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Soul as Harmonia

Author(s): H. B. GottschalkSource: Phronesis, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1971), pp. 179-198Published by: BRILL

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SoulasHarmonia

H. B. GOTTSCHALK

There aretwogroupsof early Greek hinkersof whom we are toldthat they regarded the soul as a harmonia of the body or itsparts. The first is represented for us by Simmias and Echecrates

in Plato's Phaedo (85 e ff, 88 d) and is also mentioned by Aristotle.'The second consists of two followers of Aristotle, Dicaearchus and

Aristoxenos.2 Their doctrine attracted a good deal of attention inantiquity and some more recent historians have seen in it an anticipa-tion of modern epiphenomenalistideas;3 but to my knowledge therehas been no comprehensivemodern discussion of it since della Valle'sarticle published in 1905. In the first part of this paper I shall try todetermine the exact meaning of this theory and what differences,if any, are to be found between its adherents. In the second I shallattempt to traceits origins.

Our earliest account of this theory is put into the mouth of Simmiasby Plato at Phaedo 85 e ff. After expressing his dissatisfaction withthe proofs of immortality given so far and being asked by Socratesin what respects he is dissatisfied, Simmias proceeds:

This is what I find difficult, that the same argument could beapplied to harmoniai and lyres and strings; one might say thatthe harmonia in a properly tuned (ptioaLwn) lyre is invisible

I Eudemus fr. 45 Roses, 7 Walzer-Ross; De an. 407 b 30 ff, Pol. 1340 b 19.2 Dicaearchus fr. 5-12 in F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristotles I (Basel 1944, ed.2 1967; Aristoxenos fr. 118-21 ibid. II (Basel 1945, ed. 2 1967). The same viewis attributed to another member of Aristotle's school, Clearchus (ibid. III,fr. 9), by Theodoretus, but this is certainly mistaken; see below, pp. 186 f.3 A. E. Taylor. Plato, the Man and his Work, p. 194; G. della Valle, La teoriadell'anima-armonia di Aristosseno e l'epifenomenismo contemporaneo,Riv. Filosof.8.1905.210-31 has an interesting discussion and critique of this theory, but hisdistinction (p. 224) between a "materialist" and an "epiphenomenalist"

conception of the soul is too subtle to apply to the ancient thinkers with whomwe are concerned.

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86a and incorporealand supremely valuable and divine but the lyre

itself and its strings are bodies and corporealand composite and

earthy and akin to all that is mortal. Suppose thereforethat whenthe lyre had been brokenor its stringscut and torn, someonewere

to use your argument to maintain that that harmoniamust still

exist and could not possibly have perished - for (he might

argue) it is quite impossible that the lyre and its strings, which

belong to the order of mortal things, should continue to exist

after the strings have been torn asunder while the harmonia,

86b which is akin to and has the same nature as what is divine and

immortal, should perishbefore that which is mortal - but were

to say that it must be that the harmoniacontinues to existsomewhere, and the wood and strings will rot away before any-

thing happens to it - for, Socrates, I think you are awarethat we

believe the soul to be something like this: our bodies are as it

were tensioned and held together by hot and cold and dry and

wet and other things of the same kind, and our souls are the

86c blending (xpaicnq) nd harmonia of these things, when they have

been nicely blended in due proportion - if then the soul reallyis some kind of harmonia, t is clear that when our bodies are un-

duly relaxed or tensioned by diseaseor some other

ill,the soul

must immediately perish, though it be most divine, just like

the other harmoniai found in musical sounds and all artefacts,

while the remains of every body last a long time, until they are

86d burned or rot away. Considertherefore what we are to reply to

this argument, if someome were to assert that the soul, being a

blending of the bodily constituents, is the first thing to perish

in what is called death.

I have not translated the word harmoniabecause its exact meaningis one of the things I am trying to establish. Most published trans-

lations render it by "harmony", usually but not always with a note

explaining that the English word is not an exact equivalent of the

Greek, or "attunement".' The second alternative is certainly correct

for the later part of the passage I have quoted, from 86 b 5, where

4Harmony: Jowett (all editions); Apelt (Harmonie); Robin (Harmonie);

Archer-Hind in his notes. Attunement: Bluck, Hackforth, Tredennick; Schleier-

macher (Stimmung); Burnet Early Gk. Phil.' 2951. (in his note on Phaedo

85 e 3 he writes "tuning"). Taylor (Plato p. 194 ff) uses both "melody" and

"attunement".

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Simmias equates harmonia with "blending" (xp-aLq), and for the

passages where Socrates refers to Simmias' theory in the course ofhis refutation.5 But what about Simmias' opening sentence? When

he calls harmonia something incorporeal, supremely valuable and

divine, using some of the epithets which had previously (80bff)been shown to belong to the order of being of which the soul is a part,he is surelynot referring o the state of tune of a lyre but to the musical

sounds it produces, of whose effect on men's minds the Greeks, and

Plato in particular,were so acutely conscious.6These are by no meansthe same thing. The sounds are produced by the attunement anddependent on it, without themselves affecting it in any way.7 Thus

the word harmonia changes its meaning between the simile withwhich Simmias begins and the theory he develops from it, and thisshift of meaning corresponds to an underlying ambiguity in his ac-count as a whole: on the one hand there is the positivism of makingthesoul completely dependent on the body, on the other the suppositionthat it is divine and supremely beautiful, with its mystical overtone.The significance of this is something I shall come back to in thesecondpart of my paper.

As for the theory, it is easy to summarise its main outlines. The

soul is a harmonia in the sense of a blending of the physical con-stituents of the body. The constituents in question are describedas "hot and cold and dry and wet and other things of the same kind",8

that is to say, the most elementary entities of which the organism iscomposed. A point not stated by Simmias which is brought out laterin the course of Socrates'refutation (92 e ff) is that the soul exercisesno control over the body; on the contrary, its states follow and are

5 92 a 8, b 7, c 2, 93 a 6, 11, c 5, etc.; 94 c 3, etc. xp&aLvail &p,iovtav ccurs at

86 b 9, xp&acLnd its cognates alone at 86 c 2, d 2.6 Cf. Phaedo 92 b 9 7rp6tcpov al X6px lod ol xop xac l L 9P6YYOL TL&vpLOO'rOL

6'v're; y(OyVo'rML, cr0WTXLOV 8i 7CVT.OV aUVEGtaTaXL 0 &pLO?VX.

