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4. Arab-Israeli Conflict 1957-1967

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    THE ARAB ISRAELI

    CONFLICT1957-1967

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    THE POST SUEZ ISSUES

    THE STATIONING OF THE

    UNEF REOPENING OF THE STRAITS

    OF TIRAN

    PALESTINIAN INFILTRATION

    NO RESOLUTION FOR THEBURNING ISSUES

    NO RECOGNITION OFISRAEL

    THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES

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    WATER DISPUTE

    ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF

    WATER FROM THE JORDANRIVER FOR ITS NATIONALWATER CARRIER.

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    WATER DISPUTE

    ARAB RETALITAION

    CONSTRUCTION OF THE HEADWATER DIVERSIONPLAN.

    THE BANIAS STREAM INTO THE MUKHAIBA DAM

    THE WATERS OF THE HASBANI INTO THE LITANI

    RIVER

    THE DIVERSION WOULD REDUCE ISRAEL'S CARRIER BYABOUT 35%, AND ISRAEL'S OVERALL WATER SUPPLY BYABOUT 11%.

    THE IDF SEVERAL TIMES ATTACKED THE DIVERSIONWORKS IN SYRIA THROUGHOUT 1965.

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    THE SAMU INCIDENT

    SECRET TALKS BETWEEN GOLDA MEIR AND KING

    HUSSEIN FATAH MINES

    HUSSEINS BELATED CONDOLOCENCES

    ISRAELI RETALIATION Operation Shredder

    RIOTS IN THE WEST BANK AND JORDANIAN

    MOBILIZATION HUSSEINS CHANGING RHETORIC TO PROVOKE

    NASSER: DONT HIDE UNDER THE SKIRTS OFUNEF!

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    IT WAS INEVITABLE..

    ISRAELS PERCEPTION OF

    VULNERABILITY

    CONTINUING BORDERTENSION

    SECOND ROUND THINKINGAND ARMS RACE

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    HOSTILE RHETORIC

    NASSER, BACKED BYARAB STATES THROWSISRAEL INTO THE BAYOF AQABA. PRE-1967WAR CARTOON AL-FARIDA NEWSPAPER,LEBANON.

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    EGYPTIAN ALERT

    ON MAY 14, 1967, CAIROANNOUNCED MAXIMUMALERT AND COMBATUNITS CROSSED THE SUEZINTO SINAI.

    ON MAY 18, EGYPTDEMANDED THAT U.N.RECALL ALL TROOPS OFTHE UNEF.

    INSTEAD OF DEFUSINGTHE GROWING CRISIS, UTHANT COMPLIED ALMOSTIMMEDIATELY

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    EGYPTIAN TANKS TOOK OVER U.N.POSITIONS.

    SYRIA ALSO BEGAN TO MOBILIZE,AS DID JORDAN AND IRAQ.

    ON MAY 22, NASSER ANNOUNCEDTHE CLOSING OF THE GULF OFAQABA.

    KING HUSSEIN, HITHERTOHOSTILE TO NASSER, RUSHED TOCAIRO ON 30 MAY TO CONCLUDEd AMUTUAL DEFENSE PACT.

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    ISRAEL HAD EARLIER DECLAREDTHAT IT WOULD GO TO WARIF ONE OR MORE OF THE

    FOLLOWING EVENTSOCCURRED:

    THE DEPARTURE OF UNEF;

    THE BLOCKADING OF THE TIRAN

    STRAITS; THE SIGNING OF A JORDANIAN-

    EGYPTIAN DEFENSE PACT;

    THE DISPATCH OF IRAQI FORCESTO JORDAN.

    BY THE END OF MAY ALL BUTONE

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    THE SIX-DAY WARWAS A CLOCKWORK

    WAR CARRIED OUTBY THE IDFAGAINSTINEFFECTIVE ARABARMIES.

    PREEMPTION PREPARATION SURPRISE

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    THE WAR ENDEDWITH THE IDFOCCUPYING SINAI

    PENINSULA, GOLANHEIGHTS, AND WESTBANK.

    THE UNSC CALLED FOR

    A CEASE-FIRE ON THEEVENING OF JUNE 7.

