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Theoretical and Methodological Problems ofPsychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:Commentary by Eduardo B. Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)Eduardo B. Issaharoff
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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology
very remote ones, and this has to be discovered
through the analysis
of
free association.
I wish I could agree with Semenza on the engage
ment between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology,
blessed in a marriage to come. It
is
not a question of
leaving neurology aside but
of
trying to define the
specific space of psychical mechanisms. The relation
between neurology and psychical activity is not direct.
The only suggestion I have for expanding the debate
between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology is the
creation of discussion groups wherein psychoanalysts
report a series of sessions and ask scientists for their
interpretation. Imagination is needed to fill the gaps.
Semenza complains about wild speculations, but he
does not seem to realize that his wild reductionism,
even if he protests otherwise,
is
a gross misrepresenta
tion
of
psychoanalysis. Imagination is also desirable
in the scientific literature about psychical activity. One
must admit that a Shakespearean quotation can be
more enlightening for a psychoanalyst than a ton
of
scientific literature Evidence for the value of the
imagination may be seen in the fact that scientific
findings are frequently outdated two years after they
are issued, whereas people continue writing on Hamlet
400 years after its creation. I am less interested in
keeping up scientific standards than grasping the com
plexities of psychical truth. Freudian psychoanalysis
has a double origin. One origin
is
rooted
in
science;
the other in art, mostly literature. Both aspects are
necessary to form the clinical approach. The exclu-
9
sively scientific attempt was wrong, and led Freud to
reject his own Project for a Scientific Psychology
and to write instead The Interpretation of Dreams. It
is
impossible to go backwards.
References
Dupuy,
J
P (1994), uxorigines des sciences cognitives.
Paris: Editions La decouverte.
Edelman, G M. (1992), Bright Air Brilliant Fire: On the
Matter
of
Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Freud, S. (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International
Universities Press, 1953.
(1895), Project for a scientific psychology. Stan
dard Edition
1:281-396. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.
(1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard
Edition 4&5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
(1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Standard
Edition 23:139-207. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.
Green, A., & Stern, D (2000), Clinical and Observational
Psychoanalytic Research: Roots of Controversy. Lon
don: Karnac Books.
Morin, E. (1990), Introduction pensee complexe. Paris:
ESF Editeur.
(2000), Les sept savoirs necessaires a
l
education
du Futur. Paris: Seuil.
Andre Green
9 avenue de l Observatoire
Paris 75006
France
e-mail: [email protected]
Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:
ommentary by duardo
B
Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)
In order to foster a partnership between psychoanaly
sis and cognitivism, so that they may work together,
it is essential to ask ourselves what trend in cognitiv
ism and what trend in psychoanalysis we should
choose to participate in this partnership. Both sciences
have various schools
of
thought, each of which advo
cates positions using terms that have very different
meanings for each group, and in turn, each group has
divergent ideas about the nature
of
the mind.
In the case of cognitivism,
we
shall consider two
positions related to computation in mental processes.
Eduardo Issaharoff, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Analyst
of
the Argentine Psychoanalytic Society.
There are currently two main schools of psychoanaly
sis: One school conceives of the mind as a system
of
meanings that must be understood by means
of
herme
neutic procedures; the other considers meaning as hav
ing biological structures supported by specific
functions. Only the laws of language and discourse
apply in the first case; in the second, the laws of the
biological sciences complete the explanation of the
functions
of
the mind.
Cognitivism was born from and grew through the
contribution of many techniques and theories. Neuro
anatomy, neurophysiology, experimental psychology,
and computer science are the basic sciences, while
psychophysics, computer programs
of
operations on
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20
internal representation, information processing, and
artificial intelligence are techniques that have provided
deep new insights into these basic sciences. In recent
times, evolutionary psychology has striven to acquire
the status of a basic science.
Different branches have emerged from the above
mentioned sciences and techniques. They are: cogni
tive science, cognitive neuroscience, computational
neuroscience, contemporary neuropsychology and its
three major groups: 1 clinical neuropsychology, (2)
cognitive neuropsychology, and (3) cognitive neuro
science/neuropsychology. Each branch focuses on dif
ferent and specific problems using different tools and
methodologies.