7 Cf. W. James, Princ. of Psych. I 133 (in a discussion of the "epiphenomenalist"theory), "So the melody floats from the harp-string, but neither checks norquickens its vibrations; so the shadow runs alongside the pedestrian, but in noway influences his steps." Cf. della Valle 217, 225 n. 1, who quotes this and otherillustrations. Taylor (Plato p. 194) finds an exact analogy between Simmias'doctrine and that of T. H. Huxley, who regarded consciousness as a by-productof bodily activity comparable to the whistle given off by steam leaving anengine. In spite of this he uses "melody" and "attunement" indifferently to

render harmonia.8 86 b 8 tptoL4 xczl 4uxpoi xco 4po% xad USypoi5actToLOtCrv 'Lnvv.

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conditioned by those of the body. The soul is not a pnrncipleof anykind, not even in the sense in which the tension of a string, regarded

as a physical state, may be said to be a principle governing the pitchof the note which the string will give out when plucked. Lastly allthe participants in the dialogue (and all later writers who hold ordescribe the same theory) are agreed that it entails the mortality ofthe soul; the soul can neither have existed before the body (92a)not can it continue to exist after the body's dissolution.

Aristotle knew the same theory chiefly, if not exclusively from the

Phaedo. In the Eudemus (fr. 45 R3, 7 W-R) he recast come of Plato's

objections, but we learn nothing new about the theory itself from thesurviving fragments. A fuller discussion is preservedin

the de Anima(1.4.407b 27 - 408 a 28). But althoughhe devotes a good deal of spaceto its refutation, all he tells us about the theory is that the soul is aharmonia, that harmonia means a "blending and combination"of opposites,9and that the body consists of opposites. All this, togetherwith several of his objections, could have been taken straight from

the Phaedo or the Eudemus,10 nd adds nothing to our knowledge of

the doctrine he is trying to refute. But Aristotle omits Simmias'musical analogy, avoiding the ambiguity which the word harmoniahas in the Phaedo, and nowhere suggests that the holders of this

theory regard the soul as divine or superior to the body. A bnrefreference to the same doctrine in the Politics (1340b 19) adds nothingto what we know already.

In spite of Aristotle's objections the same theory or somethingvery like it is ascribed to two of his pupils."1n the case of Aristoxenos

the picture is fairly clear. Cicero, our chief authority, tells us that

"Aristoxenos, the musician and philosopher, said that the soul is

a sort of tensioning of the body itself, like what we call "harmonia"

in singing and lyre-playing; in the same way various forms of activityarise from the whole nature and physical arrangementof the body,

9 XPaCFLV al cuvOcatv vazv'dv, 407 b 31. In the following sentence he himself

defines &'p,uovto s X6yog Ttq 'rv LXWv'rcv%M~v&CU (a 32).

10An. 407 b 30 - 32 , Phaedo 86 b 7 ff; b 32 - 4 Phaedo 92 e ff; 408 a 1 - 3=

Eudemus fr. 7 ad fin. 408 a 3 - 5 Phaedo 94 b 7 ff.11The fullest discussion, with a useful summary of earlier literature, is that of

G. Movia, Anima e Intelletto: Ricerchesulla Psicologia Peripatetica da Teofrasto a

Cratippo (Padua, 1968), pp. 71-93.

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comparable to the sounds in music."'2 Elsewhere in the same book

he says that Aristoxenos "was so fond of his music that he even tried

to transfer its notions to this field",13 that his view entails the mor-

tality of the soul'4 and that both Aristoxenos and Dicaearchus

denied the substantial existence of the mind.'5 Cicero's account isfurther embroidered by Lactantius who, however, adds nothing of

substance.16

All this does not amount to a complete theory and it is not at all

certain that Aristoxenos had worked one out. Nevertheless someinteresting points emerge. Aristoxenos seems to have recognised

that the term harmonia is used metaphorically when applied to thesoul.'7 The propermeaningof harmonia, s he used it, was "musicalsound" rather than "attunement". The physical factors giving riseto the harmoniawere not the elementary opposities - they are nevermentioned in connection with Aristoxenos' theory - but the arrange-ment and nature of the organs of the entire body. If we follow thisevidence, weak as it is, we are forced to conclude that Aristoxenos'idea was rather different from the one developed by Simmias. Insteadof an immanentrelationshipbetween the elementarybodilyconstituentsthe soul was, for Aristoxenos, the end-product - epiphenomenon if

you like - of the activity of the living organismas a whole.'8

" Tusc. 1.19 Aristoxenos fr. 120 a: Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophusipsius corporis intentionem quandam (animam esse vult), velut in cantu etfidibus quae &ptLov(aicitur: sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motuscieri tamquam in cantu sonos."'3 Ibid. 41 = A. fr. 120 b (printed in Wehrli's second edition only): "A. itadelectatur suis cantibus ut eos etiam ad haec transferre conetur. &p,wovtxvautem ex intervallis sonorum nosse possumus, quorum varia compositio etiamharmonias efficit pluris, membrorum vero situs et figura corporis vacans animoquam possit harmoniam efficere non video."4 Ibid. 24 = A.fr. 119.

1' Ibid. 51 = Dicaearchus fr. 8 e.16 Inst. 7.13, Opif. 16 = A. fr. 120 c - d. S. Brandt, Lactantius' editor in theCSEL, thinks that he may have used other authorities besides Cicero, but isunable to suggest who they could have been (Wiener St. 13.1891.281 ff).17 Cf. Wehrli SA II p. 84.18 Cf. della Valle 217, Movia 91. My interpretation gains some support from oneof the objections of Lucretius (3.119 ff): many large parts of the body may becut away without its life being lost, i.e. without destroying its harmonia. Thisargument would be pointless if Lucretius did not think that it was the limbs qualimbs whose mutual adjustment constitutes the harmonia. Lucretius does notname the author of the harmonia-doctrine, but he knew it in its Hellenistic form.

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With regard to Dicaearchus the situation is more complicated.Two doxographers, Ps-Plutarch (4.2.5 = Dic.fr. 12a) and Stobaeus

(1.49.1 = Dic. fr. 12 b) credit him with the view that the soul isa harmoniaof the four elements - the old doctrine we know from

the Phaedoand Aristotle. Cicerohowever,who certainlyknew Dicaear-

chus' psychological writings at first hand,"'gives a different accountof his teaching. On the negative side, he tells us, Dicaearchusagreedwith Aristoxenos in denying the immortality and sustantiality of

the soul,20but his description of his positive views is rather different."Dicaearchus brought on a certain Pherecrates, an old man ofPhthia, said to be a descendant of Deucalion, who explained that

the soul is nothing at all; it is a completely empty name, and tospeak of animate or "be-souled"beings is meaningless: there isneither rational nor irrational soul in man or beast and all thatpower by which we act or apprehend is spread evenly throughall living bodies and inseparablefrom the body; for it is nothingin itself and there is nothing except one simple body, so fashioned

that is lives and apprehendsowing to its naturalcomposition."1

19 He refers to his Corinthian and Lesbian Dialogues (Tusc. 1.21, 77, = Dic.

frr. 7 and 9) and in a letter to Atticus (13.32.2 = Dic.fr. 70) written on 29 May,45 BC asks for "Dicaearchi nepl sOxn utrosque". The same title is found in