    EGYPT AND JORDAN

    GAVE THEIRAGREEMENT THEFOLLOWING DAY BUTSYRIA ACCEPTED ONLYON JUNE 10.

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    TERRITORIAL CONSEQUENCES

    GOLAN HEIGHTSFROM SYRIA

    WEST BANK FROMJORDAN

    ENTIRE SINAIPENINSULA FROMEGYPT

    NOTABLY EASTJERUSALEM

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    ISRAEL'S BORDERS (1949-1967)

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    IN SIX DAYS THE GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE OF THEREGION WAS RADICALLY CHANGED.

    CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG THEARABS

    RADICAL NATIONALISTS LOST THEIR PRESTIGE THE GULF BEGAN TO GAIN POWER

    THREE SOVEREIGN STATES WERE HUMILIATED. WEAKENING NASSERISM

    LOSS OF LEGITIMACY THE END OF PAN ARABISM THE BEGINNING OF ISLAMISM

    ISRAELI STRENGTH POSITION OF STRENGTH TO CONVERT THE

    MILITARY VICTORY INTO POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT.

    MILITARILY STRONGER THAN ANY COMBINATIONOF ARAB STATES.

    OVERCONFIDENCE

    CONSEQUENCES OF THE 6 DAY WAR

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    LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES.

    MARKED THE END OF PAN-ARABISM

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    LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES.

    PAVED WAY TO THEEMERGENCE OFISLAMISM ACROSS

    THE MIDDLE EAST

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    KHARTOUM SUMMIT

    AT KHARTOUM, IN THE SUMMER

    OF 1967, THE ARAB STATESUNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED THEIRFAMOUS 'THREE NOS': NO PEACE WITH ISRAEL, NO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, NO NEGOTIATION WITH ISRAEL.

    AT KHARTOUM, NASSER PLEDGEDTO STOP DESTABILIZING THE REGION AND LAUNCHING PROPAGANDA ATTACKS

    AGAINST THE PERSIAN GULFMONARCHIES IN EXCHANGE FORBADLY NEEDED ECONOMIC

    ASSISTANCE.

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    CHANGING ISRAELI POLITICALDISCOURSE

    THE EASE OF THE VICTORY, THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION THE REUNITING OF JERUSALEM,

    PERMANENTLY ALTERED POLITICALDISCOURSE IN ISRAEL.

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    THE CONQUEST OFJERUSALEM BY ISRAELADDED RELIGIOUSDIMENSION TO THE

    CONFLICT.

    THE RHETORIC ASREGARDS THE CONFLICT

    BECAME INCREASINGLYRELIGIOUS ONE.

    THE CONQUEST OF JERUSALEM

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    STUDY NOTES: HOW JERUSALEM BECAME THE ISRAELI CAPITAL

    "By accepting the [1947] U.N. partition resolution, the Jewish Agencyhad accepted the provision for placing Jerusalem under aninternational regime. Nevertheless, the newborn Jewish statedesperately wanted Jerusalem to be its capital. At the end of1948 Jerusalem was effectively partitioned along the cease-fireline between Israel and Jordan.

    While Israel's diplomats were conducting a vigorous campaign againstinternationalization, the cabinet waged a vigorous internal debate.

    The prime minister wanted to declare Jerusalem as the capital ofIsrael and to move as many government offices as possible there;The foreign minister [Sharett] urged caution. On 5 December 1949the prime minister in the Knesset designed to make it absolutelyclear that Israel would never accept foreign rule over Jerusalem...

    The statement, however failed to deter the supporters ofinternationalization. On 9 December the U.N. General Assemblyadopted by a large majority a that called for treating Jerusalemas a separate entity and placing it under U.N. rule.

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    The U.N. decision rekindled the debate inside the Israelicabinet. The prime minister reacted with Churchillian defiance,in deeds as well as words.

    He proposed a vehement denunciation of the U.N. resolution aswell as immediate practical measures to establish facts on theground and to assert Israel's sovereignty...

    After a stormy debate the cabinet approved the text of thedeclaration submitted by the prime minister with only minor

    amendments...

    On 13 December, from the podium of the Knesset, to move theKnesset and the government offices from Tel Aviv to [West]Jerusalem.

