bureaucraticapathy ndcapture f these nstitutions ythedominant litesin thecountrysideedto theiratrophy.ndeed, he ast factorhadbeen anticipatedby scholars who hadarguedthat grantingof power to localbodies n theprevailing onservative ndhierarchicalocialmilieu wouldleadnottodemocracy ut trengtheningf theholdof ruraluppercastes elites upon localaffairs.A second roundof experimenta-tion beginning n 1977 basedupon theAshokaMehtaCommitteereportwhichshifted hefocus fromdevelopment erseto localgovernment y greater evolutionof powerachieveda modicumof successin only four states - West Bengal,Karnataka, ndhraPradeshandto someextent Jammuand Kashmir.This wasbecause fasterprocess fdemocratisationandpoliticisationnthesestatesbythe ate1970sand thegranting f reservationsoSCs and STs in the panchayats llowedthe ruralpopulationandparticularlyheweaker ectionsgreater articipationhanbefore [Crookand Manor 1998]. Thisshows that the social structure n whichpanchayats reembedded ndthe contextin whichthey function s important ndcan to a largeextentdetermine heirsuc-cess or failure. This is in keepingwithRobertPutnam's rgument asedupon he

studyof local governmentsn Italythatdemocratic erformancef institutionsssubstantially function of networksoftrustandcivic engagements mongciti-zens, as it makesthemparticipaten co-ordinatedollectiveaction Putnam 993].His workhas shifted he debateabout heprerequisitesor economicdevelopmentanddemocracyawayfromideologyandinstitutions, hichhedeemsnecessary utinsufficient,to culturalfactors such asvalues and virtues.In this context, the new panchayatsprovidean important xperimentworthyof study n ourattempt o understandheroleplayedby social capital n the func-tioningof democraticnstitutions n seg-mented ocieties,moreso becausecertaindevelopmentsn the 1990shavechangedthe contextin which they function.Thestate of UttarPradesh UP) where ourstudyis located has witnessedsince themid-1980s the new role of panchayats'frombelow',and hesharpeningf socialidentities and political consciousnessamongthe lowercastes,particularlyhedalits,who aredemanding mproved o-cialstatus, ndagreaterhareneconomicandpoliticalpower.Thishasbeen duetosocio-culturalmovementsn civil societyand mobilisationby low caste politicalparties.Hence,thisstultyexamines, n the con-text of the politicsof identity n UP, thefunctioningf sixgram village) anchayatsand heir amitis committees),he lowestlevel in the new panchayatnstitutionscreatedn 1992,in selectedblocks n twodistrictsof Uttar Pradesh.By means ofextensive empirical analysis the studyexplores firstly, whether democraticdecentralisationntroducedby the 73rd

Amendmenthas led to greaterparticipa-tionby andsuccessful mplementationfgovernment-fundedrogrammes,articu-larlyunder he AmbedkarModelVillageprogrammeor he owercastes.Secondly,whether within the panchayats onflictresolutionakesplaceamong ocialgroupscompetingor thebenefitsofdevelopmentbasedupon hecreation f commonnorms,values, trust,and collectiveaction,or aretheyan arenaof conflictandcontestationover scarceresources,social statusandpoliticalpower?In otherwords, s there'socialcapital' nrural ociety,whichhasenabledpanchayatso overcomeexistingsocial cleavagesandpromotegrassrootsdemocracy.UttarPradesh s a largestate, heplainsareaconsistingof threeregions:western,eastern ndcentralwithsubstantial-socio-economicandpoliticaldifferenceswhichhavepersistedover time. Two districtsMeerutandAzamgarhn the westernandthe easternregion respectively- wereselected to study the performanceofpanchayatnstitutions,n differingsocio-economiccontexts. n bothdistricts hreegram (village) panchayatswere selectedon the followingbasis: (a) The samplevillages have a high proportion f dalitsand owerbackwards hich nabled studyof dalitassertion, nd ts impactupon herelationship ithin hepanchayatetweenthetraditionally ominant roups,dalits,and the backwards. b) They have beenidentified s Ambedkar illagesbytheUPgovernment.As this provides hem withextra unds orprogrammesor the lowercastes,it enableda studyof bothpartici-pationby anddistribution f benefits othesegroups.A purposiveandomampleof 45-55 respondenthouseholds n each

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village, fromfourage groupsof each caste,were selected keeping in mind their pro-portion in the population to whom a de-tailedquestionnairewasadministered.lThevillage pradhansandat the block level theBDO and other functionaries were alsointerviewed.2Twofeaturesof the newpanchayatsmakeanexaminationof their democraticperfor-manceuseful for ourstudy. First, the 73rdAmendment by providing reservation todalitsandwomen has changed theirsocialcomposition by giving these groups apredominantposition in these institutions.Second, by increasing the powers andfinances of these bodies it has furtheredthe process of democratisation [Khanna1994]. Equally importantis the initiationin 1991 by the UP government of theAmbedkar Village Programme (AVP)which is implemented by panchayats.Although begun by the Mulayam Singhgovernment in 1991, its political impor-tance stems from its enthusiastic adoptionby the BSP underMayawati,when it cameto power in collaboration with the SP in1993 and the BJP in 1995 and 1997.Mayawati created a separate departmentfor the AVP, posted dalit officers at theblock level and a series of governmentorders ssued from 1995 onwards gave toppriority to its implementation,3 The aimwas to concentrate developmental fundsspread thinly over the state, in villageswhere dalitsare n largenumberto providemaximum benefits to them. It is not aseparate, but an overarching programmeunderwhich in every block, villages with50 percent dalit populationwere selectedand provided extra funds to carry on theexisting programmesfor weaker sections.The villages selected remain under theAVP foroneyearandareprovidedan extrafundof Rs 1 lakhfor village development,which supplements already existing spe-cial programmesfor the dalits and back-ward castes. Planning of variousprogrammesfor the villages is carriedoutat the Block Development Samiti (BDS)meetings held four times a year, attendedby all the 'gaon' pradhansandblock levelofficials.4 At thevillage level thepradhansareexpected to hold monthly meetings ofthe panchayat samiti at which the fundsavailable, schemes for village develop-ment andapplicationsof villagersfor loansare discussed. Between 1991 and 1997-98,a totalof 25,434 Ambedkarvillages all overUPwere selected on the criteriondescribedabove, thoughtheprogrammehasnot beenimplemented in many of them. The BSP

governmentn 1995lowered herequireddalitpopulationo 22-30percenttherebycoveringmorevillages.TheKalyanSinghgovernmentn 1997decidednot to adoptvillageswith less than 30 percentdalitsinthepopulation.Thecapture f politicalpower by the BSP, dalit assertionandreservationsordalits npanchayatodies,togetherprovidea setting or ourstudyofthe democratic erformancef panchayatinstitutionsn thesecondhalfof the 1990s.