The new synthesis theory in cognitive psychol
ogy, represented by authors such
as
Pinker (1997) and
Plotkin (1998), has generated a perspective in which
the key idea is that the mind is a system
of organs of
computation designed by natural selection to solve the
problems faced by our evolutionary ancestors. I se
lected this theory because it is at the center of current
discussions about the limits
of
computation,
as
we
now know it, in a theory
of
the human mind.
For the new synthesis theory, computation is a
formal operation based on syntactically structured
representations. Concepts such as representations and
computation are at the very foundation
of
cognitivism,
according to Semenza, but he is careful, from an epis
temological point
of
view, when he qualifies the use
of
computation as metaphorical, and modularity
as
strategic.
In a recent book, The Mind Doesn t Work That
Way
(2000),
a reply to Pinker s book How the Mind
Works (1997), Fodor revised the computational theory
of
the mind in cognitive psychology. This commentary
will take a position on cognitivism that is related to
Fodor s; my discussion of psychoanalysis will be re
lated to that of Rubinstein (1967, 1969, 1975, 1976),
and to the idea that some aspects of psychoanalytic
theory can be tested in the clinical situation, while
other aspects can only be tested by means of neuro
science.
Semenza is a researcher, and the use
of
meta
phors and strategies is normal while doing research.
Methodological and epistemological criticism of a re
searcher s work is pertinent only when the work has
reached a conclusion. During the research process,
there are no rules
as
to how to create hypotheses. That
specific part
of
the process, for which we still lack
computational architectures or systems, pertains
strictly to the creative mind
of
the researcher. It is
a nonlinear process that establishes relations among
duardo Issaharoff
elements or structures
of
different levels and aspects
of phenomena, and creates hypothetical entities to ex
plain them. Analogies, metaphors, strategies, and
models are common tools in this activity. Since com
puter theory of the mind andmodularity theory provide
no plausible hypotheses concerning this process, they
are in a certain way, incomplete.
Fodor
(2000)
asserted the existence
of
a funda
mental dichotomy between mental processes that are
local and others that are not. Local processes share
characteristic properties. They appear to accommodate
well to the application of Turing s theory that hypothe
sizes thinking as computational in nature; they appear
to be largely modular, and much
of
their architecture
and their proprietary domain of application appear to
be
innately specified.
The cognitive role
of
a thought in inferential pro
cesses is, therefore, determined by essential syntactic
properties of the corresponding mental representation.
The effect of the logical form of a thought on its role
in demonstrative inferences is what makes it computa
tional in Turing s sense. But there are some other de
terminants, such
as
beliefs and desires,
of
the role a
thought plays in mental processes; in particular, the
properties of thought that are sensitive to the belief
system it is embedded in. Inferences in which features
of an embedding theory affect the inferential-cum
causal roles of their constituent beliefs are what phi
10sophers sometimes call global or holistic in
ferences.
Global inferences are presumptive examples in
which the determinants of the computational role of
a mental representation can shift from context to con
text; hence the computational role of a mental repre
sentation is not determined only by its individuating
properties and
by
its syntax.
From the new synthesis perspective, modules are
the second element in the model of the structure of
mind. With regard to modules: f the information is
encapsulated, it is difficult to conceive how new
hypotheses, or inferences related to context, or cre
ation of theoretical terms, can occur. The use Semenza
makes of the concept encapsulated information
could be an example of the type of risk implicit in
metaphorical uses since, by definition, modules are
informationally encapsulated, and the informational
resources to which a computational mechanism has
access inside the module are not sensitive to global
properties or belief systems. In my opinion, the exam
ple by Semenza refers rather to the difficulty of chang
ing procedural mechanisms and their motor circuits.
Dissociability
of
functions is subject to the same
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Psychoanalysis
and
Cognitive Neuropsychology
problem. Only modules with encapsulated informa
tion and not sensitive to context conditions admit an
exhaustive definition based on their functions. And
there are many functions in most
of
the brain mecha
nisms that require information from many different
metrical and analogical levels and qualities; hence,
they cannot be modules in the strict sense
of
the term.
