Korean War 38th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - August 1951 2nd Infantry Division Korean War Project Record: USA-137 Folder: 060005 Box: 06 File: 05 National Archives and Records Administration College Park, Maryland Records: United States Army Unit Name: Second Infantry Division Record Group: RG407 Editor: Hal Barker Korean War Project P.O. Box 180190 Dallas, TX 75218-0190 http://www.koreanwar.org Korean War Project 2ID-00400517
42
Embed
38th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - August … · Korean War 38th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - August 1951 2nd Infantry Division Korean War Project Record: USA-137 Folder:
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Korean War
38th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - August 1951
2nd Infantry Division
Korean War Project Record: USA-137
Folder: 060005
Box: 06
File: 05
National Archives and Records Administration
College Park, Maryland
Records: United States Army
Unit Name: Second Infantry Division
Record Group: RG407
Editor: Hal Barker
Korean War Project
P.O. Box 180190
Dallas, TX 75218-0190
http://www.koreanwar.org
Korean War Project 2ID-00400517
Korean War Project 2ID-00400518
> ·j!EPRODUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ~
l"l:---, .. ·-- . -r ------ ---~-----~--.#'
DECLASSIFIED -;. l\.cJTIPri.ty. r.au\JQ7'&5lO(
-i· ""
/0'-~~~~~a_:J/Jad}'
SECRET
OOMHA.:ND REPORT E OSIIIS-:5 (Rl) (OSGP0-28)
38TH H!J!~:tlTRY HEGD-1J~:HT
for
1 thru 31 August .51
Assigned to: 2d Infantry Division APO 248 US Army
Approved by: .. '
d~J~ FRANK T. MILDREl'T Lt Col Inf Commandine;
SECRET
Korean War Project 2ID-00400519
I ',, ' '--:· ,<; ' '
;\EPRODUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES i DECLASSIFIED 1.. :~-- - -- : --
·The capture of Hill 1243 on 3 Se?tembor 1951 represents tho high·watermark of achievement in offensive action by the 38th Infantry-the proud "Rock of tho Mr..rno" R0~iment. Bnttle veter·:.ns of more the.n e. yoor.' s hard fighting in Korea, an enumeration of good and bad points in this, their finest hour, should prove of interest to nll who seck to linprove combat technique.
For this battle was one of technique ruther then tactics. Tho t~ctics were rudimentarY r'.hd straightforward, made simple by the necossi ty of ca.ptur- . ing tho dominant terro.in feature o.t tho north-west corner of a ridge of mountains. Those mountr.ins encircle a· flo.t plain making the terrain feature commonly referred to u.s the 11 Punch Bowl". Having previously cr-.ptured Hill 1179--"Fool Mountain" which lies about ono third the distance nlong the western lip of the bowl, this att~ck w~s merely a contintmtion of tho advence to tho end of the ridge. From Hill 1179 to the final objective Hi~l 1243 is over 5000 yexds. The ridge is a serrated one consisting of successive hills
· · --1059-l100-ll81-1200 wd 1234-all with deep v.tileys in bet.-1oen. Those heights are in meters, and from one hill to tho next the straight-line· distance also entails a vertical drop of 500 to 600 fe&t and a suailar climb up again.
This bct~le is en especially interesting one to c~alyzo since it reduced to a minimum the usual udvr.Jltages which the Amorican soldier enjoys over tha Comrnunist. More thr..n v.nywhere else in the experience of this R~gimont it pitted mr.n against man. The great. advantages accruing from our superior mobility (and this includes the use of.tanks) were absent. To get to the line ~ departure you dismo~~t from u vehicle nt tho neer side of the mountain r~dgc, cl~1b steadily for 2 hours to a height of 1148 meters, ru1d then for 2 more hours ·climb up ru1d do~,orn the rough-rocky trail to Hill 1179. · Upon arriving at tho line of dop~~ture you exo sure that you have dono v. good dl".y 1 s work, and indcod you ht' .. vo. For a man has to be in good physical shape to mnke it nt nll. Yet avery round of rJnmunition, every ration, and every casualty had to be tr£~nsported over this smne rough a.nd tortuous foot p..'tth. Thnt it takes r.-.:.nother 4· hours of climbing to cover thef remaining 5000 yards straight-line distaneo to the objoctive-~ikes it clear thA.t this was a battle requiring gree.t physical exertion. In this respect tho fact tht.".t tho men had seen 40 days of c::->ntin.uous fighting up to this point had its advrntnges. It is also at once obvious that supply wns the governing criterion. To compound the difficulty this was a battle in which the north Korean resisted stubbornly: at times fanatically. In m.:,st cases he hRd to be killed in his cave which be had hewn out of solid rock.