    No time was wasted between the announcement of this decisionand its implementation."

    Avi Shlaim, Professor of International Relations at St. Antony's College, Oxford, in The Iron Wall p.

    60, wrote:

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    VIA DELOROSO5TH STOP

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    THE WAILING WALL AND HARAM

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    THE WAILING WALL AND HARAM

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    WORLDWIDE SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL

    WHAT WAS REGARDED AS A THREAT TOTHE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AROUSEDSYMPATHY IN EUROPE AND AMERICA,WHERE MEMORIES OF THE JEWISH FATE

    DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR WERESTILL STRONG.

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    CUMHURIYET ve MOSHE DAYAN

    ISRAILINKENDSNDEN HEMSAYICA HEM DESILAHA KAT KAT

    STN DRT ARAPLKESINIYENNDEBAROL OYNAYAN

    MOE DAYAN YILIN(1967) DI ADAMISEILMITIR.

    MOSHE DAYAN WASCHOSEN AS THEMAN OF THE YEAR(1967) FOR PLAYING

    MAJOR ROLE INDEFEATING FOURARAB STATESHAVING

    SUPERIORITY INPOPULATION ANDARMAMENTS.

    REGIONAL CONFLICT BECAME

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    REGIONAL CONFLICT BECAMEWORLWIDE ONE

    FOR THE USSR IT WAS ALSO A KIND OFDEFEAT, BUT ONE WHICH MADE THERUSSIANS MORE RESOLUTE TO PREVENTTHEIR CLIENTS FROM INCURRING ANOTHER

    DEFEAT OF THE SAME MAGNITUDE.

    ISRAEL US PARTNERSHIP

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    THE SWIFT ISRAELI VICTORY MADEISRAEL MORE DESIRABLE AS AN ALLY INAMERICAN EYES.

    ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITHTHE UNITED STATES GAINEDMOMENTUM, ARMING THE IDF WITH USWEAPONRY.

    ISRAEL-US PARTNERSHIP

    STUDY NOTE: THE US IN SIX DAY WAR "

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    STUDY NOTE: THE US IN SIX DAY WAR."

    THE UNITED STATES TRIED TO PREVENT THE WAR THROUGHNEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT COULD NOT PERSUADE NASSER OR THE

    OTHER ARAB STATES TO CEASE THEIR BELLIGERENTSTATEMENTS AND ACTIONS.

    STILL, RIGHT BEFORE THE WAR, JOHNSON WARNED: "ISRAELWILL NOT BE ALONE UNLESS IT DECIDES TO GO ALONE. "THEN,WHEN THE WAR BEGAN, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED:"OUR POSITION IS NEUTRAL IN THOUGHT, WORD AND DEED.

    "MOREOVER, WHILE THE ARABS WERE FALSELY ACCUSING THEUNITED STATES OF AIRLIFTING SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL,JOHNSON IMPOSED AN ARMS EMBARGO ON THE REGION(FRANCE, ISRAEL'S OTHER MAIN ARMS SUPPLIER, ALSOEMBARGOED ARMS TO ISRAEL).

    BY CONTRAST, THE SOVIETS WERE SUPPLYING MASSIVE AMOUNTSOF ARMS TO THE ARABS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ARMIES OFKUWAIT, ALGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ WERECONTRIBUTING TROOPS AND ARMS TO THE EGYPTIAN, SYRIANAND JORDANIAN FRONTS.

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    REAWAKENING PALESTINIAN

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    REAWAKENING PALESTINIANIDENTITY

    THE TRAUMATIC DEMOLITION OF THE STATUSQUO AROUSE NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONSAMONG PALESTINIANS

    THE PALESTINIANS STOPPED LOOKING TO

    THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO DEFEAT ISRAEL. THEY WERE RADICALIZED BY THE 1967

    DEFEAT.

    THE PLO - AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION OFPALESTINIAN GROUPS LED BY YASIRARAFAT'S AL FATAH- MOVED TO THEFOREFRONT OF ARAB RESISTANCE AGAINSTISRAEL.