I would like to propose the theory submitted by
A Pellionisz and R. Llinas (1983) as a possible exam
ple, in brain structures,
of
computational architecture,
modules with encapsulated information, and dissocia
bility of functions. In the abstract, the authors say:
Here we present an elaboration and a quantitative
example for a hypothetical neuronal process imple
menting what we refer to as the metaorganization
principle. This process allows the internalization
of
external (body) geometries into the central nervous
system (CNS) and a reciprocal and equally important
action of the CNS geometry on the external (body)
geometry The metaorganization of metric net
works, together with the sensorimotor covariant em
bedding network, provides an explanation
of
the
emergence of a whole sensorimotor apparatus leading
to the feasibility of constructing truly brain-like ro
botic systems [po 245].
I have introduced this example because the func
tions implied are completely described by means
of
mathematics and constitute a complete local system
for that set of functions. This example represents
primitive characteristics, or primordial ones,
of
the
central nervous system. But it is difficult, or maybe
impossible, to imagine the evolution from these kinds
of
modules to the functions of thought and language.
Here, I would like to quote Fodor:
[T]he moral will eventually be conceded, namely, that
the Computational Theory is probably true at most
of
only the mind s modular parts. And that a cognitive
science that provides some insight into the part of the
mind that
isn t
modular may well have to be different
from the kind of syntactical account that Turing s in
sight inspired. It is, to return to Chomsky s way of
talking, a mystery, not just a problem, how mental
processes could be simultaneously feasible, nd ab
ductive, ndmechanical. Indeed, I think that,
as
things
now stand, this and consciousness look to be the ulti
mate mysteries about the mind [po 99].
Another point that Semenza mentions is the im
portance
of
pathological findings, which bring a lot
of
2
diverse information to light, so that sometimes it is
difficult to know which data are stable and which are
not, due to the complexity
of
the functions of the brain
and the variable specificity
of
local phenomena. Labo
ratory experiments restrict this risk, but a t the same
time, they impoverish data. We must deal with com
plexity. In Koch s (1999) words:
it
is dangerous in
neurobiology to study
anyone
mechanism at only a
single, isolated level
of
complexity. Phenomena at
multiple levels, such as ionic channel, synapse, den
drite, neuron, small network, and so on, interact in
highly nonlinear and nonintuitive ways
anyone
computation is carried out using a plurality
of
mecha
nisms at different spatial and temporal scales (p.
474). Regarding Semenza s philosophical reflections
about Freud, I would like to remark that from my point
of
view, Freud opted for a dualistic methodological
posi tion and a monistic ontological one. About the
inclusion
of
Freud in the mainstream
of
Western sci
entific tradition, nothing can be more demonstrative
of this than his belief in the principle that natural laws
govern human mental life. Nothing in the building
of
psychoanalysis makes sense without this principle.
Interdisciplinary Issues
The first problem with interdisciplinary issues is the
concept
of
a discipline itself. Sometimes a discipline
is defined in relat ion to an object, that is, as the theo
retical and experimental activity that relates to a par
ticular object. We find the typical historical example
in light, which is the object of the discipline
of
optics.
Once a new theory changes conceptions of the object,
as the notion
of
electromagnetism changed the concept
of
light, must we consider this to be the emergence
of
a new discipline just because the view
of
the object
has changed? From an epistemological point
of
view,
it is more convenient to consider specific problems
and the corresponding theory or theories as the actual
unit of knowledge. I prefer to use the terms intertheo-
retic l
and
interscientific
in lieu
of
interdisciplin ry
On the other hand, disciplines are not homogeneous
fields. They are comprised
of
different theories and
belief systems at differing stages of evolution. By evo
lution I mean the formalized state of the theory, the
experimental development
of
its hypotheses, and the
more or less explicit belief systems included in each
theory.