In what follows, no ~ttempt will be made to adhere either to n strict chronology nor evan to o. description of the attack. Rather, certain i'eo:turos will be mentioned from which it is bolieved a lesson might be .inferred, elthar a lesson of what to 9Q or what ~ ~ gg.
The attA.ck was cnrofully and prdnstakingly .planned. A -'special blowup mup of the arc:- was prepared 11t Regiment and reproduced at higher headquerters. Air bombPxdment and artillery preparatory fires were stepped up. Most importt.:mt of all, requirements were tabulntod and resources en'l.liilernted so thnt tho maximum fir.e-pwor and man-power nvaila.bl.e t() the Regiroent could ba employed.
Korean War Project 2ID-00400551
\ .I
.i\EPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES c·.·--'·
t-DECLASSIFIED
~.t:JW..ty. !\ 1 cJ Q 7 &51 0 ( .: 8 CC l..l-'M • ,/t,,/(1( ' w y . . n;w-v,l'\ :O.a.e ..ll..lW...Ll
····-----...!
Since terrc.in nrohibitcd tho employment -::>f tanks in the fi~ht, the ta...1ks were immobilized and the tankers used both 2.s supervisors over tho Korean .::o.rriers n11d as p;::tck-ce.rricrs therr.solves. To further help meet
·the carrying deficit tho ~ttachod AA battery was employed the sane wny, as were .?.11 o.vP.ilablc personnel from Service rmd Hor:.dqucrtors companies. Tho Hcdicnl Compnny could not be tapped, predictions wore that it vould have its h:;.nds full. Noi ther wqs tho Mortnr Comprmy levied upon. Desirous of employing to tho max:imu.'Tl fire povor possible the :Hortnr Company was allowed to do its own hand-cp_rrying of r> • .mmuni tion in order to supply the largest nwnber of mortfl.rs it could thus support. This turned out to be one mortar, which incidcntnlly, delivered over 300 rou~ds every day. It goes without sr.ying thnt the best FO nnd the best gunners 1:1ore used. Tho mortr-.rr!IonC2.rriors sav1 to it thP.t every round of ru:nnuni tion scored [:gr.inst the enemy.
At the very outset n serious error \.JnS made by the loo.d comnany. It had failed to clear p2.ths through tho JJ.ino-fiold surrou.rlding its defensive position. This meant th2..t much of the effect of the heavy propnrc.tion was wnstod._ When tho u.rlit die. go through tho field, however, i+. did the job Hell. It cleared multiple lanes on a broad front$ thereby preventing the enemy from stopping O\.IT o.dvc.nco by bringing fire to bear on r. single point.