    THE FEDAYEEN

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    THE FEDAYEEN

    RECRUITS AND MONEY POURED IN, ANDTHROUGHOUT 1968 PALESTINIANGUERRILLAS LAUNCHED A NUMBER OFBORDER RAIDS ON ISRAEL.

    THE FEDAYEEN ATTACKS BROUGHT LARGE-SCALE ISRAELI RETALIATION, WHICHTHE ARAB STATES WERE NOT CAPABLEOF COUNTERACTING.

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    UNSCR 242

    On November 22 1967 the United Nations

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    On November 22, 1967, the United NationsSecurity Council passed the followingresolution:

    "The Security Council,Expressing its continuing concern with thegrave situation in the Middle East,

    Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the

    acquisition of territory by warand theneed to work for ajust and lasting peaceinwhich every State in the area can live insecurity,

    Emphasizing further that all Member States

    in their acceptance of the Charter of theUnited Nations have undertaken acommitment to act in accordance withArticle 2 of the Charter,

    1 Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter

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    1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charterprinciples requires the establishment of ajustand lasting peacein the Middle East which

    should include the application of both thefollowing principles:(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from

    territories occupiedin the recent conflict;

    (ii) Termination of all claims or states ofbelligerency and respect for andacknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorialintegrity and political independence of every

    State in the area and their right to live inpeace within secure and recognized boundariesfree from threats or acts of force;

    2 Affi m f th th it

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    2. Affirms further the necessity(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation

    through international waterways in thearea;(b) For achieving ajust settlement of the

    refugee problem;

    (c) For guaranteeing the territorialinviolability and political independence ofevery State in the area, through measures

    including the establishment of demilitarizedzones;

    3 Requests the Secretary-General to

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    3. Requests the Secretary General todesignate a Special Representative toproceed to the Middle East to establish andmaintain contacts with the Statesconcerned in order to promote agreementand assist efforts to achieve a peaceful

    and accepted settlement in accordance withthe provisions and principles in thisresolution;

    4. Requests the Secretary-General to reportto the Security Council on the progress ofthe efforts of the Special Representativeas soon as possible.

    242s balanced emphasis on

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    242 sbalanced emphasis on 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory

    by war and

    the need to work for a just and lasting peace.'242 called for

    'withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied inthe recent conflict,' as well as for

    'termination of all claims or states of belligerencyand respect for and acknowledgement of thesovereignty, territorial integrity and politicalindependence of every state in the area and theirright to live in peace.'

    242 also called for 'a just settlement of therefugee problem.'

    AMBIGUITY OF TERRITORIES

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    AMBIGUITY OF TERRITORIES

    242 ALLOWED ISRAEL TO AVOID THEREQUIREMENT OF WITHDRAWING FROM 'THE TERRITORIES' OR 'ALL THE TERRITORIES' OCCUPIED IN

    THE RECENT WAR.THE FINAL WORDING WAS

    'WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES,' GIVING ISRAEL SOME ROOM FORMANEUVERING."

    Th l ti t d b

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    The resolution was accepted by Egypt,

    Jordan, and Israel from the outset,

    but was initially rejected by Syria.

    Only after the October War of 1973 didSyria accept the resolution, while all theArab states (except Libya) accepted its

    principles at the Fez Arab summitconference in 1982.

    PLO AND 242

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    PLO AND 242The most consistent rejection of Resolution 242 came

    from PLO, which from its inception in 1964 refuseda peaceful settlement with Israel.

    After 1974, however, as the PLO moved toward theidea of a negotiated settlement with Israel, it

    increasingly based its objections to Resolution 242on the fact that it dealt with the Palestinians asrefugees, rather than as a people with nationalrights.

    Finally, in 1988, the PLO formally accepted Resolution242 as the basis for a Middle East settlement,thereby meeting one of the conditions posed by theUnited States for opening contacts with it.

    WHY JERUSALEM

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    JERUSALEM IS NEVER MENTIONED IN THE

    QUR'AN. EVEN THE NAME 'JERUSALEM'DOES NOT FIGURE IN EARLY MUSLIMWRITINGS.

    WHEN THE CITY IS MENTIONED AT ALL --

    AS FOR EXAMPLE ON [CALIPH] 'ABD AL-MALIK'S MILESTONES -- IS CALLEDAELIA, THE NAME IMPOSED BY THEROMANS TO DESACRALIZE THE CITY ANDTO OBLITERATE ITS JEWISH AND ALSOCHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS.