This lack
of
homogeneity has favored arbitrary
elections
of
hypotheses or beliefs, resulting in an inad
equate knowledge content. This is the kind
of
sin that
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could be attributed to the authors of some psychoana
lytic papers who have chosen theories and clinical data
according to their convenience; moreover, the lack
of
logical and methodological strictness of the discipline
also admits this possibility,
as
well as any combination
of
hypotheses and data.
An additional problem arises from the insight that
behavioral data alone are not sufficient to characterize
mental processes. John Anderson (1978) proved that
any set of behavioral data could always be explained
by more than a single theory, and suggested that neu
rophysiological constraints would help to ameliorate
this problem.
Because our goal is to understand how the brain
produces behavior, we need descriptions
of
behavior
that can be related in a relatively direct way to under
lying neural mechanisms. Many sorts
of
behaviors re
flect complex interactions among many mechanisms.
Unfortunately, there is no way to know in advance
which regularities in behavior will mesh neatly with
distinct properties
of
the brain, and which regularities
will reflect complex interactions among numerous
properties.
Cognitive Psychology and Psychoanalysis
Semenza says:
One
cannot be but in favor
of
psycho
analysts engaging in poetry. However, when ad
dressing a theory of mental function, a dialogue with
other branches of science becomes desirable. I hope
every psychoanalyst engaged in the enterprise will re
main close to the lucidity
of
thought and sheer read
ability of Freud. I concur with Semenza in the desire
to make psychoanalysis a scientific theory of the mind.
But I do not agree with the proposal of a dialogue
between sciences. What follows represents, from a
methodological viewpoint, a more ambitious aim,
namely, to test psychoanalytic hypotheses by means
of cognitive neuroscience. To do this, it is necessary
to consider psychoanalytic hypotheses and theories ac
cording to the usual methodological standards
of
sci
ence. This means that what the hypotheses and
theories say about the mind is susceptible
of
being
controlled in some way. From what the hypotheses
affirm, we can, using logic as the instrument, derive
consequences that can be observed through pertinent
experiences. This is the basic method
of
science, in
which only logic is not specific; what the hypotheses
affirm, the consequences and the pertinent experiences
are specific for the conditions of the material each
theory manages. So, a first step should involve defin-
duardo
B
Issaharoff
ing the characteristics of our psychoanalytic hypothe
ses, elaborating some classification of them, and
proposing the adequate material to observe conse
quences.
I follow Rubinstein in the division
of
the psycho
analytic hypotheses into two broad classes: clinical
and metapsychological. The hypotheses
of
both
classes are general in the sense that they refer to as
pects of mental functioning, not to specific syndromes,
as is the case in a similar classification by Rapaport
(1959). While the class of metapsychological hypothe
ses includes high-level hypotheses and theoretical
terms, the class
of
clinical hypotheses includes both
high-level and low-level hypotheses, with a mix of
theoretical and observational terms. One difference
between clinical and metapsychological hypotheses is
that the former are more directly relevant to clinical
inference (i.e., clinical interpretation) than the latter.
Clinical hypotheses can be subdivided into particular
clinical hypotheses and general clinical hypotheses.
Particular clinical hypotheses refer to what a person
wishes, feels, and does, and to what happens to him in
the psychoanalytic situation.
If we speak about wishes,
feelings, and thoughts in general, abstracted from a
particular person, or outside the psychoanalytic situa
tion, then we speak about wishes, feelings, and
thoughts
as
phenomena that are the product
of
specific
structures and functions. We might say that, for the
time being, we lack a wide repertoire
of
theories about
these structures and functions in the brain and about
the way in which they interact to produce observable
behavior at the level of the psychoanalytic situation.
But what we now have is enough to propose new
hypotheses and rich experiments related to mecha
nisms that are involved in clinical phenomena. Fona
gy s (1999) paper, quoted by Semenza, is an example
of this.