SocialCapitalndSegmentationinaTransitionalocietySince hepublicationf Robert utnam'workon the mpactof socialcapital n thefunctioningof local institutionsn Italy,this concept has attractedconsiderableattention mongscholars Putnam 993].While the concept has roots in oldertheories,Putnam ndJamesColeman avefurther developed it in their studies.Putnam's study of Italy showed thatregions in which social capital is high,institutionalerformances better ndviceversa. n thestudy,socialcapital efers o"theset of resourceshat nhere n familyrelations nd ncommunityocialorgani-sations", and features such as "trust,normsand networkshatcanimprove heefficiency of society by facilitatingco-ordinatedactions"[ibid].Colemandes-cribes t as animportantocial structural'resource'or capitalasset for the indi-

vidual,which is productivemakingpos-sible theachievement f certain nds thatwould not be attainable n its absence.Coleman(1990) also discussesthe cre-ation,maintenancenddestructionf socialcapitaland ts impact,andargues hat hevalue of the concept ies in the fact thatit identifiescertainaspectsof the socialstructureytheir unction nd hereby idsin bothaccountingor different utcomesat he evel of individual ctors ndmakingthe micro-to-macroransition.Theconceptof social capitalhas beenapplied,with omeexceptions,5othestudyof institutionswithinadvancedndustrialsocieties6 atherhandeveloping ountriessuchasIndiaundergoingapid ocial rans-formationwhose institutionshave beenestablished airly recently.An importantsocietalcharacteristic hichaffects nsti-tutionalerformancen he atterssegment-ation, e, cleavagesalongcaste,commu-nityandclass ines.Inourstudy, egment-ation is a crucial interveningvariablebetween social capital and democracy.

Hence, the relationshipbetween socialcapitalwhich mplies rust,horms,andanactive associational ife amongcitizens,andsegmentationwhichcreatesdivisionsamongthem,needsto be discussed.Historically, ocio-economic leavagesin Indiahavecreated segmentaryocietyinwhich hevariousegments re cellular',i e, separate, achhavinga distinct ife ofits own[Saberwal 995].Thehierarchicalarrangementf thesedivisionsofcasteandclassespeciallyat thetopandthebottomlevel hascreated ocialanimosities,whichare not easily overcome. Undoubtedlyconflicts exist in all societies, and it isarguable hatpositiveattitudeso demo-cracyarenot partof the norms nherentin social capital.However, n India,seg-mentationhas createddeep-seateddivi-sions,whicharean mportanteterminantof socialcapitalandpoliticalaction n thecountryside.Thus, a cultureof distrusthistorically has developed among thevarioushierarchicalegmentsof society.Nevertheless, these are not watertightdivisionsbut allowconsiderablemobilityandhave been affectedby the forcesofdemocracy nddevelopment eginningnthe colonialperiod,butmoreparticularlysince independence.Beginningwith thecolonialperiod woclosely nter-relatedocietal rocesses avebeen significant n the northernplains:fusionorintegration nd issionor differ-entiation[Rudolphand Rudolph1967].Theformerhasbeendueto mobilisationalchangeswithin the caste systemleadingto the formation f largecasteblocks orhorizontal ggregationsn placeof smallfragmented ocal 'jatis' or sub-castes,belongingto the same level in the castehierarchy, hichwerenot nter-linkedra-ditionally.While in the colonial periodtheseeffortswereaimedat mprovingheirsocial position and obtaining conces-sions, in the post-independence eriod,they have been forjoint politicalactionoftenleading o theformation f politicalparties. None of them were aimed atdestruction f thecastesystem; atherheyprovidedgreatermobilitywithinit.In the colonialperiodamong cheduledcastes n northndia,hechamarsttemptedcollectivelyto rise in thecastehierarchyby means of censusre-definition nd theprocessof sanskritisation.heyattemptedtoregisterhemselves srajputsr hakurs,ie,kshatriyas,n thecolonial ensus.Oftenhistoricalvidencewaspresented,samongthe chamars f Agra, hat heywereorigi-nallya kshatriya astewho had over the

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centuriesome obewrongly laced utsidethe varnasystem [OwenLynch 1969].UsingSanskritisationhey mitatedhe ife-stylesandritualsof theuppercastesspe-cially thebrahmins, uch as adoptionofvegetarianism,onninghe sacred hread,marriage ituals, tc. Whiletheyfailed inthe attempt o be acceptedas kshatriyas,theymanagedo renamehemselvesn the1931censusaschamar-jatavs, hich heyargued, onstituted special ectionof thechamarsntheGangeticplains.A numberof caste ssociations ere lso ormedwhichhelpedjtis o ormargerparacommunities'[Rudolphand Rudolph1967:33] whichenabledjoint political action, such asdemandingeservationsnthebureaucracyor egislature. houghheseactivities ailedin bringing hemabovetheline of pollu-tion, tbroughtarious ntouchableroupstogetherreating nity, ocial eformwithinthe community nd oint politicalactionleadingo he ormationf theUPScheduledCaste Federationn the 1940s and theRepublicanpartyof Indiain the 1960s.Thepost-colonial eriodhaswitnessed,beginning n the mid-1960s, successivewaves of caste-basedhorizontalmobili-sation n UP leading o the formation fpoliticalparties uch as the BKD, BLD,JD andmorerecently heBSP,represent-ing thebackward, therbackward astesanddalits,asthese argeconglomerationsarenowcalled.Thesegroupsbyconstruct-ing distinct social identities and jointpolitical action were able to effectivelychallenge the dominantpositionof theCongress artyPai1993].Bythesemeans,the middleand lower castes developednetworks nd hared alues,whichallowedthem to function as a collective socialgroupin politics.However,the processremains ncomplete, usionhas notcom-pletelybroken own raditionalifferencesbetweenvarious atis or sub-castespro-ducinghomogenisation.A parallelpro-cess of fission loselyassociatedwith lass-basedchanges n therural conomy,com-bined with democratisation,'hasreatedrivalryandclassconflictbetween atis.Inthe colonial period, the introduction fnew landsystems, rrigationndcommer-cialisationof agriculturereateda small,prosperouspeasantclass, which subse-quentlybenefited rom the post-colonialpoliciesof landreformandgreenrevolu-tion andemergedas a richpeasant lass.In recent years, rivalryhas intensifiedbetween differentsections of the back-wardandschedulecastes in partsof UP:the relativelybetter-off ats andthe less

prosperous hirs,koeris andkurmis,andbetweenboththesegroupsand the mostbackwardastes MNCs); ndbetween heupwardlymobile chamarsand the lessambitiousbalmikisandpasis, among heschedulecastes.Differentialgains fromeconomic development and access topolitical power have been responsible.Thus,conflictrather hanconsensus s amajor hara'cteristicf rural ociety nUPtoday.Hence, n thisstudya centralques-tion s:can eaders fsocial/politicalroupsbasedwithin hepanchayats eneraterustand cooperative norms of functioningwhich could bridgethe existing societalconflictsandpromote ollectiveaction orruraldevelopment?

IIDalitAssertion ndContext fPanchayat unctioningThe two selected regions of east andwest UP, withroughlyequalpopulationsizes provide two differingcontexts inwhichthefunctioning f panchayats avebeenstudied.The differences etween heselecteddistricts f Meerut ndAzamgarh,ofsignificanceorourstudy,are heextentof economicdevelopment nd low castemobilisation.Our tudyndicateshat hesevariables ogetherpromotedalitassertionagainst upper/middle aste domination,whichhasbeenresponsibleorchangesnthe functioningof panchayats.