Porh;:,l's the most .outstanding single for:turo of tho nttn.ck \.Jns the full utiliz~.tion of ill nvnilo.blo HeQpons. i.Jhile tho 11nEd-ninute 11 of fire r,s show.r1 at Fort Benning could not-for logisticc~ reasons--be approac~od, no opportunity \.Je.s ovurlookecl. for bringing Holl-nir:l3d firo of every r.~vailable weapon to boar. The supporting fires within tho c >L:l.panies L:.."ld by tho bc.ttalions were exceptionally Hell ho.nc:lJ.~.;1i.' Wa:ber-c6:)led nachine-guns were used, as were both the 60 Md 81 MH ncx t rn. While some effect WP.s realized from the 57 :HH rccoiles·s rifle it w·.o tho 75 1'-M rocoiloss rifle which proved to be more effective in destr;:,yi::lg bunkers. Initial e.ttmapts to usc the flr .. mo throvmr were soon abcndonod: it we..s sililply too heavy and of too short a rv.ngo to do lllUch go·') d. Rifle grenades Here used Hi th •pod rosul ts in one of the co.mpt:tnios i other compPnies who had not tr~dned in mnrksmr::.nship vrith the rifle gronn.0e discl:'l.ir.led thc.t they wore of much V'J.lue. The lack of trA.ining nrobr:bly accounted for the difference b. opinion.
Ono.bnttv.lion pre-planned o. resupply system Hhich proved to bo most effective. Ee.ch nrm advancing uo tho trnil cr--..rricd 3 rounds of 60 .MM nortnr or :me round of 75 recoilcss n.i-:JDU.r:li tion~ '\IJhon ·'~ppronching tho spot where he loft tho trc.il to go into the line he simply dropped his round to be picked up by tho rumn~"lition boQrers lntor ')11.
The supporting ertillery fire loft little to be desired. This was clue prir.1a.rily to two reP..sons: g:::>od forwe.rd observers end accurc.te shooting. The forward o bservors with lead conp:~nics· Hero each "'llo\.Jed to control two guns of the br:.tter~r directly, ~nd in this w:.y 11vmlked the fire" nhond of then during the movonent of tho infcntry. By f<.r tho best feature of infn.ntry-c-;.rtillory coordinc.ti::>n wn.s tho close support by tho c:.rtillory, allowing the inf"mtry to "lean into it". vlhcn heavy srLll arm fire w:>..s received from the enemy company coEmanc1crs quickly bE.c_cked off frora the scene end put hel"'.~ concentration of HE c,nc1. VT an tho nret->;'t: .s.nd chn.rgod bn.ck e.go.in. It worked. '·''
'.
Korean War Project 2ID-00400552
~.,"-
,:!EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES : (C·:.-~. l
'· )-
r DECLASSIFIED
l\.cJWri.IY: f\ If\) Q 7 Q5/0 ( . By cc ®A;n ! ';,,../(IL _ . . .a. e ..li..I.L!.L.LJ
···-----! ----------- -------------~
Air support played e. no15J.:lgibl0 r)le j_r.. this attack. As usu.~., in this type ?f torrc.in, it wns faun(~ thnt strafing WllS of preccticc.lly n.:> value, rocketin~ of linitec value, nn0 n~paln the only really effective woapon. But oven here, tho nn.nnln drops were qui to inaccurate. Sovern.l w:.j :::r (e
fects in technique were revealed; defects which need correcting bcfJre we cnn 1-;et mi"..Ximur.l usc fron air support. First, the n:osquito d:Jminnted tho C')ntrol of the air by tellins it when nnd where to strike. GrG.ntod th:.1.t an nir observer n<ty occnsi:mr.ly spot n tar~ct of opp)rtuni ty which is of ~renter value thD.n that seen by the :Jround c·.)f.lt;::mder, the l.?.tter unc'.oubtGc~ly knows best wh:1t is h-Jlding up his advance nne should in the n~jority of cnsos qe r..llowed to influence the conduct of his battle. An·)ther serious c~efect lies in the lack of close tiraing between the fires of the air and tho artillery. Upon learning that ~ir was due, or in tho vicinity, the · ['.rtillery inraedi 1. toly suspenC'.ed its firing. so c..s not to _ onc:an:~er the aircraft. And then again for ninutes and s-:Jmetinos h.:mrs after the strike wc.s finishec the artillery liaison officer could not ascertain whether o:c n:-t the air attack was indeed finished. At one crucial tir.1o C'.urin~; tho P.4:.-ce.sk n-o artillery was avnilable for 2 1/2 hours: 15 minutes of wt::ch wore actually consUBcd by an air strike. The need for bettor co')rc1inatbn is ·::>b-.ri::m.s. Tho meth::>ds for achieving then anpo-~ easy enou~h once the throe interested parties--ground, air and ar_tillery comtlandcrs resolve to solve tho problen together.