Plut. adv. Col. 1115 a = Dic. fr. 5 and is presumably a collective title for the

two dialogues, each of which consisted of three books. Wehrli (SA I p. 45)

regards it as a deliberate allusion to the title of the Phaedo, but this is certainly

wrong; it is unlikely that Dicaearchus was himself responsible for the collective

name of his dialogues or that the sub-title 7tpl 4 uX7i of the Phaedo was in

regular use before the Hellenistic age, cf. E. Nachmannson, Der gr. Buchtitel

(Gbteborg Arsskr. 1941) 11 (but in (Plato) Ep. 13.363 a &v i repl IuXi4 6yyis a description, not a title). If Dicaearchus knew any treatise as -r& pl 4iuXi;it must have been Aristotle's, cf. Ind. A rist. 102 b 60 ff.

?0Tusc. 1.24, 41, 51, 77, Acad. Pr. 2.124 = Dic. fr. 8 c - f, 9; since he wrote theAcad. Pr. before receiving Dicaearchus' books "On the Soul" (see Ep. ad. Att.

13.32.3 and Philippson RE 7 A 1128) the report in this work (= fr. 8 f) must

be derived from a doxographical source.

21 "D... Pherecraten quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum,

disserrentem inducit, nihil esse ominino animum et hoc esse nomen totum

inane frustraque animalia et animantes appellari, neque in homine inesse animum

vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus

in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore

esse, quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita

figuratum ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat," Tusc. 1.21 = fr. 7.

The word-play in animalia. .. animantes ... animum vel animam is untranslatable;Dicaearchus will have used JuXind +uXor.

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We cannot be sure how faitfully Cicero has reproduced his source;

Wehrli finds a Stoicising tendency in the words "vim... fusam esse".

But the main lines of Dicaearchus' ideas emerge clearly enough.

There is no such thing as "soul" (or "mind" or "spirit") distinct

from the body; the "life" and consciousnesswhich some bodies have

are a function of those bodies arising from their structure and theinterrelation of their parts. This theory is quite different from those

of the Stoics or any other major Hellenistic school,22butas we shall

see, its appearancein the work of a follower of Aristotle can be ex-plained historically. Cicero's account is confirmed by a considerable

number of parallels, of which I shall quote the most important.According to Sextus Empiricus, Dicaearchus held that "the soulis nothing else than the body in a certain state". Simplicius tells usthat "Dicaearchus allowed that living creatures exist but denied theexistence of their cause, the soul", and compared his denial with theEretrians' denial of the reality of qualities.23Finally Atticus (the

Platonist) makes the point, to which I shaU return,that in denyingthe substantiality of the soul, Dicaearchus was drawing the logicalconclusion from Aristotle's insistence that psychic activity belongsto the whole man and not to a distinct part.'4

In all this the word harmoniadoes not occur. Indeed, Cicerotwice,and following him Lactantius, expressly distinguish Dicaearchus'teaching from that of Aristoxenos; while asserting that both denythe reality and immortality of the soul, they ascribe the view that

22It bears a slight resemblance to one attributed to Xenocrates by Lactantius(Opif. Dei 16.12 = Xenocr. fr. 71 Heinze).

23 Sext. Adv. Log. 1.349 = Dic. fr. 8 a ... ot IxuvIq&kv qctv evixL aiu'rv (sc.

sr?tv Livotav) 7rmp& 6 7Wx gXov asx, xot6inp 6 A. Simpl. in Cat. 216.12 =

Dic. fr. 8 g ot &.=6 i 'Ep&'rp(mswnpouv &i. oroL6T?rcx oa'S.&iaq&Xo'as -rt

XOLV6VvLW89, &v 8t 'o%, xO0' lxmoWOx xaxl auv-roLr, VhrpXo6am;. xXoA. 8i a.r rN;

; acxEEx;r6 &vO ov 7uveX&4pctlvtv, Av 8i atlExv co'O 4UXh)v&v'pe. Cf.

Iambl. ap. Stob. 1.49.32 p. 363.20 and 367.6 W (= Dic. fr. 8 k).24 Atticus ap. Euseb. PE 15.9.10, II 370.17 Mras - Dic. fr. 8 i (after quoting

Arist. de an. 408 b 13 ff) 'o&rw, oLyapoi3vLn6jmo; A., xxl .o x6'Xou&ov xav; &.v

&Ccpt7v, &.VwpixZ ArY 6Xwqvt6a7rwrLv rjs 4uXr;. Cf. Nemesios Nat. Hom. 2, col.

537 Migne = Dic. fr. 11 ad fin. 'ApLa-roTTkX1i xal ALmm(apXo; (Ac(tvpX0o codd.)

0voic0ov (riv 4uXyv ElvXt X&youatv). This is only correct if it means that they

denied that the soul is a substance capable of separate existence; as Movia

points out (p. 75, cf. 83), Aristotle emphasised that the soul, qua form of theorganism, is itself an ou'iac(De an. 412 a 19, etc.).

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it is a harmonia o Aristoxenos alone.u This makes it virtually certain

that Dicaearchus did not make this identification in the dialogues

known and quoted by Cicero,and it is very unlikely that he did soanywhere else. But what about pseudo-Plutarch and Stobaeus and

their source,Aetius?A possibleexplanationof their divergentevidence

might be that the harmonia-doctrinewas advocated by a speaker

in his dialogues who did not represent Dicaearchus'own belief, but if

this were correct it would have been unlikely to find acceptance

in one branch of the doxographical tradition without affecting any

of the others, represented by Sextus, Tertullian, pseudo-Galen etc.

Moreover there are signs that the text of Aetius was disturbed at

this point. While pseudo-Plutarch and Stobaeus attribute thisdoctrine to Dicaearchus, other writers who copied Aetius ascribe it

to Clearchus or Deinarchus.2 Probably therefore Aetius' testimony

"6 Cic. Tusc. 1.24, 41, Lact. Inst. 7.13 Dic. fr. 8 c, 8 d, 10 b, Aristox. fr. 119,

120 b - c. The difference has been noticed by C. Bailey on Lucr. 3.94 ff, p. 1005.2 The tradition derived from Aetius is as follows (see Diels Doxogr. p. 387 and

cf. pp. 49 f, 262 f, 651):

Ps.-Plut. Plac. 4.2.7 and Stob. 1.49.1 (= Dic. fr. 12 a - b) AtxalapXoq&ptov(av'riv ?CT'r&PCOV t7?otXzicov (SC. r?v 4Uxjv tVMXL).