Meerut DistrictMuch iterature xists whichshowsthatthe western region particularlyMeerutdistrict, s the mostprosperous egion nthe state. Beginning from the colonialperiodthe ruralareas have experiencedconsiderable agriculturaldevelopment[Pai 19931.During helast threedecades,ruralpoverty was only 26 per cent in1987-88 comparedwith 43 per cent ineasternUP [DrezeandGazdar1997:49)Due to rapidexpansionof educationalfacilities n Meerut, herehas beendiver-sification f theoccupationaltructure ndrisein incomes.Consequently,he condi-tion of dalits comparedto the easterndistrictshasalwaysbeen muchbetter. nthecolonial eriodomeownedand,wageswerehigher, elationswith andlords etterandpoverty evels lower [Singh 1947].Dalits form15-20percent of thepopu-lation nMeerut istrict HDSingh1998].Thechamar-jatavsf thedistrict avebeensociallyandpolitically ctive ince he ate

colonialperiod.This region experiencedmobilisationby the RepublicanPartyofIndia n the 1960s,which wasveryactiveinHastinapurvillage)assembly onstitu-ency close to the sample villages.How-ever,declineof the RPI n the late 1960s,andupper astedominance eptthe dalitsin a subordinateositionuntilrecently nsociety and politics. Traditionally, herajputsndjats,ormed hedominantaste/richpeasant,andowning roupwho con-trolled hepanchayats nd maintained noppressivesocio-economicsystem overthe dalits andthe lower backwards.In recentyears,due to rapideconomicdevelopment, strongwave of dalitasser-tion and establishment f the BSP, thetraditional tructuresof ruraldominancebased on land and caste havebeenques-tioned. At the grassroots,dalitassertionhas expresseditself in a socio-culturalprocessof 'Ambedkarisation',e, tremen-dousgrowth n theconsciousnessamongdalits,mainlythejatavs,about he ideasand ife ofAmbedkarPaiandSingh1997j.This phenomenonhas united the jatavsmaking them aware of their commonproblems ndneed o redress hemcollec-tively. As the dalits constitutealmost 50percent of the populationn oursamplevillages andareeconomicallybetteroffthan in other regions, this process hasmade ts mark, rrevocably lteringnter-casterelationships. hough,as in therestof Meerut district, it has affected theupwardlymobile atavs oagreater xtentthanthe balmikiswho remaineconomi-cally backward and not so politicallyconscious.Dalitassertion asbeenaccom-paniedby social andpoliticalconscious-nessamong heMBCswho arealsoques-tioninghedominant osition f themiddlecastes.7Albeitnumericallyargerhan hedalitsin west UP, only the sainisamongthem are as united,socially aware andpoliticisedas the former.Thoughas pooras thedalits, heysee themselves s 'cleancastes'above he ineofpollutionnd here-fore,are notopento the idea of collabo-rationwith the former n local affairs.Thesechangesarevisible n our electedvillages of Khanauda,Maithena InderSingh Maithena),ndUldiypur,which iewithin15-20kmof Meerutcity, the firsttwo, in Daurala nd the third, n Rajpurablock. Among them Maithena,with apopulation f 4,955 (810 families)is thelargest, ollowedbyKhanauda ith3,097(416 families) andUldiypurwith 2,814(382 families) persons.8Despite theirsmallernumbers,atsin Khanauda,ajput

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chauhans in Uldiypur, and jats andchauhansn Maithena tillform hemiddlecastedominant roups.Thedalits, onsist-ingof the chamars ndbalmikis orm thelargest group, constitutingabout50 percentof thepopulationwhiletheMBCsarefewer in number.Landremainshemainsourceof occu-pation nd ncomewith herajputsndjatsowningmostof thecultivableand, hougha few dalithouseholds wn large plotsinMaithena nd Khanauda. he MBCs arelargely andless,the dalitsowning moreland.In recentyears,the surplusgainedfrom arming asdeclineddue ofragmen-tation f holdings,andrisingcost of culti-vation;educationandjobs in the statebureaucracy9 nd service sector, havebecome the majorcatalyst or changeineconomicandsocial status.More mpor-tant, ducation as contributedo increas-ingawareness nd assertion mongdalitsin local affairs.Thisis visiblein the esta-blishment ydalitsof private alternative'unaided ndunrecognisedUAUR) choolsin our samplevillages, and attempts osend children o Meerut or high schooland college education as governmentschoolsprovidepoorqualityof education[Jaipal Singh 1998]. Named afterAmbedkar,he aimof theprivate choolsis to spreadhis ideas and to ensure thatdalitchildrenwillbe able ocompetewith'manuvadis'n all spheresof life. Conse-quently,only25 percent of ourtotalres-pondentsmainly rom he owercastesare-illiterate,nda few havebeen ocollege.10Collectivelyhesechangeshavecreated noursamplevillagesa post-independencegeneration mong he atavsanda sectionof theMBCs,which seducated, pwardlymobile,politicallyconscious,prosperousandvery aggressive owards hose abovethem nthe caste/classhierarchy.tis thissection hat s playinga central olein thenew panchayatsn Meerutdistrict.

AzamgarhDistrictThe easterndistricts, orm a regioninwhichhistorically espitefertile soil and

adequate ainfall there has been a rarecombinationfextremepovertyanddensepopulation ithheavypressure nagricul-tural and,with adverseeconomicconse-quencesor hedalits. n hecolonialperioddueto lackofalternativemployment ndindebtedness,heywereharwahas,iterallyploughmenbonded o zamindars Singh1947].After ndependence,houghabsen-tee landlordism isappeared, gricultureremainedbackward nd due to lack of

industryno alternative mploymentwasavailable.However, ince the 1980s,dueto spreadof HYVs of rice,consolidationof holdings,ntroductionf tubewellsandrural lectricity, onsiderable griculturaltransformationndurbanisationastakenplace, leadingto increasedemploymentopportunitiesordalits ndMBCson arms,brickkilns, construction ites, and rick-shawpulling n thecities,thoughpovertyremainsandthepaceof changehas beenslow. The absolutedependence n land-ownersandoldpatron-clientelationshipshavedisappearednddalitshavegiven updemeaning ccupations nd are less pre-pared o suffer ndignities KripaShankar1993].Thenature f dalitmobilisationn thisregion is historicallydifferent rom thewesternplains as it did not experiencemobilisationby a dalitparty/movement,until the riseof the BSP.However, hereis a legacyof twoanti-feudalmovementsin the colonial period, in which dalits,particularlynthecase of thesecond, ookpart.TheKisanSabha ndEkamovementsin the1920s,againstndebtednessnd owwages led at timesby low caste leaderssuchas BabaRamchand ndPasiMadari;[Siddiqui1978].andsecond,a spontane-ousrural gitation ydalits n1946,againsttheexploitative ractice f 'begar' unpaidlabour) RamNarayan1996].After nde-pendence, both the Socialist and theCommunist arties adastrongbase ntheeasterndistrictsand supportedand re-distribution,ower andceilings,abolitionof land revenueon smallholdings, tc, inthe1960s.Following hedeclineofthe eftand ocialist arties,he ower astes hiftedtheirallegianceto the Congress,and inmore recentyears,the BSP.Thedalits constitute 5 percent of thepopulation n Azamgarhdistrictand arethelargest astegroup,consistingmainlyof chamars,pasis and musahars. n oursample villages in Azamgarh, here isdefinitely politicisation and awarenessamong dalits of their low status and adesire ochange t.However,dalit dentityhas notfullycrystallised nd here s lackofunity venamong hechamars. heBSPis identifiedhere as a 'dalitpartyof thepoor'andnota chamar arty s inMeerut.More importanthan the legacy of paststruggless themobilisation ythe eadersof the BSP and spreadof the electoralprocess n a regionwhere he dalits werenot allowed to exercise theirvote untilrecently. Most dalits identify withMayawatirather hanthe BSP, and her