Groat improvement wns noted·in tho conm~n fuilin~ of bunching-up. Where men did bunch up they soon found tho enemy ill-)l:'t.'J.I's pnying attention to them. Another :;rcr!.t improvement wo.s nJted over previous engngements. The :men all fired their weapons, ~nd nost of them sh)t only aimed fire :J.t known or suspected loc:'.tbns~ Much of this was o.cquircd rapidly through imitation of the eno:r.1y. )nco our r:1en saw that he hold this fire until we were within . sh::>rt 0istancc of hin anc thnt he then )pencd up with sh::>rt bursts of accurate fire-·our nen began c1::>inr; likewise. This is porh::.ps n:Jt the lnst ti:r.Je thrct 11 locrn from your enemies" will be the dictum.
The olc1 precepts "speed not hn.ste" nnd "f.ire r.nd n.ovement" pr-oved to be sound :mes. An :Jl)portunity presented itself cluring this nttack to witness the closest poss1blo substitute to a controlled laboratory experiment. Hills t:.li:nst ic1entical in shnpo rmc1. in desreo of C'cfense were nttncked on alternate cnys by r1ifforont bnttaliJns. )ne bnttnlion juupcd aggressively int::> the nttnck but became disorganized under n:Jrtar fire. Men huddled into groups where S')Dc c::>ncer.lr;1ent but no cover Wf'..S offered, anc only by n great display of cournge by 5 or 6 :r.1en who die~ c.ost of tho firing c.nd ct2rried the brunt of the f'.ttack, was the hill finally assaulted. The charge was not successful an~ the men dug in to the side of the hill to nwuit the fol~ . lowing d~y when by similar actions the hill wns taken, but n~t before a dozen were killed :me'!. throe times thr'.t number were wounded. The succeeding battf'.li-on planned. its att:1ck more deliberately.' 7'ho bntt.a.lion cot1mander took his -c)mpr.ny, cor.nn;mcers f::>rward on rec,)nnc.issance and they in turn 1riented their p1nt::Joi'l ·leaciers. Tho preparatory fires' C'id not differ materially from that of the _prcceedinl$ C1 ay' but ir.Jmedintely afterwl'l.rcs men bego.n aC.vancing as· skirmishers :Jn n broad front. Their fire was continu::>us, nnc't well aimed. M,)rtnr fire claimed several cnsualtios but hit Jnly 'Jno ar two, since there were no conccntrc.tcc1 groups of non. Squ<::ds and plato)ns picked bunkers to ncvance upon ·and noved ~p •Jn _them steadily. WhGn pinneddown close to their objective several men shouted 11 B.wzai 11 , nne ran f'Jrw~rd thr'Jwine r;renndes into the bunker::!'.· -)thers ~imul tanoously closed in, deliveri"lr; narching fire ns they CP.mo. ·- -~· __ ~ o {;;L
-3- /'' ...~.:4-vU/ -
Korean War Project 2ID-00400553
! ·. l
~~ ,. '
_ .,/\EPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' {.·- ' --·~ ~ r '!...__, .-- ·-·- --· ·- ~ _______ ___...;
DECLASSIFIED ~.cJWri.ty · 141 r\1 Q 7 g5/0l
1
: _ay _¢C, fclAAA:O.aieJ!Ja/JJ
Enemy who were not killed or wounded crune running Jut, their hnnds high in the air. )ur.casua.ltios: 0ne killed and five wounded.