Theodoretus Gr. Atf. Cur. 5.18 = Dic. fr. 12. c, Clearchus fr. 9 SA III K)impXo;8tiQ T&V

-pCUC&V CIVaL nOLX6(COV rtV &pIAoVEMV.

Nemesios Nat. Horn. 2 p. 29 Antw, col. 537 Migne = Dic. fr. 11 Asiv(pXoc8k

&pi.voEMV T&V WOa&pCOV c'OLXC(Ow (sc. rtJV 4UXV CtVOvL), &v'i T0o XppO&LV xal OULL-

(pc)vEMvT&V cJrOLXE((.oV. V yip 'rv &x '(iiv q&6yycov auvLo T?ovM ,)v & r~v &v 'ri

arNAOT tp u7Vxal 4Uxp&Vxod iypav xal 4vp&vvmp.L6VLOVpMaLV XMIaULA(a0VCM

Po06XsVrOIyCLv.AvXov8k68t xxl ro&covol OLL r?VfiX)hV 0a(xV tVaLMkroUm,

'APLa'OT9X71q 8k xXI ACEVapXo;&Vov6MoV.Ibid. p. 35, col. 552 Atvappocp okp,tovEmv

)pLvaTo r*V 4UX*V, xocd ZLJLtLo ... srV 4iXhV &pf.&ovLav aqffxeV ttVa, )IycOv &otx6voct

rv Lkv +uXsv1pXLovt, 'r 8t a z X6p.

Meletius Nat. Hom. ap. Cramer Anecd. Oxon. 3.145 = Dic. fr. 12 e (in SA' only)

Aeivapxoq8k &pMPoLVEMVp(Eavsoriv 4xyv LiVML ml x6pcav r G&iX.

Hermias Irr. Philos. 2 = Dic. fr. 12 d ot 8 &.ptovEcxvSchol: Acv(axpxo)sc. %rhv

+Ux*v ETVa.

Ps-Plutarch, Stobaeus, Theodoretus and Nemesios have copied Aetius

directly, Meletius and the Scholiast on Hermias depend on Nemesios. Since

the reading ActvmpXo4ccurs three times in the text of Nemesios it can hardly

be due to scribal error; therefore Nemesios must have inserted it himself, either

because he found it in his copy of Aetius or as a correction after finding the name

illegible or missing there. He has expanded the information in Aetius from his

own reading, which evidently included the Phaedo and Aristotle's De Anima or a

good summary; his extramaterial cannot have come from a doxographical

source, in spite of the agreement of the last sentence of his first extract with

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is the result of confusion of some kind. Whatever the reason, we

have a direct conffict of evidence between an isolated and uncertain

doxographical text and a report based on first-hand knowledge of

Dichaearchus' own writings. There can be no doubt which we ought

to follow.

What I have just said applies to the "four elements" no less than

to "harmonia".Not that there is any essential connection between

them; there is no intrinsic reason why Dicaearchus should not have

thought of psychic activity as the product of a proper balance of

the "elements"in the living body, without using the word harmonia

in this connection. But again Aetius is our only authority to mention

them, while Ciceroand the rest suggest that the substance of Dicaear-chus' teaching scarcely differed from that of Aristoxenos and the

essential cause of consciousness was the structure and activity of

the body as a whole. Of course this entails a correct balance of the

elements within the organism, but it entails a good deal more than

that. Since Aetius is in any case a tainted source, it is best to discardhis evidence entirely.

To sum up, the main features of the psychology of both Dicaearchus

and Aristoxenos are the following: the soul is not a distinct entity

having any claim to exist in its own right, but psychic activity or

a remark of Atticus (see above, p. 185 n. 24), because he alone has the name

Deinarchus. It is particularly instructive to see how Meletius has condensed

his account in such a way as to attribute to "Deinarchus" the comparison of

the body to a lyre which Nemesios had given, quite correctly, to Simmias. I

suspect that a similar process lies behind Aetius' attribution oi the harmonia-doc-

trine to Dicaearchus.

Most modem editors have "restored" Dicaearchus' name in the texts of

Theodoretus and of Nemesios and his followers. Certainly the alternatives are

implausible. No philosopher named Deinarchus is known, Clearchus, a contem-porary of Dicaearchus in the Lyceum, wrote a dialogue to prove that the soul

can exist independently of the body (fr. 6-8 in SA III) and it is not easy to

think of another name which could have dropped out. But the corruption must

go deeper, unless we are to suppose that Aetius simply blundered. I offer the

suggestion which follows for what it is worth. In the earlier stages of the tra-

dition, Aristoxenos and Dicaearchus were treated in separate sentences, one

after the other, as in Cicero, Tusc. 1.24. At some stage the four elements were

imported from Plato or Aristotle into the report of Aristotoxenos' teaching;

Aetius conflated the reports on both into a single sentence, writing 'ApLar60voqxactALx&kapXoqp[?ov(vetc; later some of the text before -apXoqwas lost (by

mechanical damage?) in the manuscripts used by Theodoretus and Nemesiosor their archetype.

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consciousnessis a secondary manifestation of the correct functioningand interaction of the bodily parts of organisms. By "bodily parts"

are meant not so much the elementary constituents of all bodiesas the limbs and organs which are specific to organisms - whatAristotle would have called the anhomoiomerous parts. All these

organs contribute to the maintenance of "soul" and all share in it;it is not associated with any particular area or constituent of the

organism. Aristoxenos chose to compare the soul, as defined, to a

harmonia,but this is not essential to the theory.27There has been considerable uncertainty in the past whether

this theory should be interpreted as a reversion to the doctrine

expounded by Simmias or as a development of Aristotle's teaching.2MNow that the link with Simmias has been shown to be so very tenuous,there can be no doubt of the answer. We have seen already thatAtticus and Nemesios regarded Dicaearchus' psychology as closelyakin to Aristotle's,29 nd moderncommentatorson theDe Anima havepointed out that, of all the older speculations, the harmonia-doctrine

approaches most closely to his belief that the soul is the form of anorganic body.30Aristotle himself seems to have been aware of this.

At the end of his critique of that doctrine he points out that this

is the only earlier theory to explain the union of soul and body, invirtue of which the body as a whole and all its parts perish when

the soul departs (408a 24 - 8). Like Dicaearchus, he believed that

psychic activity involves the whole organism,not merely the soul,31

27 Dicaearchus may not have been entirely consistent. In a discussion of proph-

ecy (fr. 13-16) he seems to have admitted that the soul has some divine

quality and the power of prophecy in dreams or when divinely inspired; ac-

cording to Cicero, this happened when the soul "ita solutus est et vacuus ut ei

plane nihil sit cum corpore". See now D. Del Corno, Graec. de re Onirocritica

Script. Reliquiae (Milan 1969), pp. 78 ff and 161 ff, who suggests that this

explanation belongs to Cratippus, a Peripatetic of the first century BC whom

Cicero quotes with Dicaearchus in this context.