victory n the 1998parliamentarylectionfromAkbarpurn east UP, has made animpacton the regionand was visible inour sample villages. The MBCs in theeastern lainsarenumerous, oorernmostcasesthan hedalitsandremaindisparatecaste groups, with little to hold themtogether.Most of ourrespondentsadnotheard he term 'sarvadhik ichadavarg'orMBC.Lackingeducationandalterna-tive employment heystillperformradi-tionaloccupations ndprovide ervices othe middlecasteswith whomtheyretaina feudalrelationship.The ahirsandkurmis, leancultivatingcastescategorisedas OBCs,butroughlyequivalent to the jats in the west andconstituting about 15 per cent of thepopulationof Azamgarh,still form thedominant aste [H D Singh 1998].Theirpositionhas notbeenquestioned nd andandritualstatus,remain he main sourceof their socio-economic dominanceinvillage affairs.However,the oppressivepractices f thepast uchasbeating, akingoverthe landsof the lowercastes,andnotallowingthem to vote havebegunto dis-appearthoughsocial distanceis main-tained.They share their dominant tatuswith 'upperclass' Muslim Siddiquis nAzamgarh.In our sample villages thedominant roups both Hinduand Mus-lim- resideon one sideof thevillagethedalits are on the other side. While this isacommon.patternnUP,thecontinuationofuntouchabilityas ed o minimumocialinteractionbetween the two sections.

The three selectedvillages of Anaura,Nevrahi and Sammapur Khalsa(Sammapur)reapproximately0-30kmfrom Azamgarh ity and lie in Rani KiSarai block. While Anauraand Nevrahiwere selected as Ambedkarvillages in1995, Sammapurwas selected in 1994.Anaura s thelargestvillagewith a popu-lation f2,130 280 amilies)Nevrahi ,386(185 families)andSammapurhesmallest960 183families).KurmisnAnaura, hirsin Sammapur, nd rajputchauhansandMuslimPathansnNevrahi,orm hedomi-nantcastesin oursamplevillages.WhileinNevrahi lmostallthedalitsarechamars,in the othervillagestherearepasis,musa-harsand.afew paswans.Anaurahas thelargestnumber fMBCswhileSammapurhasveryfew. EastUPis aregionof smallplotsandexcept nAnaura,mostplotsareless thana bighaand the dominant astesown thebiggerplots.The chamarsollec-tively held a largeamountof land n thecolonial period, but their individual

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holdingswere small and today they aredwarf-holdersndagriculturalabourers.However,as theyare able to pursue heirtraditionalccupation f leatherworking,their conomic onditionsbetter han hatof the balmikisandmusahars.The iteracy atehasrisen nrecentyearsbut s lower han n thewest,being37.68percentinruralAzamgarh gainst46.44percent n ruralMeerut; utamongdalits,it is only 39.22percent in Azamgarh sagainst51.30percentin Meerut Census1991]. All the villages have a primaryschool, the only high school being inAnaura. xcept nAnaura,more hanhalfthepersons n the sample rom the othervillagesareilliterate, he largestnumberbeingamong heMBCs,followedby thedalits.Amongourrespondents, nly 25percenthavestudiedupto class8, and12percentuptohighschool but threedalitsandoneMBC n Nevrahi,and one yadavin Sammapur ave been to college, allchildren reattendingchool n thesamplevillagesandgenerational hangeis verymarkedmong hoseupto 25yearsof age.Education as not substantiallyontri-buted to assertionagainstthe dominantcastes. Despiterise in literacy,land re-mains hemajor ourceof livelihoodwithlittle diversification f the occupationalstructure,partrom mallbusinesses uchaspoultry arming, heepandpig rearing.TheMBCsparticularlynAnaura,ollowtheir traditional occupations of pot-making, arpentry,tc. With littleindus-trialdevelopment r employment xceptinquarriesndbrickkilnsnearby,povertyandcontinuation f feudalrelationships,thelargemajority f dalitsremaindepen-dentuponthe middlecastes for employ-ment.Nevertheless, n all the villages afewdalits renservice ither nAzamgarhor Sethwal, he numberbeinghighestinNevrahi.Thus,although ducation,ocialawareness ndpoliticisationhas riseninrecentyears amongdalits andMBCs, incontrast o Meerutdistrict, heyhaveyetto openly challengethe position of thetraditionally ominantgroups.

IllTwoPatterns f PanchayatPerformanceOur ieldstudy evealed marked iffer-ence in theperformancef panchayatsnMeerutandAzamgarh istricts.Twodif-ferent atternsfparticipation,nstitutionalperformance nddistribution f benefitsemerge due to the differential socio-

economicandpoliticalcontext n whichpanchayats re embeddedandfunction.MeerutDistrict

ParticipatoryPatternsOursurveyof the selectedvillagesandunderstandingf thechanges akingplacein westernUP,suggested hatoursample

villagesarein a phaseof transition romcontrolby the dominant aste/richpeas-ants to a more democratic ystemwhichprovidesgreater articipationothe owercastes.However, xamination f thefunc-tioningof thegramandblockpanchayatsrevealed hatdespite hangesntheir ocialcomposition ueto reservations ndques-tioningofthedominant ositionof the atsandrajputs, herehasbeenlittle increasein participationn decision-making ndimplementationfprogrammesythe argemajority f villagers.Whileearlier he atsandrajputsontrolledhepanchayats,heynow share heirdominancewitha small,but nfluential roup fjatavs.At thesametime,competition asalsoemerged mongthe jatavs for the statusand patronage,whichcontroloverpanchayatunctioningprovides.This s more videntnKhanaudaandMaithena,whereassertion mong hejatavs is more marked han n Uldiypur,intheelections othepanchayatsnd heirpatternof functioning.Although ue otheirnumerical repon-derancedalitshavebeenpradhansarlier,thiswasdue o thesupportf thedominantmiddle astes; eservationsavegiven hemamorendependentosition.nour amplevillages, in the panchayat lections heldin 1995,thepostof pradhanwas sharplycontestedbetween heleadingdalitfami-lies.11 In Maithena, he largestvillage,therewere 14womencandidates elong-ing to the dalitcommunity only two ofwhom werebalmikis he restbeing atavs- inKhanaudaherewere6 candidates ndin Uldiypur5,12butonly 2-3 candidatesgaineda substantial umber f the votescast. InMaithena, hewinningcandidategained520 outa totalof 1,507.votes ast,in Khanauda 25/869, andin Uldiyapur323/659.Prior o thepanchayat lections,atmeetings n the dalitmohalla,prosper-ous andenterprisingalit amiliesdecidedto put up their women as candidates orthepostofpradhan. owever, omeofourrespondentseld hathese andidates erealso approvedandsupported y thejatsandtherefore heirelectionwas the resultof atacitagreement etween hepowerfuljatfamilies, nd he orward ndprosperous

