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Achieving Durable Security : Being Honest About What You Can Really Do. Thomas Whipp MSc MEng CISSP CPP CBCI Head of Risk Oval Ltd
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Page 1: 4 b. thomas whipp presentation

Achieving Durable Security :Being Honest About What You Can Really Do.

Thomas Whipp MSc MEng CISSP CPP CBCIHead of RiskOval Ltd

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Where are the risks?

Thinking differently

about security

What are the real costs of

your strategy?Where are you starting from?

Presentation Overview

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Where are you starting from?

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Your Information?

ExcelSQL

Emails Memory Sticks

Printers

Scanned Images

Mobile Phones

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Your Business

Costs Value for Money?

Who’s budget?

Will it really be spent?

Capital Vs.

RevenuePolitics PreventionDetectionIncident

ResponseWill it work?Displacement

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Where are the risks?

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Script Kiddies

Who is out there?

HacktavistsCriminalsIndustrialEspionage

State Sponsored

TechnicalAttacks

SocialEngineering

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Thinking Differently About Security

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Rational Choice Theory

? How much will I get

? How likely am I to be caught

? How large is the punishment

Evaluation of risk and return

Uses

A good model for planned offences

Typically acquisitive in nature

Largely fails to explain expressive offences

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Routine activity theory

Lack of a capable guardian

Motivated offender

Can be used to explain

everyday type crimes

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Situational PreventionRonald v Clarke

Key Concerns 5 Main mechanisms

Crime not criminalityEvent drivenNear not

distant causeHow not why Increase the effort

Increase the risk

Reduce the rewardsReduce

provocationsRemove excuses

Examples:

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Defensible SpaceOscar Newman

Key PointsTerritoriality (key behaviour to

encourage)

Natural surveillance

Image MilieuThinking point:

Is it worth allowing some personalisation at the desktop?

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Displacement

A key criteria used to assess physical security initiatives

Putting in a control

May not reduce offending

May simply move it elsewhere

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Disinhibition

Strong sense of

anonymity

Disassociation from the ‘real

world’

Lack of a sense of consequence

Leads to significant changes in behaviour

Key challenge for InfoSec

awareness but also situational

controls

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What are the real costs of your strategy?

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Covering your bases...Spreading the costs

Prevention

Detection

Response

Residual

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Choosing a Strategy...What are the options?

Process Product

Service Architecture

Any option can deliver an

effective control if implemented

properly

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Risks to Strategy...

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Choosing a Strategy...Controls and their true costs

Process Product Service Architecture0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

PoliticalEffortRevenueCapital

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Tom Whipp MSc MEng CISSP CPP CBCI Head of Risk, Oval Ltd

Tel:       01924 433081Mbl:      07500 796391Email:   [email protected]