28 See Movia p. 77 ff, with a ful discussion of earlier views; cf. Zeller Ph. d. Gr.

2.23 888 ff, Wehrli SA I p. 45, II p. 84, and RE Suppl. 11 (1968) 342.29 Above, p. 185 f.30 Hicks on De An. 1.4 init. (p. 263), quoted with approval by Ross and Siwek

ad loc. H. Cherniss, Ar's Crit. of presocr. Phil. 325 f. It goes without saying that

the voiU7roLrnrx6qas to be left out of account in all this.31 De An. 408 b 5 - 15, cf. p. 185 n. 24 above. The relationship between the xpacOu

of the physical constituents of the body and its soul or MtAoqs discussed by

Alexander Aphr. De An. pp. 24 - 6 Bruns, but Alexander here speaks as if it were

the product of the xp5mq, e.g. 24.23, 25.2, 26.3.

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and it it was this unity that his definition of the soul as the form ofthe body was meant to

safeguard.Where he differed from Dicaearchuswas in making the soul the active principleof the organism,its formal,final and efficient cause. For Aristotle, the organismexisted becauseit was informed by soul; for Dicaearchus, the soul only existed, inthe attenuated sense in which it can be said to exist at all, becauseof the activity of the bodily organs.

Of course this point is absolutely fundamental, but the changemade by Dicaearchusand Aristoxenos can be understood as part of adevelopment affecting every aspect of Peripatetic thinking in thefifty years after Aristotle's death, a tendency to obliterate the dis-tinction between form and the things in which it inheres. An obviousexample is the way in which heat and light are treated as materialthings in the writings of Theophrastus and Strato.32 n psychology,this led Aristotle's successors to give up the "Active Reason" andto identify the soul with its material substrate. Theophrastus nevertook the decisive step, but Strato (fr. 108-111) held that the soulwas identical with the "vital spirit" (nv4,ua) which had alreadyplayed a large part in the psychology and physiology of Aristotleand Theophrastusand occupied a central place in the most advancedmedical thinking of the period. Dicaearchus and Aristoxenos, lessinfluencedby medical theories, less interested in the details of psycho-physical processes, approached the problem in a more radical way.In defining the soul as the "form of a body potentially endowedwith life" Aristotle had added that such a body must be endowedwith organs (De An. 412 a 27); one of his objections to the olderharmonia-doctrinewas that, if the soul were a harmonia and thismeant the "blending" n due proportion of the opposites in the body,each living thing would have many souls, because the opposites are

combined differently in each organ (De An. 408 a 13 ff). By making"soul" a function of the whole organism they avoided this difficultyand succeeded in retaining as much of Aristotle's teaching as waspossible on their assumptions, getting rid of the last traces of Plato'sspiritualisttwo-substancetheorywithout replacing t by a materialistictwo-substance theory of the type we find in Strato and the majorHellenisticsystems.

One question remains before we leave these thinkers. Did theyarrive at this conclusion independently, or did one borrow from

32Thphr. Ign., (Ar.) Meteor. IV, De Coloribus, passim. Stato fr. 65-6, etc.

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the other? While no certain answer is possible, there is enough evi-dence to make a reasonable guess. We do not hear of the existence

of any work by Aristoxenos wholly or chiefly devoted to psychology,and we have seen that his surviving remarks about the soul do not

amount to a fully worked-out theory. On the other hand Dicaearchuswrote at least two dialogues, amounting to six books in all, on these

questions, and seems to have devoted at least two books to the

exposition of his own views (fr. 7 init, 9). Probablythereforethe theory

is his and was borrowedby Aristoxenos, whose only innovation wasto call the soul a harmonia. His reasons are unknown - Cicero's

explanation that he was so fond of music that he wanted to transfer

its concepts to other fields (fr. 120 b), is not meant to be taken serious-ly, and the commonest modernview, that Aristoxenoswas influenced

by Pythagorean beliefs, can be discounted - but again we can make areasoned guess. As a musician and writer on musical theory Aristo-xenos was very interested in the psychological effect of music;33

in this connection he may have remarked that the soul is affected

by harmony because it is itself a kind of harmonia.A similar train of

thought led Aristotle to refer to this doctrine at the end of his chapteron the use of music in education.34Such a remark would have been

eagerly seized upon and presented as a fully-fledged theory by latercompilerswho knew the Phaedoand were on the lookout for a strikingphrase.

II

The harmonia-doctrinein its various forms is presented by our

authorities as one which was widely held. In the Phaedoboth Simmias

(86 b) and Echecrates (88 d) speak of it in a way which seems to

imply that it was familiar to their contemporaries, including So-

crates; Aristotle says that many found it convincing, in spite ofthe criticism it had received.36 n the first century BC both Cicero

(11. cc.) and Lucretius (3.98 - 135) thought it worthy of refutation,a fact which led at least one scholar to supposethat it was still popularat that period.36Yet Cicerocan name no thinkerlater than Aristoxenos

33Fr. 6, 121-4.

34 Pol. 8.5.1340 b 17 xoml n I0LXC 7Uyy&vCLOCTa'K &pjLOVEMLCXLad 0LC ?VU8&[LOC ?tIVCL.

&6 7r0)X0( qCXCaL,Ci)Vaoqcv Ot [LiV &pVOIM.0V etlvot r?V 4UXtv, ol 8 IXt &apIov(XV.

35De An. 407 b 28 7rDxvi ,udv7roXXotCi8c&.ucac Bmov Niv Xtyo[dvov X6yov 8'

667rEp cCiU'voLC8cwxuxuL x&VTOt; Iv xovcjVpCYCV'n*VoL.X6yOtq.(text after Ross).For the meaning of the last phrase, see p. 195 below.36 Della Valle 211 ff.

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who held this doctrine and Lucretius is vague enough about its

meaning to speak of the soul as if it were something which makes

men live and have consciousness, a principle of life rather than a

product of the living body.37However, even if this theorywas reduced

to a ghostly existence in collections of obsolete beliefs during the

Helenistic era, its prominencein our sources and its intrinsic interest

are enough to justify a search for its origins. But at this point we

come up against a difficulty. None of our earlierauthorities attribute

it to any individual or school by name; it is only among the Neo-

platonists that we find a tradition connectingit with the Pythagoreans.