dalitfamilies.Thepradhanishus,do notrepresent he democraticchoice of thedalits,norhavethe ats totally ostcontrolover the panchayatystem.In the electionsto the grampanchayatsamitisand heblockdevelopmentamitis(BDS) there was a contestbetweenthejatavsandother astegroups. n he ormer,inMaithena,13 members threeof themwomen- were electedconsistingof onejat, one MBC and one balmiki and 10jatavs.In the othervillages,all candidateswereelectedunopposed nine atavs, woMuslims, one MBC and one jat, inKhanauda;nd ixjatavs,onebalmiki,woMBCs and two rajputsn Uldiypur.Twomemberswereelected romMaithena,nefromKhanauda,nda fourthointlyfromKhanauda and Uldiypur to the BDSDaurala,which consistedof 5Tpersons.Of the two members lected to the BDSfromMaithena- fourof theeightcandi-datesbeingjatavs- one was a rajput ndthe otheranMBC.However, n theothertwovillagesfromwhereone memberwaselected o theBDS,thewinning andidateswere atavs.Thus, he atavs akingadvan-tageof thereservations rovided nd heirnumericalmajority avebeen able ogaincontrol of the panchayatbodies.Analysis of participatory atternsre-vealed that n oursamplevillages,meet-ings of the gaonpanchayat r panchayatsamiti have never been held. It is thepradhan,(actually the husband of the'pradhanis')ome members lected otheBDS anda few influential illagers,whomeetand akealldecisions egardingistri-butionof benefitsunderheAVPalthoughtherulesprescribe iscussion n schemes/applicationspresentedby villagers.Thewomenpradhanis,who stoodforelectioninplaceof theirhusbands ueto thereser-vations for women, do not attend hesemeetingsandmerely sign on papers entto theirresidence [Pai 1998]. In manycases heelectedmembers f thepanchayatsamiti are also not included.As a resultmostrespondentsn oursample includ-ingdalits had ittle nformationaboutheprogrammes nder heAVP,fundsavail-able,or heirmplementation,ndheld hata few influential chamars'made all thedecisions after 'consulting' influentialmembers f theupperandmiddlecastes.Onlya few of theyoungereducateddalitandMBCrespondentsn oursample oulddiscuss headvantages f the AVPand tsimpact on the village. In fact someexpressed keendesire o attend anchayatmeetingsand argued hatthey werenot

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invited to attend them.Thus in the samplevillages, a new nexushas developed between the more prosper-ous jatavs under the leadership of thepradhan, and the dominant landowningcastes, specially the jats. Together theyconstitute the elite section of the villageand control the panchayat. The presentpradhan f Khanauda orexample, althoughajatav is close to thejats andinvites manyof them to the panchayatsamiti meetingsheld by him. The jats supporthis style offunctioning, the schemes selected for vil-lage developmentand the manner n whichthe benefits are distributed.Institutional Performance andDistribution of Benefits

Despite the low participation, our re-spondentsagreedthat herehasbeen imple-mentationof manydevelopmental/welfareprogrammes under the AVP by the newpradhans. Out of a total of 29 villagesselectedin Dauralablockfor the AVP since1991, Khanoauda as selected in 1991-92,Maithena in 1992-93, and Uldiypur inRajpurablock in 1996-97.13 Table 1 pro-vides the mainprogrammes implemented,which are the Intensive Rural Develop-ment Programme(IRDP) andthe JawaharRozgar Yojana (JRY), two housingprogrammesand other smaller ones suchas old age pension. As no jobs can beprovided under the JRY in the village, ithas been used for all round village im-provementsuch as building of link roads,brickroads, school buildings, installationof handpumps, oilets,bore-wellsetc. Mostof these schemes have been implementedin Khanauda and Maithena. In Uldiypurthesmallest of thevillages, a newpanchayatbhawancosting Rs 72,000 in 1995-96, andin Khanauda, a 'chapaul' (communitycentre) for the dalits was built. Thesevillages have also received direct grantsfrom the state government for example,Khanauda received Rs 15,000 from theeducationdepartment or aprimaryschoolbuilding, and Rs 10,000 from the welfaredepartment orbuildingcommon toilets aspartof the AVP. Until Mayawati becamethe chief minister in 1993, there was nometal road to the highway from thesevillages, but as partof a special drive thiswas done. These developments have con-siderably raised the standardof living ofthe people andimprovedthe environment.Many villagers have takenadvantageofthe loan scheme under the IRDPprogrammeandsetup tailoringunits,cycleandmachineryrepair hops, carpentryunits,

etc, andthere are a total of 56 shopsinthesamplevillagesownedbymembers fvariouscastes. Two MBCrespondentsnMaithena nd one in Khanaudaell milk,forwhich here s greatdemand n Meerutcity, rombuffaloes ought nder heIRDPloan scheme.OneMBCrespondent wnsa flourmillin the village and two dalitrespondentsare contractorswho haveprofited by the road building activitycommissionedunder he AVP.However,a differentpictureemergeswhenwe examine hemannern which hebenefitshave been distributed. he intro-ductionof theAVP,especiallyduring heperiodwhen the BSP was in power,in-troduced newdimensionnto healreadyconflictual ituationxistingnour amplevillages,due to heightenedpoliticisationamong ow castegroups n recentyears.Oursurveyrevealed onsiderable iscon-tent, lack of trust,and even conflict be-tween caste groups.Table 1 shows thatalthoughthe AVP was conceived as aprogrammemeant for the dalitsandtheMBCs who togetherconstitute he ruralpoor, in most cases the beneficiaries redalits.Secondly,respondents rgued hatmostof thepumps,drainsandbrickroadshavebeen aid n thedalitmohallas.n act,the benefits are even morenarrowlydis-tributed,amongthe jatavs due to theircontrol ver hepanchayats,atherhan hereallypoorwhoare heMBCsandbalmikis,whichhascreated esentmentmong hesegroupstowards hem.WhiletheMBCs andthedalitsshareacommon antipathy owards the middlecastes,due totheAVP mutual ntagonismand 'social ealousies'between hemoverissuessuchas,tontrol over commonvil-lage resourcesand political preferenceshassharpened. heMBCscomplainedhaton the one hand,only a small section of'forward'backwards uch as the yadavsandkurmishavebenefited romreserva-tionswhile herest ike hemselves, emainuneducated ndbackward.On the otherhand,both n thepastandunder heAVP,the BSPgovernment asgivenhelp ntheformof loans, and or housebuildingandbasicamenities uchashandpumps, ainlyto the dalits,who see it as 'theirparty/government'and behavein an arrogantanddictatorialmannerowards hem.TheMBCs feel that these are now 'chamarvillages' in which the dalits are almostequal to the upper/middle astes, whiletheir eedsareneglected s heyack eadersto voice theirneeds,andpowerful ocalbureaucrats ndpradhansmisappropriate

whatever undstheyareentitled o. As aresult, the MBCs can neither identifythemselveswith the upper/middleasteswhom they served earlier and who onoccasion still exploit them,or the dalits,whom heyconsider eneath hem ocially.Thejats andrajputsareacutelyawarethat the jatavs have benefited from theAVP, andmoreimportanthis has bredamonghemboth ommunalolidarity nda new sense of self-respect.They alsoresent losing theirhold over the MBCswho traditionally rovided hem servicesandlabour,and who theyfeel are ncitedby the dalitsagainst hem.Thejatavsonthe otherhand eel that he MBCsdespitebeing partof the ruralpoor do not co-operatewith thedalitsin the functioningof thepanchayats. heystillalignwith hehigh/middlecastes, providethem tradi-tionalservices,andbehave n a subservi-ent mannernstead f findingndependentemployment, which is now available.Moreover,heyresent hesuperior ttitudeof the MBCs whoplacethem outside heHindu vamahierarchy.The balmikis i-nallyaccuseboth he MBCsand he atavsof ill treatment,he formeroppress hem,the latterhave not shared he benefitsofthe AVP despitetheirbeingthe poorestamongthe dalits.