    WHY JERUSALEM

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

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    JERUSALEM CAME TO BE KNOWN FOR AWHILE AS BAYT AL-MAQDIS, CLEARLYRELATED TO THE HEBREW BAYT HA-MAQDASH, THE BIBLICAL NAME OF THE

    TEMPLE.

    IN TIME BOTH THIS NAME AND AELIAWERE REPLACED BY AL-QUDS, 'THE [CITY

    OF] HOLINESS'...

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

    WHY QUDS CONSIDERED SACRED?

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    WHY QUDS CONSIDERED SACRED?

    A QUR'ANIC VERSE (17:1) TELLS HOW GOD TOOKTHE PROPHET ON A JOURNEY BY NIGHT FROMTHE SACRED MOSQUE (IN MECCA) TO THEFARTHEST MOSQUE (IN ARABIC, AL-MASJIDAL-AQSA).

    ONE EARLY EXEGETICAL TRADITION PLACES 'THE FARTHEST MOSQUE' IN HEAVEN;

    ANOTHER PLACES IT

    IN JERUSALEM.THE LATTER INTERPRETATION CAME TO BE

    UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED BY MUSLIMS.

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

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    "THE JEWISH CONNECTION TO JERUSALEM IS ANANCIENT AND POWERFUL ONE. JUDAISM MADEJERUSALEM A HOLY CITY OVER THREE THOUSANDYEARS AGO AND THROUGH ALL THAT TIME JEWSREMAINED STEADFAST TO IT.

    JEWS PRAY IN ITS DIRECTION, MENTION ITS NAME

    CONSTANTLY IN PRAYERS, CLOSE THE PASSOVERSERVICE WITH THE WISTFUL STATEMENT 'NEXTYEAR IN JERUSALEM,' AND RECALL THE CITY INTHE BLESSING AT THE END OF EACH MEAL.

    THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE LOOMS VERY

    LARGE IN JEWISH CONSCIOUSNESS;REMEMBRANCE TAKES SUCH FORMS AS A SPECIALDAY OF MOURNING, HOUSES LEFT PARTIALLYUNFINISHED, A WOMAN'S MAKEUP OR JEWELRYLEFT INCOMPLETE, AND A GLASS SMASHED

    DURING THE WEDDING CEREMONY.

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

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    THE CITY SYMBOLIZES BOTH SPIRITUAL AND NATIONALREVIVAL, SO ISRAEL'S NATIONAL ANTHEM, 'HATIKVAH'

    ('THE HOPE'), NATURALLY REFERS TO A TWO-THOUSAND-YEAR YEARNING FROM THE DIASPORA FOR ZION ANDJERUSALEM.

    NOR IS THIS YEARNING PURELY SPIRITUAL.

    THROUGH THE CENTURIES, JEWS SETTLED IN JERUSALEM TOLIVE AN EXISTENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL PIETY. ALREADY INMEDIEVAL TIMES, ELDERLY JEWS TRAVELED TO JERUSALEMTO DIE AND BE BURIED IN ITS HALLOWED GROUND.

    BY 1844, JEWS CONSTITUTED THE LARGEST RELIGIOUS GROUP

    IN THE CITY; BY THE 1870S, THEY WERE IN ABSOLUTEMAJORITY, WHICH THEY HAVE REMAINED EVER SINCE."

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

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    PALESTINE IN GENERAL AND JERUSALEM IN PARTICULAR

    WERE THE SCENE ON WHICH THE MOST UNIQUELYMOMENTOUS EVENTS OF CHRISTIANITY HAD BEENENACTED.

    THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION AND REDEMPTION HADTAKEN PLACE HERE.

    THE DIVINE ACT OF SALVATION HERE HAD ITS LOCALHABITATION AND INCARNATE MANIFESTATION.