What it more, none of the doctrines which philosophersbefore Plato

are known to have held, resembles it at all closely. This has led one

group of historiansto assumethat Simmias and Aristotlewerereferring

to a populartraditionrather than the teachingof any specificthinker.38

The weaknessof this solution is that to describe the soul as a harmonia

is rather a sophisticated idea and quite unlike the popular beliefs

known from early poetry and other non-philosophical sources."3

We could perhaps get closer to the truth by supposing that it was a

notion current n medical circles or amongsimilargroups of sophisticat-

ed non-philosophers, but again there is no real evidence and the

strange combination of mysticism and positivism in Plato's accountof the theory will not square easily with the outlook of those medical

writerswhose works have survived. Altogether this approach amounts

to little more than a confession of ignorance.

37 Sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum,

verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse

harmoniam Grai quam dicunt, quae faciat nos

vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte seit mens.

(3.98-101; there is a lacuna before line 98). Cf. 3.118 neque harmonia corpus

sentire solere.38 This group includes most editors of the Phaedo from Heindorf to Archer-

Hind; della Valle 211 ff; G. C. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries, 179 f; J. Tate,

CR 53.1939. 2 f connects our doctrine with the popular materialism of P1. Laws

889, which in CQ 30.1936.53 f he described as a degenerate Anaxagoreanism.39 Cf. E. Rohde, Psyche, passim; R. B. Onians, Origins of European Thought,

passim; J. Burnet, Essays and Addresses, 141 ff; E. L. Harrison, Phoenix 14.

1960. 63 ff; etc.40 Zeller Ph.d.Gr. 16 (1892) 445, with reservations, 2.2w (1879) 888 ff, without

reservations; Pohlenz on Cic. Tusc. 1.19; R. Mondolfo, II Pensiero Anticos

(Florence, 1950), 66 ff; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocr. Phil. 261 f;

W. K. C. Guthrie, Hist. Gk. Phil. 1.307-19. Contra R. Hackforth, PI's Phaedop. 102 f; J. A. Philips, Pyth. and Early Pythagoreanism (Toronto 1966) 163 ff.

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The alternative is to look for the author of our doctrine amongthe olderphilosophers.The most popular view is that it is Pythagorean;

its advocates include Zeller, Pohlenz, Mondolfo,Kirk and Raven andGuthrie,40 nd it is the only one to have any support from ancientwriters. The most definite of these is Macrobius,who says that Py-thagoras and Philolaos regarded the soul as a harmonia; Plotinos,Olympiodoros and Philoponos ascribe Simmias' theory to "thePythagoreans" or "some Pythagoreans!'.4L rguments for acceptingthis attribution are that Simmias and Echecrates were Pythagoreans,Simmiasbeing a pupil of Philolaos (Phaedo61 d), and the importancewhich the Pythagoreans attached to the idea of harmonia n general.

But the objections are overwhelming. The tradition represented byMacrobiusis a late one; Aristotle did not ascribe this belief to thePythagoreans or anyone else. Arguments from silence are dangerous,but since Aristotle had already referred to Pythagoreans notions ofthe soul twice in the De Anima,42his silence on this occasion looksdeliberate and pointed. The doctrine conflicts with the belief in im-mortality and transmigrationto which all important known Pytha-goreans, including Philolaos himself, adhered.43 t has been claimedthat Pythagoras or his followere could have held a different form of

the theory which was compatible with their religious doctrines."Now the idea that the soul is a "mathematicalharmonia" nd a sub-stance was current in Neo-Pythagorean and Neoplatonist circles,but the writers who mention it are most careful to distinguish it

from the belief that the soul is a harmoniaof material substances and

Simplicius says quite plainly that it is irrelevant to the harmonia-doctrine described by Aristotle.45Philoponos is equally definite on

41 Macrobius in Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 = FV 44 A 23; Plot. Enn. 4.7.8.4 (=

"Theologia Aristotelis" 3.55), II 206 f H-S; "Olympiod." in Phaed. p. 57.17

Norvin; Philop. in De An. 70.5 ff (on Arist. 404 a 16).42404 a 16, 407 b 22; cf. H. Cherniss, Ar's Crit. of Presocr. Phil. p. 323 n. 124.43 Clem. Strom. 3.17 FV 44 b 14 - at any rate a better authority than Macro-

bius, although it is impossible to feel quite certain of anything connected with

Philolaos. A further reason why he is unlikely to have been the author of

Simmias' theory is that he apparently denied that cold plays any part in the

constitution of human beings (Anon. Lond. 18.8 ff = FV 44 b 27)." Zeller 1.1w445, Guthrie 1.315 ff.45 lambl. DeAnima ap. Stob. 1.49.32 p. 364.19W 'E'rLToEvuv'V &PtLov(OV18otCv,06 'iv &vacr(..maXLvLv8pUtFAv', &)X f'T 'tdrl [m,nLjx. Simpl. in De An. 53.23

(on Arist. 407 b 32) oGt-e8i ovala o5W ITn j.FaX)ov&pxwi IaXC'Lxt

&p?ovEM. pla

yap v5v ? xcc&i?roCuI&myopeLou4,&v 0o'rnm-rtxt f&iptLovE(a,craa tcyollivn.

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this score, although his account of the "mathematical" theory is

slightly different as well as more circumstantial: when the Pythago-reans call the soul a harmonia his must not, he asserts, be understood

literally; their meaning is that the soul, standing mid-way between

the sensible and intelligible worlds, binds them together in a singleharmonia."None of this will take us very far towards explaining the

origin of Simmias' theory. Indeed, since the Pythagoreans regardednumber as the principleof everything and were preparedto describe

the universeand all the things it contains as ?otov&'r-V&pw.tiv tckoq,'97the mere statement that the soul is a number or harmonia revealsnothing of its specific character and cannot claim to be regardedas a

psychological theory in any real sense. What is more to the pointis that Plato gives no hint that there may be a sense in which the soulcan be regardedas a harmoniawithout forfeiting its claim to immor-tality, although this would have strengthened his case; it is simplytaken for grantedthat if the soul is a harmonia, t cannot be immortal.