AzamgarhParticipatoryPatterns

In contrast,our study of the samplevillages nAzamgarh istrict evealedhatthe middle castes still control thepanchayats.There s also a total absenceof participation y the largemajorityofthe villagers in the decision-making rimplementation f programmes.Due toreservations he dalits have been able tocapturealmostall the elective posts,butthis has not given themcontrolover thepanchayats.nAnaura,heearlierpradhana kurmi,hadto relinquish ispostbuttheelectionof hiswifeasthedeputypradhan,hasensured hecontinuation fhiscontroloverdisbursementfpatronage.nAnaura,therewere ninecontestants or thepostofpradhanof whom only three gained asubstantialumber f votes-408, 165and110 out of a total of 1,016 votes cast.Elevenmemberswere lected romAnaura,three of them unopposed,to 'the grampanchayatamitiand two dalitwomentotheBDS. In Sammapur f the 10 contes-tants for the post of pradhan, nly tworeceived ubstantialumber f votes.Moreimportant,hepostof deputypradhanwas

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won by a youngeducateddalit who hasbeen instrumentaln implementation fdevelopmentalrogrammesn thevillage.Elevenmemberswereelected o thegrampanchayatsamiti, of whom, two wereyadavs he rest dalitsand one member,adalit, o theBDS.14 nNevrahi, utof ninecandidates, GaudMBC)was able o winthepostof pradhan ue to acrimonybe-tween the chamarsand pasis, Thirteencandidateswereelectedunopposedo thepanchayatamitibutonlyfour were cha-mars, he restdue to mutual onsultationsto avoidacontest onsistedof threepasis,twobhars, neyadavandthreebrahmins.Fourwomenmembers three hamars ndone pasi- were electedto the BDS.Thecapture f elective posts by dalitshas ntroducedqualitativehangen nter-caste relationships,but the kurmis andyadavsretaincontrolover panchayatn-stitutions.Only n Sammapur, here heyarefewerin number,heyhave lost con-siderablegroundvis-a-vis the dalits. Infact, following reservation,capture ofpower by the BSP and particularlyMayawati'sappointment s chief minis-ter, they have attempted o tightentheirholdoverpanchayatnstitutions.nAnaurathe kurmis nd n Nevrahi heyadavs,arekeen o control henewpanchayats, hichtheyperceiveas newcentresof powerandpatronageollowing heir ncrease n sta-tus and unctions.Therajputs n theotherhandarguehat hegovernment elpsonlythedalitswhohavealwaysprovidedhema vote-bank,and do not favourfurtherincrease n thepowersof thepanchayats.Despite hesechanges, n all thevillagesthere is little participation y the largemajority of villagers - of all castes - inthefunctioningf thepanchayatwhich sviewedas a 'sarkari'government)nsti-tution esponsibleorprovidingunds orwelfareprogrammes,ras a socialmecha-nism to settledisputesamong villagers.Lack of educationandunderstandingfthe importance f participationn localaffairs, remains an importantobstacleamong hepoorer nduneducatedectionsof the lowercastes.InstitutionalPerformanceandDistributionof Benefits

In all the villagesas Table2 shows,anumber f programmesave beenimple-mented underthe AVP. These villages,except orSammapur ere electedduringthe period of the short-lived BSP-BJPcoalition government in 1995 whenMayawati aggressively pursued this

programme,hrough he districtbureau-cracyfor its speedy implementation. sfew obsareavailable, nder RY, amiliesbelow the line of povertywere identifiedandprovided mployment n largecivilworks suchas construction f link roadsanddrains,which haveconsiderablym-proved hevillageenvironment,r benefi-ciarieswereprovidedoans o setupsmallbusinesses. Women from SC and SThouseholdsweregivenpriority, nd30percent of job opportunitiesreatedarere-served or them.Allvillagesweregrantedfunds on the basis of their population,smallvillageswith less than1,000popu-lation being counted along with thosehaving1,000population. nykindofcivilwork can be selected by the villagepanchayat,withthe provisothatat least50 percent of thelabourand 15 percentofthe undsmustbeused oprovide ousingto theSCpopulationn thevillage.Otherschemeswhichmaybetakenuparepublicroads, loodcontrolworks,pondcleaning,panchayat uildings, ommunity entres,primary choolbuildings,etc.InAnaura nder RY, ourmain chemeswere undertaken:helinkroadwith smallnullahs romRaniki Sarai o the villageatanexpenditure f Rs3,99,000;second,diggingwas'begunor the Anaura illagedrainprojecton which Rs 72,000 wasspent;third,a numberof the sanctionedSulabh toilets were built at a cost ofRs 88,420; andfour,classrooms or theprimaryschool were built at a cost ofRs60,000. The Sulabhtoilet scheme isvery popularand 15 households havebenefitedrom t.Each ndividualsgrantedRs2,500,andhas o nitially epositRs 300with the pradhanwho enters it in hisaccounts and has it constructed.Dalitbeneficiaries eed to depositonlyRs 150initially.The village has benefited romthehandpumps, hichhavebeen fitted nthe schools and the bazaar,so that theentirevillage can drawwater.AlthoughNevrahi was selected as anAmbedkar illage n 1995-96, heselectedprogrammeswere mplemented ver a 2-3yearperiod.At east14ongoingprogram-mes such as TRYSEM,specialcompo-nentsprogramme, tc, have been partlyfinanced by the AVP. Underthe JRYprogrammeixhandpumps five of theminthedalitbastisandone on themainroadof thevillage were nstalled,brick oadsand drains laid and the primary choolbuilding repaired.Under most of theschemesdalitshavebenefited pecially nthe field of housing,as theydo not have

to returnhe ull oanamount.Under RDPhouseholds were able to buy bullocks,buffaloes,tart oultryarming,etup hops,begun sheep rearing,and women havepurchasedewingmachines. nSammapur,although smallvillagemanyprogrammeswere noperation,he mainones aregiveninTable2. A new schoolbuilding n 1995andextra classrooms he following yearwerebuilt,andthe extra undsalso madeconstruction of link roads and drainspossible.About29houseswerebuiltunderthe two majorhousingschemes between1993and1998.Therehas not beenmuchprogressunder he IRDP n thevillage.These programmeswere implementeddue to the effortsof thepradhans, lockofficials and the supportof the middlecastes in the sample villages.In contrastto our sample villages in Meerut,morefunds have been spenton schemesben-efitingtheentirevillageratherhan ndi-viduals.Thisis due to the nfluenceof thekurmis who are not keen to implementschemes which wouldmateriallybenefitthe dalits and MBCsmaking hemmoreconfident ndassertive. ence,heAVP hasnotgenerated penconflictamongcastegroupsas in Meerut.The dalits ncludingthechamars, redivided nto factionsanddue to lack of unity,have not been ableto make their mark elt uponpanchayatfunctioning.n Anauraorexample,whilesome factions upporthepradhanndareinvitedby him to participaten decision-making, ther anti-pradhan'roups,madeupofyounger alits, eel heis nothandlingvillage affairsproperlydueto whichfullbenefit has not been made of the AVP.Thisgroupwouldalso iketoincrease alitparticipationn the panchayats nd chal-lenge the powerof the traditional omi-nant roups.TheMBCsbeinguneducated,cannot articulate heirneeds and do notparticipate n the panchayatswith theexceptionof the bharsnNevrahiwho arepolitically onsciousandmorevocal.Thuslack of unity amongandpovertyamongthedalits andMBCs,whichplacesthemonadependent osition is-a-vis hemiddlecastes,has allowedthe latter o continueto dominatepanchayat unctioning.