The new· repladements reRcted fr.irly true to pn.ttorn: a few performed ~ery well but tho majority would have to learn by experience before the bravery th~.t was in them would be demonstrnted. ·)utstanding deficiencies which need more emphasis in training were their unfnnilirtrily with the sou."ld of friendly supporting fire, (small arms Eillc recoiless ns well as mortar and artillery), ign·.Jrance of tho basic principles of first-aid, unfru:lili8.rity with the autom~tic rifle end the hnnd grenade. As a general rule they were in p1or physiceJ. condition. Although there were s:Jr:1e losses fr·Jm mines and booqy traps, it is the writer's opinion after long so2rching for the key to minimizing casun.l ties fron this cause tbat not r.mch cc.n be c1::mo in training which will help tho unit naking an.attack. Patrol members c~n bo helped considerably by tenching them to disarn mines nnd booby trtlp~, but mine clearing where the r.1inefield is cefended appears to be o. problem which needs to be tackled by basic research.
The handling of prisoners of war, while satisfactory, could h~ve been improvec:. In sJme instrm.ces prisoners were forwarded t:> the Rogiraental onclosure without hn~ing been tagged and in s:>me ct:ses where tags were used the information was in error.
11 2heJ.l Reports 11 subnittod during this action were practicc.lly nil. This is a serious deficiency which needs r1ore cnph;~sis in training. Our troops were subjected to lon~ periods of shelling. It must be stressed that enemy !funs coulc'! probably be silenced by our artillery were there sufficient data n.vn.ilable.
A decided lnck of teleph:me and r~::.dio security w.:;.s noted throughout the action. In nnny instnncea reports of friencrry dispositions a~d planned operations, including anticipr..ted routes of approach, wore given i·n the cle~r over netf.'.llic lines. Sufficient eviconce was gathered to prove that wire-tapping was practiced. The uncanny QCcuracy with which the enemy used his troops and artillery during tho tir.e units were bving relieved indicqtes that there were strJng security leaks in :>ur systen.
Signal C.Jr.nunicntions w0rked well. This wo.s clue in lP.rge part to the tenaciousness f'nd high sense of respJnsibility on tho p'll't of tho wire crews. fu~o, these crews h~d been n.~~cnted prior to the attack by two crews from Divisi-.:m 3lld by two more fron the Mort::-c.r Company. Tho SCR 536, as usual, pr'Jved to be of little w0rth, The pe.rf0rnf'.ncc of the SCR JOO was spotty, due in part to its poor design against wet wecther cono~tions nnd in larger pnrt to the poor qu~lity of batteries ~uppliod.
The battaliJn surge)nS and C:>Iilp.llny'' aid r.icn handled medicc.l evncuation in a superb.m::nner. But nr.1ong .the raen in ranks too little knowledge of firstn,id w:1s eisplayed. In two instances non bled to death who night not have otherwise died had their .c::>mrades known wh<)re and how to apply tournaquets. An0ther serious error devel::>ped: rifleoen of one c::>r.lpn.ny went to the aid of the wounded in such large numbers that at one tiue over half the C.Jiilplll1Y was .eng~ged in carrying or assisting wounded to the rear. More training is requir0d 119 .. indoctrinate men that the wounded are the prablem of the aid men .. It is nfltur.?.l and quite understandable that a· man wants to help his comrnd~.
But he must be impressed with.the c~ncept that it is vitally necessary to keep the ntt1:1.ck r.nving; that only in this way d::>es he assist r.nd hence protect those still fighting. Lack of trained medical rcplnce@ents wns per~ hnps l!!rgely to bl~mo. In order to help overcome this deficiency n 10% over-strength hc.s been assiF.;nod the Hedical C:)z:lpnny n.t the e:;::pense of riflemen to the batt::..J.ions. It is believed that this will serve not only to c.ugment the strength in .:>rder to better cope with peclc loads but will nake 11 greater number ::>f men .?.vailable f·jr centrc.lized trnining in medic~ subjects.