Our beliefs and theories of different kinds and
levels, which we use to assign meaning to the behavior
of our patients, are essential components
of
the pro
cess that produces interpretations in the analyst s
mind. Ergo, interpretation is a particular clinical hy
pothesis that we arrive at by means of general clinical
hypotheses and metapsychological hypotheses. Test
ing or contrasting each type
of
hypothesis poses differ
ent kinds
of
problems. While particular clinical
hypotheses can be tested o y inside the clinical situa
tion, general clinical hypotheses and metapsychologi
cal hypotheses cannot be tested o y in the context
of clinical observation because they predict attributes,
characteristics, and particularities of universal psychic
mechanisms. The universality of psychic mechanisms
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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology
implies that they are structures determined by and
transmitted through genetic codes, and that they are
not the product o a particular environment or society.
this is true, then general clinical hypotheses and
metapsychological ones make predictions about hu
man beings as physiological organisms, and more spe
cifically about the structures and functions o the brain
o those organisms. Particular clinical hypotheses refer
to the realization o universal mechanisms in a partic
ular person and his circumstances.
Only general clinical hypotheses form part o the
clinical psychoanalytic theory; particular hypotheses
represent the application o this theory to actual cases.
Only in the psychoanalytic process can
we
test particu
lar hypotheses. When I work with a person, it is with
that person in the clinical situation that I must test my
hypotheses. When I w or k with the brain, it is in the
brain i.e., in the context o neuroscience), that I must
test my hypotheses. One o the conclusions derived
from this argument is that in a global theory o the
human mind I need the brain to theorize about the
mind, and the mind to theorize about the brain.
The aforementioned statement that we need de
scriptions o behavior that can be related in a rela
tively direct way to underlying neural mechanisms is
the challenge we are faced with. Since this will require
an input o knowledge and expertise from both psy
choanalysis and neuroscience, it should be the work
o
a team
o
psychoanalysts and cognitive neuroscien
tists to explore and test the possible elements that may
satisfy the required descriptions.
Here I can only mention the issues that I consider
have greater possibilities o complying with these re
quirements. The field o dynamic processes in memory
systems, and cognitive theories with their rich classi
fication o memories, are concepts that could be very
useful for psychoanalysis at the clinical and theoretical
levels. On the other hand, the patient s increased ca
pacity, acquired through psychoanalysis, to transform
part
o
the nondeclarative aspects o memory into de
clarative sentences, which represents the development
o
his communicative competence, is an interesting
contribution o psychoanalysis to cognitive theories.
We know that behavior is the product of a com
plex process that includes internal states, sensory in
puts, motor outputs, motivation, strategies, planning,
and the peculiarities o each person. Psychoanalysis
is a source o observation o behavior in its complex
ity, in the context o a peculiar asymmetrical relation
with the analyst. The conception o behavior in actual
cognitive neuroscience, incorporating the dimensions
o affect and intentionality, draws us closer to an un-
derstanding o the brain structures involved in human
behavior as we experience it in the psychoanalytic sit
uation.
References
Anderson, J. 1978), Arguments concerning representations
for mental imagery. Psycholog. Rev., 85:249-277.
Fodor, J. 2000),
The Mind Doesn t Work That
Way Cam
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
F onagy, P. 1999), Memory a nd therapeutic action. In
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Psycho-Anal., 80:215-223.
Holt, R., Ed. 1997),
Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy
of Science. Madison, CT: International Universities
Press.
Koch, C. 1999), Biophysics
of
Computations. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Pellionisz, A., Llinas, 1983), Tensor network theory
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the metaorganization
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functional geometries in the
central nervous system. Neurosci., 16 2):245-273.
Pinker, S. 1997),
How the Mind Works.
New York: W.
W. Norton.
Plotkin, H. 1998), Evolution in Mind. Cambridge, MA:
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Rapaport, D. 1959), The Structure
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ory: A Systematizing Attempt. Psychol. Issues, Monogr.
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Rubinstein, B. B. 1967), Explanation and mere descrip
tion: A metascientific examination
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certain aspects o
the psychoanalytic theory
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motivation. In: Psychoanal
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son, CT: I nt ern at io na l Universities P ress, 1997, pp.
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1997, pp. 415-465.
1975), On the clinical psychoanalytic theory and
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Eduardo Issaharoff
Arenales 87
5
1061 Buenos Aires
Argentina
e-mail: [email protected]