IVConclusionOurstudyhas examined he impactofsocialcapital,on thedemocraticunction-ing of panchayatnstitutionsn two dis-trictsof UttarPradesh.A central indingis that he context n whichsocialcapital

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functions is important, leading to differ-ential consequences. In developing soci-eties such as India, segmentation arisingout of caste/class divisions emerges as asignificant contextual variable determin-ing thedevelopmentof trust,social capitalbetweengroups,and democraticfunction-ing of institutions. Furtherthe nature ofsegmentedness in transitional societies isnot 'fixed' but fluid with consequences forthe nature of social capital. Rapid changeinpost-independenceIndiadue to the twinprocessesof democracyanddevelopment,has led to construction of new identitiesandshifts in the balance of power betweencasteandclass groups,creatingboth fusionand fission, leading to horizontal andvertical mobilisation. InUP, since the mid-1980s,fasterpoliticalmobilisationthroughsocio-cultural movements in civil societyand political parties thrown up bydemocratisation,has uniteddisadvantagedgroups creating larger identities of dalitand MBC that have challenged upper/middle caste dominance. At the same time,capitalist development and state-fundedwelfareprogrammeshave sharpenedcom-petition and conflict between dalits andMBCs, and subcastes within them, forcontrol over economic resources, socialstatusandpoliticaldomination.Thus, whatwe are witnessing is increasing differen-tiation, not homogenisation; social con-flict is no longer confined to the dominantand lower castes, but has sharpenedbetween sections of the rural poor.

These processes have impacted differ-ently in our two study areas underliningthe significance of the context. In Meerutdistrict, closer ties and stronger bonds ofsocial capital have emerged among thejatavs that has enabled them to challengethe dominanceof thejats andrajputs,gaincontrol over the panchayats and morebenefits from the AVP, though this hascreatedopen conflict with the MBCs andother subcastes of dalits. In Azamgarhdistrict, the dalits remain economicallyweak, with divisions even among thechamars and unable to collectively chal-lenge the power of the kurmis and yadavsand play a more effective role in thepanchayats.The pace of economic changeandpoliticalmobilisationamongthedalitshas been much slower in east UP, creatinglower levels of conflict and maintainingexisting structuresof dominance.These developments have both positiveandnegative connotationsfor the buildingof social capital. In positive terms, socialcapital in the form of communal solidarity

has unitedthe dalitsmakingthem con-sciousof their pecialproblems, ringingthem ogetheror ointsocial andpoliticalactionagainst heupper ndmiddle astesand providingthem collective mobilityupwards.nnegativeerms,ncreasedocialawareness, oliticisationnd mprovementin theireconomicposition,have dividedthechamarsromother roups f their wncommunity such as the balmikis andmusahars, nd sectionsof the ruralpoorsuch as theMBCswith whomtheyhavecommon conomic nterests. hisdoesnotmeanthatsocialcapitaldoes not exist insocietiescharacterised orebyconflictualthan consensual elationships.Ourstudyshowsthat ocialcapital xists,butwithinandnotbetween egmentsn rural ociety.Grouprather han individual dentities,have the potential o createstrongreser-voirsof socialcapitalwithin egments, utthey do not facilitate and can in factinhibit- the creationof a more broad-based civically useful and constructivesocial capital,which has the capacity oensure esponsiveemocraticovernment.Trust cross egments rising utofmem-bership fthesamepanchayat,nd haringcommon interestswhich need to be ad-dressed,s rare nd xperiencednlyduringacrisis,or when t benefitsallindividualssuch as buildinga roador flood controlworks.Yet,inoursamplevillages n westUP and o amuch esserdegree neastUP,the chamarsare playing the role of avanguardproviding eadership o othersubcastes,a process,which remains n-completeandholdspossibilities f greaterfuturepoliticalcooperation mongvari-ous subcastes.Thepossibility f coopera-tion between the dalits and the MBCsagainstheupper/middleastesseem ess,but cannotbe ruledout.The ncapacity f socialcapital obridgesegmentary oundaries, ashindered ol-lective action among all caste groupsspecially heruralpoor,greater articipa-tion and democratic functioning ofpanchayats.This is because the compo-nentsof social capitalaredifferent romthose in western societies, where theemphasiss uponequalcitizensparticipat-ing in publiclife for the commongood.Inour ample anchayats,neq-ualelation-shipsof power,competition nd conflictoccupy centralplace. Despite consider-able democratisationf theirsocial com-positionandgreater evolution f power,the panchayats emainunder he controlof a smallgroupof jatavsin MeerutandKurmis n Azamgarhdistrict.An 'elite'

democracy unctions n which the largemajority f membersdo notparticipatendecision-makingr, n somecases,arenoteven aware of available programmesresultingin inequitable distributionofbenefits of the AVP and competitionand conflict between segments.Thus,panchayatnstitutions n UP, faithfullyreflect heunequal ndsegmented ocietyin which they areembeddedandareanarenaof contestation ather hancoopera-tion amongvariouscaste segmentsoverresourcesand benefits.However, he conflictsamong hevari-ousgroupswithin hepanchayats eednotbe viewedin a negative ight and do notalways,it is arguable,undermine emo-cratic functioning. As Hirschman haspointed ut,socialconflict s an mportantpillar and in fact builderof democraticsociety.Whileadegreeof social cohesionis needed n every society,he holds thatthe ntegration f modemsocietiesevery-where, is the result withoutthe citizensrealising t,of theirexperience f passingthrough nd somehowmanaging r tend-ing,avariety fconflicts Hirschman994].Generally onflictsareseen asdangerousandpotentially estructive f social orderand collective action, and need to becontainedprecisely by the existence ofsocialcapital rcommunity piritnacivilsociety. Yet, social conflicts themselvesproducehevaluable iesthatholdmodemdemocratic ocietiestogether ndprovidethem the strength and cohesion theyrequire o functionand survive.In the absenceof an active and demo-craticcivil society, it is the state- givenitscentralityndevelopingocieties-whichis playinga seminalrole. In westernso-cieties, complex institutional tructureshave been devisedto constrain heparti-cipantsto reduce uncertainty n socialinteraction.Rules andregulationsexistto ensure that the gains of progressarerealised.Someofthese nstitutionaltruc-turesareweakornon-existentndevelop-ingcountries. nthe Indian ontext,whatis importants not theexistenceof conflictperse, but themanagement f conflictbythestateand the leadersof various ocialgroups.Through egotiations ndbargain-ing betweengroups,conflictscanbe re-solved,traditional ierarchies uestioned,and moreegalitarian quationsbetweensegments established, which help inbuilding a cohesive democraticorder.Second, heinterventionistndre-distrib-utive role of the state, helpingthepoorandunder-privileged, hrougha number

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Table 1: Major Panchayat Programmes: Malthena, Khanauda and UldlypurMaithena Khanauda UldiypurProgrammne Year Noand Caste Amount No andCaste Amount Noand Caste Amountof Beneficiaries (Rs) of Beneficiaries (Rs) of Beneficiaries (Rs)