Perhaps the most serious defect of all in medical ovacuatiJn wns the total ineffectiveness of evacuation by helicopter. 'I'ho long hand-carry of ov:tcuees resUlted in tho denth of several persons who raight otherwise have lived. The refusal of helicopter pilots to l~nd (reportecUy becnusc of rarefield atnosphcre at the 3500 ft elevrtbn, as well as for n host of othe::r ren.sons a,iven which cb not to the laymen npper.r.. to be valid) haile made for general dissatisfaction nr.1:mg infantrymen. Tho "pil-Jt 1 s ch·Jicc" whereby the pilot can decide whether or not it is safe to lru1d coos not sit well with the fighting soldier. He would prefer to have higher authority survey the conditions, decide whether or not a reasonable risl: is involved, and then order the pilot to ~o in or stay out accordingly. The reasoning is self-evident--the infc.ntry officer does not have a choice of "safe" or " 11 U."lsn.fe 11 objectives,· his J:J.ind is tmdo up f-::>r him by higher authority. True, the helicopters did transport a nur.2ber of woun(1.ed from tho collecting
-station back t) the roar. But tho loss of lifo occurred during tho long · cnrry tu tho collecting stntion--Jften ns much E.s 24 hours, and not from there -::>n back. It nppenrec1_ th~t speed was less essential in getting a man to ~t~r medical cere once he got ~ care other then that possible on the front line.
The s_uccess of this battle depenclod much rrore than nost on supply. This was recognized ea.rly n.nd the mn.xi:r.mra use of resources locally o.vuiable were sought. As stnted en.rlier, tho Tank Cor:1pnny and large segments of Service Comp:my, Hegir.1ontnl Hea0.quarters Compe .. ny and the battnlion headquarters C)mpnnios were used both to supervise native carriers and to pack-carry supplies thenselvcs. It is hard to .::xplain to those imlividuals why more ndive carriers could not be nade available. This feeling was not one of disse1.tisfnction with their personal lot, but rather CD.r.Je about ns a result of seein~ supplies ina.c,equc.tc c~espito their best offarts to provide then. It is hard to arque the case. For it would appea~ that the trenondous mnnpower potential of South Korea coulc1 be nn.de t'J s-qpply more than the thousllilC!-,')dd carriers who were e.ctunlly avo.ilable. It causes one to w·)ndcr if hi~her headquarters ht!s an appreciation of conditions as they really arc. ' ·
It is es-sential, i'h~ an operation wh~re supply is tho criterion, that n. shrewd C'tlculntion be made as to precisely: whnt i terns ·will be required. A rounc of ammunition which is not needed has cisplaced thnt much weight of more critically needed supplies. Good brain w~rk is required-the suoply officer must knJw the conm.nn.der's plnn in detail down to include the amounts of each type of amr.mni tion :nequired.
Under the pressure of necessity of getting every .:>Ullce of effort out of the K0rean labor several valuable lessons·were learned.
P~.·
Korean War Project 2ID-00400555
- '\ /
!EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ; (·:____ '
' ;·
DECLASSIFIED l\.cJh%.1y: ~1 cJ Q 7 gs;o r
,' /
! B c c:- IJ ... ~A I I'" /(IL :~! .. -: .. ~·. ~~~. ~ate..11.LW..LJ
Performance was highest when the Koreans ~ere closely supervised ~r soldiers whose cuty it WQS t0 guard them, prevent them f~om being C'Jffi~~rl~ered by other American tro:Jps, rmd in;:;1rre that they all returned to the point of origin at the conpletion of eac.h tr:l.p. Ee'iciency wns hi·~hest when dumps were established f'~ong the rente of ::ru·?pJ.y n?pro:dJa<-ltcly two hc·,rr·s apart. C;:.rriers were divic1ed int:> shuttle g::-or:.;,Js x1d ne.de t-wo rcund i.:.rips per day between supply c:tumps. They appeared t'J function bE!st when they were placed on a schedule and eiven regv.b.r h::mrs bqth fJr working U-'rld f·Jr resting. By W•Jrking native labor c.ppr()~iraately eight to ten hours daiJ.y they held up physically 0ver a period .Jf tine. Longer hauls invt:li'inbly lost the laborer's effective:p.ess pernmncntly. It wds found that the Korenn carriers worked best when they coulcl mnintain their ·organizo.ti::mal int.egri ty and when their Korean officers acc:>r.tp::micd them-. Best rost:.lts wec-o aC'hieved w~ero KJreAn of.fice:r.-s were treaterl 1.-Tith respor:t anc~ given n feeling of pres·::.ige. All ap~e.?..I"ed t'J w.Jrk bette!' vhen ttoy wJre Llado to feel tn,_,_t tiwir welfo.re wm: of some concern to tho Arr:er::can cJr.l!'llc,ndcrs. -,Jhere c.rran~oments were oade to p::':'ovido the lt>.b.Jrers with thr?ir own medical cc.:r.·e, bla11kets, and fooc~, .::.nd whore provisi·:ms \-Jere m.~do for drawing n.nd :_:rropcring foad and f.)r providing clothing and equipment the carriers nppec,ood happier and worked better. It seemed that nJ sense of urgon~y or feeling of patr:hotic duty could be instilled; catering to their basic aninml de-sires seemed to got best result~.
