4 3 C LIMATIC A NOMALIES AND C ONFLICTS : T HE R OLE OF T ENURE S ECURITY ON L AND D ISPUTES Marcella Veronesi University of Verona and ETH Zurich Salvatore.

4 3

CLIMATIC ANOMALIES AND CONFLICTS: THE ROLE OF TENURE SECURITY

ON LAND DISPUTES

Marcella VeronesiUniversity of Verona and ETH Zurich

Salvatore Di FalcoUniversity of Geneva

March 24, 20152015 World Bank Land and Poverty Conference

Motivation/1

• Robust evidence that deviations from normal rainfall

and temperature increase human conflicts (Hsiang,

Burke, and Miguel, Science 2013)

• The positive relationship between climate and conflicts

frequently observed in Africa.

Motivation/2

• Climate models project weather variability to increase in

Africa (IPCC, 2013).

Lack of empirical evidence on possible factors or policies

that may mitigate the impact of climate and

so prevent disputes in Africa.

This Paper

Does land tenure (property rights) mitigate the

impact of climatic anomalies on land use conflicts?

Focus on land disputes in Ethiopia

Research question

Background:Climate and Land Certification Programme in Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has frequently experienced droughts and

floods (Lautze et al., 2003; NMS, 2007).

Most of climate models converge in forecasting

scenarios of increased temperatures for most of

Ethiopia (Dinar et al., 2008).

Background (cont.):Climate and Land Certification Programme in Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Ethiopia historically plagued by lack of tenure security

Until 1975 complex system of ownerships (communal, private,

church, state) Land owned by absentee landlords; arbitrary

evictions posed serious threats to tenant farmers.

1975 land reform rights to state and usufruct rights to farmers

1998 land certification program the program entry is random

and phased in over a period of time

Data

• Sustainable Land Management Survey

• Conducted by Addis Ababa University, Ethiopian

Development Research Institute, University of Gothenburg

• Years 2005 and 2007

• Large farm-household panel survey

• About 1700 households per year

• Amhara National Regional state of Ethiopia

Study Site

EthiopiaAmhara National Regional State

14 villages7 from East Gojjam zone 7 from South Wello zone

East Gojjam South Wello

Conflict Measure

• Conflict variable: disputes over land

“Have you ever faced any

conflicts or claims

regarding the land you own?”

“Yes/No”.

Conflict Measure (cont.)

Type of conflict(i) The claimant pushed the borders of my parcel;

(ii) It was claimed that the plot was unfairly given to me;

(iii) It was claimed that the plot belonged to the claimant sometime ago;

(iv) It was claimed that I pushed the claimant’s borders;

(v) The claimant did not want to leave the land I left for him to manage

while I was away;

(vi) The claimant did not want to leave my land I had given out to him on

sharecropping.

Climatic Data

• Ethiopian National Meteorological Services

• Annual mean rainfall from 1976 to 2006 at the

household level

• Spatial interpolation using latitude, longitude and

elevation of each household

• Rainfall anomalies = deviations from long-term mean

divided by its long-term standard deviation

Final Sample

• 12 villages 4 villages with land certification8 villages without land certification

• 1,487 farm-households1,027 with land certification 460 without land certification

• Total: 2,974 observations 2,054 with land certification 920 without land certification

Descriptive Statistics

Mean Std. Dev.YEAR 2005

conflict (1/0) 0.190 0.392male 0.814 0.389age 50.299 15.445literate (1/0) 0.466 0.499family size 6.227 2.342farm size (Ha) 1.810 2.934credit access (1/0) 0.178 0.383

YEAR 2007 conflict (1/0) 0.218 0.413male 0.807 0.395age 51.413 15.012literate (1/0) 0.427 0.495family size 6.619 2.391farm size (Ha) 2.081 1.839credit access (1/0) 0.246 0.431

Baseline

Follow-up

Descriptive Statistics

No Land Tenure With Land TenureMean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.

YEAR 2005 conflict (1/0) 0.192 0.394 0.183 0.387male 0.824 0.381 0.810 0.392age 50.945 15.631 49.703 14.950literate (1/0) 0.452 0.498 0.534 0.499family size 6.316 2.358 6.431 2.353farm size (Ha) 1.755 3.173 1.945 2.899credit access (1/0) 0.195 0.396 0.148 0.355

YEAR 2007 conflict (1/0) 0.248 0.432 0.159 0.366male 0.823 0.382 0.804 0.397age 52.186 15.310 50.557 14.264literate (1/0) 0.396 0.489 0.514 0.500family size 6.580 2.409 6.805 2.512farm size (Ha) 1.878 1.636 2.463 2.260credit access (1/0) 0.220 0.414 0.270 0.444

Land Certification Introduced

1515

Households without

Land Tenure

Control Group Treatment Group

• Land tenure randomly assigned• Climatic anomalies exogenous

Identification Strategy

Households with

Land Tenure

1616

Empirical Model

• Fixed effect model with panel data:- account for potential omitted variable bias constant overtime- compare the same household overtime subject to different

rainfall anomalies.

• C*: propensity to experience land use conflicts• A: vector of rainfall anomalies• X: age, literacy, family size, land size, credit, livestock• μ: household fixed effects• η: error term

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Results: OLS Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4)Variables All Yes

Land TenureNo

Land TenureAll

+ interaction terms

Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.031** 0.050 -0.043** -0.043*** (0.014) (0.027) (0.013) (0.013)Rainfall anomaly t-2 -0.123* 0.191 -0.199*** -0.199*** (0.067) (0.124) (0.054) (0.053)Land tenure -0.142*** -0.078*** (0.005) (0.021)Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.094***

(0.027)Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.390***

(0.124)Constant 0.227*** 0.158** 0.220*** 0.220*** (0.007) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006)Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 2,974 920 2,054 2,974

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Kebele level in parenthesis. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

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Results: Fixed Effect Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4)

Variables All YesLand Tenure

NoLand Tenure

All + interaction terms

Rainfall anomaly t -0.094*** -0.043 -0.088** -0.088**

(0.032) (0.060) (0.038) (0.038)

Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.212*** 0.044 -0.260*** -0.260***

(0.050) (0.109) (0.057) (0.057)

Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.045

(0.071)

Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.304**

(0.123)

Observations 2,974 920 2,054 2,974

Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

Robustness Checks: Covariates

(1) (2) (3) (4)Variables All Yes

Land TenureNo

Land TenureAll

+ interaction termsRainfall anomaly t -0.086*** -0.035 -0.081** -0.084** (0.033) (0.062) (0.039) (0.039)Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.194*** 0.082 -0.246*** -0.241*** (0.052) (0.110) (0.059) (0.059)Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.054

(0.073)Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.307**

(0.126)Age 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)Literate 0.048* 0.066* 0.046 0.052** (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026)Family size 0.007 0.072*** -0.016 0.011 (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)Land area 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.002 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)Livestock 0.005 -0.006 0.013** 0.005 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)Access to credit -0.021 -0.078*** 0.004 -0.017 (0.017) (0.029) (0.021) (0.017)Observations 2,864 876 1,988 2,864

Conclusions

We find robust evidence that farm-households with land tenure are more resilient to climatic anomalies than farm-households without tenure security.

Land certification: effective policy instrument to buffer

against climate anomalies

THANK YOU

FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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