1 IRDP 1989-90 7SCs,5MBCs,2jats 4-8000 8SCs 4-7000(loans) 1990-91 8SCs,2MBCs,2jats 4-8000 2Jats,1OSCs,MBC,6others 5-11000 -1991-92 9SCs,6MBCs 3-10000 10SCs, 1MBC 5-10000 -1992-93 1SC, 2MBCs 7-9000 22SCs, 2 MBCs 5-15000 -1993-94 10SCs,6MBCs 9-20000 6SCs, 6 MBCs 7-15000 -1994-95 8SCs,1MBC 5-13000 11SCs, 1MBC 5-14000 -1995-96 3SCs 5-12000 11SCs,2 MBCs 7-7500 36SCs,8MBCs 6-600002 JRY 1996-97 17SCs,2MBCs 5-15000 -Forvillage 1989-90 - - 55,300Development 1990-91 - 529921991-92 - - 391851992-93 115524 - 121301993-94 150785 63307 450171994-95 43091 39535 20,7341995-96 175948 110441 339151996-97 49716 481671997-98 35000 36,0003 NirbalAwas 1991-92 5SCs,1MBC 8500 each 4 SCs,Jat, 1MBC 8500Yojana 1992-93 - - 8SCs, 2 MBCs 90001993-94 6SCs 9500 each 1MBC 90001994-95 - - 2SCs2MBCs* 100004 Pension 1991 3 caste not known 1.00pm 34 caste notknown(1991-96) 100pm - -(WidowPension 1993 - - - - 3SCs,1 rajput NAincase of Uldiypur) 1994 1 - -1995 2 - - 10SCs, 1MBC1996 8 - - 4SCs,5MBCs5 IndiraAwas 1987-88 15 6000 - -Yojana 1989-99 - - - - 14 9000(Housingoans for 1991-92 - 6SCs 6000 -SCs.) 1992-93 - 10 SCk 8000 -1993-94 20 8000 .12 SCs, 4 MBCs 9000 -1994-95 18 8000 2 SCs 9000 5 90001995-96 8 9000 - 3 90006 SulabhToilets 1997-98 50SCs, 50 others 1,10,000 25 SCs,25 others 64,000 -

Table 2: Major Panchayat Programmes: Anaura, Nevrahl and SammapurAnaura Nevrahi SammapurProgrammes Year Beneficiaries- Amount Noand Caste Amount No andcaste AmountNoand Caste (Rs) of Beneficiaries (Rs) of Beneficiaries. (Rs)

1 IRDP 1994-95 - NA - - 5 chamars4 others 3-12000(loans) 1995-96+ 5 caste not known NA 14 SCs and4 others 6-22000 1 MBC 97501996-97 3 caste not known NA - - 7 chamars 6-120002 JRY 1993-94 -- - 239631994-95 - - - - - 546141995-96 Forvillage 65,932 - 56048 - 823971996-97 Development 46295 - 56206 - 600001997-98 - 38670 - 50285 - 600001998-99 - - 46998 -3 NirbalAwas 1993-94 - -Yojana 1994-95 - - 7 chamars 6-100001995-96+ 3 SCs, Iother 8-10,000 5SCs, Iother 10-20000 4chamars1pasi 6-100001996-97 1SC 10000 -1997-98 - - - - pasi 100004. Pension 1995-96+ - - 5SCs, 4 others 125 pm 14 caste notknown 100pm1996-97 13, caste not known Rs125pm - -5 IndiraAwas 1994-95 1 8000 - - 2 chamars 7-12500Yojana 1995-96+ 10 8000 45 SCs, 12 others 10-12000 1pasi,9 chamars 10-170001996-97 - - - - pasi,2 chamars 6-100006 SulabhToilets 1997-98 10 SCs, 5 others 2500 yet to be begun- -7 FreeBoring 1991-92 2 -(costborneby 1993-94 8 .Panchayat) 1994-95 --- 21995-96+ - - 6 SCs 2 others - 41996-97 - - - - 1Note.+ the figures nthecase of Nevrahiare for1995 to 1998.

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of welfare programmes,has played animportantrole in containing conflictbetween the privilegedand underprivi-leged.In oursamplevillages, despite heauthoritariantructurend ack of partici-patorydemocracy n the functioningofpanchayats,number f welfare/develop-mental programmeshave been imple-mented both in Meerut and Azamgarh,fromwhichdalitsand MBCshavebene-fited.Our tudy ndicates hatanongoingprocess of conflict-resolution, hroughintervention y stateofficials and localcaste eaders,s presentnthefunctioningof the new panchayatsn our two studydistrictsof UttarPradesh.This suggeststhata broad-basedocialcapital,capableof bringing ogetherdifferentcaste/classgroupsmayevolve over a periodof timeout of an interplayof both conflict andconsensus,negotiationand bargaining,leading o moredemocraticunctioningfpanchayats.E1

Notes1 Thepaperdrawsupon ourrounds f fieldwork:the first was conducted n May 1996, a moredetailedone from February o May 1997, athird n November 1998 and a final round n

FebruaryMarch1999.The resultsof thefirstareavailablein, SudhaPai andJagpalSingh(1997) The second roundconcentratedon thefunctioning of panchayats,the AVP and itsimpactuponcaste/classrelationships.The lasttwo rounds concentratedupon eastern UttarPradesh.2 I am grateful to Jagbir Singh, schoolteacherin Meerut,for his painstakingand dedicatedfieldworkwithoutwhich this studywould nothave been possible.3 Ambedkar Gram Vikas YojanaSambandithMahatvapoorn hasanadesh Report nHindi)Governmentof UP, Lucknow, 1999.4 All informationabout the Ambedkarvillagescheme and developmental/welfare pro-grammeswithin it are from the recordsof theblock development officer, Daurala block,Meerut.I attendeda BDS meetingat DauralainApril1997,at which thepradhans ndotherelected members from our sample villagespresentedthe problemsof their villages andasked for new grants.5 A few examplesare:(1) Olle Tomquist 1998.(2) RenataSerra, 1999. (3) Articles on Indiaand Mexico in special issue WorldDevelop-ment, 24, no 6, 1996.6 A recentexample s, RobertA, Couto,MakingDemocracy Work Better: MediatingStructures, ocialCapital,and the DemocraticProspect,Universityof NorthCarolinaPress,1999.7 Placed on the borderdividing the clean andthe unclean castes, traditionallyMBCs wereservicecastes- suchaswashermen, arpenters,barbers, etc - forming part of the Jajmani

system. (Singh 1991)They include atis suchas dhivars,jogis, dhobis, telis, etc, amongHindu andbadais, lohars,dhunas andjulahs,amongMuslimMBCgroups nMeerutdistrict.The Most BackwardClassess CommissionofUP 1975, listed 41 castes as most backwardon the basis of social, economic, educationaland political backwardness.8 For a descriptionof these villages see Pai andSingh, 1997.

9 The number of SCs employees in the UPgovernment compare favourablywith thosefrom thebrahmin,kayasthaandvaishyacastegroups.EconomicTimes,New Delhi,June4,1995.10 For details aboutthe educational evel of therespondentssee, Pai 2000.11 All informationaboutpanchayatelections inthe sample villages in both Meerut andAzamgarh s from theBDO of the respectiveblock.12 The subcastes of the candidates n KhanaudaandUldiypurcould not be ascertained,but thewinner in all cases was a jatav.13 ThoughKhanauda ndMaithenawere selectedin the early 1990s, the actualimplementationbegan in 1993 after the SP-BSP governmentcame to power. Moreover the Mayawatigovernment (1997) granted extra funds forcompletion of schemes begun earlier.14 The subcastes of the elected dalit memberscould not be ascertained,but most of themwere chamars.

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