    ALL THE FOLLOWING TOOK PLACE ON DEFINITE SPOTS INPALESTINE AND JERUSALEM THE NATIVITY AND THE EVENTS PRECEDING IT,

    CHRIST'S CHILDHOOD AND MANHOOD, HIS MINISTRY AND PREACHING, THE CONSUMMATION OF THIS MINISTRY IN HIS PASSION,

    RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION, THE BIRTH OF THE CHURCH ON PENTECOST AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FIRST CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY.

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

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    "PAST CONTROVERSIES OVER THE CONTROL OF

    THE CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES WERE BOUND UPMORE BY DISPUTES WITHIN CHRISTIANITYTHAN BY INTERFERENCE FROM THE MUSLIMRULERS OF PALESTINE OR CONFLICT WITHJEWS.

    THE HOLY PLACES INCLUDE SITES BELIEVED TOHAVE BEEN THE SCENES OF THE CRUCIFIXIONAND BURIAL OF JESUS, INCLUDING THE CHURCH OF THE HOLY SEPULCHRE,

    THE CHURCHES MARKING THE STATIONS OFTHE CROSS ALONG THE VIA DOLOROSA, THE GARDEN OF GETHSEMANE, AND THE CHURCH OF THE ASCENSION.

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

    STUDY NOTE ON QUDS

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    IN 1757, THE OTTOMAN AUTHORITIES

    FIRST ESTABLISHED A STATUS QUO TODETERMINE WHICH CHRISTIAN SECTSCONTROLLED WHICH HOLY PLACES.

    THE STATUS QUO WAS REAFFIRMED IN 1852, GUARANTEED IN 1878 BY THE EUROPEAN

    POWERS AT THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, CONFIRMED BY THE BRITISH DURING THE

    MANDATE PERIOD, AND THEN AGAIN BY ISRAEL AFTER 1967.

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    SO IMPORTANT IS THIS STATUS QUO TO

    CHRISTIANS THAT A DISPUTE BETWEENROMAN CATHOLICS AND THE RUSSIANORTHODOX OVER CONTROL OF ALTARSIN THE CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY INBETHLEHEM WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSEOF THE CRIMEAN WAR OF 1854-56.

    CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS ARE STILLMORE CONCERNED WITH KEEPING ONECHRISTIAN SECT FROM ENCROACHINGON THE OTHERS' RIGHTS THAN WITHCONTROL OF THE CITY BY JEWS ORMUSLIMS.

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    HISTORICALLY, THE VATICAN HAS ALWAYS

    SUPPORTED INTERNATIONALIZATION, OF THEHOLY PLACES.

    STILL, THE VATICAN STILL CONSIDERS ISRAELI'OCCUPATION' OF EASTERN JERUSALEM'UNACCEPTABLE.

    YET THE VATICAN HAS APPARENTLY MOVED AWAYFROM ITS HISTORIC INSISTENCE ON CREATIONOF A CORPUS SEPARATUMTO SOME NOTION OF'INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES TO SAFEGUARDTHE UNIQUENESS OF THE CITY.

    IN RETURN FOR THIS AND FOR OPENINGDIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THEVATICAN HOPES TO PLAY A ROLE IN THENEGOTIATIONS OVER JERUSALEM.

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    THIS RAPPROCHEMENT HAS ALREADY

    CREATED CONSIDERABLECONSTERNATION AMONG OTHERCHRISTIAN GROUPS, IN PARTICULAR THEGREEK ORTHODOX, WHO ARE THE

    MAJORITY OF CHRISTIANS IN ISRAEL,AND WHO HAVE ASSERTED TRADITIONALCLAIMS OF RELIGIOUS PRIMACY FOR THECHRISTIAN COMMUNITY THERE."

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    THE JERUSALEM QUESTION IN ITS CURRENTFORM CONTAINS TWO SEPARATE ELEMENTS: SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CITY AND

    THE STATUS OF THE HOLY PLACES.

    THE FORMER IS CONTESTED BY TWO NATIONAL

    GROUPS, THE LATTER BY THREE RELIGIONS. SUCH A TAXONOMY, WHILE IT SERVES THE PURPOSE

    OF ANALYSIS, DOES NOT ALTOGETHER FIT THE REALWORLD.

    THE ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OF THE HOLYPLACES, OF NATIONALISM AND RELIGION, ARE INJERUSALEM, MORE THAN ANYWHERE ELSE ON EARTH,INEXTRICABLYTANGLED.