/..n unusal feature was the prJvisi•Jn of sand bags in the~irst resupply train, timed to arrive ~~cdiately after the objective was taken. The enemy lived up to the expect3.tion of counter-attackin~, hoping to take back the positions just snatched from him. The bags h2stily filled with rock nnr1 dirt gave the men S'Jmo protection not otherwise ,;,fforG.ed -:in tho r)cky hill tops. Incidontally, individunl snnd bags were found t'J be convenient receptncles in which to carry ammuni tbn nne~ other supplies, thus cJiscarding the extra wei:~ht of the outside packaging a.11d crating. This gave two strings to the bow: not only were the supplies more ·easily h~ndled but the bags themselves were av~.ilable far immediate use. One plnto:m lenDer believes that next time a similnr piece of terrLin has to bo tr~ken the resupply -+:.:'[dn might include s:>me C)mpositiJn 11C11 .;xplosive, which when set 'Jff by hand ~~ronrldes fuzes would bl-,st hasty fox holes for his men.
Emphe.sis <>.nd training in supply discipline bJre fruit. The cleanliness of the 1J.~ttl0 field W·?n prr.ise from tho assistant civisbn CJ1111:1andor; practically no oquipnent was discr.rc'!ecl_. v/oap.)ns, bolts, and holnets of tho wounded wore c::rried back t:> the next rearwe.rd supply (Ur.lps where salvage p:i.les were ostcblished. These piles were evacuated by the ail1IilUnition carriers Jn their return trip. A rep~osentative of the battali'Jn supply office at the nid stati:)n collected watches, binoculars and sir.liler items c~mm?nly lost to tho unit. Some battle losses Qid ~ccur, but the number of i tcms so lost >-mrc remarkably, f~1,of,. . A. prac~ice that neeC!s correcting is tho wasteful hr.~bi t of •Jpening ?- ,gr:eat nui.1ber ::>f cert?ns · containing nJrtar, rec'Jiloss, Pnd small arns ,':1JI'Jnuniti:m. Exp'Jsing llll'go qu~ntities of ruilnun:i.tbn to the W(;)Qther results in n great waste, since the amnunitbn is mace hr...rcler t::> reh~ndle e.nd in many cases is ::bnncbned because of its suspected erratic· performance when wet.
In >:.11, tho bf-'.ttle was vroll fou.csht. The instances Jf ott.tstanding VRlor were lesion. The Re~iment lived up t::> its proud reputation and overcmne gre~t :>bstgcle~ · i.n rJutiJ1g tho enemy fr,Jm the C"',..\nating high gJJuund.
·!?-&f6~1W '\
Korean War Project 2ID-00400556
. 38TH INFANTRY STAFF (AUGUST 51)
CO - - - - - - - - - - - MILDREN, Frank T. - Lt Col - 021992 - Inf
EX Off - - - -·- - - - - ROWNY, Edward L. - Lt Col - 023744 - Inf
. ~1 - ..:. -.- - - - - - - IDJGHES, Daniel F. - Maj - 01285055 - Inf