These difficultieshave led to various other suggestions being madeabout the authorship of our theory; the Eleatics, Empedocles, Alk-maion and the Sicilian medical school have all been proposed, andone writer has seen a connection with the cosmic harmonia of Hera-

kleitos."8 t is true that all these thinkers treated the balance of"opposites"in the body as the determining cause of physical andmental well-being, and Aristotle seems to envisage that Empedocles'doctrine of mixture might, if applied to psychology, give rise tosomething very like the harmonia-theory (de An. 408 a 18 - 23);

" Philop. inDe An. 70.5 (on Arist. 404 a 16) 6asrep o5v &pLovicv 4yover.c rhv4ux?V o05 ?MU arM6rV&psLovv r TvIV 't Xop&ts (yc0otoV yxp), &XX' 'rL &7a7ep

1 &ptLovEa, xxo s ccu ol t6p(tovra ot ILuO)r(6puoL, '7rOXUILLY&OVacd XOXaLXO qCpo-

V96VTCOV IVc,aLq' (-r6v yxp pocpxv cpUyyov xoxl 'r6v 6E6v Ivacwtouq 6v'ror xep&eama

i &ptLovlactv pXo0 reXvLxbv &'erWaev), o6mZ xmzl 4uXhX p&'Xp[tovEzg

&a-r''p 7raxv-dllrmx (6vwzv y&p rciv &cel&v), TOrv Vo0) aL XOXI7r CV- X@pLa'-ov

r* vn, 6wcav xaxl 'r&v &celx&T) xal 'nq u)j7q &X(2p(crav, xoal -rourv &xoLv7&)cov

6Tcov npo6 &)X?rO xml r) 6Vrt '8tX& 9poV6Ve6vrV', ?rOTro 8&IYur7q pLk"q auv8dt

* 4ux?hxal Lvot xal tLtov 4g u&rCov pFovtmv&tOTreX)lt- tc7V yap &vo ouao T?v

ot6a(Mv YEV&CrLr6v X&'rC xael Olovel xtpFuroL aurol, &' &ou'rq 'ra &LmXracXcpov-

v6ousa xxl &tuaMRouat 'ro-Lcx'ro r&v &vo), 6a7rep ouv IBcyov 'r?v pUXv &dpp.ovLav,

O5ua xcxlvriv a'r &v r(r &&pt I.Lp'rx4uXlv cpaaIV &Xo rt 8L& 'rou'-ro aIvL'6jLCVoL.47 Arist. Metaph. 985 b 29. Cf. Zeller 16 445.48 Eleatics: Geddes on Phaedo 86 b, cf. Burnet on 86 b 8; Alkmaion, Empedocles

and the Sicilian medical school: Burnet l.c. and Early Gk. Ph.' 295 f, WehrliSA 1 p. 45 f, Kirk and Raven 262. Herakleitos: della Valle 217.

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but although he raises the point immediately after his critique of

Simmias,he does not suggest that Simmiasmay have been influenced

by Empedocles.And in fact neither Empedoclesnor any of the othersidentified this balance with the soul. For Alkmaion, a correctbalance

of the opposites was identical with good health - i.e. he said exactlywhat Aristotle claims that Simmias ought to have said.49Parmenides

and Empedocles connected sensation and thought with physical

organs - in the case of Empedocles, the blood - whose effectiveness

depended on the balance of their constituents;50but if anything

deserves the name of "soul" t is the seat of consciousness, a part of

the body, not the abstract "fact of its being a blend"of its elementary

constituents. Diogenes Laertius actually says that Zeno regardedthesoul as a mixture of the four elements;"'the word he uses is xp,which always denotes the concrete product of mixture and which

Aetius (4.3.11) used to describe the atom-soul of Epicurus. No

doubt these thinkers helped to create the intellectual climate in

which Simmias' theory became possible, but they did not anticipate

its most distinctive features.

Since none of the previous suggestions about its authorship have

been substantiated, and there is no room in the history of Greek

philosophyfor an unknown thinker who left no trace of his activity

except for one striking but anonymous theory, we are thrown back

upon the text of the Phaedo. We have seen already5' hat Simmias'

exposition falls into two parts, in the course of which the meaning

of the word harmoniaundergoes a subtle change. If we look at the

first section of Simmias' speech, down to 86 a 6 or even 86 b 5, by

itself, we can see that it is a purely dialectical argument against

Socrates' third proof of immortality, beginning at 78 b; the epithets

&6povroval &aiocrov xoclnrCyxOCX6vt xcxl &dov are meant to recall

the description of the soul given there.53Socrates had argued from

the deiformity, to use Taylor's word," of the soul, to its immortality;

49Arist. Eudemus fr. 45 R', 7 W-R, De An. 408 a 1. It is also worth noting that

the term he used to denote the balance was 10ovop12x,ot harmonia.

50 Parm. FV 28 A 46, B 16 (= Thphr. Sens. 3); Emped. FV 31 A 86 (= Thphr.

Sens. 7 ff), B 107-9.

51 Diog. L. 9.29 = FV 29 A 1. The word xp&x.tas a piece of doxographer's

jargon and was probably used not by Zeno himself.

52 Above, p. 181 ff.

S3 Phaedo 85 e; cf. 78 b - 83 e, especially such passages as 79 b 13 ff, 80 a 8.

54 Plato p. 189.

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Simmias replies that the harmoniatoo is deiform relative to the lyreproducing it, just as the soul is deiform compared with the body.His objection is a valid one. The only way to meet it was by showing

that the relationship of the soul to the body is not the same as the

relationship of the harmoniato the lyre, and this involved first of

all explaining what could be meant by calling the soul a harmoniaof

the body. The theory which Plato puts into Simmias' mouth in the

second part of his speech - there is no need to suppose that it was held

by the historicalSimmias, any more than we believe that the historical

Socrates taught the Theory of Forms - was designed to meet this

requirement. This suggests that Plato devised - one might almost

say, improvised - the theory himself as a model of what was entailedin real terms by the analogy with which Simmias had begun. In

constructing it Plato made as much use as possible of familiar ideas,

e.g. the notion that the vitality and consciousnessof living things aresomehow connected with their physical constitution; this would helpto make it both comprehensible and plausible. But in essentials it is

Plato's own. Its strangely composite character is the result of its

mixed origin: the assumption of the souls' deiformity was dictatedby Socrates' earlier argument, while the positivism in which it issues

is implicit in the very idea of making the soul depend on the body.It might be objected that, according to Aristotle, the harmonia-

doctrine appealed to "many wise men".15This is a serious difficulty,although it is not easy to accept Aristotle's statement at its facevalue in view of his inability to name a single adherent. Perhapshe was thinking of members of the Academy. This would explainhis failure to mention any names, and the phrase x&v oZ, &v XoQLV

yeyyv-,6voLq)6yot of 407 b 29 would be very appropriate if it refers

to Academic discussions of the Phaedo and the problems it raised.5

It is quite possible that some of the participants in such discussionsshould have found Simmias' doctrine more attractive than Platowould have liked. We have seen already that Xenocrates is credited

'l De An. 407 b 27 86E, mO&mv?u&vo?Jotc,Pol. 1340 b 18 -no)X)otmat &v a6(pcv.The characters in the Phaedo only speak for themselves.I6 On this phrase see J. Bernays, Die Dialoge d. Arist. 15 f, 28 f, 146 n. 16. TheGreek commentators take it, with some hesitation, as a reference to the Phaedo

and Eudemus, but the parallel of Metaph. 987 b 14 shows that it could refer atleast equally well to oral discussions.