    Q

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    In December, 1948, UN General AssemblyResolution 194 established

    The Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC).

    The Commission's task was to work toward a peace settlementbetween Israel and the Arab states,

    to facilitate the repatriation,resettlement, and economic and social

    well-being of the Palestinian refugees, and to determine the status of Jerusalem.

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    The PCC, however, failed to achieve any of its goals,

    and in fact these issues remained points ofcontention for the next fifty or so years.

    Both Israel and the Arabs rejected the UN positionthat Jerusalem should become an international city.

    The Jordanians and the Israelis came to a workingarrangement by dividing the city between them,essentially disregarding the views of other nations.

    Israel later proclaimed Jerusalem its capital andgradually transferred government departments tothe city.

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    137:1 By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down,yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion.

    137:2 We hanged our harps upon the willows in themidst thereof.

    137:3 For there they that carried us away captiverequired of us a song; and they that wasted us requiredof us mirth, saying, Sing us one of the songs of Zion.

    137:4 How shall we sing the LORD's song in a strange

    land?

    137:5 If I forget

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    f f gthee, O Jerusalem,

    let my right handforget her cunning.

    137:6 If I do notremember thee, letmy tongue cleave tothe roof of mymouth; if I prefernot Jerusalem abovemy chief joy.

    BABIL IRMAKLARI KENARINDA,ORADA OTURDUK,

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    OR D O URDUK,VE SIONU ANDIKA ALADIK.IINDEKI STLER ZERINEENKLERIMIZI ASTIK.NK ORADA BIZI SRGN EDENLERBIZDEN TERANELER,VE BIZE AZAP EDENLER BIZDEN ENLIK ISTEDILER;SION TERANELERINDEN BIRINI BIZE OKUYUN DEDILER.

    YABANCININ TOPRAINDA

    RABBIN TERANESINI NASIL OKUYALIM?EER SENI UNUTURSAN YERUALIM,SA ELIM HRNERINI UNUTSUN.EER SENI ANMAZSAM,EER YERUALIMI BA SEVINCIMDEN STN TUTMAZSAM,

    DILIM DAMAIMA YAPISINESKI AHIT, MEZMUR 137

    VA, PENSIORE SULLALI DORATE

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    Fly, thought, on wings of gold;go settle upon the slopes and the hills,

    where, soft and mild, the sweet airsof our native land smell fragrant!Greet the banks of the Jordanand Zion's toppled towers...Oh, my country so lovely and lost!

    Oh, remembrance so dear and so fraught with despair!Golden harp of the prophetic seers,why dost thou hang mute upon the willow?Rekindle our bosom's memories,and speak of times gone by!Mindful of the fate of Jerusalem,

    either give forth an air of sad lamentation,or else let the Lord imbue uswith fortitude to bear our sufferings!

    MUSIC HISTORIANS HAVE LONG PERPETUATED A POWERFULMYTH ABOUT THE FAMOUS VA PENSIORE CHORUS SUNG

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    MYTH ABOUT THE FAMOUS VA, PENSIORE CHORUS SUNGIN THE THIRD ACT BY THE HEBREW SLAVES.

    SCHOLARS HAVE LONG BELIEVED THE AUDIENCE,RESPONDING WITH NATIONALISTIC FERVOR TO THESLAVES' POWERFUL HYMN OF LONGING FOR THEIRHOMELAND, DEMANDED AN ENCORE OF THE PIECE.

    AS ENCORES WERE EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN BY THEGOVERNMENT AT THE TIME, SUCH A GESTURE WOULDHAVE BEEN EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT.

    HOWEVER, RECENT SCHOLARSHIP PUTS THIS AND THECORRESPONDING MYTH OF VA PENSIORE AS THENATIONAL ANTHEM OF THE RISORGIMENTO, TO REST.

    ALTHOUGH THE AUDIENCE DID INDEED DEMAND AN ENCORE,IT WAS NOT FOR "VA, PENSIERO" BUT RATHER FOR THEHYMN "IMMENSO JEHOVA," SUNG BY THE HEBREW SLAVESTO THANK GOD FOR SAVING HIS PEOPLE.