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by one source with a doctrine similar to that of Dicaearchus,and thehedonism of Eudoxos would be an analogous case.67

The later history of this idea is a tribute to Plato's literaryinfluence.Epicurus took the trouble to controvert some of Plato's objections(one of his arguments has been preserved by Philoponos)58n spiteof the fact that his own psychological theory was quite different.Dicaearchus developed a theory which superficially resembled it,but whose real ancestor was Aristotle; this was taken up by Aristoxe-nos, who for some reason called the soul, as conceived by himself andDicaearchus, a harmonia. Their theory, together with Aristoxenos'catchword, passed into the doxographies,where it was contaminatedwith the doctrine

given to Simmias in the Phaedo and in this formcameto be attached to Dicaearchus alone. Once established in the hand-books, it became one of the topics which had to be included in everybook about the nature of the soul; so it was refuted by Lucretius andCicero from their different points of view, and later by the Neo-platonists from Plotinos to Olympiodoros. Other Neo-Pythagoreansand Neoplatonists tried to find a moreacceptableversion whichwouldallow them to call the soul a harmoniawithout entailingits dependenceon the body, using ideas ultimately derived from Plato's Timaeus(35 ff).59About 400 AD Nemesios went back to the Phaedo to pad outthe scanty information he found in Aetius, and his contaminatedreport was condensed by Meletios.After this Simmiasdoctrine wasalmost forgotten; St. Thomas does not seem to have known moreabout it than he could learn from Aristotle. In the nineteenth centurythe image was resuscitated and attached to the epiphenomenalisttheory.

Appendix: an uncollected ragmentof Epicurus.

The following passage is not included in the editions of Epicurus'fragments of Useneer, Bailey or Arrighetti and was overlooked by

5Xenocr. fr. 71 Heinze (= Lact. Opif. 16, 12, not a very good authority),

see above, p. 185. Eudoxos D 3-4 Lasserre = Arist. EN 1172 b 9, 1101 b 27.

58 In De An. 143.2 ff; see the appendix.

59 St. Thomas seems to have regarded this as a genuinely Platonic dogma;In Arist. libr. de An. I, L. 9 ?132 (on 407 b 30) "Isti concordaverunt cum

Platone in hoc, quod Plato dixit quod anima erat composita ex numeris har-

monicis, hi vero quod erat harmonia. Sed differebant in hoc, quod Plato dixit

quod anima erat harmonia numerorum, hi vero dixerunt, quod harmonia tam

compositorum quam mixtorum, vel contrariorum, erat anima."

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Bignone. It comes from Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's

discussionof the

harmonia-doctrinede An. 1.4.407b 27

ff;after

summarisingPlato's arguments against this doctrine (Phaedo93 a ff),Philoponus goes on to say that Epicurus controverted one of them

(p. 143. 1-10): np6k 'Tv 'pErov X6yov r6v Xkyovtr '- ap,uovEm.ZNov

xocl jrn6v '=tV Opp?ovEoc,8&+uXj FLUov xal i'Lo oVux {L=t iuy' (o6?m

yap XFLip cveLt ag tprokaML6 Ho &TCxaV)pcpZTX 7sap' 'Emtxo6pouM6yoq8LCx XXV 40oEcav 7retp4'tevo auTov z'kXet?v. X0 yXuxu', y7ja, -rsZ&Xov

xod frov iXSt9Xerat, r6 (LF)Xt 06 0)ov xKodt'Lov oux 2t8k XCt ol Et

yotp &a'rv r6 0LkxtL&pa oQ)x 9=L yduxt), 67Op &7ronov. &xci'apoq 8i T@

anAXOymat&vLGVV Yip(aAlmrJ

t(0tL o OG uOXeLa u&7rXaiy

oVuxOkauA-

XoyLa(04I )aC

cxVocyxIq i O'4PorkpOU;Q(X1 CVCLzL, i et 4Lvg 1vxpycog 6

'E7tLxoupouczt `auX6yLtcnoq,OLOUTOVEIvocLXOCL 6v rIXICrtwvoqJ6iol yocp

xOLt&&VTOC'I XOPOXY.

This is followed by more than a page of characteristic verbiagewhile Philoponus tries various shifts to prove Epicurus' syllogismformally invalid, without ever quite getting to the heart of the fallacy;-6

after this he summarises the objections brought against Simmias'thesis by Aristotle in the Eudemus (Philop. p. 144.22 - 145.9_Ar. fr. 45 Rose3 = Eudemus fr. 7 Walzer-Ross).

Epicurus' argument against Plato is purely dialectical; he hadno sympathy for the harmonia-doctrineas such and the objections

with which Lucretius refutes it (3.98 - 135) are probably derived

from one of his writings. Arguments of this type are rare in extantEpicurean texts, although it is a well-known fact that Epicurus

developed many of his doctrines in opposition to those of earlier

philosophers and controverted the views of many of them, includingPlato. Usually his critique is determined by the requirementsof his

positive argument and based on his own fundamental doctrines or on

observed facts. For example, there is no direct referenceto the Phaedoin the long series of proofs that the soul is mortal reproduced by

6O The anonymous writer of Cod. Vatic. 268 (Hayduck's A), an llth-century

manuscript containing excerpts from Philoponus' commentary, has done slightly

better; at the end of Philoloponus' discussion he has added the following note,printed at the foot of p. 144 in the Berlin edition: ov8 6 'ErnxoSpouX6yoq o

&Potlhvov EXe- lv y&p &v'r 'ro53y,uxkoq '?v yuxiUr-ra Xcoev &a7rep &xet 'qv

&pFLoVExV &vd 'ouT5p[oWLi.VOU, o16CV &TO7VOV 97rCL. oux a'rtV y&p Y)x6& C 'r6

ci,el x UlVOUauouLcajw).V TOxn)V eXCLiV 7rOL6rn'OC. -r o09 amXt6cL 6 rOi 'Ernxo6pou

Moyor. r6v cu)JoyLai6vro6 ITD&rcvo;.

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Lucretius 3.417 - 829, not even when he touches on the doctrine of

&V 1 a (670 ff).

The same argument of Plato's was refuted by Strato fr. 118:'

PFLoV(a&pILOVEot;Erkpa xaI apurkpo, oihcj xal iuxy +JiuXi)ou'r&pocxol

vc&Azkpm. his is the converse of Epicurus' reply, positive whereEpicurus' is negative. But it also is dialectical;Strato didnot believe,any more than Epicurus, that the soul can be describedas a harmonia.

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